Statement by the President on the Testing of Nuclear Weapons.

THE AMERICAN government's policy with respect to the testing of large-scale nuclear weapons has been made an issue in the current political campaign.

I regret this fact. The manner in which the issue has been raised can lead only to confusion at home and misunderstanding abroad. There is no subject more difficult than this to discuss before an audience of the whole world--which must include those hostile to us. There is no subject on which the American people should have so united an understanding, free of confusion or partisan differences.

I speak as President, charged under the Constitution with responsibility for the defense and security of our nation.

I therefore must point out the following essentials in our national policy.

One. The testing of atomic weapons to date has been--and continues--an indispensable part of our defense program. The development of these weapons has been a major, if not decisive, deterrent to Communist aggression in past years. And the importance of our strength in this particular field is sharply emphasized by the Communist world's numerical superiority in manpower.

Two. As part of a general disarmament program, the American government, at the same time, has consistently affirmed and reaffirmed its readiness--indeed, its strong will--to restrict and control both the testing and the use of nuclear weapons under specific and supervised international disarmament agreement. This fact is known to every government in the world. It can scarcely be unknown to any informed American citizen.

Three. In terms of our national weapons policy, it is the responsibility of specific officials of the government--notably the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President--to weigh, at all times, the proper emphasis on various types and sizes of weapons, their testing and development. Such emphasis is necessarily subject to constant review and reexamination. This specific matter is manifestly not a subject for detailed public discussion--for obvious security reasons.

In the light of this national policy, I must address myself to certain proposals that have been made over a period of months. I must point out the following facts:

One. There has been more than one proposal made. These proposals have differed. These differences themselves have caused confusion.

On April 21, it was proposed that we give "prompt and earnest attention to stopping further tests of the hydrogen bomb." This was so explicitly to be a one-sided American action that the suggestion was added that, if other nations failed to do likewise, "we can reconsider our policy."

On September 5, reference was made to "my proposal last Spring to halt further testing of large nuclear devices, conditioned upon adherence by the other atomic powers to a similar policy."

On September 20, a new verbal formula urged this country to "take the lead in promoting curtailment by all nations of hydrogen bomb tests."

Two. The unwisdom of such action, without proper international safeguards, was quickly emphasized by the Democratic Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Senator Clinton Anderson. He said: "There is no indication that Russia would stop their tests. Under the circumstances, I do not believe we could call off ours."

The testimony of such a responsible Democrat makes clear that this is not--as it should not be--a partisan political issue, but an issue raised by one individual.

Three. The proposals clearly take no account of what would be the result of stopping our tests. Tests of large weapons, by any nation, may be detected when they occur. But any such test follows many months of research and preparation. This means that elaborate tests could be prepared by another nation without our knowledge. By the time we had such knowledge, our present commanding lead in the field of nuclear weapons could be reduced or even overtaken. Thus our power to guard the peace would be weakened.

Four. The proposals made ignore some essential reasons for these tests.

(A) Our most recent tests have been those that have helped us to know how to make--not primarily weapons for vaster destruction--but weapons for defense of our cities against enemy air attack.

(B) As one important result of our latest tests, we have learned to make weapons which reduce fall-out to a minimum and whose destructive effect can be concentrated upon military objectives.

Five. In the verbal confusion surrounding these proposals, an attempt has been made to cite, as having made "similar proposals," great world figures, even including His Holiness Pope Plus XII. All these men--like this government, like all responsible and thoughtful leaders in the free world, statesmen or churchmen--are sincerely anxious for international agreement allowing effective control of all armaments, nuclear or conventional.

The Pope in his last Christmas message to the world urged "a check on experiments in nuclear weapons by means of an international agreement." He stated that the matter involved "a question of three steps: renunciation of experimentation with atomic weapons, renunciation of the use of such, and general control of armaments." And he called for "the sum total of those three precautions."

Six. Within the past week, yet another proposition has been advanced. This proposition denounced the Government's "insistence" on "perfect" or "foolproof" supervision of disarmament as a "danger" imperiling any possible international agreement.

I must solemnly disagree. I shall continue this insistence for however long I am charged with chief responsibility for the security of our nation.

The danger lies in exactly the opposite direction. It lies in the direction of the vain hope that something less than secure safeguards could justify any curtailment of our power to defend ourselves, our allies, and the free world.

Finally: I reaffirm the steadfast intention of this Government to continue striving ceaselessly to ease the burden of arms upon not just a few nations, but upon all peoples of the world.