Remarks to Reporters About Forthcoming Trip to Austria, the Soviet Union, Iran, and Poland

Ladies and gentlemen:

I understand that almost everybody here is going to leave with us tomorrow for the trip to Austria, the Soviet Union, Iran, and Poland, and to the ones who are not going we are sorry you can't go on this trip and we will report to you when we come back.

I thought it might be useful to give a little background with regard to the trip and perhaps some information that would be helpful to you in covering it. This trip is one which has been in the process of planning going back perhaps over 3 years. You may recall the first time that I had a press conference in the East Room, I was asked about summitry.

At that point I expressed a very dim view of summitry unless it was well planned in advance. I said that because I have memories, as all of you have memories, of some of the summits of the past. I remember what term was used by ladies and gentlemen of the press in describing them. There was the "spirit of Vienna," the "spirit of Geneva," and the "spirit of Glassboro," and the "spirit of Camp David."

What they all added up to was cosmetics, a big feeling of hope in the world and in the United States in particular and then a letdown because there was all froth and very little substance.

This trip is one, and I do not want to overestimate what you may expect to have from it in the way of substance, but it is one primarily directed toward substance rather than toward cosmetics.

We are not taking the trip simply for the purpose of opening a new relationship, as was the case when we went to Peking. That, of course, was enormously important and it was important to go to Peking for that very purpose, if nothing else was served at all--and other things were served, we believe.

In this case, we have had relations with the Soviet Union, as you know, for a number of years. There have been contacts at various levels, Cabinet levels, with the Soviet Union, and we have had meetings between the top Soviet leaders and top American leaders going back over a period of time through World War II and, of course, in the postwar period.

What has happened in the last 3 1/2 years is that we have started a long process in several areas of trying to determine on both sides--it has been mutual on both sides--as to whether a meeting of the leaders at the summit would serve a useful purpose, and that is why we did not make the decision, again a mutual decision, that it would be useful to have such a meeting until just a few months ago.

You will recall that perhaps the single event which brought about the decision on the part of the Soviet leaders and our decision to go to the summit was the success of the understandings on Berlin. We thought if we had made progress in that very critical area for both of us that we should try with some hope of success of making progress in other areas that were also difficult.

Now, in coming to this meeting, I would suggest that it would not be useful to speculate as to what agreements or understandings will come out of it. I would touch on just the three subjects that have been very much written about in the press that will be on the agenda and three subjects, three areas, in which there is a possibility, not a certainty by any manner of means, but a possibility of agreement, provided at the highest level we can break some bottlenecks which still exist.

One, of course, is arms limitation. Considerable progress has been made in this area. There are still some very difficult problems that remain unsolved. We will discuss them directly. I will discuss them directly with Mr. Brezhnev throughout the course of the visit, and we hope that we may be able to reach agreement in this area.

However, on both sides we recognize that we have some difficult problems in which a decision at the top only can bring agreement. We are hopeful, but we do not want to leave the implication that it is certain that we can reach agreement.

The second area is the area of trade. You have all, of course, followed Secretary Butz' trip to the Soviet Union and Secretary Stans', then the trips, of course, that have been made by the Soviet Agricultural Minister and the Soviet Minister of Trade to the United States--their meetings with Mr. Peterson and Mr. Flanigan--and of course, I have had meetings with both of them.

In this area, having just met with Congressional leaders discussing such matters as most-favored-nation and the others, the matter of credits, I would say that the chances for some positive results are good, not certain, but certainly good.

You will be wanting to follow that very closely during the course of our visit there.

A third area that is worth your watching is the area of cooperation in space. In this respect, I was looking over the speech that I made to the Soviet people on television in 1959. I had forgotten that I said it, as a matter of fact, and most things are well forgotten that you have said, but, in any event, I said at that time--those 12 who are here who went to the Soviet Union on that trip will remember--I said let us go to the Moon together.

I would not like to suggest and would not suggest that we are going to discuss, "Let us go to the Moon together, let us go to Mars together." But I do know that considerable progress has been made over the past several months with regard to cooperation in terms of the exploration of space. We are going to try to see a culmination of that progress in this area.

By mentioning these three, I do not mean that they are exclusive. I do mean that they are areas that perhaps offer considerable promise.

As far as other agenda items are concerned, both sides have submitted items for the agenda. The agenda is agreed. It will be primarily bilateral. I emphasize that all of the talks that we have will take place looking to the interests of each country vis-a-vis the other, and not at the expense of or in derogation of any country's interest toward its allies or other countries in the world.

On the other hand, there will be discussion on the agenda on such items as Vietnam and other areas of the world where the United States and the Soviet Union do have sometimes conflicting interests.

I will not go beyond that in discussing those areas because only the results of our conversations will determine whether progress is possible. We are quite far apart, as you know, in several of those areas. I can only say that there will be an open, free, and frank discussion building upon discussions that we have had previously in these areas.

Now a word about the preparation. I mentioned the preparation and I do not want to indicate that it has all been done simply at the Presidential level. I have had, as you know, both by correspondence and through other contacts, a very great volume of exchange of views directly with Mr. Brezhnev. That exchange of views, I think, even though I met him only briefly in 1959, means that both he and I will start, at least, on a basis where we understand what our differences are and therefore will be able to come to grips quickly with the problems that we, and perhaps only we, can solve at the highest level.

In addition to that, the State Department, of course, has had major responsibilities in certain areas; the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, the Science Adviser, our NASA people, a number of others, all have been working toward the time when this meeting would take place.

Having in mind the fact that if we do not succeed and we will not, of course-in reaching agreement in all the areas that will be discussed, we will at least continue the process of negotiation, so that following the summit, there may be not only dialogue but possibly future agreements depending upon what happens at the summit.

Now, with regard to your problems. I know that when you were in Peking it was rather difficult to cover. The reason was, of course, that we did not have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. We did not have, as we have in this instance, an on-going process of negotiation in various levels on which to build. And consequently, I know that from the standpoint of substance day by day until we finally got to the communiqué, that it was very difficult for members of the press to get the hard news, which I know you have to get and that you must get in order to justify your going so far. [Laughter]

In this instance I can inform you that there will be daily briefings. I can also say that in terms of substance, without indicating what will happen in the three areas that I mentioned, or other areas, there will be two very substantive speeches made on my part.

The first night at the dinner in the Kremlin, Chairman Brezhnev, or Secretary Brezhnev I should say, the General Secretary will make a substantive speech, and I will respond with a substantive speech. That will be released in advance so that you will be able to write your stories and then enjoy your dinner.

The other will be on Sunday. On Sunday, I will be speaking on the Soviet television and radio network to the Soviet people. This, of course, brings back memories of 1959. I shall never forget the long period that I worked with Ambassador Tommy [Llewellyn] Thompson, whom you all will remember, on that speech. He said a very interesting thing as I was working on it. He said, "You must think of the fact that what you said is to two audiences-the Soviet audience, the American audience. There are things you could say to the American audience that would not be helpful to the Soviet audience because they have not yet heard a top American official speak to them in this way."

And as we worked on that speech, cut this and added this, and so forth, he gave me one admonition. He said, "This is the first time that a top American official will ever have addressed the Soviet people on radio and television." He said, "Write the speech and make the speech in a way that it will not be the last time."

I think we accomplished that, and in this instance the speech that I will make on Sunday will be directed to the Soviet people, not with any naive attitude that we are going to convince them that all of our policies are right and that everything that they have heard about us is wrong, but simply to give them some observations about what we have found in the Soviet Union and to give them as well as we can a true and accurate picture of the United States, the American people, of the desire that we have, a desire which is shared by the Russian people, a desire for peace in the world and for better relations.

It will be, in other words, a speech directed to the Russian people rather than to the American people. I think, however, most of the American people would approve because this will be the first time the President of the United States has ever spoken to the Russian people by radio and television. I don't want it to be the last time.

As far as other activities are concerned, Mrs. Nixon, as was the case in Peking, will have a very intensive schedule and I am sure you will find it most interesting to follow her on days that we may be closeted in meetings. I would also suggest one other point, that there will be, in this instance, plenary sessions, probably two plenary sessions, and then we will have parallel conversations.

My conversations will be with the General Secretary, Mr. Brezhnev, or with others that he may add from time to time from his own personal staff in addition to the plenary sessions. And Secretary Rogers will be meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko. We will divide the work, and in some instances, we, of course, will be discussing the same problems.

This way, with the amount of work that we do have, we feel we can cover a massive amount of material that is before us.

Eight days seems a long time, and it will be a long time, I can assure you, from the standpoint of your own workload. But we could really take 8 days to consider even one of the subjects that I have mentioned-SALT, commercial relations, even space--and so we are cramming a great deal of work into a relatively brief period of time. We think that that, however, can be quite useful.

In mentioning, incidentally, our visit to the Soviet Union, I want you all not to overlook the fact we are going to Iran. I know you will enjoy our visit there. I consider it very important to go to Iran to return a visit that the Shah made here, to show America's friendship and our close association with this strong friend of the United States in that part of the world.

We will be going to Austria, stopping there for tomorrow and Sunday, and I look forward to going back there, having had the opportunity to see Austria in 1956 and being back on other occasions as well.

And then, of course, our trip will conclude with a visit to Poland.

I would advise that in all of these areas, to the extent you can--as you will in the Soviet Union--if you can find time from your work, do some sightseeing, because they are all great cities, extremely interesting, and I just wish I had the time to do a little sightseeing myself.

Now, one little personal note. On trips like this, virtually everybody who is going for the first time asks me, "Now, what would you advise that we see?"

Well, naturally you want to see the Kremlin. You ought to see the university; you ought to see certainly one of the great industrial plants in Moscow, the magnificence of the gardens and the former Czar's Palace in Leningrad, and so forth.

But one place that may not have occurred to you that I would urge, if you have the time, to get a real feel of the new Soviet Union and the old Russia, is to go to the marketplace. I have always gone there on all four of my trips. You will find the Russian people extremely friendly when they know you are from the United States, and extremely interested, asking many questions about our country, and you will get a flavor there you can't get in the GUM department store, which is also very much worth going to see, too.

I don't have stock in either one--neither do they. [Laughter] It is a different system.

Let me just close my remarks with one final thought. Everybody in this Government has worked extremely hard on this trip over the past months--some for years: the SALT delegation, our State Department people, the people in the other departments that I have mentioned, the White House Staff. Dr. Kissinger, of course, has made an enormous contribution with the trip that he has made to the Soviet Union, in talking to Mr. Brezhnev and the other Soviet leaders. It is basically one where we are all going with one common purpose, and that is to attempt to establish a different relationship, one in which there will still be very significant differences--we must always remember this--in philosophy and in approach and so forth, but one in which two great powers, each looking to its interests, decides that in certain areas we should work together rather than against each other.

I think that in terms of trying to give you the flavor of what to expect, I would not raise hopes too high, because there are some knotty problems left to be solved. What will determine whether they will be solved will be the attitude of the Soviet leaders, and our attitude as well.

I can say this: That from the correspondence that I have had, the contacts I have had directly with and from Mr. Brezhnev in the last few days, his attitude is positive. Mine is positive.

Mr. Dobrynin came up to Camp David yesterday and brought me a personal message from Mr. Brezhnev, raising some questions that we had to discuss, but also indicating a positive attitude toward attempting to resolve some of these differences, so that when we do meet at the summit, it will not simply be one of those spirits that comes and goes, but there will really be some substance that remains, one which will mean that the American people and the Russian people will have a more friendly relationship as people to people, despite differences in philosophy and government, and in which, perhaps-and I would hope this beyond everything else--the cause of peace would be served.

Perhaps I can best describe it with a story that Mr. Brezhnev told Dr. Kissinger when he was there. Mr. Brezhnev was expressing his desire for making some progress at the summit--not just talking, not just agreeing to disagree, not just putting out the usual communiqué which papers over all differences--and he said it was important to take a step. He said, not just a little step, but a step that is significant in the relations between our two countries, because that will tell us where we are going.

And then he told what for Mr. Brezhnev is one of his favorite Russian stories. He said there was a tradesman from a town who was walking in the woods one day, and he came to a fork in the road. He saw the sign leading to a village, and decided to go toward that village. He saw a woodsman at the fork of the road, and he said, "How long will it take me to reach the village?"

The woodsman said, "I don't know." The tradesman couldn't believe him. He thought he was being just totally obnoxious, because he knew that he lived in this area; he knew he had to have been to the village.

So the tradesman started off down the road, and after he had walked a few steps, the woodsman said, "It will take you 15 minutes." He turned around, "Why didn't you tell me that in the first place?" He said, "I had to see how long your steps were."

So we are taking a step here. How long the steps will be, you ladies and gentlemen will have to evaluate. We hope that it can be a significant step. It will not end all differences, but it could mean certainly that the United States and the Soviet Union, building on this very careful structure that we have developed over the past, could have a constructive relationship in which both great nations will use their influence, not only between each other, but in other areas of the world where we have influence, to discourage aggression, and to encourage the forces of peace.

This is our goal. We trust and hope that it will be, too, the Soviet goal, because for these two great nations to come in conflict, either directly, or to be drawn into conflict because of disputes in other parts of the world where they are indirectly affected, is a threat to the peace of the world which none of us can certainly look forward to without very great concern.

So my remarks deliberately are not with the overblown rhetoric for which you have properly criticized me in the past. [Laughter] This is a trip with very sober objectives. I intend to be very sober, but you don't have to be. [Laughter]

Thank you.