Special Message

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

Our coast defenses, as they existed in 1860, were not surpassed in efficiency by those of any country, but within a few years the introduction of rifled Cannon and armor in the navies of the world, against which the smooth-bore guns were practically useless, rendered them obsolete. For many years no attempt was made to remedy the deficiencies of these seacoast fortifications. There was no establishment in the country equipped for the manufacture of high-power rifled guns, there was no definite adopted policy of coast defense, and Congress was reluctant to undertake a work the cost of which could not be stated, even approximately, and the details of which had not advanced--so far as could be ascertained--beyond the experimental stages.

The act of March 3, 1883, was the first decisive step taken to secure suitable and adequate ordnance for military purposes. Under the provisions of this act a joint board of officers of the army and navy was appointed "for the purpose of examining and reporting to Congress which of the navy yards or arsenals owned by the government has the best location and is best adapted for the establishment of a government foundry or what other method, if any, should be adopted for the manufacture of heavy ordnance adapted to modern warfare for the use of the army and navy of the United States."

This board, known as the "gun foundry board," made its report in 1884, and directed public attention not only to the defenseless condition of our coasts, but to the importance and necessity of formulating a comprehensive scheme for the protection of our harbors and coast cities.

As a result, the act of Congress, approved March 3, 1885, provided that "the President of the United States shall appoint a board, * * which board shall examine and report at what ports fortifications or other defenses are most urgently required, the character and kind of defenses best adapted to each, with reference to armament, the utilization of torpedoes, mines, and other defensive appliances."

The board organized under the foregoing provision of law, popularly known as the "Endicott board," in its report of January 23, 1886, cited the principles on which any system of coast defense should be based, and clearly stated the necessity of having our important strategic and commercial centers made secure against naval attack. In determining the ports that were in urgent need of defense, since a fleet did not exist for the protection of the merchant marine, fortifications were provided at every harbor of importance along the coast and at several of the Lake ports.

For any particular harbor or locality the report specifies the armament considered necessary for proper protection, the character of emplacements to be used, the number of submarine mines and torpedo boats, with detailed estimates of cost for these various items. The proposed guns, mounts, and emplacements were of types that seemed at that time best suited to accomplish the desired results, based on the only data available, namely, experiments and information of similar work from abroad.

After the report was made part of the public records, the development and adoption of a suitable disappearing gun carriage caused the substitution of open emplacements for the expensive turrets and armored casemates, materially reducing the cost of installing the armament; the great advances in ordnance, increasing the power and range of the later guns, caused a diminution in the number and caliber of the pieces to be mounted, and this fact, combined with advances in the science of engineering, rendered unnecessary the construction of the expensive "floating batteries" designed by the Endicott board for mounting guns to give sufficient fire for the defense of wide channels, or for harbors where suitable foundations could not be secured on land.

Furthermore, keeping pace with the gradual development and improvement in the engines and implements of war, fortified harbors are equipped with rapid-fire guns, and, to a certain extent, with power plants, searchlights, and a system of fire control and direction now essential adjuncts of a complete system of defense, though not so considered by that board.

While the details of the scheme of defense recommended by the Endicott board have been departed from in making provision for later developments of war material, the great value of its report lies in the fact that it sets forth a definite and intelligible plan or policy, upon which the very important work of coast defense should proceed, and which is as applicable to-day as when formulated.

The greater effective ranges possible with the later rifled cannon, the necessity of thoroughly covering with gun-fire all available waters of approach and the growth of seacoast towns beyond the limits of some of the military reservations have combined to move defensive works more to the front, and many of the gun positions now occupied have been obtained from private ownership. The cost of such sites has been a large item in the present cost of fortifications, and this purchase of land was not included in its estimates by the Endicott board.

An examination of the report also discloses the fact that no estimates were submitted covering a supply of ammunition to be kept in reserve for the service of the guns that were recommended, due perhaps to the fact that a satisfactory powder to give the energy desired and a suitable projectile to accomplish the desired destruction of armor were still in experimental stages. These questions, however, are no longer in doubt, and Congress already has made provision for some of the ammunition needed.

The omissions in the estimates of the Endicott board and the changes in the details of its plans have caused doubts in the minds of many as to the money that will be needed to defend completely our coasts by guns, mines, and their adjuncts. New localities are pressing their claims for defense. The insular possessions cannot be held unless the principal ports, naval bases, and coaling stations are fortified before the outbreak of war.

These considerations have led me to appoint a joint board of officers of the army and navy "to recommend the armament, fixed and floating, mobile torpedoes, submarine mines, and all other defensive appliances that may be necessary to complete the harbor defense with the most economical and advantageous expenditures of money." The board was further instructed "to extend its examinations so as to include estimates and recommendations relative to defenses of the insular possessions," and to "recommend the order in which the proposed defense shall be completed, so that all the elements of harbor defense may be properly and effectively co-ordinated."

The board has completed its labors and its report, together with a letter of transmittal by the Secretary of War, is herewith transmitted for the information of the Congress. It is to be noted that the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, not heretofore recommended or authorized by Congress, is added to the list of ports in the United States to be defended, with the important reasons therefor clearly stated: that the gun defense proper is well advanced toward completion, and that the greater part of the estimate is for new work of gun defense, for the accessories now so necessary for efficiency, and for an allowance of ammunition, which, added to that already on hand, will give the minimum supply that should be kept in reserve to successfully meet any sudden attack.

The letter of the Secretary of War contains a comparison of the estimates of the Endicott board, with the amounts already appropriated for the present defense and the estimates of the new board, from which it appears that a completed defense of our coasts, omitting cost of ammunition and sites, can be accomplished for less than the amount estimated by the Endicott board, even including the additional localities not recommended by it.

In the insular possessions the great naval bases at Guantanamo, Subig Bay, and Pearl Harbor, the coaling stations at Guam and San Juan require protection, and, in addition, defenses are recommended for Manila Bay and Honolulu, because of the strategic importance of these localities. In the letter of the Secretary of War will be found the sums already appropriated for defenses at some of these ports or harbors, and the estimates are for the completion of an adequate defense at each locality.

Defenses are recommended for the entrances to the Panama Canal, as contemplated by the act of June 28, 1902 (Spooner act), and under the terms of this act the cost of such fortifications would probably be paid from appropriations for the construction and defense of the canal.

The necessity for a complete and adequate system of coast defense is greater to-day than twenty years ago, for the increased wealth of the country offers more tempting inducements to attack, and a hostile fleet can reach our coast in a much shorter period of time.

The fact that we now have a navy does not in any wise diminish the importance of coast defenses; on the contrary, that fact emphasizes their value and the necessity for their construction. It is an accepted naval maxim that a navy can be used to strategic advantage only when acting on the offensive, and it can be free to so operate only after our coast defense is reasonably secure and so recognized by the country.

It was due to the securely defended condition of the Japanese ports that the Japanese fleet was free to seek out and watch its proper objective--the Russian fleet--without fear of interruption or recall to guard its home ports against raids by the Vladivostok squadron. This, one of the most valuable lessons of the late war in the East, is worthy of serious consideration by our country, with its extensive coast line, its many important harbors, and its many wealthy manufacturing coast cities.

The security and protection of our interests require the completion of the defenses of our coast, and the accompanying plan merits and should receive the generous support of the Congress.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.