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Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of Their Delivery

January 14, 1994

President Clinton and President Yeltsin, during their meeting in Moscow on January 14, 1994, agreed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems represents an acute threat to international security in the period following the end of the Cold War. They declared the resolve of their countries to cooperate actively and closely with each other, and also with other interested states, for the purpose of preventing and reducing this threat.

The Presidents noted that the proliferation of nuclear weapons creates a serious threat to the security of all states, and expressed their intention to take energetic measures aimed at prevention of such proliferation.

—Considering the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the basis for efforts to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, they called for its indefinite and unconditional extension at conference of its participants in 1995, and they urged that all states that have not yet done so accede to this treaty.

—They expressed their resolve to implement effective measures to limit and reduce nuclear weapons. In this connection, they advocated the most rapid possible entry into force of the START I and START II treaties.

—They agreed to review jointly appropriate ways to strengthen security assurances for the states which have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons and that comply strictly with their nonproliferation obligations.

—They expressed their support for the International Atomic Energy Agency in its efforts to carry out its safeguards responsibilities. They also expressed their intention to provide assistance to the Agency in the safeguards field, including through joint efforts of their relevant laboratories to improve safeguards.

—They supported the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and agreed with the need for effective implementation of the principle of full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition for nuclear exports with the need for export controls on dual-use materials and technology in the nuclear field.

—They reaffirmed their countries' commitment to the conclusion as soon as possible of an international treaty to achieve a comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions and welcomed the decision to begin negotiations at the conference on disarmament. They declared their firm intention to provide political support for the negotiating process, and appealed to other states to refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions while these talks are being held.

—They noted that an important contribution to the goal of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would be made by a verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and by the most rapid conclusion of an international convention to this effect with the widest possible participation of states and on a non-discriminatory basis.

—They agreed to cooperate with each other and also with other states to elaborate measures designed to prevent the accumulation of excessive stocks of fissile materials and over time to reduce such stocks.

—They agreed to establish a joint working group to consider: —including in their voluntary IAEA safeguards offers all source and special fissionable materials, excluding only those facilities associated with activities having direct national security significance; —steps to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reduction of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of putting a portion of fissionable material under IAEA safeguards. Particular attention would be given to materials released in the process of nuclear disarmament and steps to ensure that these materials would not be used again for nuclear weapons.

—The Presidents also tasked their experts to study options for the long-term disposition of fissile materials, particularly of plutonium, taking into account the issues of nonproliferation, environmental protection, safety, and technical and economic factors.

—They reaffirmed the intention of interested organizations of the two countries to complete within a short time a joint study of the possibilities of terminating the production of weapon-grade plutonium.

—The Presidents agreed that reduction of the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear materials is a high priority, and in this context they noted the usefulness of the September 1993 Agreement to cooperate in improving the system of controls, accounting, and physical protection for nuclear materials. They attached great significance to further joint work on the separate but mutually connected problems of accounting for nuclear materials used in the civilian and military fields.

Both Presidents favored a further increase in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

—As the heads of the countries that have the world's largest stockpiles of chemical weapons, they acknowledged particular responsibility for eliminating the threat posed by these weapons. In this context, they declare their resolute support for the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and their intention to promote ratification as rapidly as possible and entry into force of the Convention not later than 1995.

—To promote implementation of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, they welcomed the conclusion of the implementing documents for the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and agreed to conclude work in as short a time as possible on the implementing documents for the Bilateral Agreement on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons.

—The Presidents reaffirmed their desire to facilitate the safe, secure, timely, and ecologically sound destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation and the United States. They applauded the joint Chemical Weapons Destruction Work Plan recently concluded between the two countries which leads the way for the United States to provide an additional $30 million in assistance to support an analytical chemical laboratory in Russia to facilitate chemical weapons destruction. The United States also agreed to consider appropriate additional measures to support Russia's chemical weapons destruction program.

—They reiterated the importance of strict compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons and of continued implementation of measures in accordance with the Russia-America-British Statement of September 1992, which provided inter alia for the reciprocal visits of facilities and meetings between experts in order to ensure confidence in the compliance with the Convention.

—They supported convening a special conference of the states' parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons in order to consider measures that would contribute to transparency and thereby confidence in compliance with the Convention and its effectiveness. The Presidents expressed the determination of their countries to cooperate with each other in preventing the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.

—They welcomed the conclusion of the Bilateral Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Export of Missile Equipment and Technologies, signed in September 1993, noted the importance of this Agreement for ensuring mutually beneficial cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in the field of space exploration, and agreed to collaborate closely in order to ensure its full and timely implementation.

—The U.S. welcomed Russia's intention to join the Missile Technology Control Regime and undertook to cooperate with Russia in facilitation its membership at an early date. The Russian Federation and the United States of America are certain that further improving the MTCR, including the prudent expansion of membership, will help reduce the threat of proliferation of missiles and missile technologies in the regional context as well. The Presidents of the two countries agreed that, in addition to strengthening global norms of nonproliferation and working out agreements to this effect, close cooperation is essential in order to develop policies on nonproliferation applicable to specific regions posing the greatest risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

—They agreed that nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would represent a grave threat to regional and international security, and decided that their countries would consult with each other on ways to eliminate this danger. They called upon the DPRK to honor fully its obligation under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in connection with the Treaty, and to resolve the problems of safeguards implementation, inter alia, through dialogue between IAEA and DPRK. They also urged full and speedy implementation of the Joint Declaration of the ROK and the DPRK on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

—They support efforts to reach agreement on the establishment of a multilateral forum to consider measures in the filed of arms control in nonproliferation that could strengthen security in South Asia. They call on India and Pakistan to join in the negotiation of and become original signatories to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions and the proposed Convention to Ban Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Explosives and to refrain from deploying ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to each other's territories.

—They agreed that the U.S. and Russia, as co-chairs in the Middle East peace process, would actively promote progress in the activity of the working group for Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East, striving for speedy implementation of confidence-building measures and working toward turning the Middle East into a region free of weapons of mass destruction, where conventional forces would not exceed reasonable defense needs.

—They firmly supported the efforts of the UN Special Commission and the IAEA to put into operation a long-term monitoring system of the military potential of Iraq, and called upon Iraq to comply with all UN Security Council resolutions.

NOTE: An original was not available for verification of the content of this communique.

William J. Clinton, Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of Their Delivery Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project

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