Interview With the President Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Senior Editors on Latin American Affairs.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, it puts me at quite a disadvantage to follow Dr. Brzezinski in describing what our overall policy is, or even the details of Nicaragua. I think all of you have a wonderful opportunity to learn about an exciting subject. And I'm sure that many of you bring long years of experience and study to our own relationships with Latin America and about that region in general.

ADMINISTRATION POLICIES

When I came to the White House as President, I had a longstanding interest in the nations in this hemisphere to the south. My wife and I both studied Spanish in college, and we had made some trips to seven or eight of the Latin American countries while I was Governor and before I became involved in public affairs.

We tried to learn from past mistakes to see what achievements had been realized by Presidents Roosevelt and Johnson, Kennedy and others who had been successful in improving relations with the southern part of our hemisphere during their terms of office. We instituted, after very detailed analyses, some long-range proposals that we thought were needed and also well advised. We didn't want to come out with another special slogan, because I think one of the most important elements that has been missing in the past is the realization that the Latin American countries and the Latin American people are individuals.

It would be a mistake for anyone to look upon Canadians and citizens of Mexico and citizens of the United States as being a homogeneous group. And the diversity in Latin America, the Caribbean, is just as wide. So, what we attempted to do was not only to focus our own attention on peoples and countries as individuals but actually to treat them as such in our public expressions of interest and in our detailed negotiations with them on matters of importance to them.

This was spelled out fairly clearly in some speeches that I made at the Organization of American States and in my visits to the countries involved.

We also began to study some of the problems that still remain from the past. One of the important concerns that we had was the rapid escalations in commitments for weapons in South and Central America, the Caribbean.

We have tried as best we could to put an absolute lid on proliferation of nuclear explosives in this hemisphere, other than those that we ourselves retain for the defense of the hemisphere. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is one on which we've invested a great deal of effort. And we are now approaching the point where all of the Latin American countries involved, and the European and Eastern European countries who have a direct relationship, will also have espoused this commitment not to have nuclear weapons be located within this tremendous and important region of our world. It'll be the first region if we secure the remaining endorsements of the treaty—shortly from, perhaps, Argentina.

The effort that was made at Ayacucho several years ago to restrain the purchase of conventional weapons has also been supported by us. President Perez and I and others have talked about this at length. And I believe this is another step in the right direction.

We've tried to encourage the settlement of boundary disputes, not as an intervener or even a mediator in some respects, but we've had meetings with the leaders involved, tried to bring them together in regional groups, add the services of the OAS and the United Nations on occasion to resolve these disputes by peaceful means. And I don't know of any heated dispute at this point anywhere in our hemisphere concerning boundaries themselves, unless perhaps it's between us and Canada on the fisheries disagreement off the coast of Maine. [Laughter]

I have personally met with 20 heads of state in this hemisphere. And this shows the degree of my interest and the degree of time that I invest in this effort, because it's very important for me, before I meet with the chief of a nation, to know as much as I can about his people and the problems and past history and interrelationships, diplomatic exchanges that have taken place or might take place in the future. But it's been a very productive thing for me.

The biggest cancer that was growing that threatened to destroy our relationship with all the nations to the south was the Panama Canal treaties. We looked upon and look upon the building of the Panama Canal as one of the greatest engineering achievements of all times; as a very benevolent thing that we did, not only for the benefit of ourselves but for the nations in Latin America, and indeed, all the world. And that's true.

But the times have passed when .a major nation like ours could, in effect, control permanently territory that divided two parts of a sovereign nation from one another. And this negotiation had been going on 14 years. Although my predecessors had better political judgment than I did and delayed it until the next one took over, but— [laughter] —we decided to address it.

At the time, as you may have noticed, a public opinion poll by the Foreign Affairs Institute done by Gallup showed that only 8 percent of the American people favored the consummation of the Panama Canal Treaty. It was the most difficult political undertaking of my life, including even my campaign for the Presidency itself. And to achieve a twothirds vote in the Senate on a matter that has no positive political benefit, but a lot of very negative political repercussions in some States, was a remarkable display of courage on the part of the U.S. Senate.

We still have a way to go. All our problems have not been resolved yet, even concerning the Canal treaties. But we've laid the groundwork now for a new image of the United States among all of our Latin American friends.

The other thing I would like to mention in particular is the human rights issue. I think it would be a mistake for me or anyone else in our country to try to take credit for the changes that have been made. But I do think that we have helped to dramatize the importance of basic human rights in the dealing of all leaders, in our country and other nations of the world, particularly in Latin America, towards the constituents who have to trust them for the nations' guidance.

In the past, as you know, there have been gross violations of human rights in some of those countries, and also gross violations of human rights in our own country. We've made some progress since the early sixties and fifties in removing some of these embarrassing elements of our own societal structure. And we've been trying to promote the same sort of evolutionary improvements among our friends in Latin America, with a great deal of success.

The Convention on Human Rights of the GAS—we signed it after I became President. At that time, I think we only had two signatories. Now we have 13, enough to put it into effect. The allocation of budget funds and staff for the preservation or enhancement of human rights under the GAS has been tripled just in the last few months.

There's a strong move toward the democratization of governments in Latin America among those that are very stable, among those, as you know, that are not quite so stable.

We've tried to devote some attention to the Caribbean, almost for the first time, on a multinational basis. We formed a Caribbean group of about 30 nations, the primary thrust being to provide limited financial aid for economic development. Many of these tiny island nations are not physically capable of taking care of their own needs. And they need long-term loans, sometimes soft loans, and this is one area where we try to take the lead.

I have personally encouraged my friend Pierre Trudeau to show more interest in Latin American affairs. As you know, Canada is not part of the GAS. I wish they were. But I think Prime Minister Trudeau has demonstrated, with his active involvement in the Caribbean group and other matters, that he is indeed interested.

When we signed the Panama Canal treaties he came here. And we've had a very good, improving relationship with Canada which can be an important element in this hemisphere to benefit the programs that I've outlined to you very briefly.

Zbig, I don't know what you said about Nicaragua. It is better not to have any direct comment from me, because we are trying through peaceful means to resolve the possible suffering that might take place in the future, to put an end to the suffering that's already taken place in Nicaragua. We want a stable government there. We don't want to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign country.

We are trying to work with our friends and well-meaning neighbors of Nicaragua to perhaps mediate the disputes. And I think that this is a worthy goal. We are using, to a maximum degree, the Organization of American States as a vehicle whenever possible. We've got several delegates down there, in addition to our regular ambassadorial staff, to try to bring some resolution of this difficult question.

But those are a few comments that come to mind. There may be some things that affect you.

QUESTIONS

DRUG CONTROL

Q. Mr. President, in South Florida-since you're not going to talk very much about Nicaragua—we're concerned about the drug traffic, which we seem to be the chief landing point. We also have a feeling that the Carter administration is not taking all of the steps that should be taken to stop this flow of traffic. And my question to you, sir, is do you have any plans to try to work out some sort of agreement with the countries that are the source of some of these drugs?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, we've already done a great deal, never enough in the case of drugs. When I became President, just a short time ago—sometimes it seems like a long time ago— [laughter] —about 90 percent of the heroin coming into this country was obtained from Mexico. And under the extremely able administration of Dr. Peter Bourne, working with Mr. Bensinger ¹ and others, we worked out an agreement with President Lopez Portillo, the new President of Mexico, to actually eliminate the poppy fields, which were the source of heroin for our hemisphere.

¹ Peter B. Bensinger, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration.

That's been almost completely eliminated, the heroin sources in Mexico—with aerial photographs, infrared, that shows the location of poppy fields, with the very good cooperation for the first time, really in an all-out effort along with Mexico to destroy the poppy fields once they are found, to try to shift the small farmers in the high altitude regions above 3,000 feet elevation to alternate sources of income, away from the poppies that were formerly used for heroin. This has been successful.

At the same time, we tried to restrict the shift of drug production, not just from heroin to something else but to reduce it overall. We've still got a serious problem with marijuana. I think we've intercepted-over 17,000 pounds? 1,700 to 17,000 [1,700,000],² I've forgotten which—I saw the figures this morning-of marijuana in the last 8 months, more than any 2-year period in history.

² White House correction.

We do still have a problem of cocaine. As you know, the coca leaves are produced in nations to the south of Colombia. Much of it is processed in .Colombia, and that's been a major avenue of drugs. But we've had good cooperation now from the Colombian Government. We are forming alliances with them, actually signing documents that share responsibility. We provide some technical assistance, some helicopter services, a free exchange of information between our authorities and theirs. We've had very good, unprecedented cooperation at the top level.

But narcotics control is a major element of our relationship with the Latin American countries. They all see it as the most threatening source of corruption and even destruction of their own governmental society. And I've had long talks with President Lopez Michelsen and others, in Colombia and Mexico and different countries about this subject.

EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS; CUBA

I might say—looking at my notes-there are a couple of things that I forgot to mention.

One is that we've tried to remove the problem of prisoner exchange. And we've already signed, I think, exemplary treaties with Mexico and Bolivia, so that if Americans are incarcerated in their prisons or their nationals are in our prisons, we can exchange those prisoners if the prisoners have no objection. This is a pattern that I think might be very well emulated in other countries around the world. We're trying now to do the same thing in Turkey, for instance. And this is another step forward.

And the other thing is a very sensitive issue that perhaps I ought not even bring up, and that's Cuba—a very serious problem for us, our relationship with Cuba.

We have opened an interests section in Havana; they have one here—not diplomatic relations at all, but it gives us an avenue of communications. And on occasion we do have our top officials meet with Cuban officials to try to work out some humanitarian projects.

There have been several hundred Cubans who have been released now; many of them have already arrived in our country. This is being done in negotiations through the State Department, administered through the Justice Department, and these are citizens with joint nationality. And there will be a large number of Cuban prisoners released before long. And we're trying to do this as a step in the right direction.

Obviously, the Cubans' heavy military presence and unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of African countries has been a major obstacle to any further progress.

But that kind of rounds out the things that I wanted to discuss.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

Q. Mr. President, both in the conversations with some of your junior colleagues who met with us this morning and in the broadest context Dr. Brzezinski very loosely sketched for us today, cited again as a premise for assessment this absolutely transcendent factor of the trans- mutation of the world economy. People toss around phrases like "the need to redefine comprehensive international comparative advantage"—OECD comes up with "positive adjustment measure," which means progressive transference of primacy of certain industries, LDC's and so on.

This is really a question about the domestic cognates, since domestic and international are really opposite, different ends of the same poles. Question: Are we at a point where we need a comprehensive domestic strategy and articulation of the responsibilities we must go through as our part of this transformation, rather than picking out a trade adjustment here and putting down an interest pressure there? Do we need it so that there's a context of understanding to which we can all have reference as we must address this and make adjustments in our lives as well as in particular?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think the answer to that question is that the developing nations of the world are much more committed to an all-encompassing, new international economic order. And the developed nations of the world are much more reticent about committing ourselves to that undefined premise that might put constraints or obligations on us that we don't presently envision.

We obviously want to increase trade with the less developed countries. We want to see them get a fair and stable price for raw materials. We want to make sure that the balance-of-trade items that concern us as a tiny part of our own economy are not devastating, because they are the major part of the smaller countries' economies. We are trying to be sure that when we make decisions on sensitive items in our own Nation, like sugar or beef or tin or copper, that these decisions don't disrupt completely the economies of countries that are heavily dependent on that item. That's what I mean by what I just described.

A common fund is a phrase that's been discussed a great deal. I think we would cautiously approach a common fund if it means the pooling of several items so that you could constrain wild fluctuations in prices and supplies. But for heavy additional allocation of money to a fund from the developed countries, it would be in effect administered by the developing nations, is something that we are reluctant to do.

We have tried, however, to increase our bilateral allocation of aid to these countries, recognizing that it's not just a handout; it's a very good investment for us in the future.

We've encouraged our own industrial leaders to explore opportunities for investment in other countries, particularly in areas where it's not highly competitive with American jobs, when the unemployment rate is high here.

We've tried to increase our allocation of funds to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and have actually created the Caribbean Group, a 30-nation organization, to help with economic development.

So, I think your question is an excellent one. The answer is complicated, because we feel that it's best to address these matters on a multifaceted basis rather than just giving a general commitment to the type of aid that, I would guess, is still not clearly defined in the minds of those who demand it. We don't want to have a breach of friendship in the future, because the expectation is much higher for the future than we ever intended when we made a cautious commitment.

It's a difficult subject. It's one that we haven't adequately addressed. And there's still a diversity of opinion among the developed countries of the world.

When—to close my answer—when I was in Bonn this year, we all promised that next year's economic summit, which might possibly be in Japan, sometime in the late spring, that this would be one of the top items on our agenda. And that is a very significant thing, because as we prepare for an economic summit, we literally do months and months of staff work, Cabinet-level work, and then I, myself, do a lot of work just to understand the question.

So, I'll be thoroughly schooled in it as a student before we get there. And I think this will open an avenue whereby the seven major developed countries in the Western World can be prepared to cooperate better in the future.

Maybe one more question.

CAMP DAVID MEETING

Q. Do you have any plans to apply your Camp David techniques to the solution of some of the Caribbean and Latin problems?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I don't. I had a meeting with some other editors earlier, and they asked me if I would get George Meany and Mr. Fitzsimmons and several others and go to Camp David and spend a few weeks to resolve the inflation problem. I told them that was a fate worse than death. [Laughter] I never had seen a time when I wanted to leave Camp David and come back to Washington until this past Sunday. [Laughter]

But, no, I think that would be a very rare thing. It was an extraordinary time. I think you can see, as editors, in the aftermath of Camp David the disruption of a legitimate exploration for differences. And I don't say that in a critical fashion.

But at Camp David we tried to get people to be cooperative and not to publicize differences, but to search for a common ground on which we could build an agreement. If I or Begin or Sadat had had a press conference daily while we were at Camp David, the conference, in my opinion, wouldn't have lasted 2 days, because there had to be a removal of appealing to the public.

And as you well know, both Begin and Sadat were extremely courageous in taking stands quite .different from what they had espoused in the past, some of which were highly controversial and might be disapproved by those who had trusted them with leadership.

I think they both are very good and courageous people. But the enclosed nature of the Camp David environment is one that in the future I prefer to enjoy by myself with my wife. [Laughter]

Thank you very much. I enjoyed it.