Remarks at the Eighth National Conference on International Economic and Social Development.

Governor Kerner, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Dillon, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Ribicoff, Senator Humphrey, distinguished Members of Congress, Mr. Black, Mr. Day, ladies and gentlemen:

I was most anxious to come here today because I think that the work that you are doing and effort that you are making represents a fulfillment of your responsibilities as citizens at the highest level.

There is no work in which you could be engaged in these days that is more important to the welfare of your country, to the security of the cause of freedom. There is no work, probably, more thankless, there is no work, probably, that may be less appreciated, but I hope the very fact that all those matters may be true gives you a sense of satisfaction. The easy work and the popular work, I think, can be left to many hands. But this work requires the effort of committed and dedicated citizens. So I was extremely anxious to come here today to express my appreciation to you for the effort that you have made, and the hope the work in which you are engaged will be understood by our fellow citizens across the country; that from this meeting a new understanding of this great national commitment and effort will pass through the country so that in the coming weeks we'll be able to commit ourselves to a program in the coming months and years that will give us a greater degree of security.

As I said in my speech the other night, I cannot understand those who are the most vigorous in wishing to stem the tide of communism around the world and who are at the same time bombarding the Congress and the Administration with attacks on this program. We all get used to paradoxes, but I must say that in all my political life that is one of the most extreme. This is a program which does offer hope of stemming the advance. I know of no program at the present time other than those that go to the actual military security of the United States and the strengthening of the Armed Forces of this country that offer a comparable return. And therefore we should recognize the close identification of this effort--the effort to protect those societies which wish to be free--because it involves directly our own security.

This is not an effort even though it brings about beneficial results and fulfills responsibilities that we have as human beings to those who are less fortunate, this is a program that involves very importantly the security of the United States. And it is therefore, in my opinion, a program that deserves the support of every American who recognizes the real nature of the struggle in which we're engaged.

Now I know that there are those who are tired of carrying what they regard as a burden-and it is a burden. But if they say that, then they mean they're tired of the struggle. And the struggle is reaching its climax in the sixties. And as I am not tired of the struggle, and you're not tired of the struggle, and this country isn't tired of the struggle, we should be willing to pay and bear our burdens in this regard for a longer period of time. And if we are tired of it, then we should recognize the implication of that fatigue.

In 1952, when foreign aid was developed in this scale it was regarded as a period of transition and trial. In 1952, the Communists were seeking to expand their influence primarily through military means. In 1952, the United States was concerned about Korea-type control and invasions with actual military forces. Now, however, we have seen an entirely different concept, which the Communists have very frankly and generously explained to us at great length: Mr. Khrushchev's speech in January--he reiterated it again in Vienna--the so-called war of liberation, which is not the Korean type of war, where an armed force of one side passes across en masse the frontier of another country, but instead the seizure of power internally by what he considers the forces of liberation but which are, as we know in many cases, forces which are Communist controlled and which are supported from outside the country, but which are internal in their operation. It is for these reasons and because of this change in the Communist strategy which they believe offers them the best hope of success that this work is more important today than it's ever been before.

I think that we should recognize that the efforts to seize power in these countries, particularly those that are bordering the periphery of the Communist bloc, can be stemmed only--particularly in those countries where poverty and ignorance and illiteracy are the order of the day--can be stemmed only by one thing. And that is governments which are oriented and directed towards assisting the people and identified with causes which mean a better life for the people of those countries.

Quite obviously we cannot stem any tide which is inevitable. But I do not believe it inevitable that the governments in those areas should adopt policies which are reactionary. I think it's inevitable that they will adopt policies which are progressive and I think we should assist them. If we're not prepared to assist them, then quite obviously they cannot carry this burden, in many cases, by themselves. And if we're not prepared to assist them, whatever efforts they make will be doomed to failure. So I think that what we want to see in these areas are governments which are concerned with the life of their people, which are making a genuine effort, which are making and putting forward programs which over a period of time promise a better life for the people. And then we should be prepared to play our part and that is what we are suggesting in this program, and that in my opinion is in the best interest of our country at this time.

Now I know it's possible to go through foreign aid in the past and show the mistakes that have been made. But as Hubert Humphrey and all of us know, who've been through this, we can go through any section of the Government and show where mistakes have been made in the past and where money has been wasted. It isn't just in foreign aid. It is difficult to spend the people's money in an effective way, always wisely, always with judgment, always with integrity, and we find errors which have been made in many sections of governmental spending in the past. The Hoover commissions were only one indication of things that they unveiled in waste in Government. It's done every day in the military establishment, in the White House, in the Congress. There is waste. There's waste in our private expenditures. What we've got to do is to try to make sure that there is as little waste as possible, that we have the best people directing these programs that we can; that we do it as well as we can.

When I talked with Ambassador Bunker who is in India and who has a distinguished record there, the other day, and he said he did not believe in his long experience as head of one of the most important companies in the United States--he did not believe that he had ever seen money as usefully and as wisely spent as the American assistance which he saw in India. We can show the obvious examples of the waste but we can show many, many countries which if we had not helped them in the past 10 years would have long ago collapsed. My trip through Western Europe indicates the extraordinary success of one facet of this program.

Now I think if we're going to talk about the mistakes we should also talk about the successes. Western Europe is an obvious one, and there are others. The effort we made in India, that we're making in Pakistan, have also been most helpful. There isn't any doubt in my mind that if we had not played a role in other countries, in the Middle East, in Asia, and in Southeast Asia, and up through the Island chain, the countries would have collapsed.

So that you may say that Laos is an unfortunate example, and perhaps it was, and perhaps it is, and perhaps the money was not wisely spent; and there have been other examples. But I can show you also examples of countries that would today be Communist dominated if it had not been for this effort, and I think we should consider the program in totality--even though we must recognize that mistakes have been made in the past and that a real effort is being made in this program to improve it. First, we are attempting to reorganize the agency so that there is one man in charge of all the aid programs in each country, who will have the responsibility instead of the present duplication. Secondly, we're attempting to reorganize so that we get in personnel. We are going to attempt to borrow them from some of our most successful companies. We're attempting to recruit them from all parts of the United States. And anyone of talent and experience in this field who wishes to serve is invited now to join us in a position which may not have great public acclaim, but which will make a measurable contribution in this area. And thirdly, we are attempting, and we think this most important, to provide long-range financing for this program. If we say to a country which is attempting an economic program, "If you do such and so over a period of 5 years, devote so much to public investment; do so much in tax reform, do so much in agriculture and all the rest, then we are prepared to support you year-by-year to the amount of X assistance." Now, that's far better than our being able to say, "Well, we can do this in 12 months, and after that we don't know if we can do anything." What incentive is there for them to devote a percentage of their national income to a particular area unless they're sure that we are going to play a supporting role.

Mr. Black in the World Bank has seen the effectiveness of this kind of long-range planning on a responsible basis, which has been the secret of the World Bank success. And no bank could function either locally or through the world if it only loaned for 12 months on any program which required a 5 or 10 year development period. So that I think that the Congress will have under the proposal we've suggested great authority in case the money is in any way wasted. They continue to maintain their control of it. But they do, I think--would permit us under this program to provide a more effective use of the taxpayers' money.

And let me say finally, that since my return from abroad, I've found in Washington and about the country a desire to do something to stop the spread of communism, to bolster the cause of freedom, to exercise initiative in world affairs; and I've heard talk about new military commitments and troop deployments, and there have been extra funds to be made available to our military purposes. But all of this is important. But the so-called war of liberation which Mr. Khrushchev has described cannot be stopped by a new B-58 squadron. They cannot be deterred--these internal movements cannot be deterred by military guarantees. They cannot for the most part be resisted by American intervention in the absence of outside Communist troop intervention.

I therefore urge those who want to do something for the United States, for this cause, to channel their agencies behind this new foreign aid program to help prevent the social injustice and economic chaos upon which subversion and revolt feed; to encourage reform and development; to stabilize new nations and weak governments; train and equip the local forces upon whom the chief burden of resisting local Communist subversion rests. Those who oppose foreign economic and military assistance should know that the Communists do not oppose it; that their aid to less-developed countries is rising sharply; that they have already sent some 8,000 technicians into these areas; that they make credits available on a long-term basis without subjecting the recipient country to the perils of annual legislative review. Even in our own hemisphere, Communist bloc aid is dangled before the eyes of those who have long been devoted to freedom but have longed for an end to their poverty. We've read in recent weeks about the proposal which grandiosely states, but which is somewhat incompletely filled in--but at least it is proposed--to give Bolivia a loan of $150,000,000, a steel mill with supporting equipment--in our own hemisphere, by the Soviet Union. In short, there's no point in speaking out against the spread of communism unless we are willing to do our part in giving those who are fighting communism the weapon to fight it. There's no point in calling for vigorous action to protect our security if we're unwilling to pay the price and maintain the burden which are necessary for that security, and as the late Arthur Vandenberg said long ago, "There is no point in throwing a drowning man 20 feet off the beach a 10-foot rope."

I don't say that our program will be free from error. Mistakes will be made and setbacks will be suffered. But I'm more concerned about the waste to our security which will result from too small a program in this critical year and too short a period of authority than I am about anything else. I'm less concerned about the dangers of meeting our full responsibility and about--in a crucial year, and this well may be the crucial year of 1961--of doing too little and too late.

I therefore want to say to all of you that I am most grateful to your coming. I hope that your example of support will be followed by citizens across the country. It is difficult for me to believe that in the climactic period of this great era, that the United States is going to fail to meet its responsibility to itself and to those who look to it. I believe that we have an opportunity to play our part. I'm confident that we're going to do so. And I think it's most important-those who are burdened and those who are fatigued and those who feel that we have been through this so much for so many years--I would think that they should realize that that challenge will be with us for a long time to come. This is an obligation and an opportunity. And there's more than self-interest and anti-communism involved. I want it to be said that this generation of Americans, jealous of its rights, conscious of its responsibilities, met its responsibility in the year 1961 and in the years to come--met it with all the resources and all the wisdom and all the judgment, and meeting it, prevailed.