Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 2655 - International Cooperation Act of 1989

(House)
(Fascell (D) Florida and 29 others)

The Administration has been seriously engaged over the past year in a major effort, initiated by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to rewrite the authorities of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The task of making substantial changes to legislation first enacted in 1961, and amended annually thereafter, has been an enormous undertaking and one that was long overdue. The Report of the Task Force on Foreign Assistance, co-chaired by Representatives Hamilton and Gilman, was perceptive and basically accurate in its findings and recommendations. The Administration appreciates greatly the efforts of the leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and those of other Members to take a fresh look at the foreign assistance program in order to establish more effective assistance programs, to eliminate obsolete and inconsistent provisions, and to foster greater cooperation between the Congress and the Executive branch. This effort coincides with the President's strong view, expressed to Congressional leaders in April, that the tendency toward legislative micromanagement should be rolled back.

The Administration recognizes that H.R. 2655, as reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, authorizes programs at or near the Administration request levels, authorizes the special assistance initiative for the Philippines, and improves or eliminates many obsolete and inconsistent provisions of current law. Among other things it provides for fair pricing in military sales; makes the Southern Region Amendment permanent; authorizes military assistance to the non-communist Cambodian resistance; revises congressional notification procedures; improves the language and reach of prohibitions on aid as well as administrative procedures that will increase programming efficiency; and eliminates outdated reporting requirements as well as modifying others to make them less burdensome.

The Administration continues to object, however, to provisions that raise serious constitutional concerns and impinge significantly on the ability of the President to conduct foreign policy. If these provisions were included in the bill presented to the President, his senior advisers would recommend that it be disapproved:

• Section 707(b) — this unconstitutional provision could be construed to prohibit, among other things, certain forms of consultation between the United States and other sovereign nations regarding actions such nations may wish to undertake. If a foreign aid recipient were to seek the President's views with respect to its policy of aiding the Nicaraguan resistance, Section 707 would purport to prohibit the President from expressing his concurrence. Any such limitation on the President's authority to discuss certain issues with foreign governments, or to recommend or concur in courses of action taken with their own resources, would pose the gravest constitutional problem.
  
  
• Section 703 greatly restricts the President's ability to work towards peace in El Salvador. It fails to reflect the spirit of greater cooperation between the Congress and the Executive branch envisioned in the Bipartisan Accord on Central America.
  
  
• By shifting $1 billion from Economic Support Assistance to Development Assistance, the bill removes the flexibility provided by economic support assistance to respond to foreign policy exigencies, and inadvisably politicizes the Development Assistance account.

The Administration also urges that several of the most important reform recommendations of the Task Force be incorporated into the bill. Unless these reforms are adopted and other defects in H.R. 2655 are addressed, they could cumulatively result in the President's senior advisers recommending disapproval of the bill:

• The majority of the economic and military assistance funds are earmarked, contrary to the recommendations of the Task Force and the repeated requests of the Administration for increased flexibility in conducting foreign policy. The earmarks and section 5304(b), which exempts the funds for Israel and Egypt from sequestration, should be deleted.
  
  
• Several sections violate the constitutional requirement that legislation go through a process of bicameral passage and presentation to the President before becoming law. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
  
  
• Sections of the bill that (1) mandate unnecessary organizational arrangements, and (2) impose excessive consultation, certification, and reporting requirements are antithetical to the intended new cooperative spirit sought by the Committee leadership and the Administration. Further, we are concerned that the bill infringes on the President's authority to determine foreign policy, to negotiate on behalf of the United States, and to vote on behalf of the United States in international organizations.
  
  
• Section 1303 would require that U.S. commodities purchased with cash transfers under the economic assistance program be shipped on U.S. merchant ships. This provision would significantly reduce the value of U.S. foreign assistance to recipient countries.
  
  
• The bill fails to achieve the Task Force recommendation to focus the economic assistance programs on the four basic objectives of broad based economic growth, poverty alleviation, environmental sustainability, and pluralism. Instead, it contains objectionable, complex policy objectives and programming requirements (sections 1102 and 1201 in Title I, Chapter 2 in Title VII, and Chapter 3 in Title X).
  
  
• Section 1201 is also counter to the Task Force Report's encouragement of programming on a country-by-country basis. This section would require the President to develop and use a plan to achieve specific, statutorily-mandated global goals and target dates for alleviating the worst aspects of poverty. This requirement undercuts the attempt to focus on the four basic objectives of economic assistance.
  
  
• The bill fails to institute the Task Force recommendation for a unified development assistance account, which would enable the Administration to effectively pursue the four basic objectives and allocate funds based on economic performance. The Administration would support an amendment to create a single development assistance account without functional or regional earmarks or other limitations.