
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

TRANSMITTED
TO THE CONGRESS
JANUARY 1977





Economic Report of the President



Transmitted to the Congress January 1977

TOGETHER WITH

THE ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
WASHINGTON: 1977



CONTENTS

	Page
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT	1
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS*	13
Chapter 1. Economic Policy and Outlook	23
Chapter 2. Economic Review of 1976	58
Chapter 3. The World Economy in 1976	100
Chapter 4. Policies to Increase Supply	136
Appendix A. Report to the President on the Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers During 1976	171
Appendix B. Statistical Tables Relating to Income, Employment, and Production	181

^{*}For a detailed table of contents of the Council's Report, see page 17.



ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT



ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

To the Congress of the United States:

The past year was a year of sound economic achievement. A year ago I said that my key economic goal was "to create an economic environment in which sustainable noninflationary growth can be achieved." While much remains to be done, we have built a very solid foundation for further economic gains in 1977 and beyond. The recovery has continued to produce substantial gains in output and employment. Unemployment remains much too high, but the marked reduction that we see in inflation as well as in inflationary expectations represents significant progress toward regaining the stable noninflationary prosperity that has been our goal.

The gross national product, adjusted for inflation, rose by slightly more than 6 percent last year. The rise in production was extremely rapid at the beginning of 1976. The advance moderated during the spring, but at the close of the year the recovery showed signs of reacceleration. In December more than 88 million Americans were employed, an increase of about 3 million from last December and more than 4 million above the 1975 recession low. Economic gains were widespread. Real incomes continued their rise, consumer expenditures also moved upward, business investment began to recover, and housing construction improved significantly. Unemployment dropped sharply in the early months of last year, although it rose again as the extraordinarily rapid expansion in the labor force outpaced the creation of new jobs.

Substantial headway was also made on the inflation front. Since late 1975 the consumer price index has risen only 5 percent, a full percentage point less than was anticipated and a noteworthy improvement over the 12 percent inflation rate of 1974. Wage settlements continued to moderate. Record crops and more ample supplies of farm products halted the sharp increases in food prices. As fears of inflation ebbed, interest rates declined, contrary to most expectations at the beginning of the year; and the stock market, reflecting this heightened confidence, was close to the highs of the year when trading ended in 1976. The lower rate of infla-

tion and the improved state of financial markets attest to the significant progress we have made during the past year toward reestablishing a stable, noninflationary, full-employment economy.

If this goal is to be fully realized, the present policy of moderation in fiscal and monetary affairs and of relying on a restored vitality in the private sector must continue. We need tax reductions to support a lasting economic recovery and to provide relief from the increases in real tax burdens induced by inflation. In the long run, inflation and real economic growth will constantly push taxpayers into higher and higher tax brackets unless tax laws are changed. Some believe that these additional tax receipts should be spent on new Government programs. I do not. Instead I believe that the Congress should counteract the growing burden imposed by the tax system—and the reduction of private incentives that it implies—by periodically providing offsetting tax cuts while continuing to restrain the rate of growth of Government spending.

The creation of permanent, meaningful, and productive jobs for our growing labor force requires a higher level of private investment. Tax reductions must be so designed that measures to stimulate consumption are balanced by those which will increase investment. Investment has for some time been falling short of the levels required if we are to provide enough productive jobs for our people at rising real wage rates, and if we hope to renew and improve our capital stock so that we can meet our requirements for energy and make headway toward environmental, job safety, and other goals. Investment has grown more slowly than would normally be true at this stage of a recovery. A stronger spur to investment in productive plant and equipment is necessary for the further improvement in production and employment in 1977 and beyond.

TAX REDUCTIONS

In October 1975, I presented to the Congress a program of tax cuts and spending restraints that would have reduced the burden of government for all taxpayers. It would have given the American people more freedom to spend their incomes as they choose rather than as Washington chooses for them, and it would have increased incentives to expand investment. However, the Congress decided otherwise—to increase spending far more than I wanted and to cut taxes far less than I wanted.

Earlier this month I again sent to the Congress my recommendations to cut taxes. I have once more urged a permanent increase in the personal exemption from \$750 to \$1,000 to replace the system of temporary tax credits that has so greatly complicated the individual income tax return. I am also recommending a higher income allowance and a series of per-

manent tax rate reductions. My proposals provide income tax relief for individuals that will total \$10 billion in 1977.

To encourage the investment that will mean good steady jobs for our expanding labor force, I am recommending once again a permanent reduction in the corporate income tax from 48 to 46 percent. I urge as well the enactment of legislation to make permanent the extension of the 10 percent investment tax credit and the increased corporate surtax exemption provided by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. In the longer run we must eliminate the double taxation of dividend payments. I am therefore renewing my proposal to integrate corporate and personal income taxes gradually over a period of years beginning in 1978.

I am also renewing my recommendation of accelerated depreciation for investment in new plants and equipment undertaken in areas where unemployment is 7 percent or higher. I am firmly convinced that this is a far better way to raise employment where the economy has not caught up with the recovery than adding layer upon layer of new spending programs.

Although such tax cuts for individuals and businesses are desirable at this time to support stronger consumer and capital goods markets, we must be mindful of the need to bring down our large Federal budget deficit as quickly as possible. As the economy improves and the demand for private credit becomes greater, Federal borrowing requirements to finance the deficit must be lowered to avoid preempting funds needed for private investment and to ensure steady progress in the battle against inflation. Accordingly, in my Budget Message I am again recommending responsible restraint in the growth of Federal budget outlays. These policies will also bring us closer to our goals of stable noninflationary prosperity.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Much progress was evident in the rest of the world last year, and international economic cooperation continued to improve. Restoration of a stable growth path, however, has proved difficult. Throughout the world, countries are still grappling with the complicated and painful aftermath of inflation, recession, and the sharp increases in the relative price of energy. Serious social and political problems have made these adjustments more difficult.

When I met with the leaders of the major industrial nations in the summer of 1976, the restoration of full employment in our several economies was the most important item on our agenda. Stable full employment and continued improvement in the well-being of our own peoples and the world population at large, we agreed, will take a number of

years. Although the course of faster expansion seems attractive, it is clearly risky. Impatience which leads to a reacceleration of inflation could jeopardize the significant progress we have achieved so far.

The costly lessons of the past decade are inescapable. High and variable inflation rates are incompatible with sustainable growth. Overly expansionary policies contributed to the very high inflation rate and, in turn, to the deepest worldwide recession since the 1930s. Policy changes and adjustments will doubtless be needed in 1977 and thereafter. But policies must hold to a reasonably steady and predictable course. In particular, the measures we select to further our economic expansion must not raise the risk of future inflation.

The growing recognition among nations of their interdependence has helped to create the cooperation that is now apparent among members of the industrial community. The mutuality of the policy goals of the developed and developing countries needs to be better understood on each side. For this reason the discussions between developed and developing countries during 1976 have attempted to foster a climate in which our joint interests and our diverse concerns can be freely expressed. Although the progress so far achieved has disappointed some, it has helped us avoid the sometimes easier but mutually destructive course of trade restrictions.

ENERGY POLICY

Energy matters retain their troublesome hold among the problems threatening the Nation's long-run prosperity. The sharp increases in oil prices in 1973–75 imposed major costs upon our economy. We have done much to accommodate the new higher prices for energy, but some aspects of energy policy have hampered the adjustment. The Congress has continued to hold prices for domestically produced oil and natural gas well below world market levels. These lower energy prices have encouraged the inefficient use of energy and discouraged efforts to expand domestic supplies and improve the energy efficiency of the overall capital stock.

The recovery has heightened the demand for energy and thus resulted in greater imports of oil. In consequence the United States now depends even more heavily upon imported petroleum and is even more vulnerable than a year ago to future price manipulation and interruptions in supply. Now that the problems of recession and inflation are receding, we can more vigorously address this difficulty. The energy program that I have presented before is designed to answer the longer need.

First steps are under way toward creating a strategic oil reserve which

will help shield us from disruptions in supply. The OPEC pricing decisions of December were a forceful reminder of the Nation's growing need for protection against foreign moves that affect the price and can alter the availability of imported oil. Strategic storage will provide a first line of defense against the threat of disrupted supplies. This vital program must be implemented, and we must also take positive steps to lessen our economic dependence upon foreign oil.

Measures that will make us less dependent on foreign energy supplies have been proposed by this Administration; but unfortunately many of the most important proposals have not yet been accepted by the Congress. Some of the measures involve present costs which will yield much greater future benefits. Others, which would lead to more efficient use of our energy resources, would benefit the Nation immediately as well as in the future.

It is critically important—for energy security, environmental quality, and long-term economic productivity—that prices of domestic petroleum and natural gas be allowed to match more closely the full cost of these fuels. In the immediate future oil prices should be allowed to rise as they were intended to do under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. Steps should also be taken which would help close the gap more rapidly between domestic and world market prices for petroleum, allow a free-market price for North Slope Alaskan oil, and deregulate the wellhead price of new natural gas.

Although a number of inconsistencies remain, the relation between the Nation's goals for energy and for the environment has become clearer and the effects of existing policies more fully known. The time is ripe for reexamining environmental policy and determining whether the ends we all seek can be achieved at a lower cost to the economy and to the security of our energy supplies.

Taken together, all of the actions recommended here would help the economy to adjust to the new energy situation and do much to ensure more reliable supplies of energy for the future. They would also signal to the world that this Nation is serious about developing secure supplies of energy. Most important, these efforts would encourage conservation and give industry the confidence that will spur the production of both conventional fuels and substitutes.

REGULATORY REFORM

As economic problems have arisen and been dealt with by new policy initiatives, the Government's role in the economy has grown ever larger.

The number of commissions, agencies, administrations, bureaus, and offices set up to conduct programs increases constantly. Each appears important when it is first established. The trouble is that they are seldom, if ever, terminated when they have accomplished their original mission. By one recent count there were 1,200 Federal Government organizations alone having significant powers to regulate a wide and growing range of economic activities.

The direct Federal outlay to control practices in the private sector is substantial. Even more important are the losses that these activities impose on the production and distribution of goods and services throughout the economy. No accurate measure of the total costs and benefits of actions by the regulatory agencies is possible at this time or perhaps ever. Although all Americans are aware of the substantial benefits which regulations produce in their everyday lives, we frequently lose sight of the efforts of such programs in restricting the growth of productivity.

The use of newly developed technology, the development of new companies and products, and the opening up of new occupations have all been impeded by the need for licenses, certification, review, and legal judgments introduced by one agency or another. When innovative activities are discouraged progress is curbed throughout the economy, even in those areas where some regulation is justified. Regulations must therefore be reexamined to ensure the removal of costly and counterproductive regulations and to identify those whose need has passed. Where benefits seem large we should make sure that the benefits are realized at the least possible cost.

To reduce the regulatory burden, I asked the Congress in the last year to eliminate unnecessary and anticompetitive regulation in the airline and trucking industries. This action was to follow the path of regulatory reform that the railroad industry achieved in the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. I also urged the Congress to eliminate the Federal Power Commission's controls on new gas prices, which have held back exploration and sales to the interstate pipelines serving northern and western cities. Earlier this month I once again submitted to the Congress a plan to eliminate controls on gasoline refining and marketing.

Among agencies under my jurisdiction I have set out new regulatory procedures which will make controls more effective and less costly to all concerned, but such steps are only a beginning. The Congress and the executive branch must undertake a comprehensive review to ascertain the effects of present controls, and then offer to the American people a corrective program that will cut across administrative boundaries. Only a sweeping reform will remove the regulatory burden where it is no longer justified and place the initiative for production and distribution back in the more efficient hands of private enterprise.

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN SOCIETY

I firmly believe that if we dedicate our efforts to the major problems I have outlined here we can successfully resolve them. As a people we have an extraordinary capacity to marshal our resources against even the gravest difficulties.

Unfortunately many of our problems are self-made. One which has concerned me particularly over the years is a tendency, born of goodwill and a desire to improve the state of American life, which makes us think we can create costless benefits for our people. We are unwilling to confront some of our hardest choices. We persist in the belief that we can always tolerate a little larger Federal deficit, or the creation of a little more money, especially for the sake of programs which seem to promise clear and readily definable benefits. This is a kind of self-deception that we must learn to resist.

Certainly we must adopt measures that promise to keep the economic expansion going and reduce the high unemployment. But overly expansive policies with their inevitable risk of renewed inflation are realities which are easily overlooked in the understandable desire for the immediately tangible benefits foreseen from specific programs. What we seek is a sustainable expansion and the restoration of full employment without inflation, and we must settle for no less.

The discipline implicit in a prudent fiscal policy is not easy but it offers very considerable and lasting rewards. I am hopeful that the recent creation of the budget committees to serve the Congress will help to provide this necessary discipline. Prudent budget policies are essential if we are to restore stable full-employment conditions and provide the productive jobs which our people need and want. Some part of our present deficit is the result of the recession and will accordingly disappear as full employment is restored. Beyond this, however, we must restrain the growth of Federal expenditures. If we do not, we shall have to resign ourselves to higher taxes or to high employment deficits with their inflationary consequences.

Nowhere are these tradeoffs so evident as in our social security program and our efforts to provide medical insurance for our people. I

have emphasized the need to maintain a fiscally sound social security system and repeatedly rejected proposals to fund increased benefits out of what are called general revenues. The purpose of linking social security benefits to specially designated taxes is to balance the benefits to one segment of society with the costs to another segment. Our democratic processes of government work better when the costs of programs are open and visible to those who pay them. Funding our social security benefits through specifically designated payroll taxes strengthens the discipline that should govern these decisions. Benefits are not costless, and we should not allow this fact to be submerged in any general revenue funding of the social security system.

Similar pressures are building up with respect to medical care. We have become concerned, and rightly so, over sharp increases in the cost of medical care which emphasize the need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of health care services. These have arisen in part because the large expansion in health insurance coverage under both private and public programs has reduced the sensitivity of consumers to costs and weakened the incentives to achieve efficiencies. Individuals, businesses, and unions, confronted with the higher costs of private health insurance have begun to exert curbs on the systems for delivering health and medical service, and their influence should be salutary. I hope we will not choose to fund these costs through a comprehensive national health insurance system, since this will only weaken the incentives for improvement and efficiency that are now emerging.

These are but two examples of the pressures which threaten to erode our fiscal processes. We must recognize that making governmental expenditure policy the principal arm of demand management has undesirable consequences. Expenditure programs once in place are extremely difficult to cut back. The result is a permanent rise in Federal outlays and the risk of ever-increasing growth in the government relative to the private sector. As the experience of other countries forcibly illustrates, this is a dangerous path. It weakens incentives, reduces efficiency, leads to lagging standards of living, and carries inevitable risks of inflation. It is much better to provide fiscal adjustments through tax reductions than through Federal spending programs.

The solid improvement of this year means continued progress toward a better life for all Americans. Problems will always remain, but the future is bright with opportunities to continue strengthening our economy. Improvement is part of the American way of life, but we must recognize that few problems, when viewed realistically, lend themselves to quick and easy solution. Our policies must take into account the full costs and

lasting implications of the changes we make today for whatever worthwhile reason. If they attack symptoms rather than causes, policies will be ineffective and may even preclude the very goals which we seek. Enduring improvement in the economic welfare of the American people requires that the courses we embark on to meet today's problems will also bring us closer to our more distant goals and aspirations.

Gerall R. Ford

January 18, 1977



THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Council of Economic Advisers, Washington, D.C., January 14, 1977.

THE PRESIDENT:

Sir: The Council of Economic Advisers herewith submits its Annual Report, January 1977, in accordance with Section 4(c)(2) of the Employment Act of 1946.

Respectfully,

ALAN GREENSPAN, Chairman.

Burton G. Malkial

BURTON G. MALKIEL.



CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Economic Policy and Outlook
General Policy Principles
Economic Policy for 1977
Fiscal Policy
Monetary Policy
Energy Policy
The Outlook
Private Consumption
Nonresidential Fixed Investment
Housing Starts and Residential Investment
Inventory Investment
Net Exports
Government Purchases
Labor Force and Unemployment
Inflation
Productivity Growth and Resource Utilization
The Productivity Slowdown, 1966–76
The Full-Employment Unemployment Rate
Growth in Potential Output
Policy Implications
Chapter 2. Economic Review of 1976
Demand and Output
Personal Consumption
Business Fixed Investment
Inventory Investment
Housing and Residential Investment
Government Purchases
Net Exports
Prices, Wages, and Profits
Prices
Wages
Productivity and Unit Labor Costs
Corporate Profitability
Government Budgets and Fiscal Policy
Federal Expenditures and the Shortfall
Tax Legislation and Federal Receipts
The Fiscal Balances
The New Congressional Budget Process

Chapter 2. Economic Review of 1976—Continued
Monetary Policy and Financial Markets
Growth of the Monetary Aggregates
Federal Reserve Tolerance Ranges for Monetary Growth
Interest Rates
Other Financial Developments
Employment, Unemployment, and Income Transfer Programs.
Employment
Unemployment
Labor Force Participation
Income Transfer Programs
Energy Developments
Consumption
Production
Imports
Prices
Agricultural Developments
Commodity Markets and Food Prices
Farm Income
Farm and Food Policy
Chapter 3. The World Economy in 1976
The Demand Situation
Demand and Output in Major Industrial Countries
General Demand Trends
Public Sector Deficits
The External Sector
Economic Outlook and Government Policies
Stabilization Policy and Exchange Rate Policy
Current Account Positions and Financing
OECD Current Account Positions
OPEC Surpluses
Non-Oil LDC's
Exchange Rate Changes
International Financial Markets
Official Financing
Adequacy of Official Financial Resources
North-South Economic Relations
Chapter 4. Policies To Increase Supply
Structural and Induced Unemployment
Frictional and Cyclical Unemployment
Induced Unemployment and Unemployment Com-
pensation
Structural Unemployment
Employment Tax Credit
Summary

CHAPTER 4. POLICIES TO INCREASE SUPPLY—Continued
Government Regulation
Regulated Price Above Market Price ?
Regulated Price Below Market Price
Regulations That Directly Affect Cost
Implementing Regulatory Reform
Summary
Agricultural Policy
The Movement to Market-Oriented Farm Programs
The Threat to Market-Oriented Policies
The Future of Market-Oriented Policies
Tax Policies for Capital Formation
Investment Tax Credit
Tax Integration
Policies To Stimulate Saving
Appendixes:
A. Report to the President on the Activities of the Council of
Economic Advisers During 1976
B. Statistical Tables Relating to Income, Employment, and
Production
Troduction
The CT III and Charles
List of Tables and Charts Tables
1. The Market Value and the Replacement Cost of Net Assets
of Nonfinancial Corporations, 1960–76
2. Projected Growth Rates of Monetary Aggregates, 1977
3. Calendar of Major Private Nonfarm Collective Bargaining
Activity, 1977
4. Civilian Unemployment Rates by Age, Sex, and Reason for
Unemployment, 1973
5. Civilian Unemployment Rates for Selected Groups, 1956,
1965, and 1973
6. Potential and Actual Gross National Product, 1952–76
7. Changes in Gross National Product in Constant (1972) Dollars,
1975–76
8. Growth of Real Consumption Expenditures and Real Dis-
posable Personal Income, 1975–76
9. Changes in Plant and Equipment Expenditures, 1974–76
10. Changes in Selected Price Measures, 1973–76
11. Changes in Labor Costs and Productivity in the Private Non-
farm Business Sector, 1974–76
•
12. Changes in Major Collective Bargaining Settlements, 1974–76.
13. Output, Profits, Net Interest, and Profit Measures of Non-
financial Corporate Business, 1960–76

List of Tables and Charts-Continued

Tab	les—Continued
14.	Comparison of Projected and Actual Federal Expenditures, National Income and Product Accounts, Fiscal Years 1970–76
15.	Federal Government Receipts and Expenditures, National Income and Product Accounts, Calendar Years 1975–76
16.	Federal Expenditure Shortfall, National Income and Product Accounts, Calendar Year 1976
17.	Reconciliation of Estimates of Federal Expenditure Shortfall, Unified Budget and National Income and Product Accounts,
	Fiscal Year 1976 and Transition Quarter
18.	Actual and Full-Employment Federal and State and Local Government Receipts and Expenditures, National Income
	and Product Accounts Basis, Calendar Years 1970-76
19.	Projected and Actual Growth Rates of Monetary Aggregates, 1975–76.
20.	Funds Raised in Credit Markets by Nonfinancial Sectors, 1971-76
21.	Labor Market Indicators, 1974–76
22.	Income Transfer Programs, 1974–76
23.	Changes in Energy Consumption and Relevant Economic Indicators by Final Consumption Sector, 1950–76
24.	Changes in Consumer Prices of Energy Items, 1966–76
25.	Real Income Per Farm and Per Capita Disposable Personal
	Farm Income as Percent of Nonfarm Income, 1961-75
26.	Personal or Household Saving Rates in Selected Industrial Countries, 1965–76
27.	Changes in Industrial Production in Selected Industrial Countries, 1975–76.
28.	Private and Public Employment in Selected Industrial Countries, 1960–75
29.	Export Shares in Trade in Manufactures of 11 Industrial Countries, 1966–76
30.	Current Account Balances for OECD, OPEC, and Other Countries, 1973-77
31.	Current Account Balances for OECD Countries, 1974–76
	Estimated Disposition of OPEC Investible Surplus, 1974–76
	Borrowing in International Capital Markets, 1974–76
	Civilian Unemployment Rates Under Alternative Definitions by Age and Sex, 1973
35.	Change in After-Tax Internal Rate of Return Under Present 10
-	Percent Investment Tax Credit, All Businesses

List of Tables and Charts-Continued

Charts	Page
1. Relation of Real Business Fixed Investment to Real GNP	27
2. Ratio of Market Value of Nonfinancial Corporations to Re-	
placement Cost of Net Assets	30
3. Productivity in the Private Business Economy	46
4. Gross National Product, Actual and Potential	55
5. Growth in Money Stock	79
6. Interest Rates	82
7. Exchange Rates for Selected Industrial Countries	116
8. Interest Rates in Selected Industrial Countries	120



CHAPTER 1

Economic Policy and Outlook

THE U.S. ECONOMIC RECOVERY is now almost 2 years old. In 1976 real gross national product (GNP) rose by 6.2 percent, and employment increased by almost 3 million persons. Although the pattern of real GNP growth during 1976 was more erratic than had been anticipated, showing rapid growth in the first quarter followed by more moderate gains in subsequent quarters, the rise in real GNP for the year as a whole was about what had been projected a year ago. The growth of production and employment for 1976 was accompanied by a further significant moderation of the inflation rate. The average annual rate of change in the GNP deflator was 5 percent over the 4 quarters of 1976 compared with a 7 percent average in 1975.

The unemployment rate declined by almost 1 percentage point from 1975 to 1976, but it is still much too high and must be reduced further. The 3.2 percent increase in employment in 1976 indicates that progress is being made in alleviating the economic and social hardships remaining from the recession. Owing to the combination of secular and cyclical increases in labor force participation rates and in the growth of the working-age population, the labor force grew by 2.3 percent in 1976. This rapid growth of the labor force means that jobs must be created at a fast pace in order to reduce the rate of unemployment.

A continuation of rapid employment and real income gains will require a strong growth in private investment demand in the years ahead. Little extra impetus to the economic expansion will be forthcoming from inventory investment and personal consumption, because inventories already have risen and saving rates have dropped closer to normal levels. Although business fixed investment has begun to recover from the low levels of the recession, its growth has been slower than in past recoveries. Without a sharper upturn in investment the expansionary momentum, already slower in the second half of last year, cannot easily be maintained. Even if final sales growth could be bolstered without a strong recovery of business fixed investment, the implied lesser growth of productive capital would not be sufficient to provide new jobs at a faster rate in the future without a slower growth of productivity and real wages.

In our 1976 Report we indicated that business fixed investment would have to account for approximately 12 percent of GNP during the last half

of the 1970s if the Nation is to achieve full employment by 1980, meet specified productivity and environmental objectives, and attain greater independence in regard to energy. While it was not suggested that economic equilibrium cannot be attained under many other sets of conditions, the social and economic strains of adjusting to a slower and less widely shared improvement in living standards seem likely to become severe if we continue to fall very far short of this ratio. Business fixed investment in 1976 was less than 10 percent of GNP, and even with the improvement anticipated this year the share is likely to remain below 10 percent in 1977. The momentum of the recovery must be maintained in the near term through measures which foster growing business confidence and which support stable economic growth and decelerating inflation. If not, a slow growth of capital formation may create capacity limitations which could stall the expansion before acceptably low levels of unemployment are reached.

To provide support for an economic expansion strong enough to effect a substantial reduction in unemployment without at the same time jeopardizing the progress achieved so far in containing inflation, the President has recommended a permanent reduction in personal and business taxes beginning this year. The purpose of these measures is to further the growth of disposable income, which has been eroded in part by inflation-induced increases in taxes, and to provide more incentives to investment spending. The continuing diminution of inflation during the past year indicates that such tax reductions to promote the growth of demand are consistent with the goal of sustainable noninflationary growth—if they are accompanied by steps to restrain the growth of Federal expenditures in future years. To help consolidate our progress in curbing inflation, the President has proposed a budget which provides for a slowing of the growth in Federal outlays in 1978 and beyond. Unless surpluses can eventually be achieved in the Federal budget at high levels of employment, it may be difficult to increase the share of investment in GNP and maintain the growth of the Nation's productive capacity.

With the help of these policies the economic recovery is expected to continue in 1977. Real GNP is expected to be 5 to 5½ percent higher than in 1976, and its rate of growth should average between 5½ and 6 percent during the 4 quarters of 1977. Such growth will produce further gains in employment. But unless labor force growth decelerates significantly from the current high rates, the decline in the unemployment rate is likely to be modest. In any event, unemployment will still be unacceptably high during the year. If we are to eliminate the economic loss and hardship associated with idle resources, economic growth in 1978 and beyond must continue to proceed at a more rapid pace than the longer-run rate of growth of potential output. We do not anticipate that these policies will lead to an increase in the underlying rate of inflation. Indeed, if wage settlements continue to moderate, further progress in reducing inflation could be possible in this year and in future years.

GENERAL POLICY PRINCIPLES

To assure a sustained expansion, four general principles should guide the formulation of economic policies over the next several years. Economic stimulus, where needed, should be provided by tax reduction rather than by increases in government spending. Tax reduction should be permanent rather than in the form of a temporary rebate. Policy initiatives should be balanced between measures directed toward consumption and those aimed at increasing business fixed investment. Economic policy should aim for a steady economic expansion in which the components of aggregate demand are in balance.

1. Stimulus should be provided by tax reduction rather than by increases in government spending. Rising government purchases of goods and services first increase income and employment in the areas that produce the increased output demanded by government. The visibility and strength of these first-round effects account for much of the political support for increased spending. A number of serious difficulties arise, however, when government expenditures are used as a tool of stabilization policy.

Our experience has been that under existing institutional arrangements the startup time for many spending programs can be quite long; this is particularly true of the large construction projects which are considered by many to be useful instruments of countercyclical fiscal policy. The danger is that the economic impact of new spending programs will not be felt when it is most needed and will then outlast the need for stimulus. In addition, when restraint rather than continued stimulus becomes desirable, it may be politically difficult to cut these programs. As a result, a fiscal policy which stimulates expansion primarily through increases in government purchases may risk overstimulating the expansion at a later stage. Another difficulty is that frictional inefficiencies arise from manipulating the level of government expenditures for stabilization purposes. Each time a government program is changed, costs are incurred as the private sector is forced to adjust and reallocate the necessary resources. And in some cases the rules and regulations associated with the enactment of these programs may necessitate widening government interference in the private sector.

Similar dangers exist with income maintenance and support programs. These programs are essential to relieve the economic hardships associated with unemployment. But we must be careful that changes in programs designed to deal with cyclical contingencies do not end by permanently increasing Federal payments, the number of beneficiaries, and the size of the individual benefits. Such a result would reduce the growth of resources available to the private sector; and the higher marginal tax rates eventually required to finance these expenditures may lower incentives to work and invest, thereby hindering the growth of our aggregate supply capabilities and heightening inflationary pressures. An analysis of some special job creation programs is provided in Chapter 4 of this *Report*.

2. Tax reduction should be permanent rather than in the form of a temporary rebate. The primary objectives of tax reduction in the current situation should be to provide relief from the inflation-induced increases in real tax burdens and to support a lasting economic expansion. Because consumers normally adjust expenditures to their "permanent" or long-run income, a lasting reduction in personal taxes which raises both current and future after-tax income should yield a sustained rise in consumer spending, as happened following the permanent tax reduction in 1964. Sustained growth in consumer spending is required to promote a durable economic expansion.

On the other hand, any stimulative effect that a temporary tax rebate may have on consumer spending will diminish quickly. For example, a substantial increase in expenditures for durables did occur after the payment of the 1975 rebate. Part of the effect of such a one-time windfall, however, may have been to shift some expenditures to the present that had been planned for a later time, with the result that spending would be correspondingly lower in subsequent periods. This phenomenon may be the reason for the very low rates of increase in purchases of consumer durables in the last 3 quarters of 1976. Such fluctuations in the movements of demand contribute to uncertainty about fiscal policy and damage the prospects for steady growth. Thus temporary tax rebates are not consistent with the objective of sustaining an economic expansion. While they may be useful in helping to bring about a reversal of generally declining demands during a recession, they are not consistent with the maintenance of an expansion of demand that is already under way.

Moreover transitory increases in consumer spending associated with temporary tax cuts are not likely to stimulate investment as much as more permanent increases in demand would do. Business firms may realize that an expansion in sales will not last if the increase is apparently due to a temporary reduction in taxes and will have less incentive to expand capacity than if they expect a more sustained rise in sales. A permanent reduction in income taxes has a more lasting impact on household consumption demand and consequently on business firms' willingness to invest in productive capital.

It is sometimes argued that tax cuts should be temporary in order to maintain a permanent revenue base for future spending programs. A strong and more certain growth in 1977 and beyond, however, is ultimately the key to whether resources will become available to support these expenditures. Moreover taxes automatically increase faster than income over time because of the combined effects exerted by inflation, real growth, and our graduated tax rate structure. Unless permanent reductions are made from time to time, taxes will account for an ever larger share of taxable income. Thus there is little danger that a permanent tax reduction will destroy the revenue base for the Federal Government. Indeed, another fear may be more realistic: if taxes are not reduced periodically we run the risk of allowing the tax burden to rise over time and thus inhibit the growth of demand in the private sector.

3. Economic initiatives should be balanced between measures to stimulate consumption and those designed to increase business investment. We noted above that investment must grow somewhat faster than GNP for some years to achieve long-run goals of employment and income growth. It is therefore essential that economic policy create an environment which will encourage business investment. Clearly, investment spending will be stimulated by substantial increases in final sales, which tend to reduce excess capacity and increase expected profitability. A cut in personal income taxes which sustains real consumption growth will thus encourage investment. However, in the current economic environment we believe this consumption-induced investment growth can usefully be augmented by direct stimulus to private investment. Consumption-oriented growth in demand will not necessarily bring aggregate investment to the levels needed to offset the inadequate investment of the past few years. On the contrary, direct stimulus may be necessary to counteract forces which have deterred investment.

Chart 1 shows that business fixed investment currently accounts for a relatively low proportion of GNP, approximating the percentage of the early 1960s. Even with substantial increases in business fixed investment next year this ratio will remain under 10 percent and far below the ratios we believe are desirable. Furthermore the slow growth of labor productivity, analyzed later in this chapter, does not suggest that productive capital has become relatively more abundant over the last decade. The policy response to comparable problems in the early 1960s was to stimulate investment directly with such measures as a reduction in corporate tax rates.

Relation of Real Business Fixed Investment to Real GNP



A number of factors may have prevented the restoration of business confidence and hence restrained investment growth. Wage and price controls are still a recent memory, and fears of a reacceleration of inflation have not been completely dispelled. Recollections of the severe 1974–75 recession may also restrain business confidence. Because fears of a renewed inflation-recession cycle may encourage businesses to increase liquidity rather than invest in plant and equipment, confidence must be rebuilt before sales growth will be translated into higher capital outlays.

Laws and regulations to provide necessary protection for the environment also create costs and uncertainties. Not only does the spread of regulations raise production costs, but long-run cost and profit calculations are made less certain because of the possibility of future changes in regulations. For instance, if a change in environmental laws may affect the operations of a new plant, then the risk associated with building this plant is correspondingly increased. The impact is more severe on longer-lived investments which require longer commitments with less flexibility once they are made.

It is of course very difficult to prove that a decline in business confidence or an increase in risk premiums is responsible for the failure of investment to rise as much as might have been expected during the current recovery. This difficulty results partly from our inability to directly measure the uncertainty or accurately assess the expectational factors and the environment within which long-term investment decisions are made. Most evidence for the view that business confidence remains poor is qualitative and involves a degree of casual empiricism. One quantitative indicator of the expectations affecting business investment is the market value of a corporation's stocks and of net interest-bearing debt relative to the replacement cost of its assets. If, for example, assets are valued in the market significantly above their replacement cost, corporations will be encouraged to invest in new equipment and thereby create capital gains for the owners of their securities. On the other hand, if assets are valued below their replacement cost, corporations which sell new securities to buy new capital goods may be creating capital losses for their security holders. In the latter case we can infer that the cost of capital has risen relative to the average profitability of past investment projects and that new investment will be discouraged. Of course, at the margin the expected rate of return on a significant number of potential new investments will remain above the cost of capital, even though existing assets on average are valued below their replacement cost. Thus even if the market value of a firm fell below the replacement cost of its assets this would not mean the end of investment incentives. It would be especially inappropriate to draw such conclusions from estimated aggregates composed of heterogeneous corporations.

Nevertheless it is probably safe to infer that the almost continuous decline in the ratio of the market value of nonfinancial corporations to the replacement cost of their assets during the last few years (Table 1 and Chart 2) is an indication that investment incentives are much lower currently than in the

TABLE 1 .- The market value and the replacement cost of net assets of nonfinancial corporations, 1960-76

	Market value		Replacement cost of net assets			Ratio of	Ratio of	
Year	Total	Interest- bearing debt ¹	Equity 2	Total	Net non- interest- bearing financial assets ³	Net stock of de- preciable fixed assets and inven- tories 3	market value to replace- ment cost of net assets	real business fixed invest- ment to real GNP
	Billions of dollars							
1960	435. 6	103. 8	331. 8	427. 0	61. 4	365. 6	1. 020	0. 090
	507. 9	114. 8	393. 1	442. 9	67. 3	375. 6	1. 147	. 087
	503. 9	126. 0	378. 0	460. 9	73. 3	387. 6	1. 093	. 089
	581. 0	136. 7	444. 2	482. 2	78. 5	403. 7	1. 205	. 088
	656. 6	147. 9	508. 7	507. 2	83. 0	424. 2	1. 295	. 093
1965	737. 5	162. 9	574. 7	541. 7	87. 2	454. 5	1. 361	. 103
	712. 9	180. 4	532. 4	590. 8	91. 8	499. 0	1. 207	. 108
	789. 8	200. 0	589. 9	649. 9	100. 7	549. 2	1. 215	. 103
	893. 0	217. 8	675. 3	711. 0	109. 3	601. 7	1. 256	. 103
	881. 9	243. 1	638. 8	782. 9	117. 0	665. 9	1. 126	. 106
1970	787. 1	267. 7	519. 4	858. 1	126. 4	731. 7	.917	. 102
	934. 2	296. 8	637. 4	925. 3	135. 9	789. 4	1.010	. 098
	1, 093. 1	330. 3	762. 8	1, 002. 5	149. 6	852. 9	1.090	. 100
	1, 166. 1	386. 1	780. 0	1, 126. 4	166. 3	960. 1	1.034	. 106
	1, 106. 5	428. 2	678. 3	1, 319. 8	181. 8	1, 138. 0	.838	. 106
1975	1, 113. 1	439. 4	673. 8	1, 494. 5	198. 3	1, 296. 2	. 745	. 093
1976 4	1, 326. 2	470. 0	856. 2	1, 601. 4	212. 3	1, 389. 1	. 828	

¹ Market value of net interest-bearing debt of nonfinancial corporations (NFCs) adjusted from face value by assuming a maturity of 5 years and discounting a stream of coupon payments equal to the net interest paid by NFCs. The discount rate is assumed to equal Moody's Baa corporate bond yield.

2 Dividends of NFCs divided by the dividend/price ratio of Standard & Poor's composite index of 500 common stocks.

4 Preliminary.

Note.—Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.


Source: Council of Economic Advisers (based on data from various sources).

second half of the 1960s. Even allowing for the possibility that the high values of the ratio in the 1960s reflected some temporary overconfidence in the evaluation of future returns, the significant downward trend is an indicator that a lack of confidence may be a factor holding back long-term investment commitments now. One inference from this evidence is that a direct stimulus to investment, such as a corporate tax reduction would provide, could hasten the restoration of business confidence and be useful to supplement the normal accelerator mechanism. Another is that measures which would help reduce the risks of substantial changes in the regulatory climate over the normal life of fixed assets would also raise investment. Such measures would help to offset the uncertainties which are still restraining investment and would make up for the slow growth of productive capital in the past few years.

4. Policy should aim at a steady expansion with balance among the components of aggregate demand. An important policy decision in the years ahead concerns the appropriate amount of fiscal and monetary stimulus to sustain the recovery. In the effort to achieve continued progress toward full employment we must not create inherently unstable and ultimately

Chart 2

Ratio of Market Value of Nonfinancial Corporations to Replacement Cost of Net Assets



SOURCE: COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS (BASED ON DATA FROM VARIOUS SOURCES).

counterproductive conditions along the way. With a high inflation rate and many uncertainties still remaining to hamper the economy, stimulus which aims for a balanced composition of demand and a steady pace will provide the safest and surest path of advance. A steady recovery allows aggregate production to expand gradually toward full capacity, thereby avoiding such imbalances as overaccumulation of inventories, shortages of strategic commodities, or insufficient accumulation of fixed capital. Moreover, if unexpected shortages or demand deficiencies begin to arise, policy can react before either inflationary or deflationary pressures become too severe. In this way the possibility of renewed instabilities is minimized. In turn the improved outlook should help restore confidence, encourage investment, and assure that increases in demand raise employment rather than inflation rates.

Evidence showing the impact of inflation and expectations of inflation on business decisions is very limited. Nevertheless an overly rapid expansion could generate a rise in inflationary expectations which might restrain capital accumulation and threaten to cut off the expansion before full employment is reached. In the short run, increases in inflation may appear to stimulate investment because of delays in the upward adjustment of market interest rates and the estimates of the risk associated with inflation. However, high rates of inflation may be associated with high variability in individual prices. If this is so, the expected variance of future returns

on investment would increase with inflation, thereby adding a risk premium to the rate of return required to undertake new investment projects. Thus the cost-price uncertainties which could be associated with high inflation because of larger, more frequent, and less predictable changes in relative prices may eventually discourage business spending. In the long run the effect of inflation may be negative as market interest rates adjust to offset the inflation stimulus and only the negative effect of greater uncertainty remains.

Another factor which will call for moderation at a later stage if the expansion is to be sustainable is the current uncertainty about the level of potential output in the U.S. economy and the likelihood that the potential has been growing at a lower rate in the 1970s than during most of the 1960s. There is also some uncertainty about the unemployment rate that should be used to represent a constant degree of tightness in the labor market at full employment either now or in the future. These uncertainties suggest the wisdom of proceeding with a greater degree of caution in our return to full employment than was previously thought necessary. (These and other factors that bear on long-run economic growth are discussed more fully later in this chapter.

International considerations provide a further reason for maintaining a steady recovery. If a too rapid expansion at home is accompanied by rapid expansions followed by bottlenecks in other major industrial countries, inflationary forces can be intensified by worldwide excess demand for strategic commodities. On the other hand, in a situation where the world's economic development is lagging, it is important that U.S. growth should not be so slow as to contribute to sluggishness in world trade. This would reinforce rather than alleviate demand deficiencies and increase the risk of another recession.

ECONOMIC POLICY FOR 1977

FISCAL POLICY

With these general principles in mind, the President has proposed a permanent tax cut for individuals and corporations which will reduce tax liabilities by about \$12.5 billion in calendar 1977. The largest part of the tax cut, \$10 billion, would go to individuals in the form of higher personal exemptions, an increase in the low-income allowance, and lower tax rates. The rest would go to corporations in the form of a 2 percentage point reduction in the corporate income tax rate. Federal expenditures on a national income and product accounts (NIPA) basis are expected to be \$429 billion in 1977. This will yield an actual deficit of \$57 billion for the year and a decline in the full-employment surplus of \$13 billion in 1977. As private sector spending continues to expand, it is expected that the Federal deficit will gradually diminish to make room for the necessary private savings flows to finance new capital formation.

The proposed \$10-billion permanent reduction in personal income taxes would be implemented by an increase in the individual exemption from \$750 to \$1,000, an increase in the low-income allowance to \$1,800 for single persons and \$2,500 for joint returns, and a reduction in rates in the lower- and middle-income brackets. Furthermore, the temporary tax credits first enacted in 1975 would be repealed. These changes would offset the increase in the real tax burden of middle-income families resulting from the high inflation rates of recent years. The reduction in personal taxes would lead to a permanent increase in after-tax income and a more confident outlook in the household sector, both of which should significantly boost consumer spending in the year ahead. By creating stronger markets and raising the rate of capacity utilization, the personal tax cut would also indirectly stimulate additional investment.

The proposed reduction in the corporate income tax rate from 48 percent to 46 percent would reduce corporate tax liabilities by about \$2.5 billion in 1977. It would thus improve the net return on all capital assets and enlarge the flow of internal funds to finance new projects. The supply of savings has been adequate since the recovery began in 1975; but as the expansion proceeds and pressure on capacity builds, the increased cash flow would be an important source of finance for new investment. The tax cut would also have a beneficial effect on expectations in the business community, possibly yielding further gains in investment spending. The President is also renewing several previous recommendations to improve business profitability: a program of accelerated depreciation for newly installed plant and equipment in areas of high unemployment; the partial integration of corporate and personal income taxes over a period of years, beginning in 1978, to offset the double tax on corporate earnings; and permanent extensions of the 10 percent investment tax credit, the 20 percent tax on the first \$25,000 of corporate income, and the \$50,000 corporate surtax exemption.

As noted in the 1963 Economic Report of the President, at a time when there was a similar concern that stagnating investment could damage the prospects for long-term growth:

... it is essential to our employment and growth objectives ... that we stimulate more rapid expansion and modernization of America's productive facilities. ... Investment in private plant and equipment is a principal source of long-term gains in productivity. ... A high rate of investment is needed to equip our growing labor force with better and more modern equipment. ... The investment needed to gain our growth objectives will be achieved only if we eliminate economic slack—only if we strengthen demand and broaden incentives to take risks.

The tax program outlined in this *Report* is designed to achieve these same objectives in 1977 and beyond. If business confidence does not improve and if investment does not begin to grow rapidly, additional stimulative measures for investment should be considered in the future.

MONETARY POLICY

The Federal Reserve Board has projected growth ranges for the three major money supply measures through the third quarter of 1977. Barring unforeseen changes in financial conditions, monetary growth within these ranges should be sufficient to finance continued economic expansion without risking a resurgence of inflation. However, the unusual uncertainties which have recently clouded the relationship between monetary growth—especially M₁ growth—and nominal GNP will require special caution and adaptability in setting, and revising if necessary, the growth ranges in the near future.

The specific ranges which have been set for the year ending in the third quarter of 1977 are $4\frac{1}{2}$ to $6\frac{1}{2}$ percent for M_1 , $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 10 percent for M_2 , and 9 to $11\frac{1}{2}$ percent for M_3 . The projected ranges for M_1 reflect a projected structural shift in the growth of demand for this aggregate. The Federal Reserve has estimated that a number of regulatory and technological changes encouraging the use of alternatives to demand deposits for transactions will reduce the demand for M_1 in 1977. Quantitatively the most significant of these changes appear to be regulations permitting the use of savings deposits by businesses and State and local governments, the growing use of negotiable orders of withdrawal (NOW) savings accounts, which can provide the equivalent of checking services, and the use of telephonic transfers of funds from savings to checking accounts.

To the extent that these developments will continue to reduce the growth of demand for M₁ in 1977 the announced ranges for M₁ growth are consistent with a monetary policy that will encourage a stable economic recovery. If the effects of these changes are forecast correctly, then a sustained growth of M₁ beyond the new upper boundary would be more than is needed to finance the recovery, and hence it might overstimulate the economy and carry a risk of renewed inflation. However, if these structural changes cease to have this expected negative effect on M₁ demand, then a reconsideration of the ranges would be necessary to ensure that the growth in M₁ is consistent with a continuation of the recovery. In interpreting the impact of these structural changes it is important to recognize that a further slowdown in the economic recovery could be a direct cause of slower M₁ growth. If so, it would be inappropriate to adjust the growth range downward. A sustained rather than a reduced M1 growth would be an important stabilizing influence, offsetting the weakness in aggregate demand. Because the current forecast of the structural change in M1 demand is necessarily imprecise, financial developments must be closely monitored to determine the underlying causes of observed monetary growth trends.

This is not to say that the current uncertainties in the demand for M₁ suggest an abandonment of monetary growth ranges in favor of market interest rates or other money market indicators. The ranges directly act to dampen inflationary expectations by indicating a commitment to a monetary policy consistent with long-run price stability. Moreover interest rates

alone cannot serve as a guide to monetary policy, especially during periods of high and variable inflation rates. A monetary policy which attempts to hold market interest rates steady for too long would be destabilizing. In the face of an unanticipated and excessive economic boom, such a policy would result in a rapid monetary expansion which would reinforce the boom and prevent the moderating effect of a rise in interest rates. On the other hand, if an unnoticed fall in inflationary expectations developed, a policy which stabilizes market interest rates would effectively raise real rates and be contractionary. Properly interpreted, however, interest rates as well as other economic variables, such as business investment, should be useful in projecting and revising the monetary growth ranges. Because a strong growth in the capital stock is crucial both for the near-term economic expansion and for the long-run sustainability of income growth, policy must be flexible enough to minimize the risk of not providing sufficient credit for long-term productive investment.

The upper boundary for M_2 and M_3 growth has been increased by one-half of 1 percentage point since the previous Federal Reserve growth projection (Table 2), and this may provide some additional flexibility. One of

Table 2.—Projected growth rates of monetary aggregates, 1977

Period	M ₁	M ₂	M ₃
Range of percent change from a year earlier 1:			
1977 :	4½-7 4½-7 4½-6½	7½-10 7½-9½ 7½-10	9-12 9-11 9-11½

 $^{^{1}}$ Range of percent changes in M_{1} , M_{2} , and M_{3} forecast by Federal Reserve for the period.

Note.— M_1 is currency plus demand deposits; M_2 is M_1 plus time deposits at commercial banks other than large negotiable certificates of deposit; and M_3 is M_2 plus deposits at nonbank thrift innstitutions.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

the serious problems facing the monetary authorities is the choice of an appropriate measure of the money supply. Theoretical or empirical evidence does not indicate the clear superiority of any one of the measures, and at times they give conflicting indications. Throughout much of 1976, M_1 growth was near the lower boundary of its range and M_2 growth near the upper boundary. Until there is a reversal of these diverse patterns, the increase in the upper boundary for M_2 may permit a slightly faster growth of both aggregates if this is necessary to finance the recovery.

Our forecast for nominal GNP growth for the year ending in the third quarter of 1977 is about 11 percent. Along with these projected monetary growth ranges it implies that the velocity of M_1 —the ratio of GNP to M_1 —will increase by $4\frac{1}{2}$ to $6\frac{1}{2}$ percent. For the 4 quarters of 1976, M_1 velocity growth was 4.5 percent. Thus even if M_1 grows near the upper boundary of its range, velocity growth in 1977 will be about the same as in 1976. Some reduction in velocity growth normally occurs in the advanced stages of economic recoveries, especially during periods of slower economic growth

like the latter part of 1976. The $4\frac{1}{2}$ percent velocity growth of M_1 is unusually large and presupposes a continued structural shift in M_1 demand. The projections also imply that the velocity of M_2 will increase by 1 to $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent over the year ending in the third quarter of 1977. This compares with a decline in M_2 velocity over the 4 quarters of 1976. Given our GNP forecasts, velocity gains closer to the larger of the above estimates— $6\frac{1}{2}$ and $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent for M_1 and M_2 velocity respectively—would be unusual under any circumstances, and could generate a substantial increase in interest rates, unless the shift in money demand is even larger than last year.

For the longer run, fiscal policy will have to absorb proportionately more of the burden of restraint than monetary policy, if we are to meet our capital growth needs. In 1975 the Federal deficit absorbed 40 percent of the net funds raised in U.S. credit markets, and although the proportion was reduced to 30 percent in the first 3 quarters of 1976 it is not expected to be reduced further in 1977. This has not yet constrained private finance because overall credit needs have been low. As the borrowing requirements for private investment grow in the years ahead, however, fiscal stimulus will have to be lessened in order to release funds to meet these needs. Smaller Federal deficits, and eventually surpluses, will permit a less restrictive monetary policy with easier conditions in the credit market. In the years ahead aggregate demand management must rely less on consumption-oriented fiscal policy for stimulus, in order that monetary policy, which generally has a disproportionate effect on investment, is not forced to take all the burden of restraining inflationary forces.

ENERGY POLICY

Assurance of sufficient supplies of energy resources will be required to sustain a steady economic expansion. To promote this end the President has recommended an energy program which stresses expanded domestic energy production and increased utilization of our most abundant resources, particularly coal. The key feature of this program is the phased elimination of controls on prices of natural gas and oil. While such a change would entail higher prices for these products in the near term, it would help to ensure that the U.S. economy is less vulnerable to sudden changes in the availability and cost of imported resources in coming years. Moreover the most efficient production and allocation of the economy's resources, which would be encouraged by decontrol, would increase our aggregate supply capabilities and reduce inflationary pressures in the longer run.

Higher prices for oil and natural gas in the short run would reduce the relative share of imported oil and gas in total energy consumption. The higher prices would also tend to shift fuel use away from oil and natural gas in favor of coal, and this would further moderate the economic impact of price increases by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The phased elimination of price controls on natural gas would help remove the risk that a period of severe cold weather could disrupt the

economic recovery by forcing a random, unscheduled closing of factories owing to curtailment of supplies. Such forced closing did not cause significant disruptions in 1974 and 1975, when there was excess capacity; but as utilization rates increase during the next 2 years the risk of shortages in manufacturing capacity could become more serious with resulting inflationary pressures.

The President has also proposed measures to encourage the use of nuclear power. If they succeed, they will further reduce our dependence on imported oil and natural gas. Increased funds for general energy development have also been proposed. While these may contribute little in the near future, in the longer run the benefits to our energy supply capabilities could be substantial.

These actions would ease and hasten the adjustment of the economy to the new energy situation, and they would help to ensure more stable and reliable energy supplies for the future. The OPEC pricing decisions of December were a forceful reminder of the Nation's growing need for protection against foreign moves that affect the price and availability of imported oil. The proposed measures mean somewhat larger increases in domestic energy prices in the near term, and they would combine with the upward adjustments of U.S. petroleum prices under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the long overdue upward adjustments in natural gas prices under the Federal Power Commission (FPC) decisions of 1976. Taken together, however, these energy price increases would not be great enough to exert a significant restraining influence upon the expansion.

THE OUTLOOK

The main elements of continued economic growth in the United States are well established, despite the slowdown which occurred in the second half of 1976. With the assistance of the monetary and fiscal policies discussed above, and with continued strength in the private sector, real GNP is expected to rise by 5 to 5½ percent from 1976 to 1977, and its annual growth rate is expected to average between 5½ and 6 percent over the 4 quarters of 1977. This will permit a further expansion of employment and bring the rate of unemployment down to nearly 7 percent by year's end. At the same time, because the recovery over the past 2 years has avoided the excesses in public and private demand which characterized the previous upturn, the rate of inflation is not expected to rise above the 5 to 6 percent range.

With a much smaller expected rise in inventory investment compared to earlier stages of this recovery, the expansion in 1977 will require a strong growth in final demand. The expected recovery of business fixed investment will be an essential component of this demand. The proposed reduction in personal income taxes, which will stimulate a higher rate of real consumption growth, as well as the reduced corporate tax rate will help to encourage such an investment recovery. A continued strengthening of residential investment is also expected to boost the rate of growth in final sales in 1977.

PRIVATE CONSUMPTION

The growth of real disposable income slowed in the latter half of 1976 but is expected to reaccelerate in 1977 as a result of strong employment growth, the reduction in personal taxes, and moderate increases in consumer prices. Because of the slower growth in real disposable income in the latter half of 1976, the saving rate had fallen to 6 percent in the last quarter. This rate should rise in early 1977 with the start of the personal tax reductions, but for the year as a whole the saving rate is not expected to be appreciably different from the 1976 average of 6½ percent. Real consumption growth for 1977 should therefore approximate the 4 to 5 percent rate expected for real disposable income.

The growth in consumer spending in 1977 is expected to be most pronounced in the durable goods categories. The combination of a return to strong and steady real income gains and lower layoff rates should continue to restore the confidence which is essential for accelerated growth in real expenditures on durable goods. The year-over-year growth in real purchases of motor vehicles and parts is expected to be about 7–8 percent. This figure is down substantially from the 23 percent growth in 1976 but still represents an important contribution to a continued economic expansion. Another major factor bolstering spending will be the strong growth in housing completions in 1977, which should stimulate furniture and appliance sales.

NONRESIDENTIAL FIXED INVESTMENT

The growth of nonresidential fixed investment in 1976, especially in the latter part of the year, was low for this stage of recovery, and by the end of the year the real level was still well below the 1973–74 peak. With the expected increase in sales growth, and with the reduction in the corporate tax rate which will begin to affect investment later this year, real business fixed investment is expected to increase by approximately 9 percent in 1977. The projected rate of investment will provide sufficient capacity for the year ahead, but the share of investment in GNP will almost certainly remain below the average of the late 1960s.

Recent surveys of investment anticipation have indicated that current dollar expenditures in business fixed investment should increase by 11 to 13 percent in 1977. Surveys often underestimate actual new investment in periods of expansion, however, and the recent surveys may not have taken full account of the effects of the proposed cut in taxes in 1977. An increase of about 15 percent therefore seems quite possible.

Investment growth in 1977 is likely to be strongest in durable manufacturing, particularly in the automobile sector. Plant and equipment modifications for producing lighter small and intermediate-sized cars as well as for general modernization appear to be the underlying factors here. Other sectors where new investment should grow rapidly are nonelectrical

machinery and ferrous and nonferrous metals. Investment growth in non-durable manufacturing, except for petroleum refining, and in the commercial sector is expected to be comparatively weak. The sluggishness in the construction of commercial and office buildings should persist through 1977 owing to overbuilding earlier in the decade.

HOUSING STARTS AND RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT

The housing recovery, which accelerated in the third and fourth quarters of last year, should continue in 1977 and be an important factor in the growth of final demand. Total housing starts are expected to average between 1.7 and 1.8 million units this year with approximately 1.3 million single-unit starts. Since this represents a significant increase over last year, and because last year's increase was concentrated in the second half of the year, real investment in residential construction is expected to rise by 15 percent in 1977. The major sources of strength for housing in 1977 will be continued growth of real disposable income, continued strong flows of funds for mortgage credit, slightly lower mortgage rates, and some stimulus from programs of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

An important influence on residential construction is the availability and cost of long-term funds for mortgages. Short-term interest rates have declined during the recovery and savings flows to thrift institutions are likely to remain strong, making funds for mortgages readily available. Moreover the decline in secondary-market mortgage rates in the latter half of 1976 has begun to bring primary-market mortgage rates down slightly.

Until the latter half of 1976 the recovery in multifamily housing had been relatively weak. Overbuilding in 1972 and 1973 and continued low profitability on rental housing had evidently been restraining the construction of multiple-dwelling units. Vacancy rates for rental housing have finally dropped, however, and are now below the 6 percent average of 1975. These factors, coupled with the HUD Section 8 lower income housing assistance program and the \$5 billion in Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) loan commitments during 1976, should support the recent recovery in the multifamily sector.

INVENTORY INVESTMENT

The dramatic \$21-billion shift from real inventory liquidation in 1975 to positive accumulation in 1976 was a major reason for the high rate of GNP growth last year. This year we expect continued growth in inventory investment as demand advances, but the growth will be slower than last year. In real terms, inventory investment should increase only by about \$2 to \$4 billion from 1976 to 1977. In view of some apparently undesired inventory buildup last year, as well as uncertainty about the outlook for 1977, businesses can be expected to proceed cautiously in building new stocks.

NET EXPORTS

In real terms net exports of goods and services are expected to be slightly lower in 1977 than in 1976. While the change in real net exports is likely to be small, the composition of the growth in merchandise exports is expected to be very different from that in 1976.

During 1977, growth in merchandise exports is expected to be concentrated in the industrial and capital goods categories, with agricultural exports slightly below their 1976 level. This change in the composition of exports contrasts with that of last year, when rising agricultural exports were an important factor. Because exports of industrial and capital goods have a larger effect on employment than agricultural exports do, the overall economic effects of this shift could be substantial.

Developments on the import side are likely to be dominated by oil imports. Because of a large oil inventory buildup late in 1976 in anticipation of a price rise, imports early in 1977 are expected to be relatively low. By mid-year they should return to normal levels but should begin to decline again in the fourth quarter when we project Alaskan oil to become available. The volume of nonfuel imports is expected to rise fairly smoothly and gradually throughout the year.

GOVERNMENT PURCHASES

Government purchases are expected to increase rapidly in 1977 following a year of sluggish growth. Total government purchases of goods and services are projected to rise by about $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent in real terms, with Federal spending growing somewhat faster and State and local purchases somewhat slower than the overall rate. In current dollar terms the President's budget projects that Federal purchases will rise approximately 12 percent in calendar 1977.

At the State and local level the overall fiscal outlook for 1977 is significantly better than it has been for the last 2 or 3 years. State and local tax receipts should increase in line with nominal income by some 11 percent. Federal grants-in-aid—which now account for nearly 25 percent of State and local receipts—are also expected to grow substantially from 1976 to 1977. A significant portion of the increase will be for public service jobs, accelerated public works, and other antirecession assistance. In addition, general revenue sharing has been extended for 4 years at about a \$7-billion annual rate. Thus total State and local government receipts should rise by about 11 percent. Allowing for a temporary increase in surpluses in their operating accounts (which exclude receipts and expenditures from social insurance funds) an 8 to 9 percent rate of growth in current dollar purchases in 1977 appears likely. If the inflation rate averages about 6 percent, the real growth would be between 2 and 3 percent. Indeed, in view of the unusually small increase in expenditures in 1976, one could reasonably

argue that some extra catching up may take place this year, with real growth reaching the 3 to 4 percent range. On the other hand, the conservative spending behavior from 1976 may carry over into 1977, in which case real growth could fall below 2 percent.

Looking beyond 1977, the impetus for continued rapid expansion of State and local purchases is diminishing for several reasons. The growth in the school-age population has slowed notably, thus reducing the need to build new schools and hire more teachers. Moreover salaries of State and local workers have now caught up with those in the private sector. Wages and salaries account for more than half of total State and local purchases, and a major reason for the rapid growth of this sector in recent years was the drive for salary comparability. Now that parity has been achieved, it is unlikely that the rise in State and local government wage rates will diverge significantly from the economy-wide trend in wages. Finally, there appears to be strong sentiment among voters to curb the expansion of State and local spending.

These considerations point to more modest growth in State and local real expenditures in the years ahead; and, if inflation rates do not increase, nominal expenditures should grow at a rate less than the 12 percent average between 1965 and 1975. With sustained revenue growth, States and localities, taken as a whole, are therefore expected to accumulate rising surpluses. It is quite possible that those governments with positive operating surpluses will want to maintain them during the expansion to avoid the possibility of further tax increases or expenditure cuts during periods of weaker economic growth. But in the long run there is little reason for these surpluses to rise strongly, and opportunities may exist in certain jurisdictions to lower taxes.

The one cautionary note to add to this optimistic longer-term outlook concerns the funding of State and local retirement plans. These plans have become an important part of the total compensation package of State and local employees, and benefits are now paid to over 1.7 million individuals. Benefits have also become exceptionally large in recent years because they are not subject to a current budget constraint or debt limitation. Most State and local pension funds are not fully funded, which means that the assets held by the funds are not sufficient to cover the present value of all promised benefits. Consequently there is growing concern that some of these funds—particularly in large cities with a deteriorating economic base will eventually become insolvent as current contributions fail to keep up with benefits. This has already led to legal action by current and prospective beneficiaries asking that States and localities fund their retirement plans on a more current basis. At least one of these suits (in Philadelphia) has been upheld and an additional contribution has been ordered. To the extent that there is a general move toward current funding, State and local expenditures will have to rise, as will the taxes to finance them. These will be budgetary increases that do not result in a higher level of current services.

LABOR FORCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT

It is expected that the civilian labor force will grow at about 2.5 percent in 1977 compared with the 2.3 percent average annual rate of growth for the last decade. The upward trend in the rate of labor force participation by women should continue and the proportion of young persons in the workingage population should increase. The trend toward earlier retirement, however, is also expected to continue. With real GNP expected to grow by 5 to 5½ percent in 1977, a decline in the average unemployment rate for the year of a little more than one-half a percentage point would be considered normal. If labor force growth is somewhat higher, however, a slightly smaller decline is possible. By the end of the year the unemployment rate is expected to be near 7 percent.

INFLATION

The inflation outlook in 1977 should be heavily influenced by the behavior of production costs, since the economy is still some distance from the point where aggregate demand would begin exerting generalized pressure on capacity. Given the cost increases expected in 1977 and the projected growth in demand, the rate of inflation is expected to remain in the 5 to 6 percent range. To the extent that the nonrecurrent changes in food and energy prices during 1976 brought measured inflation rates below the underlying rates, the forecast for 1977 represents a moderate slowing of the rate of inflation. To some degree this slowing is a reflection of the excess supply which still exists in many sectors of the economy.

Compensation per hour is expected to increase by about $7\frac{1}{2}$ percent, slightly below the 8 percent increase in 1976. However, productivity increases are expected to be smaller than in 1976. In the very short run, productivity shifts are reflected primarily in profit changes. In the longer run, however, income shares tend to remain relatively constant. With most of the cyclical gains in labor productivity probably already realized, the productivity growth rate is expected to be in the $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 percent range this year. As a result, unit labor costs in the private sector should rise by about 5 percent. Additional improvement in the inflation rate will probably require a further slowdown in nominal compensation growth. The price of food—often an erratic component of the total inflation picture—is expected to increase only modestly in 1977 because of adequate supplies of most farm products. The rate of increase in energy prices will continue to converge toward the overall inflation rate in 1977.

1. Wages. The decline in the rate of inflation since late 1974 has had a moderating effect on the rate of increase in nominal wage demands. This source of moderation is fragile, however, since fears of a renewed inflationary spiral and of wage and price guidelines or controls could generate anticipatory wage increases. But assuming that inflationary expectations do not increase and that the overall rate of inflation is about $5\frac{1}{2}$ percent, the rate of

increase in nominal wages in 1977 should be about 7 percent. The translation of wage rate increases into compensation per hour depends on interindustry shifts in employment, changes in the relative proportion of wage to salary workers, increases in private fringe benefits, and increases in publicly mandated supplements to wages. As noted above, it is estimated that total compensation per hour of work in the private sector will rise about 7½ percent in 1977.

Although nearly one-fourth of all civilian workers are members of labor unions, only about 10 million, or 11 percent of total employees, are under major contracts covering 1,000 or more workers. Some believe, however, that wage settlements in these sectors have a disproportionate impact on overall wage developments because of a demonstration effect. Consequently, in forecasting wages it is useful to examine the collective bargaining schedule for the year ahead.

The major collective bargaining contracts that expire this year or are subject to wage renegotiation cover nearly 5 million workers (Table 3). This year will be the second consecutive year of heavy collective bargaining in the 3-year cycle. The average duration of contracts expiring in 1977 is 33 months. Thus most of these contracts were negotiated in 1974 or later, after the end of the Economic Stabilization Program and during a period of high inflation. The latter led to an expansion of coverage under cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) and high first-year wage increases. Hence some of the factors that

TABLE 3.—Calendar of major private nonfarm collective bargaining activity, 1977

Period		Cont expira		Scheduled wage reopenings	
	Principal industry	Number	Workers covered (thou- sands)	Number	Workers covered (thou- sands)
All years		2, 253	9, 984	69	261
1977: Total	••••••••••	1,033	4, 721	46	172
January February March		37	150 116 297	3	24
April	Construction	89 145 138 143	333 509 529	8 6 9	22 22 22 52
July August	Construction, mining	61 133	159 1, 381	3	12
September October November December	Transportation equipmentdo.	24	204 260 68 716	1 1 2 3	20
			3, 560 1, 703	23	8:

¹ Bargaining units for which necessary information was not available include 212 agreements which expired prior to October 1976 (when these data were tabulated) covering 1,311,400 workers and 124 contracts which expired between October 1 and December 31, 1976, covering 391,300 workers.

Note.— Major agreements are those covering 1,000 or more workers. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

led to large first-year catchup increases in 1976 (for example the absence of the COLA provision or a limit to it, as in the United Rubber Workers and Teamsters contracts) will be less significant in 1977. For example, two-thirds of the workers covered by contracts expiring in 1977 are already under cost-of-living adjustments and thus have been well protected from the effects of inflation in the past 3 years. The only major contract expiring in 1977 in which there has been a cap on the COLA is in the railroad industry.

The effective wage rate change that is likely to occur in 1977 for all persons covered by major collective bargaining agreements may be projected on the basis of current contract information. Wages change because of scheduled or deferred increases written into previous contracts, automatic cost-of-living adjustments, and first-year or currently negotiated wage increases. A tabulation of deferred wage increases, excluding COLA, scheduled for the 5 million workers in the second and third years of their contracts shows an average increase of 5½ percent for 1977, compared with 6 percent for such agreements in 1976. This implies a contribution of 2½ to 3 percentage points to the expected wage rate increase in 1977 for all workers covered by major collective bargaining agreements. Cost-of-living adjustments are expected to add another 1 percent, while first-year settlements are likely to be in the neighborhood of 8 percent. The effective wage rate increase in 1977 for workers covered by major collective bargaining agreements is thus expected to be about 7½ percent. Increases of this magnitude are consistent with our projected overall growth in compensation.

2. Food prices. Food prices are not expected to be a source of inflationary pressure in 1977. Though errors in forecasting food prices are large, one may expect the consumer price of food relative to nonfood items to fall as it did in 1976. Commodity futures prices on organized exchanges are consistent with a food component of the consumer price index (CPI) about 3 percent higher in 1977 than a year earlier, about the same increase as in 1976. This projection is roughly in line with forecasts by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. While futures prices are often inaccurate predictors, they do incorporate all the currently available information and therefore provide a useful point of reference for next year's outlook for wholesale food prices.

There are important uncertainties in the outlook for food prices. Meat prices were primarily responsible for the stability of consumer food prices in 1976. However, the supply conditions that led to lower meat prices last year are unlikely to persist throughout 1977, particularly for beef. Exactly when and how much prices for all meats will be affected is not yet clear for several reasons. First, it is uncertain how long farmers will go on reducing cattle inventories. Marketing of breeding stock could continue to sustain total beef production. Second, continued large supplies of pork and poultry will dampen upward pressure on the overall price of meat. Ample pork and poultry production seems assured through the first half of 1977, although low prices could cause this supply to taper off later in the year. Third, the

marketing margin—costs added to meat prices between the farm and retail markets—is difficult to forecast for 1977. It rose sharply in 1976, especially for pork, as larger supplies increased the demand for marketing services. If supplies begin to slacken, the reduced demand for marketing services could substantially lower the rate of increase in these margins. Thus, while cattle prices above the 1976 average are expected in 1977, the ultimate effect on retail meat prices should be tempered by lower prices for hogs and poultry than in 1976 and by slower growth in marketing margins.

Prices of fresh fruits and vegetables are even more difficult to forecast than those for meat, but they also carry less weight in the CPI. Generally, supplies of fruits and vegetables for processing should be sufficient to limit the risk of sharp price increases. Coffee prices should continue to be high. Cereal products are unlikely to be subject to significant upward price pressures in 1977 because of ample stocks of the principal food grains: wheat and rice. Milk production is expected to continue at high levels, creating the possibility of some weakness in prices. Because of low stocks of the major feed grains and oilseeds for feed, production of dairy and other livestock products late in the year will be sensitive to harvests of 1977 feed and forage crops. Current soil moisture reserve conditions in the upper Midwest are unfavorable; hence 1977 crop prospects will depend more than usual on adequate spring and summer precipitation.

3. Energy prices. During the period from 1974 to 1976, wholesale and retail prices of fuel and related products rose on average at rates in excess of the increase in overall consumer and wholesale prices. In 1976, however, these rates of growth began to converge and this movement should continue in 1977; prices of consumer energy products are expected to increase between 6 and 7 percent during the year. The recently announced increase in the price of petroleum exports imposed by members of OPEC does not alter this conclusion. The higher price of imported oil is expected to add about 1 cent per gallon to the price of domestic petroleum products, and to result in a 2 to 3 percent increase in the consumer price index for gasoline and distillate fuel oil.

Consumer and wholesale prices of natural gas contributed most to the increase in the wholesale and consumer price indexes of fuel and power during 1975 and 1976, largely owing to increases in the price of imported natural gas, primarily from Canada, and to regulatory actions by the Federal Power Commission. This trend will continue in 1977 as a result of recent decisions which permit higher prices to be charged for supplies of natural gas flowing from new domestic wells. In addition, in July 1976 the FPC raised the ceiling price for gas supplies introduced into interstate commerce during 1975 and 1976. These actions will undoubtedly lead to continued large increases in wholesale and consumer prices for natural gas in the near term. In the longer run, it is hoped that higher prices will bring forth additional supplies of natural gas which will tend to moderate future price increases.

Consumer prices of fuels during 1977 will probably not be affected by the removal of price controls on petroleum products. Controls were removed from distillate and residual fuel oils in mid-1976 without a noticeable impact on inflation. The supply of gasoline appears to be more than adequate to satisfy projected demand at prevailing prices, so that the removal of price controls from gasoline would not have adverse inflationary consequences.

PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND RESOURCE UTILIZATION

In designing economic policy to cope with cyclical fluctuations in economic activity, it is important not to overlook the longer-term issue of growth. In the past 25 years more than two-thirds of the increase in real national output has been generated by increases in average labor productivity, or output per labor-hour. Over the past decade, however, productivity growth has shown a marked decline, even after adjusting for cyclical effects. Since 1966 the trend rate of growth in measured output per labor-hour has decreased by about one-third from the rate attained in the 1950s and early 1960s. If productivity gains continue to be small, real wages will continue to grow more slowly than in the 1950–65 period.

THE PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN, 1966-76


Productivity growth in the private sector averaged 3.3 percent per year between 1948 and 1966, almost 1 percentage point above the 1929–75 average. Between 1966 and 1973, however, the private productivity growth rate was only 2.1 percent per year, below the long-run trend. This slower advance may have contributed to increased inflationary pressures and may have led to lower growth in real wages.

As shown in Chart 3 the reduction in private productivity growth is striking. While part of this poor performance can be attributed to the recent recession, the falloff in productivity was evident even before 1974. Slower growth in capital per worker, a larger proportion of less experienced workers in the labor force, and the changing industrial composition of labor input have all contributed to this slowdown. Higher relative energy prices and slower technical progress may also have played a part. However, the reasons for the slowdown are not fully understood at this time because the decline in productivity growth appears to be larger than the sum of the estimated effects of these factors.

Growth of Capital and Labor

One important source of productivity growth is the increase in the amount of capital per hour of labor input. Between 1948 and 1966 capital per labor-hour in the private sector grew by about 3.1 percent per year; during the 1966–73 period this growth rate fell to 2.8 percent per year. Since 1973 the growth of capital per labor-hour has apparently fallen to 1.7 percent,

Productivity in the Private Business Economy



after adjustment for cyclical factors. The decrease can be attributed to a faster rate of growth of labor input not matched by corresponding increases in the capital stock. The larger growth in the labor force since the mid-sixties has been a result of the postwar baby boom and of an increased percentage of women in the work force. Although the average growth rate of fixed nonresidential capital in 1966–73 was higher than the average growth rate for 1948–66, the effective growth rate of capacity may well have increased less because of higher obsolescence rates and increased expenditures on pollution abatement and safety equipment. While both types of investment contribute to our well-being they do not in general increase our capacity to produce measured output. Estimates of the contribution of increases in the capital-labor ratio to productivity growth are very sensitive to the measure of capital stock used; our analysis suggests that perhaps one-tenth to one-third of the productivity slowdown since 1966 can be explained by slower growth in effective capital per labor-hour.

Composition of the Labor Force

In the last decade the proportion of the labor force made up of teenagers and young adults has been rising. Workers in these groups tend to be less productive to the extent that they have less experience and training than other workers. Productivity is measured by output per labor-hour, and these labor-hours do not reflect differences in training and experience. Early retirement has also reduced the proportion of experienced workers. Thus lower productivity growth is a natural consequence of a fall in the average work experience of those in the labor force. Changes in the age-sex composition of the labor force can explain more than 0.1 percentage point (or about 10 percent) of the productivity growth differential between 1948–66 and 1966–73.

Median educational attainment in the labor force has also increased more slowly in the past decade than it did in the previous 10 years. In many age and sex categories of workers there has been a slight slowdown in the rate of increase in years of schooling. It is, however, unlikely that this small change had a significant effect on average productivity.

Employment Shifts Between Sectors in the Economy

Changes in the industrial composition of employment have also been a factor in lowering average productivity growth. Before 1970 the shift of workers out of agriculture contributed to growth in productivity. Even though the rate of growth of productivity in agriculture was high, the average level of productivity was below the general average, and the movement of workers from agriculture to other sectors increased aggregate productivity. Since the late 1960s this shift out of agriculture has slowed, and productivity growth from this source has been much reduced. Almost one-third of the difference between the trend rate of private productivity growth in 1948–66 and 1966–73 can be attributed to the higher rate of reduction in agricultural employment in the earlier period.

A higher rate of increase in the number of workers in the low-productivity service sector has also been a factor in the slowdown in productivity growth. However, the effect of shifts in employment in the private nonfarm sector are much smaller than the effect of the movement of workers out of agriculture.

To some extent shifts in employment between sectors and changes in the amount of capital per labor-hour measure the same thing and thus represent double counting of changes in the capital-labor ratio. Low-productivity sectors may be less capital intensive, and therefore a shift in employment toward low-productivity sectors can be accompanied by a decrease in the growth of capital per worker. There are also independent effects, however, since capital per worker can change within each sector.

Other Factors Affecting Productivity

Productivity growth that is not caused by increases in capital per labor-hour or changes in the composition of the labor force is attributed to a catchall residual category. Measurement errors of many kinds comprise part of the residual, but most of it is probably traceable to various forms of technical progress, such as improvements in the quality of capital and new techniques for combining inputs to increase production.

While allocation of resources to research and development should generate technical progress and increase residual productivity growth, the quantitative relation between productivity and research is not well documented. Even though a close causal relation between aggregate research and development expenditures and residual productivity growth cannot be proved, such expenditures and their share of total output give some indication of probable productivity growth in the future. Research and development expenditures, which grew rapidly from 1955 to 1969, have fallen in real terms since 1970. The share of research and development in GNP reached a peak of 3.0 percent in 1964 and fell to 2.3 percent in 1975.

Although changes in labor force composition and slower growth in fixed capital per worker have been a partial cause of the productivity slowdown in the last decade, much of it must be attributed to other factors. Significantly greater productivity may be generated by the technical improvements incorporated in new capital equipment, a consideration which would increase the impact of the slowdown in the growth of the capital-labor ratio. However, it seems unlikely that the effect of this "embodied" technical progress could explain most of the large difference in residual productivity growth before and after 1966.

Since the productivity slowdown coincides with the entrance into the labor market of those born during the post-World War II baby boom, the slowdown in productivity may be in part a consequence of the time required to adjust to changes in relative factor proportions. If so, productivity growth similar to that in 1966–76 may continue through 1980, since the labor force is projected to grow at relatively high rates until that time. After 1980 the growth rate of the working-age population will decline, and the labor force will expand more slowly unless the slower population growth is offset by increases in the proportion of the population in the labor force.

THE FULL-EMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

Assessing long-run trends in economic growth requires a standard to measure labor resource utilization. Although an explicit definition is difficult, the full-employment unemployment rate is generally understood to mean the lowest rate of unemployment attainable, under the existing institutional structure, that will not result in accelerated inflation. Given the inexact relation between changes in the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment, estimates are necessarily imprecise, but in the early 1960s the Council of Economic Advisers selected 4 percent as an estimate of the full-employment unemployment rate in the economic circumstances existing at that time. This estimate referred to the overall measure of unemployment as a percentage of the civilian labor force and was based on an examination of economic conditions in the mid-1950s when the overall unemployment rate fluctuated around 4 percent. During the 20 years since then a number of relevant changes have occurred which give reason to believe that the fullemployment unemployment rate equivalent to 4 percent in the mid-1950s has increased.

Since the mid-1950s a dramatic change in the composition of the labor force has apparently led to an increase in the movement of workers in and out of the labor force. High rates of labor force turnover generally increase measured unemployment, since first entry and reentry into the labor force generally involve a period of job search and are counted as unemployment in the labor force statistics. Hence for approximately the same tightness in the labor market, the measured unemployment rate will be higher if a larger proportion of job seekers are persons formerly outside the labor force.

Data on reasons for unemployment indicate that the high rates of labor force entry and reentry account for most of the higher unemployment rates among youths compared with adults, and that the unemployment rates for job losers and job leavers differ very little among demographic groups (Table 4). Youths are far more likely than adults to combine work in the labor market with some other activity such as schooling or work at home. Students move in and out of the labor force in search of part-time and full-time employment during the school recess, and during the school term many search for part-time employment. A rising proportion of youths in the labor force would therefore be associated with a rising proportion of new entrants and reentrants—and hence, other things being equal, with a rise in the unemployment rate. Since the mid-1950s teenagers and young adults have, in fact, constituted an increasing proportion of the labor force, from 15 percent in 1955 to 24 percent in 1976, because of the postwar baby boom that has increased the proportion of youths in the working-age population, and because of a rise in the labor force participation rate of students.

Table 4.—Civilian unemployment rates by age, sex, and reason for unemployment, 1973
[Percent]

Age and sex	All civilian workers ¹	Job losers and job leavers ²
25 years and over: Men Women	2. 5 4. 0	2. 0 2. 3
16-24 years: Men	9. 9 11. 2	4. 9 4. 1

¹ Unemployment as percent of civilian labor force in group specified.
2 Unemployment as percent of civilian labor force excluding new entrants and reentrants.

Sources: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics) and Council of Economic Advisers.

The difference between the overall unemployment rate and that for subgroups of the population has widened markedly since the mid-1950s, partly because of these changing labor force proportions (Table 5). The unemployment rates for adults, experienced workers, and the long-term unemployed in 1965 and 1973, were all roughly equal to the rates in 1956, a year in which the overall rate of unemployment approximated the full-employment estimate of 4 percent. Yet for the later years the overall unemployment rate was much higher, rising to 4.5 percent in 1965 and to 4.9 percent in 1973.

Table 5.—Civilian unemployment rates for selected groups, 1956, 1965, and 1973 (Percent 1)

Group	1956	1965	1973
All civilian workers	4. 1	4. 5	4. 9
Experienced wage and salary workers	4. 4	4. 3	4. 5
	. 8	1. 0	. 9
Age groups: 25-54 years 55 years and over 16-24 years	3. 3	3. 2	3. 2
	3. 4	3. 2	2. 7
	8. 5	10, 1	10. 5

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The apparent secular rise in the unemployment rate for young persons relative to adults suggests that the change in the composition of the labor force does not explain all of the shift between the overall unemployment rate and the rate for adults. Direct data are not available, but some of this change in the structure of unemployment rates may be due to increased movement in and out of the labor force by youths. Among youths there has been an increase in school enrollment rates since the mid-1950s and students are more likely than other youths to alternate between working or job seeking and attending school.

There also appears to have been an increase in the measured unemployment rate for adult women relative to adult men, but because of a change in the survey the data reported after 1967 are not strictly comparable with earlier years. Moreover how greatly this survey change has affected the difference in unemployment rates between adult men and adult women is uncertain. If there has been a rise in the actual unemployment rate of adult women relative to adult men, it may be due to an increase in labor force participation for married women. Many married women leave the labor force when a child is born and return intermittently for several years. A disproportionate increase in the component of the adult female labor force in which the labor force turnover is highest would thus tend to raise the unemployment rate of adult females relative to that of adult men. Because the estimates of these developments are still uncertain, however, it is difficult to assess their influence on the overall unemployment rate.

Other developments in the past 20 years may have tended to increase the full-employment unemployment rates of all demographic groups. For example, broader coverage of unemployment compensation is likely to raise the rate of unemployment associated with a particular degree of tightness in the labor market. The most recent extension of coverage, in 1975, placed an estimated 12 million wage and salary workers under the temporary special unemployment assistance program. As a result of 1976 legislation, coverage under the regular State programs is to be extended to about 9 million of these 12 million workers. Other circumstances suggest that the financial burden of unemployment has been lessened for many families: the rise in the proportion of families with two adult earners because of the growth in

Unemployment as a percent of civilian labor force in group specified, except as noted.
 Unemployed 15 weeks or longer as percent of total civilian labor force.

women's labor force participation; and an increase in other public transfer programs for the low-income unemployed. These factors have tended to weaken the tie between current consumption and current earnings, and they may have increased the extent of unemployment that is consistent with a full-employment economy.

Other changes may have had the opposite effect. These include the rising level of education, the relative increase in white-collar occupations, and more efficient job search because of improvements in transportation and communication. Because the reasons for differences in unemployment rates by education level are not well understood, it is not clear whether the rise in education by itself has been accompanied by a stable or a changing education-specific full-employment unemployment rate for given age and sex groups. The effects of improved labor market efficiency are also ambiguous since it is not clear whether greater efficiency in the search for jobs lessens the rate of unemployment at full employment.

There is no unique procedure for adjusting the full-employment unemployment rate for the changing demographic composition of the labor force and for the changing relationships in the unemployment rates of various demographic groups. Moreover any estimating procedure is subject to sampling variability. Using available data on labor force composition and unemployment rates, and adjusting for the increased proportion of young persons in the labor force and for the increase in their unemployment rate relative to adults, the Council of Economic Advisers has estimated that the full-employment unemployment rate equivalent to 4.0 percent in 1955 is now 4.9 percent. This estimate corresponds with the widening in the difference between the overall unemployment rate and the unemployment rate for adults observed in Table 5.

The effects of many of the other factors which are believed to influence the full-employment unemployment rate are much more difficult to quantify. Partly because of this difficulty there is considerable dispute about their relative importance, but it is likely that they have raised the full-employment unemployment rate even higher than the current estimate, perhaps closer to $5\frac{1}{2}$ percent. The current benchmark estimates, however, incorporate only the effects for which the evidence is substantial. As further evidence becomes available—perhaps through more data on unemployed persons classified by reason for unemployment, or perhaps through observed changes in wages and prices as actual unemployment rates decline—the current estimate of the full-employment unemployment rate might be further refined.

It is important to bear in mind, however, that the full-employment unemployment rate will not remain constant. For example, as the population ages and youths represent a smaller percentage of the labor force, the full-employment unemployment rate will also tend to decline. The overall unemployment rate that represents full employment can be expected to change with time as demographic, social, and economic factors affect the rates at which workers move in and out of jobs, and in and out of the work force.

GROWTH IN POTENTIAL OUTPUT

Potential GNP is a measure of the aggregate supply capability of the economy, or the amount of output that could be expected at full employment. More precisely, potential GNP is the output the economy could produce with the existing technology under assumed conditions of high but sustainable utilization of the factors of production—labor, capital, and natural resources. It does not represent the absolute maximum level of production that could be generated by wartime or other abnormal levels of aggregate demand, but rather that which could be expected from high utilization rates obtainable under more normal circumstances.

The significant slowdown in average productivity growth suggests that the rate of growth of potential output was lower in the past 10 years than has been previously estimated. The revision of the national income and product accounts also reduced the rate of growth of real GNP. Moreover the widespread shortages of physical capacity and the resulting inflationary pressures experienced in 1973 suggest that previous estimates of potential GNP are overstated. The Council has therefore reestimated potential GNP, taking into account the lowered rate of productivity growth, the factors contributing to this slowdown, and the increase in the full-employment unemployment rate. The new estimates of potential output are experimental in the sense that they are based on highly aggregated measures of labor, capital, and output; and they must therefore be considered interim revisions. A more definitive study would use disaggregated data on labor and capital inputs and more evidence on the education and experience of the work force.

Estimates of Potential GNP

The benchmark level of resource utilization implicit in the Council of Economic Advisers' previous estimates of potential output was an overall unemployment rate of 4 percent; it was assumed that full utilization of other resources, such as capital and land, would accompany 4 percent unemployment. The new estimates of potential attempt to include explicitly the contribution to output of fixed capital; hence a benchmark for capital utilization as well as for labor utilization must be set. Full employment of fixed capital is assumed to be attained when the manufacturing capacity utilization index calculated by the Department of Commerce reaches 86 percent. This is the capacity utilization rate attained in the first and second quarters of 1973. In 1969, another year of high employment, manufacturing capacity utilization was 85 percent; 86 percent is thus a relatively optimistic estimate of sustainable capacity utilization. The capacity utilization index that represents the same degree of resource utilization may change over time, since capital input is at least as heterogeneous as labor input. A higher proportion of old equipment in the capital stock would probably lower the capacity utilization benchmark. Inadequate data make estimation of such a variable benchmark very difficult, however, and it has not been attempted here.

The full-employment benchmark has been changed from a constant 4 percent unemployment rate to a rate that varies over time. The new labor utilization benchmark adjusts for the increase in the proportion of younger workers in the labor force since 1955, and for the observed increase in unemployment rates for younger workers relative to those for adults. As discussed earlier, these adjustments imply a rate that rises from 4.0 percent in 1955 to 4.9 percent in 1976. The definition of the new estimate of potential GNP in 1976 is, then, the output in 1972 dollars that the economy would produce if the Department of Commerce manufacturing capacity utilization rate were 86 percent and the unemployment rate 4.9 percent.

The new potential GNP estimates are compared to the previous estimates in Table 6, and are shown graphically in Chart 4. The average annual growth rate of potential from 1962 to 1976 is now estimated to be 3.6 percent per year, a reduction from the former estimate of 3.9 percent per year; and the rate is projected to be about $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent per year in the near future. The reduction in the growth of potential GNP results in an estimate that is \$58 billion in 1972 dollars (or about 4 percent) lower in 1976 than that previous estimate of potential. Most of the reduction in the estimate of the growth of potential output is due to slower growth in labor productivity since 1966. In 1976, \$30 to \$40 billion of the estimated reduction in potential output can be attributed to this factor.

Some of the reduction in the growth rate of potential output can also be attributed to the recent benchmark revisions of the national income and product accounts, which incorporate new source data and estimating procedures. The revised real GNP estimates are evaluated in terms of 1972 rather than 1958 prices. The result of these changes has been to lower growth rates of real GNP.

The change in the unemployment benchmark lowers slightly our estimates of how the expanding labor force has increased potential GNP. Using a full-employment benchmark of 4.0 percent rather than 4.9 percent in 1976 would raise potential GNP by 0.3 percent to 1.1 percent, depending on how the reduction in unemployment is distributed over the labor force. Thus between \$5 billion and \$15 billion of the \$58 billion reduction in potential for 1976 can be attributed to the change in the assumed unemployment rate at potential.

The downward revision in potential GNP results in a current growth rate for potential output that is about the same as the 3½ percent per year originally estimated by the Council of Economic Advisers for the period from 1952 to 1962. Increases in the labor force growth rate since that time have been offset by decreases in the rate of productivity growth, yielding a growth rate of potential output which is nearly constant. This downward revision does not appear to be sensitive to the particular method which we have used to estimate potential. Experiments with a number of alternative procedures give similar results and indicate that the new estimates are robust, given current information. For example, a calculation for the period from

TABLE 6.—Potential and actual gross national product, 1952-76

[Billions of 1972 dollars]

	Potential	GNP		GNP	gap
Year	New	Old	Actual GNP	New (new potential less actual)	Old (old potential less actual)
1952	584. 9	592. 2	598. 5	-13.6	—6. 3
1953	608. 2	613. 0	621. 8	-13.6	—8. 8
1954	629. 7	634. 4	613. 7	16.0	20. 7
1955	651. 4	656, 6	654. 8	-3. 4	1. 8
1956	673. 9	679, 6	668. 8	5. 1	10. 8
1957	697. 2	703, 4	680. 9	16. 3	22. 5
1958	721. 3	728, 0	679. 5	41. 8	48. 5
1959	746. 2	753, 5	720. 4	25. 8	33. 1
1960	771. 9	779, 9	736. 8	35. 1	43. 1
1961	798. 6	807, 1	755. 3	43. 3	51. 8
1962	826. 4	835, 4	799. 1	27. 3	36. 3
1963	857. 1	865, 9	830. 7	26. 4	35. 2
1964	890. 3	898, 4	874. 4	15. 9	24. 0
1965	925. 0	932. 1	925, 9	9	6. 2
1966	960. 8	967. 0	981, 0	-20.2	14. 0
1967	996. 3	1, 003. 3	1, 007, 7	-11.4	4. 4
1967	1, 031. 7	1, 040. 9	1, 051, 8	-20.1	10. 9
1968	1, 068. 3	1, 081. 6	1, 078, 8	-10.5	2. 8
1970	1, 106. 2	1, 124. 9	1, 075. 3	30. 9	49. 6
1971	1, 145. 5	1, 169. 9	1, 107. 5	38. 0	62. 4
1972	1, 186. 1	1, 216. 7	1, 171. 1	15. 0	45. 6
1973	1, 228. 2	1, 265. 4	1, 235. 0	—6. 8	30. 4
1974	1, 271. 7	1, 315. 9	1, 214. 0	57. 7	101. 9
1975	1, 316. 9	1, 368. 6	1, 191. 7	125. 2	176. 9
	1, 363. 6	1, 421. 2	11, 265. 0	1 98. 6	1 156. 2

¹ Prefiminary.

1968 to 1973 which adds labor force growth of 2.0 percent to productivity growth of 1.8 percent and subtracts 0.3 percent for the decline in average hours worked per week, all at annual rates, yields a growth rate of potential output amounting to 3.5 percent per year. More research would be useful, however, to further our understanding of the determinants of the economy's potential and the relation between the growth of potential and economic policy. The attempt made here to incorporate the effects of capital accumulation and labor force composition on economic growth is a step in this direction.


The decline in average hours worked is also a factor which contributes to a slower growth in potential output than might be expected from the high rate of growth in the labor force. Between 1966 and 1973 the tendency toward shorter workweeks accelerated somewhat. The slightly accelerated decline in the average workweek, added to the effect of the changing composition of the labor force, implies a growth rate of effective labor input (labor hours weighted by average hourly earnings) that is significantly lower than the growth rate of the labor force. For example, from 1966 to 1973 the civilian labor force grew by 2.3 percent per year, while effective

Note.—See text in this chapter on "Productivity Growth and Resource Utilization" for differences between the old and new potential GNP.

Sources: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (actual GNP) and Council of Economic Advisers (potential GNP).

Chart 4

Gross National Product, Actual and Potential



SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.

labor input grew by only 1.5 percent per year. Therefore, although the rapidly growing labor force implies a high rate of growth in potential output, reductions in the average workweek and changes in the age-sex composition of the labor force indicate that the increases are somewhat lower.

Productivity behavior since 1973 raises a further question about the current level of potential output. In the most recent downturn, the productivity decline started earlier and was much more severe than might have been expected from earlier recessions. The data indicate that part of this decrease may have been a permanent downward shift in the level of productivity. A conservative estimate of this shift lowers potential output to \$1,330 billion in 1976. Thus the GNP gap may be about \$30 billion lower than indicated.

There is reason to expect such a drop in productivity to accompany the OPEC oil embargo and the subsequent quadrupling of crude oil prices. The new high energy prices should have made some capital equipment and some energy-intensive production processes inefficient, with a consequent loss in economic capacity. This loss would not be included in capital stock estimates, because the method normally used for estimating the aggregate capital stock depreciates new investment over a fixed period and does not adjust for short-term changes in obsolescence.

The statistical methods used to adjust for cyclical variations in productivity are necessarily based on the presumption that the variations in productivity over the business cycle are related in a stable way to measures of the cycle, such as the unemployment rate and capital utilization rates. Since the data indicate that the current slowdown may have produced an atypical reaction in productivity, it is possible that productivity will continue to increase and reach its former trend in the next 2 years. This possibility would imply private productivity growth rates for 1977 and 1978 well in excess of the 2 percent trend.

On the other hand, it has been nearly 2 years since the recession reached its trough, and there has been little evidence of cyclical productivity gains this late in previous recoveries. Because of this uncertainty regarding the permanence of the recent decline in productivity, estimates of potential output will be similarly uncertain. The estimates of potential GNP presented in Table 6 and Chart 4 do not include a shift in the level of productivity in 1973–74, but instead assume that the downward movement will be offset by an equivalent upward movement as recovery continues. The performance of the economy over the next 2 years will indicate whether or not a further revision in the estimates of potential GNP is necessary.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Neither potential GNP nor the full-employment unemployment rate will be reached in 1977. However, both may set limits to growth in coming years which cannot be exceeded without risking accelerating inflation and renewed instability. For example, the uncertainty that surrounds the estimates of potential output implies that caution must be observed as potential GNP is approached. If the 1974–75 reduction in the level of productivity proves to be permanent, physical capacity constraints similar to those encountered in 1973 may appear well before an unemployment rate of 4.9 percent is reached. If so, they will seriously interfere with our full-employment goals.

As discussed previously, there are reasons to believe that the full-employment rate may be above the 4.9 percent benchmark we have used to estimate potential output. In any case, policy makers should realize that a 4 percent goal is not likely to be sustainable in the current economic environment; and because of the tentative nature of the full-employment rate estimates they should watch closely for signs of accelerating wage inflation when the overall rate of unemployment falls to about 5½ percent. The analysis suggests, for example, that the 4.9 percent unemployment rate in 1973 may have been partly responsible for the accelerating inflation in 1973–74, although this interpretation is clouded by other events such as the wage and price controls and the extraordinary increases in the prices of food and fuel. It also suggests that economic programs which aim to reduce unemployment in particularly depressed areas or among disadvantaged

groups can be a useful supplement to policies which focus on the economy as a whole. Moreover it must be remembered that even with our revised estimates, the current output is far below potential, and unemployment is much above full-employment levels. Thus aggregate demand policies, such as the tax program proposed by the President, are still necessary to reduce unemployment and close the existing gap between potential and actual output.

The uncertainty about the lowest rate of unemployment that will not result in accelerating inflation also has important policy implications. Not too long ago economic policy makers were able to illustrate the difficulties of achieving both a stable price level and a full-employment economy by referring to the fairly close negative association between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate during the 1950s and early 1960s. While it was never thought to be exact, the relationship indicated the inevitable upward pressure of high utilization of labor and capital on prices and wages, and it was used to calculate the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. According to this relationship, the cost of an excessively low unemployment rate was a higher, though not necessarily increasing, rate of inflation.

During the last 10 years, however, this relationship has shifted dramatically and the concept of a stable tradeoff has become untenable. Nevertheless it is difficult to deny the essential fact that excessive expansion and extremely low unemployment rates ultimately produce higher and perhaps accelerating inflation. Nor can one deny that a slack economy with low utilization of capital and labor resources is usually a moderating influence on prices and wages. However, because of an economy-wide persistence in price and wage inflation, these excess demand and excess supply effects sometimes seem to work very slowly, with their influence spread over a long period.

In the long run the lower estimated growth rate of potential output, if projected into the future, implies a decrease in the "fiscal dividend" to be gained from full employment. Projection of the new potential GNP estimates through 1980 gives an output that is 4.8 percent lower than the previous estimate, a difference amounting to about \$130 billion in current dollars. The estimate of Federal tax receipts in 1980 is thus more than \$30 billion lower if output is assumed to be the new potential GNP rather than the old estimate. Lower total output implies lower tax revenues available for further tax cuts or for new or expanded Federal Government programs.

The challenge for the future will be to devise new policies to cope with the problems of economic growth and productivity. Increased productivity growth is necessary if the economy is to provide jobs without incurring declines in the growth of real income for the many new workers in the labor force. Chapter 4 in this *Report* discusses several areas in which microeconomic policies have been devised or are being considered to increase production and employment beyond levels attainable through the management of aggregate demand.

CHAPTER 2

Economic Review of 1976

THE ECONOMIC EXPANSION continued last year. Real gross national product (GNP) rose 6.2 percent, as projected in the last Report. The growth of output was unexpectedly strong in the first quarter, but fell below expectations during the rest of the year (Table 7). The rise in real GNP has been slightly greater since the trough in the first quarter of 1975 than the average rise over similar periods in the last four expansions, partly because of the exceptional depth of the last recession. The depth of the recession also accounted for the substantial excess capacity that remained at year-end, when the gap between actual and potential output was 8 percent and the unemployment rate was just under 8 percent. For the year as a whole the unemployment rate averaged 7.7 percent, 0.8 percentage point lower than in 1975, and employment increased by 2.7 million persons.

Excess capacity helped moderate last year's rate of inflation. The GNP deflator slowed to 5 percent last year from 7 percent during 1975 in spite of the large year-to-year rise of output. The slackening of inflation is a reflection of slower rates of increase in both labor compensation per hour and profits per unit of output. Smaller rises in food prices and a legislated rollback of oil prices helped in the slowing of inflation.

At year-end there were signs of some reacceleration of the economy, though real GNP rose at a 3 percent annual rate for the last quarter as a whole. A rapid growth of retail sales took place within the quarter, starting from a depressed September level, and auto sales rose rapidly from low levels early in the quarter when supplies were limited. Housing starts and residential investment grew very rapidly from third-quarter averages. Business fixed investment, which had been recovering for a year, was little changed from the third quarter, largely because of a sharp drop in car and truck purchases that also reflected limited supplies.

DEMAND AND OUTPUT

The rise of real GNP initially accelerated to a 9 percent annual rate, but then decelerated to a 33/4 percent annual rate over the last 3 quarters of last year. The unevenness of GNP growth was largely due to change in the rate of inventory accumulation. Early in 1976 GNP was increased by a large change

Table 7.—Changes in gross national product in constant (1972) dollars, 1975-76

[Percent change; quarterly changes at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Component	1975	1976 1	1976				
	19/5	19/01	1	II	111	IV 1	
Percent change in 1972 dollars:							
Total GNP	-1.8	6 2	9. 2	4. 5	3. 9	3.0	
Personal consumption expenditures Durable goods Nondurable goods Services	1.5 4 .9 2.6	5. 5 12. 3 4. 3 4. 5	8. 8 23. 2 6. 8 6. 2	4. 0 3. 0 3. 8 4. 6	3. 6 3. 2 1. 7 5. 3	5. 4 2. 3 8. 5 3. 9	
Business fixed investment Residential investment	-13.3 -14.7	3.8 22.7	7. 8 22. 3	8. 3 15. 1	9. 6 16. 1	37. 8 37. 0	
Government purchases Federal purchases State and local purchases	1. 8 . 4 2. 6	1. 3 1. 0 1. 4	-4. 9 -7. 2 -3. 5	2. 6 2. 5 2. 7	2. 9 5. 7 1. 4	. 4 3. 5 —1, 3	
Addenda:					,		
Final sales Domestic final sales	1 7	4, 3 5. 0	3. 7 6. 0	4. 2 4. 5	4. 3 4. 5	4.8 5.0	
Change in billions of 1972 dollars:							
Inventory accumulation	-20.5 6.1	21.1 -6.7	15. 9 6. 5	. 7 6	9 3	-5.5 4	

¹ Preliminary.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

in inventory investment, while the pace of inventory accumulation slowed considerably at year-end, pushing GNP growth to its lowest rate of the year. The growth rate of final sales was much steadier, averaging 4½ percent during the year. Consumption expenditures slowed after a rapid growth in the first quarter, but then accelerated at year-end. Consumption at midyear was restrained by a slow growth of personal income. The buildup of inventories in the first quarter led to cautious production and employment policies by business. Wage rates and government transfers also rose less than was expected and farm income declined. There was unexpected slowness in growth of government purchases early in the year, when public spending in many categories was below expectations. Investment, however, was weak in the final quarter of the year.

PERSONAL CONSUMPTION

Real personal consumption expenditures rose 5.5 percent in 1976. After increasing 6.1 percent in the year ending in the first quarter of 1976, real expenditures grew more slowly during the rest of the year.

Real disposable income is the most important determinant of long-run real consumption. Individuals tend to retain their consumption patterns for some time after a given change in income. In the short run the effects of income changes tend to be divided between savings and the purchases of durable items. During 1975 and 1976 the rate of growth in real consumption roughly followed the rate of growth in real disposable income (Table 8). After a period of relatively fast growth from the first quarter of 1975 through the

Table 8.—Growth of real consumption expenditures and real disposable personal income. 1975-76

[Seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Period		Real dispos- able personal income
Percent change:		
1975 I to 1975 III	5. 6	7.2
From preceding quarter:		
1975: IV	4. 5	4. 9
1976: I	8. 8 4. 0 3. 6 5. 4	6. 1 4. 7 . 7 3. 7

¹ Preliminary.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

first quarter of 1976, the rise in real disposable income slowed, especially in the third quarter. Because the slowdown in income growth may have been viewed initially as temporary and because a cushion was provided by the high savings of 1975, the slowdown in consumption was less pronounced and more steady. The personal saving rate fell from 7.0 percent in the first half of 1976 to 6.2 percent in the last half.

Real expenditures for consumer durables have been the largest contributor to the recovery in final sales in the current expansion, growing by 23 percent from the very depressed last quarter of 1974 through the fourth quarter of 1976. After a 23 percent annual rate increase in the first quarter of 1976, however, the growth of real expenditures on durable goods slowed to a 3 percent annual rate on average over the last 3 quarters. These movements in durables were dominated by purchases of motor vehicles and parts, which grew 45 percent from the last quarter of 1974 through the first quarter of 1976. Growth slowed to 3.0 and 1.5 percent respectively in the second and third quarters, and then declined by 9.0 percent at an annual rate in the strike-affected fourth quarter.

The significant slowdown in growth of real consumer durables sales in the second quarter, particularly sales of new domestic automobiles, was influenced by factors other than real disposable income. Shortages existed in some intermediate and large car lines. Changes in the relative price of automobiles may also have had an effect. The deflator for new domestic autos grew at a 9.4 percent annual rate from the third quarter of 1975 through the first quarter of 1976 as rebates and other discounts offered in 1975 were phased out and list prices on the 1976 domestic models increased. Some effects of this inflation in new automobile prices apparently continued beyond the first quarter. As individuals attempted to substitute used for new cars, the implicit deflator for used cars rose by an extraordinary 12.2 percent from the first quarter to the second and continued to rise strongly in the third quarter. The increase in domestic auto prices would appear to have been a factor in the rise in foreign car sales after the first quarter.

Relative price movements were apparently important in the real consumption of some nondurable items too. In particular, food prices were virtually constant throughout 1976 and helped the real value of food consumption to rise 5.2 percent for the year even though real incomes grew only 4.1 percent. Energy consumption was also significantly affected by relative price movements, as noted elsewhere in this chapter.

BUSINESS FIXED INVESTMENT

Real business fixed investment increased 4 percent last year, about the amount forecast in last year's *Report*. From lows reached in the second half of 1975 real business fixed investment grew at an 8½ percent average annual rate over the first 3 quarters. Largely because of the Ford Motor Company strike, growth slowed to a 1 percent annual rate in the fourth quarter. Real investment, apart from motor vehicles, rose at substantially better than a 10 percent annual rate in that quarter.

Probably most important in starting the recovery of investment were the optimistic sales expectations stimulated by the rapid increase in consumption expenditures through 1975 and early 1976. An additional thrust came from a much improved cash flow and somewhat lower interest rates, particularly for firms with lower credit ratings. Rapidly rising labor and energy costs relative to fixed investment costs have also provided an incentive to invest in plant and equipment. The increases in the investment tax credit in 1975 further enhanced the after-tax profitability of equipment investment.

Plant and equipment expenditures by nondurable goods manufacturers increased more rapidly in 1976 than the expenditures by durables manufacturers. Industries showing strong growth include motor vehicles, textiles, food, paper, and electric utilities (Table 9).

Table 9.—Changes in plant and equipment expenditures, 1974-76

[Percent change]

Industry	1974	1975	1976
	actual	actual	expected ¹
All industries	12.7	0.3	7. 5
Manufacturing	21. 0	4. 2	10. 5
Durable goods 2	17. 5	-3. 4	8. 0
	29. 2	2. 0	11. 6
	18. 0	-23. 4	20. 3
Nondurable goods 2. Food including beverages Textiles. Paper	24. 7	11. 6	12. 5
	4. 6	. 2	19. 8
	9. 9	21. 0	26. 5
	38. 8	14. 3	17. 8
Nonmanufacturing 2	7.6	-2.4	5. 3
Mining	16. 2	19. 4	4. 7
Electric utilities	10. 6	-3. 6	11. 4

¹ Based on actual expenditures in 1975 and expected expenditures in 1976 (actuals for first 3 quarters and expected for fourth quarter).

fourth quarter).

2 Includes some industries not shown separately.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Last year's Report noted that investment held up quite well during the recession in those industries which faced capacity constraints in 1973. In the past year capacity growth in the paper, chemicals, and petroleum refining industries has been above 3 percent, reflecting substantial investment in these industries over the past 2 years. In paper, however, the operating rate is perhaps high enough that constraints on capacity for the most refined kinds of paper could occur in the next year. In iron and steel, another industry of shortages in 1973, capacity has recently been growing at about 2 percent annually, close to the long-term trend growth rate of steel usage. There was a slowing of investment last year by steelmakers, however, following the very sizable acceleration in 1975. Other industries are operating considerably below capacity levels and shortages in 1977 are unlikely.

INVENTORY INVESTMENT

Real inventory investment in the national income and product accounts (NIPA) reflects the difference between aggregate production and deliveries. With real consumption expenditures growing strongly in the last half of 1975 and the first quarter of 1976, and with completion of the massive inventory adjustment of 1975, production increased very sharply in the first quarter of 1976 as firms moved to keep output in line with the anticipated growth of final sales. With an only modest rise in total final sales, inventory investment in the first quarter was \$10.4 billion, compared with a decline of \$5.5 billion in the fourth quarter of 1975. The \$15.9-billion swing in the first quarter of 1976 accounted for more than half of the 9.2 percent annual rate increase in gross national product in that quarter. Inventory investment did not accelerate later in the year, since slower growth of retail sales gave rise to conservative orders and production policies in many businesses.

The NIPA nonfarm business inventory-to-sales ratio stayed in the neighborhood of 0.272 throughout last year. This was below the peak levels of about 0.300 at the trough of the recession but was still significantly above the approximately 0.250 levels of the 1972–73 period, a fact suggesting that inventory accumulation will not accelerate sharply in the immediate future. The book value of manufacturers' work-in-process inventories, which was not rising at the beginning of the year, rose in the second half, reflecting the moderately strong growth in producers' durable equipment.

HOUSING AND RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT

The 1976 recovery in residential investment reflected the recovery in housing starts which began in 1975. Real residential investment grew at an 18 percent annual rate in the first 3 quarters of 1976 and accelerated to a 37 percent annual growth rate in the fourth quarter. Housing demand became one of the most favorable developments during a period of general weakness in the economy. A strong 11 percent increase in total housing starts in

August was followed by a 20 percent increase in September, bringing the seasonally adjusted annual rate to 1.84 million units. Total starts then remained strong in the last months of the year.

Starts of multifamily dwelling units were important in the acceleration of starts in 1976. Rental vacancy rates fell from above 6 percent late in 1975 and remained about 5½ percent during most of 1976. A strong rise in multifamily rental absorption rates was also indicative of stronger demand for rental housing.

Federal assistance programs also encouraged housing construction. In January, \$3 billion in Government National Mortgage Association 7½ percent commitment funds was released, with an additional \$2 billion in September, and by the second half of the year the subsidized leasing program authorized by section 8 of the Housing and Urban Development Act began to affect the building of new multifamily units. By the end of the year it was estimated that approximately 40,000 apartment units had been started under the section 8 program, though the incremental impact on housing construction is smaller in that some of these units would have been constructed without the program.

Financial developments were favorable to housing in 1976, especially in the second half of the year. Interest rates in the short-term money markets did not increase in the way that many had anticipated and in fact they declined in the latter part of the year. By the end of the year market interest rates were below rates on time deposits of similar maturities at financial intermediaries. This situation encouraged continued savings flows into thrift institutions and made funds for home mortgages readily available. In addition, the continued fall in all long-term interest rates in the second half of the year reduced mortgage interest rates. The Federal Housing Administration series on new-home mortgages in the secondary market fell from 9.41 percent in December 1975 to 8.45 percent last December but had a neligible impact on mortgage rates in the primary market in 1976.

GOVERNMENT PURCHASES

Total government purchases in real terms rose by 1.3 percent in 1976, less than in 1975 and below the rate forecast at the beginning of last year. Real Federal purchases grew by 1.0 percent for the year. (A detailed discussion of Federal spending is presented elsewhere in this chapter.) Real purchases of goods and services by State and local governments rose by only 1.4 percent in 1976, the lowest real growth since 1951.

There has been a downward trend in rates of growth of real State and local government purchases since the late 1960s, partly because the steady slowing of population growth has reduced the demand for additional services. The deceleration of spending appears to have been sharpened in 1976 by a delayed reaction to the 1974–75 recession and ensuing financial difficulties experienced by some States and local units. The widely publicized

budgetary crisis of New York City emphasized the dangers of an excessive expansion of current services financed by borrowing. The unusually slow growth of State and local spending in 1976 was thus in part a cyclical correction to bring expenditures in line with receipts and eliminate operating deficits. By the fourth quarter of 1976, State and local operating balances in the aggregate moved back into surplus for the first time since late 1973.

The slowdown in State and local spending was most pronounced in new construction, which fell about 8 percent in nominal terms in 1976. The bulk of the decline occurred early in the year and was concentrated in new school building and highway construction. In addition, State and local employment grew by 2.7 percent in 1976, compared with 5.0 percent a year earlier and with an average rate of growth of 4.8 percent between 1955 and 1975. Moreover, most of the increase in employment came early in 1976. To some extent the slower growth in 1976 in employment can be attributed to the expansion of federally funded public service employment jobs in 1975.

NET EXPORTS

On an NIPA basis, nominal net exports of goods and services declined by \$15.8 billion from the fourth quarter of 1975 to the fourth quarter of 1976. In real terms the decline amounted to \$7.8 billion. The decrease largely reflects a return to more normal trade balances from the cyclically high export surplus recorded in 1975. Real exports increased 2.0 percent during 1976 and real imports increased 13.7 percent. Export prices rose 5.6 percent over the same period, while the increase for import prices was 6.5 percent.

Most of the shift in real net exports was accounted for by changes in merchandise trade. Shipments from abroad in late 1976 were 18 percent above their level at the end of 1975. Most of this increase in volume was accounted for by a 26 percent rise in imports of fuels. The volume of merchandise exports changed negligibly as a rise in agricultural sales abroad offset a small decline in other sales. The real surplus on service transactions, including investment income, rose from \$6.4 billion in 1975 to about \$8 billion in 1976. This increase reflects in part a trend growth in the surplus on investment incomes.

PRICES, WAGES, AND PROFITS

The rates of growth in both prices and wages were smaller last year than in any of the preceding 3 years. Real wages increased after 2 years of decline. Corporate profits also rose with the economic recovery.

PRICES

The rate of inflation slowed significantly during 1976 to about 5 percent for both the GNP deflator and the consumer price index (CPI). Increases from the four quarter of 1975 to the fourth quarter of 1976 in many of the

main price indexes were significantly lower than during 1975 and at least 7 percentage points below the 1974 figures (Table 10).

The overall declines in the measured rates of inflation during 1976 probably exaggerate the decline in the underlying rate of inflation during the year. Declines in the prices of food and energy-related products in the first part of the year, which are not likely to recur in the near future, helped bring the overall inflation rate below a currently sustainable level. Although any decomposition of inflation changes into temporary and longerrun factors is subject to considerable error, more restrained wage increases in most sectors indicate that some of last year's decline in inflation may be more lasting. The absence of significant demand pressures on capacity and the damping of inflationary expectations have been important forces in this more permanent decline.

The rates of price increase for all major components of the CPI were well below the peak rates of 1974. Compared to 1975 rates, the rates of price increase declined for durables and nondurables and did not change for services. Consumer price increases for energy continued toward convergence with the overall inflation rate, rising at a much slower rate than during 1974 and 1975. In the first quarter the CPI for energy fell,

Table 10.—Changes in selected price measures, 1973-76 [Percent change: quarterly changes at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

j	1973 IV	1974 IV	1975 IV		19	76	
Price measure	to 1974 IV	1975 IV	1976 IV 1	ı	Ħ	111	ĮV i
GNP implicit price deflators:							
Total GNP	11.5	7.1	4.7	3. 2	5. 2	4. 4	6. 2
Business Nonfarm Farm	11.7 12.7 -12.4	7. 2 6. 6 10. 3	4, 2 5, 1 15, 4	2. 3 4. 4 -38. 4	5. 2 3. 7 52. 2	4. 0 5. 9 -32. 6	5. 5 6. 5 18. 9
Personal consumption expenditures	11.9	6.0	4.7	3.9	4. 1	5. 5	5. 4
Durable goods 2 Nondurable goods 2 Food. Gasoline and oil. Fuel oil and coal. Services.	14.7	5. 6 5. 1 5. 3 11. 3 8. 5 7. 2	5. 7 2. 7 . 6 2. 6 5. 1 6. 3	5. 4 . 5 -1. 7 -13. 4 -8. 8 7. 1	6. 7 1. 6 1. 1 -5. 1 2. 8 5. 6	3. 6 4. 8 1. 4 19. 1 17. 5 6. 8	6. 9 4. 1 1. 7 13. 2 10. 6 5. 8
Consumer price index:							
All items	12. 1	7.3	5.0	4.6	4.6	6.0	4. 7
Food Directly purchased energy 3 All other items	12. 0 25. 5 10. 9	7. 1 11. 7 6. 9	6. 1 6. 4	-2.4 -6.1 8.3	1.6 2.2 6.1	3. 1 17. 0 6. 5	1. 3 13. 1 4. 4
Wholesale price index:	:			į			
All commodities	22.4	4.3	4. 1	7	4. 9	3.9	7.9
Farm products Processed foods and feeds Industrial commodities Energy 4.	27.1	4. 3 -2. 0 5. 9 12. 7	-3.6 -3.9 6.6 8.6	-17.0 -15.5 4.9 -8.0	13. 3 10. 6 3. 2 -3. 1	-7.8 -7.5 7.5 19.9	-1. 3 10. 5 30. 0

¹ Changes in GNP deflators are preliminary, changes in consumer price index are preliminary estimates by the Council of Economic Advisers.

² Includes some groups not shown separately.
3 Gas and electricity, fuel oil and coal, and gasoline and motor oil.
4 Fuels and related products and power.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics), except as noted.

primarily because of the removal of the tariff on oil and the initial price roll-back features of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. Despite moderate second-quarter increases and large increases during the summer months, the overall 6.1 percent rate from the fourth quarter of 1975 to the fourth quarter of 1976 was substantially less than the 11.7 percent rate during 1975. The rise in food prices decelerated to 1 percent, the smallest increase occurring within a year since 1967, the principal reason being abundant supplies of meats and cereals.

Wholesale prices for all commodities rose about 4 percent from the last quarter of 1975 to that of 1976 (see Table 10). Following the second quarter, prices rose more rapidly for most of the major industrial categories, although some transaction prices may have gone up less than the reported list prices because of more discounting by sellers. Increases in list prices accompanied by larger discounts may reflect hedging against the possible return of price controls.

WAGES

The rate of increase in wages, although high by historical standards, was lower in 1976 than in 1975 (Table 11). Real wages, when measured by the adjusted average hourly earnings index deflated by the CPI, increased by 2 percent in 1976 after declines of 2.5 percent and 0.3 percent in 1974 and 1975 respectively. The continued high rate of increase in nominal wages last year was in part due to the lagged adjustment of wages to the very high rate of inflation in 1974 and 1975. It may have also reflected continued expectations of relatively high inflation.

Table 11.—Changes in labor costs and productivity in the private nonfarm business sector, 1974-76

[Percent change; quarterly changes at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Period	Adjusted average hourly earnings t	Compensation per hour	Output per hour	Unit labor costs
1974	8. 2	9. 3	-3. 5	13. 2
1975	8. 9	9. 7	2. 2	7. 4
1976 2	6. 9	8. 0	4. 0	3. 8
1975: I	9. 0	12. 1	1. 9	10. 0
	7. 3	7. 6	13. 1	4. 9
	8. 4	6. 6	8. 4	1. 7
	8. 0	7. 2	7	8. 0
1976:	6. 9	9. 3	4. 9	4. 2
	6. 5	8. 4	4. 0	4. 3
	7. 1	6. 7	2. 5	4. 1
	6. 2	9. 2	. 3	8. 9

Adjusted for overtime (in manufacturing only) and interindustry shifts.
 Preliminary.

Note.—Data for adjusted hourly earnings relate to production or nonsupervisory workers; all other data relate to all employees.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,

A broader measure of labor costs, compensation per hour of work in the private nonfarm business economy, covers all employees and includes supplements to wages and salaries. It represents the sum of labor costs to employers. Compensation per hour increased faster than average hourly earnings in the first quarter of 1976, partly because of the January increase in the base earnings subject to social security taxes. The rate of increase in compensation per hour was lower in the following quarters, and it was lower in 1976 than in 1975.

While only 11 percent of the employed are covered by major collective bargaining settlements (those which cover 1,000 or more workers), these settlements may have a disproportionate impact on wage settlements throughout the economy as the result of a demonstration effect. The rate of wage increases negotiated in such contracts declined in 1976 (Table 12). The first-year annual wage increases averaged 10.2 percent for contracts negotiated in 1975, covering 3 million workers, and 8.9 percent during the first 3 quarters of 1976, covering 2.7 million workers. (Approximately 41/2) million workers were under major contracts scheduled to expire during the full year). The effective wage rate change under collective bargaining agreements is the actual wage change going into effect in a quarter because of settlements negotiated in that year, deferred increases agreed to in the past, and escalator or cost-of-living adjustments (COLA). The effective

Table 12.—Changes in major collective bargaining settlements, 1974-76 [Percent]

	107.		19	75		1976 1			
Type of change and industry group	1974	1975	1	ti	Ш	١٧	i	li	111
Vage settlements:									
First-year wage change (annual rate)	9.8	10. 2	12.1	9.0	9.7	11.0	8.8	8. 2	10. 1
Percent of workers covered in current quarter settlements 2	50	29	7	10	9	3	3	13	7
ffective wage rate change:3			i l						
Total effective changes	9.4	8.7	1.7	2.1	3.3	1.5	1.2	2.6	2.0
Adjustment resulting from: Current settlement Prior settlement Escalator provision		2. 8 3. 7 2. 2	.6 .6 .4	.7 1.1 .3	. 8 1. 5 1. 0	.6 .5 .4	. 3 . 6 . 4	1. 2 1. 2 . 2	. 6 1. 0 . 3
Manufacturing	10.3	8.5	1.8	2. 1	2.8	1.6	1.4	2.1	2.2
Nonmanufacturing, excluding contract con- struction Construction Transportation and public utilities. Wholesale and retail trade Services	7.6	9. 3 8. 1 9. 7 9. 2 6. 4	1.9 .8 1.7 2.5 2.0	1, 2 4, 5 , 8 2, 1 , 8	4.3 2.2 5.3 3.0 2.2	1.8 .6 1.8 1.5 1.4	1. 3 . 7 . 9 1. 8 2. 2	2.6 4.0 2.7 2.8 1.6	1, 9 1, 5 1, 9 2, 5

i Preliminary.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,

² Percent of estimated number of workers under major collective bargaining settlements. Individual quarterly data for 1976 are based on preliminary estimates that do not add to the current total for the year.

³ Effective wage rate changes are wage rate changes actually going into effect per worker under major contracts in the respective quarters resulting from major collective bargaining settlements made that calendar year, plus deferred increases in accordance with prior-year contracts plus escalator adjustments.

Note.—Data relate to settlements covering 1,000 or more workers in private nonfarm industries. Effective wage rate adjustment for the year is the total of the four quarterly changes, except as noted.

Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

wage rate change during the first 3 quarters of 1976 was 7.9 percent at an annual rate, and was smaller than the increase in 1975 both because of lower first-year settlements and because the lower rate of inflation resulted in smaller cost-of-living adjustments.

PRODUCTIVITY AND UNIT LABOR COSTS

Labor productivity, or output per hour of work, increased by 4 percent in 1976 reflecting the cyclical improvement in the economy (See Table 11). Labor productivity rises sharply in the trough quarter of most recessions or in the following quarter and remains substantially above the trend growth rate for the first 2 or 3 quarters of recovery. Perhaps because of the severity of the 1974–75 recession, labor productivity growth was above the trend rate for 1976 as a whole.

Both the slowdown in compensation per hour and the rise in productivity contributed to a sharp deceleration in the rate of increase in unit labor costs last year (see Table 11). The rate of increase in unit labor costs in 1976 is consistent with further declines in the rate of inflation. However, as the economic recovery continues and the rate of growth in productivity settles to its long-run trend, unit labor costs will rise more rapidly unless the growth rate of nominal compensation per hour continues to fall.

CORPORATE PROFITABILITY

Pretax corporate profits were up 30 percent last year to about \$149 billion. Inflation-based adjustments for inventory appreciation and for depreciation based on replacment cost increased moderately from 1975, and hence the rise in NIPA profits was also 30 percent. Inventory appreciation rose about \$3 billion. The excess of the depreciation based on replacement costs used in the NIPA over the book depreciation that is still based on historical costs grew by \$4 billion, about half of the 1975 increase. The slower rise of the excess of NIPA depreciation over book depreciation was due to the substantial deceleration of the rise in prices of investment goods last year.

Last year's sharp growth in profits was a typical cyclical increase reflecting the marked rise in output and productivity characteristic of the early part of a business cycle recovery. Although productivity in the corporate sector, as in the economy as a whole, rose about 4 percent in 1976, the rate of increase had tapered off to under a 3 percent annual rate in the second half. This moderation, in combination with current rates of increase in compensation per hour of labor of $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 8 percent, means that the normal cyclical increase of the share of profits in gross product has now tapered off.

The share of after-tax operating profits in the net domestic product of nonfinancial corporate business exceeded 5 percent in the second half of 1976 after reaching a cyclical low of 1 percent in the third quarter of 1974 (Table 13). Because of the large increase in debt financing in the past 15 years, it is more revealing to examine the share of corporate income accruing to holders of both equity and liabilities. This share is measured by net interest

TABLE 13.—Output, profits, net interest, and profit measures of nonfinancial corporate business, 1960-76

				Percent of net domestic product			
Year	Net domestic product	Corporate profits after tax with IVA and CCA ¹	Net interest	Corporate profits after tax with IVA and CCA 1	Corporate profits after tax with IVA and CCA ¹ plus net interest		
	E	Billions of dollars					
1960	250. 3	18. 3	3. 5	7.3	8. 7		
1961	256. 7	18. 0	3. 9	7.0	8. 5		
1962	282. 3	24. 2	4. 5	8.6	10. 2		
1963	301. 1	27. 2	4. 8	9.0	10. 6		
1964	326. 6	32. 8	5. 3	10.0	11. 7		
1965	359. 3	38. 9	6. 1	10.8	12.5		
1966	394. 9	41. 7	7. 4	10.6	12.4		
1967	413. 6	39. 6	8. 7	9.6	11.7		
1968	455. 4	38. 5	10. 1	8.5	10.7		
1968	494. 0	33. 1	13. 1	6.7	9.4		
1970	507. 5	24. 3	17. 0	4, 8	8. 1		
1971	544. 2	28. 8	17. 9	5. 3	8. 6		
1972	608. 4	38. 5	19. 1	6. 3	9. 5		
1973	683. 3	36. 3	23. 1	5. 3	8. 7		
1974	729. 3	17. 0	29. 0	2. 3	6. 3		
1975	773. 8	32. 8	30. 8	4. 2	8. 2		
1976 :	874.8	44.9	35. 8	5.1	9. 2		
	Seasona	lly adjusted ann	ual rates				
1975: t	731. 5	19. 4	30. 0	2.7	6. 8		
	756. 1	32. 5	30. 2	4.3	8. 3		
	793. 3	40. 8	30. 8	5.1	9. 0		
	814. 2	38. 5	32. 0	4.7	8. 7		
1976: I	844, 8	42. 1	33. 9	5. 0	9. 0		
	866, 1	42. 3	35. 2	4. 9	8. 9		
	885, 0	46. 0	36. 5	5. 2	9. 3		

Corporate profits after tax with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.
Preliminary.

Note.—All data relate to nonfinancial corporate business.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

plus after-tax operating profits as a percentage of net domestic product of nonfinancial corporations. It rose to 9 percent in the third quarter of 1976. While this figure is well above the cyclical low of 5 percent reached in the third quarter of 1974, it is well below the peak of 12½ percent in 1965. Low profitability may therefore still be exerting a damping effect on investment expenditures.

GOVERNMENT BUDGETS AND FISCAL POLICY

The objective of fiscal policy in 1976 was to maintain the degree of stimulus provided during 1975 in order to keep the economy on a course of moderate, sustained expansion. The full-employment surplus, which had declined sharply in 1975, was expected to remain relatively unchanged in 1976. However, fiscal policy unintentionally became less expansionary in

the first half of 1976, when expenditures were lower than anticipated while receipts remained close to target. Had Federal expenditures followed the projected pattern, the level of GNP would have been higher and the economic slowdown following the spring of 1976 would have been less severe.

The overestimate or shortfall in Federal spending in 1976 was small relative to the size of the budget and was typical of recent years (Table 14). These errors in estimating spending suggest that the ability to forecast Government expenditures precisely is limited, and that the textbook notion of a truly deterministic level of Government spending is too simple. To the extent that a regular pattern exists in the difference between actual and predicted levels of Federal spending, appropriate adjustments can be made when predicted expenditures are incorporated into economic forecasts. The shortfall last year is an important reminder of the difficulties in attempting to fine tune the economy with fiscal policy. This experience suggests that it is hard to measure the precise magnitude of the policy instruments as well as to assess their economic effects.

Table 14.—Comparison of projected and actual Federal expenditures, national income and product accounts, fiscal years 1970-76

[Billions of dollars, except as noted]

FEDERAL EXPENDITURES AND THE SHORTFALL

The 8.7 percent increase in total Federal expenditures in 1976* was a return to a more typical rate of growth after the exceptionally large increases in 1974 and 1975 caused by the high rates of unemployment and inflation in those years (Table 15). The deceleration in 1976 was due mainly to much smaller increases in transfer payments to individuals and grants-in-aid to State and local governments.

¹ Projections made in the Budget of the United States Government published in January of the current fiscal year and, except for fiscal year 1976, adjusted for revisions by applying projected percent changes to revised data.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Office of Management and Budget, and Council of Economic Advisers.

^{*}Unless otherwise noted, reference is to calendar years and to the Federal sector in the national income and product accounts (NIPA). The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 changed the fiscal year from July 1-June 30 to October 1-September 30, beginning with fiscal 1977. The change necessitated a 3-month "transition-quarter" from July 1, 1976 to September 30, 1976.

TABLE 15.—Federal Government receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts, calendar years 1975-76

[Billions of dollars]

		1976	1976			
Receipt or expenditure category	1975	January 1976 budget projection ¹	Actual 3			
Federal Government receipts	286. 5	330. 0	330.6			
Personal tax and nontax receipts Corporate tax accruals Indirect business tax and nontax accruals Contributions for social insurance	125. 7 42. 6 23. 9 94. 3	143. 6 55. 2 22. 8 108. 4	145, 3 55, 9 23, 5 105, 8			
Federal Government expenditures	357.8	391. 6	388. 9			
Purchases of goods and services	124. 4	135. 4	133.4			
National defenseNondefense	84. 3 40. 1	88. 7 46. 7	88. 2 45. 2			
Transfer payments	148. 9	163. 0	162, 2			
To personsTo foreigners	145. 8 3. 1	159. 2 3. 8	159.0 3.2			
Grants-in-aid to State and local governments Net interest paid Subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises	54. 4 23. 5 6. 5	59. 5 28. 6 5. 1	60. 2 27. 5 5. 6			
Surplus or deficit (—)	71. 2	-61.6	58. 3			

January 1976 projected percent changes applied to revised 1975 data.
 Preliminary.

Note.-Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Office of Management and Budget.

The composition of Federal expenditures in 1976 continued the shift away from defense and toward domestic programs that has been under way since 1967. Defense purchases as a share of total spending were 23 percent in 1976, down from 48 percent in 1960. Conversely, transfer payments—now the largest single component of Federal spending-and grants-in-aid to State and local governments have grown markedly in recent years as a result of wider coverage, higher benefit payments, and new programs. These two categories accounted for 57 percent of Federal expenditures in 1976, compared with 32 percent in 1960.

There was much discussion about the unexpected shortfall in Federal expenditures in 1976, its relation to the slowing of real growth during the year, and its implications for spending in 1977. Actual spending should be compared with the January projections presented in the 1977 Federal Budget because the latter incorporated the Administration's plans and expectations early last year. Moreover a complete translation from the unified budget to NIPA concepts is readily available only for this set of estimates. On an NIPA basis the shortfall from the January projection for fiscal 1976 was 1.5 percent of actual expenditures, a difference within the range of recent experience (see Table 14). Despite the fact that the underspending for the year as a whole was neither exceptionally large nor unprecedented, it was concentrated in a short period and produced a rather sharp rise in the fullemployment surplus in the second quarter (see Table 18).

A shortfall in Federal spending of about \$3 billion, distributed over a year as shown in Table 16, could be expected to produce a decline in the annual growth rate of real GNP of roughly 0.2 to 0.3 percentage point. Because the shortfall was not sustained throughout the year and because a major portion was in transfers, which have a low GNP multiplier relative to purchases, the expected impact of such a change would be smaller. But it does help explain the weakness in the economy after the spring of 1976.

The Federal expenditure shortfall was concentrated in the second quarter (Table 16). By the third quarter the underspending was much reduced, and in the fourth quarter total spending was substantially above projected levels.

TABLE 16.—Federal expenditure shortfall, national income and product accounts, calendar year 1976

Category	1976								
outuger,	Year 2	ı	ti .	III	IAs				
Total expenditures	-2.8	5. 5	-13.8	-1.8	10.0				
Purchases of goods and services	-2.0	-3.5	-4.6	4	.5				
National defenseNondefense	5 -1.5	-1. 4 -2. 2	7 -4.0	0 3	.1 .4				
Transfer payments	9	-2.8	-4.7	.0	3.7				
To persons To foreigners	-:²	-2. 2 6	-3.8 -1.0	6 5	4.4 7				
Grants-in-aid to State and local governments	.7	.4	-3.0	9	6. 3				
Net interest paid	-1.1	3	9	-1.3	-1.6				
Subsidies less current surplus of government enter- prises	.5	.8	5	.6	1.1				

¹ Actual expenditures less adjusted January 1976 projections. See note below.
2 Preliminary.

The shortfall can be attributed to a combination of lower-than-expected rates of inflation, unemployment, and interest, as well as to delays in making new obligations and outlays and to an apparent bias toward overestimation of expenditures in the budget. The obligation and payment lags primarily affected purchases, particularly for defense, where unused obligational authority unexpectedly rose about \$10 to \$12 billion in the 15-month period between July 1, 1975 and September 30, 1976. Obligation delays were also responsible for the slowdown in the Federal highway aid program, which affects the grant component of total expenditures. The spending overrun in the last quarter of 1976 was almost entirely in transfers and grants and was due to legislation which differed from that assumed in January. This increase does not appear to have been the result of spending delayed from earlier in the year.

Note.—January 1976 quarterly projections have been adjusted to revised 1976 data by multiplying the adjusted annual projection (see Table 15) by the ratio of the original quarterly projections to the original annual projections. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Office of Management and Budget, and Council of

In the unified budget the total shortfall from the January estimate for fiscal 1976 and the transition quarter was \$11.4 billion. This figure was significantly larger than in the NIPA Federal sector (Table 17) and was the

TABLE 17.—Reconciliation of estimates of Federal expenditure shortfall, unified budget and national income and product accounts, fiscal year 1976 and transition quarter

[Billions of dollars]

	Expenditure shortfall ¹						
Category	Total	Fiscal year 1976	Transition quarter 2				
Federal budget outlays 3	-11.4	-7.9	-3, 5				
Less: Financial transactions and other asset transfers	-3.9	-1.5	-2.4				
Plus: Defense timing adjustment	4.4	2.1	2.3				
Foreign military salesOther purchases	3. 6 . 8	3. 0 —. 9	1. 7				
Coverage, netting and other timing differences	-3.1	-1.4	-1.7				
Equals: Federal expenditures in national income and product accounts	-6.2	—5. 7	- . 5				

Actual expenditures less January 1976 projections.
 July-September 1976.
 Excludes outlays of the Export-Import Bank.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Office of Management and Budget,

basis for most of the public discussion about the shortfall. Differences between expenditures on the two bases result from financial transactions and other asset transfers included in the unified budget but not in the NIPA, certain differences in coverage and netting, and timing discrepancies between foreign military deliveries and payments, and between cash payments recorded in the unified budget and actual deliveries recorded in the NIPA. Most of the difference between the unified and NIPA spending shortfalls in 1976 represents unforeseen changes in financial transactions and other asset tranfers and advance payments for military sales abroad. In addition, the shortfall in defense outlays in the unified budget was not completely reflected in NIPA defense purchases. The slowdown in these outlays was a consequence of delays in making new obligations, largely because of the delay in passage of the 1976 defense appropriations bill and a lag in adjusting to substantial increases in budget authority.

While the unified budget presents a fairly comprehensive record of all receipts and outlays of the Federal Government, the Federal sector of the NIPA is generally considered a better measure of the Government's impact on current economic activity. If unified spending deviates from targeted levels because of unexpected asset transfers or advance payments, the Federal sector in the NIPA is unaffected, since such transactions are likely to have little direct impact on economic activity. On the other hand, because the economic effects resulting from defense spending for major procurement items may occur well before there is a change in NIPA defense purchases.

the latter may not immediately reflect the impact of a significant change in defense activity. Such a phenomenon happened in 1965–66 and may have occurred in 1976. The shortfall in new obligations and defense spending on a unified basis could explain the softness in defense orders in mid-1976.

In 1977 the residual economic impact resulting from the shortfall will stem from a combination of delayed multiplier effects and possible revisions of spending levels where a catchup or continuing shortfall is expected. In the 1978 budget the fiscal 1977 outlay projections have been revised to incorporate the delayed effects of the shortfall. Outlays for some programs are expected to be higher than estimated in last year's budget. In other cases outlays will continue to lag somewhat in 1977. But on balance no significant net increase or decrease in Federal spending is anticipated in 1977 as a result of last year's shortfall.

TAX LEGISLATION AND FEDERAL RECEIPTS

The antirecession tax cuts enacted in 1975 were continued throughout 1976. The Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975 extended the personal and corporate tax cuts in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 for the first 6 months of calendar 1976. For corporations this legislation included a doubling of the surtax exemption from \$25,000 to \$50,000 and a lowering of the regular corporate income tax rate on the first \$25,000 of taxable profits from 22 percent to 20 percent. In addition, the maximum investment tax credit on qualified equipment was increased from 4 to 10 percent for utilities and from 7 to 10 percent for all other businesses. Altogether these provisions yielded a net reduction of about \$2.5 billion in corporate tax accruals in 1976 from what they would have been under 1974 law.

For individuals the Revenue Adjustment Act provided somewhat larger tax reductions than the earlier legislation in order to maintain the lower withholding rates in effect during the last 8 months of 1975. The major provisions were:

- 1. A \$35 tax credit per dependent, or a credit equal to 2 percent of taxable income up to \$9,000, whichever is larger.
- 2. An increase in the low-income allowance (minimum standard deduction) from \$1,300 per return to \$2,100 for a joint return and \$1,700 for a single person.
- 3. An increase in the percentage standard deduction, from 15 percent of adjusted gross income (with a maximum of \$2,000) to 16 percent of adjusted gross income (with a maximum of \$2,800 for a joint return, or \$2,400 for a single return).
- 4. An extension of the refundable 10 percent earned income credit for families with dependent children and incomes below \$8,000.

The tax credit on purchases of new homes was not extended beyond 1975.

The permanent changes in the Tax Reduction Act together with extension of the temporary provisions in the Revenue Adjustment Act yielded a reduction of about \$13.5 billion in personal taxes in 1976 from what they would have been under 1974 law.

Although the Administration had proposed that the personal and corporate tax reductions due to expire in mid-1976 be enlarged and made permanent, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 merely extended the provisions of the Revenue Adjustment Act. In particular, the higher low-income allowance and percentage standard deductions were made permanent; the personal tax credits, the reduction in the tax rate on the first \$25,000 of corporate income, and the increase in the corporate surtax exemption were extended through calendar 1977; and the 10 percent investment tax credit was extended through 1980. Thus the Tax Reform Act of 1976 did not produce any general tax cuts beyond those enacted at the end of 1975. Nor did it contain any of the special tax incentives proposed by the Administration to encourage specific types of economic activity. The total of the tax reductions was about \$16 billion in 1976, compared with \$18½ billion in 1975.

The Tax Reform Act of 1976 also made the first extensive changes in the tax code since 1969. These changes increased receipts by \$0.6 billion in 1976 and are expected to yield a \$1.6-billion gain in 1977. Among the more important measures enacted in the new law were unification of estate and gift taxes, a narrowing of allowable deductions for tax sheltered losses, tighter rules on personal deductions and exclusions, an increase in the minimum tax, and an expansion of loss-carryover provisions. Numerous other revisions were made in the tax law which modified existing tax preferences and added new ones. Despite these changes the Tax Reform Act of 1976 did not achieve fundamental reform or simplification of the tax code.

The other tax legislation passed in 1976 was a temporary increase in the Federal unemployment insurance tax rate from 0.5 percent to 0.7 percent to become effective January 1, 1977. The amount of wages subject to this tax was also raised permanently from \$4,200 per worker to \$6,000 per worker, effective January 1, 1978. These measures are designed to replenish State unemployment insurance trust funds. The legislation also extended coverage under the regular State unemployment compensation tax and benefit system to about 9 million additional employees in State and local government and farm and domestic workers, effective January 1, 1978. The Congress did not enact the Administration's proposed increase in the social security tax rate to 12.3 percent. Under current law, however, the rate will rise from 11.7 percent to 12.1 percent on January 1, 1978, and the taxable wage base will rise \$1,200 in both 1977 and 1978.

Federal receipts increased by \$44 billion to \$331 billion in 1976, yielding a Federal tax share of nominal GNP of 19.5 percent. The strong economy, continued inflation, and the absence of the 1975 tax rebate were responsible for the large growth in receipts.

THE FISCAL BALANCES

The Federal deficit fell to \$58.3 billion in 1976, \$3.3 billion less than the deficit projected in January. The full-employment surplus rose by \$2.2 billion for the year (Table 18). The full-employment surplus measures the difference between total receipts and expenditures under the assumption that the economy is operating along its potential GNP path. Because the fullemployment surplus is calculated at a constant operating rate for the economy, changes in receipts and expenditures that occur automatically in response to the cyclical behavior of output and employment are eliminated. Since full-employment expenditures are intended to measure discretionary shifts in fiscal policy, they include temporary expansions of unemployment compensation programs designed to counteract cyclical variations in the economy. For example, full-employment expenditures for 1975 and 1976 include benefits under the Federal supplemental benefits (FSB) program and the supplemental unemployment assistance (SUA) program created in December 1974. The full-employment budget numbers presented in Table 18 are based on the Council of Economic Advisers' new estimates of poten-

Table 18.—Actual and full-employment Federal and State and local government receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts basis, calendar years 1970–76

		Federal G	overnment		S	tate and loca	l governme	nt	
Calendar year		F 41	Surplus or	deficit ()			Surplus	Operating surplus	
	Receipts	Expendi- tures	Amount	Change	Receipts	eceipts Expendi- tures		or deficit (-) 1	
Actual:									
1970	192. 1 198. 6 227. 5 258. 3 288. 2 286. 5 330. 6	204. 2 220. 6 244. 7 265. 0 299. 7 357. 8 388. 9	-12. 1 -22. 0 -17. 3 -6. 7 -11. 5 -71. 2 -58. 3	-20.6 -9.9 4.7 10.6 -4.8 -59.7 12.9	134. 9 152. 6 177. 4 193. 5 210. 2 234. 3 260. 5	132. 2 148. 9 163. 7 180. 5 203. 0 227. 5 246. 6	2. 8 3. 7 13. 7 13. 0 7. 3 6. 9 13. 9	4. 0 3. 8 5. 6 4. 1 2. 8 5. 1	
1976:1 (I (II	316. 5 324. 6 333. 8	380. 3 378. 7 391. 1	-63. 8 -54. 1 -57. 4	5. 6 9. 7 -3. 3	251. 6 254. 3 262. 0	239. 5 245. 0 249. 3	12. 2 9. 2 12. 7	6 -3. 8 6	
Full-employment:									
1970	201, 0 210, 0 222, 1 257, 5 311, 8 337, 6 371, 6	203 6 219. 1 243. 6 265. 4 297. 7 350. 1 381. 9	-2. 6 -9. 2 -21. 5 -7. 9 14. 1 -12. 5 -10. 3	-6. 3 -6. 6 -12. 3 13. 6 22. 0 -26. 5 2. 2	138. 1 157. 3 179. 4 192. 9 219. 3 255. 6 277. 7	132. 2 148. 9 163. 7 180. 5 203. 0 227. 5 246. 6	6. 0 8. 3 15. 7 12. 4 16. 4 28. 1 31. 2		
1976: 	358. 5 365. 3 376. 1	372. 6 371. 9 384. 3	-14. 1 -6. 7 -8. 2	. 6 7. 4 —1. 5	269. 2 271. 7 279. 7	239. 5 245. 0 249. 3	29. 7 26. 7 30. 4		

¹ Surplus or deficit excluding social insurance funds.

² Preliminary.

Note.—Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Office of Management and Budget, and Council of Economic Advisers.

tial output and the full-employment unemployment rate, which are discussed in Chapter 1. Thus the levels of the surplus are different from those reported in previous years. The new benchmarks, however, have little effect on the period-to-period change in the full-employment surplus, which is the appropriate measure of the thrust of fiscal policy.

The difference between movements in the actual deficit and full-employment surplus is an indicator of the normal cyclical changes in receipts and expenditures. Over four-fifths of the drop in the actual Federal deficit in 1976 was due to an improving economy which automatically raised tax collections and reduced unemployment insurance payments. The remainder was largely the result of the unintended shortfall in spending.

The State and local surplus rose to \$13.9 billion in 1976. Of the total increase, slightly more than one-half was the result of higher tax receipts produced by the cyclical economic upturn and a significant increase in Federal grants. The rest—as shown by the \$3.1-billion increase in the State and local full-employment surplus—was due to trend economic growth and discretionary reductions in the growth of expenditures relative to receipts. The most significant aspect of State and local finances in 1976 was the restoration of a surplus in their operating accounts (exclusive of social insurance trust funds) in the last quarter of the year. This was made possible by the unusually small increase in State and local expenditures in 1976, together with the rapid growth in revenues. This fiscal conservatism at the State and local level reinforced the unexpected restraint coming from the Federal sector.

THE NEW CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS

In 1976 Congress fully implemented its new budget procedures for the first time. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 established a process whereby the Congress is forced to consider overall receipts and outlays and commit itself under a binding resolution to these totals. The First Concurrent Resolution on the budget, which must be passed before May 15 of each year, sets targets for total receipts and outlays and for the division of outlays among the major functional categories to guide congressional committees in considering new legislation. These targets are revised in the light of the normal authorization and appropriations process, and the changes are incorporated in the Second Concurrent Resolution, which sets a binding floor on receipts and a ceiling on outlays for the coming fiscal year. The second resolution must be passed before the new fiscal year begins on October 1. After the Second Concurrent Resolution has been approved, legislation that raises outlays above the ceiling or reduces receipts below the established floor cannot be considered unless both Houses of Congress first pass a revised concurrent resolution.

The most obvious benefit of the new procedures is that Congress now considers the budget as a whole and its impact on the desired course of fiscal policy and resource allocation. In earlier years, legislation was enacted in a piecemeal fashion, with little attention to the overall macroeconomic and al-

locative implications of the resulting tax and spending totals. By setting an overall ceiling on outlays and a floor on receipts, the Congress is now forced to consider the tradeoffs among alternative programs. It must also weigh higher spending against lower taxes for stabilization purposes in making the long-term choice between a larger or smaller Federal sector. The new budget process also requires current and future cost estimates for all new programs, thereby making more explicit the effects of current legislation on future budgets. The new budget process has thus institutionalized a more rational procedure for legislative deliberations on the budget and should make the Congress more aware of the costs and consequences of the programs it enacts.

MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS

Monetary policy in 1976 must be interpreted in the light of financial and economic developments affecting monetary growth and interest rates during the year. Less extensive use of demand deposits for transactions purposes has apparently continued to shift the demand for money downward, reducing the growth of M_1 which would otherwise be needed to sustain the economic expansion. An unusually low rate of growth of M_1 relative to GNP growth is hence not necessarily evidence of a restrictive monetary policy. But neither is the decline in interest rates during 1976 evidence of an expansive monetary policy. Both a slowing of economic growth in mid-1976 and falling inflationary expectations as inflation rates declined during the year have contributed to lower interest rates than had been expected. Appraisal of monetary developments in 1976 therefore requires a careful examination of monetary growth and the behavior of interest rates during the year.

GROWTH OF THE MONETARY AGGREGATES


Over the 4 quarters of 1976 the monetary aggregates M_1 and M_2 grew by 5.0 and 9.8 percent respectively. The very slow growth in M_1 which began in the latter half of 1975 continued in the first quarter of 1976, when M_1 increased by only 2.7 percent at an annual rate. In the second quarter M_1 expanded rapidly, spurred on by a significant drawdown of U.S. Treasury deposits, which transferred funds to private demand deposit accounts in April. After another slowdown in the third quarter, the growth rate of M_1 reaccelerated in the fourth quarter (Chart 5).

The growth of M_2 did not vary as much as the growth of M_1 during 1976. In the first quarter the growth rate of time and savings deposits at commercial banks increased sharply because some market interest rates fell below the rates paid at banks. Thus M_2 increased at a 10.1 percent rate in the first quarter while M_1 increased at only a 2.7 percent rate. By the last 2 months of the second quarter, however, the increase in market interest rates had caused some slowdown in the inflow to time and savings deposits.

For this reason, although the rate of growth of M_1 increased by 5.9 percentage points in the second quarter, the rate of growth of M_2 increased by only 1.1 percentage points. As interest rates on marketable securities began to decline in the second half of the year, the growth of time and savings deposits picked up again and resulted in a substantial increase in M_2 .

Chart 5

Growth in Money Stock



The velocity of M₁—the ratio of nominal GNP to M₁—grew by about a 3 percent annual rate during the last 3 quarters of 1976, much more slowly than in the previous 3 quarters. Both a faster rate of M₁ growth and a slower rate of nominal GNP growth contributed to this slowdown. The important question thus raised is whether velocity will again accelerate in 1977 when nominal GNP growth is expected to increase. Some of the slower velocity growth in the last 3 quarters can be explained by the usual lag in the adjustment of money balances to changes in nominal GNP growth. This same lag could provide some stimulus to velocity growth in 1977 if GNP growth accelerates.

Over the recovery as a whole M₁ velocity growth has been somewhat higher than in previous recovery periods—averaging more than 6 percent at an annual rate over the last 6 quarters—despite the moderate decline in interest rates. Regulatory changes and financial innovations, partly induced by the high interest rates which peaked in 1974, have apparently been a factor in this higher velocity growth, as was noted in Chapter 1. Estimates of how these changes affect M₁ demand are necessarily imprecise, however,

and should be used with caution in interpreting monetary developments and projecting actual monetary growth rates.

Another possible reason for the slow growth in demand for M_1 is the unusually weak behavior of business loans at commercial banks during this recovery. Many banks require compensating balances for their loans in the form of demand deposits, and businesses sometimes build up deposits at commercial banks to establish lines of credit in anticipation of loan needs. If loan demand is unusually weak, as has been the case in this recovery, M_1 growth thus tends to be unusually small. It is therefore possible that a recovery of loan demand in 1977 could cause an acceleration of the growth in the demand for M_1 .

Econometric estimates of the demand for M_1 as a function of GNP, a money market interest rate, and the average rate on savings deposits provide evidence that some factors, perhaps the ones mentioned above, have shifted the demand for money downward. Such an estimated money demand function incorporating lagged adjustments, which has explained the data well during most of the postwar period, began to shift in early 1974. This shift has continued during 1976, though at a moderately diminished rate.

FEDERAL RESERVE TOLERANCE RANGES FOR MONETARY GROWTH

In May 1975 the Federal Reserve began to report prospective ranges for annual growth rates in the monetary aggregates. This practice has continued with quarterly reports of projected growth rate ranges for the three main aggregates M_1 , M_2 , and M_3 . These ranges represent Federal Reserve projections of monetary growth rates using the available information about economic conditions and policy intentions at the time projections are made. The ranges have been at least 2 percentage points wide in each case, the width of the ranges giving some flexibility to the projection procedure while preserving the information about the longer-run intentions of the Federal Reserve. The quarterly updating of the base period adds flexibility, but when actual growth deviates significantly from the projected range some adjustment in the range may be necessary to prevent further deviations. Moreover the ranges themselves are not inflexible and are modified when emerging economic developments require a change.

Experience with this practice of announcing monetary growth rates indicates that it can become a constructive addition to the economic policy-making process, helping to stabilize inflationary expectations. The ranges have also provided information which permits a more enlightened discussion of monetary policy. Their forward-looking perspective has helped to promote general understanding of the tradeoffs between short-run and long-run economic goals and to clarify policy makers' intentions.

With the exception of the first projection for the period from March 1975 to March 1976, each range has referred to growth from an average taken for the most recently completed quarter to an average for the same

quarter a year later. The actual growth rates for the 1-year intervals ending in 1976 have not significantly deviated from the projected ranges (Table 19), though this alone is not an indication that monetary policy has been successful in achieving ultimate stabilization goals. The growth rate of M_2 has been inside the projected range for all but one of the four periods, with more frequent deviations of M_3 above the upper boundary and of M_1 below the lower. The largest deviation for M_1 was from the third quarter of 1975 to the third quarter of 1976, when M_1 grew by only 4.4 percent. Some of this shortfall, however, may have been due to the unusually high base for this period, a result of the 1975 tax rebates' effect on the money stock. Thus a moderate smoothing of the path of M_1 from May through September 1975, to adjust for the impact of these special payments, would bring the growth of M_1 above the lower boundary of 5 percent.

TABLE 19.—Projected and actual growth rates of monetary aggregates, 1975-76

Period	M ₁	M ₂	M ₃
Percent change from a year earlier:			
March 1976: Projected range 1	5-7½	8½-10½	10-12
	4.9	9.6	12. 2
1976 II: Projected range ¹	5-7½	8½-10½	10-12
	5. 2	9.6	12. 0
1976 III: Projected range 1	5-7½	7½-10½	9-12
	4.4	9.3	11.5
1976 IV: Projected range: Actual	4½-7½	7½-10½	9-12
	5. 4	10.9	12.8

 $^{^{1}}$ Range of percent changes in M_{1} , M_{2} , and M_{2} forecast by Federal Reserve for the period and actual percent changes between periods indicated. Actual quarterly changes are based on quarterly averages.


Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

INTEREST RATES

Short-term interest rates generally fell during 1976 and by December were at their lowest levels since 1972 (Chart 6). Only one marked fluctuation occurred during the year. In the last 2 weeks of April the Federal Reserve took actions to slow the accelerating growth in the aggregates; and the Federal funds rate began to rise, reaching 5½ percent in late May. Accompanying the rise in the key money market interest rate, the Treasury bill rate and the commercial paper rate also increased; but by June the short-term interest rates again began to decline.

Long-term interest rates also fell during 1976. Moody's Aaa corporate bond yield fell to 8.0 percent by early December from an average of 8.8 percent in December 1975. Interest rates on less highly rated corporate bonds fell more sharply, as indicated by the 144 basis point decline in Moody's Baa corporate bond yield. Mortgage interest rates in the secondary market also fell during 1976 but by the end of the year had only a negligible impact on home mortgage rates in the primary market.

Interest Rates



SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM. MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE. AND STANDARD & POOR'S CORPORATION.

At the end of 1976 both short-term and long-term interest rates were well below the levels reached at the start of the recovery in early 1975. Declines in interest rates are not typical of an economic expansion. The 1976 experience results in part from a decline in the expected rate of inflation, which has apparently accompanied the decline in actual inflation rates. The decline in longer-term interest rates, however, may have been smaller than the decline in the expected long-term rate of inflation. If so, the real rate of interest—one measure of the impact of monetary policy on the economy—has not decreased.

OTHER FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

Nonfinancial corporations have lengthened the average maturity of their debt during the recovery. With severe liquidity problems at the start of 1975, brought on by unusually large short-term borrowing in previous years, most businesses aimed at restructuring their balance sheets by increasing their long-term borrowing relative to short-term borrowing and by holding more liquid assets such as Treasury bills. The U.S. Treasury's borrowing strategy has shifted in a similar direction in 1976, with 89 percent of the increase in marketable interest-bearing public debt in the form of longer-maturity coupon issues, compared to 53 percent in 1975.

Partly as a result of the desire of business firms for increased liquidity, commercial and industrial loans at commercial banks declined throughout the first half of the year, as they have generally done during the recovery, but a marked upturn in business loans began in October 1976. As was true of the temporary turnaround in late 1975, a large proportion of this increase was in the form of bankers' acceptances—short-term money market instruments counted as bank loans—an indication that the turnaround again might be temporary.

In 1976 internal financing covered about 90 percent of total capital outlays for nonfinancial corporate business compared with more than 100 percent in 1975 when inventories were being liquidated. The fraction, however, remains well above any seen since the mid-1960s, and business use of external funds remains relatively weak. As the growth of investment continues in 1977, the internal financing fraction should continue to decline and the dependence on external finance should increase.

Proportionately more of the increase in long-term funds raised from external sources by business corporations in early 1976 was in the form of equities (Table 20), but this trend was interrupted in the third quarter. Stock market prices were higher in 1976 than in 1975, although they remained relatively steady during the year.

Increased borrowing in the household sector absorbed most of the declining share of U.S. Government borrowing in 1976. Home mortgage borrowing increased sharply in the third quarter and accounted for most of the net change in total mortgages during this period. Flows into thrift institutions, especially into savings and loan associations, were stimulated by declining market interest rates relative to deposit rates, and they provided the major share of funds to support this demand for mortgages.

TABLE 20.—Funds raised in credit markets by nonfinancial sectors, 1971-76 (Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates)

Sector and credit market instrument	1971–74		197	75			1976	
Sector and credit market instrument	average	ı	11	111	IV	· ·	II	III
Total funds raised	178.6	156.9	211.6	222.0	250.9	233.6	250.3	258.8
U.S. Government State and local government Nonfinancial business 1	15. 1 16. 6 82. 9	59.6 11.7 43.3	102.0 16.0 40.9	94. 0 16. 3 43. 8	85. 2 15. 4 62. 6	73.4 12.0 60.5	74. 2 21. 4 65. 5	78. 9 18. 9 56. 0
Corporate debt instruments Corporate equities	56. 7 8. 6	27.3 7.7	19. 2 12. 9	24. 3 6. 9	37. 9 12. 2	32. 8 12. 6	34.1 14.0	31. 9 6. 1
Households 2	56.4	33.9	44. 0	54.2	66.6	71. 1	74.6	87.0
Home mortgagesConsumer credit	37.7 15.4	28. 5 . 9	38. 5 1. 3	42. 2 14. 3	48. 2 17. 7	51.5 18.1	53. 2 20. 6	60. 6 19. 2
Foreign	7.7	8.3	8.8	13.8	21. 1	16.6	14.7	18. 0

Note.—Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Also includes farm and nonfarm noncorporate not shown separately.
 Also includes mortgages other than home, bank loans n.e.c., and other loans.

EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS

The improvement in the economy last year was reflected in the labor market: employment increased, unemployment declined, and benefits from income transfer programs were lower in comparison with 1975. The improvement in employment was stronger in the first half of 1976. While the unemployment rate fell during the first half, it increased during the second half.

EMPLOYMENT

Total civilian employment estimated from household survey data increased 3.2 percent last year over the 1975 average (Table 21). The increase was

TABLE 21.—Labor market indicators, 1974-76 [Quarterly data seasonally adjusted]

	Quarterry	duta 500	, on any aa	Justicuj					
Indicator	1974	1975	1976	1975		197	76	;	
Indicator	19/4	19/5	19/6	iv	1	11	111	IV	
EMPLOYMENT STATUS				Millions of	persons				
Civilian labor force	91.0	92. 6	94.8	93. 1	93.6	94. 5	95. 3	95,7	
Employment Unemployment	85. 9 5. 1	84. 8 7. 8	87. 5 7. 3	85. 2 7. 9	86. 5 7. 1	87. 5 7. 0	87. 8 7. 5	88.1 7.6	
				Perce	nt 1				
Civilian labor force participation rate 2 UNEMPLOYMENT RATES	61.2	61.2	61.6	61.1	61.2	61. 6	61. 8	61.8	
All civilian workers Unemployed 15 weeks or longer 3	5. 6 1. 0	8. 5 2. 7	7. 7 2. 5	8. 4 3. 1	7. 6 2. 7	7. 4 2. 2	7. 8 2. 4	7. 9 2.6	
Demographic groups						·]	ŀ		
Men 20 years and over	5.5	6. 7 8. 0 19. 9 5. 1	5.9 7.4 19.0 4.2	6. 9 7. 9 19. 6 5. 1	5. 8 7. 4 19. 2 4. 1	5. 7 7. 1 18. 8 4. 1	6. 0 7. 7 18. 8 4. 4	6. 2 7. 6 19. 1 4. 4	
Occupation				ł		1			
White-collar workersBlue-collar workers	3. 3 6. 7	4. 7 11. 7	4.6 9.4	4. 8 11. 2	4. 6 9. 3	4. 6 9. 0	4. 7 9. 8	4.6 9.7	
Industry	ļ								
Nonagricultural private wage and salary workers 4	5.7	9.2	7.9	9.0	7.9	7.6	8. 1	8.1	
Construction	5. 4 6. 2 3. 2	18. 1 10. 9 11. 3 10. 4 5. 6 8. 7 6. 6	15.6 7.9 7.7 8.1 5.0 8.6 6.5	17. 5 10. 1 10. 5 9. 6 5. 2 9. 1 6. 9	15. 8 7. 8 7. 9 7. 7 4. 7 8. 6 6. 5	15. 3 7. 5 7. 4 7. 7 4. 7 8. 3 6. 3	16, 4 8, 0 7, 6 8, 7 5, 1 8, 8 6, 5	14. 9 8. 2 7. 9 8, 7 5. 5 8. 7 6. 8	
Government workers	3. 0 7. 3	4. 0 10. 3	4.4 11.7	4. 2 11. 0	4. 4 11. 0	4, 5 11, 6	4.3 11.1	4. 4 12. 9	

Unemployment as percent of civilian labor force in group specified, except as noted.
 Civilian labor force as percent of civilian noninstitutional population.
 Unemployment as percent of total civilian labor force.

4 Includes mining, not shown separately.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

widespread among demographic groups. Since the first quarter of 1975, when the trough in employment was reached, civilian employment has increased by 4.4 percent, compared to 3.9 percent in the 7 quarters following the trough of the 1957–58 recession.

Payroll employment increased 2.8 percent in 1976 over the 1975 level and 2.7 percent from the fourth quarter of 1975 to the fourth quarter of 1976. The rate of increase in jobs from the last quarter of 1975 to the last quarter of 1976 varied substantially among the sectors of the economy. Employment rose by 4.2 percent in durable goods manufacturing and in the private service-producing sectors by 2.8 percent. In other sectors, however, there was little or no change. Perhaps most notable is that State and local government payroll employment, after growing by 4.8 percent from the fourth quarter of 1974 to the fourth quarter of 1975, increased by only 1.8 percent from the fourth quarter of 1975 to the fourth quarter of 1976. The 3.7 percent increase in payroll employment since the first quarter of 1975 was little more than half the increase recorded during the 7 quarters following the 1957–58 recession trough.

UNEMPLOYMENT

Although the unemployment rate declined in 1976 it remained substantially above the 1974 level (Table 21). The official seasonally adjusted unemployment rate decreased from the fourth quarter of 1975 to the second quarter of 1976 and increased in the last 2 quarters. The unemployment rate in the last quarter exceeded that of the first quarter.

The quarterly movements in the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate are sensitive to the seasonal adjustment procedure that is adopted, particularly when there are large swings in unemployment because of a severe recession or sudden changes in seasonality. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) recognizes that analytically there is no unique or unambiguously superior seasonal adjustment procedure and provides data adjusted under several alternative procedures. The procedure used to compute the official unemployment rate gives a heavier weight to the more recent experience than the procedure applied to other statistics. Because large changes in unemployment occurred during the course of 1974 and 1975, the official seasonal adjustment procedure may have exaggerated the movements in the unemployment rate last year.

One of the alternative seasonal adjustment procedures used by BLS is to assume that there has been no change over time in the seasonality in employment and in unemployment within age-sex groups for the years 1967 to 1973 and to exclude the experience of the recent recession. Unemployment rates adjusted according to the stable seasonality procedure suggest more gradual changes throughout the year than the official statistics and about the same unemployment rate during the last quarter as during the first quarter of 1976. Under this procedure the unemployment rate was 8.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 1975, 7.8 percent in the first quarter of 1976, 7.5 percent in

the second quarter, 7.7 percent in the third quarter, and 7.8 percent in the fourth quarter. This approach, however, does not allow for possible changes over time in the seasonality of age-sex specific unemployment rates that may have accompanied the dramatic changes in the composition of the labor force. Of course differences in seasonal adjustment procedures have no effect on the unemployment rate for the year as a whole.

Last year's decline in unemployment rates was widespread among demographic groups, though the rate fell more sharply for men than for women. One reason is the greater concentration of male workers in cyclically sensitive blue-collar jobs. Another was the rapid increase in the participation of females in the labor force, an increase which retarded the decline in their unemployment rate in spite of the rise in female employment.

The decrease in unemployment rates by occupation and industry in 1976 mirrored the cyclical increase in 1974–75. By occupation, the unemployment rate of white-collar workers was essentially the same in 1975 and 1976, but blue-collar workers' unemployment rate fell by over 2 percentage points. In 1976 the unemployment rates in construction, manufacturing, and transportation and public utilities were lower than in 1975, but in the other private service-producing industries the unemployment rates in 1976 about equaled the 1975 levels. Unemployment rates in 1976 were substantially higher than in 1975 and 1974 for government workers and agricultural wage and salary workers.

The persistence of relatively high unemployment rates in 1976 for government and agricultural wage and salary workers may in part reflect the slow growth in government employment and a continued adjustment to SUA, which came into effect in the first quarter of 1975. SUA provided unemployment compensation coverage for the first time for the 12 million wage and salary workers not covered by a regular Federal or State program, most of these being State and local government or agricultural wage and salary workers. The availability of these benefits may have encouraged some persons who became unemployed for seasonal or other reasons to extend their period of unemployment and job search rather than take a less desirable job or drop out of the labor force. (The effects of the unemployment compensation system on the unemployment rate are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.)

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

The civilian labor force participation rate increased sharply last year compared to 1974 and 1975 (Table 21). The increase was largely concentrated among women. For women aged 20 and over the participation rate rose from 46.0 percent in 1975 to 47.0 in 1976, more than offsetting a 0.4 percentage point decline in the participation rate among adult men which continued a long-term trend. The teenage labor force participation rate increased somewhat, by 0.5 percentage point to 54.6 percent in 1976.

The increase in female labor force participation is in part a continuation

of longer-term trends. Over the past 2 decades, for example, the labor force participation rate of women aged 20 and over has risen 11 percentage points from 36 percent in 1956. This change reflects a combination of related factors: increased potential earnings in the labor market; later marriages; a decline in birth rates; more efficient production in the home because of such time-saving consumer durables as freezers and dishwashers, and such non-durables as frozen foods and wash-and-wear clothing; and a change in attitudes concerning the roles of men and women. The expanded employment opportunities in 1976 compared to the previous year may also have encouraged greater labor force participation by women.

The increase in labor force participation by adult females last summer appears to be larger than one would have predicted on the basis of the secular and cyclical factors. The rise in the participation rate from 46.6 percent in the first 5 months to 47.3 percent in July and August, and the decline to 47.2 percent in the following 3 months may be traceable in part to the effect of SUA, which provided a new incentive for women in the educational services industry, and perhaps in other sectors, to remain in the labor force rather than withdrawing during the summer.

In summary, the substantial increase in employment (2.7 million persons) last year was accompanied by a very strong growth in the civilian labor force (2.2 million persons). The labor force growth resulted mainly from the increase in the population aged 16 and over, the secular increase in overall labor force participation rates, and the economic recovery to the extent that it encouraged persons to enter or remain in the labor force. The result of these factors was that only a moderate decline occurred in the number of unemployed persons (0.5 million).

INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS

A major concern of public policy in a recession is to mitigate the loss of family income among those who become unemployed. Cushioning this loss helps to maintain consumer purchases and thereby facilitates economic recovery. It also provides for a broader sharing of the economic burden created by a recession. With the improvement in the economy in 1976, benefits under income transfer programs declined (Table 22).

Unemployment compensation is the most important countercyclical income transfer program. As unemployment increases because of layoffs, the number of recipients increases; with the recall of workers the number of recipients declines. This pattern appeared in the last 2 years during the decline in economic activity and in the subsequent recovery (Table 22).

The ability of the unemployment compensation system to respond to the economic downturn was strengthened by two temporary programs. Under FSB the duration of entitlement for persons covered by a regular program was extended in two 13-week installments to a maximum of 65 weeks. Benefit durations under FSB were reduced in 1976 in States with lower insured unemployment rates, and FSB is scheduled to terminate this March.

Table 22.—Income transfer programs, 1974-76

Program	Unit	1974		1975				19	76	
Fiogram	OIIIL	IV	ı	П	Ш	IV	i	П	111	IV
Unemployment: Total number of persons	Millions	5. 6	8. 3	8. 0	7. 8	7. 2	7.9	7. 0	7. 3	7.0
Unemployment Compensation: Beneficiaries: Total Permanent programs FSB and SUA?	do	2. 3 2. 3	5. 1 4. 7 . 4	5. 5 4. 8 . 7	5. 3 4. 0 1. 3	4, 8 3, 5 1, 3	5. 2 4. 1 1. 1	4. 3 3. 2 1. 1	4. 2 3. 1 1. 1	
Benefit payments: Total 3 Permanent programs FSB and SUA	ao	7. 8 7. 8	17. 3 16. 2 1. 1	19. 0 16. 7 2. 3	18.6 14.7 3.9	17. 6 13. 2 4. 4	20. 5 15. 5 5. 0	16. 0 12. 2 3. 8	13.1 10.9 2.2	
Food Stamp Program: Beneficiaries Benefit payments	Millions 5 Billions of dollars 4_	15. 9 4. 0	18.6 4.9	19. 2 5. 0	18. 6 5. 2	18. 5 5. 1	18. 8 5. 6	18. 2 5. 4	17. 3 5. 1	
Aid to Families with Dependent Children: Beneficiaries: Total Unemployed fathers	Millions 5	10.9 .4	11.3 .5	11.3 .5	11.3 .5	11. 4 . 6	11. 5 . 7	11. 3 . 7	11. 2 . 6	
Benefit payments 3	Billions of dollars 4	8. 4	8.9	8.9	9.3	9.8	10.1	9.9	10.0	
Old-age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance: Beneficiaries: Total 6. Retired workers and dependents. Disabled persons and dependents.	Millions 5	30. 7 19. 6 3. 9	31. 1 19. 8 4. 0	31. 1 19. 9 4. 1	31. 5 20. 1 4. 2	31.9 20.3 4.3	32. 3 20. 5 4. 4	32. 4 20. 5 4. 5	32. 6 20. 6 4. 5	32. 9 20. 9 4. 6
Benefit paymenls 7	Billions of dollars 4.	56.8	60.6	63.0	67. 1	68. 3	69. 4	71. 4	75.3	76. 8
Medicaid: Beneficiaries Benefit payments	Millions 5 Billions of dollars 4-	8. 2 11. 9	8. 8 13. 4	9. 0 14. 3	8. 7 13. 7	9. 0 14. 6	9. 4 15. 3	9. 3 15. 3	9.1 15.8	
Medicare: Benefit payments Supplemental Security In-	Billions of dollars 4_	13. 7	14.9	15.4	15. 5	16.5	17.3	18. 3	18.6	
come: Beneficiaries Benefit payments 3	Millions 5	4. 0 5. 5	4. 1 5. 6	4. 2 5. 6	4. 3 5. 9	4. 3 6. 0	4. 3 6. 0	4. 3 6. 0	4. 3 6. 2	4. 3 6. 2

Sources: Department of Agriculture, Department of Labor, and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

SUA provided temporary coverage and a maximum duration of benefits of 39 weeks for the 12 million wage and salary workers not previously covered by a regular Federal or State program. Under the Unemployment Compensation Amendments Act of 1976 about 9 million of the 12 million persons covered by SUA are to be brought under the regular State programs by January 1978, and SUA will not take any new claims from that date.

The other cash transfer programs are less cyclically sensitive. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), social security, and the supplemental security income program (SSI) provide benefits largely to lowincome fatherless families, the aged, and the disabled-groups whose employ-

Weekly average.
 Federal supplemental benefits (FSB) and special unemployment assistance (SUA).
 Includes State as well as Federal payments.

⁴ Annual rate.

Monthly average.
Total also includes survivors.

⁷ in current payment status.

ment and earnings show little cyclical sensitivity (Table 22). These programs are nevertheless major sources of income redistribution. In 1976 total benefits were \$10 billion under AFDC, \$73 billion under social security, and \$6 billion under SSI.

The AFDC program for unemployed fathers (AFDC-UF), now available in 28 States, grew significantly in 1976, though it is still a small program. AFDC-UF benefits had been available only to families with low income and few assets and with an unemployed father not eligible for unemployment compensation. In June 1975, however, the Supreme Court ruled that a State with the program could not deny AFDC-UF benefits simply because the father was eligible for unemployment compensation, thus permitting such fathers to choose between the programs. For low-income families with several dependents, benefits under AFDC-UF may exceed those available under unemployment compensation. The average monthly cash benefit among AFDC-UF families was \$325 in the first half of 1976, about the same as the average monthly unemployment compensation benefit. Because they tend to have low earnings when they work, the average AFDC-UF claimant would have a lower than average unemployment compensation benefit. In addition, participation in AFDC-UF includes categorical eligibility for food stamps and medicaid. As more low-income families became aware of these greater benefits and as more workers exhausted their FSB entitlement, AFDC-UF participation increased. From June 1974 to June 1975, when the unemployment rate increased from 5.3 percent to 8.7 percent, AFDC-UF participation rose from 86,000 families to 112,000 families. By June 1976 the unemployment rate had fallen to 7.6 percent, but participation had increased to 146,000 families.

There are three major in-kind income transfer programs: medicaid, medicare, and food stamps. Medicaid subsidized medical care for persons on AFDC, and for other low-income persons who are medically indigent, at a cost of \$15 billion in 1976. Medicare provided medical insurance at a cost of \$18 billion for the aged and disabled receiving social security benefits and for persons with end-stage renal (kidney) disease. These programs exhibit some cyclical sensitivity. The food stamp program, which provides subsidized food vouchers for low-income families, is the most cyclically sensitive in-kind income transfer program. With the improvement in the economy the average monthly participation in the food stamp program decreased, although at an annual rate the program costs were about the same as in 1975 (Table 22).

One measure of the adverse impact of a recession is its effect on the poverty rate, the proportion of the population represented by families or unrelated individuals with money incomes below the poverty level. The poverty threshold in 1975 for a nonfarm family of four was officially defined as \$5,500 in money income as measured in the March 1976 supplement to the Current Population Survey. Because of the growth over time in real family money income, the poverty rate declined from 22.4 percent in 1959

(the earliest data available) to 11.1 percent in 1973. In the recessions occurring during this period poverty either declined more slowly or actually increased, while during periods of rapid economic expansion the poverty rate fell sharply.

The most recent period is no exception. The poverty rate increased by 0.5 percentage point (1.3 million persons) from 1973 to 1974 and by 1.1 percentage points (2.5 million persons) from 1974 to 1975. Given the severity of the downturn, as measured by the unemployment rate and real disposable personal income, the increase in poverty is somewhat smaller than would have been expected. Past experience suggests that the increase would have been 0.7 percentage point from 1973 to 1974 and 1.3 percentage points from 1974 to 1975. Moreover the extent of the increase in poverty would have been smaller if the value of in-kind income transfer benefits, such as the food stamp subsidy and the insurance premium value of medicaid were counted as income.

ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS

Since late 1973 world petroleum prices have risen by over 350 percent as the posted price of crude oil produced in the Persian Gulf increased from \$2.59 per barrel to about \$12 per barrel. The economic recovery in 1976 promoted an increase in energy consumption, though higher prices held consumption below the previous peak. Adjusting the quantity and mix of sources of energy consumed in the United States has been slowed because such adjustment requires extensive changes in the capital stock of the country and because the prices of domestic petroleum and natural gas are held below world price levels by controls. The United States has apparently adjusted less rapidly than other developed countries. This has contributed to increased U.S. dependence upon imports, exposing the economy to greater risk of externally imposed damage.

CONSUMPTION

Energy consumption increased in 1976 after 2 consecutive years of decline. The economic recovery was sufficiently strong to increase energy consumption by about $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent in spite of higher prices, an abnormally warm winter, and a cooler than usual summer. Energy consumption has been lowered compared with the level that would have existed if it had not been for the price increases of 1973–75. In the household-commercial sector, changes in energy usage followed movements in real disposable income for the first 2 years after the late 1973 price increase (Table 23). In the most recent 4 quarters, however, changes in energy consumption have been far smaller than the growth in real disposable income, suggesting a gradually growing response to price increases. In the manufacturing and transportation sectors as well, energy consumption has increased less rapidly than would have been predicted on the basis of the growth in manufacturing

production or real GNP, and this also implies a continuing response to the price rise.

The amount of substitution of alternative energy inputs for petroleum to date has not been great. While coal is being substituted for petroleum, increased amounts of petroleum are being used to make up for shortages of natural gas. Petroleum as a percentage of total energy inputs in manufacturing increased from 27 percent in 1973 to 30 percent in 1976. Usage of petroleum by utilities dropped 1 percent. The share of coal in total energy used in manufacturing remained constant between 1973 and 1976, while utilities increased their consumption of coal from 56 to 62 percent of all fossil fuel inputs.

Table 23.—Changes in energy consumption and relevant economic indicators by final consumption sector, 1950-76

[Percent]

Period	Energy consump- tion in household and com- mercial sector	Real dis- posable personal income	Energy consump- tion in industrial sector	Manufac- turing produc- tion	Energy consump- tion for transpor- tation	Real GNP
Annual average change:						
1950 to 1955 1955 to 1960 1960 to 1965 1965 to 1970 1970 to 1973	4. 1 4. 6 5. 5	3. 3 2. 7 4. 7 3. 9 4. 8	3. 5 1. 3 3. 4 4. 2 1. 8	5. 3 2. 4 6. 5 3. 5 6. 9	2.6 1.9 3.3 5.1 4.7	4. 2 2. 4 4. 7 3. 0 4. 7
Change from preceding year:						
1974 1975	-1.8 1.9	-1.6 1.7	-2.9 -8.3	-10.1	-3.4 .6	-1.7 -1.8
Change from a year earlier to:	ł				Ì	
1974:	6 -1. 4	-1.4 -1.9 -3.3	-1.1 -5.0 7 -4.8	2.3 1.6 1.1 -5.8	-7.3 -2.6 -2.6 -1.0	8 -1.9 -4.1
1975:	3, 2 1, 5	-2.2 3.5 1.8 4.0	-5.1 -13.1 -11.0 -4.7	-14.5 -14.4 -9.6 -1.3	3.9 1.3 6 -1.9	-5.6 -3.6 3 2.3
1976:		6. 3 2. 4 4. 1	11. 4 5. 9	13. 9 15. 1 9. 8	3. 7 3. 5 4. 6	7.3 7.0 5.2

Note.—Energy consumption includes distribution generation losses.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Department of the Interior (Bureau of Mines) Federal Energy Administration, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

PRODUCTION

Imports of oil increased while domestic production of crude oil and natural gas declined again in 1976; however, production of bituminous coal continued to grow.

The decline in the production of crude oil which began in 1970 continued in 1976, although the rate of decline slowed to 2.6 percent from a 4.7 percent decline in 1975. The decrease in petroleum production has to some extent been caused by price controls on all or part of the output of

domestic wells since 1971. From May 1973 to February 1976 roughly two-thirds of U.S. oil production was under price controls. From February 1976 to September 1976 all U.S. output was controlled. In September 1976 controls were lifted from stripper wells, which produce less than 10 barrels a day and account for 14 percent of total U.S. output. The number of oil and gas wells drilled and the total footage of such wells increased in 1976 to the level last recorded in the early 1960s, although many drilling rigs were idle through part of the year. Production from the Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Reserve was begun, and a number of problems which had prevented production of crude oil from offshore leases in California were surmounted. After numerous delays progress on the Alaskan pipeline set the stage for delivery of the first production from the North Slope in late 1977.

Production of bituminous coal increased by $2\frac{1}{2}$ percent in 1976 and reached a postwar record level. From 1973 to 1976 the production of coal increased 12 percent, as coal production capacity has expanded in response to higher coal prices.

Total marketed production of natural gas, which had been declining since 1973, appears to have stabilized in 1976. The stabilization of production masks a continuing trend to withhold new production from interstate markets in favor of intrastate markets, where a higher price is offered. The interstate market for natural gas has apparently been bearing the full brunt of the declines in total marketed production since 1973. Thus Federal price controls are not only causing reductions in U.S. production but also distorting the distribution of available supplies.

There were only small increases in production from other energy sources, primarily nuclear power and hydropower. Hydropower production is limited by the physical capacity of hydropower plants as well as by the amount of rainfall. Production from nuclear power plants was constrained by licensing and operating problems. Although the maximum dependable capacity of nuclear power plants increased by 10.3 percent from the end of 1975 to July 1976, production increased by only 6.0 percent; operating rates declined to 52.0 percent of capacity from the average 55.0 percent recorded in 1975.

IMPORTS

The increase in demand for petroleum and the decline in domestic production implied increased imports of petroleum during 1976. In some measure the increase in petroleum imports represents the natural response to the greater demand created by the economic recovery. Much of the increase, however, is the result of a policy which sets consumer prices by averaging higher-priced imports and lower-priced domestic output. Imports, the marginal supply of petroleum in the United States, are being subsidized by the price controls, which discourage conservation and expansion of domestic production. Petroleum imports averaged 7.2 million barrels a day, up 14

percent from 1973. The cost of petroleum imports has risen from \$7.5 billion in 1973 to \$32 billion in 1976. Imports currently represent 41 percent of U.S. oil consumption, compared with 29 percent in 1972. Although countries of the Western Hemisphere, primarily Venezuela and Canada, supplied about two-thirds of U.S. imports of petroleum in 1973, less than half came from the Western Hemisphere in 1976.

The 1976 increase in imports was concentrated in crude oil rather than refined products. Since 1973 total petroleum imports have increased from 6.3 million barrels a day to approximately 7.2 million; but imports of petroleum products have declined from 3 million barrels a day to less than 2 million. This substitution is a result of expansion in refining capacity and implementation of the Federal Energy Administration's (FEA) entitlement programs, which provide substantial price protection to U.S. refineries.

PRICES

The increase in energy prices, which had exceeded 10 percent per year during 1974 and 1975, slowed significantly during 1976. Contributing to this moderation was the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, which was passed by the Congress in December 1975 and became effective in February 1976. This act caused an initial reduction of 8.8 percent in the price of crude oil produced within the United States and prescribed that the rate of increase of crude oil prices would equal the rate of inflation as measured by the GNP deflator plus up to 3 percent, as a production incentive until the act expired in 1979. In its attempts to comply with the provisions of the act, FEA froze the price of crude oil at the June 1976 level as of July. Consequently, U.S. crude oil prices have fallen even farther below the price of imports.

Prices charged to consumers did not reflect the decline in domestic crude oil prices last year (Table 24). The average price of crude oil entering refineries, including imported crude oil, increased during the last year, although the price of domestic crude production fell 7 percent. The prices of fuel oil and gasoline had surpassed the December 1975 levels by mid-1976.

During 1976 price controls were removed from distillate fuel oils, residual fuel oils, and miscellaneous products. Gasoline, commercial jet fuels, propane, and certain other products remained under controls. Consumer prices of products that were no longer under price controls rose no faster than prices of those products still under control.

The average price of natural gas continued to increase during 1976; but at about 54 cents per thousand cubic feet (mcf) it remained well below the price of the nearest substitute, oil, owing to the effects of the continued regulation by the Federal Power Commission (FPC) of gas sold for resale in interstate markets. Prices of domestic gas entering the regulated interstate pipelines rose from 30 cents per mcf for the 12 months ending June 1975 to 39 cents for the 12 months ending June 1976. In mid-1976, prices for im-

TABLE 24.—Changes in consumer prices of energy items, 1966-76

[Percent]

Period	Total energy items ¹	Electricity	Fuel oil ²	Gasoline ³	Gas
Average annual change:					
1966 to 1969	2. 1 3. 1	1. 2 5. 0	2, 8 3, 4	2. 6 . 9	0. 9 6. 0
Change from a year earlier:					
1973 1974. 1975. 1976.	8. 0 29. 3 10. 6 7. 1	5. 0 18. 1 13. 2	15. 4 58. 8 8. 3	9, 8 35, 4 6, 8	4. 6 12. 5 19. 9

¹ Also includes coal and motor oil, not shown separately.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,

ported and some newly contracted intrastate gas ranged between \$1.67 and \$1.71 per mcf.

During 1976 the FPC lifted the ceiling price to 93 cents per mcf for gas first dedicated for sale in interstate commerce in 1973 and 1974. The price allowed for gas first sold in interstate commerce in 1975 and 1976 was set at \$1.42 per mcf. The FPC also raised the minimum price for what is termed old gas.

The extent to which these price changes will affect demand is limited by the practice of basing consumer charges on the average cost of gas, including the gas purchased under the previously lower regulated price. Consequently these price actions will not eliminate the shortage of natural gas for interstate trade though they will help to reduce it.

The average price of coal sold under long-term contracts continued to increase during 1976 at a rate approximately parallel to the rate of inflation in the economy at large. The price of bituminous coal in spot markets, however, continued to decline during 1976 from peaks reached during the coal strike of 1974.

Electricity prices rose at a 7.2 percent annual rate through the first 9 months of 1976 with rate increases awarded by regulatory authorities to offset the past decline in revenues from electricity consumption. As growth in the demand for electricity resumed in mid-1976, requests for these revenue-sustaining increases began to diminish.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS

Increased crop and livestock production last year resulted in the smallest food price increases since 1971, the food CPI averaging 3 percent above 1975. At the same time, farm income remained close to the 1975 level. Last year's relatively stable situation provides a vantage point from which to assess the adjustments of the agricultural sector to the relative price changes of the preceding $3\frac{1}{2}$ years.

Fuel oil No. 2.
 Regular and premium gasoline.

COMMODITY MARKETS AND FOOD PRICES

World grain (including rice) production in the 1976–77 marketing year is estimated to be 8 percent greater than the preceding year, a record harvest and sufficient to add over 40 million metric tons to world stocks. This would be the first substantial addition to world stocks in 5 years.

While much attention has been given to weather uncertainties in recent years, world production of all grains has been relatively stable. Because shortfalls in individual countries have to some extent been offsetting, world production has not fallen as much as 3 percent below trend levels in any year since 1960. However, relatively small variations in production can cause large price fluctuations because of the inelasticity of world supply and demand, especially with the much-reduced level of world carryover stocks of grain in recent years. Price fluctuations in the United States during 1972–75 were further increased in size by policies in other countries, which attempted to insulate their prices from world supply and demand conditions. The result was to leave a disproportionate amount of consumption and production adjustment to countries which follow relatively free-trade, market-oriented policies. Chief among these is the United States.

In response to the high crop prices of 1972–75, and accommodating farm policies, U.S. farmers in 1976 harvested record crops of wheat and corn for the second consecutive year. The large crops allowed substantial rebuilding of stocks, especially of wheat. U.S. carryover stocks from 1976 food grain supplies are expected to be around 28 million metric tons for wheat and 2 million tons for rice, roughly half a year's total utilization for each. At the end of 1976 farm prices were substantially lower than a year earlier for wheat and rice, and slightly lower for corn. For soybeans, however, prices were much higher as strong domestic and foreign demand, coupled with a reduced U.S. crop, indicated that carryover stocks might be drawn down near minimum levels in 1977.

The lower food grain prices were reflected in an estimated 1 percent decline between the fourth quarter of 1975 and the fourth quarter of 1976 in the cereal and bakery product component of the CPI. But grain prices influence the food sector primarily through livestock markets. Favorable ratios of livestock to feed prices in 1975 resulted in large increases in meat production in 1976. Compared to production figures a year earlier, pork production was up 8 percent, beef up 8½ percent, and broilers up 12 percent. Milk production increased 4 percent, the largest annual rise since 1953. Beef production was high not only because of increased marketing of grain-fed cattle, but also because cattlemen continued to cut back their breeding herds, which had been overbuilt in the early 1970s. The resulting addition to last year's meat supplies helped depress prices, but the reduction in cattle numbers set the stage for higher beef prices in the future.

Consumption of red meats and poultry last year rose an estimated 7 percent from 1975. The relative price of meats as measured by the red meats

and poultry CPI deflated by the overall CPI fell an estimated 6½ percent below the 1975 average. Taking into account changes in income and population, the increased quantities consumed implied a larger response of consumption to the price decline or the income increase than is found in most econometric studies of demand for meats.

Consumer prices for other food categories, including fruits and vegetables and dairy products, increased faster than the overall CPI during 1976. There were especially sharp increases for coffee, eggs, and fish. But cereals and meats declined sufficiently during the year to make the increase in the food CPI only an estimated 1 percent from the fourth quarter of 1975 to the fourth quarter of 1976 and 3 percent from year-average 1975 to 1976.

FARM INCOME

Preliminary estimates indicate that last year's real income from farm and other sources per farm household was high by historical standards for the fifth straight year, even though it was substantially below the 1973 peak. U.S. Department of Agriculture data on disposable income per capita for the farm and nonfarm populations give some basis for comparing farm and nonfarm economic well-being (Table 25). Comparison is difficult, however, because of differences in the cost of living and in the number of persons per household, as well as nonpecuniary differences between farm and nonfarm work and greater capital gains arising from farm real estate. Commercial farmers with annual gross sales of \$20,000 or more per year earned higher average incomes than the nonfarm population throughout the 1970s. This group accounted for 89 percent of the farm products sold in 1975. In 1975 they earned a mean income per household of \$24,980, after tax but including income in kind, but the aggregate conceals wide variations in returns. In particular, many cattle feeders and sugar beet and cane producers experienced losses last year, although in some recent years they earned large profits.

The changes in product and factor prices that lay behind the farm income changes of the 1970s show the influence of sharply rising export demand for grains and oilseeds. In fiscal 1976 farm exports attained a seventh consecutive yearly record of \$22.1 billion, of which \$13.7 billion was accounted for by wheat, feed grains, and soybeans. In addition, domestic demand for food has continued to increase. Total domestic utilization of farm food commodities increased 6 percent between 1970 and 1976, while the CPI for food consumed at home increased 8 percent relative to the overall CPI. Between 1970 and 1976 the prices farmers received for crops rose 35 percent relative to the GNP deflator and the relative prices received for livestock rose 2 percent.

The associated increases in factor prices reflect not only a greater derived demand but also the effects of energy price increases on production costs. The prices of all important groups of farm inputs increased in compari-

TABLE 25.—Real income per farm and per capita disposable personal farm income as percent of nonfarm income, 1961–75

Period	Total income per farm (1967 dollars) ¹	Percent of farm operators' income from farming	Per capita disposable personal income, farm as percent of nonfarm
1961-65 average	\$6, 797	51. 2	61. 7
	8, 893	45. 9	72. 0
1971	9, 327	41.3	74.7
1972	10, 865	46.4	83.4
1973	14, 183	55. 8	109. 3
	12, 685	51. 3	92. 7
1975	10, 969	44.4	89.6

¹ Net farm income excluding inventory change plus off-farm income of farm households divided by the index of prices paid by farmers for family living items, 1967=100.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

son with the general price level. The indexes for farm prices paid, deflated by the GNP deflator, were up 44 percent for fertilizers, 28 percent for tractors and self-propelled machinery, 23 percent for fuels and energy, and 21 percent for agricultural chemicals between 1970 and 1976. The index of farm real estate prices relative to the GNP deflator rose 42 percent, and the hourly real wage rate of hired farm workers rose 12 percent during this same period.

FARM AND FOOD POLICY

Through the Rice Production Act of 1975 a rice program that restricted output was replaced last year by the market-oriented approach already existing for wheat, feed grains, and upland cotton. That approach, introduced in the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, provides income support by means of deficiency payments based on the difference between a legislated target price and the market price or support price received. The market price is supported at a lower level by way of the "loan rate," the price per bushel which is provided as a loan to qualifying farmers who put grain in storage and may then pay off the loan by turning grain over to the Commodity Credit Corporation. The higher target price has little effect on acreage because deficiency payments are made only on an allotment base which a farmer cannot increase by expanding acreage. Unlike that for wheat and feed grains the target for rice established for the 1976 crop is above market prices. Consequently deficiency payments on the 1976 crop of an estimated \$140 million will be made to rice growers.

The loan rate on wheat was increased by 75 cents to \$2.25 per bushel in October 1976, with smaller increases for feed grains. This increase put the wheat support price near enough to market prices so that any further significant increase in the support price would threaten to reduce export and feed use of wheat.

Following a recent emphasis on international approaches to commodity policy, the United States proposed in the International Wheat Council a system of nationally held food grain reserves. The reserves, to consist of 30 million metric tons of wheat and rice, would be used to add to supplies during years of exceptionally low production rather than to defend any particular price band. They would be acquired and released with reference to quantitative triggers, when world supplies exceeded or fell short of trend by a fixed percentage. No progress was made toward implementation of this plan. By year-end, however, prospective private carryover stocks of wheat and rice above working stocks in the United States amounted to perhaps 20 million tons of the proposed 30-million world total.

There were significant policy developments in several other areas in 1976. The Administration attempted unsuccessfully to move toward a market-oriented program for peanuts to replace the current reliance on acreage controls and high support prices. Dairy price supports were reviewed at quarterly intervals and were raised in April and October to keep the price of milk used in manufacturing at 80 percent of parity. By the end of the year substantial Government purchases of butter, cheese, and powdered milk were being made at the support prices. The President vetoed a bill which would have raised dairy supports to 85 percent of parity and under which the accumulation of dairy products would have been still larger and the year-end prices still higher.

Other international policy developments concerned imported coffee, sugar, and meat, which in fiscal 1976 accounted for \$5.0 billion of the \$10.1 billion U.S. agricultural imports. The Senate ratified U.S. participation in a new International Coffee Agreement, which contains provisions intended to stabilize prices within a band agreed upon by producers and consumers. As with most such arrangements, there is a danger that the agreement will be more effective in holding prices above the price floor than in holding prices below the price ceiling when a short crop occurs. The devastating Brazilian frost of July 1975 is likely to keep prices well above the highest possible support price for at least 2 more years. In regard to sugar and meat, measures were taken to protect domestic producers from imports. The tariff on sugar was increased 1.25 cents per pound, and quantitative restrictions were imposed on imports of beef.

Government regulation of agriculture continued to grow last year. The Environmental Protection Agency suspended most uses of the pesticides heptachlor and chlordane. The Grain Standards Act of 1976 will greatly increase Federal supervision of the weighing and grading of grain for export. The Farmer-to-Consumer Direct Marketing Bill was enacted to encourage the purchase of food in places other than grocery stores. Other regulatory developments included increasing health and safety regulation, the ban by the Food and Drug Administration of several food additives, and the decisions, first to permit and then to deny the use of mechanically deboned red meat for human consumption.

While circumstances have enabled a movement away from restrictive programs for grains and upland cotton, most of last year's policy developments were not in the direction of less regulated markets. With farmers pressing for intervention to forestall lower grain prices, and with increased interest in achieving grain price stability through grain reserves, the potential exists for a further turn from the market orientation that has been brought about in the last decade. The costs of such a turn are discussed in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 3

The World Economy in 1976

AS 1976 DREW TO A CLOSE, there appeared to be some doubt regarding the strength, if not the sustainability, of the economic recovery. After moving very fast early in 1976, the recovery began during the summer to slow in many countries. This slowdown, combined with pressures in foreign exchange markets associated with external payments strains in a number of countries, brought about a renewed sense of uncertainty. Whereas policy concerns early in the year had centered on the risk that simultaneous recoveries in the industrial economies might reinforce each other and bring about an unsustainable pace, in the second half of 1976 the concern shifted to the possibility that the flattening of the recovery might lead to an insufficient rate of growth.

Nevertheless the record for 1976 is quite positive in many respects. Output in the industrial countries is estimated to have risen about 5 percent above its 1975 level in real terms, the volume of world trade expanded by about 10 percent, and inflation rates, though not diminished as much as would be desirable, are significantly below earlier levels. Despite the pessimism of the summer months, it should be clear that a cessation of growth is not expected this year. The consensus of government and private forecasters is that expansion in output will continue, at a pace only slightly below the average rate of growth achieved in 1976, but nevertheless a pace that may not be sufficient to allow a significant reduction in unemployment. In fact, although employment has been growing in many countries, unemployment has remained high and has begun to rise again in some.

The experience of the past several years has shown that high and rising inflation rates are incompatible with the achievement of sustainable growth. In recognition of this fact it was agreed at the Ministerial Meeting of member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and at the meeting of Heads of State and Government of the major industrial countries in the summer of 1976, that the restoration of full employment and normal levels of capacity utilization in the OECD area would take a number of years. It was also agreed that sustained recovery could be achieved only in a climate of price stability. For this reason excessively expansionary policies, which would be interpreted as carrying the seeds of renewed inflation, might at best bring only temporary relief from unemployment.

The policy actions taken in 1975 and early 1976 were aimed at establishing a sustainable recovery. Although several autonomous events in 1972-73 helped create severe inflationary pressures, it is clear that overly expansionary policy measures bore part of the responsibility and eventually contributed to the worldwide recession of 1974-75, and it is this costly experience that authorities are determined not to repeat. Nevertheless, the strategy set out in mid-1976 envisaged a considerable period of growth well above longerrun average rates to ensure a steady move toward full employment. But it also implied caution lest inflationary expectations revive. Therefore, it should not be interpreted as a failure of policy if a mid-course correction now may prove to be necessary to keep the recovery on track in a number of countries. The fiscal program recommended in the United States (see Chapter 1) and the possible adoption of fiscal measures supporting the recoveries in Japan and Germany reflect the conviction that demand management policies must aim at sustaining the recovery but should recognize the need to remain prudent, even in the face of an apparent pause. This is particularly true since the latest indicators in some countries point to a strengthening of activity.

Attainment of sustained growth after a prolonged period of rapid inflation and recession as well as adjustment to the higher cost of energy require a rising share of investment in national output, at least for some time. Now more than ever this necessity implies an avoidance of policies that in the end lead to abrupt shifts. Above all, it involves a commitment by government as well as the public at large to realistic goals for the growth in incomes and the distribution of these incomes within and among nations.

THE DEMAND SITUATION

At the beginning of 1977 the recovery from the deepest and most widespread recession of the post-World War II period was entering its second year. As one frequently finds at this stage, some 18 months after a turning point, cyclical indicators in many countries are sufficiently mixed as to raise the question whether the recovery might lapse into insufficient growth or whether a broadening out into a sustainable expansion is imminent.

In late 1975 and the beginning of 1976 substantial increases in output were registered in most industrial countries. These increases in activity were transmitted to the developing countries, in particular the primary commodity producers, through a strong expansion in international trade and a sharp upturn in commodity prices that came unusually early in the cycle. The early phase of the recovery was associated in part with the substantial amounts of fiscal and monetary stimulus that had been put in place during 1975 and early 1976, and in part with the cyclical recovery of inventory and consumption demand.

Because inventory decumulation in 1974–75 had been unusually sharp and private consumption demand had been weaker than in previous recessions,

there was considerable room for expansion in both these demand components once confidence in a stable recovery began to be established. Accordingly, the main impetus to the expansion in output in late 1975 and early 1976 came from a shift in inventory behavior, which turned from significant decumulation to moderate accumulation. As confidence about the economic outlook improved, consumer spending began to contribute strength to the recovery. The historically high saving rates of the preceding period of inflation and recession began to decline to more normal levels, especially in those countries where inflationary tendencies were subsiding, as consumers began to feel more secure about their jobs as well as about a restoration of the value of their inflation-eroded savings (Table 26). As a consequence pent-up consumer demand, reflecting earlier postponement of both replacement needs and new purchases of durable goods, was released. And industrial production in OECD countries expanded at an annual rate of nearly

TABLE 26.—Personal or household saving rates in selected industrial countries, 1965-76

[Percent;	seasonally	adjusted)
-----------	------------	-----------

Period	United States	Canada	Japan	France	Germany	United Kingdom
1965-72 average	6.7	6.2	19, 1	13.3	13. 0	8, 8
1973 1974 1975	7. 8 7. 3 7. 8	9. 3 9. 4 10. 2	22. 5 24. 3 23. 0	17.3 17.4 17.7	14. 2 15. 2 15. 8	11.6 14.0 14.0
1975: First halfSecond half	8. 1 7. 5	10. 9 9. 6	23. 2 22. 9		16. 9 14. 8	14. 5 13. 6
1976:	6. 9 7. 1 6. 4	9.8 11.6	23. 6 21. 8 22. 2	1 16.3	14.5 14.5 15.0	12.9 13.3

¹ Estimate.

Note.—For the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, the rate is personal saving as percent of personal disposable income. For other countries, the rate is household saving as percent of disposable income.

Sources: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and national sources.

20 percent in the first quarter of the year (Table 27). Most of this increase was concentrated in the growth of output of industrial materials and consumer goods. Clearly industrial activity could not be sustained at such a pace, and growth of output moderated in the second quarter of the year. But as the summer passed and the temporary impetus to activity stemming from the reversal of the inventory cycle and the partial release of pent-up consumer demand spent itself, the rate of increase of economic activity continued to be slow, largely because investment demand did not revive significantly.

DEMAND AND OUTPUT IN MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES

The continued slow pace of the world recovery after the vigorous upswing earlier in 1976 raised questions about whether or not the recovery might be faltering, especially in the United States, Germany, and Japan, where considerable progress had been made in reducing inflationary expec-

Table 27.—Changes in industrial production in selected industrial countries, 1975-76

[Seasonally adjusted monthly rates]

	Percent change from preceding period									
Period	OECD total	United States	Canada	Japan	France	Germany	Italy	United Kingdom		
Latest month from pre- recession peak	-0.8	0. 1	-2.9	-3.3	-2.3	-0, 9	0. 4	—7. 7		
1975:	-1.8 3 .3	-3.1 .3 1.8 .8	9 2 2 4	-2.6 1.0 .7 .3	-1.1 -1.0 -1.1 1.3	7 5 .1 1.2	3 -1.0 6 1.9	2 -1. 4 2 . 3		
1976: 1	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.9	1.7	.9	.8	. 5		
April May June	. 8 . 0 . 8	. 2 . 9 . 4	1.0 -1.2	3. 0 -1. 8 1. 3	.0 .0 .8	2.7 9 1.8	. 5 4. 5 2. 5	2. 2 4. 1		
July Aug Sept		.5 .5 3	7 1.3 4	2.2 -1.7 4	. 8 . 0 4. 0	-2.6 .9 .9	1. 8 -9. 1 13. 4	1.7 9 1.6		
Oct		4 1. 2	-1.3	. 2 2. 2	-4.7 -2.4	9 9		.1		

Sources: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and national sources.

tations, and where, therefore, policy could be more flexible than elsewhere. Current economic indicators in all three countries do not yet provide clear evidence whether and to what extent stimulative measures in addition to those already instituted or currently contemplated might be needed.

In Germany the economic recovery had started earlier than in most other countries, partly because inflationary pressures there had been contained earlier than elsewhere. Because of the early reining in of demand pressures, inventory accumulation in Germany was not as extensive in 1973–74 as elsewhere. Therefore, with demand reviving, the shift in inventory behavior did not contribute as much to the early stages of the recovery as in other countries. Initially, the recovery was carried by the effects of a large income tax cut and a temporary subsidy on investment instituted in late 1974. By the end of 1975 it seemed that the impetus to final demand provided by the fiscal stimulus and by strongly rising export orders might broaden the recovery. Private consumption and investment demand were growing at annual rates of 8 percent in the first quarter of 1976. Surveys of business intention and consumer sentiment pointed toward a continued firming of domestic demand.

After the first quarter, however, the pace of recovery slowed markedly. Not only was there no further improvement in unemployment, but employment remained below year-earlier levels. Domestic order inflows to industry began to weaken. Part of the slowdown in the pace of economic activity reflected a weakening of consumption demand. The saving rate stopped falling and stabilized well above its 1965–72 average, though considerably below its recent peak, and the volume of retail sales was flat through most of

1976. Only exports seemed to remain an expansionary force. Thus, considerable concern arose about the ability of the German economy to move into a sustained expansion.

However, industrial production began to pick up again toward the end of the summer. Later in the year, order inflows, especially from domestic sources, appeared to strengthen and unemployment fell slightly. But business intentions remained weak through the third quarter of 1976, according to surveys, and some part of the rise in domestic orders reflects subcontracting of export orders rather than a broad upturn of domestic investment.

Monetary policy has been accommodating, and it appears that the target for monetary expansion set by the Bundesbank for 1976 will be exceeded. For 1977, the monetary authorities have announced that their target for monetary expansion in terms of Central Bank money will be 8 percent, implying a growth rate of $6\frac{1}{2}$ percent from the last quarter of 1976 to the last quarter of 1977. In order to help ensure that the projected growth of gross national product (GNP) of 5 percent for 1977 over 1976 will materialize, the authorities have instituted a number of selective measures to increase labor mobility and curtail unemployment, and a scheduled increase in value added tax has been postponed. In addition, further measures to stimulate private investment are being contemplated.

Developments in Japan in certain respects appear to be similar to those in Germany. The early phase of the recovery was sparked by fiscal stimulus, and activity picked up sharply toward the end of 1975 with a revival of export demand. In early 1976 the recovery appeared to broaden as private consumption demand rose rapidly and investment demand, though not buoyant, registered its first significant increase in 2 years. Underlying inflationary tendencies seemed to have moderated substantially, although price indicators were rising at a somewhat faster pace than in 1975. The faster rise of consumer prices largely reflected reductions in the subsidy elements of certain government services as well as other government price decisions. A regeneration of cost pressures did not appear to be a factor. In fact wage settlements, last year at an average 834 percent, were well below past trends and indicate that the moderation in price increases that occurred in the third quarter of 1976 may well continue. Furthermore the rate of saving in Japan, as in Germany, appears to have stabilized at levels above its long-run average, and consumption demand is consequently a lesser expansionary factor than had been expected.

The Japanese recovery seemed to come to a virtual halt during the summer months. Industrial production fell toward the end of the summer, and the growth in real GNP decelerated sharply from an annual rate of 81/4 percent during the first half of the year to somewhat less than 2 percent in the third quarter of 1976. This slowdown reflected a decline in the volume of exports from the very high levels of the first half of the year and a flattening out in private investment demand. Finally, in Japan as in the United

States some underspending by public authorities may have contributed to the slowdown in the growth in output. In the case of Japan this underspending was associated with parliamentary delays in approving public financing bills.

Because of the sluggish growth in the third quarter of 1976, the Japanese authorities announced a number of stimulative measures in November. The economic package consisted primarily of fiscal measures on the expenditure side of the budget, and the direct effect of this fiscal stimulus is estimated to amount to about 1 percent of GNP. However, because last year the Government failed to effect the usual annual cut in income taxes designed to reduce fiscal drag, overall fiscal policy may not prove quite so stimulative on balance. The formulation of budgetary policy in Japan in 1976 was complicated by the tenuous political situation. Now that the December elections are over and a Government has been formed, the course of fiscal policy may well be clearer in 1977.

The slower growth in activity in the three large industrial economies, the United States, Japan, and Germany, was accompanied by similar developments in the other major industrial countries. In these countries, however, the fact that internal demand grew more slowly or stopped growing during the summer months of 1976 largely reflected domestic policy measures aimed at containing accelerating price pressures.

In Italy, partly because the Government was under strong political pressures, fiscal and monetary policies had turned decisively expansionary in the second half of 1975. As a result output expanded rapidly from the end of 1975 through May 1976. This expansion in output was accompanied, however, by accelerating price pressures, largely reflecting rising wage costs, a budget deficit that rose to 13 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and an apparent loss of control of monetary expansion. These developments were in turn reflected in growing trade deficits and pressures on the exchange rate. The authorities attempted for some time to contain exchange rate pressures by foreign borrowing and heavy intervention in the exchange markets. But growing reluctance by foreign lenders to extend further credit and mounting pressures in the exchange markets, partly caused by capital flight, brought about a significant change in economic policy. Systematic support of the exchange rate was discontinued early in 1976, and monetary policy was tightened, as was fiscal policy. Partly to reduce domestic liquidity, but mainly to arrest the drop in the exchange rate, the authorities instituted a prior deposit scheme on most foreign currency transactions. Later in the year a temporary surcharge on all purchases of foreign exchange was imposed.

Stabilization measures which could strike at the root of Italy's economic problems—wage push which was largely self-perpetuating in a climate of accelerating inflation because of tight indexation schemes and excessive government deficits financed in large part by the central bank—proved difficult to effect because of political uncertainties. Following the June elec-

tions the authorities began to formulate a more comprehensive economic program partly in preparation for reopening negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial assistance. The Government's program took more definite shape in October with the announcement and subsequent parliamentary ratification of a series of increases in taxes, administered prices, and public traiffs. Monetary policy was tightened further, and discussions with business and labor were begun to seek ways of reducing labor costs and in particular of modifying the linkage between wages and prices. These discussions are continuing, and completion of the IMF negotiations awaits presentation of a satisfactory program of wage restraint. Italy's Communist Party, which made considerable gains in the June elections, as well as the country's other major political parties have supported the Government's stabilization efforts and have agreed, along with key members of the union leadership, that wage restraint must form an essential part of any stabilization package. However, the form such restraint is to take still remains to be worked out.

In the meantime, the recovery slowed, though not quite as much as had been expected. Real GDP in the third quarter of 1976 increased at an annual rate of less than 2 percent, after strong increases in the preceding 2 quarters of 10.2 percent and 6.3 percent respectively. Growth in the second and third quarters was largely sustained by exports and stockbuilding. Investment spending, except for energy-related projects, leveled off after some improvement early in the year. If the Government's stabilization efforts are effective, income growth may remain weak in 1977. In addition, high nominal interest rates, a weak demand outlook, and poor profit opportunities may continue to inhibit private investment demand. A successful stabilization program and strong export orders, however, might do much to release long-deferred replacement demand for capital equipment.

In the United Kingdom it was hoped that an export-led recovery would bring about the structural shift of resources into exports and private investment that was needed for a sustainable expansion, but these hopes flagged in the spring of 1976. The growth of exports began to slow, and in volume terms they fell by 3 percent in the third quarter of 1976. At the same time, the recovery of private investment expenditures, except on North Sea oil installations, appeared to have come to a halt in the second half of 1976. Real GDP fell in the second quarter; and although industrial production stopped falling in September, by November it was only fractionally above its early 1976 level. As a consequence unemployment rose through most of the year.

The disappointing performance of the British economy was largely associated with continued high rates of inflation, despite the wage restraint instituted in August 1975 and the agreement for further restraint reached in May 1976 in return for some tax relief. The high rates of inflation—over 15 percent at an annual rate as measured by the CPI in the first half of 1976—to some extent reflected higher import prices, as commodity prices rose and the exchange rate weakened. But to a larger extent they reflected

continued strong domestically generated price pressures, partly emanating from the public sector.

The British Government therefore reassessed its policies toward the end of 1976. In a policy statement, formulated partly in conjunction with the need to obtain conditional credit from the IMF, the authorities set out their prospective policy guidelines and the reasons for them. An essential requirement, aside from the necessity of further reducing inflation rates and of ensuring continuing support from the unions for the Government's wage policy, is the need to improve the nonprice elements of British competitiveness at home and abroad. Furthermore resources must be shifted from public and private consumption into exports and productive investment. The Government stated that "for this purpose an essential element of the Government's strategy will be a continuing and substantial reduction . . . in the share of resources required for the public sector. It is also essential to reduce the public sector borrowing requirement in order to create monetary conditions which will encourage investment and support sustained growth and the control of inflation." Accordingly the Government is effecting public expenditure cuts, phased over several years, and raising some indirect taxes. These measures, combined with earlier expenditure cuts, an increase in employers' social security contributions, and some other revenue-raising provisions, are expected to bring the public borrowing requirement down from its current level of 9 percent of GDP to about 6 percent in fiscal 1977-78. The fiscal measures are coupled with limits on the expansion of domestic credit designed to bring the growth of bank lending and of the monetary aggregates into line with the Government's overall objectives of reducing the rate of price inflation and bringing down interest rates.

The economic program adopted by the British authorities was hammered out under intense political difficulties, since the longer-term strategy clearly was difficult to accept in the face of high and rising unemployment. However, the authorities decided that the past record of consumption-led growth policies had only weakened the industrial structure in the longer run. Equally, strong pressures to impose direct controls on imports, which were to reduce both external payments pressures as well as pressures on the internal price level stemming from rising import prices, were resisted successfully, mainly on the grounds that such controls would help to perpetuate the structural weaknesses in the economy, but also in recognition of international obligations agreed to within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the IMF. If the recent measures remove some of the uncertainties that have clouded the economic outlook for Britain, and if the forthcoming budget, as expected, removes some of the tax disincentives to business expansion, the outlook for the growth of economic activity in 1977 and beyond may have improved substantially compared with the trends apparent around mid-1976.

In France, as in the other major industrial countries, the recovery initially sparked by fiscal measures and a turnaround in inventory investment slowed

after the first quarter of 1976. The domestic economic situation is dominated by concerns about continued high inflationary pressures. Wholesale prices, which had been falling in 1975, rose at annual rates of almost 20 percent in the second and third quarters of 1976, and consumer prices increased at about a 10 percent annual rate from early 1975 through late 1976. The revival of domestic activity and the relatively high inflation rates were reflected in a growing current account deficit and downward pressure on the exchange rate.

Although a severe drought and the effects of the depreciation of the French exchange rate contributed to the rise in the domestic price level, the main pressures came from internal sources. Wages rose at an annual rate of 16 percent through the third quarter of 1976, in part led by settlements in the government sector well in excess of the inflation rate. The budget deficit in 1975 had been financed largely by bank borrowing, and monetary policy at that time was decidedly expansionary. As a result the growth of the broader money supply (\mathbf{M}_2) accelerated sharply.

Faced with internal price pressures and external financial constraints, the authorities tightened monetary conditions progressively during 1976. The budget for 1976 was designed to halve the public deficit compared with that of 1975. However, aid to farmers to alleviate the effects of the drought and subsidies to the social security fund exceeding planned amounts may keep the deficit above anticipated levels. The proposed budget for 1977 is in balance. The growth rate of public expenditures is to be less than that of nominal GNP, and increases in personal and corporate income taxes, partially offset by a cut in indirect taxes and some investment incentives, are to close the remaining gap between expenditures and revenues. In addition, monetary policy is to continue to support the anti-inflationary measures. M_2 is to grow by 121/2 percent in 1977 over 1976, compared with a 20 percent annual rate during the first half of 1976. The growth of regulated bank credit (about 80 percent of all bank credit extensions) is to be held to 5 percent for the large banks.

The authorities also instituted a general price freeze from mid-September to the end of 1976 and will keep public utility charges unchanged until April 1, 1977. The price pressures built up during the $3\frac{1}{2}$ -month freeze on private sector prices were to be offset by a reduction in value added tax in January 1977, and tighter control of profit margins is to limit price rises further. Finally, the Government proposed a voluntary wage restraint under which real wages would remain constant.

The inflationary environment, coupled with political uncertainties reflected in an early focusing on the 1978 parliamentary elections, has brought about a pessimistic turn in business and consumer confidence according to latest surveys. Nevertheless capacity utilization has continued to rise moderately; and private consumption, reflecting somewhat larger rises in real incomes than elsewhere, has continued to support economic activity.

GENERAL DEMAND TRENDS

Economic developments in the individual countries clearly show a considerable divergence among underlying conditions and therefore among policy concerns. In those countries where marked progress had been made in turning around inflationary expectations—Germany, Japan, and the United States, for example—concerns centered on the sufficiency of the policy stimuli effected earlier. In a number of other countries inflation rates had diminished only little or were accelerating once more, partly because authorities in these countries had generally not moved to contain inflationary pressures during 1974–75 to the extent that other countries had done. The authorities in these countries, notably Britain, Italy, France, and Canada, were thus forced, partly by external pressures, to institute measures aimed at cooling the inflationary climate during 1976. Despite the growing divergence of policy aims among major countries, however, the shape of the recovery revealed a number of striking similarities.

The slowdown in the growth of output over the summer months of 1976, aside from the expected diminution of the stimulus derived from earlier expansionary policy measures and inventory changes, generally reflected one major shift in the demand outlook: private investment demand failed to revive to the extent that might have been anticipated on the basis of surveys of investment intentions and general economic developments. This sluggishness occurred in many countries, despite the fact that replacement needs have been cumulating for some years and a general recognition that a return to sustained full-employment levels in most countries presupposes a shift of resources toward investment.

In Germany and Japan, for example, past recoveries have usually shown a considerable rise in investment demand following an export-led upturn. In the current cycle this pattern has not been repeated, despite the fact that the early stages of the recovery were clearly export led. Further, in a number of other countries as well, investment is turning out to be less strong than past historical relationships would indicate. Econometric evidence based on models for a number of countries participating in Project LINK supports this view.

The financial position of the business sector in many countries does not appear to be a factor restraining investment decisions at this time. The considerable improvement in the liquidity positions, and in the structure of balance sheets of nonfinancial corporations, that had been evident in 1975 apparently continued at least into the first half of 1976. The cyclical rise in corporate profits and the improved climate in bond and equity markets allowed corporations to bring their internal financing and debt-to-equity ratios into better balance. Flow of funds data for the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom collected by the OECD show

that this phenomenon was general among industrial countries. Of course, it reflects to some extent the weakness of investment demand, but the structure of the financial flows themselves was a significant contributing factor.

If neither the low level of capacity utilization nor financial constraints can fully explain current investment behavior, the explanation for the failure of investment demand to turn up decisively in the second year of recovery may be linked to a number of the longer-run factors discussed in Chapter 1. Data for most countries show that there has been an erosion of profits apparent since at least the late 1960s and earlier in some countries. At that time, however, concerns regarding the downward trend of profitability were alleviated by a growth-oriented business climate. Hence private investment demand responded strongly in the 1972-73 upswing. The current pause in investment spending appears to reflect a stronger awareness of the earlier underlying uncertainties and the addition of new ones. The risks associated with committing capital for long periods therefore appear to be weighing more heavily on the appropriation process and the risk premiums required have increased. The costing out of rates of return into the future, never easy, is compounded by the fact that recent experiences have led to greater uncertainties regarding future changes in demand, inflation rates, and financial conditions. The lack of clear guidelines regarding government policies in various areas, but more generally also a fear that governments may have lost control over economic conditions and that the economy in a number of countries may fall into stop-go cycles have added to the difficulties involved in the forward projection of profitability.

A major new element affecting investment decisions is the large increase in the relative price of energy that was effected in 1973–74 by the OPEC cartel. By raising inflation rates and making many processes in industrial and agricultural production uneconomic, the sextupling of the export price of OPEC oil since 1970 has had much more far-reaching effects than the directly obvious ones of deepening the world recession and creating serious international financial problems. The success of the OPEC cartel has also raised uncertainties regarding future price decisions and the security of supply. Investment decisions have become vastly more complicated under these circumstances; and adjustment, while creating new needs for physical capital, may take a long time. In the meantime, capital shortages may appear in various sectors and intensify inflationary tendencies, which in turn will inhibit the adjustment.

In countries where for one reason or another nominal interest rates have risen to recent cyclical highs, the problem surrounding investment decisions is further complicated by the fact that interest payments on debt create cash flow problems. Under such circumstances the longer-run problem of building and sustaining confidence is therefore compounded by the more immediate financial situation.

PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICITS

The economic programs adopted or proposed by the British, Italian, and French authorities, as well as some others, during 1976 all stressed the need to stabilize the growth of the public sector and to reduce budget deficits. In most of these countries it was felt that both inflationary tendencies and disincentives to private sector initiatives were closely linked to the fact that the longer-run trends and the past years of inflation and recession had led to an excessive growth of government expenditures. The expenditure levels that have resulted are not expected to be sufficiently reduced as recession effects wear off. During 1976 government efforts in a number of countries were therefore largely concentrated on achieving immediate cuts in public expenditures as well as better longer-run control of the government sector. The focus on expenditure policy was owing in part to the fact that in a number of countries it was felt that marginal tax rates were approaching effective limits. In Britain and Italy efforts were also directed specifically toward reducing the very large public borrowing requirement, since financing of the deficit during the year involved a high rate of monetization, thus giving impetus to inflationary expectations and, toward the end of the year, to rising nominal interest rate levels. The latter lessened the effectiveness of the governments' policies directed toward increasing private investment demand.

By itself the growth of the public sector does not necessarily imply a loss of vitality in the economy. In fact at times there is a perceived need for the expansion of certain public sector activities, such as infrastructure investment, which while leading to a growing absorption of resources by the public sector sustain or increase the vitality of the private sector. Germany is a good example of this proposition. If the public sector provides the type of services the public desires and is willing to pay for, there is no loss in either productivity or private incentives. However, if public sector services are such as to cast doubt on the willingness of the public at large to pay for them, they imply an increase in the tax burden that the public would be reluctant to bear. In such a case the struggle between business and labor about the distribution of net income could be exacerbated. Such struggles inevitably lead to inflationary pressure and to a loss in efficiency for the economy at large. In this sense the growth of the public sector may be seen as inhibiting growth in the economy.

The closest link between transactions by the public sector and their effects on the overall economy is the direct claim on output and labor that derives from government spending on goods and services. A large part of such spending is concentrated on consumption or on investment in areas that may not necessarily reflect an optimal use of resources. One example is extensive government aid to ailing sectors of industry or individual firms, when aid directed at phasing out such activities might represent a better

use of resources. In such instances the overall ability of the economy to grow may be affected negatively.

One element in the rise in government spending has been the increasing claim of the public sector on labor over time (Table 28). In some cases

TABLE 28.—Private and public employment in selected industrial countries, 1960-75

Control and asserted		Percent of total civilian employment							
Sector and country	1960	1965	1970	1972	1974	1975			
Private sector:									
United States. Canada	97. 1 91. 3 89. 8	86. 9 93. 1 96. 9 89. 8 89. 0 90. 9	85. 8 93. 1 96. 8 88. 4 88. 2 89. 8 90. 1 91. 0 74. 9	85. 5 93. 0 96. 6 87. 8 87. 4 88. 7 89. 3 90. 3 71. 8	85. 3 93. 0 96. 4 87. 3 86. 7 88. 4 2 90. 2 73. 6	96. 86. 85.			
Public sector: United States	1 7. 5 2. 9 8. 7 10. 2	13. 1 6. 9 3. 1 10. 2 11. 0	14. 2 6. 9 3. 2 11. 6 11. 8 10. 2 9. 9 9. 0 25. 1	14. 5 7. 0 3. 4 12. 2 12. 6 11. 3 10. 7 9. 7 28. 2	14. 7 7. 0 3. 6 12. 7 13. 3 11. 6 11. 1 2 9. 8 26. 4	17. 3. 13. 14.			

¹ Data for 1961.

Sources: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and national sources.

a shift of labor to the public sector has been part of a general change in resource allocation that, as noted above, has been conducive to-or at least has not hampered—overall growth. But sometimes it has led to increased inflationary tendencies, particularly in countries where the government tends to be a wage leader. This appears to have been a problem, especially in the United Kingdom in the early 1970s and in France during 1976.

In a more indirect way government policies may have influenced wage formation and price pressures through the timing and extent of increases in social insurance contributions. When such contributions represent a large, and in some cases rising, share of total employment compensation they may create problems. These problems, however, do not lie in the programs that are financed but in the fact that in wage negotiations workers do not normally regard employers' contributions to social security funds as a part of compensation. To the extent that unions in a number of countries have begun to negotiate on the basis of after-tax compensation, rising contributions by employees have also added to wage demands and thus to price pressures. The need to increase contributions to social insurance programs has become apparent in a growing number of countries as recession and inflation have reduced surpluses or have increased deficits of social

² Data for 1973.

³ Includes public corporations.

insurance funds. The requirement that such programs be put on a solvent basis has necessitated increases in contributions, and to the extent that such increases put pressure on wages and prices, they provide a good example of the problem, mentioned earlier, that can arise with regard to income distribution.

The unpredictability of changes in social policies as well as their increased cost may also be inhibiting investment decisions. There is some evidence that this may have been a significant factor in the United Kingdom and Italy. In this connection the recent decision to raise employers' social security contributions in the United Kingdom may well hinder the industrial revitalization which other British policy actions were designed to foster.

The size of the public sector and the way it is related to inflation and overall growth of the economy must be viewed in terms of a balance between public services and private output representing a social consensus. In particular, expansion of public sector expenditures for purposes of short-term demand management without an appropriate linkage to longer-term public objectives can disturb this balance. Because programs once phased in to fill a temporary need tend not to be phased out with matching speed, there may be an unintentional residue of additional public expenditure after each cycle that is possibly wasteful from a longer perspective. However, some countries, Sweden for example, have institutional arrangements that minimize such effects.

Because it has proved difficult in most instances to restrain the growth of public expenditures, or in any event to increase tax revenues at an equal pace, public sector deficits, aside from cyclical effects, have been growing in most countries. A number of countries have been able to keep domestic consumption high by drawing on foreign savings to finance their public debt. But it has become increasingly clear that there are limits to the willingness of foreign lenders to extend such credit. Although in some countries external debt levels might have reached excessive proportions in any event, the time was telescoped by the need to finance external deficits resulting from the increase in the export price of OPEC oil. Consequently in some cases the level of external debt has begun to force authorities to adopt domestic retrenchment programs. The situation has become increasingly acute in those countries where inflationary expectations have remained high and where inflation is eroding trade positions.

THE EXTERNAL SECTOR

The recovery was accompanied by a sharp upturn in the volume of world trade. In contrast to 1975, when world trade in volume terms fell by 5 percent, trade is estimated to have expanded by 10 or 11 percent in 1976. Clearly, this substantial growth of world trade has helped to sustain the recovery, but it has also brought to light the serious underlying imbalances which exist among countries but which had been masked by the recession.

Among the industrial countries, those with the most stable domestic conditions have apparently had a larger share in the expansion of world exports than those with continued high inflationary pressures. This development has occurred despite the large exchange rate adjustments during 1975 and 1976 which helped to offset differential developments in inflation rates (Chart 7). The full effects of changes in relative exchange rates are felt only after a considerable lag. Given the existing slack in capacity utilization and the vigorous upturn in world trade, however, one might expect that countries with depreciating currencies would have shared at above-average rates in the trade expansion. In the event, throughout 1976 the United Kingdom, for example, has been unable to maintain its export market shares, at least in trade in manufacturers, compared with other industrial countries. Italy's share was reduced through the first half of the year, and France may have begun to lose shares as well (Table 29).

The failure of trade flows to respond quickly to changes in exchange rates is often attributed to the failure of such changes to show up immediately and fully in transaction prices. But the price side tells only part of the story. If export prices, expressed in foreign currency, are not adjusted quickly to reflect exchange rate changes, profits on export sales will rise and selling abroad will become significantly more lucrative compared with domestic sales. It is therefore reasonable to presume that, particularly at times of low general profitability, the leverage exerted by exchange rate changes on the supply side may be greater-at least in the short run—than the leverage on demand arising from increased price competitiveness. Because there is considerable evidence that some countries which have recently experienced relatively large depreciations of their currencies have not adjusted their export prices in foreign currency to the extent that might be expected, the profit argument would have provided further grounds for expecting these countries to maintain, if not to improve, their export market shares.

In view of the above discussion, it may be surprising that some "strong currency" countries, especially Germany and Japan, have not only maintained but increased their shares in export markets. Several explanations suggest themselves. Countries with relatively low inflation rates tend to have lower interest rates and may therefore be able at a time of high domestic liquidity to offer more competitive financing terms. Unfortunately data on such nonprice components of export transactions are not available. But because a number of countries exempt export credit transactions from the effects of tight domestic monetary policies, and because the cost of forward cover may partly offset differences in uncovered rates, this explanation takes one only part of the way. Stronger circumstantial evidence exists for a structural explanation relating largely to so-called big ticket items. It is thought that countries with a relatively stable price performance and relatively little social strife and labor disruption, such as Germany and Japan, have a structural advantage in cap-

TABLE 29.—Export shares in trade in manufactures of 11 industrial countries, 1966-76 [Seasonally adjusted]

Period	United States ¹	United Kingdom ²	Germany	France	Italy	Japan	Others 3		
	Percent of total value 4								
1966 1970 1972 1973 1974 1975	20. 1 18. 5 16. 1 16. 1 17. 2 17. 7	13. 4 10. 8 10. 0 9. 4 8. 8 9. 3	19. 3 19. 8 20. 2 22. 1 21. 7 20. 3	8. 6 8. 7 9. 3 9. 5 9. 3 10. 2	6. 9 7. 2 7. 6 6. 8 6. 7 7. 5	9. 7 11. 7 13. 2 12. 8 14. 5 13. 6	22. 0 23. 3 23. 5 23. 3 21. 8		
1975: III	18. 7 18. 3	9. 2 9. 4	20. 1 19. 6	10. 1 9. 9	7. 9 7. 9	13, 6 13, 5	20. 4 21. 5		
1976: 1 	17. 2 17. 5 17. 5	9. 2 8. 8 8. 7	20. 5 20. 4 21. 1	9. 7 10. 3 9. 7	6. 6 6. 3 7. 5	14. 8 14. 7 14. 7	22. 0 22. 0 20. 7		
		<u>,</u>	Perc	ent of total vo	lume 4				
1966	20. 8 18. 5 17. 5 18. 9 20. 3 20. 2	12. 6 10. 8 9. 7 9. 8 9. 3 9. 3	19. 1 19. 8 19. 5 20. 0 20. 4 18. 9	8. 0 8. 7 9. 2 8. 8 9. 3 9. 4	6. 8 7. 2 7. 5 7. 2 7. 1 7. 6	10. 0 11. 7 12. 9 12. 1 13. 0 13. 6	22. 7 23. 3 23. 7 23. 2 20. 6 20. 7		
1975: III	20. 9 19. 9	9. 4 9. 5	18. 9 18. 7	9. 3 9. 0	7. 9 7. 8	13, 5 14, 1	20. 1 21. 0		
1976: 1	18. 6 18. 9 18. 8	9. 2 9. 2 8. 9	19. 5 19. 3 19. 6	8. 8 9. 6 9. 1	6. 9 6. 6 7. 6	15. 8 15. 4 15. 3	21. 2 21. 0 20. 1		

Excluding special category exports.
 Including reexports, and adjusted for underrecording.
 Belgium-Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.
 Total value and total volume refer to total exports of manufactures of the 11 countries in this table.

6 Partly estimated.

Note.—Details may not add to totals because of rounding.


Source: National Institute Economic Review, London.

turing large contracts. The certainty of timely delivery and the relative assurance that contracts will not be reopened because of cost overruns apparently make it worthwhile for the purchaser not to speculate on the possible exchange rate advantage that might derive from placing contracts in a "weak currency" country. If this interpretation is correct, improvement in underlying deficits may take a long time to become evident, even after the adoption of adequate measures to correct the underlying conditions.

The large swing in world trade from an actual decline in 1975 to abovenormal growth rates in 1976—equaling about twice the rate of growth in GNP—has eased external payments strains for a number of countries, especially the primary producers. The worldwide trade expansion was reflected in a shift in the U.S. trade balance of about \$20 billion (at an annual rate) from a surplus of almost \$9 billion in the fourth quarter of 1975 to a deficit of about \$12 billion in the fourth quarter of 1976. This change in the U.S. trade position, which was in large part cyclical, was not, however, accompanied by similar changes in the trade positions of Germany and Japan.

Chart 7


Exchange Rates for Selected Industrial Countries



NOTE: INDEXES ARE BASED ON TRADE—WEIGHTED AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATES AND ARE FOR THE LAST WEEK IN THE MONTH.

SOURCE: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM.

Exchange Rates for Selected Industrial Countries



NOTE: INDEXES ARE BASED ON TRADE—WEIGHTED AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATES AND ARE FOR THE LAST WEEK IN THE MONTH.

SOURCE: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM.

In fact trade surpluses of both these countries toward the end of 1976 were larger than they were the year before, a reflection not only of their strong export performance but also of a relatively slower growth rate of imports, particularly in Japan.

As the recoveries in Germany and Japan—as well as in the United States—proceed, demand for imports is likely to rise concurrently. But the total effect on world trade in 1977 exerted by about 1 or 2 percent faster growth in each of the big countries—which would imply rates of growth that are at the upper limit of what authorities currently judge to be compatible with noninflationary growth—might raise the currently projected 8 percent rate of growth of the volume of world trade to 9½ percent. This increase would help smooth the adjustment problems of the rest of the world, but it could not be enough to make a crucial difference to those countries which still find themselves in payments difficulties despite the large growth in aggregate foreign demand registered in the past year.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES

The slowing of the world recovery after the vigorous upswing earlier in 1976 raised questions about whether or not the recovery may be faltering. Nevertheless, with the policy measures now in place or contemplated, estimated growth of real GNP in 1977 for the OECD area as a whole based on national projections may amount to $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 percent. This rate of growth approximates the 5 percent or so achieved for 1976.

In the three big industrial economies, recovery paths actually may not diverge substantially from earlier recoveries. Further, it must also be remembered that the breadth and sustainability of every upswing in the recent past has been put into question at some time or other before it moved into the broader expansion phase. The difference in the current recovery lies in the greater role that inflationary expectations and other uncertainties may be playing in business decisions. Thus the judgment must be that demand management policies in the three large economies need to remain prudent if the gains achieved so far are not to be jeopardized—especially because the risk inherent in stimulating considerably faster growth than the 5 to 6 percent rates now aimed for may be too high. Nor would faster growth lead to an appreciable easing of the policy problems that are being faced by other countries.

A growing number of OECD countries are facing large and in some cases rising external deficits as recoveries proceed. In many of these countries the progress on the inflation side has been less than satisfactory, particularly compared with achievements in the three major industrial economies. Consequently, after underlying deficits which were masked by the recession surfaced once more, private capital inflows proved insufficient to cover such deficits. In fact inflation fears have in a number of cases caused such capital inflows to shrink at the same time that current account deficits

widened and the possibility of borrowing abroad began to reach its limits. As a result adjustment policies are being forced on a number of countries.


Besides Italy and the United Kingdom, a growing number of smaller countries are now experiencing problems in attracting a sufficiency of foreign capital. Consequently in late 1976 the monetary authorities in several countries moved to raise interest rates and tighten monetary conditions. This was particularly evident in countries adhering to the European snake arrangement, where exchange rate policy forced an adjustment in monetary policy. Nominal interest rate levels in the second half of 1976 were approaching recent cyclical highs in Italy, the United Kingdom, the Low Countries, and the Scandinavian countries (Chart 8). These policy actions clearly bring out the dilemma faced by many authorities: how to deal with continued inflationary pressure without diminishing private investment incentives, since the latter are requisite to a resumption of a stable growth path and a lasting reduction in unemployment. In this respect the strong reliance on monetary policy exhibited in a number of countries raises questions regarding the appropriateness of the policy mix given longer-term policy goals.

The reliance on monetary policy reflects what are perceived to be political constraints in a number of cases. Where social friction is growing and union support of demand management policies has been gained on the basis of understandings regarding transfer payments and public sector employment opportunities, it is proving difficult to change the policy mix. Partly because of such dilemmas a number of these countries have looked increasingly to rising demand in the United States, Germany, and Japan to resolve their external payments difficulties as well as to encourage domestic investment. As noted above, however, stronger demand emanating from the three large industrial countries can help to smooth the adjustment process, but it cannot take the place of well-conceived domestic stabilization programs.

STABILIZATION POLICY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY

Countries have recently had to make difficult adjustments as a result of the severe shocks the world economy has undergone in the past several years. The large exchange rate changes that occurred during 1975 and 1976 partly reflect this process. The task of formulating domestic stabilization policies, never an easy one, has been made even more difficult by these circumstances. Serious social and political problems had to be faced by authorities as they attempted to bring their economies back to a path of balanced growth. Because of these difficulties, it is not surprising that there has been a search for external sources of stability which might ease the hard choices faced by governments and the social partners in the private sector, business and labor. In particular, some have looked to exchange rate stability as a means of reducing inflationary pressures.


Interest Rates in Selected Industrial Countries



NOTE: SHORT-TERM RATES ARE GENERALLY 3-MONTH MARKET RATES AND LONG-TERM RATES ARE GENERALLY GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS; THESE RATES ARE FOR THE LAST WEEK IN MONTH.

SOURCE: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM.

Interest Rates in Selected Industrial Countries



NOTE: SHORT-TERM RATES ARE GENERALLY 3-MONTH MARKET RATES AND LONG-TERM RATES ARE GENERALLY GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS; THESE RATES ARE FOR THE LAST WEEK IN MONTH.

SOURCE: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM.

One of the theories put forward in support of substantial intervention in exchange markets is that currency fluctuations as they occur under the floating rate system provide an independent source of inflationary pressure. In its flattest terms this view is that wherever inflation has led to currency depreciation the decline in the exchange rate will create further inflationary impetus, because of its effect on the domestic price level, and will therefore make stabilization policies increasingly ineffective. In other words, exchange rate changes under these circumstances have a destabilizing effect by creating more inflation, leading in turn to further depreciation, and so on. Some proponents of this theory conclude that this so-called vicious circle can be broken by official intervention in the foreign exchange markets because this action will prevent further depreciation of the exchange rate.

That theory, however, ignores the usual basic cause of the initial depreciation of a currency: domestic policies that have allowed inflationary tendencies in a particular country to diverge substantially from those in surrounding countries. Stabilization of the exchange rate through intervention or borrowing abroad subsidizes imports and thereby suppresses already present domestic inflation and prevents needed adjustment. This effect is possible only for a limited period and when differentials in inflationary expectations are moderate. In the longer run an exchange rate change must be seen not as an independent cause of inflation but as a release of inflationary tendencies that had been suppressed earlier.

A more sophisticated variant of the vicious circle theory states that even when adequate adjustment measures are in place import prices may be forced to adjust to anticipated inflation. Because adjustment takes a considerable period of time, depending on the size of the disequilibrium needing to be corrected, the exchange markets may in some cases bring about an initial rate of depreciation that anticipates the length of the adjustment process. In such instances, the longer the expected adjustment period, the greater the initial overshooting of the exchange rate. Such overshooting at the beginning of the adjustment period may indeed cause inflationary pressure. In the short run, therefore, downward pressure on the exchange rate, resulting either from overshooting or from autonomous movements in exchange rates independent of inflation trends, may complicate the effectiveness of stabilization policies. This possibility is all the stronger in relatively open economies in which indexing arrangements establish a close link between price and wage movements. But, clearly, such a process will be sustainable only if policies are followed that validate the resulting inflation. Thus, even this more sophisticated variant of the theory of a vicious circle is incomplete. To the extent that adjustment measures cause a reversal of inflationary expectations and reestablish a stable economic environment, the likelihood that a reflow of capital will occur is increased, with a consequent tendency for the exchange rate to move upward. The changes occurring through the current and the capital accounts are hence likely to be offsetting. Thus the notion of a generalized vicious circle phenomenon is unwarranted.

Where stabilization policies are perceived to be adequate and are firmly in place, bridging finance to cover the period until external deficits can be reduced adequately and intervention in the market to counter disorderly conditions that can arise without being related to inflation trends may be helpful. In most cases where sound programs are in place and government intentions to hold to them are felt to be firm, the need for such intervention will usually be small. One should also note that the inflationary impact of exchange rate depreciation often conceals the important role of these adjustments in restoring competitiveness and accommodating a reallocation of resources toward the external sector.

It is not useful to ascribe the possible overshooting of exchange rate changes and their consequences on the domestic price level to one exchange rate system or another. If domestic policy goals diverge, and in consequence inflation rates also diverge among countries linked together by trade and capital movements, participants in the foreign exchange market will act upon their expectations regardless of the international monetary system under which they are then operating. If a fixed exchange rate system prevails, considerable speculation will occur and capital flows will after a while push the rate off the peg. If the system is flexible, the response will be similar. The underlying economic conditions and how market participants perceive a government's determination to deal with underlying problems are what determine actions in the market. And market participants will use whatever system is available to them to obtain the adjustment they consider necessary. Because they have perceived the reluctance on the part of various governments to institute politically difficult measures, their actions in the exchange market have leaned toward the pessimistic side. But under these circumstances most observers would judge such reactions to be realistic rather than pessimistic. Hence it is not clear that market actions have ordinarily led to an overdepreciation of exchange rates, or indeed that they have been destabilizing.

Government intervention in the exchange markets aimed at holding a rate when there is increasing evidence that this rate is not in line with underlying economic conditions is likely to prove costly and wasteful of scarce official financial resources. If anything is to be learned from the experience of the 1960s and early 1970s it is surely that intervention policy by itself does not bring about needed adjustment and that the markets are fully aware of this fact. In recognition of this reasoning the Heads of State and Government of the six major industrial nations agreed in November 1975 that the aim of intervention policies should be "to counter disorderly market conditions or erratic fluctuations in exchange rates," and further that stable underlying economic conditions are requisite to stable exchange rates. This agreement was affirmed in a wider context by the meeting of the Interim Committee of the IMF in early 1976.

CURRENT ACCOUNT POSITIONS AND FINANCING

The changes in the world payments pattern from 1975 to 1976 largely reflected the upswing in economic activity. Thus the current account deficit of the industrialized countries as a group increased substantially, while the deficit of the non-oil developing countries (non-oil LDCs) shrank and the surplus of OPEC rose (Table 30). But current account positions of individual countries reflected both the recovery itself and underlying disequilibria that became apparent once more during the recovery. For a number of countries the appearance of a current account deficit, or a diminution of a surplus, is a healthy sign from the point of view of both domestic activity and international equilibrium. As long as the oil-producing countries are unable to spend all their current earnings on imported goods and services, a corresponding current account deficit must be shared among the oil-importing countries. However, the distribution and the size of such deficits are compatible with international equilibrium only if the countries sustaining them exhibit a sufficient degree of economic vitality to attract offsetting capital inflows.

TABLE 30.—Current account balances for OECD, OPEC, and other countries, 1973-77
[Billions of U.S. dollars]

Group of countries	1973	1974	1975	1976 1	1977 ²
OECD	2½	-33	-6½ 39½ -29½ -15½ -15½	-23	25
OPEC	3½	70½		41	45
Non-oil developing countries	-2½	-21		-20	22
Other countries ³	-4	-9½		-12	14
Unexplained discrepancy	½	-7		14	16

¹ Partly estimated.

Sources: Department of the Treasury and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

OECD CURRENT ACCOUNT POSITIONS

The shift in the current account balance of the United States from a surplus of \$6.3 billion in the second half of 1975 to an estimated deficit of \$1½ billion in the second half of 1976 contributed to smoothing the international adjustment process (Table 31). No such support to better international equilibrium was apparent in the shifts in the current account positions of the other two major industrial countries. The Japanese current account swung from a deficit of about \$1½ billion in the second half of 1975 to a \$½-billion surplus in the second half of 1976. This shift, however, masked the diminution during the second half of the year from the very large surplus accumulated in the first half of 1976. The recent downward trend in Japan's current account balance indicates that some further cyclical adjustment may still be expected. Nevertheless the persistent Japanese surplus has complicated adjustment for other countries and has led to voluntary agreements to restrict certain trade flows. In Germany the current account surplus in 1976 was about unchanged from its 1975 level. But because import demand in

Projection.
 Sino-Soviet area, South Africa, Israel, Cyprus, Malta, and Yugoslavia.

Germany grew more in line with output than it had in Japan, there is less reason to believe that Germany's current account surplus is likely to diminish significantly in the coming year.

Table 31.—Current account balances for OECD countries, 1974-76
[Billions of U.S. dollars; seasonally adjusted]

		19	75	1976		
Country	1974	First half	Second half	First half	Second half 1	
OECD: Total	-33.0	-1.0	—5. 5	-7½	-15%	
United States. Canada. Japan. France. Germany. Italy. United Kingdom. Other OECD.	6 -1. 7 -4. 7 -6. 0 9. 7 -8. 0 -8. 7 -13. 0	5. 4 - 2. 5 - 2. 9 3. 3 - 1. 9 - 6. 8	6.3 -2.3 -1.6 7 6 -1.8 -5.3	-2.6 3.5 -1.9 2.3 -1.9 -1.1 -6.5	$ \begin{array}{r} -1\frac{1}{4} \\ -2\frac{3}{4} \\ -4 \\ 1\frac{3}{4} \\ -\frac{3}{4} \\ -\frac{2}{-7} \end{array} $	

Estimate.

Sources: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and national sources.

Because of the strong current account positions of Japan, Germany, and a number of other countries, including Switzerland and the Netherlands, the shift in the combined position of the OECD countries, from a deficit of \$5½ billion in the second half of 1975 to a deficit of more than \$15 billion in the second half of 1976, included substantial increases in the deficits of OECD countries other than the United States. Particularly large shifts were recorded for France and some smaller OECD countries. The improvement in the Italian position reflects in part the adjustment measures taken throughout the year, but it also results from the direct actions taken to curtail increases in imports and to limit purchases of foreign exchange. The position of the United Kingdom was little changed on a year-to-year basis, but a deterioration occurred during the year, partly reflecting an export performance that was somewhat disappointing, even after initially perverse effects of the exchange rate depreciation were taken into account.

Thus, for the OECD countries, 1976 was a year of adjustment difficulties and of wide disparities. However, measures taken toward the end of 1976 to help sustain the recovery, as well as further actions contemplated for early 1977 in some "strong currency" countries, should help smooth the adjustment process this year. Nevertheless, remaining difficulties must not be underestimated, nor must the danger that they could lead to growing pressures for restrictive trade measures be taken lightly. Because such pressures may be increasingly difficult to resist, it is important that progress in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs) be substantial. In particular, aside from the increase in general welfare that would result from trade expansion associated with tariff cuts and the removal of nontariff trade barriers, the strengthening of the general framework of the GATT is important in this context.

OPEC SURPLUSES

Adjustment problems of many countries continue to be complicated by the large surpluses accruing to OPEC. In line with the upswing in economic activity, the OPEC current account surplus began to rise again in 1976. Import absorption possibilities have turned out to be very high for most OPEC member states, even for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Nevertheless the rise in the current account surplus for OPEC in 1976 is a reflection of increases in the surpluses of the latter countries and Kuwait as import expansion possibilities for these countries lag well behind the inflow of oil revenues. The increase in the export price of OPEC oil agreed upon at the end of 1976 will serve to raise the OPEC surplus further in 1977. Because of port congestion, disarray in development programs that were accelerated too quickly, and surfacing financial constraints, a number of OPEC members have begun to reconsider their domestic requirements. For this reason and because much of the prospective increase in production will probably be in Saudi Arabia, it is not likely that much of the addition to oil incomes from price increases will quickly be translated into foreign orders. Thus the investible surplus of OPEC is likely to increase in 1977, assuming that economic growth in oil-importing countries will continue, albeit at a moderate pace.

The way in which OPEC members have invested their financial surpluses has changed markedly over time (Table 32). Whereas OPEC funds in 1974 were largely invested in short-term assets, the flow into bank deposits and Treasury bills has declined sharply since then, while equity investments and purchases of bonds and notes have continued to grow. With the termination of the Oil Facility in the IMF and some diminution of OPEC grant aid in 1976, a larger share of OPEC's investible surplus flowed to the market. However, considering the decline in the current account surplus, investible funds in 1976 are likely to have totaled about \$40 billion compared with almost \$60 billion in 1974.

The geographical distribution of OPEC's investment flows has also changed considerably over the past 3 years. Investments in the United States have risen from 20 percent of the total in 1974 to an estimated 30 percent or so in the third quarter of 1976. On the other hand, OPEC's placements in the United Kingdom fell from 123/4 percent of the total investible surplus in 1974 to nearly zero in 1975; and for the first 3 quarters of last year there was a net liquidation of \$11/4 billion of sterling assets.

NON-OIL LDCs

The increase in the OECD's current account deficit last year was reflected largely in a narrowing of the deficits of the non-oil developing countries. Because official financing flows to the non-oil LDCs from both OECD countries and OPEC were little changed from 1975, the diminution of the non-oil LDCs' deficit reflected primarily market transactions. Adjustment

TABLE 32.—Estimated disposition of OPEC investible surplus, 1974-76 [Billions of dollars]

			1976 1		
Disposition	1974	1975	First half	Third quarter	
United States	12.0	10.0	7.1	2. 6	
Banking and portfolio placements	10.8	6.3	2 5. 7	1.6	
Short-term bank deposits and Treasury bills	9. 3 (3) . 2 . 9 . 4	. 3 . 8 2. 0 1. 6 1. 6	.9 .6 2.4 .7 1.1	1 .8 .2 .4	
Other (includes real estate and other direct investment, prepayments on U.S. exports, debt amortization, etc.)	1.2	3. 7	² 1. 4	1.0	
United Kingdom	734	14	-34	- 34	
Other developed countries	6	734	434	134	
Less developed countries	4	6	234	3/4	
Non-market countries	1,5	2	3/4	34	
Euro-banking market 4	221/2	8	314	4	
International financial institutions (including IMF Oil Facility).	334	434	134	(3)	
Total investible surplus (identified above)	561/4	381/4	19	834	
ESTIMATED INVESTIBLE SURPLUS	59	40	(5)	(5)	
Error of estimates of surplus and unidentified investments	23⁄4	13/4	(3)	(5)	

Not available.

Note.-Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of the Treasury.

measures taken by a number of non-oil LDCs in late 1975 and in 1976 were reflected in lower import flows. But a more important factor in the smaller deficit was the resumption of growth in the volume, and even more in the value, of exports. Commodity prices began to rise early in the recovery. The London Economist's "Index of Commodity Prices" in dollar terms showed a rise of 40 percent between July 1975 and July 1976. With the pause in the recovery at midvear, price increases appeared to come to a halt for some commodities and to moderate for others. The overall result, however, was that by the end of 1976 commodity prices on average, at least as measured by the Economist's index, had reached the inflation peaks reported in 1974. This upward shift in the price level for commodities will continue to be reflected in the export earnings of commodity producers.

EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES

The financing of external deficits in 1976 was accompanied by a very high rate of activity in foreign exchange markets. The trade-weighted exchange rates for certain major currencies showed considerable movement despite relatively large balance of payments financing and heavy intervention by for-

Preliminary.
2 Includes shift of over \$1 million from prior year "direct investment" in a U.S.-incorporated petroleum company to

banking and portfolio assets.

3 Less than \$0.5 million.

4 Claims on banks in currencies other than that of the country in which bank resides; excludes banks in the United

eign central banks in exchange markets (Chart 7). The strains experienced within the European snake arrangement were a major factor in the heavy intervention activity. Early in the year heavy pressure on the French franc led the authorities to break the link with the currencies adhering to the snake. Upward pressures on the German mark, reflecting both the large German current account surplus and the continued significantly better inflation performance of the German economy compared with its trading partners, caused considerable strain among the currencies remaining in the snake. In the fall of 1976, therefore, the central values of the currencies within the snake were realigned, with the mark appreciating by 2 percent, the Swedish krona and Norwegian krone depreciating by 1 percent, and the Danish krone depreciating by 4 percent. The largest changes in the foreign currency markets, however, involved the pound sterling, the Italian lira, and the Mexican peso, which depreciated by 16 percent, 213/4 percent and 371/2 percent respectively against the U.S. dollar between the end of 1975 and the end of 1976.

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS

The unrest in the exchange markets and the financing difficulties that surfaced during the year for a number of industrial and developing countries obscured the relative ease with which deficits of many other countries continued to be financed. Activity in the international capital market was brisk during 1976. On the demand side, expectations that borrowing costs would rise in 1977 buoyed activity; in addition, there was an exceptionally strong surge in Canadian demand for long-term funds. Concurrently the supply of funds to the bond markets was encouraged by low demand for domestic credit in the United States and Europe resulting in declines in short-term interest rates during the year. As funds became more abundant, bond yields began to fall. Medium-term credits arranged in the Eurocurrency market also showed a substantial increase last year, as rising demands for finance from almost all the main categories of borrowers were met by increases in supply sufficiently large to allow borrowing costs to decline. Total borrowing in the markets for medium-term Eurocredits, Eurobonds, and foreign bonds amounted to \$48 billion in the first 10 months of the year, representing an annual rate of \$58 billion, an increase of more than one-third from the 1975 total.

New issues of Eurobonds during the first 10 months of the year at \$12½ billion were well above the volume issued in the corresponding period of 1975, a previous peak for the Eurobond markets. Industrial countries issued 69 percent of all bonds during the first 9 months of 1976, taking a considerably lower share of loanable funds than in 1975. Japan was very active in the market, but some borrowers from countries in deficit—for example, the French, the British, and especially the Canadians—also increased their use of the Eurobond markets. Canadian issues of \$2¾ billion in the first 10 months of last year were more than twice as large as in all of 1975 because of exceptional needs for long-term finance, relatively high domestic interest

rates, and tax changes that facilitated foreign issues by private companies. Developing countries floated loans whose volume in the first 3 quarters of 1976 was more than twice that of the preceding year; their share of the market consequently rose to 201/4 percent, 5 percentage points of which were accounted for by oil-producing countries (Table 33).

TABLE 33.—Borrowing in international capital markets, 1974-76 [Billions of dollars]

			1975	ŀ		1976		
Capital market	1974	Total	First half	Second half	First half	Third quarter 1	October 1	
Total borrowing	40.8	42.7	19. 2	23, 5	30. 3	11.2	6. 9	
Medium-term Eurocredits 2	28. 5	20, 6	8. 5	12.0	12.3	4.7	5. 0	
Industrial countries Denmark	19. 0 . 4 3. 3 1. 1 5. 7 8. 5	6. 4 . 3 . 5 1. 0 . 6 4. 0	2.8 0 .4 .5 .3 1.6	3. 6 . 3 . 1 . 6 . 4 2. 2	3. 6 . 4 . 7 . 3 1. 0 1. 2	2.5 0 .1 1.1 .3 1.0	1.5 0 0 .1 .6 .8	
Oil-exporting countries AlgeriaIndonesia Iran Venezuela Other	.8 0 .4 .1 .1	3. 2 .5 1. 6 .3 .2 .6	1. 4 . 1 1. 1 0 . 2	1.8 .4 .6 .2 0	1.7 .4 .3 .7 0	(3) (3) (2) 0	1. 1 0 0 . 1 1. 0	
Other developing countries. Argentina	7. 2 . 5 1. 6 1. 5 . 9 2. 7	7.9 (3) 2.1 2.2 .3 3.3	2.6 (*) .7 .7 .1 1.1	5. 3 (³) 1. 4 1. 5 . 1 2. 3	4.7 .1 1.2 .7 .7 2.0	1.6 .1 .7 .4 .1 .3	2.0 .5 (³) .9 .1	
Nonmarket countries and organizations.	1. 1	2. 7	1. 1	1.6	1.4	.2	.3	
International organizations and other	.4	.4	. 3	.1	.9	(3)	.1	
Eurobonds	4.5 .4 .3 .2 3.6	10. 2 1. 2 1. 3 1. 2 6. 5	5.6 .3 .8 .6 3.9	4.6 .9 .5 .6 2.6	8.4 1.9 .8 .7 5.0	3.1 .6 .3 .3	1.0 .2 .1 .1	
Foreign bonds	7. 8 2. 0 3. 1 2. 7	11. 9 3. 4 2. 4 6. 1	5. 1 1. 3 . 6 3. 2	6. 9 2. 0 1. 7 3. 2	9, 6 3, 4 1, 6 4, 6	3. 4 1. 1 . 5 1. 8	.9 .3 0 .6	

1 Preliminary.

Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

The brisk activity in the Eurobond market was in part related to a shift in interest rate differentials that may have contributed to the willingness of investors to reduce their liquidity positions and extend the maturity of their holdings. Short-term rates exhibited a sharp cyclical decline, while long-term rates fell relatively little, partly because inflationary expectations appeared to change slowly. Thus yield differentials changed greatly. Whereas at the time of historically high short-term interest rates the differential between Eurodollar deposit rates and Eurobond yields had been as high as 3 percentage points, Eurodeposit rates in 1976 were generally below Eurobond yields.

Publicized credits of over 1-year maturity; represents commitments.
 Less than \$50 million.

Bank lending also rose substantially in 1976. Like the rising activity in the Eurobond market, the expansion of Eurocurrency loans and the increase in claims on foreigners by head offices reflect the high level of liquidity in the private sector in the main financial centers and the low loan demand from domestic borrowers. Although there has been considerable discussion in private and government circles regarding the structure of the balance sheets of the banking system, particularly regarding the exposure vis-a-vis certain countries, bank lending to foreigners has risen briskly, at least through the third quarter of 1976 (the latest date for which overall data are available). Publicly announced Eurocurrency bank credits for 1976, at over \$28½ billion, exceeded credit extensions in 1975 by 36 percent. Morgan Guaranty estimated that the size of the market, net of interbank deposits, expanded from about \$250 billion at the end of 1975 to nearly \$285 billion in September 1976.

In the first 10 months of last year U.S. banks increased their short-term claims on foreigners by \$101/2 billion, \$81/2 billion of which was accounted for by loans to Latin America. The continued extension of bank credits to developing countries was not confined to U.S. banks: European banks have also increased their assets vis-a-vis this group of countries. The risks associated with some of these loans are reflected in the rates that are being charged. For example, in the medium-term Eurocurrency markets the premium charged some developing countries has risen to at least \% percentage point at a minimum in recent months. There seems to have been a marked shift in the way banks view the creditworthiness of certain countries. Whereas in earlier periods the fact that a government had not touched its reserve position in the IMF was taken to indicate a relatively low risk in extending loans, banks now seem to favor lending to countries operating under IMF-suggested surveillance. Because banks cannot attach macroeconomic conditions to their loans, or in any event monitor them, they apparently feel more comfortable with debtors operating under IMF conditionality.

OFFICIAL FINANCING

Official financing flows in 1976 constituted a somewhat larger proportion of the financing of external deficits than they did in 1975. Total borrowing from the IMF in 1976 amounted to SDR 6.0 billion as compared with SDR 3.9 billion in 1975. Although this change appears relatively small, funds drawn from the IMF in 1976 reflected a higher amount of drawing on regular IMF facilities subject to stricter conditionality as the Special Oil Facility came to an end in March 1976. Access to IMF resources was eased because credit availability in the IMF had been increased temporarily by 45 percent of quotas pending the ratification of the Amendments to the Articles of Agreement, which among other things will put into effect the particular quota increases agreed upon in Jamaica at the beginning of 1976.

Access to official financial resources was also considerably increased by liberalization of the Compensatory Financing Facility in the IMF. This

facility is designed to help countries overcome shortfalls in export earnings which are largely beyond their own control. During 1976 drawings approved under this facility amounted to SDR 2.3 billion compared with a total usage for the preceding 13-year period, 1963–75, of SDR 1.2 billion. The more liberal access to the Compensatory Financing Facility has clearly done much to ease external financial constraints and cyclical payments problems that non-oil primary producing countries, both developed and developing, were experiencing during the year. In fact, the non-oil LDCs as a group were able to increase their reserve positions by SDR 7½ billion during the first 10 months of 1976. However, this aggregate increase combines a number of countries that experienced increasing external financing problems with others that experienced an easing of financial constraints.

Finally, official financing resources available to developing countries are being augmented by the disposal of part of the IMF's gold holdings. One-sixth (25 million ounces) of the IMF's 150 million ounces of gold is being sold at public auction over a 4-year period for the benefit of developing countries. A portion of the profits are being transferred directly to developing countries in proportion to their quotas in the IMF. The remainder of the profits is being used to finance a Trust Fund, separate from the IMF but managed by the IMF as trustee. This Trust Fund will provide balance of payments support on concessional terms to the IMF's poorest members. An additional 25 million ounces of the IMF's gold holdings are being sold to all members in proportion to their quotas, or "restituted," at the present official price of gold in exchange for currency usable by the IMF. Restitution is being carried out in four annual installments of approximately 6½ million ounces each.

In May of last year the IMF announced a program of 16 auctions at roughly 6-week intervals over a 2-year period covering sales of 12½ million ounces of gold, with 780,000 ounces to be offered for sale at each auction. Five auctions were conducted under this program during 1976, in which a total of 3.9 million ounces of gold was sold at an average price of \$122 per ounce and at a profit for the Trust Fund of \$320 million. The first loans under the Trust Fund program were being approved by the Executive Board of the IMF at the turn of the year.

In late 1976 the Executive Board of the IMF reviewed the results of the auction program and decided that it would be desirable—without disturbing any of the basic tenets of the general agreement on gold—to shift to a definite schedule involving somewhat more frequent auctions at which slightly smaller amounts of gold would be sold. The first installment of restitution was to take place in the first weeks of January 1977, to be followed on January 26 by the last auction to be held at the 6-week intervals established in May of last year. Beginning March 2, 1977, auctions will be conducted on the first Wednesday of each month, each involving the sale of 525,000 ounces.

The general assessment of the experience gained so far, following some initial uncertainty about the potential effects of the IMF's sales and about market interest and participation, is that the IMF's sales program has been quite successful. All of the auctions were oversubscribed, and the IMF was able to obtain prices on each occasion that were very close to prices prevailing in the market. The absence of a definite timetable for sales, however, gave rise to questions about the timing and amounts of auctions, and has raised needless questions and speculation in the market about the IMF's intentions. The IMF's announcement in late 1976 of a definite schedule of dates and amounts for auctions over the next few months should remove any remaining uncertainties about the periodicity of IMF sales or the amounts to be offered.

ADEQUACY OF OFFICIAL FINANCIAL RESOURCES

Despite the fact that official financial resources were augmented considerably during 1976, there is some question about the adequacy of such resources for the period ahead. As noted earlier, the financing of external deficits, except in a few instances, was managed relatively smoothly during 1976. Extension of bank credit remained large, although during the year there was a growing perception of the need for banks to become increasingly selective vis-a-vis their debtors, and this was reflected in a growing desire on the part of private lenders to see commitments backed by some kind of conditionality in terms of adequate economic policies. As a result a number of authorities may have become less reluctant to draw on their credit with the IMF.

Since the large increases in OPEC's export price of oil, external debt levels in nominal terms have cumulated well beyond historical highs for many countries. The OECD has estimated that current account deficits for the OECD area since 1974, the first year of the high oil prices, have cumulated to \$56 billion. The comparable figure for non-oil LDCs is \$72 billion. In a number of instances debt levels are such as to make private lenders reluctant to extend further credit.

It is important that countries which have adopted satisfactory adjustment measures to deal with underlying external disequilibria and high external debt positions have access to international financial resources to carry them through the adjustment period. The need for such bridging financing is obvious because adjustments cannot take place quickly. Furthermore in the absence of such financing there is a growing risk that political pressures to institute trade restrictions cannot be resisted.

But, in addition, because of the continuing need to adjust to higher import prices for energy, further financing may need to be available. As long as OPEC surpluses persist, there can be no reversal in total debt positions. On the contrary, external debts will continue to grow. In the interest of international equilibrium and the continuation of economic growth worldwide, it

is necessary that the strongest economies be willing not to resist either a widening of their current account deficits (or lessening of surpluses) or an increase in purchases of their assets by foreign investors.

For a large number of countries balance of payments financing continues to be available from private sources. But a very high proportion of such financing flows through commercial banks, which perform a large share of the intermediation between OPEC surpluses and the deficits of other countries. There are internal risks in this situation: banks may at times make financing too easy for certain countries and thus delay needed adjustment; in other instances banks may be reluctant to promote adequate financial flows to a particular country although the country in question could reasonably be expected to be able to service such flows. In terms of the world financial structure there are therefore advantages to conditional multilateral financing of some proportion of the oil-importing countries' current account deficits. The IMF is the indicated institution to provide intermediation between the strong creditor countries on the one hand (certain members of OPEC as well as certain industrial countries with strong payments positions) and the deficit countries on the other. It is important, from this point of view as well as to strengthen the IMF's liquidity position, that the enlarged quotas agreed to under the Sixth Review of Quotas should go into effect as early as possible in 1977. This will require that the second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement be ratified by many members who have not yet done so. Further, in recognition of the possible greater financing needs, the OECD countries have negotiated a Financial Support Fund, submitted to the Congress last year. In addition, the IMF has advanced the date of the normal quinquennial review of its resources by 2 years. However, needs may materialize sooner than the advanced completion date of that review would allow; and, in any case, additional means may be required to augment the IMF's resources either generally or in terms of certain currencies.

NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The growing external financial problems that have followed the inflation, the large increases in the price of energy, and the recession of the past several years make it more important than ever that the economic interdependence between the developed and the developing countries be fully recognized. During 1976 discussions between developed and developing countries were carried on mainly at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Nairobi and the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC).

The central issues raised by the developing countries were: (1) Generalized debt relief; (2) preservation of the purchasing power of export earnings; and (3) official development assistance.

With regard to generalized debt relief, the view of most developed countries was that adequate channels already exist to handle acute cases of financial crisis efficiently. During 1976, for example, there was a need to reschedule the external debt of Zaire. This was dealt with promptly through the so-called creditor club channel. Apart from the specific instances of acute cases of financial crisis where countries are forced to seek debt rescheduling, it is not in the interest of debtor countries to seek debt relief. Indeed, an abrogation of debt contracts would put into question their creditworthiness and would inevitably hamper their future access to capital markets. In fact, the easing of such access is an agenda item of considerable importance to a number of developing countries.

In addition, the question of generalized debt relief really involves the broad external financial situation of developing countries. Debt constitutes only one aspect of the overall financial situation in a particular country; therefore general debt problems address the basic question of the adequacy of transfer of resources to developing countries. The availability of and need for such resources are reviewed periodically. Such reviews may lead to the conclusion that increases in aid flows are required either on a multilateral or on a bilateral basis. It is important, however, that questions regarding debt problems and possible defaults not be confused with those relating to the adequacy of development assistance.

The level of export earnings of developing countries constitutes a crucial element in their economic development. The purchasing power of export earnings is therefore of considerable importance to policy planning. It is directly related not only to economic conditions in the country in question but also to those prevailing abroad. Stable noninflationary growth worldwide is thus the basic prerequisite for continuing growth in the purchasing power of domestic incomes and export earnings.

It must be recognized that developed and developing countries, each in their own way, need to seek improvements in the conduct of their economic policies with a view to achieving the most effective use of available resources and assuring steady growth in years to come. Artificial ways of achieving such stable conditions in lieu of appropriate policy measures will, of their nature, be self-defeating in the longer run. Such artificial means, exemplified by attempts to relate the price of a particular good to that of some other good or bundle of goods, or to freeze the so-called terms of trade of a particular country, will inevitably introduce distortions into the economy in question as well as into the world economy. If prices thus determined tend to be higher than normal supply and demand relationships would produce, they will add to the inflationary impetus in both consuming and producing countries. This will occur directly through the price mechanism and indirectly through overinvestment in production facilities either for the goods in question or for substitutes whose production was uneconomic at competitive prices. If the price were to be lower than market forces would indicate, underinvestment would occur. In each case the eventual outcome would be detrimental to producers as well as consumers. Further, competition, the major catalyst for economic growth, would be adversely affected domestically and internationally.

A freezing of relative prices, either partially or fully, would thus inhibit the attainment of the stated goals of both developed and developing nations.

It has long been recognized that large fluctuations in export earnings that can arise outside the control of the exporting countries can have important detrimental effects on the well-being and growth of developing countries. But it is not realistic, or useful, to attempt to introduce new mechanisms when existing ones are being improved and are likely to deal adequately with the basic problems. The recent liberalization of the Compensatory Financing Facility in the IMF is an example of a major improvement effected in an already existing mechanism. The scheduled review of this facility will determine the extent to which participants consider current access to be adequate. In order to help minimize economic fluctuations, which are detrimental both to the countries in which they occur and to their trading partners, systematic consideration in producer and consumer forums of ways to improve the stability and efficiency of specific commodity markets can be useful. More generally, in the interest of both commodity producers and other trading nations the consultative machinery on general economic developments and on their interaction among countries could be improved. The possibilities for recognizing and solving mutual problems and mutual needs could thereby be strengthened.

CHAPTER 4

Policies to Increase Supply

ACROECONOMIC POLICIES are designed to encourage growth in aggregate demand and to ensure full utilization of our resources without accelerating inflation. However, there are limits to what demand management policies by themselves can do in achieving these objectives. It is therefore necessary to supplement such policies with programs that will promote the efficient use of human and material resources and thereby increase productive capacity. This microeconomic approach has received less emphasis than monetary and fiscal policies in the past. Nevertheless more efficient markets and greater effective supply can complement increases in aggregate demand to bring about larger gains in employment and real growth with less inflationary pressure.

In Chapter 1 we discussed the sources of the recent productivity slow-down in the private sector. To some extent the lower rate of productivity increase and the accompanying decline in the growth of potential output are related to the impact of the Federal Government on various sectors of the economy. This chapter discusses some major issues and possible approaches to policy in several areas where Government is involved in economic activity: labor markets, the regulation of business, agricultural markets, and tax policy.

STRUCTURAL AND INDUCED UNEMPLOYMENT

Output and employment can be increased by improving the efficiency with which labor resources are utilized. Improvements can be accomplished by a redesign of public programs to reduce involuntary unemployment and by lessening the incentives that induce unemployment. Unemployment problems and proposed policies have been discussed in some detail in recent *Economic Reports*. This section summarizes some of the major issues regarding structural and induced unemployment, focusing on policy measures intended to generate a more efficient use of the Nation's labor resources.

An examination of policies to reduce unemployment requires an understanding of the kinds of unemployment and their causes. Frictional unemployment arises from the normal operation of the labor market; cyclical unemployment is the result of a less than full utilization of productive capacity due to a recession; induced unemployment is a consequence of

implicit and explicit subsidies built into public programs; and long-term or structural unemployment is caused by rigidities that create an imbalance between the skills and other characteristics possessed by workers and those demanded in the labor market.

FRICTIONAL AND CYCLICAL UNEMPLOYMENT

Frictional unemployment exists even in periods of very low overall unemployment. In a dynamic free-market economy layoffs occur as employers adjust their level of employment to such factors as changes in the relative demand for goods and services, changes in the relative efficiency of firms, and seasonality in production or consumption. In addition, workers leave jobs to search for better employment opportunities, and they enter and leave the labor force at will. These layoffs and quits facilitate the process of reallocating workers to more productive activities. Furthermore, when workers enter the labor force for the first time or reenter after having been outside the labor force for a time, they engage in a period of job search. There is usually a time lag in finding an acceptable job offer, in part because workers, regardless of the cause of their unemployment, may not accept the first offer they receive. These lags result in periods of unemployment that are generally short and are required if labor resources are to be used efficiently.

Other types of unemployment are likely to be socially wasteful. Much attention has been given to the hardships and waste associated with cyclical unemployment. Cyclical unemployment, the primary target of macroeconomic stabilization policy, will be eliminated when unemployment is reduced to a level where further increases in aggregate demand will affect primarily the rate of inflation, with little impact on employment and output. Policies to reduce cyclical unemployment are discussed in Chapter 1.

Yet even at what economists regard as full employment, some unemployment may exist in addition to that which is purely frictional. A part of this unemployment is a consequence of, or is induced by, public policy; and some is structural, the result of rigidities in the labor market that make it difficult for some persons to find a job and remain employed for a long period.

INDUCED UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

Induced unemployment arises from incentives built into some public programs. One source of induced unemployment is the unemployment compensation system. Unemployment compensation has proved to be an extremely useful instrument for macroeconomic and income distribution policies. It serves as an important automatic stabilizer. Without the necessity for new legislation, additional benefits are paid as unemployment from job layoffs increases, thereby helping to maintain the purchasing power of the unemployed. The system also serves as a means of distributing the costs of a recession more equitably: it replaces part of the earnings lost as the result

of a downturn in economic activity. For some, an important function of the system is to enable an unemployed worker to decline an offer during the early stages of job search if the wages are low and the working conditions poor compared with the worker's previous job.

Despite its highly beneficial effects, the unemployment compensation system has some undesirable consequences. The system tends to increase unemployment above the socially efficient level largely because workers and their employers do not pay the full cost of their increased unemployment. The implicit subsidies in the system are the result of the weak "experience-rating" in the payroll tax paid by employers and the favorable income tax treatment of benefits relative to earnings from employment. In principle, the employerpaid payroll tax that finances the unemployment compensation system is experience-rated. That is, the tax levied on an employer should vary in direct proportion to the benefits received by the employer's workers; and this in turn varies with the unemployment experience of the firm's workers. In practice, however, the difference between the maximum and the minimum tax rates is small, and for many employers a reduction in layoffs does not lower their tax liability. There is therefore an economic incentive during periods of slack work arising from cyclical, seasonal, or other factors for the employer to place workers on a job layoff, or keep them on the layoff for a longer period, rather than retaining them on the payroll. For this reason firms in seasonal and cyclical industries tend to be subsidized at the expense of those in more stable industries, and the extent of seasonal and cyclical variations in employment and output is increased.

The unemployment compensation benefits that workers receive are not subject to Federal payroll or income taxation. Employers and employees may view the system as a means of providing tax-free income to workers. The implicit subsidy tends to promote more and longer layoffs.

The failure to tax benefits also creates inequities among workers. The extent to which the benefits replace earnings net of taxes depends in part on the other income of the family. Because of the progressive tax schedule, for workers with the same earnings and work history the benefits will replace a larger proportion of after-tax earnings, the higher the income of other family members. This situation is clearly contrary to conventional notions of equity.

If unemployment compensation benefits were taxed as earnings and pretax benefits were raised so that average after-tax benefits for low-income workers were unchanged, the average unemployed low-income worker would be unaffected. Raising pretax benefits would also require an increase in the employer-financed payroll tax, and if the tax were fully experience-rated the tax increase would reduce the incentive for layoffs.

In recent years there has been extensive research by economists on various aspects of the unemployment compensation system. Although the estimated magnitudes of the impacts vary, the studies tend to arrive at the same

qualitative conclusions. For example, they find that increased coverage of the work force and a longer duration of benefits tend to increase the unemployment rate and lengthen the duration of unemployment. In addition, the larger the unemployment compensation benefits relative to earnings net of taxes, the longer the duration of unemployment is likely to be. The requirement that recipients actively search for, be available for, and accept suitable employment appears to be unevenly administered. Some research suggests that more stringent enforcement of these requirements results in a lower State unemployment rate.

Reduction of the implicit subsidies currently built into the unemployment compensation system would lead to a more efficient utilization of labor resources. This may be accomplished by greater use of experience-rating of all employers in the payroll tax and by taxing benefits as if they were earnings. These changes would not reduce the effectiveness of unemployment compensation as an automatic stabilizer. These and other issues concerning the unemployment compensation system are to be studied by the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation, due to be established in accordance with legislation enacted in 1976.

STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT

Even after the economy has returned to full employment some groups in the population may still have considerable difficulty finding and retaining employment. Unemployment among such groups may arise from the lack or obsolescence of skills, from regional mismatching of workers' skills and job requirements, and from wage rigidities. The mobility of workers and enterprises makes it likely that the decline in unemployment in the coming years will be fairly widespread across the country. Although regional growth rates of employment will differ, it is not likely that large depressed areas, like Appalachia in the 1950s, will emerge as a serious problem. The long-duration unemployment rate—the number unemployed 15 weeks or longer as a percentage of the labor force—was 2.5 percent in 1976. However with the approach to full employment, it can be expected to decline toward the prerecession level of about 0.9 percent.

A number of groups, however, including youths with little schooling, and in particular black youths, and older workers laid off during the recession who have had a long period of unemployment, may continue to encounter substantial problems in finding work. Policies that reduce the barriers that are chiefly reponsible for structural unemployment would do much to promote equality of employment opportunities. It is therefore useful to review current and proposed policies designed to expand job opportunities for persons with difficulties in finding and retaining employment. These policies include public service employment, job training programs, and an employment tax credit.

Youth Employment

Youths have much higher unemployment rates than adults (Table 34). Most of this higher unemployment, however, is frictional and arises from the frequency with which youths enter and leave the labor force. Labor force entry generally entails a period of job search during which the person is unemployed. Many unemployed youths are entering the labor force for the first time. Others are entering it again after leaving it for a time, frequently because of the dovetailing of schooling and work—or, for young women, the dovetailing of household responsibilities (including child care) and work in the labor market. In addition, in an attempt to gain experience in different types of employment youths are more likely than adults to quit a job and search for another. Thus, although the unemployment rate of youths in 1973, the most recent year of low unemployment, was substantially higher than that of adults, there was little difference in unemployment rates arising from the loss of a job.

The average duration of unemployment among youths is about half that for adult males: in 1973, 7.1 weeks for teenagers compared with 14.0 weeks for men aged 25–59. However, the long-duration unemployment rate—those unemployed 15 weeks or longer as a percentage of the labor force—was greater for teenagers: 1.6 percent compared with 0.7 percent for adult men aged 25–59.

Although teenagers are less likely to be employed than adults are, the number of youths who are neither enrolled in school nor working is not likely to be large when the economy is near full employment. Of the 15.8 million teenagers (aged 16–19) in the civilian noninstitutional population in October 1973, only 1.9 million (of whom 1.4 million were females) were not enrolled in school and not employed. Most of the female teenagers not in school and not employed were providing home care for their own children.

Table 34.—Civilian unemployment rates under alternative definitions by age and sex, 1973

[Percent]			
Age and sex	All civilian workers 1	Job losers and job leavers ²	Job losers 3
16-19 years, both sexes	14.5	4.7	2.8
20-24 years: Men	7. 3 8. 4	4. 8 4. 0	3. 4 2. 1
25 years and over: Men	2. 5 4. 0	2. 0 2. 3	1. 7 1. 7

¹ Percent of civilian labor force.

Percent of civilian labor force excluding new entrants and reentrants.
 Percent of civilian labor force excluding new entrants, reentrants, and job leavers.

Note.—All unemployment rates are based on civilian labor force (as indicated in footnotes) for age and sex group specified.

Sources: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics) and Council of Economic Advisers.

For some youths unemployment is involuntary, and they have considerable difficulty in finding and retaining jobs. This may be especially true for those who come from disadvantaged families and those with little schooling. An appropriate role of public policy has been to expand job opportunities, particularly for the youths who, on their own, would not easily find and keep jobs in the private sector.

Youths need to develop the skills, habits, and job-related experience in productive activities that lead to successful employment in the private sector. About 85 percent of all civilian employment is in the private sector; and as youths mature, this is where most will find jobs. The sheltered environment of prolonged public service employment appears to be an inappropriate mechanism for generating employment for youths. On a short-term basis, however, disadvantaged youths in particular may derive important training or educational benefits from the experience provided by public programs.

Substantial investments have been made in public programs to employ and train disadvantaged youths. In 1976, the Government financed at a cost of \$563 million nearly 1 million job slots in local prime sponsor programs for the employment of disadvantaged youths in the summer. The Job Corps program provided training for 64,700 economically disadvantaged youths (the equivalent of 20,200 full-year positions) at a cost of \$186 million in fiscal 1976. Under Title I of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, 2.1 million persons, the majority of whom were youths, received job training or work experience at a cost of \$1.7 billion in fiscal 1976. These programs are preparatory to regular jobs in the private economy.

For youths, job opportunities in the private sector should be expanded to permit these young people to take full advantage of the training they have acquired in school or in special public training programs. Although aggregate job creation is largely the function of macroeconomic policy, there are significant impediments to attaining high rates of employment for youths even when the labor market for adults approaches full employment. The Federal minimum wage has been identified as one such impediment.

A substantial body of research suggests that minimum wage legislation tends to diminish employment opportunities for teenagers, but does not have a significant net effect on adult employment. Though estimated impacts vary, some recent studies suggest that a 10 percent rise in the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage would decrease teenage employment by about 100,000 to 150,000. The reason is that many employers find it too costly to employ teenagers, particularly those with few skills, given the Federal minimum wage (currently \$2.30 per hour in most jobs) and mandated payroll taxes and fringe benefits. Coverage under Federal minimum wage legislation has been extended substantially in recent years from 65 percent of the private nonsupervisory workers in 1965 to 87 percent in 1976. This extension of coverage, especially at a time when youths make

up an increased proportion of the population aged 16 and over, has limited the increase in youth employment and labor force participation.

In recognition of the adverse effects of the minimum wage on employment, there has been an expansion in the number of exemption certificates which permit employers in certain circumstances to pay youths and the disabled a wage below the applicable minimum wage. In fiscal 1976 exemption certificates covering 800,000 persons were issued, of which three-fourths were for full-time students working part-time in their educational institutions.

The exemption program entails a number of problems, and the effectiveness of allowing more exemptions needs to be considered. The special applications that are required raise the administrative costs to the Government and employers. In addition, the program discriminates among employers of youths doing essentially the same job: a subminimum wage can be paid to a student working in a private university, but because of limitations on the number of exemptions it need not apply if a student is working in a comparable job in any other nongovernmental enterprise. The program also discriminates between youths in school and those out of school.

For these reasons, many believe the exemption program should be extended to all employers and to all youths regardless of school enrollment. This could be accomplished by incorporating a teenage differential into the minimum wage law. Alternatively some believe it would be more appropriate to let the Federal minimum wage lag behind the growth in average wages with the aim of promoting job opportunities not only for youths but also for partially disabled or low-skilled adults.

Long-Term Unemployment

For some adult workers who have experienced long periods of unemployment, reemployment opportunities may be limited even after macroeconomic policies have reduced the unemployment rate to nearly the full-employment level. The situation would be particularly distressing for those who had exhausted their unemployment compensation entitlement. Public service employment (PSE) and job training programs are often viewed as mechanisms for expanding job opportunities for persons with long-term unemployment. Thus far, however, these spending programs have had little net impact on employment compared to tax reductions that increase the deficit by the same magnitude. With appropriate modification of programs, however, the favorable effects could be larger.

In terms of overall macroeconomic effect, the long-run job-creating impact of federally financed PSE programs appears to be quite limited. Initially most of the State and local government jobs funded by the program may represent a net increase in the number of jobs in comparison with what would otherwise exist. With normal attrition and the expansion in regular State and local government jobs, an increasing proportion of the funds are soon used to pay for job slots that would exist in any case. Preliminary estimates suggest, for example, that after 3 quarters about 65 percent of federally funded PSE jobs are net additions to employment; but after 2 years the net addition

may be as low as 10 percent. Thus the funding for the other 90 percent of the jobs becomes essentially a form of Federal revenue sharing with State and local governments. Then the job-creating impact of a PSE program is little different from an expansion in revenue sharing.

Persons with prospects of finding a regular job in the private sector during the expansion in economic activity might be less inclined to search for a regular job if they are in a PSE job. On the other hand, adults with long-term unemployment problems are the ones who would appear to be the most suitable candidates for the more than 300,000 public service employment job slots currently funded by the Government.

Several factors make it difficult to target PSE programs toward persons with long-term employment problems. For example, State and local governments tend to hire the more able among the unemployed for federally funded PSE jobs. As a result, PSE participants are more likely to be persons in the prime age groups and to have more schooling than the average unemployed worker. This has the advantage of maintaining the current employment practices of State and local governments. Yet persons with these characteristics are also those who have the least difficulty in finding a job in the private sector. There is therefore a tradeoff between attempting to maintain State and local government employment practices and inducing these governments to hire persons with difficulty in finding a job.

The relatively high wages in PSE jobs also attract persons who are employable in the private sector. In 1976, for example, the average annual Federal contribution to wages and benefits in a PSE job was about \$7,700 (some localities supplement the Federal contribution), over 50 percent more than a worker could receive in wages and benefits for full-time full-year employment at the minimum wage. It has therefore been suggested that these jobs be limited to persons with long-term unemployment, such as those who have exhausted their unemployment compensation entitlement, and that they be paid only the minimum wage or the subminimum permitted under Department of Labor exemptions (generally 85 percent of the applicable minimum wage). While the 1976 amendment to the temporary employment assistance program addresses in part the long-term unemployment aspect of these suggestions, it retains the requirement that the PSE jobs pay the prevailing wage. The need to keep wages low has been subject to some criticism. The payment of such low wages may adversely affect the efficiency of workers holding these jobs. Some are also concerned that a family could not be adequately supported on such low wages. However, the regular income maintenance system (AFDC, food stamps, medicaid) would provide supplementary support to low-income families which include a participant in a PSE program. In addition, a low PSE salary would permit a program with a larger number of participants for the same budget cost; as a result, more workers would gain job experience and fewer workers would be discouraged from taking a private sector job when employment opportunities improve. Indeed this approach would make it more explicit that creating

jobs and reducing poverty are separate issues, since many persons with long-term unemployment may not be in families with very low incomes.

Job training programs are designed as a means of upgrading the skills of the structurally unemployed. These programs seem to promise a satisfactory solution to the structural unemployment problem. The evidence currently available, however, suggests that the experience has been disappointing. If adjustment is made for the probability that a trainee would eventually become employed without the program, the effects of the training programs on real wages and employment appear to be small. This outcome is not surprising since persons with good training characteristics and prospects would acquire the training on their own or on a job. Persons with few skills and a record of long-term unemployment are largely those for whom successful retraining is most difficult. Part of the problem may be in identifying the programs that are most likely to be successful for particular trainees.

The difficulties with past public service employment and job training programs should be considered before expanding the present programs. Much may be learned, however, from careful evaluation of the present programs and from small-scale experimental programs.

EMPLOYMENT TAX CREDIT

Employment tax credits have been suggested as a means of increasing employment during a recession or increasing employment opportunities for persons who experience structural unemployment. The purpose of an employment tax credit is to encourage the direct use of labor relative to capital and other inputs. Under different variants of such a program, in addition to counting wages as a regular cost of business, firms could claim a credit against their corporate income tax for some portion of the wages or payroll taxes paid for all workers on their payrolls, workers added to their payrolls compared to some base period, or workers drawn from designated groups in which high rates of unemployment exist. These approaches pose a number of problems.

One problem in using an employment tax credit as a countercyclical tool is that the largest effects on employment may not appear until the economy is well on the road to recovery. This delay could occur because the substitution of labor for capital and other inputs which the tax credit encourages becomes greater the longer the period of adjustment. To be countercyclical an employment tax credit would need some mechanism through which the subsidy gradually decreases as overall unemployment declines.

If employment in a recession trough is used as the benchmark, during a business cycle recovery an employment tax credit would tend to subsidize firms for increases in employment that would occur in any case. This effect might be ameliorated if employment prior to the downturn were used as the base. If firms anticipate a renewal of a countercyclical employment tax credit in the future, cyclical swings in employment—and hence in unemployment—would be intensified. An inequity would arise among firms—some receiving

large subsidies through the tax credit and others, particularly those with stable employment, deriving no benefit from these subsidies. As a result of an employment tax credit, there would be additional disincentives to firms to maintain stable employment.

There are also difficulties in attempting to use an employment tax credit to expand job opportunities for particular groups. It is difficult, for example, to identify individuals with long-term unemployment problems, unless the program is limited to those having exhausted the unemployment compensation benefits available to them. Employers would have an incentive to hire the most employable persons in any group (such as aged or disabled persons and teenagers) which is eligible for the subsidy. Jobs may therefore go to persons who would not have difficulty finding employment in any case, even though they are members of a demographic group broadly defined as hard to employ. Moreover the narrower the group eligible for the subsidy, the greater the administrative costs to certify eligibility for the tax credit. Experience with the present tax credits for persons on welfare—for example, the WIN tax credit—suggests that an employment tax credit is not likely to expand substantially the job opportunities for persons with difficulty finding and retaining employment. The result could be to subsidize many jobs without achieving much increase in the employment of those individuals whom the program was intended to assist.

While superficially there is much appeal to an employment tax credit, the problems of implementation are great and the result is likely to be a less efficient utilization of labor resources.

SUMMARY

Macroeconomic policy is necessarily the primary mechanism for reducing the current excessively high unemployment. As the economy continues to recover, cyclical unemployment will decline. Much of the long-term unemployment, which currently appears to be structural, will also lessen as job opportunities expand. As a result of increasing employment the amount of job training will increase, since much training occurs through work experience.

Declines in unemployment beyond those attainable by macroeconomic policy may be brought about by reducing the incentives for unemployment currently built into the unemployment compensation system because of weak experience-rating of employers and the tax-exempt status of the benefits. These issues will be studied by the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation. Job opportunities for teenagers may be improved by allowing the applicable minimum wage to be lower in relation to average wages.

Public service employment programs are most likely to increase job opportunities for persons having difficulty in finding employment if eligibility is restricted to the long-term unemployed (for example, unemployment compensation exhaustees) and if the wage is low relative to wages in the private sector. Income maintenance objectives are more successfully addressed by

the means-tested income transfer programs which focus on family income. The summer employment program may be helpful for disadvantaged youths by providing experience with a work environment and routine.

Thus far, training programs for adults with employment difficulties have not been shown to have more than very limited benefits and they have incurred substantial costs. The problems of structural unemployment and training mismatches that remain despite private initiatives appear to be very difficult to solve. Until we learn how to ameliorate these problems effectively, small-scale experimental programs and careful evaluation of present programs should be useful. The current large-scale public employment and training programs should not be expanded at this time.

Although it has much superficial appeal, an employment tax credit may create far more difficulties than it can resolve. The impact on employment is likely to be small, particularly in the near term, and new distortions in the use of resources as well as new inequities may emerge.

GOVERNMENT REGULATION

The Government regulates a substantial part of the economy in an effort to improve economic performance and promote individual welfare. Such regulation has created costs as well as benefits, and some anticipated benefits of regulation have never been realized. Regulation has also been difficult to reform or abandon, even when recognized as counterproductive, because elements of regulation frequently tend to satisfy certain special interests. Historically, some business enterprises have sought to avoid competition, and have sometimes been aided in doing so by regulation; other rules and procedures create vested interests and capital values which reform would endanger.

The motives behind efforts to regulate economic activity have generally been commendable, and the net effect of some Government regulatory activity has been positive. Unfortunately it often turns out that regulatory processes are not capable of achieving their intended goals or have generated greater costs than would result from the original problem. In some instances the problem prompting the adoption of regulation has passed but the regulations remain. In other cases the regulatory process has proved too inflexible to accommodate changes in the economy, and a previously beneficial regulatory activity may become ineffectual or harmful. In each of these instances reform of the regulations would lower the nonproductive use of Government resources and would free private resources for productive tasks. More important, some regulation is harmful as well as wasteful since it distorts the allocation of resources and thus lowers the potential output of the economy. The reform of such regulations would increase efficiency, thus making the economy better able to provide current consumers with goods and services and to ensure growth in output for the future.

A major purpose of regulation is to control prices charged and services rendered in industries considered to be natural monopolies, especially those

in the transportation and public utility sectors, in order to prevent firms in these industries from exercising market power. The economic characteristics of these industries are such that it is more efficient for a single firm to supply the entire market. Price regulation is therefore usually accompanied by entry restrictions. Price and entry regulations have been extended, however, beyond the select cases where control of monopoly power justifies their implementation. They have been applied to many industries which seem capable of vigorous and healthy competition under less restrictive regulations: for example, trucking and airlines. In these cases it is appropriate to compare the results of price and entry regulation with the level of price and output that would be realized in a freely operating market.

If a regulated price exceeds the market-determined price, consumers will purchase less and output will be reduced. If a regulated price is below the competitive level, firms will provide less output than they would if they were not regulated. In both cases price and entry controls reduce the production of goods and services in the regulated markets. Resources are then reallocated to alternative uses which are less valuable to consumers. The result, coupled with the administrative costs of imposing and enforcing regulations, is to reduce efficiency and production.

Most regulatory legislation since the mid-1960s affects business activity in much more direct ways and in much greater detail than is true of simple price controls. The Federal Government has intervened in such matters as product quality, producer liability, conditions affecting the health and safety of employees, waste disposal, and equal employment opportunity. Much of this legislation is an attempt to deal with the problem of externalities—real costs or benefits that affect individuals other than those directly involved in a transaction. Economic efficiency requires that prices appropriately reflect the full cost to society of producing each good or service. External costs or benefits must be incorporated into each transaction, or internalized, for efficiency to be achieved. The internalization should be accomplished in the least costly manner. Unfortunately some of the regulations concerning health, safety, and the environment appear to be ineffective, and we bear their costs without enjoying much, if any, corresponding benefit. In other cases the benefits might have been achieved at a smaller sacrifice of other goods and services.

There are costs of extending regulation in a free-market economy that go beyond the direct impact on supply. First, the regulatory process itself uses public and private resources which could be used to produce other, more valuable, goods or services. Second, some regulatory procedures reduce the ability of industry to respond to changing supply and demand conditions and so create bottlenecks in regulated sectors of the economy. For example, the lag in implementing price adjustments to reflect the changing supply or demand conditions confronting public utilities can influence the timing of their investment decisions, causing shortages or excess capacity. Third, regulations which protect existing firms from potential competitors may reduce

incentives for technological improvement and innovation. Fourth, the uncertainty introduced by the regulatory process itself will cause resources to be used in unproductive ways. Finally, if price controls lower the expected returns to new capital investment, capital formation will be retarded and the economy will grow more slowly.

The effects of regulation on supply can be organized into three categories: cases where the regulated price exceeds the long-run free-market price; cases where the regulated price is less than the long-run competitive market price; and cases where regulation increases the costs of production. Regulation reduces the flow of output from the regulated industry in all three categories.

REGULATED PRICE ABOVE MARKET PRICE

In a number of instances a government-dictated price has been established at a level exceeding the free-market price. This situation might arise from a public effort to ensure profitability and encourage investment in a new industry. Or it might develop from a private industry's securing legislative protection against "unfair" price competition from another industry producing a substitute product. Or it could occur when regulation prevents relative prices from responding to changes in supply or demand conditions. Regardless of the circumstances which bring about the excessive price, government price control can develop into a legal and enforceable means of attaining the goals of a private cartel.

The establishment of a higher price is usually accompanied by restrictions on entry or output as well. When a regulated price is higher than the free-market level, existing producers seek to expand output and new firms are attracted to the industry by the prospect of high profits. Alternatively, an excessive price may deter the withdrawal of firms and production capacity from an industry with declining demand. At the same time, consumers confronted by increased prices restrict their purchases. Because firms offer a larger supply than consumers wish to purchase at the regulated price, pressures are generated for the regulatory authority to limit entry and restrict expansion of output in order to protect the profits of the existing producers.

Restricting entry, however, will not necessarily result in higher profit rates. The higher expected profits per unit of sales encourage each firm to try to increase its total sales by using nonprice methods of competition, such as advertising and quality competition. Because these activities are costly, profits are dissipated. Under such circumstances competition leads to higher costs because price competition is precluded. Consumers may derive some benefits from such nonprice competition, but they are denied the opportunity to choose among alternative price-quality options, as they can in the free market, and thus are made worse off.

Motor Carriers

Trucking provides a good example of the economic costs of regulations that hold prices above the free-market level. In interstate trucking an anti-

trust exemption permits motor carriers to agree upon rates through rate bureaus, which are groups of truckers that function like private cartels. Rates tend to be set high enough to cover the costs of less efficient carriers. The result is higher prices to consumers. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulates both the entry of new carriers and the expansion of route authority by existing carriers. These restrictions frequently require some trucks to drive extra miles on circuitous routes, prohibit access to intermediate points on routes, limit the commodities that can be handled by some carriers, and prohibit certain kinds of freight on the return trip. The result is excessive truck miles and unproductive consumption of motor fuel, labor time, and other resources.

Where more than one carrier gains a certificate to provide service, competition tends to occur on the basis of service quality—frequency of departure, faster delivery, and so on—rather than through prices. As a consequence trucks are often dispatched with smaller loads than they might otherwise haul. Equipment and labor costs are thus spread over fewer ton-miles and costs and prices are higher than necessary. The regulation of rates precludes price competition, and consequently the range of price-service options available to shippers is restricted. Those shippers who would have chosen less frequent service if it were offered at a lower price pay more for services they do not want. In markets where only one trucker has route authority, this process of rate setting may permit lower costs since the trucker, exercising his monopoly control, may reduce the frequency of scheduling, with the result that a higher proportion of trucks is dispatched fully loaded. However, because such a trucker has no competitors, he is unlikely to lower prices to fully reflect the lower-quality service.

A comparison of the transportation of small parcels with large or bulky shipments illustrates the advantages of multiple price-service options. Shippers of small parcels have several options. The scheduled airlines carry small packages as baggage at substantial prices but with a guarantee of delivery the same day. Some air freight firms collect packages at various cities, fly them first to a central sorting location, then on to their final destination each evening, and provide overnight service at slightly lower prices than those charged by the scheduled airlines. Intercity bus lines and special firms that deliver small packages use surface transportation to furnish delivery service at even cheaper rates. Finally, the U.S. Postal Service offers slower but widely available parcel delivery. The advantage of having multiple options is that shippers of small parcels may choose between various degrees of service at different prices. Although shippers of large or bulky freight have some flexibility, many are chiefly limited to motor carriers, where the range of price-service options is much more limited because of regulation.

The problems of excess capacity, higher prices, and too few price-service options would be reduced if entry into the trucking industry were not restricted. Unlike public utilities, trucking does not exhibit scale economies.

Thus price competition is not likely to result in a single survivor—a monopolist. In trucking, fixed costs are low and except for Government restrictions entry is relatively easy. Competition, not monopoly, would be the natural condition in the trucking industry if it were not for Government regulation.

Recent research has demonstrated that common carrier truck regulations cause large losses in production and efficiency. Freight rates in countries that do not regulate motor carriers are significantly lower than rates in countries like West Germany and the United States where regulation is strict. Excessively high motor carrier rates cause some shippers to substitute alternative modes of transportation, or to provide their own transportation services. These responses to regulation reduce economic efficiency.

The motor carrier reform legislation submitted by the President to the last Congress would have increased both price competition and entry into the trucking industry. The legislation proposed pricing flexibility, subject only to later ICC review, which would allow individual carriers to raise or lower their rates as much as 15 percent annually, and it would eventually remove the lower limit on price changes entirely (as long as the price was not set below direct costs). The legislation also proposed eliminating the antitrust immunity that currently protects the collusive rate setting through rate bureaus. Barriers to entry would have been reduced by lifting the hauling restrictions on certain existing carriers and by liberalizing the criteria for route certification. Entrants could no longer be barred simply because the proposed service was already provided by existing carriers. This legislation would constitute a major step in the reform of regulation inhibiting the efficiency of the motor carrier industry.

Airlines

In the airline industry, restrictions on price competition have likewise led to higher fares and emphasis on nonprice methods of competition. In intrastate markets in Texas and California carriers are subject to Federal safety regulations but are free of Federal restrictions on fares and routes. In these markets prices have been consistently lower than prices in federally regulated markets which have similar characteristics.

The regulated air carriers have not earned unusually high profits as a result of regulation restricting price competition. Potential profits have been dissipated through advertising and service competition—most visibly in the form of in-flight stereo, free meals, and other amenities. Less visible but more expensive forms of nonprice competition are capacity increases and scheduling additional flights. More frequent departures and a higher probability of obtaining a seat on a preferred flight do yield benefits to consumers, but recent studies have shown that the cost of operating the additional flights is considerably greater than these benefits. The popularity of air charter flights illustrates the willingness of many consumers to accept the inconvenience of less frequent service, less flexible scheduling, and fewer amenities in order to

purchase less expensive air travel. Increased flexibility permitting adjustments in prices to meet market demands, liberalized entry into specific air routes, and the removal of antitrust immunity would help assure a wider range of consumer choices for air transportation and lead to lower air fares than would otherwise occur.

The need for reform in air transportation is compelling and is now generally acknowledged. The 94th Congress considered reform bills submitted by the President, various members of the Congress, and the Civil Aeronautics Board. None of the proposals recommend any change in the safety standards enforced by the Federal Aviation Administration; they all focused on economic regulation. Each of the proposed bills would place greater reliance upon competitive market forces. Each recognizes that increased pricing freedom must be accompanied by a significant lowering of regulatory barriers to entry if truly competitive performance is to be assured. The current issue appears to be not whether a change needs to be made, but rather how far and how quickly it should proceed.

REGULATED PRICE BELOW MARKET PRICE

At a regulated price below the competitively determined market price, consumers want to purchase more output than producers are willing to supply. The result is a shortage: more is demanded than will be supplied at the regulated price. A shortage means that some potential customers who place a value on the product higher than its cost of production are unable to purchase it because the low price has discouraged its manufacture.

Price ceilings also require that nonprice methods be used to decide who is to get the limited supply that is available. Although the monetary price to those fortunate enough to meet the nonprice criteria for purchasing a regulated commodity or service may be lower, all those who want to purchase it, but cannot, must pay a higher price, corresponding to the price of the best substitute product. They are forced to seek more costly substitutes to satisfy their demand, or else to do without. In addition, because the costs of nonprice rationing—waiting in line at a gas station, for example—are sometimes substantial, the realized price paid by those who do meet the criteria may be greater than the free-market price would be, even though the monetary price is lower. As a rule, nonprice rationing methods are less efficient and more costly than price rationing.

Natural Gas

Price controls on natural gas provide an illustration of the losses resulting from a price fixed below the competitive market-clearing level. The Federal Power Commission (FPC) regulates the price of gas sold to pipeline companies for resale across State boundaries. Since the regulated price is below the price in unregulated intrastate markets, most new gas has gone to the intrastate markets. As a consequence there has been a shortage in certain areas where gas must cross a State line to get from producer to consumer. Many

businesses and institutions have had to substitute more expensive energy for natural gas in the past few years; and where natural gas is critical for some industrial uses, work stoppages and unemployment have also resulted. Few residential customers already subscribing to gas service have encountered problems, but some new applications for gas service have been denied. Since 1972, as an example, no new customers have been accepted by the Columbia Gas System, which serves consumers from Virginia to Ohio and New York. Recent forecasts indicate a growing shortage of natural gas to meet the contract requirements of pipelines for gas deliveries to local distributors and portend future problems even for residential customers.

The economic costs of the natural gas shortage emerge in various forms. First, under the nonprice allocation system that has been devised by the FPC, distribution companies are allocated gas on the basis of a set of FPCapproved priorities. This allocation system does not directly consider the relative cost of switching to an alternative energy source or the relative productivity of natural gas in alternative uses. The gas that is available may therefore not be going to its most productive uses. Second, natural gas is underutilized as an energy source in favor of more costly alternatives because gas producers, responding to the artificially low prices, undertake less exploration and development than would occur in an unconstrained market. During the last decade total annual additions to natural gas reserves declined slightly, while demand was increasing steadily. Third, because intrastate sales of gas are not controlled by the FPC, producers prefer to sell as much gas as possible at the higher prices prevailing within the producing States. As the controlled price of natural gas has lagged behind the rising price of alternative fuels, this problem has become more serious. About two-thirds of the natural gas reserves committed to markets went to interstate markets in the late 1960s, but this fraction had declined to less than 20 percent by 1975. The unregulated price of natural gas in gas-producing States is sometimes lower than the price of equivalent energy in nonproducing areas, where businesses occasionally cannot obtain gas at any price. Moreover, for some industrial processes, natural gas is less costly to use than alternative fuel sources which could supply the equivalent energy. As a result firms may find it advantageous to move from regions served by regulated natural gas to regions where supplies are available. Instead of being based on true relative locational advantages, this migration to gas-producing States is induced because the regulated price of gas is held below the competitive level.

Last year the FPC announced a threefold increase in the regulated price of "new gas" (gas coming from wells on which drilling commenced after January 1, 1976). FPC efforts to raise the price ceilings can contribute to economic growth, but any long-term solution to the natural gas shortage necessitates legislative action to eliminate price controls. Although increased prices will undoubtedly affect residential consumers, one should not ignore the current costs to consumers caused by regulation-induced misallocation: those which are now hidden in the prices of goods and services

produced with higher-cost energy sources, and those which primarily burden residential consumers who are unable to obtain gas supplies at any price.

REGULATIONS THAT DIRECTLY AFFECT COST

A free-market economy cannot allocate resources efficiently unless prices reflect all of the costs of producing and consuming each good and service, and unless buyers and sellers have adequate information on which to base their market decisions. If the external costs that spill over to outsiders are ignored, the price of a good or service will be too low and consumers will buy too much. The output that is purchased will entail a greater social cost of production than the benefits that its consumers will derive. The effect would be similar to a direct subsidy of certain economic activities: economic decisions would be distorted toward the production and consumption of the subsidized product. In addition, if producers or consumers have inadequate information, market decisions will not necessarily reflect relative costs. The more prominent cases of Government efforts to correct for spillover costs and inadequate market information in recent years concern health, safety, and the environment.

Unfortunately, in many instances it is extraordinarily difficult to estimate the external cost of private decisions or the public benefits which would stem from policies to alter those decisions. Errors in estimating either the benefits or the costs can result in programs which are socially more costly than the externalities they are attempting to correct. The inadequacy of information frequently means that these decisions must be made in the presence of considerable uncertainty.

Several problems hinder the development of efficient regulations that will correct for external costs and inadequate information. The appropriate degree of pollution removal or reduction of risks to health and safety must be determined. Eliminating absolutely all pollution or risk to health and safety would be so expensive that it would preclude other national goals. By analogy, in their private lives individuals rarely try to lessen the risk of incurring injury or contracting disease to the technologically feasible minimum. People recognize that the incremental benefits of health and safety are limited and must be balanced against having more resources available to satisfy other needs. In those instances where the private sector is unable to generate a socially efficient amount of information, there is scope for Government research and dissemination of data. Finally, whatever is chosen as the target of environmental cleanup or health and safety improvement should be achieved at the minimum sacrifice of other goods and services.

Electric Power

Regulations have been imposed on the generation of electric power in an effort to internalize the spillover costs associated with air and water pollution. Although it is difficult to measure the benefits, these goals have clearly been expensive to achieve. Investments to meet air and water standards are estimated to add about 10 percent to the total capital expenditures in electric-

ity generation. If the regulations are set properly, they should improve the efficient operation of our economy. The methods adopted for this task, however, have not always been consistent with another objective of cost internalization—achieving it with maximum efficiency.

For example, because certain types of power plants are required to prepare environmental impact statements and have been hampered by frequent legal disputes, considerable delay has occurred in the construction of some electric generation plants. The spasmodic and still evolving development of environmental regulatory policy can create an atmosphere of uncertainty and increase the risk attached to new construction projects for generating power. The uncertainty of regulatory policy can have particularly severe effects on the building of power plants because they involve long commitments and have little flexibility once they are constructed. Hence the caution that utility companies have shown in planning the expansion of future capacity is not surprising. However, the delay in getting power plants under way may cause a switch to alternative types of generating plants which, though less efficient, can be constructed more quickly as demand pressures intensify. The absence of confidence in the stability of environmental regulations may thus lead to a less efficient and more costly mix of generation capacity in the future.

Occupational Health and Safety

Government efforts to improve health and safety conditions in and around the workplace provide another example of the difficulty of using direct regulatory efforts to achieve social goals. The Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 mandates the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to assure "so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions." Under the act each employer is required to comply with the standards promulgated by OSHA. These standards are intended to furnish for each employee a job which is "free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm."

Without OSHA's standards employers would remove work-related hazards whenever the benefits to them of doing so would exceed the incremental costs. If employers confronted the full costs of illness and injury from poor working conditions by having to pay higher wages, or incurred other costs that varied directly with the dangers to health and safety in workplaces, they would tend to operate at an efficient level of occupationally related health and safety. For a number of reasons, however, employers do not actually face the full costs of injuries and illnesses, and some of these costs are borne by others than the injured or ill employees.

The workers' compensation system does not fully reimburse workers and the rest of society for the loss in earnings and the additional medical and rehabilitation expenses that arise from job-related injuries and diseases. Two reasons for this failure are the extraordinary difficulty of estimating the private and the social cost of work-related injuries and diseases and the problem of establishing efficient methods of internalizing these costs. The society at large pays part of the costs of occupational illness and injury through other transfer programs—for example, social security disability, medicaid, and vocational rehabilitation. In addition, the workers' compensation insurance premium paid by the individual employer does not vary in direct proportion to the benefits paid out to its injured workers. Employers are not given the incentive to respond optimally even to those losses for which the system provides direct compensation. Finally, wage differences may not fully adjust to otherwise uncompensated hazards present in the workplace if workers are not well informed of the actual risks that they face, or do not have enough mobility to avoid risks for which they do not feel fully compensated.

A system of health and safety standards is one mechanism for further internalizing accident and illness costs borne by parties other than employers. To implement an efficient system of health and safety standards, the Government needs detailed knowledge about the many different causes of accidents and disease and the relative costs in different firms of alternative methods that may reduce them. There are important differences in the risk of injury and damage to health among occupations and employersand perhaps also among employees. For administrative and legal reasons, however, it is difficult to impose different standards on different employers. Because of these problems any system of health and safety standards will inevitably be arbitrary and inefficient to some extent. OSHA has usually mandated "engineering controls" for reducing workers' exposure to hazards, rather than allowing firms and employees to determine for themselves the least-cost means of achieving health and safety goals. Given the diversity among firms, the application of engineering standards requires more information, is less likely to result in uniform treatment, and thereby entails higher costs than performance standards or "injury fees" for the same reduction in injuries.

In situations where sufficient information exists to permit a reasonably precise estimate of the social loss from work-related injuries and diseases, health and safety objectives can more efficiently be achieved through the use of performance standards or injury fees, rather than by mandating particular means of reducing injuries. Performance standards levy charges against firms according to the incidence and severity of all job-related injuries, or to increases in injuries above some predetermined level. If information permits, the fees could be tailored to the frequency and seriousness of accident or illness and might be incorporated in a workers' compensation system. These charges should be large enough to fully compensate those directly harmed and to cover the external costs as well. Individual firms would be left to seek least-cost methods of reducing accidents and disease, and they would adopt them to the point where the costs of reducing accidents and illness exceeded the charges levied on the occurrence of accident and illness.

The present state of knowledge is not sufficient to extend this approach to all problems in relation to health and safety. It is frequently difficult to

identify the causes of a disease, and the link between health and working conditions is difficult to establish. Many occupationally related diseases appear long after exposure to their causes. The charges might follow so long after the hazardous conditions had caused harm that they would not play much part in decisions affecting the health of employees. The assignment of liability is further complicated because firms may disappear as time passes or avoid responsibility in other ways.

Information problems and the long latency of many occupational diseases make it very difficult to estimate costs and therefore the level of exposure that society is willing to tolerate. In addition, even if these problems were resolved it would be hard to embody the results in an operational system of levying the appropriate charges and internalizing the costs. These same difficulties confront the engineering standards approach. But for occupational health objectives there is often a correct preference for standards that prohibit or severely limit exposure, rather than for an injury fee approach that might allow substantial exposure. In the presence of considerable uncertainty, the desire to err in the direction of too much health and safety may require a standards approach. Where the relevant information is available and the risks involved are not excessive, the use of performance standards may be a more effective means of achieving desired levels of safety and health. Because of the substantial externalities that may be involved, and the difficulty of generating private sector financing of basic research, an important role for Government lies in financing research relating to occupational disease.

IMPLEMENTING REGULATORY REFORM

In spite of the widespread recognition that reform of certain Government regulatory policies could yield substantial economic benefits, there remain major obstacles to achieving reform. Compared to those who would benefit by reform, those who would be hurt are fewer; but they are also likely to be more aware of the losses that they would incur. Many potential losers are well organized and have an effective system for communicating their views to policy makers and the public. On the other hand, the beneficiaries of regulatory reform (especially the ultimate consumers of products of the regulated industries) are numerous, and the benefit per individual is usually small. Beneficiaries of reform are less likely to understand their stake in regulatory reform, are not usually organized, and generally have little success in effectively communicating their views to decision makers and the public.

Those in a position to lose from regulatory reform are not always the ones who have gained from prior restrictive economic regulations. In a well-functioning market, the sales price of capital assets reflects the future earnings stream they are expected to generate, appropriately discounted to account for delay in the receipt of those earnings. The value of regulated industries' assets are likely to be elevated sufficiently to reflect the expectation that regulation, and its associated benefits to existing firms, will continue

in the future. Consequently current stockholders of such industries who purchased shares after regulation was introduced are unlikely to earn more than a normal return on their investment. When regulatory reform threatens to alter the economic environment on which they based their future profit expectations, they will naturally resist.

In many instances income distribution considerations are cited in support of holding regulated prices below free-market levels. Allowing prices to rise, however, may not affect low-income consumers more adversely than higher-income consumers. There are substantial differences in consumption patterns among households at the same income levels, and the effects of deregulation on family well-being are likely to differ greatly. For these reasons it is preferable to use the regular tax and income transfer systems, rather than price regulations, to achieve society's income distribution objectives.

Another problem facing regulatory reform is the difficulty often encountered in bringing regulatory reform initiatives before the full Congress. Individual congressional committees, responding to the pressures described above, are sometimes reluctant to consider significant reform bills. Thus, although there is a growing consensus that regulatory reform is needed, the process of achieving it may be hampered by fragmentation of individual proposals. It may therefore be desirable for policy makers to address a number of regulatory reform issues simultaneously. Such an approach was contained in the proposed Agenda for Regulatory Reform submitted by the President to the 94th Congress. This proposal would have required the Administration to introduce legislation to effect major regulatory reforms over a 4-year period. Another provision would have ensured congressional action by placing the Administration's proposals before the full Congress after a specified time if similar proposals were not reported out of committee.

SUMMARY

Major policy initiatives are required to address the kinds of regulatory problems described above. Two types of efforts are needed. First, the statutes under which some agencies operate need to be modified. This approach is particularly applicable to the independent regulatory agencies which have jurisdiction over specific industries. The principal goal should be to eliminate regulations that inhibit competition, prevent innovation, and otherwise distort the allocation of resources. Second, the quality of agency decisions under the existing regulatory statutes needs to be improved. This approach appears particularly suited to those regulatory agencies which deal with matters of health, safety, and the environment.

Several specific reforms deserve consideration in 1977. First, reform that increases rate flexibility and eases entry restrictions in the airline and trucking industries would reduce the costs imposed by prices set in excess of competitively determined free-market levels. The reduction in the quantity of resources absorbed unproductively would increase the ability of the economy to produce more goods and services of all types, including those of the regulated sector.

Second, the economic costs generated by price ceilings could be reduced by the elimination of many price restrictions. Decontrol of natural gas prices is the most urgent need. This would increase economic efficiency and, by increasing supply, move us toward greater energy self-sufficiency.

Third, regulations related to health, safety, and the environment need to be carefully evaluated. These regulations are aimed at some important though elusive social goals. But some generate hidden economic costs that are being ignored, and some may not be effective in achieving the goals of their enabling legislation. A sound comparison of the realized benefits against the total costs generated by each of these regulations is necessary to ensure that the regulatory goals chosen by society are desirable and are achieved at the least possible cost.

AGRICULTURAL POLICY

Farm programs over the years have reduced real GNP by imposing a variety of restrictions on pricing, production, land use, and trade in farm commodities. Some of the most important of these restrictions have been eliminated in recent years, but others remain. In 1977 major pieces of farm legislation will expire, and there will be pressures to return to past approaches which have caused an inefficient allocation of the Nation's agricultural resources. This section reviews the progress made in farm policy, the threat to that progress, and the direction we believe that future farm policy should take.

THE MOVEMENT TO MARKET-ORIENTED FARM PROGRAMS

Beginning in the 1930s the pursuit of income protection for farmers led to programs which have raised average farm prices above competitive market-clearing levels. These programs have produced the general consequences of price-increasing regulation discussed in the preceding section: the regulated price induces more output and less consumption than would otherwise have occurred, and the excess production and capacity generate pressures to restrict output.

For grains and some other commodities the regulated price has been supported by Government acquisition of commodities. The existence of excess capacity is then revealed in the accumulation of stocks of commodities held by the Government. To prevent stock accumulation, schemes have been tried under which a relatively high price was paid for commodities used domestically, while exports were made at a lower world price. If sufficient quantities could not be exported at world market prices, export subsidies have been paid—notoriously in the case of wheat, when subsidies were paid during the period of the Soviet purchases of 1972. In addition, subsidized exports have been made through the Food for Peace program and through subsidized credit to foreign purchasers. Domestic food consumption has been subsidized through the school lunch, food stamp, and other special programs. Because no demand-increasing approach has been able for long to equate

demand and supply at support prices, there was continued resort to production control schemes. Measures taken to restrict production have included: acreage allotments and marketing quotas for the major crops; Government purchase and slaughter of sows and baby pigs in the 1930s; payments to farmers to turn cropland to less productive use under cropland adjustment, conservation reserve and cropland conversion programs; and, more recently, requirements to "set aside" cropland acres as a prerequisite to participation in price support programs, supplemented by diversion payments to induce further reduction in crop acreage.

The typical result of these programs was a reduction in food output, or at least in domestic consumption, and inefficiency in the allocation of resources. Establishment of domestic prices above world market levels required measures inconsistent with our overall trade liberalization objectives. Food prices were more stable, but at the cost of higher average prices than if prices had been unregulated. Apart from efficiency losses, costs to the nonfarm public included many billions of dollars in direct payments to farmers. In 1968–70, annual budget outlays for farm programs averaged \$5 billion, and Government payments amounted to over one-fourth of total net farm income. Over the years the program benefits were largely capitalized into land values, so that they accrued primarily to owners of farm real estate.

Reductions in some crop support prices in the mid-1960s began a reorientation of farm policy toward unregulated market prices, and since 1972 increases in world market demand have permitted an almost complete abandonment of restrictive features in U.S. farm programs for major crops. Reforms which only a few years ago were considered a practical impossibility have now been put into effect. At the same time, extreme price increases following the sharp reduction in U.S. and world carryover stocks of grains in 1972–73 have renewed interest in measures to stabilize prices. This concern for stability, together with a desire for farm income protection, could open the door to a return to past restrictive approaches.

THE THREAT TO MARKET-ORIENTED POLICIES

Farm programs differ from other regulatory activities in that regulated prices and means of controlling production are more often specified in legislation. Consequently the features of farm programs tend to be a more direct political issue, and more subject to sudden change in approach, than is the case in the regulation of most other industries. Farm policy will be considered by the Congress in 1977 because much of the legislation authorizing current programs will expire, including the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, which covers the major crops. The machinery set up under the 1973 act allows the separation of farm income support from price stabilization measures to a greater degree than was possible under preceding programs. Farm income support can be provided by means of deficiency payments, which are based on the difference between

a legislated target price and the market price or support price received. Farmers in the aggregate cannot increase their payments by expanding output, since payments are limited to a given base production. Thus although this approach could be very costly to taxpayers if the target prices were high enough, it can provide farm income support without Government stock buildup and without restricting food supplies. To date, the strength of world markets has kept market prices above target prices, and therefore no deficiency payments have been made, although payments for rice are a certainty in fiscal 1977.

Recent weakness in the price of grains, especially wheat and rice, has rekindled farmers' interest in price support programs. The threat of declining farm incomes, coupled with appeals for policies to promote food price stability by means of grain reserves, could lead to higher support prices and hence a turn away from full-production, market-oriented policies.

The United States has proposed an international system of food grain reserves of limited size which would not be used to defend any particular price band. An alternative, but one which would also involve important issues in international policy coordination, could be a unilateral domestic buffer stock of grain, which would be built up when prices are low and sold when prices are high. This idea fits in naturally with Government storage of grain acquired to support prices. The main new elements would have to do with whether the stocks would be open-ended in size or would specify maximum quantities to be acquired, and the rules for placing stocks on the market to moderate price increases.

While a publicly owned buffer stock can reduce price fluctuations, it involves substantial costs and risks. The principal risk is that support prices and resale prices as well as quantities to be acquired and released will tend to be determined by political criteria. The result, if past history is a guide, will be to stabilize prices in a range which on the average is above competitive market-clearing levels. Such regulated prices would probably return us finally to the acreage restrictions, production controls, and export subsidies which have characterized past farm programs.

THE FUTURE OF MARKET-ORIENTED POLICIES

Farm policy should not only resist bringing back the restrictive grain and cotton programs of the past, but should also move toward market orientation for the commodities where price-increasing measures remain effective. Commodities covered by effective price supports include milk, tobacco, and peanuts. Price supports for milk used to manufacture other dairy products are currently resulting in substantial Government purchases of powdered milk, cheese, and butter, and they require import controls to keep out foreign dairy products attracted by the high prices. The existing programs for tobacco and peanuts rely on economically objectionable production controls. Rights to grow and market these crops have become valuable assets. Even

with stringent controls on peanut acreage and tobacco production, the support prices are high enough to result in Government stock accumulation.

Milk and some fruits, vegetables, and nuts are marketed by large cooperatives under the auspices of Federal marketing agreements and orders. Apart from those for milk, there were 47 orders and agreements in fiscal 1976 covering farm products valued at \$3.7 billion. Regulation in these cases does not establish prices by legislative or executive action but grants powers to producer groups sufficient to influence prices paid to them. To attain "orderly marketing," flows of products to market during peak production periods are cut back or diverted from fresh to processing uses or to export markets. The result is a higher price for fresh products for domestic uses. The quantitatively most important case is the higher price established for milk sold in fluid form compared to milk for other dairy products. Size and grade standards have in some instances been used to reduce flows of imports, notably of winter tomatoes from Mexico. While most producers' associations have found it difficult to control total supplies, they have in some cases—notably for hops and celery—been able to do so and thereby to raise prices.

Farm policy, besides avoiding production controls under commodity programs, should actively promote efficient food production in other ways. Perhaps the most important means is basic agricultural research, the benefits of which are difficult for private business to capture. Another is to make sure that efficient food production gets appropriately weighted against other social goals, for example by insisting that more stringent environmental or safety regulations do not impose greater additional costs than their expected additional benefits.

The goal of eliminating excessive price instability can be served by more promising means than direct market intervention. Provision of timely and accurate production and market information is a valuable service which may be inadequately supplied by the private sector because of the difficulty of capturing the benefits. By fostering efficient futures markets, which assist commodity producers and users in risk management and which translate the market information that exists into price signals easily interpreted by and readily available to market participants, Government may play a useful role. Domestic price stability would be furthered by reducing protectionism and increasing market orientation abroad. Adjustment to world supply and demand fluctuations would then not occur as disproportionately as it does now in the United States. Freer trade in agricultural products is a chief U.S. goal in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations currently under way, which suggests that the United States should resist undermining its position by protectionist measures to favor our own domestic producers. Bilateral negotiations may also prove useful. The 5-year grain sales agreement with the Soviet Union, which covers shipments of wheat and corn after October 1, 1976, may reduce the year-to-year fluctuations in Soviet grain imports and is a step toward making the grain export policy of the United States steadier and more predictable. In all of these respects agricultural policy can promote

price stability without the risks inherent in direct intervention in commodity markets.

Farm programs also influence the efficiency of resource utilization in agriculture by helping farmers bear the risks of crop failure caused by bad weather, pests, or disease. For most commodities, production risk is paid for by consumers in the higher prices needed to induce people to undertake risky activities. For grains and cotton, current legislation provides free insurance through disaster payments when bad weather prevents planting or when a harvest of two-thirds or less of normal production on allotment acreage is realized. These payments totaled about \$840 million in 1974 and 1975 together. The economic arguments favor replacement of the disaster payment scheme by an expanded system of nonsubsidized general crop insurance. Subsidized crop failure encourages farmers to use marginal land too intensively, contrary to the conservation goals of agricultural policy, and could reduce the output of our agricultural resources in the future.

Farm programs offer both opportunities and pitfalls in the effort to make the most of our agricultural resources and thus increase real GNP. Opportunities offered by the commodity price boom of recent years were used to establish a potentially valuable legacy of a full-production policy for agriculture. The challenge is to use whatever new opportunities present themselves to eliminate remaining restrictive measures. Most important for the immediate future is not to let the pursuit of farm income support or price stabilization lead us back into past restrictive approaches.

TAX POLICIES FOR CAPITAL FORMATION

In Chapter 1 it was noted that a higher rate of investment is desirable for two reasons: to help sustain the expansion in the short run and to provide the new capacity required in the longer run to ensure rising real incomes, productive employment opportunities for a growing labor force, greater self-sufficiency in energy, and a cleaner environment. Chapter 1 also noted that one of the important causes of the recent productivity slowdown has been the slower growth in the stock of capital per worker over the last decade. The conclusion was therefore reached that an important objective of economic policy in the years ahead should be to ensure adequate levels of new investment. In the near term, stable economic growth is essential for a higher rate of capital formation. But policies may also have to be devised to counteract the forces, identified in Chapter 1, which may have lowered the effective rates of return to saving and investment and interfered with an efficient allocation of capital resources. For example, the President's proposed reductions in personal and corporate income taxes can be justified in part as an offset to the bias against private investment created by our tax structure, under which the real tax burdens for business as well as individuals rise in periods of high inflation. There are a number of other aspects of the tax system which impinge on investment and saving. This section discusses some of these features and suggests some possible changes that may be useful to stimulate additional capital formation and promote a more efficient use of available capital resources.

INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT

The investment tax credit (ITC) was first enacted in 1962 as part of the Kennedy Administration's program to stimulate investment by increasing the profitability of new equipment. Since then, the ITC has been revised by a series of legislative actions and successively suspended, repealed, and reenacted. The ITC was permanently reinstated at a maximum 7 percent rate (4 percent for utilities) by the Revenue Act of 1971. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 temporarily increased the maximum rate to 10 percent for all businesses, including utilities, during 1975 and 1976. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 subsequently extended the 10 percent rate through 1980, and the President has proposed that it be made permanent.

At present the law provides for a credit against current tax liabilities of corporate and noncorporate businesses, equal to 10 percent of the value of qualified investments. Qualified investments are generally new depreciable assets used in production, excluding structures, with service lives of 3 years or more. The credit is applied on a sliding scale in such a way that one-third of the full credit is allowed for assets with service lives of 3 or 4 years, twothirds for assets with service lives of 5 or 6 years, and the full credit for those assets with service lives of 7 years or more. The ITC rates thus range from 31/3 to 10 percent, depending on the life of the asset. The credit claimed in any year cannot exceed a company's total tax liability for the year, and the maximum credit that generally may be taken is \$25,000, plus 50 percent of the tax liability in excess of \$25,000. Credits not usable in the current year because of this limitation may be deducted against tax liabilities 3 years back and 7 years forward on a first-in, first-out basis, that is, the oldest credits are used first. Under current law, the basis for calculating depreciation allowances on new equipment is not reduced by the amount of the credit. A provision requiring a basis adjustment was contained in the original 1962 legislation, but it was subsequently repealed by the Revenue Act of 1964.

The credit was restricted to equipment purchases because of the favorable tax treatment already accorded to structures under the rules for accelerated depreciation and for expensing of interest and taxes incurred during the construction period. It was also felt that the most rapid gains in productivity could be achieved by encouraging investment in new equipment. In addition, there was a fear that a credit on structures might become a tax loophole for real estate speculation and the purchase of private residences.

There is no general consensus about the precise impact of the ITC on investment spending. Nevertheless it does appear that past increases in

the credit have led to significantly higher expenditures for new equipment. Moreover, compared with the other major investment incentives—changes in accelerated depreciation and reductions in the corporate income tax rate—the ITC apparently yields larger and more rapid increases in investment per dollar of reduced tax liability. Consequently the issue with respect to the ITC concerns not so much its overall effectiveness as the distortions it may create in choices among different types of capital assets. These distortions derive from three specific aspects of the ITC as it now operates.

First, because the amount of credit that may be taken is generally limited by the investor's total tax liability, firms with highly variable profit rates may have difficulty making full use of the ITC in any given year. It is estimated that about \$1½ billion in additional tax credits would have been claimed in 1975 if this limitation had not existed, and this represents nearly 20 percent of the total amount of investment tax credit claimed in that year. The present carry-back and carry-forward provisions do permit eventual recovery of most credits. However, since profits and business tax liabilities generally fall during recessions, the credits may not be available to firms in cyclically sensitive industries at the very time when the need for additional cash flow is greatest. The same problem may affect rapidly growing firms, which have large investment needs relative to their profits and tax liabilities. Making the ITC fully refundable in the year in which assets are purchased would eliminate that constraint. This change would tend to minimize the adverse effects of the business cycle on investment and provide an additional incentive to the most dynamic sectors of the economy.

Second, the ITC discriminates against very short-lived assets as well as assets with service lives of more than 7 years. There may be some justification for denying the ITC to inventory assets because they are not used in production. Moreover, administration of the ITC for inventories tends to be complicated by the fact that they are often sold before the end of their service lives, thus necessitating recapture of credits received. There are nevertheless many other types of productive short-lived capital assets which on the grounds of efficiency should benefit from the credit. In addition, the flat 10 percent rate applied to all assets with useful lives of 7 years or more results in a progressively smaller increase in the rate of return on longer-lived capital assets (Table 35). If the credit is not to impart such a bias against long-term investments, the implied rate of return must be increased proportionately for all assets. To achieve this result, a variable rate ITC is required, with a larger credit applied to longer-lived assets. A restructuring and extension of the present sliding scale would therefore neutralize the effect of the ITC on the choice among assets with different service lives. Such a change would particularly benefit many primary processing industries which are critical to the economy's long-term growth potential and whose capital structure is heavily weighted toward long-lived assets.

Table 35—Change in after-tax internal rate of return under present 10 percent investment tax credit, all businesses

Life of asset (years)	Investment tax credit (percent)	Change in after-tax internal rate of return (percentage points) ¹
1	0. 0 . 0 3. 3	0. 00 . 00 1. 92
5	3. 3 6. 7	3 1.57
6 7 8 9 10	6. 7 10. 0 10. 0 10. 0 10. 0	2. 42 3. 30 2. 99 2. 73 2. 52
15	10. 0 10. 0 10. 0 10. 0	1. 91 1. 60 1. 42 1. 31

¹ Assumes that the net income stream from the investment is constant, that the after-tax internal rate of return before the investment tax credit equals 10 percent, and that the credit does not affect future costs or revenues.

Source: Council of Economic Advisers.

Finally, the current failure to exclude the amount of the tax credit from the depreciable base of an asset means that a write-off is allowed for an expense not incurred. This raises the effective rate of the ITC above the statutory level, the increase being larger for shorter-lived assets, thus accentuating the bias against longer-term investments. It would be preferable to make the appropriate adjustment to the depreciable tax base and change the size of the credit itself to achieve the desired rate of profitability on assets with different useful lives.

A redesign of the ITC to eliminate the distortions noted above would make it a more neutral and effective incentive for new investment and should be considered if the need arises in the future for additional fiscal stimulus for investment. Making the ITC permanent would also be desirable to remove the uncertainty about its future level and create a more stable basis for business investment planning. Frequent changes in the ITC should be avoided because they may actually have a destabilizing effect on aggregate demand. The primary effect of temporary revisions in the credit may simply be to change the timing of investment spending. For example, a 1-year increase in the credit may boost the level of investment in the short run, but then lead to a correspondingly lower level in the following year. Furthermore the ITC may have perverse effects on investment if firms begin to anticipate changes in the rate. If increases in the credit are regularly expected as the economy is headed out of recessions, the downturn may be prolonged if firms hold back on new investment until the credit is raised. For these reasons, then, the use of the ITC to stabilize aggregate demand in the short run should be kept to a minimum.

TAX INTEGRATION

Integration of the corporate and personal income taxes to eliminate the double tax on corporate income is another proposal that has been recommended as a means of improving the allocation of capital resources and raising the aggregate rate of investment. Under current law the first \$25,000 of corporate income is taxed at a rate of 20 percent, the second \$25,000 at 22 percent, and all income above \$50,000 at 48 percent (22 percent plus a surtax of 26 percent).* In addition shareholders must pay individual income taxes on distributed profits (dividends); and retained earnings are taxed again, though at lower effective rates, when capital gains are realized from the sale of stock. Thus, while income from noncorporate businesses and wages and salaries is taxed only once, corporate income is subject to a double tax. This extra tax creates a number of distortions affecting the financial structure of corporations and the overall allocation of capital resources, which impair economic stability and reduce total output.

First, because after-tax rates of return on capital tend to be equalized by market forces, the higher rate of tax on corporate income implies that an extra dollar invested in the corporate sector must yield a higher before-tax rate of return than an extra dollar invested in the noncorporate sector. The double tax therefore discourages capital resources from flowing into higheryielding projects in the corporate sector, the result being a net loss in output. Second, since retained earnings are generally translated into capital gains in the form of higher stock prices, and these gains are taxed at preferential rates, the tax burden on distributed profits is relatively larger than that on undistributed profits. Corporations thus have an incentive to reduce dividends and increase retained earnings. This phenomenon may produce a misallocation of capital within the corporate sector as investment is encouraged in older established firms with a high level of retained earnings and discouraged in newer firms, which usually rely more heavily on capital markets to raise funds. Moreover certain investment projects may be undertaken with internally generated funds, despite the fact that they might not be worthwhile if financed with capital from external sources. Third, the combination of high inflation and the tax-deductibility of interest payments has encouraged many corporations to raise debt-equity ratios to levels where the risk of bankruptcy may have risen substantially. Such firms are thereby made more vulnerable to business cycle developments and may experience increasing difficulty in raising funds in capital markets. Finally, the increase in the tax burden resulting from the double tax is relatively greater for lower-income stockholders.

It is also sometimes claimed that the double taxation of corporate income reduces the national rate of saving and that integration would be desirable to increase capital formation. Taken by itself, integration would lower taxes

^{*}The Tax Reform Act of 1976 extended these brackets and rates only through the end of 1977. The President has proposed that the first two brackets and rates be made permanent, and that the surtax be permanently lowered to 24 percent. The latter change would yield a combined rate of 46 percent on corporate income over \$50,000.

and raise the return to capital income, which could be expected to result in higher saving as well as consumption. However, if integration were accompanied by an increase in other taxes, leaving total revenue unchanged, the effect on saving would be ambiguous. Saving would rise only to the extent that a net increase in the rate of return remained after the offsetting tax changes (and saving responded positively to such an increase) or income was redistributed to individuals with above-average propensities to save. Since the response of saving to changes in the rate of return is uncertain in any case, and it is unlikely that the offsetting tax increases would produce a significant change in the after-tax distribution of income, it is probable that the effect of revenue-neutral integration on aggregate saving would be minimal. The major benefits of integration thus stem from the improved allocation of capital resources and the more equitable distribution of tax burdens that it would bring about—not from its presumed effects on total saving.

Full integration in its purest form would eliminate the corporate income tax entirely and allocate income to stockholders as if they were general partners in a small business. There may be certain administrative problems, however, which would make this partnership approach difficult to implement in the case of widely held corporations. Moreover, severe cash flow problems could be created for shareholders with high marginal tax rates if their tax liabilities significantly exceeded the dividends paid out.

A more modest scheme of partially integrating the personal and corporate income taxes would remove only the double tax on dividends, either by allowing corporations to deduct their dividend payments in calculating income for tax purposes, or by treating the corporate tax on dividends as withholding for the shareholders. Under either of these methods of partial integration, the bias toward reliance on retained earnings in corporate financing decsions would be reduced. The Administraton's integration proposal combines both approaches. A portion of dividends paid would be treated as a cost of doing business and therefore would be deductible from a corporation's gross income. The remaining amount of dividends would be subject to the ordinary corporate income tax, but the tax paid would be imputed to shareholders and treated as withholding in the calculation of their individual income taxes. The shareholders would then be required to raise their dividend income by the amount of tax imputed to them and withheld by the corporation, calculate their individual income tax on this adjusted basis, and credit the amount withheld against their tax liability. If there were no offsetting increase in taxes, this integration procedure could be expected to raise the after-tax incomes of both corporations and their shareholders, assuming no change in dividend payout rates.

Full integration of corporate and personal income taxes would completely eliminate the distortions in resource allocation mentioned earlier. Partial integration, affecting dividends only, would not be completely neutral because it would not change the present tax treatment of retained corporate income.

Nevertheless, if the difficulties in implementing full integration should prove insurmountable, partial integration may be a possible second-best solution. Neither plan by itself, however, should be expected to result in a noticeable change in the saving rate.

POLICIES TO STIMULATE SAVING

To help meet the economy's need for more capital, the most pressing goal of policy should be to strengthen the long-term incentives for investment. However, if the share of GNP devoted to investment is to rise over the next several years, a comparable flow of savings must also be forthcoming. Otherwise there may be a significant rise in the rate of interest, which could limit the amount of new capital formation. Although the present supply of savings is sufficient in view of the current level of economic activity, it may be necessary to stimulate more saving as we approach full employment toward the end of the decade. If this need does arise, the additional saving could come either from the public sector in the form of larger budget surpluses (or lower deficits), or from higher personal and business saving. In Chapter 1 it was noted that in order to release the resources necessary for investment it would be desirable in the longer run to move toward a macroeconomic policy mix which generates a higher level of public saving. In the private sector, consideration should be given to changing those features of our present tax system that may discourage saving. Recent discussions have suggested that the personal saving rate might be raised by restructuring the social security system or by substituting a consumption tax for the personal income tax. There may of course be other reasons for reforming both taxes, but the discussion here will focus only on the impact they may have on personal saving.

Most individuals finance their retirement with the returns from savings accumulated during their working years, intrafamily transfers, and social security benefits. Social security has become increasingly important in people's retirement planning because of liberal increases in benefits and wider coverage. The question therefore arises whether this development may have led to a decline in private saving. If it has, the national rate of saving would be correspondingly lower, since the social security system is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis; that is, benefit payments are financed by contributions from the current work force rather than through a trust fund reserve accumulated over time.

The social security system may affect personal saving in several ways, some of which tend to raise the level, while others tend to lower it. The prospect of retirement benefits financed by younger generations in effect raises the current working population's future endowment of wealth and encourages a reduction in their saving. To the extent that social security benefits are expected to yield significantly higher returns to individuals than are available in private capital markets, the incentive to save is further reduced during the working years. On the other hand, by providing retirement in-

come, social security encourages people to shorten their working lives. Since social security retirement benefits generally become available only at the age of 62, individuals will therefore tend to save more over a shorter working life in order to lengthen the period of retirement. Furthermore, because income from assets, unlike labor income, does not reduce social security benefits, the desire to maintain a high rate of consumption after retirement may encourage more saving. Finally, to some extent social security may simply replace intergenerational transfers within familes, and hence have no net impact on national saving.

Whether the net effect of these factors influencing personal saving is positive or negative is an empirical question. Some recent econometric studies have suggested that the social security system on balance may have reduced personal saving. The evidence is inconclusive, however, about the exact magnitude of this effect, and further research is clearly necessary before a definitive answer can be reached. Nevertheless it would be useful to begin considering possible ways of altering the social security system to mitigate any adverse effects it may have on saving. Insofar as such a reform would involve more complete funding of current and future social security benefits, a large Federal budget surplus might result. Of course it would be necessary to ensure that the implicitly more restrictive fiscal policy would be consistent with the overall objectives of demand management.

An alternative proposal designed in part to encourage saving would be to replace the personal income tax with a tax on consumption. It is well known that both taxes cause a loss in efficiency by distorting individual choices between market and nonmarket activities. An income tax, however, generates an additional distortion between consumption and saving by first reducing after-tax income available for all purposes, and then lowering the interest earned on savings. An income tax therefore interferes with the choice between present and future consumption by causing a divergence between the before- and after-tax rates of return on capital investments. This distortion could be removed either by making capital income deductible under the income tax, or by replacing the latter with a tax on consumption.

A consumption tax, by deferring the tax payment until consumption occurs, is neutral with respect to the choice regarding consumption in different periods. Such a tax would therefore raise the yield from postponing consumption and remove the existing disincentive to saving. As in the case of tax integration, whether a consumption tax would in fact lead to a net increase in aggregate saving depends on the relative magnitudes of its income, substitution, and asset value effects. The available empirical evidence suggests that there is considerable uncertainty regarding both the magnitude and the direction of the effect of interest rate changes on saving. Therefore, if one purpose of a consumption tax is to stimulate saving, further examination of how changes in the rate of return affect saving-consumption decisions is clearly necessary. Nevertheless a consumption tax merits study not only as a possible mechanism to raise personal saving, but also in connection with basic tax reform as an alternative to a broader-based and simplified income tax.



Appendix A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS DURING 1976

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Council of Economic Advisers, Washington, D.C., December 30, 1976.

The President:

SIR: The Council of Economic Advisers submits this report on its activities during the calendar year 1976 in accordance with the requirements of the Congress, as set forth in section 4(d) of the Employment Act of 1946.

Respectfully,

Alan Greenspan, Chairman. Burton G. Malkiel.



Report to the President on the Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers During 1976

The Council of Economic Advisers was created by the Employment Act of 1946 to provide economic analysis and advice to the President and thus assist him in establishing and maintaining conditions under which the objectives of the act can be secured.

Alan Greenspan served as Council Chairman during 1976, his second year in that capacity. Burton G. Malkiel was a Council Member throughout 1976, on leave of absence from Princeton University, where he is Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor of Economics. On November 15, 1976, Paul W. MacAvoy, Council Member, resigned to become Professor of Economics with the School of Organization and Management at Yale University.

Past Council Members and their dates of service are listed below

Name	Position	Oath of office date	Separation date
Edwin G. Nourse	Chairman	August 9, 1946	November 1, 1949.
Leon H. Keyserling	Vice Chairman	_ August 9, 1946	. '
, ,	Acting Chairman	. November 2, 1949	. J
	Chairman	- May 10, 1950	
lohn D. Clark			.]
	Vice Chairman		February 11, 1953.
Roy Blough	Member	. June 29, 1950	August 20, 1952.
Robert C. Turner		. September 8, 1952	. January 20, 1953.
Arthur F. Burns	Chairman	March 19, 1953	
Neil H. Jacoby		. September 15, 1953	February 9, 1955.
Walter W. Stewart			April 29, 1955.
Raymond J. Saulnier		. April 4, 1955	- -
	Chairman	December 3, 1956	January 20, 1961.
oseph S. Davis		May 2, 1955	October 31, 1958.
Paul W. McCracken	Member	December 3, 1956	January 31, 1959.
Carl Brandt	Member		. January 20, 1961.
lenry C. Wallich			
Nalter W. Heller		January 29, 1961	November 15, 1964.
ames Tobin		January 29, 1961	July 31, 1962.
Cermit Gordon	Member	January 29, 1961	
Gardner Ackley	Member	. August 3, 1962	
	Chairman		
ohn P. Lewis		May 17, 1963	
Otto Eckstein		September 2, 1964	
Arthur M. Okun			- 1 00 1000
C D	Chairman		January 20, 1969.
ames S. Duesenberry		February 2, 1966	June 30, 1968.
Merton J. Peck		February 15, 1968	January 20, 1969.
Warren L. Smith		July 1, 1968	January 20, 1969.
Paul W. McCracken	Chairman	February 4, 1969	December 31, 1971.
lendrik S. Houthakker		February 4, 1969	_ July 15, 1971.
lerbert Stein		February 4, 1969	- 0
Tana Calaan	Chairman	January 1, 1972	August 31, 1974.
zra Solomon			
Marina v.N. Whitman	Member	March 13, 1972	
Gary L. Seevers		July 23, 1973	April 15, 1975.
Villiam J. Fellner		October 31, 1973	
Paul W. MacAvoy	Member	June 13, 1975	November 15, 1976.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COUNCIL

The principal directive of the Employment Act is that the Federal Government "use all practicable means consistent with its needs and obligations . . . for the purpose of creating and maintaining . . . conditions . . . to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power."

To this end, the basic responsibility of the Council of Economic Advisers is to analyze economic problems and interpret trends and changes in the economy so as to assist the President in the development and evaluation of national economic policies. The Council prepares regular reports on current economic conditions and forecasts of future economic developments as well as submitting recommendations which are considered in the formulation of economic policy. The Council also performs a direct advisory role both within the Executive Office of the President and through participation in interagency groups in which representatives of various departments, agencies, and offices in the executive branch evaluate economic problems and develop alternative solutions.

During 1976 the Council and its staff contributed to the study of many different economic issues. Analyzing current developments in business activity, evaluating alternative macroeconomic policies, as well as investigating productivity and the growth of potential output in the United States were an important part of the Council's work last year. The Council also participated in studies of other topics of current importance in policy decisions: foreign economic conditions and international financial developments; issues and proposals regarding agriculture and food, agricultural exports, and commodity trade; ways of improving the functioning of the labor markets; measures and programs to support housing construction and stimulate investment; proposals for dealing with a wide range of energy issues and problems; transportation problems; various proposals related to regulatory reform and product liability insurance; proposals for improving the effectiveness of unemployment compensation, health insurance, social security and income maintenance; and procedures that might improve the Government's economic statistics.

Early each year the President submits the Economic Report of the President to the Congress as required by the Employment Act. The Council assumes major responsibility for the preparation of the Report, which together with the accompanying Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers reviews the progress of the economy during the preceding year and outlines the Administration's policies and programs.

The Chairman is a member of the Economic Policy Board and of its Executive Committee. This board was formed in October 1974 to direct the formulation, coordination, and implementation of economic policy. The Executive Committee, which serves as the focal point for economic policy making, meets daily to address current issues of economic policy. It is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and consists of the Chairman of

the Council of Economic Advisers, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, who is the Executive Director of both the Economic Policy Board and its Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, often augmented by the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, meets regularly with the President to review economic conditions and to discuss and recommend possible changes in economic policy.

The Chairman of the Council is also a member of the Executive Committee of the President's Energy Resources Council, which was instituted in October 1974 to formulate and coordinate energy policy. The Chairman heads the U.S. delegation to the Economic Policy Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and serves as vice chairman of that committee. Council Members and staff economists meet with various working parties of the committee and attend other meetings of the OECD during the year.

The review and analysis of the overall performance of the economy is conducted and coordinated through a series of "Troika" working groups, comprising representatives of the Council, the Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget. At regular intervals economists from these agencies evaluate recent economic performance and formulate economic forecasts which are then reviewed by a second group, chaired by a Council Member and including a representative of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget. The analysis and projections thus developed are finally reviewed and cleared through the Chairman of the Council for presentation and consideration by the Executive Committee of the Economic Policy Board.

The Council has initiated a series of periodic meetings at which leading economists are invited to present their views on the economy and economic policy to the Executive Committee of the Economic Policy Board.

The Joint Economic Committee (JEC), like the Council, was created by the Employment Act of 1946 to make a continuing study of matters relating to the economy and to submit its own report and recommendations to the Congress. During 1976 the Chairman and Members of the Council appeared three times before the JEC. The Chairman and Council Members also presented testimony before the following: the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; the Subcommittee on Manpower, Compensation, and Health and Safety of the Committee on Education and Labor; and the Subcommittee on Financial Markets of the Senate Finance Committee.

The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers, contained in the *Economic Report of the President*, is the main vehicle through which the Council informs the public of its work and its views. This publication presents a comprehensive review and analysis of economic conditions, with forecasts and projections for the coming year, as well as an explanation of

the Administration's economic policy. In recent years about 50,000 copies of the *Economic Report* have been distributed. The Council also conveys its views on current economic problems and developments through occasional press briefings, testimony before various congressional committees, and speeches and papers by the Chairman and the Members of the Council. The Council assumes primary responsibility for the monthly publication *Economic Indicators*. This compilation of current data, prepared by the Council's Statistical Office under the direction of Frances M. James and Catherine H. Furlong, and issued by the Joint Economic Committee, has a distribution of about 10,000 copies.

ORGANIZATION AND STAFF OF THE COUNCIL

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

The Chairman is responsible for communicating the Council's views to the President. This duty is performed through discussions with the President and through regular reports on economic developments. The Chairman also represents the Council at Cabinet meetings and at many other formal and informal meetings of Government officials. He exercises ultimate responsibility for directing the work of the professional staff.

COUNCIL MEMBERS

The Council Members directly supervise the work of the staff and are responsible for all subject matter covered by the Council. They generally meet with the Economic Policy Board and prepare analyses for its use, and they represent the Council at numerous other meetings, where they assume major responsibility for the Council's involvement. Whenever the Chairman is absent from Washington, one of the Council Members becomes Acting Chairman.

In practice the Chairman and the Council Members work as a team. For operational reasons, however, subject matter is divided informally between the Council Members. In 1976 Mr. Malkiel's responsibility covered these areas: analysis of business conditions; short-term forecasting, and matters that relate to monetary and fiscal policy; international trade and finance; manpower employment and developments in the labor market; financial markets; housing; taxation; and social security. Mr. Malkiel was Chairman of the second-level Troika group and also of the Economic Policy Board's subcommittee on improving economic statistics. Mr. Mac-Avoy's responsibility encompassed these fields: energy; natural resources and commodity trade issues; food and agriculture; health, education, and welfare; environmental problems; transportation; regulated industries; and antitrust questions. He was Chairman of the Economic Policy Board's Food Deputies Group and co-Chairman of the Domestic Council Group on Regulatory Reform. The Council Members were involved in a large number of the committees and subcommittees of the Economic Policy Board.

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

At the end of 1976 the professional staff was made up of the following persons with their special fields of economic analysis:

Senior Staff Economists

Barry R. Chiswick	•
Peter K. Clark	Distribution Productivity, Aggregate Supply, and Economic Analysis
John M. Davis	Special Assistant to the Chairman
Bruce L. Gardner	Agriculture and Food
Helen B. Junz	International Finance and Trade
Michael D. McCarthy	Business Conditions, Econometrics, and Fore- casting
David C. Munro	Business Conditions, Econometrics, and Fore- casting
John J. Siegfried	Regulated Industries, Transportation, and Environment
William L. Springer	Fiscal Policy and Public Finance
John B. Taylor	Monetary Policy, Capital Markets, Interest Rates, and Housing
Philip K. Verleger, Jr	Energy Analysis and Policy, Microeconomic Analysis
St	aff Economist
Doral S. Cooper	International Finance and Trade

•		
	Statisticians	

Frances M. James	Senior Staff Statistician
Catherine H. Furlong	Statistician

Junior Staff Economists

Arthur E. Blakemore	Labor, Human Resources, and Fiscal Policy
Richard E. Browning	Business Conditions, Labor, and International
	Finance
Richard A. Koss	Econometrics and Forecasting
Timothy H. Quinn	Regulated Industries
Barbara A. Smith	Business Conditions and International Finance
Paul C. Westcott	Agriculture and Prices
Benjamin Zycher	Regulated Industries, Monetary Policy, and
	Energy

Frances M. James, Senior Staff Statistician, is in charge of the Statistical Office and manages the Council's economic and statistical information system. In addition to supervising the publication of *Economic Indicators* she directs the fact checking of memoranda, testimony, and speeches presented by Council Members and staff. Catherine H. Furlong, Dorothy Bagovich, and Natalie Rentfro assist Miss James in carrying out these tasks and in the preparation of the tables and charts accompanying the *Economic Report*.

During the summer James R. Golden (U.S. Military Academy) was a

member of the senior staff, and Robert S. Stillman (University of California, Los Angeles) served on the junior staff. Rudiger Dornbusch (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), George M. von Furstenberg (Indiana University), Stephen M. Goldfeld (Princeton University), R. Jeffery Green (Indiana University), Allan G. Pulsipher (Southern Illinois University), and Milton Russell (Resources for the Future, Washington), served as consultants to the Council. Students providing assistance were Susan Benedict (Allegheny College) and Teri F. Liebowitz (Boston University).

In preparing the *Economic Report* the Council relied upon the editorial assistance of Rosannah C. Steinhoff. Also called on for special assistance in connection with the *Report* were Dorothy L. Reid, a former member of the Council staff, Elizabeth A. Kaminski of the Administrative Office, and Earnestine Reid of the Statistical Office.

SUPPORTING STAFF

The Administrative Office provides administrative support for the entire Council staff. Its work includes preparing and analyzing the Council's budget, procuring equipment and supplies, responding to letters and inquiries from the general public, and distributing the Council's speeches, reports, and congressional testimony. In 1976 the Administrative Office consisted of Nancy F. Skidmore, Administrative Officer, and Elizabeth A. Kaminski. The duplicating, mail, and messenger department was operated by James W. Gatling and Frank C. Norman.

Serving on the secretarial staff for the Chairman and Council Members during 1976 were Margaret A. Bocek, Patricia A. Lee, and Alice H. Williams. Secretaries for the professional staff were M. Catherine Fibich, Dorothy L. Green, Bessie M. Lafakis, Joyce A. Pilkerton, Earnestine Reid, Linda A. Reilly, Margaret L. Snyder, and Lillie M. Sturniolo.

DEPARTURES

The Council's professional staff members are drawn primarily from universities and research institutions. Senior staff economists who resigned during the year, and their new institutions and affiliations, were John D. Darroch (Department of Commerce), George M. von Furstenberg (Indiana University), R. Jeffery Green (Indiana University), David L. McNicol (California Institute of Technology), June A. O'Neill (Congressional Budget Office), Frederick M. Peterson (Rinfret Associates, New York), Milton Russell (Resources for the Future, Washington), and John L. Scadding (University of Toronto). Rosemary Quintano, staff economist, resigned to accept a position with the Brookings Institution, Washington.

Junior economists who resigned in 1976 were David W. Brazell (University of Wisconsin), David B. Crary (National Bureau of Economic Research, Washington), James W. Moser (University of California, Los Angeles), Joan M. Porter (Rice University), Valerie Sarris (Yale University), and J. W. Henry Watson (University of California, Los Angeles). Others who resigned during the year were Jerry W. Gatling, messenger, and Anne V. Jackson, secretary.

Appendix B

STATISTICAL TABLES RELATING TO INCOME, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTION



CONTENTS

B-2. Gross national product in 1972 dollars, 1929-76. B-3. Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-76. B-4. Implicit price deflators and alternative price measures of gross national product and gross domestic product, 1929-76. B-5. Gross national product by industry in 1972 dollars, 1947-75. B-6. Gross national product by major type of product in 1972 dollars, 1929-76. B-7. Gross national product by major type of product in 1972 dollars, 1929-76. B-8. Gross national product: Receipts and expenditures by major economic groups, 1929-76. B-9. Gross national product by sector, 1929-76. B-10. Gross national product by sector in 1972 dollars, 1929-76. B-11. Gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporate business, 1949-76. B-12. Output, costs, and profits of nonfinancial corporate business, 1948-76. B-13. Personal consumption expenditures, 1929-76. B-14. Gross private domestic investment, 1929-76. B-15. Inventories and final sales of business, 1946-76. B-16. Inventories and final sales of business, 1946-76. B-17. Relation of gross national product and national income, 1929-76. B-18. Relation of pross national product and national income, 1929-76. B-19. National income by type of income, 1929-76. B-20. Sources of personal income, 1929-76. B-21. Disposition of personal income, 1929-76. B-22. Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures in current and 1972 dollars, 1929-76. B-23. Gross saving and investment, 1929-76. B-24. Saving by individuals, 1946-76. B-25. Number and money income (in 1975 dollars) of families and unrelated individuals, by race of head, 1947-75. B-26. Population by age groups, 1929-76. B-27. Noninstitutional population and the labor force, 1929-76. B-28. Civilian employment rates, 1948-76. B-29. Selected unemployment production, 1947-76. B-29. Selected unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1946-76. B-31. Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1946-76. B-34. Average weekly earnings in selected	NATION	AL INCOME OR EXPENDITURE:	Page
B-2. Gross national product in 1972 dollars, 1929-76. B-3. Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-76. B-4. Implicit price deflators and alternative price measures of gross national product and gross domestic product, 1929-76. B-5. Gross national product by industry in 1972 dollars, 1947-75. B-6. Gross national product by major type of product in 1972 dollars, 1929-76. B-7. Gross national product: Receipts and expenditures by major economic groups, 1929-76. B-8. Gross national product by sector, 1929-76. B-9. Gross national product by sector in 1972 dollars, 1929-76. B-10. Gross domestic product by sector in 1972 dollars, 1929-76. B-11. Gross domestic product by sector in 1972 dollars, 1929-76. B-12. Output, costs, and profits of nonfinancial corporate business, 1948-76. B-13. Personal consumption expenditures, 1929-76. B-14. Gross private domestic investment, 1929-76. B-15. Inventories and final sales of business, 1946-76. B-16. Inventories and final sales of business, 1946-76. B-17. Relation of gross national product and national income, 1929-76. B-18. Relation of pross national product and national income, 1929-76. B-20. Sources of personal income, 1929-76. B-21. Disposition of personal income, 1929-76. B-22. Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures in current and 1972 dollars, 1929-76. B-23. Gross saving and investment, 1929-76. B-24. Saving by individuals, 1946-76. B-25. Number and money income (in 1975 dollars) of families and unrelated individuals, by race of head, 1947-75. B-26. Population by age groups, 1929-76. B-28. Civilian employment rates, 1948-76. B-29. Selected unemployment parts, 1948-76. B-29. Selected unemployment parts, 1948-76. B-29. Selected unemployment parts, 1948-76. B-31. Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1946-76. B-32. Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-76. B-34. Average weekly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-76. B-35. C	B-1.	Gross national product, 1929-76	187
B-4. Implicit price deflators and alternative price measures of gross national product and gross domestic product, 1929-76	B-2.	Gross national product in 1972 dollars, 1929-76	188
national product and gross domestic product, 1929–76	B-3.	Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-76	190
B-5. Gross national product by industry in 1972 dollars, 1947-75	B-4.	Implicit price deflators and alternative price measures of gross	
B-6. Gross national product by major type of product, 1929-76		national product and gross domestic product, 1929-76	192
B-7. Gross national product by major type of product in 1972 dollars, 1929-76	B-5.	Gross national product by industry in 1972 dollars, 1947-75	193
B-8. Gross national product: Receipts and expenditures by major economic groups, 1929–76	B-6.	Gross national product by major type of product, 1929-76	194
nomic groups, 1929–76. 196 B-9. Gross national product by sector, 1929–76. 198 B-10. Gross national product by sector in 1972 dollars, 1929–76. 200 B-11. Gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporate business, 1929–76. 200 B-12. Output, costs, and profits of nonfinancial corporate business, 1948–76. 201 B-13. Personal consumption expenditures, 1929–76. 202 B-14. Gross private domestic investment, 1929–76. 203 B-15. Inventories and final sales of business, 1946–76. 203 B-16. Inventories and final sales of business in 1972 dollars, 1947–76. 205 B-17. Relation of gross national product and national income, 1929–76. 205 B-18. Relation of national income and personal income, 1929–76. 207 B-19. National income by type of income, 1929–76. 207 B-20. Sources of personal income, 1929–76. 207 B-21. Disposition of personal income, 1929–76. 212 B-22. Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures in current and 1972 dollars, 1929–76. 213 B-23. Gross saving and investment, 1929–76. 214 B-24. Saving by individuals, 1946–76. 215 B-25. Number and money income (in 1975 dollars) of families and unrelated individuals, by race of head, 1947–75. 216 B-26. Population by age groups, 1929–76. 217 B-27. Noninstitutional population and the labor force, 1929–76. 218 B-28. Civilian employment and unemployment by sex and age, 1947–76. 226 B-29. Selected unemployment rates, 1948–76. 227 B-30. Unemployment by duration, 1947–76. 222 B-31. Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1946–76. 222 B-32. Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929–76. 224 B-34. Average weekly hours and hourly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947–76. 226 B-35. Productivity and related data, private business economy, 1947–76. 226 B-36. Changes in productivity and related data, private business economy,	В-7.		195
B-10. Gross national product by sector in 1972 dollars, 1929-76	В-8.		196
B-10. Gross national product by sector in 1972 dollars, 1929-76	B-9 .	Gross national product by sector, 1929-76	198
B-11. Gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporate business, 1929-76. B-12. Output, costs, and profits of nonfinancial corporate business, 1948-76. B-13. Personal consumption expenditures, 1929-76. B-14. Gross private domestic investment, 1929-76. B-15. Inventories and final sales of business, 1946-76. B-16. Inventories and final sales of business in 1972 dollars, 1947-76. B-17. Relation of gross national product and national income, 1929-76. B-18. Relation of national income and personal income, 1929-76. B-20. Sources of personal income, 1929-76. B-21. Disposition of personal income, 1929-76. B-22. Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures in current and 1972 dollars, 1929-76. B-23. Gross saving and investment, 1929-76. B-24. Saving by individuals, 1946-76. B-25. Number and money income (in 1975 dollars) of families and unrelated individuals, by race of head, 1947-75. B-26. Population by age groups, 1929-76. B-27. Noninstitutional population and the labor force, 1929-76. B-28. Givilian employment and unemployment by sex and age, 1947-76. B-29. Selected unemployment rates, 1948-76. B-30. Unemployment by duration, 1947-76. B-31. Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1946-76. B-32. Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-76. B-34. Average weekly hours and hourly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-76. B-35. Productivity and related data, private business economy, 1947-76. B-36. Changes in productivity and related data, private business economy,	B-10.		199
B-13. Personal consumption expenditures, 1929-76			200
B-13. Personal consumption expenditures, 1929-76	B-12.	Output, costs, and profits of nonfinancial corporate business, 1948-76.	201
B-15. Inventories and final sales of business, 1946-76			202
B-16. Inventories and final sales of business in 1972 dollars, 1947-76	B-14.	Gross private domestic investment, 1929-76	203
B-17. Relation of gross national product and national income, 1929-76	B-15.	Inventories and final sales of business, 1946-76	204
B-18. Relation of national income and personal income, 1929-76	B-16.	Inventories and final sales of business in 1972 dollars, 1947-76	205
B-19. National income by type of income, 1929-76	B-17.	Relation of gross national product and national income, 1929-76	206
B-20. Sources of personal income, 1929-76. 210 B-21. Disposition of personal income, 1929-76 212 B-22. Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures in current and 1972 dollars, 1929-76 213 B-23. Gross saving and investment, 1929-76 214 B-24. Saving by individuals, 1946-76 215 B-25. Number and money income (in 1975 dollars) of families and unrelated individuals, by race of head, 1947-75 216 POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND PRODUCTIVITY: B-26. Population by age groups, 1929-76 217 B-27. Noninstitutional population and the labor force, 1929-76 218 B-28. Civilian employment and unemployment by sex and age, 1947-76 220 B-29. Selected unemployment rates, 1948-76 221 B-30. Unemployment by duration, 1947-76 222 B-31. Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1946-76 223 B-32. Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-76. 224 B-33. Average weekly hours and hourly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-76 226 B-34. Average weekly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-76 227 B-35. Productivity and related data, private business economy, 1947-76 228 B-36. Changes in productivity and related data, private business economy,			207
B-21. Disposition of personal income, 1929-76 B-22. Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures in current and 1972 dollars, 1929-76			208
B-22. Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures in current and 1972 dollars, 1929-76	B-20.	Sources of personal income, 1929–76	210
sumption expenditures in current and 1972 dollars, 1929–76			212
B-23. Gross saving and investment, 1929-76	B-22.		
B-24. Saving by individuals, 1946-76			
B-25. Number and money income (in 1975 dollars) of families and unrelated individuals, by race of head, 1947-75		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
individuals, by race of head, 1947–75			215
POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND PRODUCTIVITY: B-26. Population by age groups, 1929-76	B -25.		
B-26. Population by age groups, 1929-76		individuals, by race of head, 1947–75	216
B-27. Noninstitutional population and the labor force, 1929-76			
B-28. Civilian employment and unemployment by sex and age, 1947-76. B-29. Selected unemployment rates, 1948-76. B-30. Unemployment by duration, 1947-76. B-31. Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1946-76. B-32. Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-76. B-33. Average weekly hours and hourly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-76. B-34. Average weekly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-76. B-35. Productivity and related data, private business economy, 1947-76. 226 B-36. Changes in productivity and related data, private business economy,			
B-29. Selected unemployment rates, 1948-76			
B-30. Unemployment by duration, 1947-76			
B-31. Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1946-76			
B-32. Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-76. B-33. Average weekly hours and hourly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-76. B-34. Average weekly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-76. 226 B-35. Productivity and related data, private business economy, 1947-76. 227 B-36. Changes in productivity and related data, private business economy,			
B-33. Average weekly hours and hourly earnings in selected private non-agricultural industries, 1947-76			
agricultural industries, 1947-76			224
B-34. Average weekly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-76	В-33.		000
tries, 1947-76	7. 0.		226
B-35. Productivity and related data, private business economy, 1947-76 228 B-36. Changes in productivity and related data, private business economy,	В-34.		007
B-36. Changes in productivity and related data, private business economy,	P 05		
			228
	B-36.	Changes in productivity and related data, private business economy, 1948–76	229

PRODUCTION AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY:	Page
B-37. Industrial production indexes, major industry divisions, 1929-76	. 230
B-38. Industrial production indexes, market groupings, 1947-76	
B-39. Industrial production indexes, selected manufactures, 1947-76	
B-40. Capacity utilization rate in manufacturing, 1948-76	
B-41. New construction activity, 1929-76	
B-42. New housing units started and authorized, 1959-76	
B-43. Business expenditures for new plant and equipment, 1947-77	
B-44. Sales and inventories in manufacturing and trade, 1947-76	
B-45. Manufacturers' shipments and inventories, 1947-76	
B-46. Manufacturers' new and unfilled orders, 1947-76	
PRICES:	. 241
B-47. Consumer price indexes by expenditure classes, 1929-76	
B-48. Consumer price indexes by commodity and service groups, 1939-76	
B-49. Consumer price indexes, selected commodities and services, 1939-76	
B-50. Consumer price indexes, for commodity groups, seasonally adjusted	
1973–76	
B-51. Consumer price indexes for service groups and selected expenditure	
classes, seasonally adjusted, 1973–76	
B-52. Percent changes in consumer price indexes, major groups, 1948-76.	
B-53. Wholesale price indexes by major commodity groups, 1929-76	
B-54. Wholesale price indexes by stage of processing and by special group) -
ings, 1947–76	
B-55. Wholesale price indexes for selected groupings, seasonally adjusted	d,
1973–76	. 25
B-56. Percent changes in wholesale price indexes, major groups, 1948-76.	. 252
MONEY STOCK, CREDIT, AND FINANCE:	
•	055
B-57. Money stock measures, 1947-76	
B-58. Commercial bank loans and investments, 1930-76	
B-59. Private liquid asset holdings, nonfinancial investors, 1959-76	
B-60. Total funds raised in credit markets by nonfinancial sectors, 1968-76	
B-61. Federal Reserve Bank credit and member bank reserves, 1929-76	
B-62. Aggregate reserves and member bank deposits, 1959-76	
B-63. Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-76	
B-64. Instalment credit extensions and liquidations, 1971-76	
B-65. Mortgage debt outstanding by type of property and of financing	
1939–76	
B-66. Mortgage debt outstanding by holder, 1939-76	
B-67. Net public and private debt, 1929-75	. 265
GOVERNMENT FINANCE:	
B-68. Federal budget receipts, outlays, and debt, fiscal years 1968-78	. 266
B-69. Federal budget receipts and outlays, fiscal years 1929-78	
B-70. Relation of the Federal budget to the Federal sector of the national	
income and product accounts, fiscal years 1976-78	
B-71. Receipts and expenditures of the government sector of the national	
income and product accounts, 1929–76	
B-72. Receipts and expenditures of the Federal Government sector of the	
national income and product accounts, 1949–78	
B-73. Receipts and expenditures of the State and local government sector of	
the national income and product accounts, 1946-76	
B-74. State and local government revenues and expenditures, selected fisca	
years, 1927-75	
B-75. Interest-bearing public debt by kind of obligation, 1967-76	. 274

	Page
B-76. Estimated ownership of public debt securities, 1967-76	275
B-77. Average length and maturity distribution of marketable interest-	
bearing public debt held by private investors, 1967-76	276
CORPORATE PROFITS AND FINANCE:	
B-78. Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption	
adjustments, 1946–76	277
B-79. Corporate profits by industry, 1929-76	278
B-80. Corporate profits of manufacturing industries, 1929-76	280
B-81. Sales, profits, and stockholders' equity, all manufacturing corporations, 1947-76	282
B-82. Relation of profits after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, all manufacturing corporations, 1947-76	283
B-83. Relation of profits after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, all	-00
manufacturing corporations, by industry group, 1975-76 B-84. Sources and uses of funds, nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business,	284
1946-76	285
B-85. Current assets and liabilities of U.S. corporations, 1939-76	286
B-86. State and municipal and corporate securities offered, 1934-76	287
B-87. Common stock prices and yields, 1949-76	288
B-88. Business formation and business failures, 1929-76	289
AGRICULTURE:	
B-89. Income of farm people and farmers, 1929-76	290
B-90. Farm production indexes, 1929-76	291
B-91. Farm population, employment, and productivity, 1929-76	292
B-92. Indexes of prices received and prices paid by farmers and selected farm	
resource prices, 1929-76	293
B-93. Selected measures of farm resources and inputs, 1929-76	294
B-94. Comparative balance sheet of the farming sector, 1929-77	295
INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS:	
B-95. U.S. international transactions, 1946-76	296
B-96. U.S. merchandise exports and imports by commodity groups,	298
B-97. U.S. merchandise exports and imports by area, 1970-76	299
B-98. U.S. overseas loans and grants, by type and area, fiscal years, 1962-75.	300
B-99. International reserves, 195?, 1962, and 1972-76	301
B-100. U.S. reserve assets, 1946-76	302
B-101. International investment position of the United States at year-end,	303
B-102. Price changes in international trade, 1968-76	304
B-103. Consumer price indexes in the United States and other major indus-	
trial countries, 1955-76	305

General Notes

Detail in these tables may not add to totals because of rounding. Unless otherwise noted, all dollar figures are in current dollars.

Symbols used:

- ▶ Preliminary.
- __ Not available (also, not applicable).



NATIONAL INCOME OR EXPENDITURE

TABLE B-1.—Gross national product, 1929-76

[Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Net exports of goods Gov and services				Government purchases of goods and services						
Year or quarter	Gross national product	sonal con- sump- tion ex- pend- itures	Gross private do- mestic invest- ment	Net exports	Ex- ports	Im- ports	Total	Total	Na- tional de- fense 1	Non- defense	State and local	change from pre- ceding period, gross na- tional pro- duct ²
1929	103.4	77.3	16. 2	1.1	7.0	5.9	8.8	1, 4			7.4	
1933	55.8	45. 8	1. 4	. 4	2.4	2.0	8.2	2.1			6.1	-4.2
1939	90.8	67.0	9. 3	1.1	4.4	3. 4	13.5	5. 2	1.2	3. 9	8.3	6.9
1940	100. 0 124. 9 158. 3 192. 0 210. 5 212. 3 209. 6 232. 8 259. 1 258. 0	71. 0 80. 8 88. 6 99. 4 108. 2 119. 5 143. 8 161. 7 174. 7	13. 1 17. 9 9. 9 5. 8 7. 2 10. 6 30. 7 34. 0 45. 9 35. 3	1.7 1.3 -2.0 -1.8 6 7.6 11.6 6.5 6.2	5. 4 5. 9 4. 8 4. 4 5. 3 7. 2 14. 8 19. 8 16. 9 15. 9	3.6 4.6 4.8 6.5 7.1 7.8 7.2 8.2 10.4 9.6	14, 2 24, 9 59, 8 88, 9 97, 0 82, 8 27, 5 25, 5 32, 0 38, 4	6. 1 16. 9 52. 0 81. 3 89. 4 74. 6 17. 6 12. 7 16. 7 20. 4	2. 2 13. 7 49. 4 79. 7 87. 4 73. 5 14. 8 9. 0 10. 7 13. 2	3.9 3.2 2.6 1.6 2.0 1.1 2.8 3.7 6.0 7.2	8. 1 8. 0 7. 8 7. 5 7. 6 8. 2 9. 9 12. 8 15. 3 18. 0	10. 1 24. 9 26. 8 21. 3 9. 6 . 9 -1. 3 11. 1 11. 3 4
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959		192. 0 207. 1 217. 1 229. 7 235. 8 253. 7 266. 0 280. 4 289. 5 310. 8	52. 1 53. 3 52. 7 68. 4 71. 0 69. 2 61. 9	1. 9 3. 8 2. 4 . 6 2. 0 2. 2 4. 3 6. 1 2. 5	13. 9 18. 9 18. 2 17. 1 18. 0 20. 0 23. 9 26. 7 23. 3 23. 7	12. 0 15. 1 15. 8 16. 6 16. 0 17. 8 19. 6 20. 7 20. 8 23. 2	38. 5 60. 1 75. 6 82. 5 75. 8 75. 0 79. 4 87. 1 95. 0 97. 6	18. 7 38. 3 52. 4 57. 5 47. 9 44. 5 45. 9 50. 0 53. 9	14. 0 33. 5 45. 8 48. 6 41. 1 38. 4 40. 2 44. 0 45. 6	4. 7 4. 8 6. 5 8. 9 6. 8 6. 0 5. 7 5. 9 8. 3 8. 3	19. 8 21. 8 23. 2 25. 0 27. 8 30. 6 33. 5 37. 1 41. 1 43. 7	10. 9 15. 4 5. 1 5. 5 9. 0 5. 4 5. 2 1. 4
1960	506. 0 523. 3 563. 8 594. 7	324. 9 335. 0 355. 2 374. 6 400. 4 430. 2 464. 8 490. 4 535. 9	74.3 85.2 90.2 96.6 112.0 124.5 120.8 131.5	4. 4 5. 8 5. 4 6. 3 8. 9 7. 6 5. 1 4. 9 2. 3 1. 8	27. 6 28. 9 30. 6 32. 7 37. 4 39. 5 42. 8 45. 6 49. 9 54. 7	23. 2 23. 1 25. 2 26. 4 28. 4 32. 0 37. 7 40. 6 47. 7 52. 9	100. 3 108. 2 118. 0 123. 7 129. 8 138. 4 158. 7 180. 2 198. 7 207. 9	53. 7 57. 4 63. 7 64. 6 65. 2 67. 3 78. 8 90. 9 98. 0 97. 5	44. 5 47. 0 51. 1 50. 3 49. 0 49. 4 60. 3 71. 5 76. 9 76. 3	9. 3 10. 4 12. 7 14. 3 16. 2 17. 8 18. 5 19. 5 21. 2	46. 5 50. 8 54. 3 59. 0 64. 6 71. 1 79. 8 89. 3 100. 7 110. 4	4. 0 3. 4 7. 7 5. 5 6. 9 8. 2 9. 4 5. 8 9. 1 7. 7
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	982. 4 1, 063. 4 1, 171. 1 1, 306. 6 1, 413. 2	618.8 668.7 733.0 809.9 887.1	2 160. 0 188. 3 220. 0	3.9 1.6 -3.3 7.1 7.5	62. 5 65. 6 72. 7 101. 6 144. 4	58. 5 64. 0 75. 9 94. 4 136. 9	218. 9 233. 7 253. 1 269. 5 303. 3	95. 6 96. 2 102. 1 102. 2 111. 6	73. 5 73. 5	22. 1 26. 0 28. 6 28. 7 34. 3	123. 2 137. 5 151. 0 167. 3 191. 6	5. 0 8. 2 10. 1 11. 6 8. 2
1975 1976 p		973. 2 1, 078. 0	183.7 241.2	20. 5 6. 9	148. 1 161. 9	127.6 155.1	339. 0 365. 8	124. 4 133. 4	84. 3 88. 2	40. 1 45. 2	214. 5 232. 3	7.3 11.6
1974: 1 II III IV	1, 372. 7 1, 399. 4	853. 878. 906. 911.	7 218.8 8 213.3	15. 0 3. 9 2. 9 8. 1	133. 2 142. 2 148. 4 153. 8	118. 2 138. 3 145. 5 145. 7	288. 0 298. 0 308. 6 318. 5	106. 1 108. 9 113. 5 118. 1	75.9 78.2	33. 0 35. 3	181. 9 189. 1 195. 1 200, 4	5. 3 8. 0 9. 5 5. 0
1975: V	. 1, 548. 7	933. 960. 987. 1, 012.	3 164.4	15. 0 24. 4 21. 4 21. 0	147. 5 142. 9 148. 2 153. 7	132. 5 118. 5 126. 8 132. 7	325. 6 333. 2 343. 2 353. 8	120. 3 122. 4 124. 6 130. 4	83. 4 84. 6	39. 0 40. 0	205. 3 210. 9 218. 6 223. 4	8 10. 4 19. 1 10. 6
1976: 1 11 11 1V p	. 1, 6/5. 2	1, 088.	7 239.2 5 247.0	4.7	154. 1 160. 3 167. 7 165. 6	145. 7 151. 0 163. 0 160. 4	354. 7 362. 0 369. 6 376. 8	129. 2 131. 2 134. 5 138. 9	86. 9 88. 5	44. 2 46. 0	225. 5 230. 9 235. 0 238. 0	12. 6 9. 9 8. 5 9. 4

¹ This category corresponds closely to the national defense classification in "The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1978."
² Changes are based on unrounded data and therefore may differ slightly from those obtained from data shown here.

Table B-2.—Gross national product in 1972 dollars, 1929-76 [Billions of 1972 dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Persona	l consump	otion expe	nditures	Gr	oss privat	e domestic	investme	ent	
	Gross						Fixed investment				
Year or quarter	national product	Total	Durable goods	Non- durable goods	Services	Total	Total	Total	Struc- tures	Pro- ducers' durable equip- ment	
1929	314. 7	215. 6	21.5	98. 1	96. 1	55. 9	51.3	37. 0	20. 6	16.	
933	222, 1	170. 7	10.9	82.9	76.8	8. 4	13, 3	10. 4	4. 9	5.	
939	319. 7	220. 3	19. 1	115. 1	86. 1	33. 6	32.0	20. 7	8. 6	12,	
940 941 942 943 944 945 945 947 947 948	343. 6 396. 6 454. 6 527. 3 567. 0 477. 0 468. 3 487. 7 490. 7	230. 4 244. 1 241. 7 248. 7 255. 7 271. 4 301. 4 306. 2 312. 8 320. 0	21. 8 24. 7 16. 3 14. 5 13. 5 14. 8 25. 8 30. 6 33. 1 36. 3	119. 9 127. 6 129. 9 134. 0 139. 4 150. 3 158. 9 154. 8 155. 0 157. 4	88. 7 91. 8 95. 5 100. 1 102. 7 106. 3 116. 7 120. 8 124. 6	44. 6 55. 8 29. 6 18. 1 19. 8 27. 8 71. 0 70. 1 82. 3 65. 6	38. 4 43. 8 24. 4 18. 0 22. 1 31. 4 58. 8 70. 4 76. 8	25. 7 30. 3 17. 6 14. 0 18. 7 27. 6 42. 0 48. 9 51. 0 46. 0	9. 9 11. 9 6. 7 4. 2 5. 5 8. 3 18. 8 17. 3 18. 4 17. 8	15. 18. 10. 9. 13. 19. 23. 31. 32. 28.	
1950	533. 5 576. 5 598. 5 621. 8 613. 7 654. 8 668. 8 680. 9 679. 5 720. 4	338. 1 342. 3 350. 9 364. 2 370. 9 395. 1 406. 3 414. 7 419. 0 441. 5	43. 4 39. 9 38. 9 43. 1 43. 5 52. 2 49. 8 49. 7 46. 4 51. 8	161. 8 165. 3 171. 2 175. 7 177. 0 185. 4 191. 6 194. 9 196. 8 205. 0	132. 8 137. 1 140. 8 145. 5 150. 4 157. 5 164. 9 170. 2 175. 8 184. 7	93. 7 94. 1 83. 2 85. 6 83. 4 104. 1 102. 9 97. 2 87. 7 107. 4	83, 2 80, 4 78, 9 84, 1 85, 6 96, 3 97, 1 95, 7 89, 6 101, 0	50. 0 52. 9 52. 1 56. 3 55. 4 61. 2 65. 2 66. 0 58. 9	19. 1 20. 6 20. 6 22. 5 23. 5 25. 3 28. 1 28. 1 26. 4 26. 8	30. 32. 31. 33. 31. 35. 37. 37. 37. 36.	
1960	736. 8 755. 3 799. 1 830. 7 874. 4 925. 9 981. 0 1,007. 7 1,051. 8 1,078. 8	453. 0 462. 2 482. 9 501. 4 528. 7 558. 1 586. 1 603. 2 633. 4 655. 4	52. 5 50. 3 55. 7 60. 7 73. 4 79. 0 79. 7 88. 2 91. 9	208. 2 211. 9 218. 5 223. 0 233. 3 244. 0 255. 5 259. 5 270. 2 276. 4	192. 3 200. 0 208. 7 217. 6 229. 7 240. 7 251. 6 264. 0 275. 0 287. 2	105. 4 103. 6 117. 4 124. 5 132. 1 150. 1 161. 3 152. 7 159. 5 168. 0	101. 0 100. 7 109. 3 116. 8 124. 8 138. 8 144. 6 140. 7 150. 8 157. 5	66. 0 65. 6 70. 9 73. 5 81. 0 95. 6 106. 1 103. 5 108. 0 114. 3	28. 8 29. 3 30. 8 30. 8 33. 3 39. 6 42. 5 41. 1 42. 0 44. 0	37. 36. 40. 42. 47. 56. 63. 62. 66. 70.	
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	1,075.3 1,107.5 1,171.1 1,235.0 1,214.0 1,191.7 1,265.0	668. 9 691. 9 733. 0 767. 7 759. 1 770. 3 812. 9	88. 9 98. 1 111. 2 121. 8 112. 3 111. 9 125. 7	282. 7 287. 5 299. 3 309. 3 303. 5 306. 1 319. 1	297. 3 306. 3 322. 4 336. 5 343. 4 352. 4 368. 1	154. 7 166. 8 188. 3 207. 2 182. 0 137. 8 171. 9	150. 4 160. 2 178. 8 190. 7 173. 5 149. 8 162. 8	110. 0 108. 0 116. 8 131. 0 128. 5 111. 4 115. 7	42. 8 41. 7 42. 5 45. 5 42. 1 36. 7 38. 1	67. 66. 74. 85. 86. 74. 77.	
1974: I II III IV		761. 8 761. 9 764. 7 748. 1	114, 9 115, 0 116, 1 103, 1	305. 1 304. 0 304. 9 299. 8	341. 8 342. 9 343. 7 345. 1	194. 8 187. 9 176. 2 169. 1	183. 4 178. 5 171. 1 161. 1	133. 5 131. 6 127. 3 121. 8	44. 6 43. 5 40. 3 39. 8	88. 88. 86. 82.	
1975: I II III IV		754. 6 767. 5 775. 3 783. 9	106. 0 108. 4 115. 1 118. 0	300. 6 307. 2 306. 8 309. 5	348. 0 351. 8 353. 4 356. 4	129. 3 126. 2 148. 7 147. 0	149. 8 147. 4 149. 7 152. 5	114, 4 110, 6 110, 1 110, 5	37. 5 36. 1 36. 6 36. 7	76. 74. 73. 73.	
1976: 	1, 246. 3 1, 260. 0 1, 272. 2 1, 281. 5	800. 7 808. 6 815. 7 826. 6	124. 3 125. 2 126. 2 127. 0	314. 6 317. 6 318. 9 325. 5	361. 8 365. 8 370. 6 374. 2	167. 1 171. 7 175. 2 173. 7	156, 7 160, 6 165, 0 169, 1	112.6 114.9 117.5 117.8	37. 1 37. 9 38. 4 39. 0	75. 77. 79. 78.	

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE B-2.—Gross national product in 1972 dollars, 1929-76—Continued [Billions of 1972 dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Gross p investr	orivate de nent—co	mestic ntinued		Net ex	ports of d service	goods es	Govern of good			
Year or	Fixed	investme Resid	nt—conti	inued	Change							Percent change from pre-
quarter	Total	Non- farm struc- tures	Farm struc- tures	Pro- duc- ers' dur- able equip- ment	in busi- ness inven- tories	Net ex- ports	Ex- ports	Im- ports	Total	Fed- eral	State and local	ceding period, gross national product ¹
1929	14.3	13.6	0.6	0.1	4.6	2. 2	15. 6	13. 4	40. 9	6.9	33. 9	
1933	2.9	2.6	. 2	.1	-4.9	.2	9, 4	9.3	42.8	10.8	32.0	-2.1
1939	11.3	10.6	.6	.1	1.6	2.0	13. 3	11.4	63.8	22.6	41.2	7.6
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	12. 8 13. 5 6. 8 4. 0 3. 4 3. 8 16. 8 21. 5 25. 8 24. 0	11. 8 12. 5 6. 1 3. 5 3. 0 3. 5 15. 5 19. 8 23. 9 22. 3	.8 .9 .6 .4 .3 1.1 1.3 1.5	.1 .0 .0 .1 .2 .3 .3 .3	6.2 12.0 5.2 .1 -2.3 -3.6 12.2 2 5.5 -4.4	3.0 -2.5 -7.3 -7.2 -4.5 11.6 8.5 8.8	14. 6 14. 7 10. 3 9. 0 10. 0 13. 5 26. 1 30. 2 24. 2	11. 5 14. 0 12. 8 16. 3 17. 3 18. 0 14. 6 13. 6 15. 7	65. 5 95. 9 185. 8 267. 9 298. 8 264. 3 93. 1 75. 4 84. 1 96. 2	26. 3 58. 6 151. 5 236. 3 268. 2 232. 7 58. 4 36. 1 42. 4 48. 9	39. 2 37. 3 34. 3 31. 6 30. 6 31. 6 34. 8 39. 3 41. 8 47. 4	7.5 15.4 14.6 16.0 7.5 -1.4 -14.7 -1.8 4.1
1950	27.5 26.8 27.8 30.2 35.1 31.9 29.7 30.6 38.1	31. 5 25. 9 25. 3 26. 3 28. 8 33. 8 30. 4 28. 3 29. 2 36. 5	1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 .9 1.0 1.0	.33 .33 .44 .45 .6	10.6 13.7 4.3 1.5 -2.2 7.7 5.8 1.5 -1.8 6.5	4. 0 7. 4 9. 0 4. 5 4. 7 7. 3 8. 9 3. 5	21. 7 25. 9 24. 9 23. 8 25. 3 27. 9 32. 3 34. 8 30. 7 31. 5	17. 7 18. 5 20. 0 21. 8 20. 8 23. 2 25. 0 26. 0 27. 2 30. 6	97. 7 132. 7 159. 5 170. 0 154. 9 150. 9 152. 4 160. 1 169. 3 170. 7	47. 0 81. 3 107. 0 114. 6 95. 2 86. 9 85. 9 89. 8 92. 8 91. 8	50. 7 51. 3 52. 5 55. 4 59. 7 64. 0 66. 5 70. 3 76. 4 78. 9	8.7 8.1 3.8 3.9 -1.3 6.7 2.1 1.8 2
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	35. 0 35. 1 38. 4 43. 2 43. 8 43. 2 38. 5 37. 2 42. 8 43. 2	33. 7 33. 6 36. 9 41. 7 42. 2 41. 6 36. 9 35. 5 41. 1 41. 5	.8 1.0 .9 .9 .9 .8 .9	.5 .6 .6 .7 .7 .8 .9	4. 4 2. 9 8. 1 7. 8 7. 3 11. 3 16. 7 12. 0 8. 7 10. 6	5. 5 6. 7 5. 8 7. 3 10. 9 8. 2 4. 3 3. 5 4 -1. 3	35. 8 37. 0 39. 6 42. 2 47. 8 49. 1 51. 6 54. 2 58. 5 62. 2	30. 3 30. 3 33. 9 35. 0 36. 9 41. 0 47. 3 50. 7 58. 9 63. 5	172. 9 182. 8 193. 1 197. 6 202. 7 209. 6 229. 3 248. 3 259. 2 256. 7	90. 8 95. 6 103. 1 102. 2 100. 6 100. 5 112. 5 125. 3 128. 3 121. 8	82. 0 87. 1 90. 0 95. 4 102. 1 109. 1 116. 8 123. 1 130. 9 134. 9	2. 3 2. 5 5. 8 4. 0 5. 3 5. 9 2. 7 4. 4 2. 6
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	40. 4 52. 2 62. 0 59. 7 45. 0 38. 4	38. 9 50. 5 60. 3 57. 9 42. 9 36. 6 45. 1	.6 .7 .7 .5 .8 .6	1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3	4. 3 6. 6 9. 4 16. 5 8. 5 -12. 0 9. 1	1. 4 6 -3. 3 7. 6 16. 5 22. 6 15. 9	67. 1 67. 9 72. 7 87. 4 97. 2 90. 6 95. 7	65. 7 68. 5 75. 9 79. 9 80. 7 68. 1 79. 8	250, 2 249, 4 253, 1 252, 5 256, 4 261, 0 264, 2	110. 7 103. 9 102. 1 96. 6 95. 3 95. 7 96. 7	139. 5 145. 5 151. 0 155. 9 161. 1 165. 2 167. 5	3 3.0 5.7 5.5 -1.7 -1.8 6.2
1974: I II IV	49. 9 47. 0 43. 9	47. 8 44. 9 41. 9 37. 1	.9 .7 .7 1.0	1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2	11. 4 9. 4 5. 1 8. 0	18. 4 14. 9 14. 9 17. 7	97. 8 98. 7 96. 4 95. 9	79. 4 83. 8 81. 5 78. 2	255. 4 256. 1 257. 1 256. 9	95. 3 94. 7 95. 8 95. 4	160. 1 161. 4 161. 3 161. 5	-3.9 -3.1 -2.6 -6.8
1975: I II III IV	39.6	34. 0 35. 2 37. 6 39. 7	.4 .4 .7 1.0	1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2	-20.5 -21.2 -1.0 -5.5	20. 1 24. 3 22. 8 23. 1	90. 3 87. 7 90. 7 93. 9	70. 2 63. 4 67. 9 70. 8	257. 1 259. 1 262. 4 265. 2	94. 8 95. 3 95. 6 97. 2	162. 2 163. 8 166. 9 168. 0	-9.9 5.6 11.4 3.3
1976: 	45.7	42. 0 43. 9 45. 5 49. 2	.9 .6 .7 .8	1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4	10. 4 11. 1 10. 2 4. 7	16.6 16.0 15.7 15.3	93. 6 95. 4 98. 0 95. 8	77. 0 79. 4 82. 3 80. 5	261. 9 263. 6 265. 5 265. 8	95. 4 96. 0 97. 3 98. 1	166. 6 167. 7 168. 2 167. 7	9. 2 4. 5 3. 9 3. 0

¹ Changes are based on unrounded data and therefore may differ slightly from those obtained from data shown here. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Table B-3.—Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-76 [Index numbers, 1972=100, except as noted; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]

						Gross (orivate dor	nestic inves	tment ¹		
		Perso	nal consum _l	otion expend	itures	Fixed investment					
Year or quarter	Gross national						Nonresidential				
	prod- uct ¹	Total	Dur- able goods	Non- durable goods	Serv- ices	Total	Total	Struc- tures	Pro- ducers' durable equip- ment		
1929	32. 87	35. 8	43. 1	38. 4	31.6	28. 2	28. 2	24. 1	33, 4		
1933	25. 13	26. 8	31. 7	26. 8	26. 1	22. 4	22.8	19.1	26. 2		
939	28. 40	30. 4	34.9	30.5	29. 2	27.6	28. 2	22.8	32.0		
940 941 942 943 944 945 945 946 947 948 949	29. 10 31. 49 34. 82 36. 41 37. 13 37. 99 43. 88 49. 70 53. 13 52. 59	30. 8 33. 1 36. 7 40. 0 42. 3 44. 0 47. 7 52. 8 55. 9	35. 7 39. 1 42. 1 45. 0 49. 5 53. 7 61. 1 66. 8 69. 1 69. 1	30. 9 33. 6 39. 1 43. 7 46. 2 47. 8 52. 1 58. 7 62. 3 60. 3	29. 5 30. 8 32. 4 34. 2 36. 1 37. 3 38. 9 41. 7 44. 4	28. 5 30. 6 33. 4 35. 6 36. 9 37. 1 41. 3 48. 9 53. 6 54. 8	29. 1 30. 9 33. 8 35. 7 36. 6 39. 9 46. 8 51. 3 52. 8	23. 1 24. 7 28. 1 32. 0 33. 6 36. 3 43. 7 48. 4 48. 0	32. 8 34. 9 37. 3 37. 3 38. 0 37. 9 42. 8 48. 5 52. 9 55. 9		
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1957	53. 64 57. 27 58. 00 58. 88 59. 69 60. 98 62. 90 65. 02 66. 06 67. 52	56. 8 60. 5 61. 9 63. 1 63. 6 64. 2 65. 5 67. 6 69. 1	70. 8 74. 7 74. 8 75. 5 73. 2 74. 0 76. 0 79. 2 79. 4 81. 9	60. 7 65. 8 66. 6 66. 3 67. 3 69. 4 71. 0 71. 4	47. 4 49. 9 52. 6 55. 4 57. 2 58. 2 60. 2 64. 2 66. 0	56. 5 60. 8 62. 1 62. 9 63. 4 64. 8 68. 3 70. 9 70. 8 71. 6	54. 3 58. 9 59. 9 61. 0 61. 4 62. 6 67. 0 70. 7 70. 6 72. 0	48. 8 54. 7 55. 8 56. 8 57. 0 61. 8 63. 3 63. 6	57. 6 61. 6 62. 5 63. 7 65. 4 66. 5 71. 0 76. 5 78. 2		
1960	68. 67 69. 28 70. 55 71. 59 72. 71 74. 32 76. 76 79. 02 82. 57 86. 72	71. 7 72. 5 73. 6 74. 7 75. 7 77. 1 79. 3 81. 3 84. 6 88. 5	82.1 82.7 83.9 84.8 85.7 85.6 85.7 87.4 90.7 93.1	72.6 73.3 73.9 74.9 75.8 77.3 80.1 81.9 85.3 89.4	68. 0 69. 1 70. 4 71. 7 72. 8 74. 3 76. 5 78. 8 82. 0 86. 1	71. 9 71. 6 72. 0 72. 1 72. 8 73. 8 76. 2 78. 7 82. 1 86. 9	72. 2 71. 8 72. 3 72. 9 73. 6 74. 5 76. 8 79. 3 82. 6 86. 6	63. 1 62. 7 63. 0 63. 5 64. 4 65. 9 68. 8 71. 8 75. 3 81. 1	79. 3 79. 2 79. 4 79. 6 80. 1 80. 6 82. 1 84. 3 90. 0		
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	91. 36 96. 02 100. 00 105. 80 116. 41 127. 25 133. 79	92. 5 96. 6 100. 0 105. 5 116. 9 126. 3 132. 7	95. 5 99. 0 100. 0 101. 6 108. 3 117. 7 124. 4	93. 6 96. 6 100. 0 107. 9 124. 0 133. 7 138. 0	90. 5 95. 8 100. 0 104. 7 113. 5 122. 7 130. 9	91. 1 95. 9 100. 0 106. 0 117. 7 132. 4 140. 3	91. 3 96. 4 100. 0 103. 8 116. 1 132. 1 138. 3	88. 0 94. 4 100. 0 107. 8 128. 7 141. 6 145. 5	93.4 97.6 100.0 101.7 110.0 127.4 134.7		
1974: I II III IV	111. 56 114. 64 118. 03 121. 60	112. 0 115. 3 118. 6 121. 8	103. 2 106. 5 110. 2 113. 8	118. 2 122. 3 125. 9 129. 6	109. 5 112. 1 114. 9 117. 4	111. 1 115. 3 120. 3 125. 2	108. 7 113. 2 118. 6 124. 7	117. 5 126. 0 134. 1 138. 6	104. 3 106. 9 111. 4 118. 0		
1975: I II III IV	124. 55 125. 93 128. 07 130. 27	123. 7 125. 1 127. 3 129. 1	115. 1 117. 1 118. 2 120. 2	131. 2 132. 1 135. 1 136. 2	119. 7 121. 5 123. 6 125. 9	129. 9 131. 9 132. 7 134. 9	129. 4 131. 8 132. 7 134. 5	141. 6 141. 5 141. 4 142. 0	123. 5 127. 1 128. 3 130. 8		
1976: I II III IV P	131. 29 132. 96 134. 40 136. 44	130. 3 131. 7 133. 4 135. 2	121. 8 123. 8 124. 9 127. 0	136. 4 136. 9 138. 5 139. 9	128. 0 129. 8 132. 0 133. 8	137. 0 139. 0 140. 6 142. 6	136. 2 137. 5 138. 7 140. 5	143. 3 145. 0 146. 1 147. 4	132.8 133.8 135.1 137.1		

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE B-3.—Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-76—Continued [Index numbers, 1972=100, except as noted; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]

	inve	oss priva estment i	-contin	ued	Exportimpo good: servi	rts of s and	Governi of good	ment pui ds and se	rchases ervices			change eceding od ²
Year or quarter		Resid	ential							Gross do- mestic		
	Total	Non- farm struc- tures	Farm struc- tures	Pro- ducers' dur- able equip- ment	Ex- ports	Im- ports	Totaí	Fed- eral	State and local	prod- uct	Gross national product deflator	Gross do- mestic product deflator
1929	28. 2	27. 8	28. 6	77.2	45. 0	43. 8	21.6	20. 7	21.8	32.8		
1933	20. 7	19.8	19.5	58.8	25. 5	22.1	19.3	19.6	19, 1	25. 2	-2.2	2.1
1939		26. 3	23. 4	61. 1	33. 3	29.6	21. 2	22. 9	20. 2	28. 4	7	7
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1946 1947 1948 1949	27. 4 29. 9 32. 4 34. 9 38. 1 40. 8 44. 6 53. 7 58. 1	27. 2 29. 7 31. 8 34. 3 37. 3 40. 0 43. 9 53. 0 57. 4 58. 1	23. 6 26. 6 30. 7 35. 7 40. 8 42. 9 46. 6 52. 8 57. 3 58. 0	59. 6 63. 8 71. 3 71. 4 75. 0 84. 6 95. 2 105. 6 111. 5 107. 9	36. 8 40. 2 46. 5 49. 2 52. 6 53. 6 56. 7 65. 8 69. 8 65. 5	31. 5 33. 2 37. 4 39. 6 41. 1 43. 6 49. 7 60. 7 66. 1 62. 7	21. 6 26. 0 32. 2 33. 2 32. 5 31. 3 29. 4 33. 8 38. 0 39. 9	23. 1 28. 9 34. 3 34. 4 33. 3 32. 1 29. 9 35. 1 39. 4 41. 8	20. 6 21. 4 22. 8 23. 8 24. 9 25. 9 28. 6 32. 5 36. 6 38. 0	29. 1 31. 5 34. 8 36. 4 37. 1 38. 0 43. 9 49. 7 53. 1 52. 6	2.5 8.2 10.6 4.6 2.0 2.3 15.7 13.1 6.9 -1.0	2. 5 8. 2 10. 6 4. 5 2. 0 2. 3 15. 6 13. 1 6. 9
1950 1951 1952 1953 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1957	60. 0 64. 4 66. 4 66. 9 67. 1 68. 7 70. 9 71. 3 71. 2 71. 0	59. 5 63. 8 65. 8 66. 3 66. 6 70. 5 70. 8 70. 7	59. 4 63. 8 65. 7 66. 2 66. 5 68. 3 70. 6 70. 9 70. 8	107. 4 114. 9 114. 6 114. 2 112. 4 109. 1 104. 3 103. 4 101. 9 101. 8	64.0 73.1 73.0 71.9 71.2 71.8 73.9 76.4 75.7 75.4	67.8 81.8 79.1 75.8 76.9 76.8 78.3 79.5 76.5 75.7	39. 4 45. 3 47. 4 48. 5 48. 9 49. 7 52. 1 54. 4 56. 1 57. 2	39. 9 47. 1 48. 9 50. 2 50. 4 51. 1 53. 4 55. 7 58. 1 58. 7	39. 0 42. 4 44. 2 45. 1 46. 6 47. 8 50. 4 52. 8 53. 8 55. 4	53.6 57.2 57.9 58.8 59.6 60.9 62.8 65.0 66.0 67.5	2.0 6.8 1.3 1.5 1.4 2.2 3.2 3.4 1.6 2.2	2. 0 6. 7 1. 3 1. 5 2. 2 3. 4 1. 6 2. 2
1960	71. 4 71. 3 71. 5 70. 9 71. 2 72. 3 74. 6 77. 0 80. 7 87. 7	70.9 70.9 71.1 70.5 70.8 72.0 74.2 76.7 80.4 87.5	71. 2 70. 7 71. 3 70. 7 71. 0 72. 3 74. 3 76. 7 80. 5 87. 5	100.8 99.1 96.8 95.3 94.3 92.1 90.8 91.0 93.2 95.2	77. 1 78. 0 77. 3 77. 5 78 3 80. 5 82. 8 84. 0 85. 3 87. 9	76. 7 76. 1 74. 5 75. 6 77. 1 78. 0 79. 7 80. 1 80. 9 83. 3	58. 0 59. 2 61. 1 62. 6 64. 0 66. 0 69. 2 72. 6 76. 7 81. 0	59. 1 60. 0 61. 8 63. 3 64. 8 67. 0 70. 1 72. 6 76. 4 80. 0	56. 8 58. 3 60. 3 61. 9 63. 3 65. 1 68. 4 72. 5 76. 9 81. 9	68.6 69.2 70.5 71.6 72.7 74.3 76.8 79.0 82.6 86.8	1.7 .9 1.8 1.5 1.6 2.2 3.3 2.9 4.5 5.0	1. 7 1. 9 1. 9 1. 9 2. 2 3. 3 4. 9 5. 1
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	90. 6 94. 9 100. 0 110. 8 122. 3 133. 2 143. 8	90. 4 94. 8 100. 0 111. 0 122. 8 133. 7 144. 4	90. 5 95. 0 100. 0 110. 7 122. 8 133. 6 143. 9	97. 5 99. 3 100. 0 100. 1 105. 3 116. 3 122. 4	93. 1 96. 6 100. 0 116. 2 148. 6 163. 4 169. 2	89. 1 93. 5 100. 0 118. 2 169. 6 187. 4 194. 3	87. 5 93. 7 100. 0 106. 7 118. 3 129. 9 138. 4	86. 4 92. 6 100. 0 105. 8 117. 1 130. 0 138. 0	88. 3 94. 5 100. 0 107. 3 119. 0 129. 8 138. 7	91. 4 96. 0 100. 0 105. 7 115. 9 126. 9 133. 4	5. 4 5. 1 4. 1 5. 8 10. 0 9. 3 5. 1	5. 3 5. 1 4. 1 5. 7 9. 6 9. 5
1974: 1 !I !II !V		118. 0 121. 6 125. 9 127. 2	117. 8 121. 2 125. 0 126. 6	101. 3 103. 3 106. 8 110. 6	136. 2 144. 1 154. 0 160. 4	148. 9 164. 9 178. 6 186. 3	112. 7 116. 4 120. 0 124. 0	111. 3 114. 9 118. 4 123. 8	113.6 117.2 121.0 124.1	111. 1 114. 1 117. 4 121. 0	9.5 11.5 12.4 12.7	8. 5 11. 3 12. 1 12. 8
1975: 1 V	131.5 132.1	132. 1 132. 7 133. 3 136. 4	130. 9 131. 6 132. 6 136. 2	113.6 115.6 117.0 118.8	163. 4 163. 0 163. 4 163. 7	188. 9 186. 9 186. 6 187. 3	126. 7 128. 6 130. 8 133. 4	126. 8 128. 4 130. 4 134. 2	126. 5 128. 7 131. 0 132. 9	124. 2 125. 6 127. 7 129. 9	10.1 4.5 7.0 7.1	10.9 4.5 7.0 7.1
1976: I V	139. 0 142. 9 145. 3	139. 6 143. 4 145. 9 148. 0	138. 8 143. 8 145. 5 147. 8	120. 1 122. 4 123. 2 124. 0	164. 6 168. 1 171. 1 172. 9	189. 2 190. 4 198. 1 199. 4	135. 4 137. 3 139. 2 141. 8	135. 4 136. 7 138. 3 141. 5	135. 4 137. 7 139. 7 141. 9	130. 9 132. 6 133. 9 136. 0	3. 2 5. 2 4. 4 6. 2	3. (5. 3 4. 2 6. 3

¹ Separate deflators are not available for gross private domestic investment, change in business inventories, and net

exports of goods and services.

² Changes are based on unrounded data and therefore may differ slightly from those obtained from data shown here. Quarterly data are at annual rates.

Table B-4.—Implicit price deflators and alternative price measures of gross national product and gross domestic product, 1929-76

	Gı	ross national measures,	product 1972 = 10	price 0		Percent c	hange froi	n precedii	ng period ¹	
Year or quarter	т	otal		domestic oduct		Total		Gross	domestic p	roduct
qua . (c)	Implicit price deflator	Fixed- weighted price index (1972 weights)	Implicit price deflator	Fixed- weighted price index (1972 weights)	Implicit price deflator	Fixed- weighted price index (1972 weights)	Chain price index	Implicit price deflator	Fixed- weighted price index (1972 weights)	Chain price index
1929	32. 87		32, 8							
1933	25. 13		25.2		-2.2			-2.1		
1939	28, 40		28. 4		7			7		
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1948	29. 10 31. 49 34. 82 36. 41 37. 13 37. 99 43. 88 49. 70 53. 13 52. 59		29. 1 31. 5 34. 8 36. 4 37. 1 38. 0 43. 9 49. 7 53. 1 52. 6		2.5 8.2 10.6 4.6 2.0 2.3 15.7 13.1 6.9 -1.0			2.5 8.2		
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	53. 64 57. 27 58. 00 58. 88 59. 69 60. 98	68. 1	53. 6 57. 2 57. 9 58. 8 59. 6 60. 9 62. 8 65. 0 66. 0 67. 5	68. 0 69. 1	2. 0 6. 8 1. 3 1. 5 1. 4 2. 2 3. 2 3. 4 1. 6 2. 2	1.6	1.6	2. 0 6. 7 1. 3 1. 5 1. 4 2. 2 3. 2 3. 4 1. 6 2. 2	1.6	
1960	68. 67	70. 3 71. 1 72. 0 72. 8 73. 7 75. 0 77. 2 79. 5 83. 0 87. 1	68. 6 69. 2 70. 5 71. 6 72. 7 74. 3 76. 8 79. 0 82. 6 86. 8	70. 2 71. 1 72. 0 72. 8 73. 7 75. 0 77. 2 79. 6 83. 0 87. 1	1.7 .9 1.8 1.5 2.2 3.3 2.9 4.5	1. 7 1. 1 1. 3 1. 1 1. 2 1. 8 2. 9 3. 0 4. 3 5. 0	1.7 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.9 3.1 3.0 4.4 5.0	1.7 .9 1.9 1.5 1.6 2.2 3.3 3.0 4.5 5.1	1. 7 1. 2 1. 3 1. 1 1. 2 1. 8 3. 0 3. 0 4. 4 5. 0	1. 7 1. 2 1. 5 1. 3 1. 4 1. 9 3. 1 4. 4
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	91. 36 96. 02 100. 00 105. 80 116. 41 127. 25 133. 79	91. 6 96. 1 100. 0 106. 0 116. 6 127. 3 134. 2	91. 4 96. 0 100. 0 105. 7 115. 9 126. 9 133. 4	91. 7 96. 2 100. 0 105. 9 116. 2 126. 8 133. 8	5. 4 5. 1 4. 1 5. 8 10. 0 9. 3 5. 1	5. 2 4. 9 4. 0 6. 0 10. 0 9. 2 5. 4	5.3 5.0 4.1 6.0 10.0 9.2 5.3	5. 3 5. 1 4. 1 5. 7 9. 6 9. 5 5. 1	5. 2 4. 9 4. 0 5. 9 9. 7 9. 2 5. 5	5. 3 5. 0 4. 1 5. 9 9. 7 9. 3 5. 5
1974: 	111, 56 114, 64	111. 8 114. 8 118. 2 121. 8	111. 1 114. 1 117. 4 121. 0	111. 5 114. 4 117. 7 121. 3	9. 5 11. 5 12. 4 12. 7	10. 5 11. 0 12. 5 12. 6	10. 7 11. 2 12. 8 12. 7	8. 5 11. 3 12. 1 12. 8	10. 0 10. 5 12. 3 12. 6	10. 2 10. 5 12. 5 12. 7
1975: I II III IV	124, 55	124. 4 126. 0 128. 3 130. 4	124. 2 125. 6 127. 7 129. 9	123. 9 125. 6 127. 8 129. 9	10, 1 4, 5 7, 0 7, 1	8. 9 5. 4 7. 3 6. 6	9. 2 5. 4 7. 3 6. 4	10.9 4.5 7.0 7.1	9. 0 5. 5 7. 4 6. 7	9. 4 5. 5 7. 4 6. 4
1976: I II III IV »	131. 29 132. 96 134. 40 136. 44	131. 7 133. 4 134. 9 136. 8	130. 9 132. 6 133. 9 136. 0	131. 3 133. 0 134. 4 136. 3	3. 2 5. 2 4. 4 6. 2	4. 2 5. 2 4. 6 5. 8	4. 3 5. 4 4. 6 5. 8	3. 0 5. 3 4. 2 6. 3	4. 2 5. 3 4. 4 5. 9	4. 3 5. 4 4. 4 5. 8

¹ Changes are based on unrounded data and therefore may differ slightly from those obtained from published indexe shown here.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-5.—Gross national product by industry in 1972 dollars, 1947-75
[Billions of 1972 dollars]

		Agri-		Ma	nufactur	ing	Trans- porta-		r:		Gov-	
Year	Gross na- tional product	culture, fores- try, and	Con- tract con- struc- tion	Total	Du- rable goods indus- tries	Non- durable goods indus- tries	tion, com- muni- cation, and utili- ties	Whole- sale and retail trade	Finance, insur- ance, and real estate	Serv- ices	ern- ment and govern- ment enter- prises	All other 1
1947 1948 1949	468. 3 487. 7 490. 7	26. 1 28. 0 27. 8	22.7 26.2 26.2	114. 9 121. 5 115. 0	68. 5 72. 0 66. 3	46. 4 49. 6 48. 8	38. 3 38. 7 36. 4	76. 1 78. 0 79. 9	55. 6 57. 3 60. 9	55. 1 56. 7 57. 2	68. 5 69. 0 73. 1	11. 1 12. 0 14. 1
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	533. 5 576. 5 598. 5 621. 8 613. 7	29. 1 28. 2 29. 0 30. 3 31. 1	28. 9 32. 2 33. 5 34. 5 35. 6	131. 3 146. 0 150. 7 161. 2 149. 6	78. 1 89. 9 94. 3 102. 6 91. 7	53. 2 56. 1 56. 4 58. 6 57. 9	39. 6 44. 2 44. 3 45. 9 45. 6	87. 6 88. 3 91. 1 94. 0 94. 6	64.7 67.0 71.5 74.4 78.1	59. 4 60. 6 61. 6 63. 0 63. 1	75. 4 89. 8 96. 6 96. 4 94. 9	17. 5 20. 2 20. 2 22. 3 21. 1
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	654.8 668.8 680.9 679.5 720.4	30.8 32.0	37. 8 40. 4 40. 5 41. 7 44. 9	165. 8 166. 9 167. 8 153. 3 170. 7	103. 4 102. 5 102. 9 88. 8 100. 7	62. 4 64. 4 64. 9 64. 5 70. 0	49. 4 52. 3 53. 4 52. 2 55. 7	103. 2 106. 2 108. 0 107. 9 115. 8	82. 4 86. 2 90. 2 94. 0 98. 7	67. 5 71. 1 73. 3 75. 8 80. 3	95. 4 97. 6 100. 1 101. 7 103. 6	21. 4 16. 6 16. 8 21. 0 20. 0
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	755.3 799.1 830.7	32.3 32.8	45.6 46.1 47.7 49.2 53.1	172.0 171.2 186.2 201.0 215.7	101.5 99.3 110.1 119.0 129.3	70. 5 72. 0 76. 2 82. 1 86. 4	58. 0 59. 1 62. 1 65. 6 68. 9	117. 9 119. 2 126. 7 131. 7 139. 7	102.3 107.4 115.9 115.9 119.8	82. 2 85. 4 88. 6 92. 2 96. 9	107. 2 111. 1 115. 1 118. 3 122. 6	19. 4 23. 6 24. 5 24. 1 25. 6
1965	925. 9 981. 0 1, 007. 7 1, 051. 8 1, 078. 8	33. 0 31. 3 32. 6 32. 4 33. 0	56. 3 58. 4 58. 9 61. 8 60. 4	235. 1 254. 0 254. 1 268. 4 276. 2	144. 1 157. 0 157. 2 165. 5 169. 1	91. 0 97. 0 96. 9 102. 9 107. 2	74. 3 80. 0 82. 3 88. 2 92. 9	148. 6 156. 9 160. 7 170. 6 174. 5	127. 8 132. 0 137. 1 143. 7 150. 2	101. 2 106. 5 112. 7 116. 3 121. 4	127. 4 136. 4 143. 5 148. 1 151. 8	22. 1 25. 4 25. 7 22. 4 18. 4
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974			56. 2 56. 1 56. 6 57. 2 51. 6	260. 6 264. 1 288. 8 313. 0 296. 8	154. 4 155. 3 171. 9 188. 9 176. 2	106. 2 108. 7 116. 8 124. 1 120. 6	95. 1 97. 3 103. 6 112. 6 112. 4	178. 4 186. 8 201. 2 212. 0 207. 2	153. 7 161. 7 168. 6 172. 3 173. 9	124. 7 126. 6 134. 5 143. 1 143. 1	152. 0 153. 1 154. 9 157. 3 159. 8	20. 4 25. 7 27. 7 31. 6 33. 6
1975	1	1	49.0	270.0	159. 2	110.9	111.5	211.1	180. 2	144.4	162.3	25. 4

¹ Mining, rest of world, and residual (GNP in 1972 dollars measured as the sum of final products less GNP in 1972 dollars measured as the sum of gross product by industry).

Table B-6.—Gross national product by major type of product, 1929-76

[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

								Goods							
Year or	Gross national	Final	Inven- tory		Total		Dui	rable go	ods	Nond	urable	goods	Serv-	Struc-	Auto out-
quar- ter	product	sales	change	Total	Final sales	Inven- tory change	Total	Final sales	Inven- tory change	Total	Final sales	Inven- tory change	ices	tures	put
1929.	103.4	101.7	1.7	56.1	54.4	1.7	17.5	16. 1	1.4	38.6	38, 3	0.3	35. 9	11.4	
1933_	55. 8	57. 4	-1.6	27. 0	28.6	-1.6	4. 9	5. 4	5	22. 1	23, 2	-1.1	25.9	2.9	
1939_	90.8	90. 4	. 4	49.0	48. 6	. 4	12.7	12. 4	. 3	36. 3	36. 2	. 1	34.3	7.5	
1940 - 1941 - 1942 - 1943 - 1944 - 1945 - 1946 - 1947 - 1948 - 1949 -	100. 0 124. 9 158. 3 192. 0 210. 5 212. 3 209. 6 232. 8 259. 1 258. 0	97. 8 120. 4 156. 5 192. 5 211. 5 213. 4 203. 2 233. 2 254. 4 261. 1	2. 2 4. 5 1. 8 -1. 0 -1. 0 6. 4 -2. 5 4. 7 -3. 1	56. 0 72. 5 93. 7 120. 4 132. 3 128. 9 125. 3 139. 8 154. 4 147. 7	53. 8 68. 0 91. 9 121. 0 133. 3 129. 9 118. 9 140. 3 149. 7 150. 8	2. 2 4. 5 1. 8 -1. 0 -1. 0 6. 4 -2. 7 -3. 1	16. 6 26. 8 35. 5 54. 2 57. 9 48. 9 37. 2 45. 8 47. 6 46. 2	15. 4 23. 8 34. 5 54. 2 58. 5 50. 1 31. 8 44. 1 46. 9 48. 3	5.3 1.7	39. 4 45. 6 58. 1 66. 2 74. 4 80. 0 88. 1 94. 0 106. 7 101. 5	38. 4 44. 2 57. 4 66. 8 74. 8 79. 8 87. 1 96. 2 102. 5	3	35. 7 40. 6 50. 6 62. 9 72. 2 76. 9 68. 6 71. 3 76. 7	8. 3 11. 8 14. 0 8. 7 6. 1 6. 5 15. 7 21. 7 28. 0 28. 4	7.3 8.9 12.0
1950 - 1951 - 1952 - 1953 - 1954 - 1955 - 1956 - 1957 - 1958 - 1959 -	286. 2 330. 2 347. 2 666. 1 366. 3 399. 3 420. 7 442. 8 448. 9 486. 5	279. 4 319. 9 344. 0 365. 7 367. 8 393. 3 416. 0 441. 4 450. 4 481. 2	6.8 10.3 3.1 -1.5 6.0 4.7 1.3 -1.5	162. 4 189. 5 194. 6 203. 1 196. 1 214. 5 223. 3 232. 3 228. 2 247. 4	155. 6 179. 2 191. 5 202. 7 197. (208. 5 218. 6 231. 0 229. 7 242. 2	6.8 10.3 3.1 -1.5 6.0 4.7 1.3 -1.5 5.2	58. 8 69. 5 68. 7 72. 4 66. 4 81. 3 85. 1 88. 5 77. 7 90. 1	54. 7 62. 5 67. 6 71. 5 69. 0 78. 2 82. 3 87. 3 80. 5	4. 1 6. 9 1. 1 -2. 5 3. 0 2. 8 1. 3 -2. 8 2. 7	103. 6 120. 0 125. 9 130. 8 129. 6 133. 2 138. 1 143. 7 150. 5 157. 4	100. 9 116. 7 123. 9 131. 2 128. 7 130. 3 136. 3 143. 7 149. 2 154. 8	2. 7 3. 4 2. 0 5 1. 0 2. 9 1. 3 2. 5	88. 2 102. 9 113. 1 121. 0 125. 7 135. 3 145. 2 157. 5 166. 9 179. 5	35. 6 37. 1 39. 4 42. 0 44. 5 49. 5 52. 2 53. 0 53. 8 59. 5	15. 5 13. 4 12. 2 16. 3 14. 9 21. 5 17. 2 19. 6 14. 6 19. 6
1960 - 1961 - 1962 - 1963 - 1964 - 1965 - 1966 - 1967 - 1968 - 1969 -	506. 0 523. 3 563. 8 594. 7 635. 7 688. 1 753. 0 796. 3 868. 5 935. 5	502. 2 521. 1 557. 3 588. 8 629. 9 678. 6 738. 7 786. 2 860. 8 926. 2	3. 8 2. 2 6. 5 6. 0 5. 8 9. 5 14. 3 10. 1 7. 7	254. 3 256. 5 278. 0 289. 7 309. 0 336. 6 373. 9 387. 3 418. 9 446. 2	250. 6 254. 3 271. 5 283. 7 303. 2 327. 1 359. 6 377. 2 411. 2 436. 8	3. 8 2. 2 6. 5 6. 0 5. 8 9. 5 14. 3 10. 1 7. 7 9. 4	91. 5 90. 0 102. 0 108. 0 118. 9 133. 6 149. 1 148. 7 162. 4 175. 3	89. 1 90. 2 98. 4 105. 4 115. 0 127. 0 139. 0 143. 5 157. 4 169. 2	2. 4 1 3. 6 2. 7 3. 9 6. 6 10. 0 5. 3 5. 0 6. 1	162. 8 166. 5 176. 1 181. 6 190. 1 203. 1 224. 9 238. 5 256. 5 270. 9	161. 4 164. 1 173. 2 178. 3 188. 2 200. 1 220. 6 233. 7 253. 8 267. 6	1. 4 2. 3 2. 9 3. 3 1. 9 2. 9 4. 8 2. 8 3. 3	193. 2 206. 7 221. 5 236. 2 254. 4 272. 7 297. 7 326. 1 356. 6 388. 7	58. 4 60. 1 64. 3 68. 9 72. 4 78. 8 81. 4 82. 9 93. 0 100. 7	21. 6 18. 1 22. 9 25. 6 26. 5 31. 8 31. 1 28. 8 36. 6 36. 8
1972 -	1, 171. 1 1, 306. 6 1, 413. 2	978. 6 1, 057. 1 1, 161. 7 1, 288. 6 1, 402. 5 1, 531. 0 1, 679. 0	3. 8 6. 4 9. 4 17. 9 10. 7 -14. 6 13. 5	456. 2 479. 8 526. 0 598. 8 639. 7 681. 7 761. 5	452. 4 473. 5 516. 6 580. 9 629. 0 696. 3 748. 0	3. 8 6. 4 9. 4 17. 9 10. 7 -14. 6 13. 5	170. 8 181. 6 208. 4 240. 5 247. 2 254. 4 301. 0	170. 7 179. 8 202. 1 229. 6 240. 2 266. 5 297. 4	. 0 1. 8 6. 3 10. 9 7. 1 -12. 1 3. 5	285. 4 298. 3 317. 7 358. 3 392. 4 427. 3 460. 5	281. 7 293. 7 314. 5 351. 3 388. 9 429. 8 450. 6	3. 7 4. 6 3. 2 7. 0 3. 6 -2. 6 9. 9	424. 6 465. 5 510. 8 560. 5 626. 6 692. 5 771. 3	101, 6 118, 1 134, 3 147, 2 146, 9 142, 1 159, 7	30. 6 42. 2 45. 1 50. 7 42. 7 45. 8 62. 8
11	1, 399. 4 1, 431. 6	1, 360. 0 1, 386. 4 1, 424. 2 1, 439. 4	12. € 13. 6 7. 3 9. 7	621. 0 634. 8 650. 4 652. 5	608. 4 621. 9 643. 0 642. 8	12.6 13.0 7.3 9.7	238. 9 242. 8 252. 6 254. 7	232. 3 240. 6 247. 6 240. 2	6. 6 2. 2 5. 1 14. 5	382. 1 392. 1 397. 7 397. 8	376. 1 381. 3 395. 4 402. 6	6. 0 10. 8 2. 3 -4. 7	605. 1 614. 6 633. 8 652. 8	146. 5 150. 0 147. 4 143. 8	39. 1 42. 1 48. 2 41. 4
1975: V	1, 482. 3 1, 548. 7	1, 468. 4 1, 512. 3 1, 550. 6 1, 592. 5	-22.2 -30.0 -2.0 -4.5	642.6 661.0 703.5 719.7	664.8 691.0 705.4 724.0	-22.2 -30.0 -2.0 -4.3	234. 1 248. 5 265. 0 270. 0	249. 5 263. 8 272. 0 280. 6	-15.4 -15.3 -7.0 -10.6	408. 5 412. 5 438. 4 449. 7	415. 3 427. 2 433. 4 443. 3	-6.8 -14.7 5.0 6.3	666.3 684.2 700.2 719.5	137.2 137.1 145.0 149.1	36. 3 44. 1 52. 0 51. 0
	1, 636. 2 1, 675. 2 1, 709. 8 1, 748. 5	1, 621. 4 1, 659. 2 1, 694. 7 1, 740. 6	14. 8 16. 0 15. 1 7. 9	742.3 758.4 766.1 779.2	727.5 742.4 751.0 771.2	14. 8 16. 0 15. 1 7. 9	282. 7 301. 2 308. 2 311. 8	286, 3 295, 8 301, 4 306, 3	-3.6 5.4 6.8 5.5	459. 6 457. 1 457. 9 467. 4	441. 1 446. 6 449. 6 464. 9	8.3	759.6	151. 3 157. 3 162. 2 168. 0	61. 2 64. 3 61. 0 64. 4

TABLE B-7.—Gross national product by major type of product in 1972 dollars, 1929-76
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

				<u> </u>				Goods						ļ	
Year	Gross	Final	Inven-		Total		Dui	able go	ods	Nond	urable	goods	Serv-	Struc-	Auto
quar- ter	national product	sales	tory change	Total	Final sales	Inven- tory change	Total	Final sales	Inven- tory change	Total	Final sales	Inven- tory change	ices	tures	out- put
1929.	314.7	310.0	4.6	143, 9	139. 3	4.6	44. 2	40. 7	3.5	99.7	98, 6	1, 1	126. 8	44.0	
1933_	222. 1	227.0	-4.9	97. 2	102. 1	-4.9	15. 5	17.6	-2.1	81.7	84.5	-2.8	110.9	14.0	
1939.	319. 7	318. 1			152. 3	1.6	36. 4	35.6	l .	1	116.7	.9	134.6	31, 2	
1940. 1941. 1942. 1943. 1944. 1945. 1946. 1947. 1948. 1949.	343. 6 396. 6 454. 6 527. 3 567. 0 559. 0 477. 0 468. 3 487. 7	337. 4 384. 6 449. 4 527. 3 569. 3 562. 6 464. 9 468. 5 482. 2 495. 1	6. 2 12. 0 5. 2 -2. 3 -3. 6 12. 2 -5. 5 -4. 4	286. 8 279. 2 238. 0 236. 8 244. 2 239. 9	165. 0 185. 4 215. 9 263. 4 289. 1 282. 8 225. 8 237. 0 238. 7 244. 3	6.2 12.0 5.2 -2.3 -3.6 12.2 -5.5 -4.4	119.9 134.1 118.2	43. 1 57. 5 76. 0 119. 3 135. 9 121. 9 60. 5 74. 9 75. 6 76. 1		141. 7 143. 5 152. 7 161. 0 166. 7 160. 1	121. 8 127. 9 140. 0 144. 1 153. 2 161. 0 165. 3 162. 1 163. 1 168. 2	2.8 3.8 1.7 6 5 .1 1.3 -2.0 4.0 8	139. 5 157. 6 192. 7 240. 9 263. 6 261. 9 199. 7 186. 9 190. 9 197. 0	32, 9 41, 5 40, 7 23, 0 16, 6 17, 9 39, 4 44, 7 52, 5 53, 7	12.9 14.7 18.9
1950 - 1951 - 1952 - 1953 - 1954 - 1955 - 1956 - 1957 - 1958 - 1959 -	533.5 576.5 598.5 621.8 613.7 654.8 668.8 680.9 679.5 720.4	522.9 562.8 594.2 620.3 615.8 647.1 663.0 679.4 681.3 714.0	10.6 13.7 4.3 1.5 -2.2 7.7 5.8 1.5 -1.8 6.5	261. 5 283. 1 292. 3 306. 9 292. 2 316. 3 320. 9 321. 8 312. 0 332. 5	250. 9 269. 4 288. 0 305. 4 294. 4 308. 6 315. 1 320. 3 313. 8 326. 1	10.6 13.7 4.3 1.5 -2.2 7.7 5.8 1.5 -1.8 6.5	90.7 102.4 102.3 107.3 98.1 117.1 117.2 116.1 101.4 113.8	84. 4 92. 6 100. 6 105. 9 101. 7 112. 9 113. 5 114. 6 104. 8 110. 6	9.8 1.8 1.4 -3.6 4.2 3.7	194.1	166. 5 176. 8 187. 4 199. 5 192. 7 195. 7 201. 6 205. 6 209. 0 215. 5	4.2 3.9 2.5 .1 1.4 3.5 2.1 .0 1.6 3.2	206. 0 229. 0 240. 6 245. 5 247. 0 257. 6 267. 2 279. 3 285. 6 298. 0	66. 0 64. 4 65. 6 69. 4 74. 5 80. 9 80. 7 79. 9 81. 9	24. 0 20. 4 18. 4 23. 9 22. 9 31. 3 24. 4 25. 8 20. 0 24. 7
1960_ 1961_ 1962_ 1963_ 1964_ 1965_ 1966_ 1967_ 1968_ 1969_	736. 8 755. 3 799. 1 830. 7 874. 4 925. 9 981. 0 1, 007. 7 1, 051. 8 1, 078. 8	732.4 752.4 791.0 823.0 867.1 914.6 964.3 995.7 1,043.1 1,068.2	8.1 7.8 7.3 11.3 16.7 12.0	337.1 338.1 362.0 373.0 394.0 421.5 455.6 461.9 481.1 492.3	332.8 335.2 353.8 365.2 386.7 410.2 438.9 449.9 472.4 481.7	4. 4 2. 9 8. 1 7. 8 7. 3 11. 3 16. 7 12. 0 8. 7	114. 4 112. 5 125. 5 131. 8 144. 2 160. 6 177. 1 173. 0 181. 3	111.6 112.6 121.1 128.4 139.2 152.6 165.2 166.6 175.7 183.3	2.9 1 4.4 3.4 5.0 8.0 11.9 6.4 5.6	222. 7 225. 6 236. 5 241. 1 249. 9 261. 0 278. 5 288. 9 299. 8 302. 2	221. 2 222. 7 232. 7 236. 8 247. 5 257. 7 273. 7 283. 3 296. 7 298. 4	1.5 3.0 3.7 4.3 2.3 3.3 4.8 5.6 3.2	310. 7 325. 5 339. 9 354. 0 372. 2 389. 1 410. 2 432. 7 449. 9 465. 4	89. 0 91. 7 97. 2 103. 8 108. 1 115. 3 115. 2 113. 1 120. 9 121. 1	26. 8 22. 6 27. 5 30. 3 31. 1 37. 4 36. 7 33. 5 40. 6 40. 0
1071	1, 075. 3 1, 107. 5 1, 171. 1 1, 235. 0 1, 214. 0 1, 191. 7 1, 265. 0	1, 071. 0 1, 100. 9 1, 161. 7 1, 218. 5 1, 205. 5 1, 203. 7 1, 255. 9	6.6	483. 4 491. 6 526. 0 569. 0 552. 9 532. 6 576. 3	479. 1 484. 9 516. 6 552. 5 544. 4 544. 7 567. 2	4. 3 6. 6 9. 4 16. 5 8. 5 -12. 0 9. 1	179. 2 183. 4 208. 4 236. 5 224. 1 204. 7 230. 2	179. 1 181. 5 202. 1 225. 9 218. 6 214. 1 2227. 9		304. 2 308. 2 317. 7 332. 5 328. 8 327. 9 346. 1	200	4. 2 4. 8 3. 2 5. 9 3. 0 -2. 7 6. 8	477. 2 491. 1 510. 8 531. 1 545. 0 556. 6 578. 6	114.6 124.9 134.3 134.8 116.1 102.4 110.0	32. 5 42. 1 45. 1 50. 6 40. 0 39. 7 50. 2
1974: _ V	1, 230. 4 1, 220. 8 1, 212. 9 1, 191. 7	1, 219. 1 1, 211. 4 1, 207. 8 1, 183. 7	11. 4 9. 4 5. 1 8. 0	560. 6 558. 1 555. 6 537. 4	549. 2 548. 7 550. 5 529. 3	11. 4 9. 4 5. 1 8. 0	228. 224. 226. 217.	222. 4 222. 8 222. 7 222. 7 206. 8	6. 1. 3. 10.	332. 2 333. 7 329. 3 7 319. 9	326. 8 325. 9 327. 9 322. 6	5. 3 7. 8 1. 4 -2. 6	544.6	124. 2 120. 6 112. 7 106. 9	39. 0 40. 2 44. 1 36. 8
1975: _ _ 	1 161 1	1, 181. 6 1, 198. 2 1, 210. 2 1, 224. 7	-20. ! -21. ! -1. ! -5. !	512. 2 522. 5 522. 5 546. 0 549. 9	532. 7 543. 7 547. 0 555. 4	-20. ! -21. ! -1. ! -5. !	193. 200. 212. 5 213.	3 206. 8 1 211. 9 1 216. 8 4 220. 7	-13. -11. -4. -7.	5 318. 9 9 322. 4 6 333. 9 4 336. 6	325. 9 331. 7 330. 2 334. 7	-7.0 -9.3 3.7 1.9	549. 6 555. 4 558. 7 562. 8	99. 3 99. 2 104. 6 106. 4	32.7 38.6 45.0 42.6
11	_ 1, 246, 3	1, 248. 8	10. 11. 10. 4.	569. 5 1 576. 0 2 579. 1 580. 8	559, 1 564, 8 568, 9 576, 2	11.	4 221. 1 230. 2 234. 7 233.	9 224. 3 5 226. 7 6 230. 0 8 230. 5	-2. 3. 4. 3.	4 347. 6 8 345. 5 6 344. 5 3 347. 0	334. 8 338. 2 338. 9 345. 7	7.3	582. 1	108.7 111.0	50. 4 51. 8 48. 7 50. 1

Table B-8.—Gross national product: Receipts and expenditures by major economic groups, 1929-76

[Billions of dollars]

			Persons					0	Sovernme	ent		
	Dispo	sable pe income	rsonal				let receip	ots	E	xpenditu	res	Sur- plus
Year or quarter	Total 1	Less: Inter- est paid and trans- fers 2	Equals: Total exclud- ing in terest paid and trans- fers	Per- sonal con- sump- tion ex- pendi- tures	Personal saving or dissaving (-)	Tax and non- tax re- ceipts or ac- cruals	Less: Trans- fers, inter- est, and sub- sidies 3	Equals: Net re- ceipts	Total ex- pendi- tures	Less: Trans- fers, inter- est, and sub- sidies 3	Equals: Pur- chases of goods and serv- ices	or deficit (-), na- tional in- come and prod- uct ac- counts
1929	82. 3	1.9	80. 4	77.3	3.1	11.3	1.5	9.8	10.3	1.5	8.8	1.0
1933	45. 5	.7	44.8	45.8	-1.0	9.3	2.5	6.9	10. 7	2.5	8. 2	-1.4
1939	69.9	.9	69. 1	67.0	2.1	15. 4	4. 1	11.3	17.6	4. 1	13. 5	-2.2
1940	187. 4 187. 1	1.0 1.1 .8 .7 .8 .9 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.3	74. 3 91. 0 115. 6 132. 1 144. 6 148. 0 157. 3 166. 7 185. 3 184. 9	71. 0 80. 8 88. 6 99. 4 108. 2 119. 5 143. 8 161. 7 174. 7 178. 1	3. 3 10. 2 27. 0 32. 7 36. 5 28. 5 13. 4 4. 9 10. 6 6. 7	17. 7 25. 0 32. 6 49. 2 51. 2 53. 2 51. 0 56. 9 58. 9	4. 3 3. 8 4. 2 4. 4 6. 0 9. 9 18. 0 17. 1 18. 5 20. 9	13. 5 21. 2 28. 4 44. 7 45. 2 43. 3 33. 0 39. 9 40. 4 35. 0	18. 4 28. 8 64. 0 93. 3 103. 0 92. 7 45. 6 42. 5 50. 5 59. 3	4. 3 3. 8 4. 2 4. 4 6. 0 9. 9 18. 0 17. 1 18. 5 20. 9	14. 2 24. 9 59. 8 88. 9 97. 0 82. 8 27. 5 25. 5 32. 0 38. 4	7 3.8 31.4 44.1 51.8 39.5 5.4 14.4 3.4
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	205. 5 224. 8 236. 4 250. 7 255. 7 273. 4 291. 3 306. 9 317. 1 336. 1	2.7 2.9 3.3 4.0 4.3 4.8 5.6 6.0 6.5	202. 8 221. 9 233. 1 246. 6 251. 4 268. 6 285. 7 301. 0 311. 1 329. 6	192. 0 207. 1 217. 1 229. 7 235. 8 253. 7 266. 0 280. 4 289. 5 310. 8	10. 8 14. 8 16. 0 17. 0 15. 6 14. 9 19. 7 20. 6 21. 7 18. 8	69. 0 85. 2 90. 1 94. 6 89. 9 101. 1 109. 7 116. 2 115. 0 129. 4	22. 5 19. 1 18. 3 19. 0 21. 3 23. 0 25. 1 28. 2 32. 6 33. 4	46. 5 66. 2 71. 8 75. 6 68. 6 78. 1 84. 6 88. 0 82. 4 96. 0	61. 0 79. 2 93. 9 101. 6 97. 0 98. 0 104. 5 115. 3 127. 6 131. 0	22. 5 19. 1 18. 3 19. 0 21. 3 23. 0 25. 1 28. 2 32. 6 33. 4	38. 5 60. 1 75. 6 82. 5 75. 8 75. 0 79. 4 87. 1 95. 0 97. 6	8.0 6, 1 -3.8 -6.9 -7.1 3.1 5.2 -12.6
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	349. 4 362. 9 383. 9 402. 8 437. 0 472. 2 510. 4 544. 5 588. 1 630. 4	7. 4 7. 7 8. 3 9. 4 10. 5 11. 7 12. 6 13. 3 14. 1 15. 6	342. 0 355. 2 375. 6 393. 4 426. 5 460. 4 497. 8 531. 2 574. 0 614. 8	324. 9 335. 0 355. 2 374. 6 400. 4 430. 2 464. 8 490. 4 535. 9 579. 7	17. 1 20. 2 20. 4 18. 8 26. 1 30. 3 33. 0 40. 9 38. 1 35. 1	139. 5 144. 8 156. 7 168. 5 174. 0 188. 3 212. 3 228. 2 263. 4 296. 3	36. 1 40. 9 42. 4 44. 1 46. 5 49. 5 54. 9 62. 2 70. 2 77. 8	103. 4 103. 9 114. 3 124. 4 127. 5 138. 9 157. 4 166. 0 193. 2 218. 5	136, 4 149, 1 160, 5 167, 8 176, 3 187, 8 213, 6 242, 4 268, 9 285, 6	36. 1 40. 9 42. 4 44. 1 46. 5 49. 5 54. 9 62. 2 70. 2 77. 8	100. 3 108. 2 118. 0 123. 7 129. 8 138. 4 158. 7 180. 2 198. 7 207. 9	3. 1 -4. 3 -3. 8 -2. 3 -1. 3 -14. 2 -5. 5 10. 7
1970	685. 9 742. 8 801. 3 901. 7 982. 9 1, 080. 9 1, 181. 8	16. 6 17. 3 18. 9 21. 5 23. 2 23. 7 25. 4	669. 4 725. 5 782. 4 880. 2 959. 7 1, 057. 2 1, 156. 3	618. 8 668. 2 733. 0 809. 9 887. 5 973. 2 1, 078. 6	50. 6 57. 3 49. 4 70. 3 72. 2 84. 0 77. 8	302. 6 322. 2 367. 4 411. 2 454. 6 466. 4 530. 8	93. 1 106. 8 117. 8 135. 4 155. 6 191. 8 209. 5	209. 5 215. 5 249. 6 275. 8 299. 0 274. 6 321. 3	311. 9 340. 5 370. 9 404. 9 458. 8 530. 8 575. 3	93, 1 106, 8 117, 8 135, 4 155, 6 191, 8 209, 5	218. 9 233. 7 253. 1 269. 5 303. 3 339. 0 365. 8	-9.4 -18.3 -3.5 6.3 -4.2 -64.4

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE B-8.—Gross national product: Receipts and expenditures by major economic groups, 1929-76-Continued

[Billions of dollars]

		Busines	s		lt	nternatio	nal				
		0	F	Net		xports of nd service		Excess of net	T-4-1	Statis-	Gross na-
Year or quarter	Gross re- tained earn- ings 4	Gross pri- vate do- mestic invest- ment 5	Excess of earn- ings or of in- vest- ment (-)	trans- fers and inter- est paid to for- eigners (6)	Ex- ports	Less: 1m- ports	Equals: Net ex- ports	trans- fers and inter- est or of net ex- ports (—) 7	Total income or re- ceipts	tical dis- crep- ancy	tional prod- uct or ex- pendi- ture
1929	11.7	16. 2	-4.4	0.4	7.0	5. 9	1.1	-0.7	102. 3	1.1	103. 4
1933	3, 2	1.4	1.8	.2	2. 4	2.0	. 4	2	55.1	.7	55.8
1939	8, 8	9.3	5	.2	4. 4	3.4	1.1	9	89. 4	1.4	90.8
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1946 1947 1948	10, 9 12, 0 14, 8 16, 7 17, 7 16, 0 15, 8 21, 8 30, 0 31, 4	13. 1 17. 9 9. 9 5. 8 7. 2 10. 6 30. 7 34. 0 45. 9 35. 3	-2. 2 -5. 8 4. 9 10. 9 10. 5 5. 4 -14. 9 -12. 1 -15. 8 -3. 8	.22 .22 .38 2.9 2.65 5.6	5. 4 5. 9 4. 8 4. 4 5. 3 7. 2 14. 8 19. 8 16. 9	3.6 4.6 4.8 6.5 7.1 7.8 7.2 8.2 10.4 9.6	1.7 1.3 -0 -2.0 -1.8 6 7.6 11.6 6.5 6.2	-1.5 -1.1 2 2.2 2.1 1.4 -4.6 -9.0 -2.0 6	98. 9 124. 3 159. 1 193. 8 207. 8 208. 2 208. 9 231. 0 260. 3 257. 0	1. 1 . 5 8 -1. 8 2. 7 4. 1 . 7 1. 8 -1. 2 1. 0	100.0 124.9 158.3 192.0 210.5 212.3 209.6 232.8 259.1 258.0
1950	30. 8 34. 6 37. 1 38. 0 41. 0 47. 5 48. 7 51. 1 51. 3 58. 5	53. 8 59. 2 52. 1 53. 3 52. 7 68. 4 71. 0 69. 2 61. 9 77. 6	-23. 0 -24. 6 -15. 1 -15. 3 -11. 7 -20. 8 -22. 3 -18. 1 -10. 6 -19. 0	4.0 3.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6	13. 9 18. 9 18. 2 17. 1 18. 0 20. 0 23. 9 26. 7 23. 3 23. 7	12. 0 15. 1 15. 8 16. 6 17. 8 19. 6 20. 7 20. 8 23. 2	1. 9 3. 8 2. 4 . 6 2. 0 2. 2 4. 3 6. 1 2. 5	2.1 3 .2 1.9 .3 .3 -1.8 -3.6 -3.6	284. 1 326. 2 344. 5 362. 8 363. 3 396. 8 421. 5 442. 6 447. 2 486. 7	2.0 4.0 2.7 3.3 3.0 2.5 8 1.7	286. 2 330. 2 347. 2 366. 1 366. 3 399. 3 420. 7 442. 8 448. 9
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967	58. 7 59. 8 67. 0 70. 1 76. 2 84. 6 91. 2 93. 7 98. 2 101. 7	76. 4 74. 3 85. 2 90. 2 96. 6 112. 0 124. 5 120. 8 131. 5 146. 2	-17. 7 -14. 5 -18. 2 -20. 1 -20. 4 -27. 4 -33. 3 -27. 1 -33. 3 -44. 5	2.6 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.8	27. 6 28. 9 30. 6 32. 7 37. 4 39. 5 42. 8 45. 6 49. 9 54. 7	23. 2 23. 1 25. 2 26. 4 28. 4 32. 0 37. 7 40. 6 47. 7 52. 9	4. 4 5. 8 5. 4 6. 3 7. 6 5. 1 4. 9 2. 3 1. 8	-1.7 -3.0 -2.4 -3.2 -5.7 -4.3 -1.6 -1.2 1.4 2.0	506. 7 521. 7 559. 8 591. 0 633. 5 687. 2 749. 8 794. 6 869. 1 938. 8	7 1.6 4.0 3.7 2.2 3.2 1.7 6 -3.3	506.0 523.3 563.8 594.7 635.7 688.1 753.0 796.3 868.5
1970	101.4	140. 8 160. 0 188. 3 220. 0 215. 0 183. 7 241. 2	-39.5 -44.3 -57.3 -79.8 -75.6 -12.1 -42.6	4. 3 5. 5 6. 5 7. 7 8. 5 8. 6	62. 5 65. 6 72. 7 101. 6 144. 4 148. 1 161. 9	58. 5 64. 0 75. 9 94. 4 136. 9 127. 6 155. 1	3. 9 1. 6 -3. 3 7. 1 7. 5 20. 5 6. 9	3.9 9.8 .6 1.0 -11.9	984. 5 1, 062. 1 1, 169. 4 1, 303. 9 1, 406. 6 1, 511. 9 1, 684. 8	-2.1 1.3 1.7 2.6 6.6 4.4 7.6	982. 4 1, 063. 4 1, 171. 1 1, 306. 6 1, 413. 2 1, 516. 3 1, 692. 4

<sup>Personal income less personal tax and nontax payments (fines, penalties, etc.).
Interest paid by consumers to business and net personal transfer payments to foreigners.
Government transfer payments to persons and foreigners, net interest paid by government, subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises, and disbursements less wage accruals.
Capital consumption allowances with capital consumption adjustment, corporate inventory valuation adjustment, undistributed corporate profits with capital consumption adjustment, and private wage accruals less disbursements.
Private business investment, purchases of capital goods by private nonprofit institutions, and residential housing and equipment. See Table B-14.
Net transfers to foreigners by persons and government and interest paid by government to foreigners.
Capital grants received by the United States (net) less net foreign investment.</sup>

TABLE B-9.—Gross national product by sector, 1929-76

[Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		!		Gr	oss don	nestic p	roduct					Percent
	_			Busine	ss			Go	vernme	ent ?		change from preced-
Year or quarter	Gross national product	Total	Total	Non- farm ¹	Farm	Sta- tis- tical dis- crep- ancy	House- holds and insti- tutions	Total	Fed- eral	State and local	Rest of the world	period, gross domes- tic prod- uct 3
1929	103. 4	102.6	95.4	84.7	9.7	1.1	2.9	4.3	0.9	3, 5	0. 8	
1933	55.8	55.5	49. 1	43.8	4.6	.7	1.7	4.7	1.2	3.5	.3	-4.1
1939	90.8	90.5	80.6	72.9	6.3	1.4	2.3	7.6	3. 4	4. 2	.3	7.0
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1947 1948	100. 0 124. 9 158. 3 192. 0 210. 5 212. 3 209. 6 232. 8 259. 1 258. 0	99. 6 124. 5 157. 9 191. 6 210. 1 212. 0 209. 0 231. 8 257. 9 256. 9	89. 4 112. 6 139. 9 162. 8 174. 2 172. 8 183. 8 210. 0 234. 9 231. 5	81. 8 103. 1 127. 7 149. 3 156. 2 152. 7 164. 2 188. 0 212. 7 211. 7	6. 5 8. 9 13. 0 15. 3 16. 0 18. 9 20. 2 23. 3 18. 8	1.1 .5 8 -1.8 2.7 4.1 .7 1.8 -1.2	2. 4 2. 5 2. 9 3. 2 3. 7 4. 1 4. 5 5. 1 5. 6 5. 9	7.8 9.4 15.1 25.6 32.2 35.2 20.8 16.7 17.4 19.4	3. 5 5. 0 10. 6 20. 9 27. 2 29. 8 14. 6 9. 4 8. 9 10. 0	4.3 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.4 6.2 7.3 8.5 9.4	. 4 . 4 . 3 . 4 . 3 . 5 . 9 1. 2	10.1 25.0 26.8 21.2 9.6 -1.2 10.9
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1957	286. 2 330. 2 347. 2 366. 1	284. 8 328. 7 345. 7 364. 6 364. 5 397. 3 418. 5 440. 5 446. 6 484. 0	257. 5 294. 4 307. 3 324. 9 323. 9 354. 0 372. 1 390. 8 393. 1 427. 7	235. 5 267. 4 282. 5 301. 2 301. 3 332. 8 354. 3 372. 3 370. 7 408. 9	20. 0 22. 9 22. 2 20. 3 19. 6 18. 8 18. 6 18. 4 20. 7 19. 1	2.0 4.0 2.7 3.3 3.0 2.5 8 .2 1.7	6. 4 6. 9 7. 2 7. 8 8. 1 9. 1 9. 8 10. 5 11. 4 12. 3	20. 9 27. 4 31. 2 31. 9 32. 5 34. 2 36. 6 39. 1 42. 1 44. 0	10. 7 16. 2 18. 9 18. 6 17. 8 18. 4 19. 0 19. 6 20. 5 20. 9	10. 1 11. 2 12. 3 13. 3 14. 7 15. 8 17. 6 19. 6 21. 6 23. 1	1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.4	10.9 15.2 5.5 0 9.0 9.0 1.4
1960	1	503. 5 520. 2 560. 2 591. 1 631. 4 683. 4 748. 8 791. 8 863. 7 931. 1	442. 5 455. 3 490. 4 516. 5 550. 7 596. 6 651. 1 682. 7 742. 2 798. 1	423. 0 433. 4 465. 9 492. 2 523. 8 625. 0 658. 8 720. 2 776. 2	20. 2 20. 2 20. 5 20. 5 19. 3 22. 0 22. 9 22. 2 22. 6 25. 2	7 1.6 4.0 3.7 2.2 .9 3.2 1.7 6 -3.3	13. 8 14. 4 15. 5 16. 6 17. 8 19. 2 21. 1 23. 9 26. 4 29. 2	47. 1 50. 5 54. 3 58. 0 62. 9 67. 6 76. 5 85. 1 95. 2 103. 7	21. 7 22. 6 24. 1 25. 2 27. 0 28. 3 32. 4 35. 6 39. 3 41. 8	25. 5 27. 9 30. 2 32. 9 35. 9 39. 3 44. 1 49. 5 55. 9 61. 9	2.5 3.1 3.6 3.7 4.3 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.5	4.0 3.3 7.7 5.8 8.2 9.7 9.1
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	982. 4 1, 063. 4 1, 171. 1 1, 306. 6 1, 413. 2 1, 516. 3 1, 692. 4	977. 8 1, 056. 8 1, 164. 1 1, 297. 5 1, 398. 7 1, 505. 7 1, 679. 1	831. 5 896. 9 989. 5 1, 108. 0 1, 192. 4 1, 277. 5 1, 428. 4	807. 6 867. 9 955. 8 1, 055. 3 1, 137. 3 1, 222. 8 1, 370. 0	25. 9 27. 7 32. 0 50. 1 48. 5 50. 3 50. 8	-2.1 1.3 1.7 2.6 6.6 4.4 7.6	31. 6 34. 7 37. 2 40. 5 44. 7 49. 7 55. 9	114. 7 125. 2 137. 4 149. 1 161. 6 178. 5 194. 8	44. 7 46. 8 50. 1 51. 9 54. 9 59. 3 63. 4	70. 0 78. 5 87. 3 97. 1 106. 7 119. 2 131. 4	4.6 6.6 7.0 9.1 14.5 10.6 13.3	5. 0 8. 1 10. 1 11. 5 7. 8 7. 7
1974: 1 	1, 372. 7 1, 399. 4 1, 431. 6 1, 449. 2	1, 355. 5 1, 387. 0 1, 417. 8 1, 434. 4	1, 156, 1 1, 183, 8 1, 209, 6 1, 219, 9	1, 100. 6 1, 130. 1 1, 155. 1 1, 163. 4	53. 1 46. 6 46. 9 47. 2	2. 4 7. 1 7. 7 9. 3	42. 7 44. 0 45. 7 46. 4	156. 7 159. 2 162. 5 168. 1	53. 7 54. 0 54. 6 57. 4	102. 9 105. 2 107. 9 110. 7	17. 2 12. 4 13. 8 14. 8	3, 1 9, 6 9, 2 4, 8
	1, 446. 2 1, 482. 3 1, 548. 7 1, 588. 2	1, 436. 7 1, 471. 7 1, 537. 4 1, 577. 1	1, 216. 3 1, 246. 4 1, 306. 8 1, 340. 4	1, 167. 4 1, 197. 4 1, 246. 7 1, 279. 6	42.5 49.0 55.0 54.8	6. 4 . 1 5. 1 6. 1	48. 1 49. 0 50. 4 51. 5	172. 4 176. 3 180. 1 185. 2	58. 2 58. 4 59. 1 61. 5	114. 2 117. 9 121. 1 123. 7	9. 4 10. 6 11. 3 11. 1	10. 1 19. 1 10. 8
1976: 1 V p		1, 623. 2 1, 662. 8 1, 696. 1 1, 734. 3	1, 415. 5 1, 443. 1	1, 324. 8 1, 354. 7 1, 384. 4	48. 7 55. 0 50. 0 49. 4	7. 2 5. 8 8. 7	53. 3 54. 8 57. 0 58. 6	189. 2 192. 5 196. 0 201. 4	62. 2 62. 5 63. 2 65. 6	127. 0 130. 0 132. 8 135. 8	13. 0 12. 4 13. 7 14. 2	12. 2 10. 1 8. 2 9. 3

 ¹ Includes compensation of employees in government enterprises.
 2 Compensation of government employees,
 3 Changes are based on unrounded data and therefore may differ slightly from those obtained from data shown here.
 See table B-1 for percent changes in gross national product.

TABLE B-10.—Gross national product by sector in 1972 dollars, 1929-76 [Billions of 1972 dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

				Gross	s domes	tic pro	duct					Percent change
Year or quarter	Gross national			Busine	ess		House-	Go	vernme	nt ³	Rest of the	from preced- ing
Tear or quarter	product	Total	Total	Non- farm ¹	Farm	Resid- ual ²	holds and insti- tutions	Total	Fed- eral	State and local	world	period, gross domestic product 4
1929	314.7	312.8	271. 1	244, 2	23. 8	3. 1	15.6	26. 1	5, 2	20.9	1.9	
1933	222. 1	220.5	179. 7	152.1	25.0	2, 6	12. 2	28.7	6.6	22.0	1.6	-2.1
1939	319. 7	318.6	261.5	231.6	25.3	4.7	15. 1	42.0	16.9	25.1	1.2	7.7
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	343. 6 396. 6 454. 6 527. 3 567. 0 559. 0 477. 0 468. 3 487. 7 490. 7	342. 3 395. 4 453. 5 526. 4 566. 0 558. 1 475. 9 466. 7 485. 9 488. 8	282. 4 324. 4 355. 3 381. 9 401. 9 396. 9 385. 1 392. 8 411. 2 409. 4	254. 1 297. 2 330. 3 360. 6 371. 2 365. 3 362. 3 370. 8 387. 2 382. 1	24. 7 26. 3 28. 7 27. 8 27. 3 25. 8 25. 8 25. 7 25. 7	3.6 .9 -3.8 -6.6 3.5 5.8 -3.0 -1.9 -1.7	16. 1 15. 9 16. 4 15. 2 15. 1 15. 0 15. 1 16. 0 16. 7 17. 3	43. 9 55. 1 81. 8 129. 3 149. 0 146. 2 75. 8 57. 9 58. 0 62. 2	18. 6 29. 6 56. 7 105. 0 125. 2 121. 8 49. 7 29. 8 29. 2 31. 3	25. 3 25. 5 25. 0 24. 4 23. 8 24. 5 26. 1 28. 1 28. 8 30. 9	1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 .8 1.1 1.6 1.8	7.5 15.5 14.7 16.1 7.5 -1.4 -14.7 -1.9 4.1
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1957 1958	533. 5 576. 5 598. 5 621. 8 613. 7 654. 8 668. 8 680. 9 679. 5 720. 4	531. 5 574. 7 596. 7 619. 9 611. 4 652. 2 666. 1 678. 0 676. 5 717. 3	448. 6 477. 2 492. 8 515. 6 508. 0 546. 5 557. 2 566. 0 561. 9 600. 5	417. 9 445. 9 460. 7 480. 6 473. 4 512. 5 529. 3 538. 7 528. 2 569. 6	26. 9 25. 8 26. 3 27. 6 28. 3 29. 2 28. 8 28. 1 29. 3 28. 2	3.8 5.57 7.3 6.2 4.8 9 8 4.4 2.7	18. 3 18. 7 18. 6 19. 3 19. 4 21. 4 22. 5 23. 1 24. 2 24. 9	64.6 78.8 85.3 85.0 83.9 84.4 86.5 88.9 90.4 91.8	32. 7 46. 2 51. 6 49. 6 47. 2 45. 9 45. 6 45. 8 44. 5	31. 9 32. 6 33. 7 35. 5 36. 7 38. 4 40. 8 43. 1 45. 8 47. 3	1.9 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.2	8.7 8.1 3.8 3.9 -1.4 6.7 2.1 1.8 2 6.0
1960	736. 8 755. 3 799. 1 830. 7 874. 4 925. 9 981. 0 1, 007. 7 1, 051. 8 1, 078. 8	733. 6 751. 2 794. 3 825. 8 868. 7 919. 9 975. 6 1, 001. 9 1, 045. 7 1, 073. 1	611. 8 625. 6 663. 9 692. 0 730. 4 776. 4 822. 4 839. 8 878. 2 901. 5	580. 5 590. 9 629. 6 658. 4 697. 1 746. 7 791. 1 807. 8 850. 6 877. 4	29. 5 29. 6 29. 5 30. 0 29. 2 30. 1 28. 5 29. 6 29. 4 29. 9	1. 8 5. 1 4. 8 3. 6 4. 0 4 2. 8 2. 4 -1. 8 -5. 9	26. 8 27. 2 28. 3 29. 0 29. 9 31. 1 32. 8 34. 8 35. 9 36. 6	94. 9 98. 5 102. 1 104. 8 108. 4 112. 4 120. 4 127. 2 131. 7 135. 0	45. 2 46. 2 48. 3 48. 2 48. 5 48. 7 53. 0 57. 2 58. 1 58. 2	49. 7 52. 3 53. 9 56. 6 60. 0 63. 6 67. 5 70. 0 73. 6 76. 8	3. 2 4. 1 4. 8 4. 9 5. 7 6. 1 5. 8 6. 1 5. 7	2.3 2.4 5.7 4.0 5.9 6.1 2.7 4.4 2.6
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 P	1, 075. 3 1, 107. 5 1, 171. 1 1, 235. 0 1, 214. 0 1, 191. 7 1, 265. 0	1, 069. 8 1, 100. 3 1, 164. 1 1, 227. 4 1, 206. 9 1, 186. 8 1, 259. 1	898. 3 927. 6 989. 5 1, 050. 4 1, 027. 3 1, 004. 1 1, 072. 0	871. 3 894. 9 955. 8 1, 013. 2 987. 7 968. 1 1, 033. 9	31. 1 32. 8 32. 0 32. 3 32. 0 34. 1 35. 2	-4.2 1 1.7 4.9 7.5 1.8 3.0	38.5	135. 2 136. 0 137. 4 138. 9 141. 5 144. 2 146. 3	55, 2 52, 5 50, 1 48, 3 48, 4 48, 2 48, 1	80.1 83.5 87.3 90.6 93.1 96.0 98.2	5. 5 7. 2 7. 0 7. 6 7. 0 4. 8 5. 9	3 2.8 5.8 5.4 -1.7 -1.7 6.1
1974: V	1, 230. 4 1, 220. 8 1, 212. 9 1, 191. 7	1, 219. 8 1, 215. 3 1, 207. 3 1, 185. 3	1, 040. 9 1, 036. 0 1, 027. 0 1, 005. 0	1, 005, 6 994, 6 986, 6 964, 1	30.6 32.8 32.2 32.5	4. 7 8. 6 8. 3 8. 4	38. 1 38. 5	140. 7 141. 1 141. 9 142. 4	48. 4 48. 3 48. 4 48. 4	92.3 92.8 93.4 94.0	10.7 5.5 5.6 6.4	-4.9 -1.5 -2.6 -7.1
1975: V	1, 161, 1 1, 177, 1 1, 209, 3 1, 219, 2	1, 157. 0 1, 172. 2 1, 204. 0 1, 214. 1	975. 6 989. 9 1, 020. 8 1, 030. 2	938. 8 956. 6 983. 0 994. 1	31. 8 34. 6 36. 0 34. 2	4.9 -1.3 1.8 1.9	38. 5	143. 1 143. 9 144. 7 145. 1	48. 4 48. 2 48. 2 48. 1	94. 7 95. 7 96. 5 97. 0	4. 1 4. 8 5. 3 5. 1	-9. 2 5. 4 11. 3 3. 4
1976: I		1, 240. 4 1, 254. 3 1, 266. 2 1, 275. 3	1, 055. 1 1, 068. 0 1, 078. 2 1, 086. 9	1, 018. 0 1, 031. 5 1, 039. 4 1, 046. 7	34, 3 34, 9 35, 0 36, 4	2. 8 1. 6 3. 8 3. 8	41.5	145. 5 146. 0 146. 6 147. 0	48. 1 48. 0 48. 1 48. 1	97. 4 97. 9 98. 4 98. 9	5. 9 5. 6 6. 0 6. 2	9. 0 4. 6 3. 8 2. 9

Includes compensation of employees in government enterprises.
 The difference between gross product in 1972 dollars measured as the sum of final products and that measured as the sum of gross product by industry.
 Compensation of government employees.
 Changes are based on unrounded data and therefore may differ from those obtained from data shown here. See Table B-2 for percent changes in gross national product in 1972 dollars.

TABLE B-11.—Gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporate business, 1929-76
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

	Gross	Cap-						Net de	omestic	produc	t				
	do- mes-	ital con-	-		Ī				Don	nestic in	come				
	tic prod- uct	tion allow- ances					Cor	porate			entory n adjust		n and ca	pital	
Year or quarter	of non- finan-	with capi- tal	Total	Indi- rect busi-		Com- pen- sation			Profi	ts befo			Inven- tory	Capi- tal	Net
	cial cor- po- rate busi- ness	con- sump- tion ad- just- ment		ness taxes	Total	of em- ploy- ees	Total	Total	Profits tax liabit- ity	Total	Divi- dends	undis- tribu- ted profits	valu- ation ad- just- ment	con- sump- tion ad- just- ment	inter- est
1929	50. 1	5.4	44. 7	3.4	41.3	32. 3	7.6	8.4	1.2	7. 3	5.2	2.0	0.5	-1.3	1. 4
1933	24. 4	4. 2	20, 2	3.8	16.4	16.7	-2.0	.6	.5	. 1	2.0	-1.9	2.1	5	1.7
1939	43. 7	4.7	39. 1	5.1	34.0	28. 2	4.3	6. 1	1.4	4. 7	3.3	1.4	7	-1.0	1.5
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948	95. 3 99. 3 120. 0 137. 3	4.8 5.3 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.4 7.3 9.1 10.7 11.6	45.6 60.4 77.0 92.6 95.9 88.9 92.1 110.9 126.5 121.9	5. 5 6. 4 6. 8 7. 3 8. 1 8. 9 10. 1 11. 2 12. 1 12. 6	40. 1 53. 9 70. 1 85. 3 87. 8 80. 0 81. 9 99. 8 114. 4 109. 3	31. 2 39. 8 51. 0 62. 2 65. 1 61. 9 67. 2 79. 1 87. 8 85. 3	7.5 12.8 17.9 22.0 21.7 17.2 14.1 19.9 25.8 23.0	8.8 16.4 20.1 23.6 22.2 17.8 22.0 29.1 31.8 24.9	2. 7 7. 5 11. 2 13. 8 12. 6 10. 2 8. 6 10. 8 11. 8 9. 3	6. 1 9. 0 8. 9 9. 8 9. 6 7. 6 13. 4 18. 3 20. 0 15. 6	3. 6 4. 0 3. 8 4. 0 4. 2 4. 2 5. 1 5. 9 6. 5	2. 5 4. 9 5. 1 5. 7 5. 4 3. 4 8. 3 12. 4 13. 5 9. 1	2 -2.5 -1.2 8 3 -5.3 -5.9 -2.2	-1.1 -1.0 8 2 1 -2.7 -3.3 -3.9 -3.8	1. 4 1. 3 1. 3 1. 1 1. 0 1. 0 . 7 . 8 . 9
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957	182.3 195.0	12.6 14.6 15.7 17.0 17.9 19.2 21.5 23.7 24.9 26.0	139. 3 159. 9 166. 7 178. 1 174. 1 197. 5 210. 1 218. 5 211. 4 239. 7	14. 1 15. 2 16. 8 18. 2 17. 4 19. 2 20. 8 22. 4 22. 8 25. 4	125. 2 144. 7 149. 8 159. 9 156. 6 178. 3 189. 2 196. 2 188. 6 214. 4	94. 7 110. 2 118. 3 128. 7 126. 5 138. 5 151. 4 159. 1 155. 9 171. 6	29. 6 33. 4 30. 3 29. 9 28. 6 38. 2 36. 1 35. 0 30. 1 39. 7	38. 5 39. 1 33. 8 34. 9 32. 1 42. 0 41. 8 39. 8 33. 7 43. 1	16. 9 21. 2 17. 8 18. 5 15. 6 20. 2 20. 1 19. 1 16. 2 20. 7	21. 6 17. 9 16. 0 16. 4 16. 4 21. 8 21. 8 20. 7 17. 5 22. 3	7. 9 7. 8 7. 8 8. 0 8. 2 9. 4 10. 1 10. 2 10. 8	13.6 10.1 8.1 8.4 8.2 12.4 11.6 10.3 7.3	-5.0 -1.2 1.0 -1.0 3 -1.7 -2.7 -1.5 3	-3.9 -4.5 -4.4 -4.0 -3.2 -2.1 -3.0 -3.3 -3.4 -2.9	.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.1
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967	277. 3 284. 5 311. 0 330. 9 357. 6 392. 1 430. 7 452. 9 498. 4 541. 8	31 N	250. 3 256. 7 282. 3 301. 1 326. 6 359. 3 394. 9 413. 6 455. 4 494. 0	35.0	222. 0 226. 5 249. 2 265. 6 288. 3 318. 2 352. 0 367. 9 403. 8 437. 0	181. 1 185. 1 199. 8 210. 7 226. 3 246. 1 273. 5 291. 9 321. 6 357. 4	37. 4 37. 4 44. 9 50. 0 56. 7 66. 1 71. 2 67. 2 72. 1 66. 4	39. 5 39. 2 43. 7 48. 3 54. 6 64. 4 69. 5 65. 4 71. 9 68. 4	19. 2 19. 5 20. 6 22. 8 24. 0 27. 2 29. 5 27. 7 33. 6 33. 3	20. 3 19. 7 23. 1 25. 5 30. 7 37. 2 40. 0 37. 7 38. 3 35. 1	11.5 11.7 12.7 14.1 15.3 17.2 18.1 18.9 20.7 20.7	8. 7 8. 0 10. 3 11. 4 15. 4 20. 0 21. 9 18. 8 17. 6 14. 4	.3 .1 2 5 -1.9 -2.1 -1.7 -3.4 -5.5	-2.3 -1.8 1.0 1.9 2.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5	3. 5 3. 9 4. 5 4. 8 5. 3 6. 1 7. 4 8. 7 10. 1 13, 1
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 »	560. 6 602. 5 671. 0 752. 0 810. 0 870. 4 982. 6	53. 1 58. 2 62. 6 68. 7 80. 8 96. 6 107. 9	507. 5 544. 2 608. 4 683. 3 729. 3 773. 8 874. 8	61. 8 68. 2 73. 5 80. 5 86. 1 93. 4 100. 5	445. 7 476. 0 534. 8 602. 8 643. 2 680. 4 774. 2	377. 1 399. 4 443. 8 503. 8 554. 7 577. 1 641. 5	51. 6 58. 7 72. 0 76. 0 59. 6 72. 5 97. 0	55. 1 63. 3 75. 9 92. 7 102. 3 95. 5 127. 2	27. 3 29. 9 33. 5 39. 6 42. 6 39. 7 52. 1	27. 9 33. 3 42. 4 53. 1 59. 8 55. 8 75. 1	19. 9 20. 0 21. 7 23. 9 30. 4 29. 0 32. 0	8. 0 13. 3 20. 7 29. 2 29. 4 26. 7 43. 1	-5.1 -5.0 -6.6 -18.6 -39.8 -11.4 -14.6	1. 5 .5 2. 7 1. 8 -3. 0 -11. 6 -15. 6	17. 0 17. 9 19. 1 23. 1 29. 0 30. 8 35. 8
17	787. 9 807. 5 821. 5 823. 3	75. 2 78. 7 82. 6 86. 6	712. 8 728. 7 738. 9 736. 6	83. 0 85. 6 87. 9 87. 7	629. 8 643. 1 651. 0 649. 0	536. 6 549. 9 564. 3 568. 0	66. 3 64. 9 57. 0 50. 1	96. 9 103. 4 113. 9 95. 1	40. 6 43. 3 47. 5 39. 0	56. 4 60. 2 66. 4 56. 1	26. 9 33. 2 33. 2 28. 1	29. 5 26. 9 33. 2 28. 0	-30. 4 -36. 6 -53. 4 -38. 8	3 -1.9 -3.5 -6.3	26. 8 28. 4 29. 7 30. 9
III IV	822. 3 851. 1 892. 0 916. 1	90. 9 95. 0 98. 7 101. 9	731. 5 756. 1 793. 3 814. 2	88. 4 92. 0 95. 6 97. 5	643. 1 664. 2 697. 7 716. 7	563. 4 566. 2 580. 3 598. 5	49. 6 67. 8 86. 6 86. 1	74. 8 87. 0 108. 3 112. 0	30. 2 35. 4 45. 8 47. 6	44. 5 51. 7 62. 5 64. 4	29. 5 29. 0 29. 1 28. 6	15. 0 22. 7 33. 4 35. 9	-16. 5 -7. 8 -9. 0 -12. 3	-8.6 -11.4 -12.7 -13.6	30. 0 30. 2 30. 8 32. 0
11[949. 0 972. 8 993. 8	104. 2 106. 8 108. 9	844. 8 866. 1 885. 0	97. 4 99. 7 101. 2	747. 4 766. 4 783. 7	620. 3 635. 4 646. 9	93, 2 95, 7 100, 3	119. 4 125. 6 128. 6	51. 1 53. 4 54. 7	68. 3 72. 2 73. 9	28, 2 31, 9 32, 9	40. 1 40. 3 41. 0	-11.5 -14.4 -12.6	-14.7 -15.5 -15.7	33. 9 35. 2 36. 5

¹ Indirect business tax and nontax liability plus business transfer payments less subsidies. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-12.—Output, costs, and profits of nonfinancial corporate business, 1948-76 [Quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		omestic uct of	Ct	rrent-dolla	ar cost a	nd profit	per unit	of outpu	t (dollars)1		
Year or	corp busi (billio	nancial orate ness ons of lars)	Total	Capital con- sump- tion allow-	in-	Com- pen-		inven	ate profit tory valu nd capita mption a ments	ation	Output per hour of all em-	Compen- sation per hour of
quarter	Cur- rent dollars	1972 dollars	cost and profit?	ances with capital con- sump- tion adjust- ment	direct busi- ness taxes 3	sation of em- ployees	Net in- terest	Total	Profits tax liability	Profits after tax 4	ployees (1972 dollars)	all em- ployees (dollars)
1948 1949	137. 3 133. 5	229. 7 219. 9	0. 598 . 607	0. 047 . 053	0. 053 . 057	0. 382 . 388	0.004 .004	0. 112 . 105	0. 051 . 042	0.061 .062		
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	151. 9 174. 5 182. 3 195. 0 191. 9	247. 5 270. 2 275. 2 292. 0 283. 5	. 614 . 646 . 663 . 668 . 677	. 051 . 054 . 057 . 058 . 063	. 057 . 056 . 061 . 062 . 061	. 383 . 408 . 430 . 441 . 446	. 004 . 004 . 004 . 004 . 006	. 120 . 124 . 110 . 102 . 101	. 068 . 079 . 065 . 063 . 055	. 051 . 045 . 046 . 039 . 046		
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	216. 7 231. 6 242. 3 236. 3 265. 7	315. 1 324. 1 328. 3 313. 4 347. 3	. 688 . 715 . 738 . 754 . 765	. 061 . 066 . 072 . 080 . 075	. 061 . 064 . 068 . 073 . 073	. 439 . 467 . 484 . 497 . 494	. 005 . 005 . 007 . 009 . 009	. 121 . 112 . 106 . 096 . 114	. 064 . 062 . 058 . 052 . 060	. 057 . 050 . 048 . 044 . 055	5. 110 5. 333	2. 541 2. 635
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	277. 3 284. 5 311. 0 330. 9 357. 6	358. 9 366. 7 399. 7 425. 4 455. 2	.773 .776 .778 .778 .786	. 075 . 076 . 072 . 070 . 068	. 079 . 082 . 083 . 084 . 084	. 505 . 505 . 500 . 495 . 497	.010 .011 .011 .011 .012	.104 .102 .112 .118 .125	. 053 . 053 . 052 . 054 . 053	. 051 . 049 . 061 . 064 . 072	5, 455 5, 634 5, 912 6, 167 6, 427	2. 752 2. 844 2. 956 3. 054 3. 195
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	392. 1 430. 7 452. 9 498. 4 541. 8	494. 6 532. 9 545. 8 581. 6 607. 3	. 793 . 808 . 830 . 857 . 892	. 066 . 067 . 072 . 074 . 079	. 083 . 080 . 084 . 089 . 094	. 497 . 513 . 535 . 553 . 589	.012 .014 .016 .017	.134 .134 .123 .124 .109	. 055 . 055 . 051 . 058 . 055	. 079 . 078 . 072 . 066 . 055	6. 625 6. 777 6. 873 7. 141 7. 211	3, 296 3, 478 3, 676 3, 948 4, 240
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	602.5 671.0 752.0	600. 6 619. 3 671. 0 720. 4 698. 7	. 933 . 973 1. 000 1. 044 1. 159	. 088 . 094 . 093 . 095 . 116	. 103 . 110 . 110 . 112 . 123	. 628 . 645 . 661 . 699 . 794	.028 .029 .028 .032 .041	.086 .095 .107 .105 .085	.045 .048 .050 .055 .061	. 041 . 046 . 057 . 050 . 024	7. 242 7. 531 7. 798 7. 985 7. 743	4. 547 4. 858 5. 158 5. 583 6. 147
1975 1976 p	870. 4 982. 6	676. 8 726. 8	1. 286 1, 352	. 143 . 148	. 138 . 138	. 853 . 883	.045	. 107 . 133	. 059 . 072	. 048	7.969	6. 795
1974: I II IV	807.5 821.5	717. 1 707. 8 696. 9 675. 2	1. 099 1. 141 1. 179 1. 219	. 105 . 111 . 118 . 128	.116 .121 .126 .130	.748 .777 .810 .841	. 037 . 040 . 043 . 046	. 093 . 092 . 082 . 074	. 057 . 061 . 068 . 058	. 036 . 031 . 014 . 016	7. 880 7. 807 7. 693 7. 612	5. 897 6. 065 6. 229 6. 403
1975: I II III IV	851. 1 892. 0	653. 1 668. 1 688. 9 696. 1	1. 259 1. 274 1. 295 1. 316	. 139 . 142 . 143 . 146	. 135 . 138 . 139 . 140	. 863 . 847 . 842 . 860	. 046 . 045 . 045 . 046	. 076 . 101 . 126 . 124	. 046 . 053 . 066 . 068	. 030 . 049 . 059 . 055	7. 678 7. 958 8. 123 8. 097	6. 624 6. 745 6. 843 6. 962
1976: -	972.8	713. 9 725. 7 731. 5	1. 329 1. 341 1. 359	. 146 . 147 . 149	. 136 . 137 . 138	. 869 . 876 . 884	. 047 . 049 . 050	. 131 . 132 . 137	. 072 . 074 . 075	. 059 . 058 . 062	8. 187 8. 289 8. 341	7. 113 7. 258 7. 370

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

Output is measured by gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporate business in 1972 dollars.
 This is equal to the deflator for gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporate business with the decimal point.
 Indirect business tax and nontax liability plus business transfer payments less subsidies.
 With inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.

TABLE B-13.—Personal consumption expenditures, 1929-76 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Dur	able god	ods 1		Nondura	able goo	ds 1			S	ervices 1		
Year or quarter	Personal consumption expenditures	Total	Motor vehicles and parts	Furniture and household equipment	Total	Food	Clothing and shoes	Gasoline and oil	Fuel oil and coal	Total	Housing ²	Total opera		Transportation
1929	77.3	9.2	3.3	4.7	37.7	19.5	9.4	1.8	1.6	30. 3	11.7	4.0	1.2	2.6
1933	45, 8	3,5	1.1	1.9	22.3	11.5	4.6	1.5	1.2	20. 1	8.1	2.8	1.1	1.5
1939		6.7	2.3	3.4	35. 1	19.1	7.1	2. 2	1.4	25. 2	9.4	3.8	1.4	2.0
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	71. 0 80. 8 88. 6 99. 4 108. 2 119. 5 143. 8 161. 7 174. 7	7.8 9.7 6.9 6.5 6.7 8.0 15.8 20.4 22.9 25.0	2.8 3.5 .7 .8 1.0 4.1 6.6 8.0 10.6	3.8 4.8 4.6 3.9 3.8 4.5 8.4 10.6 11.5	37.0 42.9 50.8 58.6 64.3 71.9 82.7 90.9 96.6 94.9	20. 2 23. 4 28. 4 33. 2 36. 7 40. 6 47. 4 52. 3 54. 2 52. 5	7. 5 8. 8 11. 0 13. 4 14. 6 16. 5 18. 2 18. 8 20. 1 19. 3	2.3 2.6 2.1 1.3 1.4 1.8 3.4 4.0 4.8 5.3	1.5 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.4	26. 2 28. 2 31. 0 34. 3 37. 1 39. 6 45. 3 50. 4 55. 3 58. 2	9. 7 10. 4 11. 2 11. 8 12. 3 12. 8 14. 2 16. 0 17. 9 19. 6	4. 0 4. 3 4. 8 5. 9 6. 4 6. 8 7. 1 8. 5	1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.6 2.9	2. 1 2. 4 2. 7 3. 4 3. 7 4. 0 5. 0 5. 3 5. 8
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	192. 0 207. 1 217. 1 229. 7 235. 8 253. 7 266. 0 280. 4 289. 5 310. 8	30. 8 29. 8 29. 1 32. 5 31. 8 38. 6 37. 9 39. 3 36. 8 42. 4	13. 7 12. 2 11. 3 13. 9 13. 0 17. 8 15. 8 17. 2 14. 8 18. 9	13.7 14.0 14.0 14.6 14.6 16.2 17.1 16.9 16.6 17.8	98. 2 108. 8 113. 9 116. 5 118. 0 122. 9 128. 9 135. 2 139. 8 146. 4	53.9 60.4 63.4 64.4 65.4 67.2 69.9 73.6 76.4 79.1	19.6 21.2 21.9 22.1 22.1 23.1 24.1 24.3 24.7 26.1	5.5 6.1 6.8 7.4 7.8 8.6 9.4 10.2 10.6 11.3	3.4 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.0	63. 0 68. 5 74. 0 80. 6 86. 1 92. 1 99. 2 105. 9 112. 8 121. 9	21. 7 24. 3 27. 0 29. 8 32. 2 34. 3 36. 7 39. 3 42. 0 45. 0	9.5 10.4 11.1 12.0 12.6 14.0 15.2 16.2 17.3 18.5	3.3 3.7 4.1 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.1 7.6	6.2 6.7 7.1 7.8 7.9 8.2 8.6 9.0 9.3
1960	324. 9 335. 0 355. 2 374. 6 400. 4 430. 2 464. 8 490. 4 535. 9 579. 7	43. 1 41. 6 46. 7 51. 4 56. 3 62. 8 67. 7 69. 6 80. 0 85. 5	19. 7 17. 8 21. 5 24. 4 26. 0 29. 8 30. 1 29. 7 35. 8 37. 7	17.7 17.9 18.9 20.3 22.8 24.7 27.7 29.5 32.6 35.0	151. 1 155. 3 161. 6 167. 1 176. 9 188. 6 204. 7 212. 6 230. 4 247. 0	81. 1 83. 2 85. 5 87. 8 92. 7 98. 9 106. 6 109. 6 118. 3 126. 1	26. 7 27. 4 28. 7 29. 5 31. 9 33. 5 36. 6 38. 2 41. 8 45. 1	12.0 12.0 12.6 12.9 13.5 14.7 16.0 17.0 18.4 20.4	3.8 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.7 4.8 5.0 5.2	130. 7 138. 1 147. 0 156. 1 167. 1 178. 7 192. 4 208. 1 225. 6 247. 2	48. 1 51. 2 54. 7 58. 0 61. 4 65. 5 69. 5 74. 1 79. 9 86. 8	20. 1 21. 0 22. 2 23. 4 24. 8 26. 3 28. 0 30. 6 32. 7 35. 5	8. 3 8. 8 9. 4 9. 9 10. 4 10. 9 11. 5 12. 2 13. 1 14. 2	10.7 11.2 11.7 12.2 12.8 13.7 15.0 16.2 17.4
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	618. 8 668. 2 733. 0 809. 9 887. 5 973. 2 1, 078. 6	84. 9 97. 1 111. 2 123. 7 121. 6 131. 7 156. 3	34. 9 43. 8 50. 6 55. 2 47. 9 53. 2 70. 6	36. 7 39. 4 44. 8 50. 7 54. 7 57. 6 62. 9	264. 7 277. 7 299. 3 333. 8 376. 2 409. 1 440. 3	136. 3 140. 6 150. 4 168. 1 189. 9 209. 5 224. 5	46.6 50.5 55.1 61.3 65.1 70.0 75.3	22. 0 23. 4 24. 9 27. 8 36. 3 38. 9 41. 4	5. 4 5. 5 6. 3 7. 7 9. 5 10. 1 11. 8	269. 1 293. 4 322. 4 352. 3 389. 6 432. 4 482. 0	94. 0 102. 7 112. 3 123. 2 136. 4 150. 2 165. 8	38. 3 41. 6 45. 9 50. 2 56. 1 63. 9 71. 6	15. 5 17. 0 18. 9 20. 6 24. 0 28. 9 32. 1	21. 1 23. 8 26. 0 27. 9 31. 1 34. 0 37. 4
1974: V	853.3 878.7 906.8 911.1	118.6 122.5 128.0 117.4	46. 2 48. 5 53. 0 43. 7	53. 7 54. 9 55. 7 54. 4	360. 6 371. 9 383. 8 388. 5	181. 5 186. 4 193. 7 198. 0	64.2 65.0 66.2 65.0	31.8 36.2 38.0 39.3	9. 0 9. 3 9. 8 9. 9	374. 1 384. 3 394. 9 405. 2	131. 8 134. 6 137. 8 141. 3	52.8 55.3 57.5 59.1	21.6 23.3 24.8 26.3	29. 7 30. 6 31. 6 32. 5
1975: 1	933. 2	122. 1 127. 0 136. 0 141. 8	47. 6 49. 5 56. 3 59. 2	54. 6 57. 0 58. 2 60. 6	394. 4 405. 8 414. 6 421. 6	203. 2 207. 8 211. 8 215. 2	66. 6 69. 3 71. 3 73. 0	37. 9 38. 6 39. 2 39. 9	9.5 9.9 10.8 10.2	416. 7 427. 4 436. 7 448. 6	145. 0 148. 4 151. 8 155. 8	61. 2 63. 7 65. 0 65. 9	27. 6 28. 9 29. 5 29. 6	33.3 33.6 34.1 35.0
1976: I II IV *	1, 043. 6 1, 064. 7 1, 088. 5 1, 117. 5	151. 4 155. 0 157. 6 161. 2	68. 0 70. 4 71. 7 72. 4	61. 2 62. 3 62. 9 65. 1	429. 1 434. 8 441. 8 455. 5	219. 2 223. 1 225. 2 230. 4	73. 5 73. 2 75. 9 78. 5	40.1 40.3 41.6 43.6	11.2 11.0 11.9 13.2	463. 2 474. 9 489. 1 500. 8	159. 7 163. 9 167. 8 171. 7	68. 4 69. 6 72. 8 75. 4	31. 0 30. 6 32. 6 34. 1	36. 5 37. 0 37. 8 38. 6

¹ Total includes "other" category, not shown separately.
 ² Includes imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Table B-14.—Gross private domestic investment, 1929-76
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

			Fixed investment										ge in ness tories		
Year or	Gross private		Nonresidential						Resid						
quarter	domes- tic invest- ment	Total	Total	Total	Total	Stru	ctures	Producers' durable equipment		Total	Non- farm struc-	Farm struc-	Pro- ducers' dur- able	Total	Non- farm
				Total	Non- farm	Total	Non- farm		tures	tures	equip- ment				
1929	16.2	14.5	10.5	5. 0	4.8	5.5	4.8	4.0	3.8	0. 2	0.1	1.7	1.8		
1933	1,4	3.0	2.4	. 9	.9	1.4	1.3	.6	.5	.0	.0	-1.6	-1.4		
1939		8.8	5.8	2.0	1.9	3.9	3.3	3.0	2.8	.1	.1	.4	.3		
1940	13. 1 17. 9 9. 9 5. 8 7. 2 10. 6 30. 7 34. 0 45. 9 35. 3	10. 9 13. 4 8. 1 6. 4 8. 1 11. 7 24. 3 34. 4 41. 1 38. 4	7. 5 9. 4 6. 0 5. 0 6. 8 10. 1 16. 8 22. 9 26. 2 24. 3	2.3 2.9 1.9 1.3 1.8 2.8 6.8 7.6 8.9 8.6	2.2 2.8 1.8 1.2 1.7 2.6 6.1 6.8 8.1 7.8	5. 2 6. 4 4. 1 3. 7 5. 0 7. 3 9. 9 15. 3 17. 3 15. 7	4. 5 5. 5 3. 5 4. 2 6. 3 9. 0 13. 4 14. 7 12. 8	3.5 4.0 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.6 7.5 11.5 15.0 14.1	3. 2 3. 7 1. 9 1. 2 1. 1 1. 4 6. 8 10. 5 13. 8 12. 9	.2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .5 .7	.1 .1 .0 .0 .0 .2 .3 .3	2.2 4.5 1.8 -1.6 -1.0 -1.0 6.4 5 4.7 -3.1	1. 9 4. 0 . 7 6 6 6. 4 1. 3 3. 0 2. 2		
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	53. 8 59. 2 52. 1 53. 3 52. 7 68. 4 71. 0 69. 2 61. 9 77. 6	47. 0 48. 9 49. 0 52. 9 54. 3 62. 4 66. 3 67. 9 63. 4 72. 3	27. 1 31. 1 31. 2 34. 3 34. 0 38. 3 43. 7 46. 7 41. 6 45. 3	9. 3 11. 3 11. 5 12. 8 13. 2 14. 4 17. 4 18. 1 16. 7 17. 0	8.6 10.5 10.6 12.0 12.4 13.7 16.6 17.4 16.0	17. 8 19. 9 19. 7 21. 5 20. 8 23. 9 26. 3 28. 6 24. 9 28. 3	14.9 16.9 17.1 18.7 18.4 21.3 24.1 26.2 21.9 25.2	19. 9 17. 7 17. 8 18. 6 20. 3 24. 1 22. 6 21. 2 21. 8 27. 0	18. 7 16. 6 16. 6 17. 5 19. 2 23. 0 21. 4 20. 0 20. 7 25. 8	.8 .8 .8 .7 .6 .7 .7	. 4	6.8 10.3 3.1 -1.5 6.0 4.7 1.3 -1.5 5.2	6. 0 9. 1 2. 1 1. 1 -2. 1 5. 5 5. 1 -2. 3 5. 3		
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	76. 4 74. 3 85. 2 90. 2 96. 6 112. 0 124. 5 120. 8 131. 5 146. 2	72. 7 72. 1 78. 7 84. 2 90. 8 102. 5 110. 2 110. 7 123. 8 136. 8	47. 7 47. 1 51. 2 53. 6 59. 7 71. 3 81. 4 82. 1 89. 3 98. 9	18. 2 18. 4 19. 4 19. 6 21. 5 26. 1 29. 2 29. 5 31. 6 35. 7	17. 3 17. 5 18. 5 18. 6 20. 5 25. 1 28. 1 28. 2 30. 4 34. 3	29. 5 28. 7 31. 8 34. 0 38. 2 45. 1 52. 2 52. 6 57. 7 63. 3	27. 0 26. 1 28. 9 30. 6 34. 6 41. 2 47. 9 48. 0 53. 4 58. 9	25. 0 25. 0 27. 4 30. 6 31. 2 31. 2 28. 7 28. 6 34. 5 37. 9	23. 9 23. 8 26. 3 29. 4 29. 9 27. 4 27. 2 33. 1 36. 3	:7	.5 .5 .6 .7 .7 .7 .8	3. 8 2. 2 6. 5 6. 0 5. 8 9. 5 14. 3 10. 1 7. 7 9. 4	3. 5 1. 9 5. 8 5. 2 6. 4 8. 5 14. 5 9. 4 7. 6		
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	140. 8 160. 0 188. 3 220. 0 215. 0 183. 7 241. 2	137. 0 153. 6 178. 8 202. 1 204. 3 198. 3 227. 7	100. 5 104. 1 116. 8 136. 0 149. 2 147. 1 160. 0	37. 7 39. 3 42. 5 49. 0 54. 1 52. 0 55. 4	36. 1 37. 8 41. 1 46. 9 51. 8 49. 8 53. 1	62.8 64.7 74.3 87.0 95.1 95.1 104.5	58. 1 59. 9 69. 1 80. 1 87. 2 86. 9 95. 6	36. 6 49. 6 62. 0 66. 1 55. 1 51. 2 67. 8	35. 1 47. 9 60. 3 64. 3 52. 7 49. 0 65. 1	.6 .7 .7 .6 1.0 .8	1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3	3. 8 6. 4 9. 4 17. 9 10. 7 -14. 6 13. 5	3. 7 5. 1 8. 8 14. 7 12. 2 -17. 6 13. 6		
1974: I II IV	216. 4 218. 8 213. 3	203. 8 205. 8 206. 0 201. 7	145.1 149.0 150.9 151.9	52. 4 54. 8 54. 1 55. 2	50. 1 52. 3 51. 9 52. 9	92.7 94.2 96.8 96.7	85. 5 86. 5 89. 0 88. 0	58. 7 56. 8 55. 0 49. 8	56. 4 54. 6 52. 7 47. 2	1.0 .9 .9 1.3	1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3	12.6 13.0 7.3 9.7	14. 5 13. 9 7. 4 12. 9		
1975: I II IV	164.4 196.7	194.6 194.3 198.6 205.7	148. 0 145. 8 146. 1 148. 7	53.1 51.2 51.8 52.1	50. 9 48. 8 49. 6 49. 9	94. 9 94. 6 94. 3 96. 6	86. 5 86. 2 86. 7 88. 0	46.6 48.6 52.6 57.0	44. 9 46. 7 50. 2 54. 2	.5 .6 1.0 1.4	1. 2 1. 3 1. 4 1. 4	-22.2 -30.0 -2.0 -4.3	-25.6 -31.2 -4.2 -9.5		
1976: II IV P	229. 6 239. 2 247. 0	214.7 223.2 231.9 241.1	153. 4 157. 9 163. 0 165. 5	53. 2 54. 9 56. 0 57. 5	51.0 52.5 53.7 55.1	100. 2 103. 0 107. 0 108. 0	91. 3 94. 1 98. 0 98. 8	61.3 65.3 68.9 75.6	58. 6 62. 9 66. 3 72. 7	1.2 .9 1.0 1.2	1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7	14. 8 16. 0 15. 1 7. 9	12.7 17.3 15.6 8.9		

TABLE B-15.—Inventories and final sales of business, 1946-76 [Billions of dollars, except as noted; seasonally adjusted]

				Inventories	1				Inventory-final sales ratio		
Year and quarter						Final sales 2					
4-2.1.1.	Total	Farm	Total non- farm	Manufac- turing	Wholesale trade	Retail trade	Other		Total	Non- farm ⁸	
ourth quarter: 1946 1947 1948 1948	73. 7 86. 9 90. 6 81. 0	21. 8 25. 8 23. 4 19. 5	51. 9 61. 1 67. 2 61. 4	26.7 31.8 34.8 31.0	9. 6 10. 6 11. 3 10. 9	11. 9 14. 1 16. 1 15. 0	3.7 4.6 4.9 4.4	192. 0 219. 6 235. 7 234. 6	0. 384 . 396 . 384 . 345	0. 276 . 278 . 285 . 262	
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	98. 8 112. 1 109. 4 110. 1 107. 2	24. 2 26. 5 23. 1 21. 6 20. 5	74.6 85.6 86.3 88.5 86.7	37. 4 46. 2 47. 3 49. 3 47. 0	13.4 14.0 14.0 14.2 14.5	18.6 19.2 18.8 19.5 19.7	5. 2 6. 2 6. 2 5. 5 5. 6	259. 8 295. 6 313. 3 325. 8 330. 1	. 380 . 379 . 349 . 338 . 325	. 287 . 290 . 275 . 273 . 263	
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	112. 1 121. 8 126. 7 128. 9 132. 3	17.6 18.3 20.9 24.9 23.6	94.6 103.5 105.8 103.9 108.7	51. 4 57. 5 57. 9 56. 0 57. 5	15. 6 16. 7 16. 9 16. 9 18. 0	21. 9 22. 9 24. 0 24. 1 25. 3	5.6 6.4 6.9 6.9 8.0	356. 5 377. 0 392. 7 405. 0 426. 7	.315 .323 .323 .318 .310	. 26! . 27/ . 26! . 25!	
1960	136. 2 138. 4 145. 2 151. 5 157. 6	24.8 25.0 26.6 26.9 25.7	111.3 113.4 118.6 124.6 131.8	58. 1 59. 5 62. 5 64. 8 68. 5	18. 4 19. 0 19. 7 21. 2 22. 3	26. 8 26. 3 27. 9 29. 4 31. 1	8.1 8.7 8.6 9.2 9.9	442. 1 465. 3 492. 7 524. 2 553. 1	. 308 . 297 . 295 . 289 . 285	. 25 . 24 . 24 . 23 . 23	
1965 1966 1967 1968	172, 7 189, 1 202, 2 215, 3 236, 2	29.7 28.9 29.2 30.4 33.4	143. 0 160. 2 173. 0 184. 9 202. 8	73. 7 83. 4 91. 1 97. 4 107. 1	24. 0 27. 2 29. 2 30. 9 33. 8	34. 4 38. 0 39. 2 42. 2 45. 9	10.9 11.6 13.5 14.4 16.1	610.7 647.5 688.0 757.6 804.5	. 283 . 292 . 294 . 284 . 294	. 23 . 24 . 25 . 24 . 25	
1970	ł .	31. 7 36. 8 44. 6 66. 2 61. 7	212. 5 225. 1 243. 9 289. 6 366. 3	110. 8 113. 6 120. 4 143. 6 188. 7	36. 8 39. 4 43. 6 52. 8 67. 0	47. 1 52. 9 58. 0 66. 8 76. 3	17. 7 19. 2 21. 8 26. 4 34. 4	839. 4 915. 2 1, 019. 9 1, 120. 5 1, 210. 1	. 291 . 286 . 283 . 318 . 354	. 25: . 24: . 23: . 25: . 30:	
1975 1976 p	426. 8 462. 1	63.3 61.1	363.5 401.0	188. 5 206. 3	64. 7 72. 5	74. 7 82. 6	35.6 39.5	1, 344. 7 1, 466. 3	.317 .315	. 27	
1974: 1 1 1 V	392 0	64. 7 59. 2 65. 9 61. 7	309. 9 332. 7 354. 0 366. 3	155. 7 170. 0 182. 3 188. 7	57. 2 61. 2 64. 9 67. 0	68. 4 70. 7 74. 0 76. 3	28.6 30.9 32.8 34.4	1, 143. 5 1, 170. 8 1, 202. 3 1, 210. 1	. 328 . 335 . 349 . 354	. 27 . 28 . 29 . 30	
1975:	419. 0 417. 7 426. 8	58. 5 63. 2 66. 3 63. 3	360. 5 354. 5 360. 5 363. 5	187. 7 184. 8 186. 4 188. 5	66. 0 64. 1 65. 0 64. 7	73. 2 72. 3 75. 0 74. 7	33. 6 33. 3 34. 1 35. 6	1, 238. 5 1, 276. 4 1, 308. 8 1, 344. 7	. 338 . 327 . 326 . 317	. 29 . 27 . 27 . 27	
1976: !	434.9 445.4 452.9 462.1	64. 2 65. 4 62. 3 61. 1	370. 7 380. 0 390. 6 401. 0	190. 6 194. 7 199. 7 206. 3	66. 6 69. 0 70. 4 72. 5	77. 2 79. 4 82. 2 82. 6	36. 3 36. 9 38. 3 39. 5	1, 365. 9 1, 399. 5 1, 428. 0 1, 466. 3	. 318 . 318 . 317 . 315	. 27 . 27 . 27 . 27	

¹ End of quarter.
2 Annual rates.
3 Ratio based on total final sales, which include a small amount of final sales by farms.

TABLE B-16.—Inventories and final sales of business in 1972 dollars, 1947-76 (Billions of 1972 dollars, except as noted; seasonally adjusted)

				Inventories	1				Invento sales	ry-final ratio
Year and quarter				N	onfarm			Final sales 2		
degree	Total	Farm	Totai non- farm	Manufac- turing	Wholesale trade	Retail trade	Other	34163	Total	Non- farm 3
Fourth quarter: 1947 1948 1949	118.6 124.1 119.7	25. 7 26. 7 26. 2	93. 0 97. 3 93. 5	49. 9 51. 3 48. 6	13.8 15.0 15.0	20. 5 22. 5 22. 0	8.7 8.6 7.8	397. 2 412. 0 415. 1	0. 299 . 301 . 288	0, 234 . 236 . 225
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	143.9 148.2 149.7	27. 5 29. 1 30. 4 30. 2 31. 1	102.7 114.8 117.9 119.6 116.5	51. 8 62. 5 65. 2 66. 9 63. 3	17. 0 17. 5 17. 9 18. 1 18. 4	25. 2 25. 3 25. 3 25. 8 26. 0	8.7 9.5 9.6 8.7 8.8	442.6 476.5 499.1 516.2 517.0	. 294 . 302 . 297 . 290 . 285	. 232 . 241 . 236 . 232 . 225
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	155.3 161.1 162.6 160.8 167.2	32.4	123. 7 130. 3 131. 2 128. 4 134. 8	66. 7 71. 6 71. 1 68. 6 71. 1	19. 9 20. 5 20. 3 20. 3 22. 1	28.7 29.0 30.0 29.7 31.1	8. 4 9. 2 9. 8 9. 8 10. 5	547. 4 557. 6 565. 3 577. 2 596. 8	. 284 . 289 . 288 . 279 . 280	. 226 . 234 . 232 . 222 . 226
1960	171.6	33. 2 34. 5 35. 7	138. 8 141. 2 148. 1 154. 7 162. 6	72. 4 74. 2 78. 4 80. 8 84. 7	22. 7 23. 4 24. 3 26. 2 27. 5	33. 0 32. 2 34. 0 35. 7 37. 6	10.7 11.4 11.4 12.0 12.8	609. 0 636. 6 664. 2 699. 3 730. 7	. 282 . 274 . 275 . 272 . 271	. 228 . 221 . 223 . 221 . 223
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	209. 0 225. 7 237. 7 246. 4	36. 0 36. 8 37. 0	172. 8 189. 7 200. 9 209. 4 219. 7	89. 1 99. 0 105. 9 110. 7 115. 8	28. 9 32. 0 33. 9 34. 9 36. 5	41. 0 44. 4 44. 8 47. 0 49. 4	13.8 14.3 16.3 16.8 18.0	791. 3 809. 2 837. 2 882. 8 892. 2	. 264 . 279 . 284 . 279 . 288	. 218 . 234 . 240 . 237 . 246
1970	261. 3 267. 9 277. 4 293. 9 302. 3	39. 2 39. 8 42. 1	223. 6 228. 8 237. 6 251. 8 260. 7	117. 1 115. 4 117. 5 123. 6 129. 7	38. 7 40. 1 42. 4 45. 3 48. 5	49. 0 53. 7 56. 5 60. 3 59. 2	18. 8 19. 5 21. 3 22. 7 23. 4	891.7 935.0 1,007.6 1,031.8 997.0	. 293 . 287 . 275 . 285 . 303	. 251 . 245 . 236 . 244 . 261
1975 1976 »	1	42. 6 42. 5	247. 7 256. 9	124. 1 127. 5	44. 9 47. 8	55. 6 57. 9	23. 1 23. 7	1, 035. 7 1, 082. 2	. 280 . 277	. 239 . 237
1974 : 1 I I I I V	296. 7 299. 1 300. 3 302. 3	1 41.9 3 41.8	257.2	125. 7 127. 4 128. 6 129. 7	46. 6 47. 7 48. 0 48. 5	59. 6 59. 2 58. 9 59. 2	22. 9 22. 9 23. 0 23. 4	1, 029. 5 1, 026. 7 1, 022. 0 997. 0	. 288 . 291 . 294 . 303	. 247 . 251 . 253 . 261
1975: V	297 2	7 42.2	255. 3 249. 9 249. 4 247. 7	128. 7 126. 6 125. 0 124. 1	47. 3 45. 7 45. 5 44. 9	56. 4 55. 2 56. 2 55. 6	22. 9 22. 5 22. 6 23. 1	996. 1 1, 011. 1 1, 021. 8 1, 035. 7	. 298 . 289 . 285 . 280	. 256 . 247 . 244 . 239
1976: 	295.7 298.7	7 42.7 2 42.7	252.9	126.4	46.8	58. 2	23. 3 23. 5 23. 5 23. 7	1, 044. 7 1, 059. 9 1, 068. 0 1, 082. 2	.280 .279 .279 .277	. 239 . 239 . 237

End of quarter.
 Annual rates.
 Ratio based on total final sales, which include a small amount of final sales by farms.

Table B-17.—Relation of gross national product and national income, 1929-76
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Less: Capital		Plus: Subsidies		Less:		
Year or quarter	Gross national product	consump- tion allow- ances with capital consump- tion adjust- ment	Equals: Net national product	less current surplus of govern- ment enter- prises	Indirect business tax and nontax fiability	Business transfer payments	Statistical discrep- ancy	Equals: National income
1929	103. 4	9.7	93. 7	-0.2	7. 1	0.6	1.1	84. 8
1933	55.8	7.5	48.3	0	7.1	.7	.7	39.9
1939	90.8	8.7	82. 1	.4	9.4	. 5	1.4	71.3
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948	100. 0 124. 9 158. 3 192. 0 210. 5 212. 3 209. 6 232. 8 259. 1 258. 0	9.0 10.0 11.2 11.5 11.8 12.3 13.8 17.2 20.3 22.0	91. 0 114. 9 147. 1 180. 5 198. 7 200. 0 195. 7 215. 6 238. 8 236. 1	.4 .1 .1 .6 .7 .9 2 1 3	10. 1 11. 3 11. 8 12. 8 14. 2 15. 5 17. 1 18. 4 20. 1 21. 3	.4555555678	1.1 .5 8 -1.8 2.7 4.1 .7 1.8 -1.2	79. 7 102. 6 135. 7 169. 1 181. 9 180. 6 178. 3 194. 6 219. 0 212. 7
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1955 1957 1957	286. 2 330. 2 347. 2 366. 1 366. 3 399. 3 420. 7 442. 8 448. 9 486. 5	23. 9 27. 6 29. 6 31. 6 33. 1 35. 3 38. 9 42. 0 44. 1 46. 1	262. 3 302. 6 317. 6 334. 5 333. 2 364. 0 381. 8 400. 8 404. 8 440. 4	1 3 5 3 0 .7 .7 1.1	23. 4 25. 3 27. 7 29. 7 29. 6 32. 2 35. 1 37. 5 38. 7 41. 8	. 8 . 9 1. 0 1. 2 1. 1 1. 2 1. 4 1. 5 1. 6 1. 8	2.0 4.0 2.7 3.3 3.0 2.5 8 1.7 2	236. 2 272. 3 285. 8 299. 7 299. 1 328. 0 346. 0 362. 3 364. 0 397. 1
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1965 1967 1967	506. 0 523. 3 563. 8 594. 7 635. 7 688. 1 753. 0 796. 3 868. 5 935. 5	47. 7 49. 1 50. 5 52. 2 54. 6 57. 5 61. 7 67. 0 73. 8 82. 5	458. 3 474. 2 513. 3 542. 5 581. 2 630. 6 691. 3 729. 3 794. 7 853. 1	.4 1.7 1.8 1.1 1.7 1.6 2.5 1.6 1.3	45. 4 48. 0 51. 6 54. 6 58. 8 62. 6 65. 3 70. 2 78. 8 86. 4	2. 0 2. 0 2. 1 2. 4 2. 7 2. 8 3. 0 3. 1 3. 4 3. 8	7 1.6 4.0 3.7 2.2 .9 3.2 1.7 6 -3.3	412. 0 424. 2 457. 4 482. 8 519. 2 566. 0 622. 2 655. 8 714. 4 767. 9
1970	982. 4 1, 063. 4 1, 171. 1 1, 306. 6 1, 413. 2 1, 516. 3 1, 692. 4	90. 8 98. 8 105. 4 117. 7 137. 7 161. 4 179. 8	891. 6 964. 7 1, 065. 8 1, 188. 9 1, 275. 5 1, 355. 0 1, 512. 7	2. 7 2. 4 3. 6 3. 9 . 8 2. 0 1. 2	94. 0 103. 4 111. 0 120. 2 128. 4 138. 7 149. 7	4. 0 4. 2 4. 7 5. 4 5. 6 6. 3 7. 1	-2. 1 1. 3 1. 7 2. 6 6. 6 4. 4 7. 6	798. 4 858. 1 951. 9 1, 064. 6 1, 135. 7 1, 207. 6 1, 349. 4
1974: I	1, 372. 7 1, 399. 4 1, 431. 6 1, 449. 2	128. 5 134. 5 140. 6 147. 2	1, 244. 2 1, 265. 0 1, 291. 0 1, 301. 9	1. 3 . 8 . 9 . 3	124. 0 127. 5 131. 0 131. 0	5. 6 5. 5 5. 6 5. 7	2. 4 7. 1 7. 7 9. 3	1, 113. 5 1, 125. 6 1, 147. 6 1, 156. 3
1975: 	1, 446. 2 1, 482. 3 1, 548. 7 1, 588. 2	152. 9 158. 7 164. 4 169. 5	1, 293. 3 1, 323. 6 1, 384. 3 1, 418. 7	1. 4 1. 9 2. 1 2. 7	132. 6 136. 5 141. 5 144. 1	5. 9 6. 2 6. 4 6. 6	6. 4 . 1 5. 1 6. 1	1, 149. 7 1, 182. 7 1, 233. 4 1, 264. 6
1976: 	1, 636. 2 1, 675. 2 1, 709. 8 1, 748. 5	173.6 177.7 181.6 186.2	1, 462. 6 1, 497. 6 1, 528. 2 1, 562. 3	.9 .7 1.2 1.9	144. 9 148. 2 151. 0 154. 8	6.8 7.0 7.2 7.4	7. 2 5. 8 8. 7	1, 304, 7 1, 337, 4 1, 362, 5

TABLE B-18.—Relation of national income and personal income, 1929-76
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

			Le	ss:			Equals:			
Year or quarter	National income	Corpo- rate profits with inven- tory valuation and capital capital sumption adjust- ments	Net interest	Contri- butions for social insur- ance	Wage accruals less dis- burse- ments	Govern- ment transfer pay- ments to persons	Personal interest income	Divi- dends	Business transfer pay- ments	Personal income
1929	84. 8	9. 2	4, 7	0. 2	.0	0.9	6.9	5.8	0,6	84.9
1933	39. 9	-1.7	4. 1	. 3	.0	1,5	5.5	2.0	.7	46.9
1939	71.3	5.3	3.6	2.1	.0	2.5	5.4	3.8	.5	72.4
1940 1941 1942 1943 1945 1945 1947 1948 1949	79. 7 102. 6 135. 7 169. 1 181. 9 180. 6 178. 3 194. 6 219. 0 212. 7	8. 7 14. 1 19. 3 23. 5 23. 6 19. 0 16. 6 22. 2 29. 1 26. 9	3.3 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.6 2.1 2.2	2.3 2.5 3.5 5.2 6.1 5.8 5.4 5.9	.0 .0 .2 2 0 0	2. 7 2. 6 2. 7 2. 5 3. 1 5. 6 10. 8 11. 2 10. 6 11. 7	5.3 5.2 5.1 5.9 6.4 7.3 7.8	4. 0 4. 4 4. 3 4. 6 4. 6 5. 6 7. 0 7. 2	. 45.5.5.5.5.667.8	77. 8 95. 3 122. 4 150. 7 164. 4 169. 8 177. 3 189. 8 208. 5 205. 6
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958	236. 2 272. 3 285. 8 299. 7 299. 1 328. 0 346. 9 362. 3 364. 0 397. 1	33. 7 38. 1 35. 4 35. 5 34. 6 42. 9 42. 1 37. 5 48. 2	2.3 2.7 3.0 3.4 4.3 4.8 5.5 8.8	7. 1 8. 5 9. 0 9. 1 10. 1 11. 5 12. 9 14. 9 15. 2 18. 0	.0 .1 0 1 .0 .0	14. 4 11. 6 12. 1 12. 9 15. 1 16. 2 17. 3 20. 1 24. 3 25. 2	8. 9 9. 6 10. 3 11. 4 12. 7 13. 8 15. 3 17. 4 18. 8 20. 9	8. 8 8. 5 8. 8 9. 1 10. 3 11. 1 11. 5 11. 3 12. 2	.8 .9 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.6	226. 1 253. 7 270. 4 286. 1 288. 2 308. 8 330. 9 349. 3 359. 3
1960	412. 0 424. 2 457. 4 482. 8 519. 2 566. 0 622. 2 655. 8 714. 4 767. 9	46. 6 46. 9 54. 9 59. 6 67. 0 77. 1 82. 5 79. 3 85. 8 81. 4	9. 8 11. 2 12. 8 14. 3 15. 9 18. 5 21. 9 24. 3 26. 8 30. 8	21. 1 21. 9 24. 3 27. 3 28. 7 30. 0 38. 8 43. 4 48. 1 54. 9	.0	27. 0 30. 8 31. 6 33. 4 34. 8 37. 6 41. 6 49. 5 62. 7	23. 3 24. 6 27. 1 30. 2 33. 3 37. 2 41. 8 45. 0 49. 6 55. 9	12. 9 13. 3 14. 4 15. 5 17. 3 19. 1 20. 1 21. 9 22. 6	2.0 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.8	399. 7 415. 0 440. 7 463. 1 495. 7 537. 0 584. 9 626. 6 685. 2 745. 8
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 **	798. 4 858. 1 951. 9 1, 064. 6 1, 135. 7 1, 207. 6 1, 349. 4	67. 9 77. 2 92. 1 99. 1 84. 8 91. 6 118. 7	37. 5 42. 8 47. 0 52. 3 67. 1 74. 6 82. 1	58. 7 64. 8 73. 6 91. 5 103. 4 109. 7 122. 8	.0 .6 .0 1 5	75. 9 89. 9 99. 4 113. 5 134. 6 168. 9 184. 2	64. 3 69. 3 74. 6 84. 1 101. 4 110. 7 123. 1	22. 9 23. 0 24. 6 27. 8 30. 8 32. 1 35. 1	4. 0 4. 2 4. 7 5. 4 5. 6 6. 3 7. 1	801. 3 859. 1 942. 5 1, 052. 4 1, 153. 3 1, 249. 7 1, 375. 4
1974: V	1, 113. 5 1, 125. 6 1, 147. 6 1, 156. 3	95. 7 87. 8 81. 7 74. 1	59. 4 65. 9 70. 0 73. 2	100. 4 102. 4 105. 0 105. 9	6 -1.5 -0	123. 2 130. 8 138. 5 146. 0	92. 9 99. 7 104. 8 108. 2	29. 9 30. 7 31. 3 31. 1	5. 6 5. 5 5. 6 5. 7	1, 109. 7 1, 136. 8 1, 172. 5 1, 194. 1
1975: V	1, 149. 7 1, 182. 7 1, 233. 4 1, 264. 6	69. 0 86. 6 105. 3 105. 6	73. 7 74. 0 74. 9 75. 8	107. 6 108. 1 110. 3 112. 6	.0 .0 .0	157. 8 169. 3 172. 7 176. 0	108. 2 109. 0 111. 0 114. 4	31.7 31.9 32.6 32.2	5. 9 6. 2 6. 4 6. 6	1, 203. 1 1, 230. 3 1, 265. 5 1, 299. 7
1976: i ii !!i !V p_	1, 362. 5	115. 1 116. 4 122. 0	78. 6 80. 3 83. 5 86. 0	119. 3 121. 4 123. 7 126. 8	.0 .0 .0	181. 8 180. 6 185. 2 189. 2	118. 0 120. 7 125. 0 128. 7	33. 1 34. 4 35. 4 37. 7	6. 8 7. 0 7. 2 7. 4	1, 331. 3 1, 362. 0 1, 386. 0 1, 422. 1

TABLE B-19.—National income by type of income, 1929-76
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

			Compensation of employees			roprietor	s' income con	with inv sumption	entory v adjustm	aluation : ents	and capit	:al	
	Na- tional in- come ¹	employees					Farm		Nonfarm				
Year or quarter		Total	Wages and sala- ries	Sup- ple- ments to wages and sala- ries 2	ple- nents Total to vages and sala-	Total	In- come 8	Capi- tal con- sump- tion ad- just- ment	Total	in- come 4	Inven- tory valua- tion ad- just- ment	Capi- tal con- sump- tion ad- just- ment	
1929	84. 8	51.1	50. 5	0.6	14.9	6.2	6.3	-0.1	8.8	8.8	0.1	-0.2	
1933	39. 9	29.5	29.0	.5	5.8	2.6	2.5	.1	3.2	3.9	5	2	
1939	71.3	48.1	46.0	2, 1	11.7	4. 4	4. 4	0	7.3	7.6	2	1	
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1945 1946 1947 1948	79. 7 102. 6 135. 7 169. 1 181. 9 180. 6 178. 3 194. 6 219. 0 212. 7	52. 1 64. 8 85. 3 109. 5 121. 2 123. 1 118. 1 129. 2 141. 4 141. 3	49. 9 62. 1 82. 1 105. 8 116. 7 117. 5 112. 0 123. 1 135. 5 134. 7	2. 3 2. 7 3. 2 3. 8 4. 5 6. 0 6. 1 5. 9 6. 6	12. 9 17. 4 24. 0 29. 0 30. 2 31. 7 36. 6 35. 8 40. 7 36. 1	4. 5 6. 4 9. 8 11. 7 11. 6 12. 2 14. 9 15. 2 17. 5 12. 7	4. 5 6. 5 10. 3 12. 2 12. 2 12. 6 15. 1 15. 6 18. 1	0 5 5 4 4 4 67	8. 4 10. 9 14. 3 17. 3 18. 6 19. 4 21. 6 20. 6 23. 2 23. 5	8.6 11.7 14.4 17.1 18.3 19.3 23.3 21.8 23.1 22.2	0 6 4 2 1 -1.7 -1.5 4	1 1 .2 .3 .4 .2 .0 .4	
1950	236, 2 272, 3 285, 8 299, 7 299, 1 328, 0 346, 9 362, 3 364, 0 397, 1	154. 8 181. 0 195. 7 209. 6 208. 4 224. 9 243. 5 256. 5 258. 2 279. 6	147. 0 171. 3 185. 3 198. 5 196. 8 211. 7 228. 3 239. 3 240. 5 258. 9	7. 8 9. 7 10. 4 11. 0 11. 6 13. 2 15. 2 17. 2 17. 7 20. 6	38. 4 42. 8 42. 9 41. 3 40. 8 42. 5 43. 6 45. 0 47. 4 47. 2	13. 5 15. 8 14. 9 12. 9 12. 3 11. 3 11. 2 11. 0 13. 1 10. 7	14. 1 16. 6 15. 7 13. 7 12. 9 11. 8 11. 8 13. 9 11. 6	88 87 66 88 9	24, 9 27, 0 28, 0 28, 4 28, 5 31, 2 32, 4 33, 9 34, 3 36, 6	25. 1 26. 4 26. 9 27. 6 27. 6 30. 5 31. 8 33. 1 33. 2 35. 3	-1.1 3 2 0 5 5 1 1	.9 .9 .9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1	
960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969	412. 0 424. 2 457. 4 482. 8 519. 2 566. 0 622. 2 655. 8 714. 4 767. 9	294. 9 303. 6 325. 1 342. 9 368. 0 396. 5 439. 3 471. 9 519. 8 571. 4	271. 9 279. 5 298. 0 313. 4 336. 1 362. 0 398. 4 427. 5 469. 5 514. 6	23. 0 24. 1 27. 1 29. 5 31. 8 34. 5 40. 9 44. 4 50. 3 56. 8	47. 0 48. 3 49. 6 50. 3 52. 2 56. 7 60. 3 61. 0 63. 4 66. 2	11. 4 11. 8 11. 9 11. 6 10. 3 12. 6 13. 6 12. 1 12. 0 13. 9	12. 3 12. 7 12. 8 12. 5 11. 2 13. 5 14. 6 13. 2 13. 3 15. 4	9 -1.0 9 -1.0 9 -1.0 -1.2 -1.3 -1.4	35. 6 36. 4 37. 7 38. 7 42. 0 44. 1 46. 7 48. 9 51. 4 52. 3	34. 2 35. 3 36. 4 37. 2 40. 2 42. 7 45. 3 47. 5 50. 4 51. 3	.1 0 0 0 2 3 3	1. 3 1. 2 1. 4 1. 6 1. 8 1. 6 1. 7 1. 5 1. 4	
1970	798. 4 858. 1 951. 9 1, 064. 6 1, 135. 7 1, 207. 6 1, 349. 4	609. 2 650. 3 715. 1 799. 2 875. 8 928. 8 1,028.4	546. 5 580. 0 633. 8 701. 2 764. 5 806. 7 890. 4	62. 7 70. 3 81. 4 98. 0 111. 3 122. 1 138. 0	65. 1 67. 7 76. 1 92. 4 86. 9 90. 2 96. 7	13. 9 14. 3 18. 0 32. 0 25. 8 24. 9 22. 8	15. 3 16. 0 20. 0 34. 2 28. 4 28. 6 27. 0	-1.4 -1.7 -2.0 -2.2 -2.6 -3.8 -4.2	51. 2 53. 4 58. 1 60. 4 61. 1 65. 3 73. 8	50. 7 52. 8 56. 4 60. 3 63. 1 65. 2 74. 1	5 4 7 -1.7 -3.6 -1.1 -1.2	1. 0 1. 1 2. 5 1. 8 1. 6 1. 3	
1974: I II III IV	1, 113. 5 1, 125. 6 1, 147. 6 1, 156. 3	846. 3 866. 3 888. 8 901. 8	739. 7 756. 7 775. 6 786. 0	106.6 109.6 113.3 115.8	91. 2 85. 0 86. 0 85. 5	31. 6 24. 6 23. 8 23. 3	33. 9 26. 9 26. 4 26. 4	-2.3 -2.3 -2.6 -3.1	59, 6 60, 4 62, 2 62, 2	60.7 61.8 65.4 64.6	-2.8 -3.0 -4.8 -3.9	1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6	
1975: 1 11 111 1V	1, 149. 7 1, 182. 7 1, 233. 4 1, 264. 6	904. 0 912. 9 935. 2 963. 1	785. 8 792. 8 811. 7 836. 4	118, 2 120, 1 123, 5 126, 7	81. 1 86. 8 95. 5 97. 2	17. 9 24. 1 29. 2 28. 3	21. 4 27. 8 33. 1 32. 3	-3.5 -3.7 -3.9 -4.1	63. 2 62. 7 66. 3 69. 0	63. 0 62. 3 66. 1 69. 2	-1.3 9 -1.1 -1.2	1.5 1.4 1.2 1.0	
1976: { 		994. 4 1,017.2 1,037.5 1,064.5	861. 5 881. 1 897. 8 921. 0	132. 9 136. 2 139. 6 143. 5	93. 2 100. 3 96. 1 97. 1	21.9 27.5 21.7 20.3	26. 1 31. 7 25. 9 24. 5	-4.2 -4.2 -4.2 -4.2	71.4 72.8 74.4 76.8	71. 1 73. 2 74. 6 77. 5	7 -1.3 -1.2 -1.7	.9 .9 .9	

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE B-19.—National income by type of income, 1929-76—Continued

[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

	Rental	income	of per-	Co	rporate	profits w	ith invent	ory valu djustmer	ation and	d capital	consump	tion	
	l co	with cap insumption ljustmen	on		Profits	with in	ventory v pital cons	aluation umption	adjustm adjustn	ent and ent	without		
Year or		ī					Prof	its befor	e tax			Capital con-	Net inter-
quarter		Rental	Capital con-	Total				Profits after		r tax	Inven- tory	sump- tion	est
	Total	income of persons	sump- tion		Total	Total	Profits tax liability	Total	Divi- dends	Undis- tributed profits	valua- tion adjust- ment	adjust- ment	
1929	4. 9	5. 7	-0.8	9. 2	10.5	10.0	1.4	8. 6	5.8	2.8	0. 5	-1.3	4.7
1933	2. 2	2.3	1	-1.7	-1.2	1.0	.5	. 4	2.0	-1.6	-2.1	5	4.1
1939	2.6	3. 1	6	5. 3	6.3	7.0	1.4	5. 6	3.8	1.8	7	-1.0	3.6
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948	2.7 3.1 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.6 5.5 5.3 6.1	3. 3 3. 9 5. 0 5. 6 5. 9 6. 2 7. 3 7. 7 8. 5	6 8 -1.0 -1.2 -1.4 -1.6 -1.8 -2.5 -2.8	8. 7 14. 1 19. 3 23. 5 23. 6 19. 0 16. 6 22. 2 29. 1 26. 9	9. 8 15. 2 20. 3 24. 4 23. 8 19. 2 19. 3 25. 6 33. 0 30. 8	10. 0 17. 7 21. 5 25. 1 24. 1 19. 7 24. 6 31. 5 35. 2 28. 9	2. 8 7. 6 11. 4 14. 1 12. 9 10. 7 9. 1 11. 3 12. 4 10. 2	7. 2 10. 1 10. 1 11. 1 11. 2 9. 0 15. 5 20. 2 22. 7 18. 7	4. 0 4. 4 4. 3 4. 4 4. 6 5. 6 7. 0 7. 2	3. 2 5. 7 5. 9 6. 6 6. 5 4. 4 9. 9 13. 9 15. 7 11. 5	2 -2.5 -1.2 8 3 5.3 -5.9 -2.2	-1.1 -1.0 8 2 1 -2.7 -3.4 -3.9 -3.8	3. 3 3. 1 2. 7 2. 4 2. 2 1. 6 2. 1 2. 2
1950	7. 1 7. 7 8. 8 10. 0 11. 0 11. 3 11. 6 12. 2 12. 9 13. 2	10. 0 11. 0 12. 2 13. 4 14. 4 14. 8 15. 2 15. 9 16. 7 17. 3	-2.9 -3.3 -3.4 -3.5 -3.6 -3.6 -4.0	33. 7 38. 1 35. 4 35. 5 34. 6 44. 6 42. 9 42. 1 37. 5 48. 2	37. 6 42. 7 39. 8 39. 5 37. 8 46. 7 45. 9 45. 4 40. 8 51. 2	42. 6 43. 9 38. 9 40. 5 38. 1 48. 4 48. 6 46. 9 41. 1 51. 6	17. 9 22. 6 19. 4 20. 3 17. 6 22. 0 21. 4 19. 0 23. 6	24. 7 21. 3 19. 5 20. 2 20. 5 26. 4 26. 6 25. 5 22. 1 28. 0	8. 8 8. 5 8. 8 9. 1 10. 3 11. 1 11. 5 11. 3	15. 9 12. 8 11. 0 11. 5 11. 4 16. 1 15. 5 14. 0 10. 8 15. 8	-5. 0 -1. 2 1. 0 -1. 0 3 -1. 7 -2. 7 -1. 5 3 5	-4.0 -4.6 -4.5 -4.1 -3.2 -2.1 -3.0 -3.3 -3.4 -2.9	2. 3 2. 7 3. 0 3. 4 4. 3 4. 8 5. 2 8. 0 8. 8
1960	13. 8 14. 3 15. 0 15. 7 16. 1 17. 1 18. 2 19. 4 18. 6 18. 1	17. 8 18. 3 19. 0 19. 6 20. 1 21. 0 22. 1 23. 4 23. 8 24. 8	-4.1 -4.0 -4.0 -3.9 -4.0 -3.9 -4.0 -5.2 -6.7	46. 6 46. 9 54. 9 59. 6 67. 0 77. 1 82. 5 79. 3 85. 8 81. 4	48. 9 48. 7 53. 7 57. 6 64. 2 73. 3 78. 6 75. 6 82. 1 77. 9	48. 5 48. 6 53. 6 57. 7 64. 7 75. 2 80. 7 77. 3 85. 6 83. 4	22. 7 22. 8 24. 0 26. 2 28. 0 30. 9 33. 7 32. 5 39. 4 39. 7	25. 8 25. 8 29. 6 31. 5 36. 7 44. 3 47. 1 44. 9 46. 2 43. 8	12. 9 13. 3 14. 4 15. 5 17. 3 19. 1 19. 4 20. 1 21. 9 22. 6	13. 0 12. 5 15. 2 16. 0 19. 4 25. 2 27. 6 24. 7 24. 2 21. 2	.3 .1 2 5 -1.9 -2.1 -1.7 -3.4 -5.5	-2.3 -1.8 1.2 2.1 2.8 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.5	9. 8 11. 2 12. 8 14. 3 15. 9 18. 5 21. 9 24. 3 26. 8 30. 8
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	18. 6 20. 1 21. 5 21. 6 21. 0 22. 4 23. 5	25. 8 27. 7 29. 4 31. 3 33. 3 37. 0 40. 5	-7. 1 -7. 6 -7. 9 -9. 8 -12. 3 -14. 6 -17. 0	67. 9 77. 2 92. 1 99. 1 84. 8 91. 6 118. 7	66. 4 76. 9 89. 6 97. 2 87. 8 103. 1	71. 5 82. 0 96. 2 115. 8 127. 6 114. 5	34.5 37.7 41.5 48.7 52.4 49.2 64.7	37. 0 44. 3 54. 6 67. 1 75. 2 65. 3	22. 9 23. 0 24. 6 27. 8 30. 8 32. 1 35. 1	14. 1 21. 3 30. 0 39. 3 44. 4 33. 2	-5.1 -5.0 -6.6 -18.6 -39.8 -11.4	1.5 .3 2.5 1.9 -3.0 -11.5	37. 5 42. 8 47. 0 52. 3 67. 1 74. 6 82. 1
1974: I II III IV	20. 9 20. 6 21. 0 21. 5	32. 4 32. 6 33. 5 34. 6	-11.5 -12.0 -12.5 -13.1	95. 7 87. 8 81. 7 74. 1	95. 9 89. 7 85. 2 80. 4	126. 3 126. 4 138. 6 119. 2	50. 5 53. 0 57. 6 48. 6	75. 8 73. 3 81. 0 70. 6	29. 9 30. 7 31. 3 31. 1	45. 9 42. 6 49. 7 39. 5	-30. 4 -36. 6 -53. 4 -38. 8	2 -1. 9 -3. 5 -6. 3	59. 4 65. 9 70. 0 73. 2
1975: \ II III IV	21. 9 22. 3 22. 4 22. 9	35. 6 36. 6 37. 3 38. 4	-13.6 -14.2 -14.9 -15.5	69.0 86.6 105.3 105.6	77. 7 97. 9 117. 9 119. 1	94. 2 105. 8 126. 9 131. 3	40, 2 44, 8 54, 8 57, 2	54.0 61.0 72.1 74.1	31. 7 31. 9 32. 6 32. 2	22. 3 29. 1 39. 5 41. 9	-16.5 -7.8 -9.0 -12.3	-8.6 -11.4 -12.6 -13.5	73. 7 74. 0 74. 9 75. 8
1976: I II IV P.	23. 3 23. 1 23. 4 24. 3	39. 6 39. 6 40. 6 42. 1	-16.3 -16.5 -17.2 -17.8	115. 1 116. 4 122. 0	129. 6 131. 8 137. 6	141. 1 146. 2 150. 2	61. 4 63. 5 65. 1	79. 7 82. 7 85. 1	33. 1 34. 4 35. 4 37. 7	46. 6 48. 3 49. 7	-11.5 -14.4 -12.6	-14.5 -15.4 -15.7	78. 6 80. 3 83. 5 86. 0

¹ National income is the total net income earned in production. It differs from gross national product mainly in that it excludes depreciation charges and other allowances for business and institutional consumption of durable capital goods and indirect business taxes. See Table B-17.

2 Employer contributions for social insurance and to private pension, health, and welfare funds; workmen's compensation; directors' fees; and a few other minor items.

3 With inventory valuation adjustment and without capital consumption adjustment.

4 Without inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.

TABLE B-20.—Sources of personal income, 1929-76
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Wage and salary disbursements ¹							Proprietors' in- come with inven-	
Year or quarter	Per- sonal	Total	brod	nodity- ucing stries	Distrib- utive	Service	Govern- ment and	Other labor in-	tory valu capital c	ation and onsump- istments
	income		Total	Manu- factur- ing	indus- tries	indus- tries	govern- ment enter- prises	come 1	Farm	Non- farm
1929	84. 9	50. 5	21. 5	16. 1	15.6	8. 4	5.0	0.5	6. 2	8.8
1933	46. 9	29. 0	9.8	7.8	8.8	5.2	5.2	. 4	2, 6	3. 2
1939	72.4	46. 0	17. 4	13.6	13. 3	7.1	8. 2	.6	4.4	7.3
1940	77. 8 95. 3 122. 4 150. 7 164. 4 169. 8 177. 3 189. 8 208. 5 205. 6	49. 9 62. 1 82. 1 105. 6 116. 9 117. 5 112. 0 123. 1 135. 5 134. 8	19. 7 27. 5 39. 1 49. 0 50. 4 45. 9 46. 0 54. 2 60. 9 57. 7	15. 6 21. 7 30. 9 40. 9 42. 9 38. 2 36. 5 42. 5 47. 1 44. 6	14. 2 16. 3 18. 0 20. 1 22. 7 24. 8 31. 0 35. 2 37. 5 37. 7	7. 5 8. 1 9. 0 9. 9 10. 9 11. 9 14. 3 16. 1 18. 0 18. 6	8. 5 10. 2 16. 0 26. 6 33. 0 34. 9 20. 7 17. 5 19. 0 20. 8	. 6 . 7 1. 1 1. 5 1. 8 2. 0 2. 4 2. 7 2. 9	4. 5 6. 4 9. 8 11. 7 11. 6 12. 2 14. 9 15. 2 17. 5 12. 7	8. 4 10. 9 14. 3 18. 6 19. 4 21. 6 23. 2 23. 5
1950	226. 1 253. 7 270. 4 286. 1 288. 2 308. 8 330. 9 349. 3 359. 3 382. 1	147. 0 171. 3 185. 4 198. 6 196. 8 211. 7 228. 3 239. 3 240. 5 258. 9	64. 6 76. 1 81. 9 89. 4 85. 5 92. 9 106. 4 104. 0 99. 8 109. 3	50. 3 59. 3 64. 1 71. 2 67. 5 73. 8 79. 4 82. 4 78. 6 86. 8	39. 8 44. 3 46. 9 49. 7 50. 1 53. 4 57. 7 60. 5 60. 8 64. 8	20. 0 21. 7 23. 3 25. 0 26. 3 28. 8 31. 5 33. 8 35. 8 38. 8	22. 6 29. 2 33. 3 34. 4 36. 6 38. 8 41. 0 44. 1 46. 0	3. 7 4. 6 5. 2 5. 9 6. 1 7. 0 8. 0 9. 0 9. 4 10. 6	13. 5 15. 8 14. 9 12. 9 12. 3 11. 3 11. 2 11. 0 13. 1 10. 7	24. 9 27. 0 28. 0 28. 4 28. 4 31. 2 32. 4 33. 9 34. 3
1960	399. 7 415. 0 440. 7 463. 1 495. 7 537. 0 584. 9 626. 6 685. 2 745. 8	271. 9 279. 5 298. 0 313. 4 336. 1 362. 0 398. 4 427. 5 469. 5 514. 6	112. 9 113. 4 121. 5 126. 6 135. 1 145. 7 160. 7 168. 0 183. 0 199. 1	89. 7 89. 8 96. 7 100. 6 107. 1 115. 5 128. 0 134. 1 145. 8 157. 5	68. 2 69. 3 72. 8 76. 3 81. 4 87. 2 94. 4 100. 9 109. 9 120. 7	41. 7 44. 4 47. 5 50. 6 54. 7 59. 2 65. 0 72. 2 80. 2 89. 9	49. 2 52. 4 56. 3 60. 0 64. 9 69. 9 78. 3 86. 4 96. 4	11. 2 11. 8 13. 0 14. 0 15. 7 17. 8 19. 9 21. 7 25. 1 28. 2	11. 4 11. 8 11. 9 11. 6 10. 3 12. 6 13. 6 12. 1 12. 0 13. 9	35. 6 36. 4 37. 7 38. 7 42. 0 44. 1 46. 7 48. 9 51. 4
1970 1971 1972 1973 1973 1974 1975	801. 3 859. 1 942. 5 1, 052. 4 1, 153. 3 1, 249. 7 1, 375. 4	546. 5 579. 4 633. 8 701. 3 765. 0 806. 7 890. 4	202. 5 207. 8 226. 7 253. 5 273. 9 275. 3 304. 8	158. 2 160. 3 175. 4 196. 2 211. 4 211. 7 237. 0	130. 1 139. 3 151. 9 168. 1 184. 4 195. 6 214. 9	97. 9 106. 8 117. 9 131. 0 145. 9 159. 9 180. 0	116. 0 125. 6 137. 3 148. 6 160. 9 175. 8 190. 7	32.0 36.2 42.0 48.7 55.5 62.5 70.1	13. 9 14. 3 18. 0 32. 0 25. 8 24. 9 22. 8	51. 2 53. 4 58. 1 60. 4 61. 1 65. 3 73. 8
1974: I V		739. 7 757. 3 777. 1 786. 0	266. 6 271. 9 278. 8 278. 1	205. 2 209. 6 215. 6 215. 2	178. 0 183. 0 187. 3 189. 3	139. 6 143. 7 148. 3 151. 8	155. 5 158. 7 162. 7 166. 7	52. 6 54. 5 56. 4 58. 5	31. 6 24. 6 23. 8 23. 3	59. 6 60. 4 62. 2 62. 2
1975: I	1, 203. 1 1, 230. 3 1, 265. 5 1, 299. 7	785. 8 792. 8 811. 7 836. 4	269. 9 269. 1 276. 2 285. 8	206. 8 206. 9 212. 5 220. 3	191. 0 192. 5 196. 8 202. 3	154, 8 157, 4 161, 3 166, 1	170. 0 173. 8 177. 3 182. 2	60. 0 61. 4 63. 3 65. 2	17. 9 24. 1 29. 2 28. 3	63, 2 62, 7 66, 3 69, 0
1976: I		861, 5 881, 1 897, 8 921, 0	295, 3 302, 9 307, 0 314, 0	229. 6 235. 6 238. 9 243. 8	208. 3 212. 8 216. 5 221. 8	172. 4 176. 7 182. 7 188. 3	185. 4 188. 7 191. 7 197. 0	67. 1 69. 0 71. 1 73. 2	21. 9 27. 5 21. 7 20. 3	71. <i>8</i> 72. 8 74. 4 76. 8

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE B-20.—Sources of personal income, 1929-76—Continued [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

· · · · · ·	Rental income					Transf	er paymo	ents			Less:	
Year or quarter	of per- sons with capital con- sump- tion ad- just- ment	Divi- dends	Personal interest income	Total	Old age, survivors, disability, and health insurance benefits	Govern- ment unem- ploy- ment in- surance benefits	Vet- erans bene- fits	Govern- ment em- ployee retire- ment benefits	Aid to families with de- pendent children (AFDC)	Other	Personal contri- butions for social insur- ance	Non- farm per- sonal in- come 2
1929	4.9	5.8	6.9	1.5			0.6	0.1	0.	. 8	0.1	
1933	2. 2	2.0	5. 5	2. 1			.6	.2	1.	. 4	.2	
1939	2.6	3.8	5. 4	3.0	0.0	0.4	. 5	.3	1.	. 7	.6	
1940 1941 1942 1943 1945 1946 1947 1948	2.7 3.1 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.6 5.5 5.3 5.7 6.1	4. 0 4. 4 4. 3 4. 4 4. 6 5. 6 7. 0 7. 2	5.3 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.9 6.4 7.3 7.7 8.2	3. 1 3. 1 3. 0 3. 6 6. 2 11. 3 11. 7	.0 .1 .1 .2 .2 .3 .4 .5	.5 .4 .1 .1 .4 1.1 .8	.5 .5 .5 1.0 3.0 7.0 7.0 5.9	.3 .3 .4 .4 .5 .7 .7	1. 1. 1. 2. 2. 2. 3 . 4	. 8	.7 1.2 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.2	159. 6 171. 5 187. 7 189. 9
1950 1951 1952 1953 1955 1956 1957 1958	7.1 7.7 8.8 10.0 11.0 11.3 11.6 12.2 12.9 13.2	8.8 8.5 8.5 8.8 9.1 10.3 11.1 11.5 11.3	8. 9 9. 6 10. 3 11. 4 12. 7 13. 8 15. 3 17. 4 18. 8 20. 9	15. 2 12. 6 13. 1 14. 1 16. 2 17. 5 18. 7 21. 6 25. 9 27. 0	1.0 1.9 2.2 3.0 3.6 4.9 5.7 7.3 8.5 10.2	1. 5 1. 1 1. 0 2. 2 1. 5 1. 5 1. 9 4. 1 2. 8	7. 7 4. 6 4. 3 4. 1 4. 2 4. 4 4. 5 4. 7 4. 6	1. 0 1. 1 1. 2 1. 4 1. 5 1. 7 1. 9 2. 2 2. 5 2. 8	.66.55 .66.67 .78.9	3. 5 3. 6 3. 8 4. 1 4. 3 4. 5 5. 3	2.9 3.4 3.8 4.0 4.6 5.2 5.8 6.7 6.9 7.9	209. 3 234. 3 252. 4 269. 0 272. 6 294. 7 316. 4 335. 0 342. 9 367. 7
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	13. 8 14. 3 15. 0 15. 7 16. 1 17. 1 18. 2 19. 4 18. 6 18. 1	12. 9 13. 3 14. 4 15. 5 17. 3 19. 1 19. 4 20. 1 21. 9 22. 6	23. 3 24. 6 27. 1 30. 2 33. 3 37. 2 41. 8 45. 0 49. 6 55. 9	28. 9 32. 8 33. 8 35. 8 37. 4 40. 4 44. 7 52. 6 59. 9 66. 5	11. 1 12. 6 14. 3 15. 2 16. 0 18. 1 19. 8 25. 5 30. 2 32. 9	3. 0 4. 3 3. 1 3. 0 2. 7 2. 3 1. 9 2. 2 2. 1 2. 2	4.6 5.0 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.9 5.6 5.9	3.1 3.7 4.7 5.1 6.9 7.6	1. 0 1. 1 1. 3 1. 4 1. 5 1. 7 1. 9 2. 3 2. 8 3. 5	6. 2 6. 4 6. 7 7. 3 7. 8 8. 3 10. 2 11. 1 12. 5	9. 3 9. 7 10. 3 11. 8 12. 6 13. 3 17. 8 20. 6 22. 8 26. 3	384. 4 399. 0 424. 5 447. 0 480. 7 519. 5 566. 1 667. 5 725. 8
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	18. 6 20. 1 21. 5 21. 6 21. 0 22. 4 23. 5	22. 9 23. 0 24. 6 27. 8 30. 8 32. 1 35. 1	64. 3 69. 3 74. 6 84. 1 101. 4 110. 7 123. 1	79. 9 94. 1 104. 1 118. 9 140. 3 175. 2 191. 3	38. 5 44. 5 49. 6 60. 4 70. 1 81. 4 93. 0	4. 0 5. 8 5. 6 4. 3 6. 6 17. 3 15. 6	7. 7 8. 8 9. 7 10. 4 11. 8 14. 5 15. 0	10. 1 11. 7 13. 5 15. 6 18. 6 22. 1 25. 0	4. 8 6. 2 6. 9 7. 2 7. 9 9. 2 9. 8	14. 9 17. 2 18. 9 21. 0 25. 2 30. 8 32. 9	28. 0 30. 8 34. 2 42. 2 47. 6 50. 0 54. 9	780. 7 838. 0 917. 3 1, 011. 9 1, 117. 3 1, 213. 4 1, 340. 1
1974: _ _ 	20. 9 20. 6 21. 0 21. 5	29. 9 30. 7 31. 3 31. 1	92.9 99.7 104.8 108.2	128. 8 136. 3 144. 2 151. 8	63.7 69.1 72.6 75.0	5. 4 6. 1 6. 6 8. 5	10. 8 11. 0 12. 1 13. 5	17.5 18.0 19.1 19.9	7. 5 7. 7 8. 1 8. 4	23. 9 24. 5 25. 7 26. 6	46. 4 47. 3 48. 2 48. 5	1, 068. 4 1, 102. 2 1, 138. 5 1, 160. 1
1975: I II III. IV.	21. 9 22. 3 22. 4 22. 9	31.7 31.9 32.6 32.2	108. 2 109. 0 111. 0 114. 4	163. 7 175. 5 179. 1 182. 5	76. 7 77. 8 84. 7 86. 3	15. 0 18. 1 18. 4 17. 7	14.6 13.9 14.2 15.0	21.0 21.6 22.4 23.3	8.7 9.0 9.4 9.7	27.7 35.1 30.0 30.5	49. 4 49. 5 50. 1 51. 0	1, 174. 0 1, 195. 2 1, 224. 9 1, 259. 7
1976: I !I !II. !V »	23. 3 23. 1 23. 4 24. 3	33. 1 34. 4 35. 4 37. 7	118. 0 120. 7 125. 0 128. 7	188. 6 187. 6 192. 4 196. 6	88. 1 89. 5 95. 8 98. 4	17.7 15.3 14.7 14.7	16. 0 14. 7 14. 4 14. 9	23. 8 24. 9 25. 5 25. 9	9.8 9.7 9.9 10.0	33. 2 33. 4 32. 2 32. 6	53. 4 54. 3 55. 2 56. 6	1, 297. 7 1, 322. 4 1, 351. 7 1, 388. 6

The total of wage and salary disbursements and other labor income differs from compensation of employees in Table B-19 in that it excludes employer contributions for social insurance and the excess of wage accruals over wage disbursements.

2 Personal income exclusive of farm proprietors' income, farm wages, farm other labor income, and agricultural net interest.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-21.—Disposition of personal income, 1929-76
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates, except as noted]

					Less : Pers	onal outla	ys		Perce pe	ent of disp rsonal inc	osable ome
Year or quarter	Per- sonal income	Less: Per- sonal tax and nontax pay- ments	Equals: Dispos- able per- sonal income	Total	Per- sonal con- sump- tion expend- itures	Interest paid by con- sumers to busi- ness	Per- sonal transfer pay- ments to for- eigners (net)	Equals: Per- sonal saving	Personal Total	Con- sump- tion expend- itures	Per- sonal saving
1929	84.9	2.6	82, 3	79, 1	77.3	1.5	0.3	3.1	96. 2	93. 9	3, 8
1933		1.4	45, 5	46, 5	45, 8	.5	.2	-1.0	102, 2	100.7	-2.2
1939	' '	2. 4	69. 9	67. 8	67. 0	.7	.2	2.1	97.0	95.8	3, 0
1940	77. 8 95. 3 122. 4 150. 7 164. 4 169. 8 177. 3 189. 8 208. 5 205. 6	2. 6 3. 3 5. 9 17. 8 18. 9 20. 8 18. 7 21. 4 21. 0 18. 5	75. 2 92. 0 116. 5 132. 9 145. 5 149. 0 158. 6 168. 4 187. 4	72. 0 81. 8 89. 4 100. 1 109. 0 120. 4 145. 2 163. 5 176. 9 180. 4	71. 0 80. 8 88. 6 99. 4 108. 2 119. 5 143. 8 161. 7 174. 7 178. 1	.8	.22 .11 .24 .57 .77 .5	3. 3 10. 2 27. 0 32. 7 36. 5 28. 5 13. 4 4. 9 10. 6 6. 7	95. 6 88. 9 76. 8 75. 4 80. 8 91. 5 97. 1 94. 3 96. 4	94. 3 87. 7 76. 1 74. 8 80. 2 90. 6 96. 1 93. 2 95. 2	4. 4 11. 1 23. 2 24. 6 25. 1 19. 2 8. 5 2. 9 5. 7 3. 6
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	226. 1 253. 7 270. 4 286. 1 288. 2 308. 8 330. 9 349. 3 359. 3 382. 1	20. 6 28. 9 34. 0 35. 5 32. 5 35. 4 39. 7 42. 4 42. 1 46. 0	205. 5 224. 8 236. 4 250. 7 255. 7 273. 4 291. 3 306. 9 317. 1 336. 1	194. 7 210. 0 220. 4 233. 7 240. 1 258. 5 271. 6 286. 4 295. 4 317. 3	192. 0 207. 1 217. 1 229. 7 235. 8 253. 7 266. 0 280. 4 289. 5 310. 8	2.3 2.59 3.6 3.8 4.4 5.5 5.6 6.1	.44455.455.44	10. 8 14. 8 16. 0 17. 0 15. 6 14. 9 19. 7 20. 6 21. 7 18. 8	94. 7 93. 2 93. 2 93. 9 94. 6 93. 2 93. 3 93. 2 94. 4	93. 4 92. 1 91. 8 91. 6 92. 2 92. 8 91. 3 91. 4 91. 3 92. 5	5.3 6.8 6.8 6.1 5.4 6.7 6.8
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1966 1967 1968 1969	399. 7 415. 0 440. 7 463. 1 495. 7 537. 0 584. 9 626. 6 685. 2 745. 8	50. 4 52. 1 56. 8 60. 3 58. 6 64. 9 74. 5 82. 1 97. 1 115. 4	349. 4 362. 9 383. 9 402. 8 437. 0 472. 2 510. 4 544. 5 588. 1 630. 4	332. 3 342. 7 363. 5 384. 0 410. 9 441. 9 477. 4 503. 7 550. 1 595. 3	324.9 335.0 355.2 374.6 400.4 430.2 464.8 490.4 535.9 579.7	7.0 7.3 7.8 8.8 9.9 11.1 12.0 12.5 13.3 14.7	44.5667.698.9	17. 1 20. 2 20. 4 18. 8 26. 1 30. 3 33. 0 40. 9 38. 1 35. 1	95. 1 94. 4 94. 7 95. 3 94. 6 93. 5 93. 5 93. 5 94. 4	93. 0 92. 3 92. 5 93. 0 91. 6 91. 1 91. 1 90. 0 91. 1 92. 0	4.9 5.6 5.3 4.7 6.4 6.5 5.5 5.6
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 »	801. 3 859. 1 942. 5 1, 052. 4 1, 153. 3 1, 249. 7 1, 375. 4	115. 3 116. 3 141. 2 150. 8 170. 4 168. 8 193. 6	685. 9 742. 8 801. 3 901. 7 982. 9 1, 080. 9 1, 181. 8	635. 4 685. 5 751. 9 831. 3 910. 7 996. 9 1, 104. 0	618. 8 668. 2 733. 0 809. 9 887. 5 973. 2 1, 078. 6	15. 5 16. 2 17. 9 20. 2 22. 2 22. 8 24. 4	1.1 1.0 1.3 1.0 .9	50. 6 57. 3 49. 4 70. 3 72. 2 84. 0 77. 8	92. 6 92. 3 93. 8 92. 2 92. 7 92. 2 93. 4	90. 2 90. 0 91. 5 89. 8 90. 3 90. 0 91. 3	7. 4 7. 7 6. 2 7. 8 7. 3 7. 8 6. 6
1974: 	1, 109. 7 1, 136. 8 1, 172. 5 1, 194. 1	161. 3 167. 4 174. 5 178. 3	948. 4 969. 5 998. 0 1, 015. 8	875. 8 901. 6 930. 4 935. 0	853. 3 878. 7 906. 8 911. 1	21. 4 21. 9 22. 6 22. 9	1. 1 1. 0 1. 0 1. 0	72. 6 67. 8 67. 6 80. 8	92. 3 93. 0 93. 2 92. 0	90. 0 90. 6 90. 9 89. 7	7.7 7.0 6.8 8.0
1975: V		179. 3 142. 2 174. 0 179. 8	1, 023. 8 1, 088. 2 1, 091. 5 1, 119. 9	956. 7 983. 6 1, 011. 1 1, 036. 2	933. 2 960. 3 987. 3 1, 012. 0	22. 5 22. 4 22. 8 23. 3	.9 .9 .9	67. 2 104. 5 80. 5 83. 7	93. 4 90. 4 92. 6 92. 5	91. 2 88. 2 90. 5 90. 4	6.6 9.6 7.4 7.5
1976: I II		183, 8 189, 5 195, 8 205, 3	1, 147. 6 1, 172. 5 1, 190. 2 1, 216. 9	1, 068. 0 1, 089. 6 1, 114. 3 1, 144. 0	1, 043. 6 1, 064. 7 1, 088. 5 1, 117. 5	23. 4 23. 9 24. 8 25. 5	1. 0 1. 0 1. 1 1. 1	79. 5 82. 9 75. 8 72. 9	93. 1 92. 9 93. 6 94. 0	90. 9 90. 8 91. 5 91. 8	6. 9 7. 1 6. 4 6. 0

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Table B-22.—Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures in current and 1972 dollars, 1929-76

[Quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates, except as noted]

	Disp	osable pe	rsonal incon	ne	Persona	l consump	tion expend	itures	
Year or quarter	Total (bi	llions ars)	Per ca (dolla	pita rs)	Total (b of doll	illions ars)	Per ca (dolla	pita irs)	Popu- lation (thou- sands) 1
	Current dollars	1972 dollars	Current dollars	1972 dollars	Current dollars	1972 dollars	Current dollars	1972 dollars	
1929	82. 3	229. 8	675	1, 886	77.3	215.6	634	1, 769	121, 875
1933	45, 5	169.7	362	1, 350	45.8	170.7	364	1, 358	125, 690
1939		230.1	534	1, 756	67. 0	220, 3	511	1, 681	131, 028
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1945 1947 1947 1948	75. 2 92. 0 116. 5 132. 9 145. 5 149. 0 158. 6 168. 4 187. 4	244. 3 278. 1 317. 3 332. 2 343. 9 338. 6 332. 4 318. 8 335. 5 336. 1	570 690 863 972 1,051 1,065 1,122 1,168 1,278 1,254	1, 849 2, 084 2, 353 2, 429 2, 485 2, 420 2, 351 2, 212 2, 288 2, 253	71. 0 80. 8 88. 6 99. 4 108. 2 119. 5 143. 8 161. 7 174. 7 178. 1	230. 4 244. 1 241. 7 248. 7 255. 7 271. 4 301. 4 306. 2 312. 8 320. 0	537 605 657 727 781 854 1,017 1,122 1,192 1,194	1, 744 1, 830 1, 792 1, 819 1, 847 1, 939 2, 131 2, 124 2, 133 2, 145	132, 122 133, 402 134, 860 136, 739 138, 397 139, 928 141, 389 144, 126 146, 631 149, 188
1950	205. 5 224. 8 236. 4 250. 7 255. 7 273. 4 291. 3 306. 9 317. 1 336. 1	361.9 371.6 382.1 397.5 402.1 425.9 444.9 453.9 459.0 477.4	1, 355 1, 457 1, 506 1, 571 1, 574 1, 654 1, 731 1, 792 1, 821 1, 898	2, 386 2, 408 2, 434 2, 491 2, 476 2, 577 2, 643 2, 650 2, 636 2, 696	192. 0 207. 1 217. 1 229. 7 235. 8 253. 7 266. 0 280. 4 289. 5 310. 8	338. 1 342. 3 350. 9 364. 2 370. 9 395. 1 406. 3 414. 7 419. 0 441. 5	1, 266 1, 342 1, 383 1, 439 1, 452 1, 535 1, 581 1, 637 1, 662 1, 755	2, 229 2, 219 2, 236 2, 283 2, 284 2, 391 2, 415 2, 421 2, 406 2, 493	151, 684 154, 287 156, 954 159, 565 162, 391 165, 275 168, 221 171, 274 174, 141 177, 073
1960	349. 4 362. 9 383. 9 402. 8 437. 0 472. 2 510. 4 544. 5 588. 1 630. 4	487.3 500.6 521.6 539.2 577.3 612.4 643.6 669.8 695.2 712.3	1, 934 1, 976 2, 058 2, 128 2, 278 2, 430 2, 597 2, 740 2, 930 3, 111	2, 697 2, 725 2, 796 2, 796 3, 009 3, 152 3, 274 3, 371 3, 464 3, 515	324.9 335.0 355.2 374.6 400.4 430.2 464.8 490.4 535.9 579.7	453.0 462.2 482.9 501.4 528.7 558.1 586.1 603.2 633.4 655.4	1, 798 1, 824 1, 904 1, 979 2, 087 2, 214 2, 365 2, 468 2, 670 2, 860	2,507 2,516 2,589 2,755 2,872 2,872 2,982 3,035 3,156 3,234	180, 671 183, 691 186, 538 189, 242 191, 889 194, 303 196, 560 198, 712 200, 706 202, 677
1970	685. 9 742. 8 801. 3 901. 7 982. 9 1, 080. 9 1, 181. 8	741.6 769.0 801.3 854.7 840.8 855.5 890.7	3, 348 3, 588 3, 837 4, 285 4, 639 5, 062 5, 494	3, 619 3, 714 3, 837 4, 062 3, 968 4, 007 4, 141	618, 8 668, 2 733, 0 809, 9 887, 5 973, 2 1, 078, 6	668.9 691.9 733.0 767.7 759.1 770.3 812.9	3, 020 3, 227 3, 510 3, 849 4, 188 4, 558 5, 014	3, 265 3, 342 3, 510 3, 648 3, 582 3, 608 3, 779	204, 878 207, 053 208, 846 210, 410 211, 901 213, 540 215, 118
1974: I		846. 7 840. 6 841. 7 834. 0	4, 487 4, 579 4, 705 4, 779	4, 006 3, 970 3, 968 3, 923	853. 3 878. 7 906. 8 911. 1	761. 8 761. 9 764. 7 748. 1	4, 037 4, 151 4, 275 4, 286	3, 604 3, 599 3, 605 3, 519	211, 361 211, 705 212, 134 212, 578
1975: I II III IV		827. 9 869. 7 857. 1 867. 5	4, 809 5, 102 5, 105 5, 227	3, 889 4, 078 4, 009 4, 049	933. 2 960. 3 987. 3 1, 012. 0	754. 6 767. 5 775. 3 783. 9	4, 383 4, 503 4, 618 4, 724	3, 545 3, 599 3, 626 3, 659	212, 897 213, 278 213, 805 214, 245
1976: I	i	880. 4 890. 5 892. 0 900. 2	5, 347 5, 455 5, 526 5, 639	4, 103 4, 143 4, 142 4, 171	1, 043. 6 1, 064. 7 1, 088. 5 1, 117. 5	800. 7 808. 6 815. 7 826. 6	4, 863 4, 954 5, 054 5, 178	3, 731 3, 762 3, 788 3, 830	214, 599 214, 926 215, 355 215, 805

Population of the United States including Armed Forces overseas; includes Alaska and Hawaii beginning 1960. Annual data are for July 1; quarterly data are for middle of period, interpolated from monthly data.

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census).

TABLE B-23.—Gross saving and investment, 1929-76

[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

				Gross	saving				Gro	ss investr	nent	
Year or quarter	Tatal	Gross	private :	saving	Govern defici incon	ment sur t (—), na ne and pr accounts	tional oduct	Capital grants received	Tatal	Gross private domes-	Net foreign	Statis- tical dis- crep-
ļ	Total	Total	Per- sonal saving	Gross busi- ness saving ¹	Total	Fed- eral	State and local	by the United States, (net) ²	Total	tic in- vest- ment	invest- ment ³	ancy
1929	15. 9	14. 9	3. 1	11.7	1.0	1. 2	-0.2		17. 0	16. 2	0.8	1. 1
1933	. 9	2. 2	-1.0	3, 2	-1,4	-1.3	1		1, 6	1. 4	. 2	.7
1939	8. 7	10. 9	2. 1	8.8	-2.2	-2.2	.0		10.1	9. 3	.9	1.4
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1945 1946 1947 1948	13. 5 18. 5 10. 5 5. 3 2. 3 5. 1 34. 6 41. 2 49. 0 34. 8	14. 2 22. 2 41. 9 49. 4 54. 1 44. 6 29. 2 26. 8 40. 6 38. 2	3. 3 10. 2 27. 0 32. 7 36. 5 28. 5 13. 4 4. 9 10. 6	10. 9 12. 0 14. 8 16. 7 17. 7 16. 0 15. 8 21. 8 30. 0 31. 4	7 -3.8 -31.4 -44.1 -51.8 -39.5 5.4 14.4 -3.4	-1.3 -5.1 -33.1 -46.6 -54.5 -42.1 3.5 -13.4 8.3 -2.6	1.3 1.8 2.5 2.7 2.6 1.9 1.0		14. 6 19. 7 3. 5 5. 1 9. 2 35. 3 42. 8 35. 9	13. 1 17. 9 9. 9 5. 8 7. 2 10. 6 30. 7 34. 0 45. 9 35. 3	1.5 1.1 2 -2.2 -2.1 -1.4 4.6 9.0 2.0	1. 1 . 5 -1. 8 -1. 8 2. 7 4. 1 . 7 1. 8 -1. 2
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1957 1958	49. 7 55. 5 49. 3 48. 1 49. 4 65. 6 72. 6 60. 4 75. 8	41. 6 49. 4 53. 1 55. 0 56. 5 62. 4 68. 4 71. 7 73. 0 77. 3	10. 8 14. 8 16. 0 17. 0 15. 6 14. 9 19. 7 20. 6 21. 7 18. 8	30. 8 34. 6 37. 1 38. 0 41. 0 47. 5 48. 7 51. 1 51. 3 58. 5	8. 0 6. 1 -3. 8 -6. 9 -7. 1 3. 1 5. 2 -12. 6 -1. 6	9.2 6.5 -3.7 -7.1 -6.0 4.4 6.1 2.3 -10.3	-1.2 4 0 .1 -1.1 -1.3 9 -1.4 -2.4 4		51. 7 59. 5 51. 9 51. 4 52. 4 68. 0 72. 8 62. 0 75. 5	53. 8 59. 2 52. 1 53. 3 52. 7 68. 4 71. 0 69. 2 61. 9 77. 6	-2.1 2 -1.9 3 3 1.8 3.6 -2.0	2.0 4.0 2.7 3.3 3.0 2.5 2 1.7
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1968	78. 9 75. 8 83. 6 89. 6 100. 1 115. 4 122. 9 120. 3 130. 8 147. 5	75. 8 80. 0 87. 4 88. 9 102. 4 114. 9 124. 2 134. 6 136. 3 136. 8	17. 1 20. 2 20. 4 18. 8 26. 1 30. 3 33. 0 40. 9 38. 1 35. 1	58. 7 59. 8 67. 0 70. 1 76. 2 84. 6 91. 2 93. 7 98. 2 101. 7	3.1 -4.3 -3.8 -7 -2.3 .5 -1.3 -14.2 -5.5 10.7	3. 0 -3. 9 -4. 2 -3. 3 -3. 3 -1. 8 -13. 2 -5. 8 8. 5	.1 4 .5 .5 1.0 0 .5 -1.1 .3 2.1		78. 2 77. 3 87. 6 93. 4 102. 3 116. 3 126. 1 122. 1 130. 2 144. 2	76. 4 74. 3 85. 2 96. 6 112. 0 124. 5 120. 8 131. 5 146. 2	1.7 3.0 2.4 3.2 5.7 4.3 1.6 1.2 -1.4 -2.0	7 1.6 4.0 3.7 2.2 3.2 1.7 6
1970	143. 4 155. 4 177. 5 216. 8 205. 3 191. 2 231. 9	151. 9 173. 0 180. 4 210. 5 211. 6 255. 6 276. 4	50. 6 57. 3 49. 4 70. 3 72. 2 84. 0 77. 8	101. 4 115. 7 131. 0 140. 2 139. 4 171. 6 198. 6	-9.4 -18.3 -3.5 6.3 -4.2 -64.4 -44.5	-12.1 -22.0 -17.3 -6.7 -11.5 -71.2 -58.3	2.8 3.7 13.7 13.0 7.3 6.9 13.9	0.9 .7 .7 .0 4-2.0 .0	141. 4 156. 8 179. 2 219. 4 211. 9 195. 6 239. 5	140. 8 160. 0 188. 3 220. 0 215. 0 183. 7 241. 2	-3.2 -9.0 6 -3.0 11.9 -1.7	-2.1 1.3 1.7 2.6 6.6 4.2
1974: 1 !l !l !V	213. 0 206. 5 200. 0 201. 7	216. 4 206. 4 201. 0 222. 4	72. 6 67. 8 67. 6 80. 8	143. 8 138. 6 133. 4 141. 6	4. 7 . 2 -1. 0 -20. 8	-4.1 -7.6 -9.0 -25.3	8. 7 7. 8 8. 0 4. 5	4-8.0 .0 .0	215. 4 213. 6 207. 7 211. 0	216. 4 218. 8 213. 3 211. 5	-1.0 -5.2 -5.6 5	2. 4 7. 1 7. 7 9. 3
1975: 	180.2	217. 0 273. 2 262. 7 269. 4	67. 2 104. 5 80. 5 83. 7	149. 8 168. 7 182. 2 185. 7	-45.0 -92.9 -58.1 -61.5	-49.8 -99.9 -66.0 -69.4	4. 7 6. 9 7. 9 7. 9	.0 .0 .0	178. 5 180. 3 209. 8 214. 0	172. 4 164. 4 196. 7 201. 4	6. 1 15. 9 13. 1 12. 6	6. 4 5. 6.
1976: 1 V p	234.2	273. 8 279. 1 278. 9 273. 6	79. 5 82. 9 75. 8 72. 9	194. 3 196. 2 203. 1	-51.6 -44.9 -44.7	-63. 8 -54. 1 -57. 4	12. 2 9. 2 12. 7	.0 .0 .0	229. 4 240. 0 242. 9 245. 8	229. 6 239. 2 247. 0 249. 0	2 .8 -4.1 -3.2	7. 5. 8.

¹ Undistributed corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, corporate and non-corporate capital consumption allowances with capital consumption adjustment, and private wage accruals less disburse-

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

corporate capital consumption allowances with capital consumption adjustment, and private mage attentions of special drawing rights (SDR), except as noted in footnote 4.

3 Net exports of goods and services less net transfers to foreigners and interest paid by government to foreigners plus capital grants received by the United States, net.

4 In February 1974, the U.S. Government paid to India \$2,010 million (quarterly rate) in rupees under provisions of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act. This transaction is being treated as capital grants paid to foreigners, and is included in the first quarter of 1974 as—\$8.0 (annual rate) in capital grants received by the United States.

Table B-24.—Saving by individuals, 1946-761 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

			Inc	crease i	i financ	ial asse	ts		Neti	nvestm	ent in		: Increa	
Year or			Cur-		S	Securiti	es	Insur-			Non-	Mort-		
quarter	Total	Total 2	rency and de- mand de- posits	Sav- ings ac- counts	Gov- ern- ment secu- rities 3	Corpo- rate and for- eign bonds	Corpo- rate equi- ties 4	ance and pen- sion re- serves (3)	Non- farm homes	Con- sumer du- rables	cor- po- rate busi- ness assets	gage debt on non- farm homes	Con- sumer credit	Other debt 6
1946 1947 1948 1949	16.5 20.6 18.7 14.3	18.9 13.2 9.0 9.9	5. 6 .1 -2. 9 -2. 0	6.3 3.4 2.2 2.6	-1.4 1.6 1.3 1.8	-0.9 8 1 4	1.1 1.1 1.0 .7	5. 3 5. 4 5. 3 5. 6	-3.0 9.7 6.3 6.8	5.8 7.3 6.9 6.7	1. 2 .7 7. 1 .6	3. 6 4. 7 4. 6 4. 4	2.7 3.2 2.9 2.9	0. 1 2. 5 3. 2 2. 4
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	19. 1 26. 3 25. 6 26. 7 24. 3	13.7 19.1 23.1 22.6 22.1	2.6 4.6 1.6 1.0 2.2	2.5 4.8 7.8 8.2 9.2	1 6 2.5 2.5 1.0	8 2 0 1 9	.7 1.8 1.6 1.0	6.9 6.3 7.7 7.9 7.8	8.3 11.0 11.8 12.1 13.2	9.3 4.9 3.0 4.7 3.5	4.1 3.1 1.9 .9 1.4	6.7 6.6 6.6 7.5 9.1	4.1 1.2 4.8 3.9 1.1	5. 4 3. 9 2. 8 2. 3 5. 7
1955 1956 1957 1958 1958	29. 7 32. 6 31. 8 30. 5 33. 3	27. 9 30. 0 28. 6 31. 6 37. 1	1. 2 1. 8 4 3. 8 . 8	8.6 9.5 12.0 13.9 11.1	5.8 3.9 2.3 -2.5 9.1	.7 1.0 .9 1.2	1.0 2.0 1.5 1.5	8.5 9.5 9.5 10.4 11.9	16. 1 15. 5 13. 3 12. 5 15. 4	8. 0 4. 6 3. 3 . 4 4. 0	2.8 .7 2.1 2.1 3.8	11.7 11.2 9.0 9.8 12.4	6. 4 3. 5 2. 6 . 2 6. 4	7. 0 3. 5 4. 0 6. 2 8. 0
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	30. 7 30. 9 35. 7 40. 0 48. 7	31. 9 35. 8 39. 6 46. 5 55. 2	1.0 9 -1.2 5 4.9	12. 1 18. 3 26. 2 26. 3 26. 2	3.3 1.9 1.3 6.4 5.4	.7 1 4 .1 5	5 .3 -2.1 -2.5 1	11.5 12.1 12.7 13.9 16.1	14. 1 12. 5 12. 6 13. 6 13. 6	3.3 .9 4.5 6.9 8.8	3. 2 3. 1 6. 4 8. 4 7. 9	11.6 12.6 13.9 16.4 17.2	4.6 1.8 5.8 7.9 8.5	5. 6 6. 9 7. 6 11. 1 11. 1
1965 1966 1967 1968	55. 0 62. 9 64. 2 67. 6 57. 9	58. 4 59. 4 67. 9 73. 2 61. 5	7.5 2.4 9.9 11.1 2.5	28. 0 19. 1 35. 3 31. 1 9. 1	4.0 11.0 6 5.6 19.9	. 5 1. 4 4. 0 4. 2 5. 4	-2.1 7 -4.2 -6.5 -4.5	16. 9 19. 2 19. 0 20. 2 21. 3	13. 5 12. 0 12. 0 13. 9 13. 8	12. 0 12. 9 10. 2 14. 4. 13. 7	11.2 9.7 7.9 9.3 11.0	17. 1 13. 4 13. 4 16. 8 18. 2	9. 6 6. 4 4. 5 10. 0 10. 4	13. 5 11. 4 15. 8 16. 4 13. 5
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	74. 7 91. 5 102. 0 121. 7 115. 3	78. 7 104. 4 127. 6 143. 0 137. 7	8. 9 9. 1 14. 8 12. 7 5. 1	43. 6 67. 8 71. 0 67. 9 57. 9	-8.9 -10.7 1.7 23.5 18.3	9.5 8.3 4.2 .9 5.3	8 -3.7 -4.5 -6.9 -1.2	24. 4 27. 3 29. 2 32. 8 36. 0	12. 4 18. 9 25. 9 27. 9 23. 2	7. 9 13. 9 21. 5 25. 4 11. 1	8. 8 13. 0 17. 2 19. 4 3. 3	14. 7 27. 1 41. 5 47. 0 35. 3	5. 9 11. 6 18. 6 21. 7 9. 8	12. 5 19. 9 30. 2 25. 4 15. 0
1975	131.2	167. 8	6. 9	84. 9	14. 4	10.4	-1.8	43.7	20.4	8. 1	-2.4	39. 4	8.5	14.8
1975: I II III IV	149. 1 134. 5	134. 8 187. 2 163. 9 185. 9	-14. 8 40. 8 11. 5 -10. 0	80. 6 83. 1 74. 5 101. 5	-4.9 9.4 28.5 24.5	15. 0 12. 1 8. 5 6. 0	-4.2 1.4 -3.7 6	40. 0 41. 8 43. 5 50. 2	18. 2 18. 5 21. 0 24. 0	3. 5 5. 0 10. 4 13. 4	-2.0 -4.4 -1.8 -1.5	28. 5 38. 5 42. 2 48. 2	.9 1.3 14.3 17.7	16. 4 17. 4 2. 4 23. 1
1976: I II III		180.1	8. 9 -1. 4 3. 8	87. 2 79. 2 112. 5	13.9 27.6 10.8	2.3 9.7 2.3	-7.7 3.8 -7.9	52.6 48.8 49.1	29. 4 32. 5 35. 1	19. 2 18. 8 17. 8	-4.5 -6.2	51.5 53.2 60.6	18. 1 20. 6 19. 2	20.7 21.8 25.6

Saving by households, personal trust funds, nonprofit institutions, farms, and other noncorporate business.
 Includes commercial paper and miscellaneous financial assets, not shown separately.
 Consists of U.S. savings bonds, other U.S. Treasury securities, U.S. Government agency securities and sponsored agency securities, and State and local obligations.
 Includes investment company shares.
 Private life insurance reserves, private insured and noninsured pension reserves, and government insurance and

pension reserves.

8 Security credit, policy loans, noncorporate business mortgage debt, and other debt.

Table B-25.—Number and money income (in 1975 dollars) of families and unrelated individuals by race of head, 1947-75

		Tot	ał			Whi	ite		B1	ack and o	ther race	es
Year	Total			nt with mes	Total			nt with	Total			nt with
i cai	ber (mil- lions)	Median income	Be- low \$5,000	Below pov- erty level	ber (mil- lions)	Median income	Be- low \$5,000	Below pov- erty level	ber (mil- lions)	Median income	Be- low \$5,000	Below pov- erty level
FAMILIES 1947	37.2	\$7, 303	29. 3		34. 1	\$7, 608	26. 0		3. 1	\$3, 888	64. 3	-
1947 1948 1949	37. 2 38. 6 39. 3	\$7, 303 7, 126 7, 016	29. 3 30. 5 31. 8		35. 3	\$7,608 7,400 7,296	26. 0 27. 4 28. 8		3. 1 3. 3	3, 953 3, 726	63. 4 65. 9	
1951	39. 9 40. 6 40. 8	7, 422 7, 684 7, 888	29. 4 27. 0 25. 5 23. 9			7, 702 7, 996 8, 343	26. 5 23. 9 22. 2			4, 178 4, 210 4, 741	60. 4 59. 3 53. 4	
1950	41. 2 42. 0 42. 9 43. 5	8, 536 8, 345 8, 881 9, 466	25. 3 25. 3 22. 9 20. 9		38. 2 39. 0 39. 5	8, 851 8, 687 9, 271	21. 4 22. 8 20. 3		3. 8 3. 9 4. 0	4, 962 4, 839 5, 113 5, 211 5, 284	50. 5 51. 4 49. 1 48. 2	
1957 1958 1959	43. 7 44. 2 45. 1	9, 496 9, 469 10, 003	21. 2 21. 3 20. 1	18, 5	39. 7 40. 2 40. 9	9, 906 9, 882 9, 866 10, 420	18. 1 18. 4 18. 5 17. 2	15, 2	4. 0 4. 0 4. 0 4. 2	5, 284 5, 054 5, 382	48. 1 49. 8 47. 1	50. 4
		10, 214 10, 318	19.7 19.7	18. 1 18. 1	41.1 41.9	10, 604 10, 760	17. 2 17. 1	14.9 14.8	4. 3 4. 5	5, 871 5, 741	43. 4 44. 5	49. (49. (
1963	147. 5 148. 0	10, 597 10, 984 11, 398 11, 867	18. 4 17. 5 16. 6 15. 6	17. 2 15. 9 15. 0 13. 9	42. 4 42. 7 43. 1 43. 5	11, 098 11, 511 11, 900 12, 370 12, 977	15.9 14.9 14.5 13.5	13.9 12.8 12.2 11.1	4.6 4.8 4.8 4.8	6, 090 6, 660	41. 8 40. 9 35. 8 34. 5	48. (43. 1 40. (39. 1
1960 1961 1962 1963 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967	1 49. 2 1 50. 1	12, 491 12, 788	13.6 13.3 11.8	11. 8 11. 4 10. 0	44. 1 44. 8 45. 4		11.8 11.6 10.2	9. 3 9. 0 8. 0	5. 0 5. 0 5. 1	6, 812 7, 780 8, 212 8, 648	30. 0 28. 9 26. 0	33. 9 32. 1 28. 2
1969	151.6 152.2	13, 354 13, 849 13, 676	11. 4 12. 0	9.7 10.1	46. 0 46. 5	13, 826 14, 379 14, 188	9.9 10.3	7. 7 8. 0	5. 2 5. 4	9, 089 9, 032	25. 0 26. 0 26. 1	26. 9 28. 1
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1974 2 1975	54. 4 55. 1 55. 7	13, 668 14, 301 14, 595 14, 009	11.9 11.2 10.8 11.5	10.0 9.3 8.8 9.2	47.6 48.5 48.9 49.5	14, 182 14, 858 15, 254 14, 577	10.3 9.5 9.1 9.6	7. 9 7. 1 6. 6 7. 0	5. 7 5. 9 6. 1 6. 3	8, 923 9, 142 9, 200 9, 020	26. 1 25. 1 26. 6	27. 4 27. 7 26. 2 26. 0
1974 ² 1975	55. 7 56. 2	14, 082 13, 719	11.1	8. 8 9. 7	49. 4 49. 9	14, 633 14, 268	9. 2	6. 8	6. 3 6. 4	9, 361 9, 321	25. 7 26. 3	25, 1 25, 3
			Be- low \$3, 000	Below pov- erty level			Be- low \$3, 000	Below pov- erty level			Be- low \$3, 000	Below pov- erty level
UNRELATED INDIVIDUALS 1947	8. 2	\$2 362	58. 2		7.2	\$2.495	56. 1		1.0	\$1,798	72.3	
1947 1948 1949 1950	8. 4 9. 0	\$2, 362 2, 228 2, 370	60. 0 57. 2 56. 8		7.3	\$2, 495 2, 354 2, 559 2, 492	58.3 55.1 55.2		i.ŏ	1, 764 1, 850 1, 826	71.8 69.5 67.5	
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	9.1 9.7 9.5	2, 336 2, 475 2, 858 2, 809 2, 447	54.6 51.8 51.9			0,000	53.5 49.3			1, 925 2, 130 2, 331 1, 749	61. 2 66. 3 59. 2	
1954 1955 1956	9.7 9.9 9.8	2,648	55. 9 54. 4 52. 1		8.3 8.5 8.5	2, 634 2, 815 2, 898	50. 4 54. 0 52. 3 51. 2		1.4 1.4 1.3	1.880	65.6 66.4 57.5	
1956 1957 1958 1959	10.4 10.9 10.9	2, 856 2, 766 2, 875	51.6 52.5 51.6	46. 1	8. 9 9. 2 9. 3	2, 606 3, 079 2, 964 2, 634 2, 815 2, 898 3, 055 2, 964 3, 072	49. 8 50. 6 49. 7	44. 1	1.5 1.6 1.6	2, 152 1, 941 2, 010 1, 984	62.8 63.8 63.4	57.4
1960 1961 1962	1 11. 1 1 11. 2 1 11. 0	3, 126 3, 155 3, 119	49. 3 49. 0 49. 3	45. 2 45. 9 45. 4	9.6 9.6 9.5	3, 380 3, 392 3, 337 3, 318	47. 2 46. 6 46. 9	43. 0 43. 2 42. 7	1.5 1.6 1.5	1, 940 2, 082 2, 228 2, 277	62. 8 63. 3 63. 5	59. 3 62. 7 62. 1
1963 1964 1965	1 11. 2 1 12. 1 1 12. 2	3, 165 3, 441 3, 672	48.7 46.3	44. 2 42. 7 39. 8	9.7 10.4 10.5	3, 624	47. 0 44. 7 42. 2	42. 0 40. 7 38. 1	1.5 1.6 1.7	2, 277 2, 483 2, 792 2, 511 2, 942	60.4 56.0 52.7 55.2	58. 3 55. 0 50. 7 53. 1
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	1 12. 5 1 13. 2 1 13. 9	3, 798 3, 835 4, 310	42.5 42.2 38.2	38.3 38.1 34.0	10.7 11.3 12.0	3, 994 3, 982 4, 567	40. 6 40. 7 36. 6	36. 1 36. 5 32. 2	1.6 1.8 1.8	3, 093	51.2 49.0	48. 2 45. 7
1071	16. 2	4, 303 4, 348 4, 407	37. 4 36. 4	34.0 32.9 31.6	12. 5 13. 4 14. 2	4, 519 4, 551 4, 605	36. 2 35. 7 34. 5	32. 1 30. 8 29. 6	2.0 1.9 2.1	3, 186 3, 109 3, 090	48. 3 49. 1 49. 2	45. 5 46. 7 44. 9
1972 1973 1974 1974 2 1975	16. 8 18. 3 18. 9	4,530 5,007 4,845 5,025	34.3 30.7 31.2	29. 0 25. 6 25. 5	14.5 15.8 16.3 16.3	4, 731 5, 172 5, 060	32.6 29.0 29.0 27.8	27. 1 23. 7 23. 2	2.3 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7	3, 514 3, 865 3, 437	44.5 41.4 44.9	40. 9 37. 8 40. 0
19/4 2	18.9	5, 025 4, 882	29. 8 29. 7	24. 1 25. 1	16.3 17.5	5, 205 5, 099	27.8	21.8	2.6	3, 638 3, 528	42. 6 44. 4	38. (40. 9

Revised using population controls based on the 1970 Census. Such controls not available by race.
2 Based on revised methodology procedures.

Note.—The poverty level is based on the poverty index adopted by a Federal interagency committee in 1969. That index reflects different consumption requirements for families based on size and composition, sex and age of family head, and farm-nonfarm residence. The poverty threshold is updated every year to reflect changes in the consumer price index. For further details, see "Current Population Reports," Series P-60, No. 103, Bureau of the Census.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND PRODUCTIVITY

TABLE B-26.—Population by age groups, 1929-76 [Thousands of persons]

July 1					Age (years)			
July 1	Total	Under 5	5-15	16-19	20-24	25-44	45-64	65 and over
1929	121, 767	11, 734	26, 800	9, 127	10, 694	35, 862	21, 076	6, 474
1933	125, 579	10, 612	26, 897	9, 302	11, 152	37, 319	22, 933	7, 363
1939	130, 880	10, 418	25, 179	9, 822	11, 519	39, 354	25, 823	8, 764
1940	132, 122	10, 579	24, 811	9, 895	11, 690	39, 868	26, 249	9, 031
1941	133, 402	10, 850	24, 516	9, 840	11, 807	40, 383	26, 718	9, 288
1942	134, 860	11, 301	24, 231	9, 730	11, 955	40, 861	27, 196	9, 584
1943	136, 739	12, 016	24, 093	9, 607	12, 064	41, 420	27, 671	9, 867
1944	138, 397	12, 524	23, 949	9, 561	12, 062	42, 016	28, 138	10, 147
1945	139, 928	12, 979	23, 907	9, 361	12, 036	42, 521	28, 630	10, 494
	141, 389	13, 244	24, 103	9, 119	12, 004	43, 027	29, 064	10, 828
	144, 126	14, 406	24, 468	9, 097	11, 814	43, 657	29, 498	11, 185
	146, 631	14, 919	25, 209	8, 952	11, 794	44, 288	29, 931	11, 538
	149, 188	15, 607	25, 852	8, 788	11, 700	44, 916	30, 405	11, 921
1950	152, 271	16, 410	26, 721	8, 542	11, 680	45, 672	30, 849	12, 397
1951	154, 878	17, 333	27, 279	8, 446	11, 552	46, 103	31, 362	12, 803
1952	157, 553	17, 312	28, 894	8, 414	11, 350	46, 495	31, 884	13, 203
1953	160, 184	17, 638	30, 227	8, 460	11, 062	46, 786	32, 394	13, 617
1954	163, 026	18, 057	31, 480	8, 637	10, 832	47, 001	32, 942	14, 076
1955	165, 931	18, 566	32, 682	8, 744	10, 714	47, 194	33, 506	14,525
1956	168, 903	19, 003	33, 994	8, 916	10, 616	47, 379	34, 057	14,938
1957	171, 984	19, 494	35, 272	9, 195	10, 603	47, 440	34, 591	15,388
1958	174, 882	19, 887	36, 445	9, 543	10, 756	47, 337	35, 109	15,806
1959	177, 830	20, 175	37, 368	10, 215	10, 969	47, 192	35, 663	16,248
1960	180, 671	20, 341	38, 494	10, 683	11, 134	47, 140	36, 203	16,675
1961	183, 691	20, 522	39, 765	11, 025	11, 483	47, 084	36, 722	17,089
1962	186, 538	20, 469	41, 205	11, 180	11, 959	47, 013	37, 255	17,457
1963	189, 242	20, 342	41, 626	12, 007	12, 714	46, 994	37, 782	17,778
1964	191, 889	20, 165	42, 297	12, 736	13, 269	46, 958	38, 338	18,127
1965	194, 303	19, 824	42, 938	13, 516	13, 746	46, 912	38, 916	18, 451
	196, 560	19, 208	43, 702	14, 311	14, 050	47, 001	39, 534	18, 755
	198, 712	18, 563	44, 244	14, 200	15, 248	47, 194	40, 193	19, 071
	200, 706	17, 913	44, 622	14, 452	15, 786	47, 721	40, 846	19, 365
	202, 677	17, 376	44, 840	14, 800	16, 480	48, 064	41, 437	19, 680
1970	204, 878	17, 148	44, 774	15, 275	17, 184	48, 435	41, 975	20, 087
	207, 053	17, 177	44, 441	15, 635	18, 089	48, 811	42, 413	20, 488
	208, 846	16, 990	43, 948	15, 946	18, 032	50, 254	42, 785	20, 892
	210, 410	16, 694	43, 227	16, 310	18, 345	51, 411	43, 077	21, 346
	211, 901	16, 288	42, 538	16, 590	18, 741	52, 593	43, 319	21, 833
1975	213, 540	15, 882	41, 956	16, 793	19, 229	53, 733	43, 542	22, 405
1976	215, 118	15, 339	41, 454	16, 934	19, 630	55, 120	43, 707	22, 934

Note.—Includes Armed Forces overseas beginning 1940. Includes Alaska and Hawaii beginning 1950.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

Table B-27.—Noninstitutional population and the labor force, 1929-76
[Monthly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted]

	Nonin- stitu-	Total labor force			Civil	ian labor t	force		Unem- ploy- ment	Labor force partici- pation rate (total
Year or month	tional popu- lation 1	(includ- ing Armed	Armed Forces 1		E	mployme	nt		rate (percent of	labor
		Forces)		Total	Total	Agri- cul- tural	Non- agri- cul- tural	Unem- ploy- ment	civilian labor force)	of non- institu- tional popu- lation)
		Tho	usands of	persons 14	years of	age and o	ver		Per	cent
1929		49, 440	260	49, 180	47, 630	10, 450 ·	37, 180	1, 550	3. 2	
1933		51, 840	250	51, 590	38, 760	10, 090	28, 670	12, 830	24.9	
1939		55, 600	370	55, 230	45, 750	9, 610	36, 140	9, 480	17.2	
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944	100, 380 101, 520 102, 610 103, 660 104, 630	56, 180 57, 530 60, 380 64, 560 66, 040	540 1, 620 3, 970 9, 020 11, 410	55, 640 55, 910 56, 410 55, 540 54, 630	47, 520 50, 350 53, 750 54, 470 53, 960	9, 540 9, 100 9, 250 9, 080 8, 950	37, 980 41, 250 44, 500 45, 390 45, 010	8, 120 5, 560 2, 660 1, 070 670	14. 6 9. 9 4. 7 1. 9 1. 2	56. 0 56. 7 58. 8 62. 3 63. 1
1945 1946 1947	105, 530 106, 520 107, 608	65, 300 60, 970 61, 758	11, 440 3, 450 1, 590	53, 860 57, 520 60, 168	52, 820 55, 250 57, 812	8, 580 8, 320 8, 256	44, 240 46, 930 49, 557	1, 040 2, 270 2, 356	1. 9 3. 9 3. 9	61. 9 57. 2 57. 4
		Tho	usands of	persons 1	6 years of	age and o	over			
1947 1948 1949	103, 418 104, 527 105, 611	60, 941 62, 080 62, 903	1, 591 1, 459 1, 617	59, 350 60, 621 61, 286	57, 038 58, 343 57, 651	7, 890 7, 629 7, 658	49, 148 50, 714 49, 993	2, 311 2, 276 3, 637	3. 9 3. 8 5. 9	58. 9 59. 4 59. 6
1950 1951 1952 1953 ² 1954	106, 645 107, 721 108, 823 110, 601 111, 671	63, 858 65, 117 65, 730 66, 560 66, 993	1,650 3,100 3,592 3,545 3,350	62, 208 62, 017 62, 138 63, 015 63, 643	58, 918 59, 961 60, 250 61, 179 60, 109	7, 160 6, 726 6, 500 6, 260 6, 205	51, 758 53, 235 53, 749 54, 919 53, 904	3, 288 2, 055 1, 883 1, 834 3, 532	5. 3 3. 3 3. 0 2. 9 5. 5	59. 9 60. 4 60. 4 60. 2 60. 0
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	112,732 113,811 115,065 116,363 117,881	68, 072 69, 409 69, 729 70, 275 70, 921	3, 049 2, 857 2, 800 2, 636 2, 552	65, 023 66, 552 66, 929 67, 639 68, 369	62, 170 63, 799 64, 071 63, 036 64, 630	6, 450 6, 283 5, 947 5, 586 5, 565	55, 722 57, 514 58, 123 57, 450 59, 065	2, 852 2, 750 2, 859 4, 602 3, 740	4. 4 4. 1 4. 3 6. 8 5. 5	60. 4 61. 0 60. 6 60. 4 60. 2
1960 ² 1961	119, 759 121, 343 122, 981 125, 154 127, 224	72, 142 73, 031 73, 442 74, 571 75, 830	2,514 2,572 2,828 2,738 2,739	69, 628 70, 459 70, 614 71, 833 73, 091	65, 778 65, 746 66, 702 67, 762 69, 305	5, 458 5, 200 4, 944 4, 687 4, 523	60, 318 60, 546 61, 759 63, 076 64, 782	3, 852 4, 714 3, 911 4, 070 3, 786	5. 5 6. 7 5. 5 5. 7 5. 2	60. 2 60. 2 59. 7 59. 6 59. 6
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969		77, 178 78, 893 80, 793 82, 272 84, 240	2,723 3,123 3,446 3,535 3,506	74, 455 75, 770 77, 347 78, 737 80, 734	71, 088 72, 895 74, 372 75, 920 77, 902	4, 361 3, 979 3, 844 3, 817 3, 606	66, 726 68, 915 70, 527 72, 103 74, 296	3, 366 2, 875 2, 975 2, 817 2, 832	4. 5 3. 8 3. 8 3. 6 3. 5	59. 7 60. 1 60. 6 60. 7 61. 1
1970		85, 903 86, 929 88, 991 91,040 93, 240	3, 188 2, 817 2, 449 2, 326 2, 229	82, 715 84, 113 86, 542 88, 714 91, 011	78, 627 79, 120 81, 702 84, 409 85, 935	3, 462 3, 387 3, 472 3, 452 3, 492	75, 165 75, 732 78, 230 80, 957 82, 443	4, 088 4, 993 4, 840 4, 304 5, 076	4. 9 5. 9 5. 6 4. 9 5. 6	61.3 61.0 61.0 61.4 61.8
1975 1976	1	94, 793 96, 917	2, 180 2, 144	92, 613 94, 773	84, 783 87, 485	3, 380 3, 297	81, 403 84, 188	7, 830 7, 288	8.5 7.7	61.8 62.1

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE B-27.- Noninstitutional population and the labor force, 1929-76-Continued [Monthly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted]

	Nonin- stitu-	Total labor force			Civil	lian labor	force		Unem- ploy-	Labor force partici- pation rate (total
Year or month	tional popu- lation1	(includ- ing Armed	Armed Forces 1		E	mployme	nt		ment rate (percent of	labor force as percent
	, and a	Forces)		Total	Total	Agri- cul- tural	Non- agri- cul- tural	Unem- ploy- ment	civilian labor force)	of non- institu- tional popu- lation)
		Tho	usands of	persons 10	6 years of	age and o	ver		Per	ent
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	152, 230 152, 445 152, 646 152, 840 153, 051 153, 278	94, 146 93, 819 94, 218 94, 405 94, 970 94, 773	2, 193 2, 198 2, 198 2, 195 2, 181 2, 178	91, 953 91, 621 92, 020 92, 210 92, 789 92, 595	84, 673 84, 259 84, 243 84, 246 84, 475 84, 496	3, 337 3, 286 3, 301 3, 283 3, 535 3, 361	81, 336 80, 973 80, 942 80, 963 80, 940 81, 135	7, 280 7, 362 7, 777 7, 964 8, 314 8, 099	7. 9 8. 0 8. 5 8. 6 9. 0 8. 7	61. 8 61. 5 61. 7 61. 8 62. 1 61. 8
July	153, 585 153, 824 154, 052 154, 256 154, 476 154, 700	95, 103 95, 220 95, 296 95, 299 95, 180 95, 305	2, 186 2, 185 2, 170 2, 164 2, 155 2, 157	92, 917 93, 035 93, 126 93, 135 93, 025 93, 148	84, 856 85, 114 85, 115 85, 087 85, 212 85, 443	3, 435 3, 417 3, 506 3, 389 3, 315 3, 255	81, 421 81, 697 81, 609 81, 698 81, 897 82, 188	8, 061 7, 921 8, 011 8, 048 7, 813 7, 705	8. 7 8. 5 8. 6 8. 6 8. 4 8. 3	61. 9 61. 9 61. 8 61. 6 61. 6
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	154, 915 155, 106 155, 325 155, 516 155, 711 155, 925	95, 613 95, 743 96, 009 96, 520 96, 693 96, 841	2, 140 2, 146 2, 148 2, 144 2, 142 2, 137	93, 473 93, 597 93, 862 94, 376 94, 551 94, 704	86, 226 86, 471 86, 845 87, 329 87, 640 87, 533	3, 305 3, 198 3, 215 3, 398 3, 332 3, 313	82, 921 83, 273 83, 630 83, 931 84, 308 84, 220	7, 247 7, 126 7, 017 7, 047 6, 911 7, 171	7.8 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.3 7.6	61. 7 61. 7 61. 8 62. 1 62. 1
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	156, 367 156, 595 156, 788 157, 006	97, 329 97, 498 97, 387 97, 449 98, 020 98, 106	2, 140 2, 147 2, 145 2, 147 2, 149 2, 146	95, 189 95, 351 95, 242 95, 302 95, 871 95, 960	87, 783 87, 834 87, 794 87, 738 88, 220 88, 441	3, 333 3, 372 3, 278 3, 310 3, 248 3, 257	84, 450 84, 462 84, 516 84, 428 84, 972 85, 184	7, 406 7, 517 7, 448 7, 564 7, 651 7, 519	7.8 7.9 7.8 7.9 8.0 7.8	62. 2 62. 2 62. 2 62. 2 62. 4

Note.—Labor force data in Tables B-27 through B-30 are based on household interviews and relate to the calendar week including the 12th of the month. For definitions of terms, area samples used, historical comparability of the data, comparability with other series, etc., see "Employment and Earnings."

¹ Not seasonally adjusted.
2 Not strictly comparable with earlier data due to population adjustments as follows: Beginning 1953, introduction of 1950 Census data added about 600,000 to population and about 350,000 to labor force, total employment, and agricultural employment. Beginning 1960, inclusion of Alaska and Hawaii added about 500,000 to population, about 300,000 to labor force, and about 240,000 to nonagricultural employment. Beginning 1962, introduction of 1960 Census data reduced population by about 50,000 and labor force and employment by about 20,000. Beginning 1972, introduction of 1970 Census data added about 800,000 to civilian noninstitutional population and about 333,000 to labor force and employment. A subsequent adjustment based on 1970 Census in March 1973 added 60,000 to labor force and to employment. Overall categories of the labor force other than those noted were not appreciably affected.

TABLE B-28.—Civilian employment and unemployment by sex and age 1947-76
[Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

-			E	mployme	nt					Une	mployn	nent		
Year or			Males			Female;	5			Males			Females	
month	Total	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over
1947 1948 1949	57, 038 58, 343 57, 651	40, 994 41, 726 40, 926	2, 218 2, 345 2, 124	38, 776 39, 382 38, 803	16, 045 16, 618 16, 723	1, 691 1, 683 1, 588	14, 354 14, 937 15, 137	2, 311 2, 276 3, 637	1, 692 1, 559 2, 572	270 255 352	1, 422 1, 305 2, 219	619 717 1, 065	144 152 223	475 564 841
1950 1951 1952 1953 1 1954	58, 918 59, 961 60, 250 61, 179 60, 109	41, 580 41, 780 41, 684 42, 431 41, 620	2, 186 2, 156 2, 106 2, 135 1, 985	39, 394 39, 626 39, 578 40, 296 39, 634	17, 340 18, 182 18, 570 18, 750 18, 490	1 611	15, 824 16, 570 16, 958 17, 164 17, 000	3, 288 2, 055 1, 883 1, 834 3, 532	2, 239 1, 221 1, 185 1, 202 2, 344	318 191 205 184 310	1, 922 1, 029 980 1, 019 2, 035	1, 049 834 698 632 1, 188	195 145 140 123 191	854 689 559 510 997
1955 1956 1957 1958	62, 170 63, 799 64, 071 63, 036 64, 630	42, 621 43, 380 43, 357 42, 423 43, 466	2, 095 2, 164 2, 117 2, 012 2, 198	40, 526 41, 216 41, 239 40, 411 41, 267	19,550 20,422 20,714 20,613 21,164	1,548 1,654 1,663 1,570 1,640	18, 767 19, 052 19, 043	2, 852 2, 750 2, 859 4, 602 3, 740	1, 854 1, 711 1, 841 3, 098 2, 420	274 269 299 416 398	1,580 1,442 1,541 2,681 2,022	998 1,039 1,018 1,504 1,320	176 209 197 262 256	823 832 821 1, 242 1, 063
1960 1 1961 1962 1 1963 1964	65, 778 65, 746 66, 702 67, 762 69, 305	43, 904 43, 656 44, 177 44, 657 45, 474	2, 360 2, 314 2, 362 2, 406 2, 587	41, 543 41, 342 41, 815 42, 251 42, 886	21, 874 22, 090 22, 525 23, 105 23, 831	1, 769 1, 793 1, 833 1, 849 1, 929	20, 693 21, 257	3, 852 4, 714 3, 911 4, 070 3, 786	2, 486 2, 997 2, 423 2, 472 2, 205	425 479 407 500 487	2, 060 2, 518 2, 016 1, 971 1, 718	1, 366 1, 717 1, 488 1, 598 1, 581	286 349 313 383 386	1, 080 1, 368 1, 175 1, 216 1, 195
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	71, 088 72, 895 74, 372 75, 920 77, 902	46, 340 46, 919 47, 479 48, 114 48, 818	3, 255 3, 430	45, 388	24, 748 25, 976 26, 893 27, 807 29, 084		22, 630 23, 510 24, 397 25, 281 26, 397	3, 366 2, 875 2, 975 2, 817 2, 832	1, 914 1, 551 1, 508 1, 419 1, 403	479 432 448 427 441		1,429	395 404 391 412 412	1,056 921 1,078 985 1,016
1970 1971 1972 ¹ 1973 ¹ 1974	78, 627 79, 120 81, 702 84, 409 85, 936	48, 960 49, 245 50, 630 51, 963 52, 519	3, 407 3, 470 3, 750 4, 017 4, 074	45, 553 45, 775 46, 880 47, 946 48, 445	29, 667 29, 875 31, 072 32, 446 33, 417	2, 734 2, 725 2, 972 3, 219 3, 329	26, 933 27, 149 28, 100 29, 228 30, 088	4, 088 4, 993 4, 840 4, 304 5, 076	2, 235 2, 776 2, 635 2, 240 2, 668	599 691 707 647 749	1, 636 2, 086 1, 928 1, 594 1, 918	1, 853 2, 217 2, 205 2, 064 2, 408	506 567 595 579 660	1,347 1,650 1,610 1,485 1,748
1975 1976	84, 783 87, 485	51, 230 52, 3 9 1	3, 803 3, 904	47, 427 48, 486	33, 553 35, 0 9 5	3, 243 3, 365	30, 310 31, 730	7, 830 7, 288	4, 385 3, 968	957 928	3, 428 3, 041	3, 445 3, 320	795 773	2,649 2,546
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	84, 673 84, 259 84, 243 84, 246 84, 475 84, 496	51, 399 51, 192 51, 067 50, 960 51, 138 51, 024	3, 850 3, 806 3, 805 3, 753 3, 851 3, 758	47, 549 47, 386 47, 262 47, 207 47, 287 47, 266	33, 274 33, 067 33, 176 33, 286 33, 337 33, 472	3, 298 3, 232 3, 201 3, 223 3, 244 3, 245	29, 976 29, 835 29, 975 30, 063 30, 093 30, 227	7, 280 7, 362 7, 777 7, 964 8, 314 8, 099	3, 919 4, 070 4, 289 4, 445 4, 665 4, 602	924 943 951 972 955 1,066	2, 995 3, 127 3, 338 3, 473 3, 710 3, 536	3, 361 3, 292 3, 488 3, 519 3, 649 3, 497	802 755 805 751 855 769	2, 559 2, 537 2, 683 2, 768 2, 794 2, 728
July Aug. Sept Oct Nov Dec.	84, 856 85, 114 85, 115 85, 087 85, 212 85, 443	51, 267 51, 365 51, 296 51, 244 51, 324 51, 401	2 700	47 469	33, 589 33, 749 33, 819 33, 843 33, 888 34, 042	3, 209 3, 245 3, 272 3, 221 3, 228 3, 275	30, 380 30, 504 30, 547 30, 622 30, 660 30, 767	8, 061 7, 921 8, 011 8, 048 7, 813 7, 705	4, 613 4, 458 4, 615 4, 598 4, 430 4, 256	1, 009 988 932 935 892 922	3, 604 3, 470 3, 683 3, 663 3, 538 3, 334	3, 448 3, 463 3, 396	800 825 799 802 765 821	2, 648 2, 638 2, 597 2, 648 2, 618 2, 628
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June_	86, 226 86, 471 86, 845 87, 329 87, 640 87, 533	51, 789 51, 942 52, 078 52, 397 52, 490 52, 332	3, 848 3, 863 3, 877 3, 942 3, 948 3, 889	48, 079 48, 201 48, 455 48, 542	34, 437 34, 529 34, 767 34, 932 35, 150 35, 201	3, 296 3, 301 3, 353 3, 386 3, 479 3, 400	31, 141 31, 228 31, 414 31, 546 31, 671 31, 801	7, 247 7, 126 7, 017 7, 047 6, 911 7, 171	3, 949 3, 858 3, 798 3, 812 3, 830 3, 931	946 920 924 990 937 882	3, 003 2, 938 2, 874 2, 822 2, 893 3, 049	3, 298 3, 268 3, 219 3, 235 3, 081 3, 240	779 775 775 768 753 763	2. 328
July Aug Sept_ Oct Nov Dec	87, 783 87, 834 87, 794 87, 738 88, 220	52, 507 52, 596 52, 546 52, 576 52, 643 52, 799	3, 963 3, 958 3, 845 3, 892 3, 870		35, 276 35, 238 35, 248 35, 162 35, 577 35, 642	2 423	31, 853 31, 883 31, 906 31, 811 32, 208 32, 340	7 406	4, 020 3, 968 4, 060 4, 178 4, 244 4, 152	908 908 910 950 951 933	3, 131 3, 060 3, 150 3, 228 3, 293 3, 219	3, 386	752 870 754 753 767 769	2, 634 2, 679 2, 634 2, 633 2, 640

¹ See footnote 2, Table B-27.

Note.—See Note, Table B-27.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Table B-29.—Selected unemployment rates, 1948-76

[Percent 1; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

•		Ву	sex and	age	Ву	color		Ву	selected ;	groups		
Year or month	All work- ers	Both sexes 16–19 years	Males 20 years and over	Females 20 years and over	White	Black and other	Expe- rienced wage and salary work- ers	House- hold heads	Mar- ried men 2	Full- time work- ers ³	Blue- collar work- ers 4	Labor force time lost s
1948 1949	3. 8 5. 9	9. 2 13. 4	3. 2 5. 4	3. 6 5. 3	3. 5 5. 6	5. 9 8. 9	4. 3 6. 8		3. 5	5. 4	4. 2 8. 0	
1950	5. 3 3. 3 3. 0 2. 9 5. 5 4. 4 4. 1 4. 3 6. 8 5. 5	12. 2 8. 2 8. 5 7. 6 12. 6 11. 0 11. 1 11. 6 15. 9 14. 6	4. 7 2. 5 2. 4 2. 5 4. 9 3. 8 3. 4 3. 6 6. 2 4. 7	5. 1 4. 0 3. 2 2. 9 5. 5 4. 4 4. 2 4. 1 6. 1 5. 2	4.9 3.1 2.8 2.7 5.0 3.9 3.6 3.8 6.1 4.8	9. 0 5. 3 5. 4 4. 5 9. 9 8. 7 8. 3 7. 9 12. 6 10. 7	6. 0 3. 7 3. 3 3. 2 6. 2 4. 8 4. 4 4. 6 7. 2 5. 7		4. 6 1. 5 1. 4 1. 7 4. 0 2. 8 2. 6 2. 8 5. 1 3. 6	5. 0 2. 6 2. 5 5. 2 3. 8 3. 7 4. 0 7. 2	7. 2 3. 9 3. 6 3. 4 7. 2 5. 8 5. 1 6. 2 7. 6	4, 8 5, 1 5, 3 8, 1 6, 6
1960		14. 7 16. 8 14. 7 17. 2 16. 2 14. 8 12. 8 12. 8 12. 7 12. 2	4. 7 5. 7 4. 6 4. 5 3. 9 3. 2 2. 5 2. 3 2. 2	5. 1 6. 3 5. 4 5. 2 4. 5 3. 8 4. 2 3. 8 3. 7	4.9 6.0 4.9 5.0 4.6 4.1 3.4 3.2 3.1	10. 2 12. 4 10. 9 10. 8 9. 6 8. 1 7. 3 7. 4 6. 7 6. 4	5. 7 6. 8 5. 6 5. 5 5. 0 4. 3 3. 6 3. 4 3. 3	3. 7 3. 2 2. 7 2. 2 2. 1 1. 9 1. 8	3. 7 4. 6 3. 6 3. 4 2. 8 2. 4 1. 9 1. 8 1. 6	6. 7 5. 5 4. 9 4. 2 3. 5 3. 4 3. 1 3. 1	7. 8 9. 2 7. 4 7. 3 6. 3 5. 3 4. 2 4. 4 4. 1 3. 9	6. 7 8. 6 6. 4 5. 8 4. 4 4. 6
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	4. 9 5. 9 5. 6 4. 9 5. 6 8. 5 7. 7	15. 2 16. 9 16. 2 14. 5 16. 0 19. 9 19. 0	3. 5 4. 4 4. 0 3. 2 3. 8 6. 7 5. 9	4. 8 5. 7 5. 4 4. 8 5. 5 8. 0 7. 4	4. 5 5. 4 5. 0 4. 3 5. 0 7. 8 7. 0	8. 2 9. 9 10. 0 8. 9 9. 9 13. 9 13. 1	4.8 5.7 5.3 4.5 5.3 8.2 7.3	2.9 3.6 3.3 2.9 3.3 5.8 5.1	2.6 3.2 2.8 2.3 2.7 5.1 4.2	4. 5 5. 5 5. 1 4. 3 5. 1 8. 1 7. 3	6. 2 7. 4 6. 5 5. 3 6. 7 11. 7 9. 4	5. 6. 6. 5. 9.
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	7.9	19. 5 19. 4 20. 0 19. 8 20. 3 20. 8	5. 9 6. 2 6. 6 6. 9 7. 3 7. 0	7. 9 7. 8 8. 2 8. 4 3. 5 8. 3	7.3 7.3 7.8 7.9 8.3 8.1	13. 0 13. 3 13. 9 14. 2 14. 3 14. 1	7. 7 7. 7 8. 2 8. 5 8. 9 8. 6	5. 2 5. 3 5. 7 5. 9 6. 2 6. 1	4. 4 4. 7 5. 0 5. 4 5. 7 5. 5	7. 5 7. 7 8. 1 8. 4 8. 7 8. 4	10. 6 10. 7 12. 0 12. 4 12. 8 12. 5	8. 8. 9. 9. 9.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	8. 7 8. 5 8. 6 8. 6 8. 4 8. 3	20. 5 20. 5 19. 6 19. 9 19. 1 19. 8	7. 1 6. 8 7. 2 7. 2 6. 9 6. 5	8. 0 8. 0 7. 8 8. 0 7. 9 7. 9	8. 0 7. 8 7. 8 7. 9 7. 7 7. 6	13. 5 14. 3 14. 5 14. 2 13. 8 13. 6	8. 4 8. 3 8. 4 8. 4 8. 2 8. 0	6. 0 5. 8 6. 0 6. 0 5. 7 5. 6	5. 4 5. 3 5. 4 5. 3 5. 0 4. 8	8. 4 8. 2 8. 4 8. 4 8. 2 7. 9	12. 4 12. 0 12. 0 11. 7 11. 2 10. 6	9. 9. 9. 9. 9.
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	7.8	19. 4 19. 1 19. 0 19. 3 18. 5 18. 4	5. 9 5. 8 5. 6 5. 5 5. 6 5. 9	7. 5 7. 4 7. 2 7. 3 6. 8 7. 2	7. 1 6. 8 6. 8 6. 8 6. 7 6. 8	13. 2 13. 6 12. 6 13. 0 12. 3 13. 4	7. 5 7. 3 7. 1 7. 1 7. 1 7. 2	5. 2 5. 0 5. 0 4. 8 4. 9 5. 1	4. 1 4. 2 4. 1 4. 0 4. 1 4. 3	7.3 7.1 7.0 7.0 6.9 7.2	9. 4 9. 3 9. 1 8. 9 9. 0 9. 3	8. 8. 8. 8. 7.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	7. 8 7. 9 7. 8 7. 9 8. 0	18. 2 19. 6 18. 8 19. 0 19. 2 19. 0	6. 1 5. 9 6. 1 6. 2 6. 3 6. 2	7. 6 7. 8 7. 6 7. 6 7. 6 7. 6	7.1 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.1	12. 9 13. 6 12. 8 13. 4 13. 5 13. 4	7. 4 7. 5 7. 4 7. 5 7. 6 7. 4	5. 3 5. 2 5. 5 5. 4 5. 3 5. 1	4. 4 4. 3 4. 5 4. 4 4. 5 4. 3	7.3 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.5	9. 7 9. 8 9. 8 9. 8 9. 7 9. 6	8. 8. 8. 8.

Note.—See footnote 2 and Note, Table B-27.

¹ Unemployment as percent of civilian labor force in group specified, except as noted.
2 Married men living with their wives. Data for 1949 and 1951-54 are for April; 1950, for March.
3 Data for 1949-61 are for May.
4 Includes craft and kindred workers, operatives, and nonfarm laborers. Data for 1948-57 are based on data for January, April, July, and October.
3 Aggregate hours lost by the unemployed and persons on part-time for economic reasons as a percent of potentially available labor force hours.

TABLE B-30.—Unemployment by duration, 1947-76 [Monthly data seasonally adjusted 1]

	Total un-		Duration of un	employment		Average
Year or month	employ- ment	Less than 5 weeks	5-14 weeks	15-26 weeks	27 weeks and over	(mean) duration in weeks
	TH	nousands of per	sons 16 years	of age and o	ver	
947	2, 311 2, 276	1, 210	704	234	164	
948	2, 276 3, 637	1, 210 1, 300 1, 756	669 1, 194	234 193 428	116 256	8. (10. (
950 951	3, 288 2, 055	1, 450 1, 177	1, 055 574	425 166	357 137	12. 9.
152	1, 883 1, 834	1, 135 1, 142	516 482	148	84	8.4
953 954	3, 532	1, 605	1, 116	132 495	78 317	8. (11. t
955 956	2, 852 2, 750	1, 335 1, 412	815 805	366 301	336 232	13. (11.
157\	2,859	1,408 1,753	891	321	239	10.
958 959	4, 602 3, 740	1, 753	1, 396 1, 114	785 469	667 571	13.9
960	3, 852 4, 714	1,719	1, 176 1, 376	503 728	454 804	12.
61 62	3, 911	1, 806 1, 663	1.134	534	585	15. 14.
963 964	4, 070 3, 786	1,751 1,697	1, 231 1, 117	535 491	553 482	14.1 13.
65	3, 366 2, 875	1, 628	983	404	351	11.
66 67	2, 8/5 2, 975	1,573 1,634	779 893	287 271	239 177	10. 8.
968	2, 975 2, 817 2, 832	1, 594 1, 629	810 827	256 242	156 133	8. 7.
970	4, 088	2, 137 2, 234 2, 223 2, 196	1, 289 1, 578	427	235 517	8. 11. 12.
71	4, 993 4, 840	2, 223	1, 459	665 597	562	11.
973 974	4,304 5,076	2,196 2,567	1,296 1,572	475 563	337 373	10.
975 976	7,830 7,288	2, 894 2, 790	2, 452 2, 159	1,290 1,003	1,193 1,336	14. 15.
975: Jan	7. 280	3, 196	2, 578	939	627	10.
Feb Mar	7, 362 7, 777	2, 818 3, 198	2, 536 2, 558	1, 122 1, 234	721 767	11. 11.
Apr May	7, 964	2, 936 3, 038	2, 621	1, 404 1, 515	952	1 12
June	8, 314 8, 099	2, 829	2,536 2,558 2,621 2,621 2,465	1, 467	1, 071 1, 251	13. 15.
July	8, 061 7, 921	2, 850	2, 200 2, 445 2, 419	1,535 1,405	1, 344 1, 418	14. 15.
Aug Sept Oct	8,011	2, 783 2, 839	2, 419	1, 405 1, 341 1, 261	1,581	16.
Oct Nov	8, 048 7, 813	2, 960 2, 662	2, 448 2, 373 2, 200	1. 253	1, 473 1, 696	15. 16.
Dec	7, 705	2,651	1	1, 349	1,632	16.
976: Jan Feb	7, 247 7, 126	2, 635 2, 637 2, 630	2, 065 1, 890	1, 165 968	1,616 1,563	16. 16. 16.
Mar	7,017	2, 630	1 915	870 715	1, 455	16.
Apr	7,047 6,911 7,171	2, 988 2, 795 2, 730	1, 902 1, 978 2, 215	850 902	1, 455 1, 388 1, 192 1, 271	15. 15. 16.
June			· I	1 058	l i	15.
July Aug	7, 406 7, 517 7, 448 7, 564 7, 651	2, 931 2, 867 2, 852 2, 952 2, 759	2, 093 2, 433 2, 426 2, 367 2, 494	1, 127	1, 189 1, 214 1, 193	15.
AugSept	7, 448 7, 564	2, 852 2, 952	2, 426 2, 367	1, 127 1, 118 1, 094	1, 193 1, 266	15. 15.
Nov	7, 651 7, 519	2, 759 2, 765	2, 494 2, 319	1, 188 1, 130	1, 266 1, 329 1, 384	15. 15. 15.
Dec	7,519	2, 705	2, 319	1, 130	1,364	15.

¹ Because of independent seasonal adjustment of the various series, detail will not add to totals.

Note.—See footnote 2 and Note, Table B-27.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE B-31-Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1946-76

		Ali program	s			State progr	ams		
Year or month	Covered employ- ment ¹	Insured unem- ploy- ment (weekly aver- age) ²³	Total benefits paid (millions of dol- lars) ² 4	Insured unem- ploy- ment	Initial claims	Ex- haus- tions ⁵	Insured unem- ploy- ment as percent of cov- ered employ- ment	Total (mil- lions of dol- lars) 4	Average weekly check (dol- lars) 6
	Thou	sands		Weekly a	verage; tho	usands			
1946 1947 1948 1949	31, 856 33, 876 34, 646 33, 098	2, 804 1, 793 1, 446 2, 474	2, 878. 5 1, 785. 5 1, 328. 7 2, 269. 8	1, 295 997 980 1, 973	189 187 200 340	38 24 20 37	4. 3 3. 1 3. 0 6. 2	1, 094. 9 775. 1 789. 9 1, 736. 0	18.50 17.88 19.03 20.43
1950	34, 308 36, 334 37, 006 38, 072 36, 622 40, 018 42, 751 43, 436 44, 411 45, 728	1,605 1,000 1,069 1,067 2,051 1,399 1,323 1,571 3,269 2,099	1, 467.6 862.9 1, 043.5 1, 050.6 2, 291.8 1, 560.2 1, 540.6 1, 913.0 4, 290.6 2, 854.3	1, 513 969 1, 044 990 1, 870 1, 265 1, 215 1, 446 2, 526 1, 684	236 208 215 218 304 226 227 270 369 277	36 16 18 15 34 25 20 23 50	4.6 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.5.2 3.5 3.6 4.4	1, 373. 1 840. 4 998. 2 962. 2 2, 026. 9 1, 350. 3 1, 380. 7 1, 733. 9 3, 512. 7 2, 279. 0	20. 76 21. 09 22. 79 23. 58 24. 93 25. 04 27. 02 28. 17 30. 58 30. 41
1960	46, 334 46, 266 47, 776 48, 434 49, 637 51, 580 54, 739 56, 977 59, 999	2, 071 2, 994 1, 946 7 1, 973 1, 753 1, 450 1, 129 1, 270 1, 187 1, 177	3, 022. 8 4, 358. 1 3, 145. 1 3, 025. 9 2, 749. 2 2, 360. 4 1, 890. 9 2, 221. 5 2, 191. 0 2, 298. 6	1, 908 2, 290 1, 783 7 1, 806 1, 605 1, 328 1, 061 1, 205 1, 111 1, 101	331 350 302 7 298 268 232 203 226 201 200	31 46 32 30 26 21 15 17 16	4.8 5.6 4.3 3.8 3.0 2.3 2.2 2.1	2, 726.7 3, 422.7 2, 675.4 2, 774.7 2, 522.1 2, 166.0 1, 771.3 2, 092.3 2, 031.6 2, 127.9	32. 87 33. 80 34. 56 35. 27 35. 92 37. 19 39. 75 41. 25 43. 43
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 _P	E0 E2C	2, 070 2, 608 2, 192 1, 793 2, 558 4, 943 3, 822	4, 209. 3 6, 214. 9 5, 491. 1 4, 517. 3 6, 933. 9 16, 802. 4	1, 805 2, 150 1, 848 1, 632 2, 262 3, 992 2, 968	296 295 261 246 363 478 382	25 39 35 29 37 81	3.4 4.1 3.5 2.7 3.5 6.0	3, 848. 5 4, 957. 0 4, 471. 0 4, 007. 6 5, 974. 9 11, 754. 7	50. 34 53. 23 56. 76 59. 00 64. 25 70. 23
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June		5, 751 5, 886 5, 647 5, 202 4, 892	1, 256. 6 1, 312. 3 1, 490. 4 1, 539. 7 1, 395. 2 1, 256. 7	3, 603 3, 832 4, 125 4, 271 4, 480 4, 331	543 530 534 508 504 494	50 58 66 84 92 104	5.5 5.8 6.3 6.4 6.7 6.5	1, 128. 2 1, 164. 2 1, 290. 6 1, 301. 2 1, 145. 1 984. 0	67. 83 68. 73 69. 07 69. 08 69. 33 69. 58
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec		4, 979 4, 576 4, 238 4, 037 4, 120 4, 461	1, 365. 5 1, 218. 4 1, 126. 5 1, 115. 8 972. 5 1, 231. 9	4, 210 4, 130 4, 070 3, 940 3, 576 3, 242	456 473 463 445 392 362	106 98 84 76 73	6.3 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.4 4.9	1, 037. 1 891. 4 779. 4 759. 5 677. 8 893. 2	71. 56 71. 06 71. 32 72. 37 73. 11 73. 64
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June		4, 962 4, 721 4, 366 3, 917 3, 564 3, 457	1, 344. 9 1, 231. 9 1, 334. 4 1, 150. 7 945. 7 981. 7	2, 961 2, 859 2, 759 2, 717 2, 862 2, 947	371 343 350 361 398 397	76 74 71 69 66 64	4. 5 4. 3 4. 2 4. 1 4. 4 4. 5	1, 018. 6 945. 1 1, 018. 2 869. 6 698. 7 719. 3	74. 71 75. 66 75. 69 75. 61 74. 79 74. 16
July Aug Septp Octp Novp		3, 642 3, 446 3, 236 3, 227 3, 453	960, 5 951, 5 892, 8 821, 6	3, 086 3, 203 3, 261 3, 328 3, 165 2, 933	403 417 427 437 385 356	61 59 56 53	4. 7 4. 9 5. 0 5. 1 4. 8 4. 5	711. 5 698. 7 640. 8 610. 5	73. 66 73. 83 74. 19 75, 50

Source: Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.

[•] Monthly data are seasonally adjusted.

¹ Includes persons under the State, UCFE (Federal employee, effective January 1955), and RRB (Railroad Retirement Board) programs. Beginning October 1958, also includes the UCX program (unperployment compensation for ex-servicemen).

² Includes State, UCFE, RR, UCX, UCV (unemployment compensation for veterans, October 1952-January 1960), and SRA (Servicemen's Readjustment Act, September 1944-September 1951) programs. Also includes Federal and State extended benefit programs. Does not include FSB (Federal supplemental benefits) and SUA (special unemployment assistance) programs.

extended benefit programs. Does not include FSB (reueral supplemental veneral) assistance) programs.

2 Covered workers who have completed at least 1 week of unemployment.

4 Annual data are net amounts and monthly data are gross amounts.

5 Individuals receiving final payments in benefit year.

6 For total unemployment only.

7 Programs include Puerto Rican sugarcane workers for initial claims and insured unemployment beginning July 1963.

4 Latest data available for all programs combined. Workers covered by State programs account for about 92 percent of the total

TABLE B-32.—Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-76
[Thousands of persons; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

	Total	Ma	inufacturii	ng			Trans- porta-		Fi-		Govern	ment
Year or month	wage and salary work- ers	Total	Dura- ble goods	Non- dura- ble goods	Min- ing	Con- tract con- struc- tion	tion and pub- lic utili- ties	Whole- sale and retail trade	nance, insur- ance, and real estate	Serv- ices	Fed- eraj	State and local
1929	31, 339	10, 702			1, 087	1, 497	3, 916	6, 123	1, 509	3, 440	533	2, 532
1933	23, 711	7, 397			744	809	2, 672	4, 755	1, 295	2, 873	565	2, 601
1939	30, 618	10, 278	4,715	5, 564	854	1, 150	2, 936	6, 426	1, 462	3, 517	905	3, 090
1940 1941 1942 1943	32, 376 36, 554 40, 125 42, 452 41, 883	10, 985 13, 192 15, 280 17, 602 17, 328	5, 363 6, 968 8, 823 11, 084 10, 856	5, 622 6, 225 6, 458 6, 518 6, 472	925 957 992 925 892	1, 294 1, 790 2, 170 1, 567 1, 094	3, 038 3, 274 3, 460 3, 647 3, 829	6, 750 7, 210 7, 118 6, 982 7, 058	1, 502 1, 549 1, 538 1, 502 1, 476	3, 681 3, 921 4, 084 4, 148 4, 163	996 1, 340 2, 213 2, 905 2, 928	3, 206 3, 320 3, 270 3, 174 3, 116
1945	40, 394	15, 524	9, 074	6, 450	836	1, 132	3, 906	7, 314	1, 497	4, 241	2, 808	3, 137
1946	41, 674	14, 703	7, 742	6, 962	862	1, 661	4, 061	8, 376	1, 697	4, 719	2, 254	3, 341
1947	43, 881	15, 545	8, 385	7, 159	955	1, 982	4, 166	8, 955	1, 754	5, 050	1, 892	3, 582
1948	44, 891	15, 582	8, 326	7, 256	994	2, 169	4, 189	9, 272	1, 829	5, 206	1, 863	3, 787
1949	43, 778	14, 441	7, 489	6, 953	930	2, 165	4, 001	9, 264	1, 857	5, 264	1, 908	3, 948
1950	45, 222	15, 241	8, 094	7, 147	901	2, 333	4, 034	9, 386	1, 919	5, 382	1, 928	4, 098
1951	47, 849	16, 393	9, 089	7, 304	929	2, 603	4, 226	9, 742	1, 991	5, 576	2, 302	4, 087
1952	48, 825	16, 632	9, 349	7, 284	898	2, 634	4, 248	10, 004	2, 069	5, 730	2, 420	4, 188
1953	50, 232	17, 549	10, 110	7, 438	866	2, 623	4, 290	10, 247	2, 146	5, 867	2, 305	4, 340
1954	49, 022	16, 314	9, 129	7, 185	791	2, 612	4, 084	10, 235	2, 234	6, 002	2, 188	4, 563
1955	50, 675	16, 882	9, 541	7, 340	792	2, 802	4, 141	10, 535	2, 335	6, 274	2, 187	4, 727
1956	52, 408	17, 243	9, 834	7, 409	822	2, 999	4, 244	10, 858	2, 429	6, 536	2, 209	5, 069
1957	52, 894	17, 174	9, 856	7, 319	828	2, 923	4, 241	10, 886	2, 477	6, 749	2, 217	5, 399
1958	51, 363	15, 945	8, 830	7, 116	751	2, 778	3, 976	10, 750	2, 519	6, 806	2, 191	5, 648
1959	53, 313	16, 675	9, 373	7, 303	732	2, 960	4, 011	11, 127	2, 594	7, 130	2, 233	5, 850
1960	54, 234	16, 796	9, 459	7, 336	712	2, 885	4, 004	11, 391	2, 669	7, 423	2, 270	6, 083
1961	54, 042	16, 326	9, 070	7, 256	672	2, 816	3, 903	11, 337	2, 731	7, 664	2, 279	6, 315
1962	55, 596	16, 853	9, 480	7, 373	650	2, 902	3, 906	11, 566	2, 800	8, 028	2, 340	6, 550
1963	56, 702	16, 995	9, 616	7, 380	635	2, 963	3, 903	11, 778	2, 877	8, 325	2, 358	6, 868
1964	58, 331	17, 274	9, 816	7, 458	634	3, 050	3, 951	12, 160	2, 957	8, 709	2, 348	7, 248
1965	60, 815	18, 062	10, 406	7, 656	632	3, 186	4, 036	12, 716	3, 023	9, 087	2, 378	7, 696
1966	63, 955	19, 214	11, 284	7, 930	627	3, 275	4, 151	13, 245	3, 100	9, 551	2, 564	8, 227
1967	65, 857	19, 447	11, 439	8, 008	613	3, 208	4, 261	13, 606	3, 225	10, 099	2, 719	8, 679
1968	67, 951	19, 781	11, 626	8, 155	606	3, 306	4, 311	14, 099	3, 381	10, 622	2, 737	9, 109
1969	70, 442	20, 167	11, 895	8, 272	619	3, 525	4, 435	14, 704	3, 562	11, 228	2, 758	9, 444
1970	70, 920	19, 349	11, 195	8, 154	623	3, 536	4, 504	15, 040	3, 687	11, 621	2, 731	9, 830
1971	71, 222	18, 572	10, 597	7, 975	609	3, 639	4, 457	15, 352	3, 802	11, 903	2, 696	10, 192
1972	73, 714	19, 090	11, 006	8, 084	625	3, 831	4, 517	15, 975	3, 943	12, 392	2, 684	10, 656
1973	76, 896	20, 068	11, 839	8, 229	644	4, 015	4, 644	16, 674	4, 091	13, 021	2, 663	11, 075
(1974	78, 413	20, 046	11, 895	8, 151	694	3, 957	4, 696	17, 017	4, 208	13, 617	2, 724	11, 453
1975	76, 985	18, 347	10, 679	7, 668	745	3, 457	4, 498	16, 947	4, 223	13, 995	2, 748	12, 025
1976₽	79, 115	18, 954	11, 028	7, 926	78 3	3, 370	4, 507	17, 490	4, 316	14, 607		12, 352

See footnotes at end of table.

Table B-32.—Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-76—Continued

[All employees; thousands of persons; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

	Total	Ma	nufacturi	ng		Con-	Trans-	Whole-	Fi-		Gover	nment
Year or month	wage and salary work- ers	Total	Dura- ble goods	Non- dura- ble goods	Min- ing	tract con- struc- tion	tion and pub- lic utili- ties	sale and retail trade	nance, insur- ance, and real estate	Serv- ices	Fed- eral	State and local
974: Jan	78, 033	20, 305	12, 037	8, 268	673	4, 050	4, 705	16, 864	4, 172	13, 313	2,683	11, 268
Feb	78, 205	20, 220	11, 967	8, 253	679	4, 121	4, 716	16, 878	4, 186	13, 400	2,699	11, 306
Mar	78, 275	20, 196	11, 957	8, 239	680	4, 098	4, 711	16, 911	4, 196	13, 453	2,702	11, 328
Apr	78, 423	20, 235	12, 009	8, 226	688	4, 062	4, 707	16, 968	4, 202	13, 488	2,711	11, 362
May	78, 559	20, 220	11, 989	8, 231	692	4, 037	4, 708	17, 029	4, 209	13, 573	2,717	11, 374
Jun	78, 628	20, 234	12, 020	8, 214	694	3, 985	4, 704	17, 051	4, 210	13, 621	2,723	11, 406
July	78, 660	20, 209	12, 026	8, 183	700	3, 921	4, 699	17, 111	4, 210	13, 656	2,729	11, 425
Aug	78, 709	20, 128	11, 954	8, 174	703	3, 934	4, 703	17, 125	4, 217	13, 696	2,734	11, 465
Sep	78, 774	20, 074	11, 927	8, 147	707	3, 891	4, 683	17, 139	4, 220	13, 753	2,742	11, 565
Oct	78, 718	19, 938	11, 856	8, 082	714	3, 869	4, 686	17, 142	4, 224	13, 797	2,740	11, 608
Nov	78, 339	19, 635	11, 658	7, 977	718	3, 818	4, 674	17, 049	4, 226	13, 822	2,740	11, 657
Dec	77, 703	19, 183	11, 353	7, 830	684	3, 759	4, 659	16, 939	4, 225	13, 833	2,738	11, 683
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun	77, 300 76, 804 76, 518 76, 491 76, 577 76, 444	18, 784 18, 375 18, 237 18, 183 18, 192 18, 131	11, 092 10, 816 10, 737 10, 650 10, 607 10, 539	7, 692 7, 559 7, 500 7, 533 7, 585 7, 592	725 728 732 734 741 743	3, 732 3, 596 3, 483 3, 455 3, 446 3, 405	4, 599 4, 556 4, 511 4, 508 4, 496 4, 474	16, 903 16, 878 16, 864 16, 856 16, 873 16, 882	4, 219 4, 210 4, 207 4, 205 4, 208 4, 206	13, 857 13, 865 13, 864 13, 878 13, 903 13, 885	2,736 2,735 2,735 2,735 2,736 2,736 2,741	11, 74 11, 86 11, 88 11, 93 11, 98 11, 97
July	76, 706	18, 115	10, 488	7, 627	745	3, 404	4, 473	16, 949	4, 211	13, 990	2,748	12, 071
Aug	76, 988	18, 272	10, 578	7, 694	750	3, 412	4, 466	16, 968	4, 218	14, 050	2,753	12, 092
Sep	77, 239	18, 395	10, 645	7, 750	753	3, 420	4, 472	17, 016	4, 235	14, 099	2,757	12, 092
Oct	77, 470	18, 452	10, 644	7, 808	759	3, 399	4, 472	17, 043	4, 242	14, 157	2,761	12, 185
Nov	77, 542	18, 472	10, 652	7, 820	761	3, 406	4, 482	17, 027	4, 248	14, 188	2,756	12, 202
Dec	77, 764	18, 555	10, 709	7, 846	766	3, 392	4, 477	17, 084	4, 260	14, 229	2,753	12, 248
1976: Jan	78, 142	18, 704	10, 810	7, 894	767	3, 409	4, 489	17, 207	4, 266	14, 307	2,749	12, 244
Feb	78, 358	18, 774	10, 857	7, 917	767	3, 379	4, 504	17, 308	4, 266	14, 360	2,742	12, 258
Mar	78, 692	18, 897	10, 956	7, 941	773	3, 380	4, 507	14, 399	4, 276	14, 422	2,735	12, 303
Apr	79, 011	19, 008	11, 016	7, 992	775	3, 413	4, 510	17, 465	4, 289	14, 498	2,733	12, 320
May	79, 006	19, 000	11, 062	7, 938	776	3, 393	4, 503	17, 461	4, 282	14, 529	2,730	12, 332
Jun	79, 043	18, 984	11, 059	7, 925	781	3, 375	4, 482	17, 460	4, 301	14, 571	2,728	12, 361
July	79, 183	18, 945	11, 034	7, 911	791	3, 382	4, 508	17, 531	4, 312	14, 623	2,723	12, 368
Aug	79, 278	18, 979	11, 083	7, 896	752	3, 349	4, 501	17, 554	4, 312	14, 709	2,732	12, 390
Sep	79, 572	19, 100	11, 146	7, 954	798	3, 330	4, 528	17, 625	4, 338	14, 758	2,728	12, 367
Oct	79, 467	18, 941	11, 018	7, 923	800	3, 340	4, 506	17, 610	4, 359	14, 781	2,730	12, 400
Nov P_	79, 700	19, 057	11, 134	7, 923	808	3, 353	4, 510	17, 585	4, 381	14, 844	2,734	12, 428
Dec P	79, 957	19, 093	11, 181	7, 912	808	3, 349	4, 537	17, 685	4, 403	14, 897	2,736	12, 451

Note.—Data in Tables B-32 through B-34 are based on reports from employing establishments and relate to full- and part-time wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments who worked during, or received pay for, any part of the pay period which includes the 12th of the month.

Not comparable with labor force data (Tables B-27 through B-30), which include proprietors, self-employed persons, domestic servants, and unpaid family workers; which count persons as employed when they are not at work because of industrial disputes, bad weather, etc.; and which are based on a sample of the working-age population, whereas the estimates in this table are based on reports from employing establishments.

For description and details of the various establishment data, see "Employment and Earnings."

Table B-33.—Average weekly hours and hourly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-76

[For production or nonsupervisory workers; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

					1		hourly ea	rnings		usted hou	rly earni	nge
	A	verage we	ekly hou	118		current	dollars	83,	total	private no	nagriculi	ural 3
Year or month	Total private nonag- ricul-	Manu- factur- ing	Con- tract con- struc-	Retail trade ²	Total private non- agri- cul-	Manu- factur- ing	Con- tract con- struc-	Retail trade ²	Ind 1967	=100	Pero cha fro a y earl	nge om ear ier ⁵
	tural t		tion		tural 1		tion		rent dol- lars	1967 dol- lars ⁴	rent dol- lars	1967 dol- lars
1947 1948 1949	40. 3 40. 0 39. 4	40. 4 40. 0 39. 1	38. 2 38. 1 37. 7	40. 3 40. 2 40. 4	\$1. 131 1. 225 1. 275	\$1. 217 1. 328 1. 378	\$1.541 1.713 1.792	\$0. 838 . 901 . 951	42. 6 46. 0 48. 2	63. 7 63. 8 67. 5	8. 0 4. 8	0. 2 5. 8
1950	39. 8 39. 9 39. 9 39. 6 39. 1	40. 5 40. 6 40. 7 40. 5 39. 6	37. 4 38. 1 38. 9 37. 9 37. 2	40. 4 40. 4 39. 8 39. 1 39. 2	1.335 1.45 1.52 1.61 1.65	1. 440 1. 56 1. 65 1. 74 1. 78	1.863 2.02 2.13 2.28 2.39	. 983 1. 06 1. 09 1. 16 1. 20	50. 0 53. 7 56. 4 59. 6 61. 7	69. 3 69. 0 70. 9 74. 4 76. 6	3. 7 7. 4 5. 0 5. 7 3. 5	2.7 4 2.8 4.9 3.0
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959		40. 7 40. 4 39. 8 39. 2 40. 3	37. 1 37. 5 37. 0 36. 8 37. 0	39. 0 38. 6 38. 1 38. 1 38. 2	1.71 1.80 1.89 1.95 2.02	1.86 1.95 2.05 2.11 2.19	2. 45 2. 57 2. 71 2. 82 2. 93	1. 25 1. 30 1. 37 1. 42 1. 47	63. 7 67. 0 70. 3 73. 2 75. 8	79. 4 82. 3 83. 4 84. 5 86. 8	3. 2 5. 2 4. 9 4. 1 3. 6	3.7 3.7 1.3 1.3 2.7
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964		39. 7 39. 8 40. 4 40. 5 40. 7	36.7 36.9 37.0 37.3 37.2	38. 0 37. 6 37. 4 37. 3 37. 0	2. 09 2. 14 2. 22 2. 28 2. 36	2. 26 2. 32 2. 39 2. 46 2. 53	3. 08 3. 20 3. 31 3. 41 3. 55	1.52 1.56 1.63 1.68 1.75	78. 4 80. 8 83. 5 85. 9 88. 3	88. 4 90. 2 92. 2 93. 7 95. 1	3. 4 3. 1 3. 3 2. 9 2. 8	1.8 2.0 2.2 1.6 1.5
1965	38.8 38.6 38.0 37.8 37.7	41. 2 41. 3 40. 6 40. 7 40. 6	37. 4 37. 6 37. 7 37. 3 37. 9	36. 6 35. 9 35. 3 34. 7 34. 2	2. 45 2. 56 2. 68 2. 85 3. 04	2.61 2.72 2.83 3.01 3.19	3. 70 3. 89 4. 11 4. 41 4. 79	1.82 1.91 2.01 2.16 2.30	91. 6 95. 4 100. 0 106. 3 113. 3	97. 0 98. 1 100. 0 102. 0 103. 2	3.7 4.1 4.8 6.3 6.6	2. 0 1. 1 1. 9 2. 0 1. 2
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	37. 1 37. 0 37. 1 37. 1 36. 6	39. 8 39. 9 40. 6 40. 7 40. 0	37. 3 37. 2 36. 9 37. 0 36. 9	33. 8 33. 7 33. 7 33. 3 32. 7	3. 22 3. 44 3. 67 3. 92 4. 22	3. 36 3. 57 3. 81 4. 08 4. 41	5. 24 5. 69 6. 03 6. 37 6. 75	2.44 2.57 2.70 2.87 3.09	120. 8 129. 4 137. 8 146. 6 158. 6	103. 9 106. 7 110. 0 110. 1 107. 4	6. 6 7. 1 6. 5 6. 4 8. 2	2.7 2.7 3.1 -1 -2.5
1975 1976 p	36. 1 36. 2	39. 4 40. 1	36, 6 37, 1	32. 4 32. 2	4. 54 4. 86	4. 81 5. 19	7. 25 7. 67	3. 34 3. 55	172.7 184.7	107.1	8.9 6.9	3
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	36. 2 36. 0 35. 9 35. 9 36. 0 36. 0	39. 1 38. 9 38. 9 39. 0 39. 1 39. 3	37. 1 36. 6 34. 9 36. 7 36. 8 36. 0	32. 3 32. 3 32. 5 32. 3 32. 4 32. 4	4. 41 4. 43 4. 45 4. 47 4. 49 4. 52	4. 65 4. 68 4. 72 4. 73 4. 75 4. 78	7. 04 6. 98 7. 18 7. 18 7. 16 7. 26	3. 23 3. 26 3. 27 3. 28 3. 30 3. 32	166. 0 167. 4 168. 9 169. 3 170. 3 171. 8	106. 1 106. 4 107. 0 106. 7 106. 8 106. 9	9.5 9.8 10.0 9.6 9.0 8.6	-1.9 -1.1 3 6 5 8
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	36. 0 36. 1 36. 1 36. 2 36. 3 36. 4	39. 4 39. 7 39. 8 39. 8 39. 9 40. 3	36. 4 36. 7 36. 7 36. 7 36. 9 37. 2	32. 3 32. 4 32. 3 32. 4 32. 4 32. 4	4. 55 4. 58 4. 60 4. 63 4. 67 4. 68	4. 82 4. 85 4. 88 4. 90 4. 93 4. 96	7. 32 7. 30 7. 32 7. 34 7. 40 7. 45	3. 34 3. 37 3. 38 3. 40 3. 42 3. 43	172. 7 174. 2 174. 8 176. 2 177. 6 178. 0	106. 5 107. 0 106. 9 107. 1 107. 3 107. 0	8.7 8.8 8.1 8.2 8.4 7.9	9 .1 .1 .5 1.0
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	36. 4 36. 4 36. 2 36. 1 36. 3	40. 4 40. 3 40. 3 39. 4 40. 3 40. 2	37.6 37.7 36.0 37.4 37.1 37.3	32. 5 32. 3 32. 2 32. 5 32. 2 32. 0	4.72 4.74 4.77 4.79 4.83 4.85	5. 00 5. 04 5. 08 5. 08 5. 13 5. 16	7. 48 7. 47 7. 57 7. 57 7. 66 7. 68	3. 46 3. 47 3. 48 3. 49 3. 51 3. 52	179. 4 180. 3 181. 1 182. 1 183. 3 184. 0	107. 3 107. 8 108. 0 108. 2 108. 3 108. 1	8.0 7.7 7.2 7.6 7.7 7.1	1. 2 1. 3 1. 0 1. 4 1. 4
July Aug Sept Oct Nov p Dec p	36. 1 36. 1 36. 1 36. 2	40. 1 40. 0 39. 7 39. 9 40. 1 40. 1	36. 9 36. 8 35. 9 37. 3 37. 4 37. 3	32. 1 32. 0 32. 1 32. 0 32. 0 32. 2	4, 88 4, 90 4, 92 4, 95 4, 99 5, 01	5. 21 5. 25 5. 29 5. 29 5. 34 5. 37	7.77 7.74 7.71 7.76 7.81 7.85	3. 55 3. 57 3. 60 3. 63 3. 66 3. 67	185. 2 186. 4 187. 2 188. 2 189. 2 190. 0	108. 4 108. 5 108. 5 108. 7 109. 0	7. 3 7. 0 7. 1 6. 8 6. 5 6. 7	1. 8 1. 4 1. 5 1. 5 1. 6

<sup>Also includes other private industry groups shown in Table B-32.
Includes eating and drinking places.
Adjusted for overtime (in manufacturing only) and for interindustry employment shifts.
Current dollar earnings index divided by the consumer price index.

Monthly data are computed from indexes to two decimal places.</sup>

Note.-See Note, Table B-32.

TABLE B-34.—Average weekly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-76 [For production or nonsupervisory workers; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

,		Average	gross weekly	earnings		year earlier,	ange from a total private cultural 4
Year or month	Total p	orivate cultural ¹	Manu- facturing	Contract construc- tion	Retail trade 3	Current dollars	1967 dollars
	Current dollars	1967 dollars 2		Current dollars		Contain	
1947 1948 1949	\$45, 58 49, 00 50, 24	\$68.13 67.96 70.36	\$49.17 53.12 53.88	\$58. 87 65. 27 67. 56	\$33.77 36.22 38.42	7. š 2. 5	-0.2 3.5
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	53. 13 57. 86 60. 65 63. 76 64. 52	73. 69 74. 37 76. 29 79. 60 80. 15	58. 32 63. 34 67. 16 70. 47 70. 49	69. 68 76. 96 82. 86 86. 41 88. 91	39. 71 42. 82 43. 38 45. 36 47. 04	5.8 8.9 4.8 5.1 1.2	4. 7 . 9 2. 6 4. 3 . 7
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	67. 72 70. 74 73. 33 75. 08 78. 78	84. 44 86. 90 86. 99 86. 70 90. 24	75. 70 78. 78 81. 59 82. 71 88. 26	90. 90 96. 38 100. 27 103. 78 108. 41	48. 75 50. 18 52. 20 54. 10 56. 15	5. 0 4. 5 3. 7 2. 4 4. 9	5. 4 2. 9 . 1 —. 3 4. 1
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	80. 67 82. 60 85. 91 88. 46 91. 33	90. 95 92. 19 94. 82 96. 47 98. 31	89. 72 92. 34 96. 56 99. 63 102. 97	113. 04 118. 08 122. 47 127. 19 132. 06	57. 76 58. 66 60. 96 62. 66 64. 75	2. 4 2. 4 4. 0 3. 0 3. 2	.8 1.4 2.9 1.7 1.9
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	95. 06 98. 82 101. 84 107. 73 114. 61	100. 59 101. 67 101. 84 103. 39 104. 38	107. 53 112. 34 114. 90 122. 51 129. 51	138.38 146.26 154.95 164.49 181.54	66, 61 68, 57 70, 95 74, 95 78, 66	4.1 4.0 3.1 5.8 6.4	2.3 1.1 .2 1.5 1.0
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	119. 46 127. 28 136. 16 145. 43 154. 45	102.72 104.93 108.67 109.26 104.57	133. 73 142. 44 154. 69 166. 06 176. 40	195. 45 211. 67 222. 51 235. 69 249. 08	82. 47 86. 61 90. 99 95. 57 101. 04	4. 2 6. 5 7. 0 6. 8 6. 2	-1.6 2.2 3.6 .5 -4.3
1975 1976 *	163, 89 175, 93	101.67	189. 51 208. 12	265. 35 284. 56	108. 22 114. 31	6. 1 7. 3	-2.8
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	159. 64 159. 48 159. 76 160. 47 161. 64 162. 72	102.01 101.39 101.17 101.12 101.34 101.32	181. 82 182. 05 183. 61 184. 47 185. 73 187. 85	261. 18 255. 47 250. 58 263. 51 263. 49 261. 36	104. 33 105. 30 106. 28 105. 94 106. 92 107. 57	6.8 6.2 5.9 7.0 5.1	-4.4 -4.4 -4.0 -2.9 -4.0 -3.6
July	163, 80 165, 34 166, 06 167, 61 169, 52 170, 35	100. 99 101. 56 101. 57 101. 89 102. 43 102. 37	189. 91 192. 55 194. 22 195. 02 196. 71 199. 89	266. 45 267. 91 268. 64 269. 38 273. 06 277. 14	107.88 109.19 109.17 110.16 110.81 111.13	5. 1 5. 9 5. 5 5. 8 7. 6 7. 1	-4,2 -2.5 -2.2 -1.7
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	171. 81 172. 54 172. 67 172. 92 175. 33 175. 57	102. 82 103. 13 103. 03 102. 74 103. 56 103. 22	202. 00 203. 11 204. 72 200. 15 206. 74 207. 43	281. 25 281. 62 272. 52 283. 12 284. 19 286. 46	112, 45 112, 08 112, 06 113, 43 113, 02 112, 64	8.2 8.1 7.9 7.5 8.5 7.6	1.3 1.7 1.6 1.4 2.1 1.6
July	176, 66 176, 89 177, 12 178, 70 180, 64 181, 86	103. 37 102. 96 102. 68 103. 24 104. 06	208. 92 210. 00 210. 01 211. 07 214. 13 215. 34	286. 71 284. 83 276. 79 289. 45 292. 09 292. 81	113. 96 114. 24 115. 56 116. 16 117. 12 118. 17	7.9 7.0 6.6 6.9 6.5 6.8	2. 3 1. 3 1. 0 1. 5 1. 5

Also includes other private industry groups shown in Table B-32.
 Earnings in current dollars divided by the consumer price index.
 Includes eating and drinking places.
 Based on unadjusted data.

Note.-See Note, Table B-32.

Table B-35.—Productivity and related data, private business economy, 1947-76 [1967=100; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]

	Outp	ut 1	Hours pers		hour	ut per of all sons		nsation lour ³		labor sts		it price ator •
Year or quarter	Total private busi- ness	Private non- farm busi- ness	Total private busi- ness	Private non- farm busi- ness	Total private busi- ness	Private non- farm busi- ness	Total private busi- ness	Private non- farm busi- ness	Total private busi- ness	Private non- farm busi- ness	Total private busi- ness	Private non- farm busi- ness
1947 1948 1949	48. 6 50. 8 49. 9	47. 5 49. 5 48. 7	92.9 93.5 90.3	80. 9 82. 1 78. 9	52.3 54.4 55.3	58. 7 60. 3 61. 7	35. 1 38. 1 38. 8	37. 5 40. 7 42. 0	67. 1 70. 1 70. 2	63. 9 67. 5 68. 1	65. 1 70. 6 69. 8	62.3 67.5 68.0
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	54.5 57.7 59.1 61.9 60.8	53. 2 56. 7 58. 4 60. 8 59. 6	91. 2 93. 9 93. 9 94. 7 91. 5	81. 3 85. 0 85. 8 87. 9 84. 7	59. 7 61. 5 63. 0 65. 3 66. 5	65. 5 66. 7 68. 1 69. 2 70. 3	41.6 45.6 48.6 51.8 53.5	44. 5 48. 4 51. 0 54. 0 55. 8	69. 6 74. 3 77. 1 79. 3 80. 5	67. 9 72. 5 75. 0 78. 0 79. 3	70.8 76.0 77.4 77.9 78.6	69. 1 73. 7 75. 2 76. 8 77. 8
1955 1956 1957 1958	65. 6 67. 5 68. 4 66. 9 71. 8	64. 5 66. 5 67. 5 65. 8 71. 0	94. 8 96. 2 94. 6 90. 2 93. 4	88. 1 90. 3 89. 7 85. 8 89. 3	69. 2 70. 2 72. 3 74. 2 76. 8	73. 2 73. 6 75. 3 76. 8 79. 6	54. 9 58. 6 62. 5 65. 5 68. 5	57. 8 61. 4 65. 0 67. 7 70. 6	79. 3 83. 5 86. 5 88. 2 89. 1	79. 0 83. 3 86. 4 88. 1 88. 8	79. 8 82. 2 84. 8 86. 4 88. 1	79. 4 81. 9 84. 6 85. 9 88. 0
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	73.1 74.1 78.8 82.2 86.8	72. 2 73. 3 78. 1 81. 6 86. 4	93. 6 92. 0 93. 4 93. 8 95. 1	89. 9 88. 7 90. 5 91. 4 93. 3	78. 1 80. 6 84. 4 87. 7 91. 3	80.3 82.6 86.2 89.3 92.6	71. 4 74. 2 77. 7 80. 7 85. 1	73.7 76.2 79.4 82.3 86.2	91. 4 92. 1 92. 1 92. 0 93. 2	91. 7 92. 3 92. 0 92. 2 93. 1	89. 3 89. 8 90. 6 91. 4 92. 7	89. 2 89. 8 90. 5 91. 5 92. 9
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	98.0 100.0 105.1	92.6 98.1 100.0 105.4 108.6	98.1 100.3 100.0 101.7 104.5	96.8 100.0 100.0 102.1 105.3	94. 7 97. 8 100. 0 103. 3 103. 7	95. 7 98. 1 100. 0 103. 2 103. 1	88. 4 94. 7 100. 0 107. 6 115. 1	89. 1 94. 5 100. 0 107. 3 114. 2	93. 4 96. 8 100. 0 104. 1 111. 0	93. 2 96. 4 100. 0 103. 9 110. 9	94. 2 97. 2 100. 0 103. 9 108. 8	94. 1 96. 8 100. 0 104. 0 108. 7
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	110.3	107. 4 110. 3 117. 9 125. 0 121. 1	102.8 102.3 106.0 110.1 110.6	104. 0 103. 7 107. 6 112. 2 112. 7	104.5 107.8 110.9 113.1 109.2	103. 2 106. 3 109. 5 111. 4 107. 5	123.3 131.5 138.9 150.3 164.3	121. 9 129. 9 137. 4 148. 1 162. 0	118. 1 121. 9 125. 2 132. 9 150. 4	118. 1 122. 2 125. 5 133. 0 150. 8	113. 9 118. 9 123. 2 130. 3 143. 8	114.0 119.2 122.9 128.0 142.0
1975	118.1	118.0	105.9	107.9	111.5	109.4	180.2	177.7	161.6	162.4	157.5	156.4
1974: I II IV	121.8	123. 7 122. 1 121. 0 117. 9	111.3 111.3 110.9 109.3	113. 2 113. 5 113. 3 111. 5	110.5 109.4 108.7 107.6	109. 3 107. 6 106. 7 105. 7	157.1 161.8 166.7 170.7	155.3 159.6 164.0 168.3	142.1 147.9 153.3 158.6	142.1 148.3 153.6 159.3	137. 4 141. 5 146. 0 150. 4	134. 7 140. 1 144. 6 149. 2
1975: I II III IV	- 116.7 - 120.1	114. 4 116. 6 119. 9 121. 3	105. 7 104. 8 105. 7 107. 0	107. 9 106. 7 107. 4 109. 2	108.1 111.4 113.6 113.2	106. 0 109. 2 111. 6 111. 0	176. 0 179. 0 181. 3 185. 0	173. 1 176. 4 179. 3 182. 2	162. 9 160. 7 159. 5 163. 4	163.3 161.6 160.6 164.1	154. 5 155. 9 158. 4 160. 9	154. 0 155. 0 157. 0 159. 3
1976: I II III	124. 2 125. 8 126. 9	124. 3 126. 0 127. 1	107.7 108.2 108.2	110.4 110.4 110.6	115.3 116.3 117.2	112.6 114.1 114.9	189. 8 193. 3 196. 7	186. 4 190. 4 193. 6	164. 7 166. 1 167. 8	165. 5 166. 9 168. 5	161.7 163.8 165.4	161.0 162.5 164.8

<sup>Output refers to gross domestic product originating in the sector in 1972 dollars.
Hours of all persons in private industry engaged in production, including hours of proprietors and unpaid family workers. Estimates based primarily on establishment data.
Wages and salaries of employees plus employers' contributions for social insurance and private benefit plans. Also includes an estimate of wages, salaries, and supplemental payments for the self-employed.
Current dollar gross domestic product divided by constant dollar gross domestic product.</sup>

TABLE B-36.—Changes in productivity and related data, private business economy, 1948-76 [Percent change from preceding period; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

	1		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				···				1	
	Outp	out 1		rs of sons 2	Output p of all p	er hour ersons	Compe per h	nsation nour ³	Unit	labor ts		it price ator 4
Year or quarter	Total private busi- ness	Private non- farm busi- ness	Total private busi- ness	Private non- farm busi- ness	Total private busi- ness	Private non- farm busi- ness	Total private busi- ness	Private non- farm busi- ness	Total private busi- ness	Private non- farm bus- ness	Total private busi- ness	Private non- farm busi- ness
1948 1949	4.6 -1.8	4. 4 -1. 7	0.6 -3.4	1.6 -4.0	3. 9 1. 7	2. 8 2. 3	8. 6 1. 8	8. 7 3. 2	4. 5 . 1	5. 8 . 8	8. 4 -1. 1	8.3 .7
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	5.9	9. 4 6. 5 3. 0 4. 1 -1. 9	1.1 2.9 .0 .9 -3.5	3. 1 4. 6 1. 0 2. 4 -3. 6	8. 0 2. 9 2. 5 3. 7 1. 8	6. 1 1. 8 2. 0 1. 6 1. 7	7. 1 9. 8 6. 4 6. 6 3. 4	5. 8 8. 7 5. 6 5. 7 3. 3	8 6.7 3.8 2.9 1.5	3 6.7 3.5 4.0 1.6	1.5 7.3 1.9 .6	1.6 6.5 2.1 2.1 1.3
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	2.8	8. 2 3. 1 1. 5 -2. 4 7. 9	3.7 1.4 -1.6 -4.7 3.6	4.0 2.4 7 -4.3 4.1	4.1 1.4 3.0 2.7 3.6	4. 1 . 6 2. 2 2. 0 3. 6	2. 6 6. 7 6. 7 4. 7 4. 6	3. 7 6. 2 5. 9 4. 0 4. 4	-1.5 5.2 3.7 1.9 1.0	4 5.5 3.7 2.0 .7	1.5 3.0 3.2 1.9 2.0	2. 1 3. 2 3. 3 1. 5 2. 4
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	1.5 6.2 4.4	1.6 1.5 6.5 4.5 5.9	-1.7 1.5 .4 1.4	-1.3 2.1 1.0 2.1	1.6 3.3 4.6 4.0 4.1	1. 0 2. 8 4. 4 3. 5 3. 7	4. 2 4. 0 4. 7 3. 9 5. 4	4.3 3.5 4.1 3.7 4.8	2.6 .7 .1 1 1.3	3.3 .6 3 .1 1.0	1. 4 . 6 . 9 . 9 1. 4	1.4 .6 .8 1.0 1.5
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	5. 5 2. 0 5. 1	7. 1 6. 0 1. 9 5. 4 3. 0	3. 1 2. 3 3 1. 7 2. 7	3.7 3.3 0 2.1 3.2	3.7 3.2 2.3 3.3	3.3 2.5 1.9 3.2 2	3.9 7.0 5.6 7.6 7.0	3. 4 6. 1 5. 8 7. 3 6. 5	3.7 3.3 4.1 6.6	. 1 3. 4 3. 8 3. 9 6. 6	1. 6 3. 2 2. 9 3. 9 4. 7	1.3 2.9 3.3 4.0 4.5
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	2.8	-1.1 2.7 6.9 6.0 -3.1	-1.6 4 3.6 3.9	-1.2 3 3.7 4.3 .4	.7 3.2 2.9 1.9 -3.4	2.9 3.0 1.7 -3.5	7. 2 6. 6 5. 7 8. 2 9. 3	6. 7 6. 6 5. 8 7. 8 9. 4	6. 4 3. 2 2. 7 6. 2 13. 2	6. 5 3. 5 2. 7 6. 0 13. 4	4. 7 4. 4 3. 6 5. 8 10. 3	4. 9 4. 5 3. 1 4. 1 11. 0
1975	-2.3	-2.6	-4.2	-4.3	2.1	1.8	9.7	9.7	7.5	7.7	9.5	10.1
1974: \	-6. 4 -3. 8 -3. 9 -9. 4	-5. 2 -4. 8 -3. 8 -9. 9	. 3 0 -1. 4 -5. 7	9 1.2 6 -6.2	-6.6 -3.8 -2.6 -4.0	-4.3 -5.9 -3.2 -3.9	8. 0 12. 7 12. 6 9. 9	9. 3 11. 5 11. 5 10. 9	15. 6 17. 1 15. 5 14. 5	14, 3 18, 5 15, 2 15, 5	9. 1 12. 5 13. 2 12. 9	9. 4 17. 0 13. 4 13. 5
1975: 1 II III IV	-11. 2 8. 9 12. 3 3. 6	11.3 7.9 12.1 4.5	-12.7 -3.3 3.5 5.2	-12. 4 -4. 1 2. 5 6. 9	1.6 12.7 8.5 -1.5	1.3 12.6 9.3 -2.2	13. 1 6. 9 5. 2 8. 3	11.8 7.9 6.8 6.6	11. 3 -5. 1 -3. 0 10. 0	10. 4 -4. 2 -2. 2 9. 0	11. 3 3. 5 6. 6 6. 6	13, 5 2, 6 5, 3 6, 2
1976: I II	5.5	10. 5 5. 4 3. 4	2. 6 1. 6 . 2	4. 4 . 1 . 5	7. 4 3. 8 3. 1	5. 8 5. 4 2. 9	10. 9 7. 5 7. 3	9. 5 8. 9 6. 9	3. 2 3. 6 4. 1	3. 5 3. 3 3. 9	2. 1 5. 2 3. 9	4. 3 3. 6 5. 8

<sup>Output refers to gross domestic product originating in the sector in 1972 dollars.
Hours of all persons in private industry engaged in production, including hours of proprietors and unpaid family workers.
Stimates based primarily on establishment data.
Wages and salaries of employees plus employers' contributions for social insurance and private benefit plans. Also includes an estimate of wages, salaries, and supplemental payments for the self-employed.
Current dollar gross domestic product divided by constant dollar gross domestic product.</sup>

Note.—Percent changes are based on original data and therefore may differ slightly from percent changes based on indexes in Table B-35.

PRODUCTION AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY

Table P-37.—Industrial production indexes, major industry divisions, 1929-76 [1967=100; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

industrial	 -				
	Total	Durable	Nondurable	Mining	Utilities
100.00	87.95	51. 98	35. 97	6.36	5. 6
21.6	22. 8	22. 5	23. 2	43.1	7.
13.7	14.0	9.1	19.9	30.6	6.
21.7	21.5	17.7	26. 1	42.1	10.
25. 0	25. 4	23. 5	27.5	46.8	11.:
31.6	32.4	31. 4	33.3	49.7	11. 13. 14. 16.
44.0	3/. 0	54.2	37.1	52.5	14. 16
47.4	50.9	59. 9	38.6	56. 2	17.
40.7	42.6	45. 2	38. 5	55. 1	17,3
35.0	35. 3	31.5	39.7	54. 2	18.
39.4	39.4	3/. /	41.3		20.
38.8	38.7	39. 3 35. 7	42. 0	57.1	22. 23.
44.9	45. 0	43, 5	46, 7	63.8	27,
48.7	48.6	48. 9	48.3	70.0	31 (
50.6	50.6	51.9	49.2	69. 4	33. 36. 39.
54.8	55. 2	58. 7	51.2	71.2	36.
31. 3	50.0	51.8 59.2	57 2	69.9 77.0	39.
61 1	60.5	61.1	60.1	82.0	43. 48.
61.9	61.2	61.6	61. 1	82 1 I	51
57.9	57.0	53.9	61,6	75.3	51. 53. 59.
64.8	64. 2	61.9	67.7	78.7	
66. 2	65. 4	62.9	69. 3	80.3	63. 6 67. (72. (
06./	65.6	61.8	/1.3	80.8	6/.
76.5			80.0		77 (
81.7		78.3	85.2	89.9	83. 88. 95.
89.8	89.7	89.0	90.9	93 2	88.
97.8	97. 9	98, 9	96.7	98, 2	95.
100.0		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
106.3	106.4	106.5	106.2	104.2	108. 117.
	1			1	
107.8	106.4	102.3	112.3	112.2	124. ! 130. !
119.0	119 0	113.7	126.5	113.0	130.
129.8	129.8	127. 1		114.7	145.
129.3	129, 4	125.7	134.6	115.3	143.
117.8	116.3	109. 3	126, 4	112.8	146,
1				1	151.
115.2					144.
112.7	110.8	105.6	116.4	114.1	145. 146.
112.6		105 4		112.9	143.
113.7	111.8	105. 5	120.8	111.8	144.
116. 4	114.6	107. 0	125. 5	113.3	148.
118. 4	117.0	109. 3	128. 1	110.8	145.
121.0	119. 7	112. 3	130.5	111.6	148. 144.
122.1	121.4	113.5	132.9		144. 143.
122.2	121. 2	112. /	133.6	113.8	143. 149
124. 4	123. 6	114. 4	136. 9	112.5	148. 147.
125.7	125. 2	115.8	138.4	113.6	152.
127. 3	127.0	117.9	140.2	112.7	152.
128.1	127.9	119.0	140. /	113.9	151. 150.
128.4	120.0	120. 1	140.7	113.5	150.
130.1	130. 2	122. 3	141.3	114.4	153. (151. :
130.7	131.0	124. 2	141. 1	112.5	150.
131.3	131.6	125. 1	140.9	114.4	151.
130.8	130.7	122.4	142.6	115.7	150. 1 150. 1
130.4	130.0	121.4	142.3	116.9	151.
131.9	131.0	123. 0 124 R	143.4		154.
	21. 6 13. 7 21. 7 25. 0 31. 6 36. 3 44. 0 47. 4 40. 7 35. 0 39. 4 41. 1 38. 8 44. 9 48. 7 50. 6 66. 7 50. 9 64. 8 66. 7 72. 2 76. 5 89. 8 100. 0 106. 3 111. 1 107. 8 109. 6 119. 7 129. 8 117. 8 129. 8 117. 8 129. 8 117. 8 129. 8 115. 2 112. 7 111. 6 113. 7 112. 6 113. 7 112. 1 122. 2 123. 5 124. 4 125. 7 127. 7 128. 1 128. 4 125. 7 127. 7 128. 1 128. 4 125. 7 127. 7 128. 1 128. 4 125. 7 127. 7 128. 1 128. 4 125. 7 127. 7 128. 1 128. 4 125. 7 127. 7 128. 1 128. 4 125. 7 127. 7 128. 1 128. 4 125. 7 127. 7 128. 1 128. 4 129. 6 130. 1	21.6 22.8 13.7 14.0 21.7 21.5 25.0 25.4 31.6 32.4 36.3 37.8 44.0 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0	21. 6	21. 6	21.6

TABLE B-38.—Industrial production indexes, market groupings, 1947-76 [1967=100; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

				Final p	roducts					Materials	2
Year or	Total indus- trial		Con	sumer god	ods ¹	Equip	ment	Inter- mediate			
month	pro- duc- tion	Total	Total	Auto- motive prod- ucts	Home goods	Total	Busi- ness	prod- ucts	Total	Dura- ble goods	Non- dura- ble goods
1967 pro- portion	100.00	47. 82	27. 68	2.83	5. 06	20. 14	12.63	12. 89	39. 29	20. 35	10. 47
1947 1948 1949	39. 4 41. 1 38. 8	38. 6 40. 0 38. 8	42. 4 43. 7 43. 4	45. 3 47. 4 47. 0	37. 5 39. 1 36. 2	30. 6 32. 2 28. 7	38. 0 39. 5 34. 5	41. 9 44. 3 42. 0	39. 5 41. 2 37. 6	38. 3 39. 4 35. 3	
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	44. 9 48. 7 50. 6 54. 8 51. 9	43. 7 47. 2 50. 7 54. 1 51. 3	49. 6 49. 1 50. 2 53. 2 52. 9	59. 1 52. 3 47. 1 59. 5 55. 4	49. 9 43. 0 43. 0 48. 6 44. 9	31. 1 43. 3 51. 9 56. 3 49. 3	37. 0 45. 2 51. 2 53. 3 46. 8	48. 8 51. 3 50. 9 54. 5 54. 3	45. 0 49. 8 50. 5 56. 1 51. 8	44. 4 50. 5 51. 6 60. 3 52. 0	45, 9
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	58. 5 61. 1 61. 9 57. 9 64. 8	55, 4 58, 6 60, 3 57, 6 63, 2	59. 0 61. 2 62. 6 62. 1 68. 1	73, 6 60, 6 63, 5 50, 5 63, 3	53. 0 55. 7 54. 5 51. 4 59. 0	50. 4 55. 3 57. 5 51. 5 56. 5	50. 8 58. 8 61. 1 51. 5 57. 9	61. 7 64. 4 64. 4 63. 0 69. 5	61. 3 62. 8 62. 8 56. 5 65. 2	63. 7 63. 9 63. 8 53. 7 64. 0	52. 54. 54. 54. 4 54. 4 62. 1
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964		65. 3 65. 8 71. 4 75. 5 79. 7	70.7 72.2 77.1 81.3 85.9	72. 5 66. 1 80. 1 87. 7 91. 9	59. 4 61. 3 66. 5 71. 8 78. 4	58. 1 57. 3 63. 7 67. 5 71. 4	59. 4 57. 7 62. 7 65. 8 73. 7	70.0 71.4 75.7 79.9 85.2	66. 1 66. 2 72. 1 76. 7 82. 9	64. 8 63. 3 70. 4 75. 1 81. 9	63. 2 65. 8 71. 3 75. 6 82. 2
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	89. 8 97. 8 100. 0 106. 3 111. 1	87. 6 95. 9 100. 0 106. 2 109. 6	92. 6 97. 3 100. 0 105. 9 109. 8	113. 3 112. 8 100. 0 119. 4 118. 1	88. 9 97. 9 100. 0 106. 4 113. 2	80. 7 94. 0 100. 0 106. 5 109. 3	84. 4 97. 7 100. 0 105. 5 112. 5	90. 6 96. 2 100. 0 106. 3 112. 9	92. 4 100. 7 100. 0 106. 5 112. 5	93. 8 103. 3 100. 0 106. 2 112. 1	90. 3 97. 5 100. 0 108. 8 115. 7
1970	107. 8 109. 6 119. 7 129. 8 129. 3	105.3 106.3 115.7 124.4 125.1	109. 0 114. 7 124. 4 131. 5 128. 9	98, 8 124, 4 141, 4 153, 0 132, 8	110. 2 115. 6 129. 5 142. 5 136. 8	100. 1 94. 7 103. 8 114. 5 120. 0	107. 0 104. 1 118. 0 134. 2 142. 4	112. 9 116. 7 126. 5 137. 2 135. 3	109. 2 111. 3 122. 3 133. 9 132. 4	103. 8 104. 9 117. 7 134. 6 132. 7	115. 120. 132. 142. 142.
1975		118. 2	124.0	125, 8	118.8	110. 2	128. 2	123. 1	115. 5	109. 1	126.
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June.	115. 2 112. 7 111. 7 112. 6 113. 7 116. 4	115. 2 113. 5 113. 4 114. 7 115. 6 118. 2	117. 0 116. 1 117. 0 119. 0 120. 4 124. 3	98. 6 95. 6 108. 4 118. 1 122. 4 128. 9	110. 4 109. 7 108. 0 113. 2 115. 5 117. 3	112. 7 110. 0 108. 6 108. 7 109. 2 109. 8	130. 8 128. 0 125. 7 125. 6 126. 0 126. 6	119. 5 117. 9 115. 9 116. 9 118. 1 120. 8	113. 7 110. 1 108. 3 108. 8 109. 8 112. 6	110. 6 105. 3 103. 0 103. 2 102. 9 104. 3	116. 6 113. 9 110. 8 115. 2 118. 123. 2
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	118. 4 121. 0 122. 1 122. 2 123. 5 124. 4	119. 7 120. 8 121. 5 120. 9 122. 3 123. 5	126. 6 127. 5 129. 0 128. 7 131. 1 132. 3	137. 0 139. 1 142. 1 140. 8 143. 2 147. 7	120. 8 123. 5 126. 7 127. 0 126. 5 126. 4	110. 0 111. 4 111. 3 110. 0 110. 0 111. 5	127. 3 129. 9 129. 2 128. 8 129. 6 131. 6	125. 0 127. 9 127. 6 128. 0 129. 3 129. 9	114. 5 119. 0 121. 0 122. 0 123. 1 123. 3	107. 3 112. 9 114. 5 114. 6 115. 2 115. 5	127. 1 131. 6 138. 8 140. 3 141. 3
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June.	125. 7 127. 3 128. 1 128. 4 129. 6 130. 1	123. 9 125. 3 126. 4 126. 3 127. 3 127. 6	133. 1 134. 9 136. 1 136. 1 137. 4 137. 8	142. 8 148. 9 155. 1 155. 2 154. 0 156. 6	130. 3 131. 7 132. 0 133. 1 137. 2 137. 4	111. 2 112. 1 112. 9 112. 9 113. 5 113. 8	131. 0 132. 6 134. 0 134. 1 134. 6 135. 0	133. 6 135. 3 134. 9 134. 7 135. 0 135. 9	125. 3 127. 3 128. 2 129. 2 130. 6 131. 1	118. 3 121. 6 122. 4 124. 5 126. 8 127. 0	142. 145. 146. 146. 146. 147.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov p _ Decp _	130.4	127. 6 128. 3 127. 4 127. 3 129. 5 131. 3	136. 8 137. 5 136. 2 136. 9 138. 7 141. 4	155. 9 158. 4 147. 4 147. 7 161. 9 181. 0	133. 8 135. 6 133. 3 133. 5 133. 5 134. 3	114. 9 115. 7 115. 2 114. 4 116. 7 117. 7	136. 9 137. 7 137. 5 136. 0 139. 5 140. 9	137. 6 137. 8 138. 7 138. 4 139. 3 140. 4	132. 2 133. 0 132. 5 131. 6 132. 3 132. 3	130. 6 131. 4 130. 0 128. 5 129. 1 128. 1	146. 0 146. 1 147. 8 147. 0 148. 1

 $^{^{\}rm 1}$ Also includes clothing and consumer staples, not shown separately. $^{\rm 2}$ Also includes energy materials, not shown separately.

TABLE B-39.—Industrial production indexes, selected manufactures, 1947-76 [1967=100; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

			Du	rable ma	nufactur	es			Non	durable i	nanufact	ures
Period	Primary	metals	Fabri-	Non-	Elec-	Transp equip	ortation oment	Lum-	•	Print-	Chem-	
	Total	iron and steel	cated metal prod- ucts	elec- trical ma- chin- ery	trical ma- chin- ery	Total	Motor ve- hicles and parts	ber and prod- ucts	Ap- parel prod- ucts	ing and pub- lishing	icals and prod- ucts	Foods
1967 proportion.	6. 57	4. 21	5.93	9. 15	8. 05	9. 27	4. 50	1.64	3. 31	4. 72	7.74	8. 75
1947 1948 1949	63.3 65.8 55.4		49, 9 50, 8 45, 8	39. 0 39. 2 33. 4	22. 2 23. 0 21. 6	31.8 34.8 34.9		58.9 61.3 54.1	57. 8 60. 3 59. 7	43.3 45.4 46.6	19. 7 21. 3 21. 0	55.8 55.2 55.9
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	69. 7 75. 8 69. 2 78. 5 63. 5	70.1	56. 1 59. 9 58. 5 66. 0 59. 4	37.5 47.7 51.9 54.0 46.1	29. 6 29. 8 34. 0 39. 0 34. 7	41. 8 46. 6 54. 2 68. 0 59. 2	60.5	65. 7 65. 5 64. 7 68. 4 68. 0	64. 3 63. 1 66. 3 67. 2 66. 4	48. 9 49. 7 49. 7 52. 0 54. 1	26. 2 29. 7 31. 1 33. 6 34. 1	57. 9 59. 0 60. 2 61. 4 62. 7
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	82. 5 82. 0 78. 5 62. 3 72. 7	93. 2 91. 5 88. 2 66. 5 76. 5	67.8 68.8 70.6 63.3 71.0	50. 6 58. 0 57. 9 48. 6 56. 7	39. 9 43. 1 42. 8 39. 2 47. 6	68. 0 66. 0 70. 7 55. 8 63. 2	81. 2 65. 8 69. 0 51. 0 66. 2	75. 9 75. 0 68. 8 69. 9 79. 3	73. 3 75. 0 74. 9 72. 8 80. 1	59. 5 63. 2 65. 4 63. 9 68. 2	39. 8 42. 7 45. 2 46. 6 54. 3	66. 3 70. 1 71. 1 72. 9 76. 5
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	72. 4 71. 1 76. 3 82. 3 92. 8	77. 7 74. 2 77. 3 84. 3 95. 9	71. 1 69. 4 75. 4 77. 8 82. 6	56. 9 55. 4 62. 1 66. 3 75. 6	51. 6 54. 8 62. 9 64. 7 68. 4	65. 4 61. 5 71. 1 78. 0 80. 0	74. 7 65. 5 79. 8 88. 3 90. 7	74. 7 78. 2 82. 5 86. 3 92. 7	81. 7 82. 2 85. 5 89. 1 92. 2	71. 0 71. 3 73. 9 77. 8 82. 6	56. 4 59. 2 65. 7 71. 8 78. 8	78. 6 80. 9 83. 4 86. 4 90. 4
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	102. 1 108. 4 100. 0 104. 3 113. 8	105. 2 108. 4 100. 0 103. 2 112. 6	90. 8 97. 2 100. 0 105. 6 107. 9	85. 0 98. 8 100. 0 101. 8 109. 3	81. 7 97. 9 100. 0 105. 5 111. 9	95. 1 102. 0 100. 0 111. 1 108. 4	115. 9 113. 9 100. 0 120. 3 116. 5	96. 3 100. 0 100. 0 105. 5 107. 9	97. 4 99. 9 100. 0 102. 9 106. 7	87. 9 94. 6 100. 0 103. 2 107. 4	87. 8 95. 7 100. 0 109. 5 118. 4	92. 4 96. 0 100. 0 102. 6 106. 1
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	106. 6 100. 2 112. 1 126. 7 123. 1	104. 7 96. 1 107. 1 122. 3 119. 8	102. 4 103. 5 112. 1 124. 7 124. 2	104. 4 100. 2 116. 0 133. 7 140. 1	108. 1 107. 7 122. 2 143. 1 143. 8	89. 5 97. 9 108. 2 118. 3 108. 7	92. 3 118. 6 135. 8 148. 8 128. 2	105. 6 113. 8 120. 8 126. 0 116. 2	101. 4 104. 7 109. 4 117. 3 114. 3	107. 0 107. 1 112. 7 118. 2 118. 2	120. 4 125. 9 143. 6 154. 5 159. 4	108. 9 112. 8 116. 8 120. 9 124. 0
1975	96. 4	95. 8	109.9	125. 1	116. 5	97.4	111.1	107.6	107.6	113. 3	147.3	123. 4
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	103, 4 98, 4 95, 0 90, 8	107. 7 108. 7 104. 4 97. 9 89. 4 89. 4	105. 9 104. 1 103. 9 106. 4 106. 2 106. 7	128. 4 125. 7 122. 7 122. 1 122. 0 122. 6	118. 4 113. 5 110. 6 112. 7 112. 4 112. 4	88. 7 83. 3 88. 5 90. 8 94. 6 97. 9	91. 7 84. 7 95. 2 101. 7 104. 9 110. 2	95. 0 96. 7 98. 0 100. 8 105. 4 108. 6	96. 6 102. 4 97. 6 100. 4 104. 5 105. 1	111.7 111.5 109.9 108.5 111.4 113.3	141. 7 136. 9 134. 6 136. 4 139. 5 144. 7	117. 8 117. 9 116. 6 120. 2 121. 1 124. 3
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	97. 9 97. 9 95. 4 98. 1	87. 0 92. 7 93. 4 92. 0 96. 5 89. 1	108.9 113.8 115.3 114.4 116.3 117.3	123.9 126.2 125.5 125.4 126.6 128.6	116. 5 118. 0 120. 2 120. 1 120. 1 122. 7	101.1 105.0 105.9 104.4 104.7 106.7	116. 3 123. 7 126. 8 126. 5 127. 1 130. 1	110.6 113.6 115.8 116.8 114.1 116.4	106.3 112.8 111.5 115.9 118.3 121.2	115. 5 115. 3 114. 7 113. 2 115. 4 118. 4	147. 1 150. 8 154. 4 157. 5 161. 9 163. 3	125. 4 125. 8 126. 2 126. 4 128. 8 128. 5
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	103.9	92. 9 100. 9 97. 7 103. 5 110. 7 110. 0	116. 6 120. 9 120. 2 121. 5 121. 4 124. 0	129. 0 131. 5 132. 9 133. 5 134. 0 133. 5	124. 7 126. 5 127. 8 130. 0 131. 8 132. 0	105. 8 109. 0 111. 2 110. 6 112. 9 112. 6	126. 7 135. 2 140. 8 141. 3 144. 3 146. 5	123. 5 123. 9 121. 1 122. 8 123. 0 120. 3	123. 8 128. 0 126. 3 126. 1 130. 3 126. 8	120. 0 121. 0 121. 0 122. 0 120. 5 119. 7	162. 9 167. 6 170. 6 168. 7 166. 6 170. 0	129. 2 130. 8 128. 3 129. 2 131. 2 130. 5
July Aug Sept Oct Nov P Dec P	116. 9 118. 6 114. 1 109. 8 106. 7	115. 3 116. 2 110. 3 105. 1 102. 7 94. 6	124, 6 125, 8 126, 6 123, 5 126, 2 126, 6	135. 0 136. 4 136. 8 134. 4 137. 2 138. 0	131. 0 135. 3 133. 7 134. 8 135. 6 137. 0	113. 3 115. 0 104. 4 104. 3 113. 0 120. 9	148. 5 150. 6 130. 2 128. 3 145. 6 161. 1	124, 6 128, 1 128, 7 130, 7 131, 7	125. 6 123. 7 122. 5 126. 6	122. 0 120. 6 120. 6 119. 2 121. 3	167, 6 170, 4 170, 5 170, 1 172, 8	131. 8 133. 4 135. 7 136. 1 135. 8

TABLE B-40.—Capacity utilization rate in manufacturing, 1948-76 [Percent; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]

	F	RB series	1		Con	nmerce se	ries ²		Wha	arton serie	s a
Year or quarter	Total manu- fac- turing	Primary proc- essing	Ad- vanced proc- essing	Total manu- fac- turing	Dur- able goods	Non- dur- able goods	Pri- mary- proc- essed goods	Ad- Vanced- proc- essed goods	Total manu- fac- turing	Dur- able goods	Non- dur- able goods
1948 1949	82. 5 74. 2	87. 3 76. 2	80. 0 73. 2								
1950	82. 8 85. 8 85. 4 89. 2 80. 1	88. 5 90. 2 84. 9 89. 4 80. 6	79. 8 83. 4 85. 9 89. 3 80. 0	11	1	l .	1		88. 9 90. 3 88. 4 92. 4 82. 9	83. 7 87. 2 86. 0 93. 3 79. 5	96. 94. 91. 91. 87.
1955 1956 1957 1958 1958	87. 0 86. 1 83. 6 75. 0 81. 6	92. 0 89. 4 84. 7 75. 4 83. 0	84. 2 84. 4 83. 1 74. 9 81. 1						91. 4 90. 8 88. 0 77. 5 84. 0	90. 2 89. 1 86. 1 70. 8 78. 6	93. 93. 90. 87.
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	80. 1 77. 3 81. 4 83. 5 85. 7	79. 8 77. 9 81. 5 83. 8 87. 8	80, 5 77, 2 81, 6 83, 4 84, 6	11	I				82. 1 79. 1 82. 5 84. 0 86. 8	77. 0 72. 9 77. 7 79. 6 82. 9	89. 88. 89. 90. 92,
1965		91. 0	88. 9	86	88	85	89	85	92. 4	90. 6	95.
1966		91. 4	91. 1	86	87	86	88	85	96. 6	96. 0	97.
1967		85. 7	87. 6	84	83	85	87	83	93. 5	91. 8	96.
1968		87. 6	86. 8	85	84	86	86	84	95. 0	93. 7	97.
1968		88. 6	85. 0	85	84	86	87	84	95. 3	94. 0	97.
1970	79. 2	82. 8	77. 3	81	78	83	83	79	87. 9	84. 2	93.
1971	78. 0	82. 0	75. 9	80	78	83	82	80	86. 4	82. 3	92.
1972	83. 1	88. 0	80. 5	83	82	85	85	82	91. 8	88. 9	96.
1973	87. 5	92. 4	84. 9	86	85	86	89	84	97. 1	96. 6	98.
1974	84. 2	87. 5	82. 3	83	82	84	85	82	93. 0	91. 9	94.
1975	73.6	73.4	73.7	77	76	79	76	77	80.4	77.1	86.
1971:	77. 5	81. 7	75. 3	80	78	83	82	79	86. 2	82. 5	92.
	77. 9	82. 9	75. 2	81	79	84	83	80	86. 3	82. 5	92.
	77. 8	81. 1	75. 9	80	77	84	80	80	86. 0	81. 4	93.
V	79. 0	82. 4	77. 1	80	78	82	81	79	87. 2	82. 8	94.
1972: I	80, 9	85, 2	78. 6	82	80	84	82	82	89. 3	85. 6	95.
II	82, 4	87, 2	79. 8	82	81	84	83	81	90. 9	87. 7	96.
III	83, 4	88, 6	80. 6	83	82	85	85	82	92. 1	89. 3	96.
IV	85, 8	91, 1	83. 1	85	85	85	88	84	94. 9	93. 1	97.
1973: J	87. 1	91. 8	84. 5	86	86	86	88	85	96. 4	95. 4	98.
	87. 6	92. 1	85. 2	86	86	86	89	85	97. 2	96. 4	98.
	87. 8	92. 7	85. 0	85	85	86	89	83	97. 4	97. 1	97.
V	87. 7	93. 6	85. 0	85	84	86	89	82	97. 5	97. 4	97.
1974:	85. 7	96. 5	83. 0	84	83	85	87	83	94. 7	93. 3	96.
	85. 8	90. 0	83. 4	84	84	85	87	83	94. 8	93. 5	96.
	85. 5	89. 0	83. 6	84	84	84	86	83	94. 6	93. 9	95.
V	79. 7	80. 4	79. 3	78	76	80	79	77	87. 8	86. 9	89.
1975:	70. 9	69. 5	71. 5	75	74	76	75	75	77. 4	74. 8	81. !
	71. 3	70. 0	72. 1	75	73	78	73	76	77. 9	74. 7	83. :
	75. 3	75. 8	75. 0	79	78	80	78	79	82. 4	78. 8	88. :
V	76. 8	78. 1	76. 1	79	77	81	78	79	84. 0	80. 0	90. :
1976: L	79. 0	80. 2	78. 2	82	81	82	83	81	86. 4	82. 6	92. 7
II	80. 2	81. 5	79. 2	82	83	81	83	82	87. 8	84. 9	92. 6
III P	80. 8	82. 5	79. 6	80	79	82	82	79	88. 0	85. 7	91. 8

¹ For description of the series, see "Federal Reserve Bulletin," November 1976.

² Quarterly data are for last month in quarter. Annual data are averages of the four indexes, except for 1965 (December index) and 1965–67 (averages of June and December indexes). For description of the series, see "Survey of Current Business," July 1974.

³ Annual data are averages of quarterly indexes. For description of the series, see F. Gerard Adams and Robert Summers, "The Wharton Index of Capacity Utilization: A Ten Year Perspective," 1973 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section, American Statistical Association.

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), and Wharton School of Finance.

 $T_{ABLE} \ B-41. \\ -- \textit{New construction activity, 1929-76}$ [Value put in place, billions of dollars; monthly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

				Privat	e construc	tion			Public	constru	ction
Year or month	Total new con-			ential ings ¹	Nonresid	lential bu constru	ildings a ection ¹	nd other			
	struc- tion	Total	Total 2	New hous- ing units	Total	Com- mer- cial 3	In- dus- trial	Other 4	Total	Fed- eral	State and local s
1929	10.8	8.3	3. 6	3.0	4. 7	1.1	0.9	2. 6	2. 5	0. 2	2. 3
933	2.9	1. 2	. 5	.3	.8	.1	.2	.5	1.6	. 5	1, 1
939	8. 2	4. 4	2.7	2. 3	1.7	.3	.3	1.2	3.8	.8	3.1
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944	8. 7 12. 0 14. 1 8. 3 5. 3	5. 1 6. 2 3. 4 2. 0 2. 2	3. 0 3. 5 1. 7 . 9 . 8	2.6 3.0 1.4 .7	2. 1 2. 7 1. 7 1. 1 1. 4	.3 .4 .2 .0	.4 .8 .3 .2	1.3 1.5 1.2 .9 1.1	3.6 5.8 10.7 6.3 3.1	1. 2 3. 8 9. 3 5. 6 2. 5	2.4 2.0 1.3 .7
1945 1946	5. 8 14. 3	3. 4 12. 1	1.3 6.2	. 7 4. 8	2. 1 5. 8	1. 2 1. 2	. 6 1. 7	1.3 3.0	2. 4 2. 2	1.7 .9	. 7 1. 4
New series											
1947 1948 1949	20. 0 26. 1 26. 7	16. 7 21. 4 20. 5	9. 9 13. 1 12. 4	7, 8 10, 5 10, 0	6. 9 8. 2 8. 0	1.0 1.4 1.2	1.7 1.4 1.0	4. 2 5. 5 5. 9	3. 3 4. 7 6. 3	. 8 1. 2 1. 5	2.5 3.5 4.8
1950 1951 1952 1953	33. 6 35. 4 36. 8 39. 1 41. 4	26. 7 26. 2 26. 0 27. 9 29. 7	18. 1 15. 9 15. 8 16. 6 18. 2	15.6 13.2 12.9 13.4 14.9	8.6 10.3 10.2 11.3 11.5	1.4 1.5 1.1 1.8 2.2	1.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.0	6. 1 6. 7 6. 8 7. 3 7. 2	6.9 9.3 10.8 11.2 11.7	1.6 3.0 4.2 4.1 3.4	5. 2 6. 3 6. 6 7. 1 8. 3
1955 1956 1957 1958	46. 5 47. 6 49. 1 50. 0 55. 4	34. 8 34. 9 35. 1 34. 6 39. 3	21. 9 20. 2 19. 0 19. 8 24. 3	18. 2 16. 1 14. 7 15. 4 19. 2	12.9 14.7 16.1 14.8 15.1	3. 2 3. 6 3. 6 3. 6 3. 9	2. 4 3. 1 3. 6 2. 4 2. 1	7.3 8.0 9.0 8.8 9.0	11.7 12.7 14.1 15.5 16.1	2. 8 2. 7 3. 0 3. 4 3. 7	8.9 10.0 11.1 12.1 12.3
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	54. 7 56. 4 60. 2 64. 8 67. 7	38. 9 39. 3 42. 3 45. 5 47. 3	23. 0 23. 1 25. 2 27. 9 28. 0	17. 3 17. 1 19. 4 21. 7 21. 8	15. 9 16. 2 17. 2 17. 6 19. 3	4. 2 4. 7 5. 1 5. 0 5. 4	2. 9 2. 8 2. 8 2. 9 3. 6	8. 9 8. 7 9. 2 9. 7 10. 3	15. 9 17. 1 17. 9 19. 4 20. 4	3.6 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.9	12. 2 13. 3 14. 0 15. 4 16. 5
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	73. 7 76. 4 78. 1 87. 1 93. 9	51. 7 52. 4 52. 5 59. 5 66. 0	27. 9 25. 7 25. 6 30. 6 33. 2	21. 7 19. 4 19. 0 24. 0 25. 9	23. 8 26. 7 27. 0 28. 9 32. 8	7. 8 9. 4	6. 0 6. 8	15. 1 16. 6	22. 1 24. 0 25. 5 27. 6 28. 0	4. 0 4. 0 3. 5 3. 4 3. 3	18.0 20.0 22.1 24.2 24.2
1970 1971 1972 1973	94. 9 110. 0 124. 1 137. 9 138. 5	66. 8 80. 1 93. 9 105. 4 100. 2	31. 9 43. 3 54. 3 59. 7 50. 4	24. 3 35. 1 44. 9 50. 1 40. 6	34. 9 36. 8 39. 6 45. 7 49. 8	9. 8 11. 6 13. 5 15. 5 15. 9	6. 5 5. 4 4. 7 6. 2 7. 9	18.6 19.8 21.5 24.0 26.0	28. 1 29. 9 30. 2 32. 5 38. 3	3. 3 4. 0 4. 4 4. 9 5. 3	24. 8 25. 9 25. 8 27. 7 33. 0
1975	132.0	93.0	46.5	34.4	46.6	12.8	8.0	25. 7	39.0	6.1	32.9

See footnotes at end of table.

Table B-41.—New construction activity, 1929-76—Continued [Value put in place, billions of dollars; monthly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

				Privat	e construc	tion			Public	constru	ction
Year or month	Total new con-		Resid build		Nonreside	ential bu constru	ildings a uction 1	ind other			State
rear or month	struc- tion	Total	Total 3	New hous- ing units	Total	Com- mer- cial 3	In- dus- trial	Other 4	Total	Fed- eral	and local s
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	130, 2 127, 4 123, 7 126, 2 127, 1 129, 7	93. 8 91. 1 89. 5 89. 2 89. 9 90. 6	44. 0 42. 8 42. 7 43. 2 43. 9 44. 7	33. 4 31. 9 31. 4 31. 3 31. 5 32. 2	49. 8 48. 3 46. 8 46. 1 45. 9 45. 9	15. 1 14. 5 13. 4 12. 7 12. 3 12. 2	8. 5 8. 4 8. 1 8. 0 8. 4 8. 1	26. 2 25. 4 25. 3 25. 3 25. 2 25. 5	36. 4 36. 3 34. 2 37. 0 37. 2 39. 1	5. 7 6. 0 5. 9 5. 8 5. 8	30. 7 30. 2 28. 4 31. 2 31. 4 33. 3
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	133, 1 132, 2 136, 3 136, 2 138, 0 137, 8	92. 0 92. 1 95. 4 95. 6 97. 3 98. 1	46. 1 46. 3 48. 4 49. 4 50. 4 52. 1	33, 4 33, 6 35, 7 37, 5 38, 9 39, 9	45. 8 45. 7 47. 0 46. 2 46. 9 46. 0	12. 3 12. 4 12. 4 12. 4 12. 4 12. 2	8. 2 8. 0 7. 9 7. 6 7. 7 7. 6	25. 3 25. 3 26. 7 26. 2 26. 8 26. 2	41. 1 40. 1 40. 9 40. 6 40. 7 39. 8	6. 2 6. 3 6. 3 5. 9 6. 6 6. 6	35. 0 33. 9 34. 6 34. 7 34. 1 33. 2
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	136. 7 139. 0 145. 1 144. 5 143. 4 145. 4	99. 3 102. 6 107. 1 106. 6 107. 2 106. 5	52. 8 55. 2 58. 1 58. 9 58. 8 58. 7	39. 3 41. 1 43. 8 44. 2 43. 9 45. 4	46. 6 47. 4 48. 9 47. 7 48. 4 47. 8	11. 5 12. 8 13. 3 12. 6 12. 3 12. 0	7. 5 7. 8 7. 6 7. 2 7. 0 6. 7	27. 6 26. 8 28. 0 27. 9 29. 1 29. 1	37. 4 36. 4 38. 0 37. 9 36. 2 38. 9	6. 2 6. 7 6. 1 6. 6 6. 0 6. 4	31. 2 29. 7 32. 0 31. 3 30. 2 32. 6
July Aug Sept Oct Nov **	141. 1 142. 0 146. 3 146. 7 150. 2	104. 3 104. 7 108. 7 112. 8 116. 3	57. 2 55. 4 58. 7 63. 5 66. 6	46. 9 46. 5 48. 8 51. 1 52. 9	47. 1 49. 3 49. 9 49. 3 49. 7	12.6 13.0 12.8 12.6 12.4	6. 1 6. 9 6. 9 6. 4 6. 5	28. 4 29. 4 30. 3 30. 4 30. 7	36. 8 37. 3 37. 6 34. 0 33. 9	6. 4 6. 4 7. 6 5. 7 7. 0	30. 4 30. 9 30. 0 28. 2 26. 9

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census), except as noted.

Beginning 1960, farm residential buildings included in residential buildings; prior to 1960, included in nonresidential buildings and other construction.
 Total includes additions and alterations and nonhousekeeping units, not shown separately.
 Office buildings, warehouses, stores, restaurants, garages, etc.
 A Religious, educational, hospital and institutional, miscellaneous nonresidential, farm (see also footnote 1), public utilities, and all other private.
 Includes Federal grants-in-aid for State and local projects.

TABLE B-42.—New housing units started and authorized, 1959-76 [Thousands of units]

		Ne	w housing	units star	ted					
	Private and public 1 Private 1 Total (farm and nonfarm)					Ne	w private I	housina u	nite	
Year or month			To	tal (farm a	nd nonfar	m)		autho	rized ²	
Tear or month	Total (farm and non-	Non- farm		Туре	of struct	иге				
	farm)		Total	One unit	2 to 4 units	5 units or more	Total	One unit	2 to 4 units	5 units or more
1959		1, 531. 3	1, 517. 0	1, 234. 0	283	3. 0	1, 208. 3	938. 3	77.1	192. 9
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	1, 296. 1 1, 365. 0 1, 492. 5 1, 634. 9 1, 561. 0	1, 274. 0 1, 336. 8 1, 468. 7 1, 614. 8 1, 534. 0	1, 252. 2 1, 313. 0 1, 462. 9 1, 603. 2 1, 528. 8	994. 7 974. 3 991. 4 1, 012. 4 970. 5	257 338 471 590 108. 4	. 7 5	998. 0 1, 064. 2 1, 186. 6 1, 334. 7 1, 285. 8	746. 1 722. 8 716. 2 750. 2 720. 1	64.6 67.6 87.1 118.9 100.8	187. 4 273. 8 383. 3 465. 6 464. 9
1965	1, 509. 7 1, 195. 8 1, 321. 9 1, 545. 4 1, 499. 5	1, 487. 5 1, 172. 8 1, 298. 8 1, 521. 4 1, 482. 3	1, 472. 8 1, 164. 9 1, 291. 6 1, 507. 6 1, 466. 8	963. 7 778. 6 843. 9 899. 4 810. 6	86. 6 61. 1 71. 6 80. 9 85. 0	422. 5 325. 1 376. 1 527. 3 571. 2	1, 239. 8 971. 9 1, 141. 0 1, 353. 4 1, 323. 7	709. 9 563. 2 650. 6 694. 7 625. 9	84. 8 61. 0 73. 0 84. 3 85. 2	445. 1 347. 7 417. 5 574. 4 612. 7
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974		(3) (3) (3) (3)	1, 433. 6 2, 052. 2 2, 356. 6 2, 045. 3 1, 337. 7	812.9 1, 151.0 1, 309.2 1, 132.0 888.1	84. 8 120. 3 141. 3 118. 3 68. 1	535. 9 780. 9 906. 2 795. 0 381. 6	1, 351. 5 1, 924. 6 2, 218. 9 1, 819. 5 1, 074. 4	646. 8 906. 1 1, 033. 1 882. 1 643. 8	88. 1 132. 9 148. 6 117. 0 64. 3	616. 7 885. 7 1, 037. 2 820. 5 366. 2
1975	1	(³)	1, 160. 4	892. 2	64.0	204. 3	939, 2	675. 5	63. 9	199. 8
				·	Seaso	nally adj	usted ann	ual rates	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
1975: Jan	56. 2 81. 1 98. 4 117. 0	(3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3)	1, 005 953 986 982 1, 085 1, 080	748 722 763 774 853 874	41 48 46 45 53 56	216 183 177 163 179 150	729 721 843 903	529 541 605	45 57 44 61 57 62	177
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	118.7 112.8 125.0 97.2	(3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3)	1, 207 1, 264 1, 304 1, 431 1, 381 1, 283	916 979 966 1, 093 1, 048 962	76 67 76 103 79 77	215 218 262 235 254 244	998 1, 092 1, 111 1, 127	699 725 772 794 814 812	72 61 71 84 83 72	212 249 233
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	91.6 118.8 137.4	(3) (3) (3) (3) (3)	1, 236 1, 547 1, 417 1, 367 1, 422 1, 510	957 1, 295 1, 110 1, 055 1, 065 1, 139	70 62 80 76 94 76	209 190 227 236 263 295	1, 165 1, 188 1, 082 1, 158	863 882 803 807	71 76 77 71 75 72	229 208 276
July Aug Sept Oct Nov P	147. 6 153. 1 150. 2	(3) (3) (3) (3) (3)	1, 382 1, 537 1, 840 1, 813 1, 705	1, 123 1, 171 1, 280 1, 340 1, 237	69 84 114 102 94	190 282 446 371 374	1, 296 1, 504 1, 492	926 998	73 93 106 110 109	329 472 384

¹ Units in structures built by private developers for sale upon completion to local public housing authorities under the Department of Housing and Urban Development "Turnkey" program are classified as private housing. Military housing starts, including those financed with mortgages insured by FHA under Section 803 of the National Housing Act, are included in publicly owned starts but excluded from total private starts.

² Authorized by issuance of local building permit: in 14,000 permit-issuing places beginning 1972; 13,000 for 1967–71; 12,000 for 1963–66; and 10,000 prior to 1963.

³ Not available separately beginning January 1970.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

Note.—Only the series on private and public nonfarm housing units started is available prior to 1959. See 1976 "Economic Report" for this earlier series,

TABLE B-43.—Business expenditures for new plant and equipment, 1947-771 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Ma	anufacturi	ng			N	onmant	ıfacturing			
Year or quarter	Total		Dura-	Non-			Tra	nsportat	ion	Public	Com-	Com- mer-
or quarter		Total	ble goods	durable goods	Total	Mining	Rail- road	Air	Other	utili- ties	muni- cation	cial and other 2
1947 1948 1949	19. 33 21. 30 18. 98	8. 44 9. 01 7. 12	3. 25 3. 30 2. 45	5. 19 5. 71 4. 68	10. 89 12. 29 11. 86	0.69 .93 .88	0. 91 1. 37 1. 42	0. 17 . 10 . 12	1. 13 1. 17 . 76	1. 54 2. 54 3. 10	1. 40 1. 74 1. 34	5. 0 5 4. 42 4. 24
1950 1951 1952 1953	20. 21 25. 46 26. 43 28. 20 27. 19	7. 39 10. 71 11. 45 11. 86 11. 24	2. 94 4. 82 5. 21 5. 31 4. 91	4. 45 5. 89 6. 24 6. 56 6. 33	12. 82 14. 75 14. 98 16. 34 15. 95	.84 1.11 1.21 1.25 1.28	1. 18 1. 58 1. 50 1. 42 . 93	. 10 . 14 . 24 . 24 . 24	1. 09 1. 33 1. 23 1. 29 1. 22	3. 24 3. 56 3. 74 4. 34 3. 99	1. 14 1. 37 1. 61 1. 78 1. 82	5. 22 5. 67 5. 45 6. 02 6. 45
1955 1956 1957 1958		11. 89 15. 40 16. 51 12. 38 12. 77	5. 41 7. 45 7. 84 5. 61 5. 81	6. 48 7. 95 8. 68 6. 77 6. 95	17. 64 20. 34 21. 43 19. 51 20. 78	1. 31 1. 64 1. 69 1. 43 1. 36	1. 02 1. 37 1. 58 . 86 1. 02	. 26 . 35 . 41 . 37 . 78	1. 30 1. 31 1. 30 1. 06 1. 33	4. 03 4. 52 5. 67 5. 52 5. 14	2. 11 2. 82 3. 19 2. 79 2. 72	7. 63 8. 32 7. 60 7. 48 8. 44
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964		15. 09 14. 33 15. 06 16. 22 19. 34	7. 23 6. 31 6. 79 7. 53 9. 28	7. 85 8. 02 8. 26 8. 70 10. 07	21. 66 21. 58 23. 33 24. 55 27. 62	1. 30 1. 29 1. 40 1. 27 1. 34	1. 16 . 82 1. 02 1. 26 1. 66	. 66 . 73 . 52 . 40 1. 02	1. 30 1. 23 1. 65 1. 58 1. 50	5. 24 5. 00 4. 90 4. 98 5. 49	3. 24 3. 39 3. 85 4. 06 4. 61	8, 75 9, 13 9, 99 10, 99 12, 02
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	54. 42 63. 51 65. 47 67. 76 75. 56	23. 44 28. 20 28. 51 28. 37 31. 68	11. 50 14. 06 14. 06 14. 12 15. 96	11. 94 14. 14 14. 45 14. 25 15. 72	30. 98 35. 32 36. 96 39. 40 43. 88	1. 46 1. 62 1. 65 1. 63 1. 86	1. 99 2. 37 1. 86 1. 45 1. 86	1. 22 1. 74 2. 29 2. 56 2. 51	1. 68 1. 64 1. 48 1. 59 1. 68	6. 13 7. 43 8. 74 10. 20 11. 61	5. 30 6. 02 6. 34 6. 83 8. 30	13. 19 14. 48 14. 59 15. 14 16. 05
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	79. 71 81. 21 88. 44 99. 74 112. 40	31. 95 29. 99 31. 35 38. 01 46. 01	15. 80 14. 15 15. 64 19. 25 22. 62	16. 15 15. 84 15. 72 18. 76 23. 39	47. 76 51. 22 57. 09 61. 73 66. 39	1. 89 2. 16 2. 42 2. 74 3. 18	1. 78 1. 67 1. 80 1. 96 2. 54	3. 03 1. 88 2. 46 2. 41 2. 00	1. 23 1. 38 1. 46 1. 66 2. 12	13. 14 15. 30 17. 00 18. 71 20. 55	10. 10 10. 77 11. 89 12. 85 13. 96	16, 59 18, 05 20, 07 21, 40 22, 05
1975 1976 ³	112.78 121.23	47. 95 52. 98	21. 84 23. 60	26. 11 29. 38	64, 82 68, 25	3. 79 3. 97	2. 55 2. 35	1.84 1.32	3. 18 3. 58	20. 14 22. 44	12.74 13.63	20.60 20.96
1977 3	134. 95	59. 58	26, 47	33. 11	75. 37	4. 41	2, 59	1. 67	2. 56	25. 60	38	. 54
1974: I II IV	107. 27 111. 40 113. 99 116. 22	42. 96 45. 32 47. 04 48. 08	21. 43 22. 50 23. 08 23. 28	21. 53 22. 82 23. 96 24. 80	64. 31 66. 08 66. 94 68. 14	2. 80 3. 07 3. 27 3. 56	2. 10 2. 42 2. 68 3. 05	2. 13 2. 21 1. 84 1. 81	1. 63 1. 84 2. 16 2. 71	20, 12 20, 97 20, 16 20, 93	13. 83 13. 94 14. 01 14. 04	21. 69 21. 63 22. 84 22. 04
1975: 	114. 57 112. 46 112. 16 111. 80	49. 05 48. 78 47. 39 46. 82	22. 86 22. 59 21. 01 21. 07	26. 20 26. 19 26. 38 25. 75	65. 52 63. 68 64. 76 64. 98	3. 76 3. 78 3. 82 3. 82	2. 39 2. 70 2. 75 2. 39	2. 09 1. 60 2. 12 1. 65	2. 82 2. 75 2. 99 3. 56	20. 28 19. 52 19. 79 20. 91	13. 36 12. 50 12. 95 12. 22	20. 82 20. 83 20. 34 20. 44
1976: 	114. 72 118. 12 122. 55	49. 21 50. 64 54. 78	21. 63 22. 54 24. 59	27. 58 28. 09 30. 20	65. 51 67. 48 67. 76	3. 83 3. 83 4. 21	2. 08 2. 64 2. 69	1. 18 1. 44 1. 12	3. 29 4. 16 3. 44	21. 91 21. 85 21. 67	12.54 12.62 13.64	20. 68 20. 94 20. 99
IV 3	127. 87	56. 23	25. 23	31.00	71. 64	4.03	1.98	1.51	3, 34	24.05	36	. 73
1977: 3 8	129. 38 131. 28	56. 99 57. 58	25. 52 26. 45	31. 47 31. 12	72.38 73.70	4, 22	2.22	1.45	2.67	24, 57	37	. 26

¹Excludes agricultural business; real estate operators; medical, legal, educational, and cultural services; and nonprofit organizations. These figures do not agree precisely with the nonresidential fixed investment data in the gross national product estimates, mainly because those data include investment by farmers, professionals, nonprofit institutions, and real estate firms, and certain outlays charged to current account.

² Commercial and other includes trade, service, construction, finance, and insurance.

³ Estimates based on expected capital expenditures reported by business in October–December 1976. Includes adjustments when necessary for systematic tendencies in expectations data.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Note.—Annual total is the sum of unadjusted expenditures; it does not necessarily coincide with the average of seasonally adjusted figures.

TABLE B-44.—Sales and inventories in manufacturing and trade, 1947-76

[Amounts in millions of dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

Year or month		nanufacti nd trade	ıring	Ma	nufactur	ing	Merch	ant whole	esalers	R	etail trad	ie
	Sales 1	Inven- tories ²	Ratio 3	Sales 1	Inven- tories ²	Ratio 3	Sales 1	Inven- tories 2	Ratio ³	Sales 1	Inven- tories ²	Ratio ³
1947 1948 1949		•		15, 513 17, 316 16, 126		1. 58 1. 57 1. 75	6, 808 6, 514	7, 957 7, 706	1. 13 1. 19	10, 200 11, 135 11, 149	14, 241 16, 007 15, 470	1. 26 1. 39 1. 41
1950	38, 596 43, 356 44, 840 47, 987 46, 443	/6, 122	1. 36 1. 55 1. 58 1. 58 1. 60	18, 634 21, 714 22, 529 24, 843 23, 355	31, 078 39, 306 41, 136 43, 948 41, 612	1. 48 1. 66 1. 78 1. 76 1. 81	7, 695 8, 597 8, 782 9, 052 8, 993	9, 284 9, 886 10, 210 10, 686 10, 637	1. 07 1. 16 1. 12 1. 17 1. 18	12, 268 13, 046 13, 529 14, 091 14, 095	19, 460 21, 050 21, 031 21, 488 20, 926	1, 38 1, 64 1, 52 1, 53 1, 51
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959		79, 516 87, 304 89, 052 87, 094 92, 132	1. 47 1. 55 1. 59 1. 60 1. 50	26, 480 27, 740 28, 736 27, 247 30, 286	45, 069 50, 642	1 62	9, 893 10, 513 10, 475 10, 257 11, 491	11, 678 13, 260 12, 730 12, 739 13, 879			22, 769 23, 402 24, 451 24, 113 25, 305	1. 43 1. 47 1. 44 1. 43 1. 40
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964		94, 718 95, 596 101, 064 105, 482 111, 501	1. 56 1. 54 1. 50 1. 49 1. 47	30, 879 30, 923 33, 357 35, 058 37, 330		1. 76 1. 74 1. 70 1. 69 1. 64		14, 120 14, 488 14, 936 16, 048 17, 000	1. 22 1. 20 1. 16		26, 813 26, 221 27, 941 29, 386 31, 094	1. 45 1. 43 1. 38 1. 39 1. 40
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969		120, 912 136 789	1. 45 1. 48 1. 57 1. 55 1. 57	40, 995 44, 869 46, 487 50, 269 53, 540	68, 190 77, 951	1. 60 1. 62 1. 76 1. 74 1. 76	15, 611 16, 987 17, 108 18, 366 19, 756	18, 317 20, 765	1. 15 1. 15 1. 23 1. 22 1. 21	23 677	34, 405 38, 073 38, 952 41, 973 45, 376	1. 39 1. 44 1. 46 1. 43 1. 46
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974			1. 64 1. 61 1. 52 1. 46 1. 51		101, 502 102, 490 108, 072 124, 395 157, 971		20, 583 22, 327 24, 862 30, 400 37, 344	27, 290 29, 695 32, 817 38, 302 46, 564	1. 26 1. 27 1. 24 1. 16 1. 13			1, 47 1, 47 1, 46 1, 46 1, 53
1975	i		1.60	87, 240	155, 693	1.80	36, 583	45, 115	1. 24	48, 702	74,676	1.51
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	166, 596 168, 070 164, 116 167, 687 167, 995 170, 625	278, 710 277, 867 276, 634 275, 628 274, 139 273, 418	1. 67 1. 65 1. 69 1. 64 1. 63 1. 60	83, 937 83, 996 82, 564 85, 511 84, 382 85, 787	159, 271 159, 677 159, 087 158, 392 157, 659 156, 582	1, 90 1, 90 1, 93 1, 85 1, 87 1, 83	36,675 37,120 35,590 35,228 35,442 36,186	46, 197 45, 951 45, 527 45, 303 44, 558 44, 850	1. 26 1. 24 1. 28 1. 29 1. 26 1. 24	45, 984 46, 954 45, 962 46, 948 48, 171 48, 652	73,242 72,239 72,020 71,933 71,922 71,986	1, 59 1, 54 1, 57 1, 53 1, 49 1, 48
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	173, 802 176, 001 177, 475 178, 621 178, 119	273, 277 274, 906 275, 576 277, 680 276, 804 275, 484	1. 57 1. 56 1. 55 1. 55 1. 55 1. 55	87, 824 89, 061 90, 227 91, 177 90, 549 92, 553	155, 926 155, 426 155, 534 155, 984 156, 121 155, 693	1. 78 1. 75 1. 72 1. 71 1. 72 1. 68	36,567 37,166 37,604 37,449 37,018 37,360	44, 653 45, 5(1 45, 625 45, 715 45, 554 45, 115		49, 411 49, 774 49, 644 49, 995 50, 552 51, 734	72,698 73,979 74,417 75,981 75,129 74,676	1. 47 1. 49 1. 50 1. 52 1. 49
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	183, 818 186, 968 190, 224	277, 057 279, 008 281, 256 283, 062 285, 693 289, 138	1. 51 1. 49 1. 48 1. 48 1. 50 1. 49	94, 067 95, 551 97, 786 98, 519 98, 546 98, 937	156, 120 156, 458 157, 560 158, 134 159, 488 161, 118	1, 66 1, 64 1, 61 1, 61 1, 62 1, 63		45, 645 46, 307 46, 398 46, 826 47, 799 48, 645			75, 292 76, 243 77, 298 78, 102 78, 406 79, 375	
July Aug Sept Oct Nov P Dec P	193, 704 194, 672 194, 261 192, 963 196, 942	290, 866 293, 308 296, 537 298, 179 298, 490	1, 50 1, 51 1, 53 1, 55 1, 52		162, 144 163, 184 164, 966 166, 674 166, 915		40, 616 40, 581 41, 381 40, 676					1. 49 1. 48 1. 51 1. 49 1. 46

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census).

Monthly average for year and total for month.
 Seasonally adjusted, end of period.
 Inventory/sales ratio. For annual periods, ratio of weighted average inventories to average monthly sales; for monthly data, ratio of inventories at end of month to sales for month.

Note.—The inventory figures in this table do not agree with the estimates of change in business inventories included in the gross national product since these figures cover only manufacturing and trade rather than all business, and show inventories in terms of current book value without adjustment for revaluation.

TABLE B-45.—Manufacturers' shipments and inventories, 1947-76

[Millions of dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

		Shipment	ts 1				1	nventorie	ş 1			
					Du	rable goo	ds indus	tries	Nond	urable go	ods indu	stries
Year or month	Total	Dura- ble goods indus- tries	Non- durable goods indus- tries	Total	Total	Mate- rials and sup- plies	Work in process	Fin- ished goods	Total	Mate- rials and sup- plies	Work in process	Fin- ished goods
1947 1948 1949			8, 819 9, 738 8, 935									
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	18, 634 21, 714 22, 529 24, 843 23, 355	8, 845 10, 493 11, 313 13, 349 11, 828	9, 789 11, 221 11, 216 11, 494 11, 527	31, 078 39, 306 41, 136 43, 948 41, 612	15, 539 20, 991 23, 731 25, 878 23, 710	8, 966 7, 894	10, 720 9, 721	6, 206 6, 040	15, 539 18, 315 17, 405 18, 070 17, 902	8, 317 8, 167		7, 409 7, 415
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959		14, 071 14, 715 15, 237 13, 563 15, 609	12, 409 13, 025 13, 499 13, 684 14, 677	45, 069 50, 642 51, 871 50, 242 52, 948				6, 348 7, 565 8, 125 7, 829 8, 232			2, 571 2, 721 2, 864 2, 835 2, 950	7,666 8,622 8,624 8,474 8,825
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964		15, 883 15, 616 17, 262 18, 280 19, 637	14, 996 15, 307 16, 095 16, 778 17, 693	53, 785 54, 887 58, 187 60, 048 63, 407			12,777 13,210 14,170	9, 243 9, 058 9, 659	21, 410 22, 343 23, 555 24, 182			
1965 1966 1967 1968 1968	40, 995 44, 869 46, 487 50, 269 53, 540	22, 221 24, 648 25, 267 27, 698 29, 477		68, 190 77, 951 84, 527 90, 394 98, 011		13, 311 15, 033 16, 397 17, 314 18, 638	18, 098 22, 583 24, 984 27, 265 30, 329	10, 853 12, 305 13, 505 14, 121 15, 606				
	52, 831 55, 925 63, 042 72, 954 84, 612	28, 215 29, 973 34, 042 39, 704 44, 043			66, 648 66, 149 70, 098 81, 218 101, 780	19, 123 19, 681 20, 752 25, 892 35, 809	29, 785 28, 586 30, 738 35, 440 41, 254					16, 447
975	87, 240	43, 912	43, 328	155, 693	100, 310	33, 145	41, 304	25, 747	55, 382	23, 023		1
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr Apr June	83, 937 83, 996 82, 564 85, 511 84, 382 85, 787	43, 058 42, 864 42, 242 43, 406 42, 568 42, 963	40, 880 41, 132 40, 322 42, 104 41, 813 42, 824	159, 271 159, 677 159, 087 158, 392 157, 659 156, 582	102, 828 103, 808 103, 705 103, 880 103, 730 103, 216	36, 540 36, 938 36, 663 36, 166 35, 681 35, 470	41, 069 41, 358 41, 286 41, 766 41, 889 41, 866	25, 076 25, 389 25, 714 25, 962 26, 231 26, 026	56, 442 55, 869 55, 382 54, 512 53, 928 53, 366	23, 881 23, 559 23, 351 22, 838 22, 630 22, 077	8, 214 8, 161 8, 030 8, 001 7, 879 7, 929	24, 345 24, 149 24, 001 23, 672 23, 420 23, 359
	87, 824 89, 061 90, 227 91, 177 90, 549 92, 553	43, 962 44, 552 45, 292 45, 243 44, 548 46, 772	43, 862 1 44, 509 1 44, 935 1 45, 934 1 46, 001 1 45, 781 1	55, 926 55, 426 55, 534 55, 984 56, 121 55, 693	102, 796 101, 976 101, 403 101, 221 101, 016 100, 310	35, 025 34, 650 34, 259 33, 899 33, 754 33, 145	42, 030 41, 622 41, 362 41, 384 41, 412 41, 304	25, 867 25, 794 25, 835 25, 939 25, 793 25, 747	53, 129 53, 450 54, 131 54, 763 55, 105 55, 382	22, 105 21, 948 22, 200 22, 663 22, 837 23, 023	7, 990 8, 059 8, 152 8, 150 8, 255 8, 234	23, 036 23, 444 23, 778 23, 950 24, 014 24, 124
976: Jan Feb Mar Apr	04 067	47, 289 48, 430 50, 382 50, 146 50, 558 50, 606	46, 778 1 47, 121 1 47, 404 1 48, 374 1 47, 988 1 48, 331 1	56, 120 56, 458 57, 560 58, 134 59, 488 61, 118	99, 980 99, 942 100, 740 101, 033 101, 502 102, 429	33, 551 33, 269 33, 541 33, 416 33, 669 33, 927	40, 910 40, 568 40, 745 40, 910 40, 978 41, 411	25, 371 25, 438 25, 558 25, 855 26, 045 26, 344	56, 140 56, 516 56, 820 57, 101 57, 986 58, 689	23, 288 23, 460 23, 666 23, 765 24, 366 24, 453	8, 391 8, 520 8, 640 8, 677 8, 705 8, 873	24, 461 24, 536 24, 512
July Aug Sept Oct Nov ** 1		51, 090 51, 648 50, 060 49, 267 51, 365	48, 244 1 47, 799 1 48, 720 1 48, 386 1 49, 093 1	62, 144 63, 184 64, 966 66, 674 66, 915	102, 856 103, 282 104, 117 105, 589 106, 011	34, 064 33, 822 34, 113 35, 047 35, 329	41, 499 41, 743 41, 987 42, 627 42, 889	26, 495 26, 862 27, 114 27, 915 27, 793	59, 288 59, 902 60, 850 61, 085 60, 904	24, 900 25, 023 25, 502 26, 880 27, 354	8, 929 9, 004 9, 096 8, 524 8, 507	25 460

Note.—Data are as published by Bureau of the Census, but beginning 1968 detail for durable goods inventories does not add to totals. Correction will be published later by Census.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

Monthly average for year and total for month.
 Book value, seasonally adjusted, end of period, except as noted.

TABLE B-46.-Manufacturers' new and unfilled orders, 1947-76

[Amounts in millions of dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

		New	orders 1		Ur	ifilled orde	rs ²	Uni shi	filled order pments rat	rs— tio ³
V		Durab indu	le goods stries	Non-		Dura	Non-		B	Non-
Year or month	Total	Total	Capital goods indus- tries, non- defense	dura- ble goods indus- tries	Total	Dura- ble goods indus- tries	dura- ble goods indus- tries	Total	Dura- ble goods indus- tries	dura- ble goods indus- tries
1947 1948 1949	15, 256 17, 693 15, 614	6, 388 8, 126 6, 633		8, 868 9, 566 8, 981	34, 473 30, 736 24, 045	28, 579 26, 619 19, 622	5, 894 4, 117 4, 423			
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	20, 110 23, 907 23, 204 23, 586 22, 335	10, 165 12, 841 12, 061 12, 147 10, 768		9, 945 11, 066 11, 143 11, 439 11, 566	41, 456 67, 266 75, 857 61, 178 48, 266	35, 435 63, 394 72, 680 58, 637 45, 250	6, 021 3, 872 3, 177 2, 541 3, 016		4, 12	
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	27, 465 28, 368 27, 559 27, 002 30, 724	14, 996 15, 365 14, 111 13, 290 16, 003		12, 469 13, 003 13, 448 13, 712 14, 720	60, 004 67, 375 53, 183 47, 280 52, 571	56, 241 63, 880 50, 352 44, 465 49, 207	3, 763 3, 495 2, 831 2, 815 3, 364	3. 63 3. 87 3. 35 3. 07 3. 00	4. 27 4. 55 4. 00 3. 67 3. 53	1.1 1.0 .8 .8
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	30, 235 31, 104 33, 436 35, 524 38, 357	15, 303 15, 759 17, 374 18, 709 20, 652		14, 932 15, 345 16, 061 16, 815 17, 705	45, 061 47, 384 48, 600 54, 384 67, 001	42, 491 44, 345 45, 983 51, 321 63, 806	2, 570 3, 039 2, 617 3, 063 3, 195	2. 78 2. 64 2. 68 2. 81 3. 10	3. 36 3. 14 3. 21 3. 38 3. 71	.7 .7 .6 .7
1965	42, 100 46, 402 47, 062 50, 720 54, 014	23, 278 26, 177 25, 831 28, 149 29, 934	7, 079 7, 821	18, 823 20, 225 21, 232 22, 571 24, 079	80, 174 98, 519 105, 114 110, 537 116, 330	76, 395 94, 689 101, 144 106, 563 112, 158	3, 778 3, 830 3, 970 3, 974 4, 172	3. 34 3. 80 3. 73 3. 85 3. 76	3. 97 4. 54 4. 44 4. 64 4. 50	.8 .7 .7 .6
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	52, 096 55, 937 64, 246 76, 217 86, 988	27, 447 29, 951 35, 142 42, 888 46, 570	7, 053 7, 575 8, 947 11, 169 12, 656	24, 649 25, 986 29, 104 33, 329 40, 418	107, 460 107, 656 122, 362 161, 766 190, 271	102, 867 102, 623 116, 004 154, 361 184, 697	4, 593 5, 033 6, 358 7, 404 5, 575	3. 70 3. 39 3. 35 3. 94 4. 23	4. 45 4. 06 3. 96 4. 66 5. 09	.7 .7 .8 .9
1975	85, 673	42, 164	10, 899	43, 509	171, 438	163, 582	7, 856	3.63	4.40	.78
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	80, 760 81, 156 78, 966 82, 968 83, 114 83, 486	40, 156 40, 165 38, 590 40, 723 41, 156 40, 373	11, 619 10, 593 10, 152 10, 750 10, 563 10, 305	40, 604 40, 991 40, 375 42, 245 41, 958 43, 113	187, 094 184, 255 180, 656 178, 114 176, 846 174, 545	181, 795 179, 097 175, 445 172, 762 171, 350 168, 760	5, 299 5, 158 5, 211 5, 351 5, 496 5, 784	4. 17 4. 11 4. 12 3. 99 4. 02 3. 96	5. 04 4. 99 4. 99 4. 84 4. 90 4. 81	. 60 . 54 . 60 . 61 . 62
July	87, 720 88, 205 89, 533 90, 392 90, 620 91, 816	43, 534 43, 368 44, 181 43, 840 44, 282 45, 985	11, 319 10, 915 11, 070 11, 192 11, 369 11, 054	44, 186 44, 837 45, 352 46, 552 46, 337 45, 830	174, 441 173, 584 172, 890 172, 104 172, 175 171, 438	168, 332 167, 148 166, 037 164, 634 164, 368 163, 582	6, 108 6, 436 6, 853 7, 470 7, 806 7, 856	3. 89 3. 81 3. 73 3. 70 3. 72 3. 63	4. 73 4. 62 4. 51 4. 47 4. 52 4. 40	. 6 . 6 . 7 . 7 . 7 . 7
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	92, 822 95, 044 98, 550 98, 756 99, 379 99, 476	45, 904 47, 930 51, 111 50, 245 51, 354 51, 249	11, 663 11, 900 12, 173 12, 476 12, 666 12, 607	46, 918 47, 114 47, 439 48, 511 48, 025 48, 227	170, 193 169, 686 170, 450 170, 687 171, 520 172, 059	162, 197 161, 697 162, 426 162, 525 163, 322 163, 965	7, 996 7, 989 8, 024 8, 162 8, 198 8, 094	3. 53 3. 46 3. 37 3. 39 3. 35 3. 38	4. 26 4. 19 4. 06 4. 08 4. 02 4. 06	. 79 . 77 . 77 . 78 . 78
July Aug Sept Oct Nov P	99, 214 97, 924 98, 869 99, 701 100, 888	51, 180 50, 380 50, 068 51, 078 51, 986	13, 778 12, 690 13, 468 14, 302 12, 799	48, 033 47, 544 48, 801 48, 624 48, 902	171, 938 170, 414 170, 503 172, 553 172, 992	164, 055 162, 787 162, 795 164, 607 165, 234	7, 883 7, 627 7, 708 7, 946 7, 758	3. 38 3. 31 3. 33 3. 43 3. 37	4. 04 3. 97 4. 02 4. 12 4. 05	. 70 . 73 . 73 . 74

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

Monthly average for year and total for month.
 Seasonally adjusted, end of period.
 Ratio of unfilled orders at end of period to shipments for period; excludes industries with no unfilled orders. Annual figures relate to seasonally adjusted data for December.

PRICES

Table B-47.—Consumer price indexes by expenditure classes, 1929-76

For urban wage earners and clerical workers

[1967 = 100]

Vaas as	Ali	F0	Hou	sing	Apparel	Trans-	Medical	Personal	Rea ding and	Other goods
Year or month	items	Food	Total	Rent	and upkeep	porta- tion	care	care	recrea- tion	and services
1929	51.3	48. 3		76.0	48. 5					
1933	38.8	30.6		54.1	36. 9					
1939	41.6	34. 6	52. 2	56.0	42.4	43.0	36. 7	40.3	45. 3	46. 9
1940 1941	42. 0 44. 1 48. 8	35. 2 38. 4 45. 1	52. 4 53. 7 56. 2	56. 2 57. 2 58. 5	42. 8 44. 8 52. 3	42. 7 44. 2 48. 1	36. 8 37. 0 38. 0	40. 2 41. 2 45. 2	46. 1 47 7 50 0	48. 3 49. 2 50. 7
1943	51. 8 52. 7	50.3 49.6	56. 8 58. 1 59. 1	58. 5 58. 6 58. 8	54. 6 58. 5	47.9 47.9	39.9 41.1	49.9 53.4	54.1 60.0	53. 3 54. 7 56. 9 58. 8
1945	53. 9 58. 5	50.7 58.1	60.6	59.2	61.5 67.5	47. 8 50. 3	42. 1 44. 4	55.1 59.0	62. 4 64. 5	56.9 58.8
1940	66. 9 72. 1 71. 4	70.6 76.6 73.5	65. 2 69. 8 70. 9	61. 1 65. 1 68. 0	67. 5 78. 2 83. 3 80. 1	55. 5 61. 8 66. 4	48. 1 51. 1 52. 7	66. 0 68. 5 68. 3	68. 7 72. 2 74. 9	63. 8 66. 8 68. 7
		74. 5 82. 8	72. 8 77. 2	70. 4 73. 2	79. 0 86. 1	68. 2 72. 5 77. 3	53. 7 56. 3	68. 3 74. 7	74 4 76. 6	69. 9 72. 8
1952 1953 1954	79. 5 80. 1 80. 5	84.3 83.0	78.7 80.8 81.7	76. 2 80. 3 83. 2	85. 3 84. 6 84. 5	79. 5 78. 3	59. 3 61. 4 63. 4	75. 6 76. 3 76. 6	76.9 77.7 76.9	76. 6 78. 5 79. 8 79. 8
1955 1956	80. 5 80. 2 81. 4	81.6 82.2 84.9	82.3 83.6	84.3 85.9 87.5	84.1	77.4	64.8 67.2	76.6 77.9 81.1 84.1	76.7 77.8	81.0
1950. 1951. 1952. 1953. 1954. 1955. 1956. 1956. 1957.	84.3 86.6 87.3	84. 9 88. 5 87. 1	86. 2 87. 7 88. 6	87. 5 89. 1 90. 4	87. 3 87. 5 88. 2	83. 3 86. 0 89. 6	69. 9 73. 2 76. 4	84. 1 86. 9 88. 7	80. 7 83. 9 85. 3	83. 3 84. 4 86. 1
1960	88. 7 89. 6	88. 0 89. 1	90. 2 90. 9	91. 7 92. 9 94. 0	89. 6 90. 4	89. 6 90. 6 92. 5	79. 1 81. 4	90. 1 90. 6	87. 3 89. 3	87. 8 88. 5
1962 1963	90. 6 91. 7 92. 9	89. 9 91. 2 92. 4	91.7 92.7 93.8	94. 0 95. 0 95. 9	90. 9 91. 9 92. 7	92. 5 93. 0 94. 3	83. 5 85. 6 87. 3	92. 2 93. 4 94. 5	91. 3 92. 8 95. 0	89. 1 90. 6 92. 0
1965	94. 5 97. 2	94. 4 99. 1	94.9 97.2	96. 9 98. 2	93.7	95.9	87. 3 89. 5 93. 4	94.5 95.2 97.1	95.9 97.5	94.2
1960	100. 0 104. 2 109. 8	100.0 103.6 108.9	100. 0 104. 2 110. 8	100.0 102.4 105.7	100.0 105.4 111.5	100. 0 103. 2 107. 2	100. 0 106. 1 113. 4	100. 0 104. 2 109. 3	100. 0 104. 7 108. 7	100.0 104.6 109.1
1970	116.3 121.3 125.3	114.9 118.4 123.5	118.9 124.3 129.2	110.1 115.2	116. 1 119. 8	112.7 118.6	120.6 128.4	113. 2 116. 8	113.4 119.3	116. 0 120. 9
1972	125. 3 133. 1 147. 7 161. 2	141.4	129. 2 135. 0 150. 6	119. 2 124. 3 130. 6	119. 8 122. 3 126. 8	119.9 123.8 137.7	132.5 137.7 150.5	119.8 125.2 137.3	122. 8 125. 9 133. 8	120. 9 125. 9 129. 0
1975	161.2	161.7 175.4	166.8	137.3	136.2 142.3	150.6	168.6	150.7	144.4	137.2
1975: Jan	156. 1 157. 2	170.9 171.6	161. 3 162. 8	134. 5 135. 1	139. 4 140. 2	143. 2 143. 5	161.0 163.0	146. 5 147. 8	141. 0 141. 8	144. 8 145. 9
Mar Apr	157. 8 158. 6 159. 3	171.3 171.2 171.8 174.4	163. 6 164. 7	135. 5 135. 9	140. 9 141. 3 141. 8 141. 4	144. 8 146. 2	164. 6 165. 8	148. 9 149. 5 149. 9	142.0 143.5	146. 8 146. 8 147. 1 147. 3
June	160. 6	1	165. 3 166. 4	136. 4 136. 9	i	147. 4 149. 8	166. 8 168. 1	150. 3	143. 8 144. 1	1
July	162. 3 162. 8	178.6 178.1	167. 1 167. 7	137, 3 138, 0	141. 1 142. 3 143. 5	152.6 153.6 155.4	169. 8 170. 9	151. 2 151. 4	144, 4 144, 7 146, 0	147.6
Oct	163. 6 164. 6 165. 6	177.8 179.0 179.8	168. 9 169. 8 171. 3	138. 4 139. 3 139. 9	144. 6 145. 5	156. 1 157. 4	172. 2 173. 5 173. 3	151. 4 152. 1 152. 9 153. 6	146. 6 147. 0	148.5 148.5 148.5
Dec	166.3	180.7	172.2	140.6	145.2	157.6	174.7	154.6	147.5	149.8
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	166. 7 167. 1	180. 8 180. 0	173. 2 173. 8	141. 2 142. 1	143. 3 144. 0	158. 1 158. 5	176. 6 178. 8	155. 7 157. 0	148. 2 148. 5	150.5 151.3
Mar Apr	167. 1 167. 5 168. 2 169. 2	178. 7 179. 2	174. 5 174. 9 175. 6 176. 5	142. 7 143. 2 143. 8	145. 0 145. 7	159. 8 161. 3 163. 5	180. 6 181. 6	157. 4 158. 3 158. 9	149. 0 149. 5 150. 3	151. 1 152. 1 152. 1 153. 1
June	169. 2	180. 0 180. 9	175.6	143. 8 144. 4	146. 8 146. 9	163. 5 165. 9	181. 6 182. 6 183. 7	158. 9 159. 8	150. 3 150. 9	153.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov	171.1 171.9	182. 1 182. 4 181. 6	177. 5 178. 4	145. 0 145. 6	146. 5 148. 1	167. 6 168. 5	185. 5 186. 8	160. 5 161. 6	151. 2 151. 4	153. 153.
Sept Oct	172.6 173.3	181.6	179.5 180.1	146.2	150, 2	169. 5 170. 9	187. 9 188. 9	. 162. 8 163. 9	151. 4 152. 8 153. 5	153.9 154.4
Nov	173.3 173.8	181.6 181.1	180. 1 180. 7	146.9 147.5	150. 9 151. 9	170. 9 171. 4	188.9	163. 9 164. 8	153. 5 154. 1	154

Table B-48.—Consumer price indexes by commodity and service groups, 1939-76

For urban wage earners and clerical workers

	7=	

	or All		C	ommodit	ies			Services	:	Sp	ecial inde	Xes
Year or month	All items	All		Comm	odities le	ss food			Serv-	All	All	Non- dura-
		com- modi- ties	Food	All	Dura- ble	Non- dura- ble	AII services	Rent	ices less rent	items less food	items less shel- ter	com- mod- ities
1939	41.6	40. 2	34.6	47.7	48. 5	44. 3	43.5	56. 0	38. 1	47. 2	39. 7	38.4
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1946 1947 1948	42. 0 44. 1 48. 8 51. 8 52. 7 53. 9 58. 5 66. 9 72. 1 71. 4	40. 6 43. 3 49. 6 54. 0 54. 7 56. 3 62. 4 75. 0 80. 4 78. 3	35. 2 38. 4 45. 1 50. 3 49. 6 50. 7 58. 1 70. 6 76. 6 73. 5	48. 0 50. 4 56. 0 58. 4 61. 6 64. 1 76. 8 82. 7 81. 5	48. 1 51. 4 58. 4 60. 3 65. 9 70. 9 74. 1 80. 3 86. 2 87. 4	44. 7 46. 7 51. 6 53. 8 56. 6 58. 6 62. 9 72. 2 77. 8 76. 3	43. 6 44. 2 45. 6 46. 4 47. 5 48. 2 49. 1 51. 1 54. 3 56. 9	56, 2 57, 2 58, 5 58, 5 58, 6 58, 8 59, 2 61, 1 65, 1 68, 0	38. 1 38. 6 40. 3 42. 1 44. 2 45. 1 46. 7 49. 0 51. 9 54. 5	47. 3 48. 7 52. 1 53. 6 55. 7 56. 9 59. 4 64. 9 69. 6 70. 3	39. 9 42. 4 47. 7 51. 3 52. 2 53. 6 59. 0 68. 5 73. 9 72. 6	38. 9 41. 6 51. 8 52. 53. 71. 9 71. 9 74. 9
950 951 952 953 954 955 956 956 957 958	72. 1 77. 8 79. 5 80. 1 80. 5 80. 2 81. 4 84. 3 86. 6 87. 3	78. 8 85. 9 87. 0 86. 7 85. 9 85. 1 85. 9 88. 6 90. 6	74.5 82.8 84.3 83.0 82.8 81.6 82.2 84.9 88.5 87.1	81. 4 87. 5 88. 3 88. 5 87. 5 86. 9 87. 8 90. 5 91. 5 92. 7	88. 4 95. 1 96. 4 95. 7 93. 3 91. 5 91. 5 94. 4 95. 9 97. 3	76. 2 82. 0 82. 4 83. 1 83. 5 83. 5 85. 3 87. 6 88. 2 89. 3	58. 7 61. 8 64. 5 67. 3 69. 5 70. 9 72. 7 75. 6 78. 5 80. 8	70. 4 73. 2 76. 2 80. 3 83. 2 84. 3 85. 9 87. 5 89. 1 90. 4	56. 0 59. 3 62. 2 64. 8 66. 7 68. 2 70. 1 73. 3 76. 4 79. 0	71. 1 75. 7 77. 5 79. 0 79. 5 79. 7 81. 1 83. 8 85. 7 87. 3	73. 1 79. 2 80. 8 81. 0 81. 0 80. 6 81. 7 84. 4 86. 9 87. 6	75. 4 82. 5 83. 4 83. 2 83. 3 84. 5 86. 3 88. 6
960	88. 7 89. 6 90. 6 91. 7 92. 9 94. 5 97. 2 100. 0 104. 2 109. 8	91. 5 92. 0 92. 8 93. 6 94. 6 95. 7 98. 2 100. 0 103. 7 108. 4	88. 0 89. 1 89. 9 91. 2 92. 4 94. 4 99. 1 100. 0 103. 6 108. 9	93. 1 93. 4 94. 1 94. 8 95. 6 96. 2 97. 5 100. 0 103. 7 108. 1	96. 7 96. 6 97. 6 97. 9 98. 8 98. 4 98. 5 100. 0 103. 1 107. 0	90. 7 91. 2 91. 8 92. 7 93. 5 94. 8 97. 0 100. 0 104. 1 108. 8	83. 5 85. 2 86. 8 88. 5 90. 2 92. 2 95. 8 100. 0 105. 2 112. 5	91. 7 92. 9 94. 0 95. 0 95. 9 96. 9 98. 2 100. 0 102. 4 105. 7	81. 9 83. 9 85. 5 87. 3 89. 2 91. 5 95. 3 100. 0 105. 7 113. 8	88. 8 89. 7 90. 8 92. 0 93. 2 94. 5 96. 7 100. 0 104. 4 110. 1	88. 9 89. 9 90. 9 92. 1 93. 2 94. 6 97. 4 100. 0 104. 1 109. 0	89. 4 90. 2 92. 0 93. 0 94. 6 98. 1 103. 9 108. 9
970 971 972 973 974 975	116. 3 121. 3 125. 3 133. 1 147. 7 161. 2	113. 5 117. 4 120. 9 129. 9 145. 5 158. 4	114. 9 118. 4 123. 5 141. 4 161. 7 175. 4	112.5 116.8 119.4 123.5 136.6 149.1	111. 8 116. 5 118. 9 121. 9 130. 6 145. 5	113.1 117.0 119.8 124.8 140.9 151.7	121. 6 128. 4 133. 3 139. 1 152. 1 166. 6	110. 1 115. 2 119. 2 124. 3 130. 6 137. 3	123. 7 130. 8 135. 9 141. 8 156. 0 171. 9	116. 7 122. 1 125. 8 130. 7 143. 7 157. 1	114. 4 119. 3 122. 9 131. 1 146. 1 159. 1	114. 0 117. 7 121. 7 132. 8 151. 0 163. 2
975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	156. 1 157. 2 157. 8 158. 6 159. 3 160. 6	153. 4 154. 4 155. 0 155. 7 156. 5 157. 9	170. 9 171. 6 171. 3 171. 2 171. 8 174. 4	143. 9 144. 9 146. 0 147. 2 148. 1 148. 9	139. 3 140. 3 142. 1 143. 6 144. 8 145. 8	147. 2 148. 2 148. 8 149. 8 150. 5 151. 2	161. 3 162. 6 163. 2 164. 1 164. 5 165. 7	134. 5 135. 1 135. 5 135. 9 136. 4 136. 9	166. 2 167. 5 168. 3 169. 2 169. 6 170. 9	151. 9 153. 0 153. 9 154. 9 155. 6 156. 6	154. 1 155. 0 155. 6 156. 3 157. 0 158. 4	158. 7 159. 6 159. 7 160. 1 160. 8 162. 4
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	162. 3 162. 8 163. 6 164. 6 165. 6 166. 3	160. 1 160. 4 160. 8 161. 7 162. 2 162. 7	178. 6 178. 1 177. 8 179. 0 179. 8 180. 7	149, 9 150, 7 151, 4 152, 2 152, 6 152, 8	146. 9 147. 5 148. 2 148. 9 149. 2 149. 3	152. 2 153. 0 153. 8 154. 6 155. 1 155. 4	166. 6 167. 4 169. 1 170. 1 172. 0 173. 1	137. 3 138. 0 138. 4 139. 3 139. 9 140. 6	171. 9 172. 7 174. 6 175. 7 177. 7 179. 0	157. 6 158. 3 159. 5 160. 4 161. 5 162. 1	160. 3 160. 8 161. 6 162. 6 163. 4 164. 1	165. 0 165. 2 165. 4 166. 4 167. 1
976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	166. 7 167. 1 167. 5 168. 2 169. 2 170. 1	162. 4 162. 3 162. 3 163. 1 164. 2 165. 2	180. 8 180. 0 178. 7 179. 2 180. 0 180. 9	152. 3 152. 7 153. 3 154. 2 155. 5 156. 5	149. 0 149. 3 150. 4 151. 9 153. 5 154. 7	154. 7 155. 2 155. 5 156. 0 157. 0 157. 9	174. 9 176. 1 177. 2 177. 7 178. 4 179. 5	141. 2 142. 1 142. 7 143. 2 143. 8 144. 4	181. 0 182. 2 183. 4 184. 0 184. 7 185. 8	162. 6 163. 4 164. 2 165. 0 166. 0 167. 0	164. 4 164. 9 165. 3 166. 1 167. 1 168. 1	167. 2 167. 2 166. 7 167. 2 168. 2 169. 0
July Aug Sept Oct Nov	171. 1 171. 9 172. 6 173. 3 173. 8	166. 0 166. 6 167. 0 167. 4 167. 7	182. 1 182. 4 181. 6 181. 6 181. 1	157. 1 158. 0 158. 9 159. 6 160. 3	155. 8 156. 4 156. 9 157. 8 158. 0	158. 1 159. 1 160. 4 161. 0 161. 9	180. 7 181. 8 183. 2 184. 1 185. 1	145. 0 145. 6 146. 2 146. 9 147. 5	187. 2 188. 4 189. 8 190. 8 191. 8	167. 9 168. 9 170. 0 170. 8 171. 6	169. 0 169. 7 170. 4 171. 0 171. 6	169. 7 170. 4 170. 7 171. 0 171. 3

TABLE B-49.—Consumer price indexes, selected commodities and services, 1939-76 For urban wage earners and clerical workers

[1967 = 100]

	D	urable co	mmoditi	es		rable cor es less fo			Serv	ices less	rent	
Year or month	Total 1	New cars	Used cars	House- hold dura- bles	Total	Ap- parel com- mod- ities	Non- dura- bles less food and apparel	Total	House- hold serv- ices less rent	Trans- porta- tion serv- ices	Med- ical care serv- ices	Other 3
1939	48. 5	43. 2		56.6	44.3	43.0	46. 3	38. 1		36.1	32. 5	
1940	48. 1 51. 4 58. 4 60. 3 65. 9 70. 9 74. 1 80. 3 86. 2 87. 4			55. 9 59. 8 66. 9 69. 5 76. 0 81. 8 86. 5 95. 6 101. 7 99. 0	44. 7 46. 7 51. 6 53. 8 56. 6 58. 6 62. 9 72. 2 77. 8 76. 3	43. 5 45. 8 53. 5 55. 9 59. 8 63. 0 69. 5 80. 4 85. 4	46. 8 48. 4 51. 1 53. 2 54. 7 55. 8 58. 2 66. 2 72. 3 72. 4	38. 1 38. 6 40. 3 42. 1 44. 2 45. 1 46. 7 49. 0 51. 9 54. 5		36. 1 36. 3 38. 2 38. 2 38. 2 39. 0 40. 3 44. 9 50. 0	32. 5 32. 7 33. 7 35. 4 36. 9 37. 9 40. 1 43. 5 46. 4 48. 1	
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1957 1958	88. 4 95. 1 96. 4 95. 7 93. 3 91. 5 91. 5 94. 4 95. 9 97. 3	83. 4 87. 4 94. 9 95. 8 94. 3 90. 9 93. 5 98. 4 101. 5 105. 9	89. 2 75. 9 71. 8 69. 1 77. 4 80. 2 89. 5	100. 2 109. 8 106. 9 105. 7 102. 9 100. 1 99. 7 101. 4 102. 1 102. 0	76. 2 82. 0 82. 4 83. 1 83. 5 83. 5 85. 3 87. 6 88. 2 89. 3	81. 1 88. 7 87. 7 86. 7 86. 3 85. 8 87. 3 88. 2 88. 2	72.9 77.5 79.0 81.0 81.8 82.1 84.1 87.4 88.3 89.6	56. 0 59. 3 62. 2 64. 8 66. 7 68. 2 70. 1 73. 3 76. 4 79. 0	71. 2 75. 4 79. 4 81. 6	53. 3 58. 3 62. 4 66. 4 69. 2 69. 4 70. 5 73. 8 78. 5 81. 2	49. 2 51. 7 55. 0 57. 0 58. 7 60. 4 62. 8 65. 5 68. 7 72. 0	71. 1 73. 9 76. 2 78. 0
1960	96.7 96.6 97.6 97.9 98.8 98.4 98.5 100.0 103.1 107.0	104. 5 104. 5 104. 1 103. 5 103. 2 100. 9 99. 1 100. 0 102. 8 104. 4	83.6 86.9 94.8 96.0 100.1 99.4 97.0 100.0 (*)	101. 9 100. 7 100. 6 100. 3 100. 2 98. 7 98. 6 100. 0 103. 3 107. 4	90. 7 91. 2 91. 8 92. 7 93. 5 94. 8 97. 0 100. 0 104. 1 108. 8	90. 3 90. 8 91. 2 92. 0 92. 8 93. 6 96. 0 100. 0 105. 6 111. 9	90. 9 91. 3 92. 1 93. 1 93. 9 95. 5 97. 5 100. 0 103. 3 107. 0	81. 9 83. 9 85. 5 87. 3 89. 2 91. 5 95. 3 100. 0 105. 7 113. 8	85. 0 86. 0 87. 1 89. 0 90. 4 92. 1 95. 7 100. 0 105. 9 115. 3	83. 3 85. 3 86. 6 87. 5 89. 6 92. 9 96. 8 100. 0 104. 0 111. 3	74.9 77.7 80.2 82.6 84.6 87.3 92.0 100.0 107.3 116.0	80. 8 83. 4 85. 6 87. 7 90. 1 92. 6 96. 2 100. 0 105. 6 110. 6
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	111. 8 116. 5 118. 9 121. 9 130. 6 145. 5	107.6 112.0 111.0 111.1 117.5 127.6	104. 3 110. 2 110. 5 117. 6 122. 6 146. 4	110. 2 112. 9 115. 0 118. 8 128. 9 140. 3	113.1 117.0 119.8 124.8 140.9 151.7	116. 5 120. 1 122. 7 127. 1 136. 1 141. 2	111. 2 115. 2 118. 2 123. 4 143. 8 157. 9	123.7 130.8 135.9 141.8 156.0 171.9	126. 8 132. 6 139. 2 146. 8 166. 0 184. 7	123. 1 133. 0 136. 0 136. 9 141. 9 152. 7	124. 2 133. 3 138. 2 144. 3 159. 1 179. 1	116.7 122.5 125.8 131.6 141.6 152.1
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	139. 3 140. 3 142. 1 143. 6 144. 8 145. 8	123. 4 124. 5 127. 3 127. 5 126. 8 127. 0	134. 9 133. 5 135. 3 138. 1 142. 2 147. 5	136. 8 137. 3 138. 3 139. 4 140. 0 140. 3	147. 2 148. 2 148. 8 149. 8 150. 5 151. 2	138. 6 139. 2 139. 9 140. 3 140. 8 140. 3	152. 3 153. 6 154. 2 155. 4 156. 3 157. 7	166, 2 167, 5 168, 3 169, 2 169, 6 170, 9	179. 0 180. 4 180. 8 181. 7 182. 1 183. 9	146. 5 147. 2 148. 3 149. 5 149. 6 150. 4	170. 7 172. 9 174. 7 175. 9 177. 0 178. 4	148. 8 149. 7 150. 1 150. 6 151. 0
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	146. 9 147. 5 148. 2 148. 9 149. 2 149. 3	126. 6 126. 8 126. 5 129. 9 131. 3 134. 0	153. 2 156. 1 156. 6 156. 5 153. 7 149. 6	140. 6 141. 0 141. 7 142. 3 142. 9 143. 0	152, 2 153, 0 153, 8 154, 6 155, 1 155, 4	139. 8 141. 1 142. 3 143. 5 144. 4 143. 9	159. 5 160. 1 160. 7 161. 3 161. 5 162. 2	171.9 172.7 174.6 175.7 177.7 179.0	184. 8 185. 6 187. 0 188. 2 190. 7 192. 0	151. 1 151. 9 156. 1 157. 0 161. 7 163. 2	180. 4 181. 7 183. 2 184. 6 184. 2 185. 8	152. 0 152. 4 153. 8 154. 4 155. 2 155. 7
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	149. 3 150. 4 151. 9	134. 2 134. 3 134. 5 134. 4 134. 5 134. 5	144. 6 144. 9 150. 9 159. 4 167. 8 173. 4	143. 3 144. 0 144. 8 145. 5 145. 8 146. 1	154. 7 155. 2 155. 5 156. 0 157. 0 157. 9	141. 5 142. 2 143. 1 143. 9 145. 1 145. 0	162. 6 162. 9 162. 8 163. 2 164. 2 165. 6	181. 0 182. 2 183. 4 184. 0 184. 7 185. 8	193. 7 194. 4 195. 1 195. 4 196. 1 197. 3	167. 0 168. 9 171. 1 171. 7 172. 3 173. 2	188. 0 190. 4 192. 5 193. 5 194. 6 195. 8	156. 6 157. 4 158. 4 159. 1 159. 7 160. 5
July Aug Sept Oct Nov	155. 8 156. 4 156. 9 157. 8 158. 0	134. 4 134. 4 134. 2 139. 1 139. 7	177. 5 179. 6 180. 1 179. 9 179. 0	146. 5 146. 3 146. 7 147. 2 147. 8	158. 1 159. 1 160. 4 161. 0 161. 9	144. 4 146. 2 148. 5 149. 2 150. 1	166. 3 166. 8 167. 4 168. 1 169. 0	187. 2 188. 4 189. 8 190. 8 191. 8	198. 7 200. 1 201. 5 202. 3 202. 6	174. 7 175. 5 177. 3 178. 9 180. 2	197. 9 199. 4 200. 6 201. 7 204. 5	161. 2 162. 0 163. 6 164. 3 165. 2

¹ Also includes the "other durables" group.
3 Includes the services components of apparel, personal care, reading and recreation, and other goods and services.
3 Not available.

Table B-50.—Consumer price indexes, for commoditity groups, seasonally adjusted, 1973-76

For urban wage earners and clerical workers

[1967=100, seasonally adjusted]

						Commo	dities less	food			
Year and	All com-			Du	rable comr	nodities		ŀ	londurable	es less food	ı
month	mod- ities	Food	Total	Total 1	House- hold dur- ables	New cars	Used cars	Total 1	Apparel com- mod- ities	Gaso- line and motor oil	Fuel oil and coal
1973: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	123. 8 124. 8 126. 1 127. 3 128. 3 129. 1	129. 0 130. 8 134. 0 136. 3 138. 3 139. 7	121. 0 121. 5 121. 9 122. 5 122. 9 123. 3	120. 2 120. 7 121. 0 121. 4 121. 7 121. 8	116. 4 116. 7 117. 1 117. 7 118. 4 118. 9	109. 8 110. 2 110. 4 110. 9 111. 1 111. 0	116. 4 118. 8 119. 6 120. 8 120. 3 119. 5	121. 5 122. 0 122. 5 123. 3 123. 7 124. 4	124. 5 124. 8 125. 5 126. 3 126. 7 127. 2	112. 2 112. 8 112. 9 114. 4 115. 2 117. 8	118.3 124.4 125.4 126.1 128.4
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	129. 3 132. 5 132. 6 133. 3 134. 6 135. 8	140. 0 148. 6 148. 2 148. 9 150. 8 152. 1	123. 5 123. 9 124. 1 124. 9 125. 9 127. 0	121. 8 122. 3 122. 4 122. 6 122. 8 123. 1	119. 2 119. 4 119. 8 120. 2 120. 6 121. 1	111. 2 111. 7 111. 6 111. 5 111. 5 111. 4	118. 8 118. 0 116. 7 114. 7 113. 5 112. 4	124. 7 125. 0 125. 3 126. 6 128. 1 129. 7	127. 2 127. 8 128. 1 128. 6 128. 9 129. 4	118. 2 118. 7 118. 2 123. 1 128. 5 134. 0	133. 135. 137. 144. 156.
1974: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	137. 6 139. 5 141. 0 141. 7 143. 3 144. 4	154. 2 157. 2 158. 4 158. 4 160. 1 160. 3	128. 6 129. 9 131. 6 132. 7 134. 3 135. 9	123. 7 124. 3 125. 1 126. 1 127. 6 129. 3	122. 2 123. 1 124. 1 125. 2 126. 4 127. 9	111. 8 112. 1 112. 5 113. 2 114. 7 116. 4	110. 8 109. 3 108. 0 110. 7 114. 6 119. 5	132. 0 134. 0 136. 2 137. 5 139. 1 140. 6	130. 2 131. 5 132. 6 133. 7 134. 6 135. 6	140. 7 147. 7 157. 2 159. 2 162. 2 162. 9	191. 197. 197. 203. 209. 214.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	145. 2 147. 4 149. 2 150. 5 151. 9 153. 1	159. 8 162. 2 165. 2 166. 8 168. 7 170. 4	137. 4 139. 3 140. 6 141. 7 142. 9 143. 8	130. 8 132. 7 134. 4 136. 0 137. 4 138. 7	129. 2 131. 3 132. 6 133. 8 135. 2 136. 1	118. 3 119. 0 120. 8 123. 3 123. 7 124. 2	123. 7 128. 0 131. 1 134. 4 138. 2 138. 2	142. 0 144. 1 145. 1 145. 8 146. 8 147. 4	136. 2 139. 2 139. 1 139. 4 140. 2 140. 3	164. 2 164. 1 164. 0 161. 8 161. 4 161. 7	221. 226. 229. 230. 230. 227.
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	154. 0 154. 6 155. 0 155. 6 156. 5 157. 6	171. 3 171. 1 170. 6 171. 0 172. 5 174. 6	144. 7 145. 7 146. 6 147. 4 147. 9 148. 5	140. 0 141. 6 143. 2 144. 4 144. 8 145. 4	137. 3 138. 0 138. 7 139. 6 139. 9 140. 0	122. 4 124. 0 127. 0 127. 4 127. 0 127. 1	139. 9 142. 0 143. 3 143. 3 142. 7 144. 3	148. 1 148. 7 148. 9 149. 5 150. 0 150. 7	140. 5 140. 5 140. 5 140. 4 140. 4 140. 3	161. 0 160. 6 160. 2 160. 9 162. 8 166. 6	224. 223. 223. 225. 228. 231.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	159. 6 160. 1 160. 6 161. 5 162. 2 162. 9	177. 8 177. 5 178. 0 179. 6 180. 6 181. 6	149. 8 150. 7 151. 2 151. 7 152. 2 152. 8	146. 2 147. 0 147. 6 148. 1 148. 5 149. 2	140. 3 140. 8 141. 3 142. 1 142. 7 143. 2	126. 9 127. 7 129. 0 129. 5 130. 5 133. 4	148. 0 151. 2 150. 8 150. 7 150. 1 149. 4	152. 4 153. 4 153. 7 154. 4 154. 8 155. 3	141. 2 142. 3 141. 6 141. 9 142. 4 142. 7	173. 9 176. 3 177. 9 179. 4 179. 4 179. 1	237. 241. 246. 249. 248. 247.
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	163. 1 162. 7 162. 4 163. 1 164. 3 164. 9	181. 2 179. 4 177. 9 178. 9 180. 6 181. 0	153. 1 153. 5 153. 9 154. 4 155. 3 156. 0	149. 7 150. 6 151. 7 152. 7 153. 6 154. 1	143. 7 144. 7 145. 2 145. 6 145. 7 145. 8	133. 1 133. 8 134. 2 134. 3 134. 8 134. 6	150. 0 154. 1 159. 9 165. 4 168. 5 169. 7	155. 6 155. 7 155. 6 155. 7 156. 6 157. 4	143. 3 143. 6 143. 6 143. 9 144. 6 145. 0	176. 2 173. 6 170. 6 169. 0 170. 5 174. 0	244. 242. 242. 243. 244. 247.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov	165. 6 166. 4 166. 8 167. 3	181. 2 181. 8 181. 8 182. 3 181. 9	156. 9 157. 9 158. 5 159. 1 154. 8	155. 0 155. 7 156. 3 156. 8 157. 4	146. 2 146. 0 146. 3 146. 9 147. 7	134. 7 135. 3 136. 8 138. 7 138. 9	171. 5 173. 9 173. 5 173. 3 174. 8	158. 4 159. 6 160. 2 160. 8 161. 6	145. 8 147. 4 147. 7 147. 5 147. 9	176. 6 179. 2 180. 4 182. 7 184. 0	251. 255. 258. 259. 259.

¹ Includes certain groups not shown separately.

Table B-51.—Consumer price indexes for service groups and selected expenditure classes, seasonally adjusted, 1973-76

For urban wage earners and clerical workers

[1967=100, seasonally adjusted]

			S	ervices			Sele	cted expen	diture class	es
Year				Services	less rent		Fuel	House- hold		
and month	AII services	Rent	Total 1	House- hold services less rent	Trans- porta- tion services	Medical care services	Fuel and utili- ties	furnish- ings and opera- tion	Apparei and upkeep	Trans- porta- tion
1973: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	135. 4 136. 0 136. 6 137. 1 137. 8 138. 3	121. 6 122. 1 122. 6 123. 1 123. 7 124. 0	137. 9 138. 4 139. 1 139. 6 140. 3 140. 9	141. 8 142. 5 143. 3 144. 0 144. 7 145. 5	135. 5 135. 8 136. 1 136. 2 136. 6 136. 9	141. 2 141. 5 142. 0 142. 6 143. 1 143. 5	122. 3 123. 1 123. 6 124. 2 124. 9 125. 6	122, 6 123, 0 123, 2 123, 6 123, 7 124, 5	124. 2 124. 3 125. 1 125. 8 126. 3 126. 7	121. 2 121. 3 122. 1 122. 3 123. 2
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	138. 6 139. 4 140. 6 142. 1 142. 8 143. 6	124. 5 125. 0 125. 5 125. 9 126. 4 126. 9	141. 1 141. 9 143. 3 145. 0 145. 7 146. 5	145. 7 147. 0 149. 2 151. 4 152. 5 153. 6	136. 9 137. 2 137. 4 137. 6 137. 6 138. 1	143. 8 144. 0 144. 9 147. 8 148. 3 148. 9	126. 1 127. 1 127. 8 129. 8 132. 5 136. 0	124. 9 125. 2 125. 8 126. 4 127. 2 128. 0	126. 9 127. 5 127. 8 128. 4 128. 9 129. 4	123. 9 123. 9 124. 1 124. 1 125. 1 127.
1974: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	144. 7 145. 8 147. 1 148. 2 149. 8 151. 2	127. 6 128. 3 128. 6 129. 1 129. 6 130. 2	147. 7 148. 9 150. 4 151. 6 153. 3 154. 9	155. 3 156. 9 159. 0 160. 6 162. 8 164. 7	138. 5 139. 0 139. 5 140. 0 140. 6 141. 4	150. 0 151. 2 152. 6 153. 7 155. 6 158. 0	140. 2 142. 2 143. 8 145. 8 148. 0 149. 4	129. 6 130. 7 132. 9 134. 0 136. 8 139. 0	130. 3 131. 3 132. 6 133. 7 134. 6 135. 7	128. ! 130. ! 132. ! 134. ! 136. !
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	152. 8 154. 3 155. 8 157. 2 158. 4 159. 7	130. 7 131. 2 131. 9 132. 5 133. 2 133. 7	156. 7 158. 4 160. 1 161. 5 162. 8 164. 3	167. 0 169. 2 171. 3 173. 4 174. 8 176. 6	142. 3 142. 7 143. 5 144. 2 145. 1 145. 9	160. 1 162. 5 164. 2 165. 5 167. 1 168. 7	151, 5 153, 6 155, 4 156, 8 157, 6 158, 5	141. 3 143. 9 146. 2 148. 6 150. 6 152. 3	136. 4 139. 2 139. 3 139. 7 140. 5 140. 7	139.4 140.5 142.3 142.6 143.4
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	161. 1 162. 4 163. 3 164. 3 164. 9 166. 0	134. 4 135. 0 135. 4 135. 8 136. 4 136. 9	165. 9 167. 3 168. 3 169. 4 170. 0 171. 2	178. 5 180. 1 181. 0 182. 3 182. 9 184. 7	146. 3 147. 2 148. 3 149. 4 149. 8 150. 3	171. 0 173. 0 174. 5 176. 0 177. 3 178. 4	159. 8 160. 7 161. 7 163. 3 164. 7 166. 9	153. 9 155. 5 156. 0 156. 9 157. 2 157. 9	141. 0 141. 2 141. 4 141. 4 141. 5 141. 4	143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	167.6	137. 5 138. 1 138. 5 139. 4 140. 1 140. 7	172. 1 172. 9 174. 4 175. 4 177. 3 178. 5	185. 4 186. 0 186. 9 187. 8 189. 8 191. 1	151. 1 151. 9 156. 2 157. 2 162. 0 163. 1	180. 3 181. 4 182. 9 184. 6 184. 3 186. 1	168. 8 170. 1 172. 5 173. 8 175. 1 176. 3	158. 2 158. 8 159. 7 160. 5 161. 2 162. 0	142. 3 143. 4 142. 8 143. 2 143. 6 144. 1	151. 2 152. 2 155. 5 157. 4 158. 3
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	176.0 177.2 178.0 178.8	141. 1 142. 0 142. 6 143. 1 143. 8 144. 4	180. 7 182. 1 183. 5 184. 3 185. 1 186. 3	193. 1 194. 2 195. 3 196. 0 196. 9 198. 3	166. 7 168. 9 171. 1 171. 5 172. 5 173. 2	188. 4 190. 4 192. 3 193. 7 194. 8 195. 8	175. 6 176. 1 177. 5 177. 9 179. 3 181. 7	164. 4 166. 0 167. 1 167. 4 167. 7 168. 2	145. 0 145. 0 145. 4 145. 8 146. 5 146. 9	158. 160. 160. 161. 163. 164.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov	181.0 182.0 183.0 184.0	145. 1 145. 6 146. 3 147. 0 147. 6	187. 5 188. 5 189. 6 190. 7 191. 4	199. 3 200. 5 201. 3 201. 9 201. 6	174. 7 175. 5 177. 5 179. 1 180. 6	197. 9 199. 0 200. 2 201. 7 204. 7	183. 4 185. 0 186. 8 188. 6 189. 0	168. 9 169. 1 169. 7 170. 4 171. 2	147. 8 149. 1 149. 5 149. 4 150. 0	166. 1 167. 1 169. 1 170. 1

¹ Also includes the "other services" group.

Table B-52.—Percent changes in consumer price indexes, major groups, 1948-76
[Percent change]

Year or month	All items		Food		Commodities less food		Services	
	Dec. to Dec. ¹	Year to year	Dec. to Dec. ¹	Year to year	Dec. to Dec. ¹	Year to year	Dec. to Dec. ¹	Year to year
1948	2. 7 —1. 8	7. 8 -1. 0	-0.8 -3.7	8. 5 -4. 0	5.3 -4.8	7. 7 -1. 5	6. 1 3. 6	6.3
950 951 952 953 954	5.8 5.9 .9 .6 5	1.0 7.9 2.2 .8	9.6 7.4 -1.1 -1.3 -1.6	1.4 11.1 1.8 -1.5 2	5.7 4.6 5 .2 -1.4	1 7.5 .9 .2 -1.1	3.6 5.2 4.6 4.2 1.9	3. 5. 4. 4. 3.
955 956 957 958 959	. 4 2. 9 3. 0 1. 8 1. 5	4 1.5 3.6 2.7	9 3.1 2.8 2.2 8	-1.4 .7 3.3 4.2 -1.6	0 2.5 2.2 .8 1.5	7 1.0 3.1 1.1 1.3	2. 3 3. 1 4. 5 2. 7 3. 7	2. (2. ! 4. (3. ! 2. !
960 961 962 963	1.5 .7 1.2 1.6 1.2	1.6 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3	3.1 9 1.5 1.9 1.4	1.0 1.3 .9 1.4 1.3	3 .6 .7 1.2 .4	.4 .3 .7 .7	2.7 1.9 1.7 2.3 1.8	3. 3 2. 0 1. 9 2. 0 1. 9
965 966 967 968 969	1. 9 3. 4 3. 0 4. 7 6. 1	1.7 2.9 2.9 4.2 5.4	3. 4 3. 9 1. 2 4. 3 7. 2	2. 2 5. 0 . 9 3. 6 5. 1	.7 1.9 3.1 3.7 4.5	.6 1.4 2.6 3.7 4.2	2.6 4.9 4.0 6.1 7.4	2. 2 3. 9 4. 4 5. 2 6. 9
970 971 972 973 974	5. 5 3. 4 3. 4 8. 8 12. 2	5. 9 4. 3 3. 3 6. 2 11. 0	2. 2 4. 3 4. 7 20. 1 12. 2	5.5 3.0 4.3 14.5 14.4	4. 8 2. 3 2. 5 5. 0 13. 2	4. 1 3. 8 2. 2 3. 4 10. 6	8. 2 4. 1 3. 6 6. 2 11. 3	8. 5. 3. 4. 9.
1975	7.0	9.1	6.5	8. 5	6.2	9.2	8.1	9.
	Change from preceding month							
	Un- adjusted	Seasonally adjusted	Un- adjusted	Seasonally adjusted	Un- adjusted	Seasonally adjusted	Un- adjusted	Seasonally adjusted
975: Jan	0.5 .7 .4 .5 .4	0. 7 . 5 . 4 . 5 . 5 . 7	0.7 .4 2 1 .4 1.5	0.5 1 3 .2 .9	0 .7 .8 .8 .6	0.6 .7 .6 .5 .3	0.7 .8 .4 .6 .2	0.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	1.1 .3 .5 .6 .6	1. 0 . 4 . 6 . 6	2.4 3 2 .7 .4	1.8 2 .3 .9 .6	.7 .5 .5 .3	.96 .33 .33	.5 1.0 .6 1.1	1.1
976: Jan	.2 .2 .4 .6	.4 .1 .2 .4 .6	4 7 3 .4	2 -1.0 8 6 1.0	3 .4 .6 .8	.2 .3 .3 .6	1.0 .7 .6 .3 .4	1.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov	.6 .5 .4 .4	.5 .5 .4 .3	.7 .2 4 0 3	.1 .3 0 .3 2	. 4 . 6 . 6 . 4	.6 .6 .4 .4	.7 .6 .8 .5	

¹ Changes from December to December are based on unadjusted indexes.

Table B-53.—Wholesale price indexes by major commodity groups, 1929-76 [1967=100]

	All	Farm pro	ducts and pods and fee	processed ds		Indust	ndustrial commodities			
Year or month	All com- modities	Total	Farm products	Proc- essed foods and feeds	Total	Textile products and apparel	Hides, skins, leather, and related products	Fuels and related products, and power 1	Chemicals and allied products	
1929	49. 1		64. 1		48.6		48. 9	59. 4		
1933	34.0	 	31. 4		37. 8	 	36. 3	47.6	47. 4	
1939	39. 8		40. 0		43. 3		42. 8	52. 3	51. 5	
1940	40. 5 45. 1 50. 9 53. 3 53. 6 54. 6 62. 3 76. 5 82. 8 78. 7	94. 3 101. 5 89. 6	41. 4 50. 3 64. 8 75. 0 75. 5 78. 5 90. 9 109. 4 117. 5 101. 6	82. 9 88. 7 80. 6	44. 0 47. 3 50. 7 51. 5 52. 3 53. 0 70. 8 76. 9 75. 3	103.6 108.1 98.9	45. 2 48. 4 52. 8 52. 7 52. 2 52. 9 61. 1 83. 3 84. 2 79. 9	51. 4 54. 6 56. 2 57. 8 59. 5 60. 1 64. 4 76. 9 90. 5 86. 2	52. 4 57. 0 63. 3 64. 1 65. 2 70. 5 93. 7 95. 9	
1950	81. 8 91. 1 88. 6 87. 4 87. 6 87. 8 90. 7 93. 3	93. 9 106. 9 102. 7 96. 0 95. 7 91. 2 90. 6 93. 7 98. 1 93. 5	106. 7 124. 2 117. 2 106. 2 104. 7 98. 2 96. 9 99. 5 103. 9 97. 5	83. 4 92. 7 91. 6 87. 4 88. 9 85. 0 84. 9 87. 4 91. 8 89. 4	78. 0 86. 1 84. 1 84. 8 85. 0 86. 9 90. 8 93. 3 93. 6 95. 3	102. 7 114. 6 103. 4 100. 8 98. 6 98. 7 98. 7 98. 8 97. 0 98. 4	86. 3 99. 1 80. 1 81. 3 77. 6 77. 3 81. 9 82. 0 82. 9 94. 2	87. 1 90. 3 90. 1 92. 6 91. 3 91. 2 94. 0 99. 1 95. 3 95. 3	88. 9 101. 7 96. 5 97. 7 98. 9 98. 5 99. 1 101. 2 102. 0	
1960	94. 9 94. 5 94. 8 94. 5 94. 7 96. 6 99. 8 100. 0 102. 5 106. 5	93. 7 93. 7 94. 7 93. 8 93. 2 97. 1 103. 5 100. 0 102. 4 108. 0	97. 2 96. 3 98. 0 96. 0 94. 6 98. 7 105. 9 100. 0 102. 5 109. 1	89. 5 91. 0 91. 9 92. 5 92. 3 95. 5 101. 2 100. 0 102. 2 107. 3	95. 3 94. 8 94. 8 94. 7 95. 2 96. 4 98. 5 100. 0 102. 5 106. 0	99. 5 97. 7 98. 6 98. 5 99. 2 99. 8 100. 1 100. 0 103. 7 106. 0	90. 8 91. 7 92. 7 90. 0 90. 3 94. 3 103. 4 100. 0 103. 2 108. 9	96. 1 97. 2 96. 7 96. 3 93. 7 95. 5 97. 8 100. 0 98. 9 100. 9	101. 8 100. 7 99. 1 97. 9 98. 3 99. 0 99. 4 100. 0 99. 8	
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976	110. 4 114. 0 119. 1 134. 7 160. 1 174. 9 182. 9	111. 7 113. 9 122. 4 159. 1 177. 4 184. 2 183. 1	111. 0 112. 9 125. 0 176. 3 187. 7 186. 7 191. 1	112. 1 114. 5 120. 8 148. 1 170. 9 182. 6 178. 0	110. 0 114. 1 117. 9 125. 9 153. 8 171. 5 182. 3	107. 1 109. 0 113. 6 123. 8 139. 1 137. 9 148. 0	110. 3 114. 1 131. 3 143. 1 145. 1 148. 5 167. 4	106. 2 115. 2 118. 6 134. 3 208. 3 245. 1 265. 5	102. 2 104. 1 104. 2 110. 0 146. 8 181. 3 187. 0	
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	171.8	183. 8 179. 5 174. 9 178. 8 181. 2 182. 3	179. 7 174. 6 171. 1 177. 7 184. 5 186. 2	186, 4 182, 6 177, 3 179, 4 179, 0 179, 7	167. 5 168. 4 168. 9 169. 7 170. 3 170. 7	137. 5 136. 5 134. 3 134. 4 135. 2 135. 9	142. 1 141. 7 143. 2 147. 5 147. 7 148. 7	232. 2 232. 3 233. 0 236. 5 238. 8 243. 0	176. 0 178. 1 181. 8 182. 4 182. 1 181. 2	
July	176.7 177.7	188. 2 189. 0 190. 4 190. 5 186. 1 186. 0	193. 7 193. 2 197. 1 197. 3 191. 7 193. 8	184. 6 186. 3 186. 1 186. 2 182. 6 181. 0	171. 2 172. 2 173. 1 174. 7 175. 4 176. 1	136. 8 137. 6 138. 4 141. 3 143. 2 144. 0	149. 3 149. 3 151. 3 152. 4 154. 4 154. 6	246. 6 252. 4 254. 9 256. 5 257. 0 258. 0	181. 4 182. 1 182. 2 182. 3 182. 9 183. 4	
1976: Jan	179.3 179.6 181.3	184. 6 182. 0 180. 3 183. 7 184. 9 187. 5	192. 8 191. 0 187. 2 192. 9 192. 6 196. 5	179. 4 176. 4 175. 8 178. 0 179. 9 181. 8	177. 3 178. 0 178. 9 180. 0 180. 4 181. 3	145. 1 146. 3 146. 7 147. 4 147. 0 148. 1	157. 5 159. 9 162. 0 165. 4 169. 6 167. 4	257. 3 255. 7 255. 7 256. 9 257. 2 260. 3	184. 2 184. 9 185. 6 187. 1 186. 9 187. 1	
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	183. 7 184. 7 185. 2 185. 6	188. 1 181. 7 182. 7 179. 4 178. 4 183. 9	196. 9 189. 3 191. 8 186. 6 183. 6 191. 6	182.6 176.8 177.1 174.9 174.8 179.0	182.6 183.6 184.7 186.3 187.0 187.4	149. 0 149. 2 149. 0 149. 3 149. 8 149. 5	169. 8 171. 3 173. 6 170. 8 169. 7 171. 5	265. 0 269. 1 270. 9 277. 0 281. 8 278. 8	187. 0 187. 7 188. 5 188. 4 188. 7	

See next page for continuation of table and for footnotes.

TABLE B-53.—Wholesale price indexes by major commodity groups, 1929-76—Continued [1967 = 100]

	1			ndustrial c	ommodities	Continue	ď	··	
Year or month	Rubber and plastic products	Lumber and wood products	Pulp, paper, and allied products	Metals and metal products	Machin- ery and equip- ment	Furni- ture and house- hold durables	Nonme- tallic mineral products	Trans- portation equip- ment: Motor vehicles and equip- ment 2	Miscel- laneous products
1929	59. 4	25. 0		40. 2		55. 8	51. 2	41. 9	
1933	40.2	19.0		30.7		44.6	47.2	34.8	
1939	61. 2	24. 8		37.6	41. 3	52.6	49.1	39. 1	
1940	57. 1 61. 5 71. 6 73. 6 72. 7 70. 5 70. 8 70. 5 72. 8 70. 5	27. 4 32. 7 35. 6 37. 7 40. 6 41. 2 47. 2 73. 4 84. 0 77. 7	72.5	37. 8 38. 5 39. 1 39. 0 39. 0 39. 6 44. 3 54. 9 62. 5 63. 0	41. 4 42. 1 42. 8 42. 4 42. 1 42. 2 46. 4 53. 7 58. 2 61. 0	53. 8 57. 2 61. 8 61. 4 63. 1 63. 2 67. 1 77. 0 81. 6 82. 9	49. 1 50. 2 52. 3 52. 4 53. 5 55. 7 59. 3 66. 3 71. 6 73. 5	40. 4 43. 2 47. 2 47. 5 48. 3 56. 0 64. 1 70. 8 75. 7	73. 5 76. 5 78. 0
1950	85. 9	89. 3 97. 2 94. 4 94. 3 92. 6 97. 1 98. 5 93. 5 92. 4 98. 8	74. 3 88. 0 85. 7 85. 5 85. 5 87. 8 93. 6 95. 4 96. 4 97. 3	66. 3 73. 8 73. 9 76. 3 76. 9 82. 1 89. 2 91. 0 90. 4 92. 3	63. 1 70. 5 70. 6 72. 2 73. 4 75. 7 81. 8 87. 6 89. 4 91. 3	84. 7 91. 8 90. 1 91. 9 92. 9 93. 3 95. 8 98. 3 99. 1 99. 3	75. 4 80. 1 80. 1 83. 3 85. 1 87. 5 91. 3 94. 8 95. 8	75. 3 79. 4 84. 0 83. 6 83. 8 86. 3 91. 2 95. 1 98. 1 100. 3	79. 2 83. 9 83. 4 85. 6 86. 4 86. 5 87. 6 90. 2 92. 0 92. 2
1960	103. 1 99. 2 96. 3	95. 3 91. 0 91. 6 93. 5 95. 4 95. 9 100. 2 100. 0 113. 3 125. 3	98. 1 95. 2 96. 3 95. 6 95. 4 96. 2 98. 8 100. 0 101. 1 104. 0	92. 4 91. 9 91. 2 91. 3 93. 8 96. 4 98. 8 100. 0 102. 6 108. 5	92. 0 91. 9 92. 0 92. 2 92. 8 93. 9 96. 8 100. 0 103. 2 106. 5	99. 0 98. 4 97. 7 97. 0 97. 4 96. 9 98. 0 100. 0 102. 8 104. 9	97. 2 97. 6 97. 6 97. 1 97. 3 97. 5 98. 4 100. 0 103. 7 107. 7	98. 8 98. 6 98. 6 97. 8 98. 3 98. 5 98. 5 100. 0 102. 8 104. 8	93. 0 93. 3 93. 7 94. 5 95. 2 95. 9 97. 7 100. 0 102. 2 105. 2
1970	108. 3 109. 1 109. 3 112. 4 136. 2 150. 2 159. 2	113. 6 127. 3 144. 3 177. 2 183. 6 176. 9 205. 6 164. 7	108. 2 110. 1 113. 4 122. 1 151. 7 170. 4 179. 4 169. 8	116. 6 118. 7 123. 5 132. 8 171. 9 185. 6 195. 8 185, 5	111. 4 115. 5 117. 9 121. 7 139. 4 161. 4 170. 9	107. 5 110. 0 111. 4 115. 2 127. 9 139. 7 145. 5 138. 8	112. 9 122. 4 126. 1 130. 2 153. 2 174. 0 186. 0	108.7 114.9 118.0 119.2 129.2 144.6 153.8 140.2	109. 9 112. 9 114. 6 119. 7 133. 1 147. 7 153. 7
Feb MarApr Apr May June	1 150 0	169. 3 169. 6 174. 9 183. 0 181. 0	169. 8 170. 0 169. 7 169. 8 169. 8	186. 3 186. 1 185. 7 185. 1 184. 5	157. 7 158. 8 159. 7 160. 4 161. 0	139. 1 138. 5 138. 5 138. 6 139. 0	170 3 170. 8 173. 0 173. 1 173. 3	141. 5 143. 0 143. 0 142. 9 143. 1	146. 4 146. 8 147. 3 147. 5 147. 5
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	150.0 150.8 151.5	179. 6 179. 7 179. 9 179. 1 178. 3 183. 1	170.0 170.0 170.3 170.9 171.3 173.1	183. 4 184. 3 185. 5 187. 2 187. 0 187. 1	161.7 162.2 163.1 164.1 165.3 165.8	139. 2 139. 8 140. 1 141. 1 141. 5 142. 0	174.7 175.8 176.1 177.1 177.7 178.0	143. 1 143. 5 143. 9 150. 0 150. 6 150. 9	147. 7 147. 8 148. 2 147. 6 148. 6 151. 1
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	155. 5 156. 7 157. 1	190. 5 196. 0 202. 3 203. 3 203. 3 199. 8	174. 8 175. 8 176. 9 178. 5 179. 2 179. 5	187. 7 189. 2 190. 6 192. 9 194. 0 196. 4	167. 0 167. 7 168. 2 168. 9 169. 4 170. 2	143. 1 143. 4 143. 9 144. 4 144. 8 145. 3	181. 1 181. 3 182. 5 185. 2 185. 6 186. 0	151. 3 151. 3 151. 7 151. 9 151. 6 151. 6	151. 8 152. 1 152. 6 152. 4 152. 7 154. 4
July	161. 0 163. 6 164. 5 164. 8	203. 7 207. 5 212. 7 213. 6 214. 3 219. 9	180. 5 181. 0 181. 6 181. 4 181. 7 182. 0	198. 7 199. 0 200. 0 199. 9 199. 9 200. 8	171.0 171.4 172.9 174.2 174.7 175.5	145. 7 146. 1 146. 5 147. 0 147. 4 147. 8	186. 9 187. 7 188. 2 189. 1 189. 1 189. 5	151. 7 152. 8 153. 5 159. 0 159. 1 159. 5	153, 8 153, 5 153, 9 154, 1 156, 1 157, 0

Prices for most items in this grouping are lagged and refer to 1 or 2 months earlier than the index month.
 Index for total transportation equipment is not shown but is available beginning December 1968.

Table B-54.—Wholesale price indexes by stage of processing and by special groupings, 1947-76 [1967=100]

		1			[1907		rmediate	materia	ls, suppli	es, and o	componer	nts ı
		fo	Crude m r further	naterials processi	ng			aterials	and comp	onents f		
Year or month	All com- modi-			Nan					Materials			Mate- rials and com-
	ties	Total	Food- stuffs and feed- stuffs	Non- food mate- rials except fuel	Fuel	Total	Total	For food manu- factur- ing	For non- durable manu- factur- ing	For durable manu- factur- ing	Com- ponents	ponents for con- struc- tion
1947 1948 1949	76. 5 82. 8 78. 7	101. 2 110. 9 96. 0	111. 7 120. 8 100. 3	90. 6 100. 7 91. 6	66. 6 78. 7 78. 3	72. 4 78. 3 75. 2	72.1 77.8 74.5	94. 0 96. 9 83. 3	95. 2 100. 8 91. 9	54. 4 61. 4 63. 1	58. 3 63. 0 64. 2	66. 0 73. 1 73. 2
1950		104.6 120.1 110.3 101.9 101.0	107.6 124.5 117.2 104.9 104.9	104.7 120.7 104.6 100.1 98.2	77. 9 79. 4 79. 9 82. 7 79. 0	78.6 88.1 85.5 86.0 86.5	78. 1 88. 5 84. 8 86. 2 86. 3	86. 7 96. 6 92. 9 93. 0 92. 2	96.5 111.7 100.6 99.8 98.2	66.7 74.1 74.3 77.6 79.3	66.6 75.6 75.7 77.1 77.5	77. 0 84. 3 83. 7 85. 1 85. 5
1955	87. 8 90. 7 93. 3 94. 6 94. 8	97. 1 97. 6 99. 8 102. 0 99. 4	95. 1 93. 1 97. 2 103. 0 96. 2	103. 8 107. 6 106. 2 102. 2 105. 8	78. 8 84. 4 89. 2 90. 3 91. 9	88. 1 92. 0 94. 1 94. 3 95. 6	88. 4 92. 6 94. 8 95. 2 96. 5	89. 3 89. 7 91. 3 93. 4 90. 0	98. 6 100. 1 101. 4 100. 4 102. 1	83.3 88.5 91. 92.0 94.2	80. 9 88. 3 91. 8 92. 5 93. 6	88. 9 93. 5 94. 0 94. 0 96. 6
1960	94.9 94.5 94.8 94.5 94.7	97. 0 96. 5 97. 5 95. 4 94. 5	95. 1 93. 8 95. 7 92. 9 90. 8	101. 4 102. 5 102. 0 100. 7 102. 4	92. 8 92. 6 92. 1 93. 2 92. 8	95. 6 95. 0 94. 9 95. 2 95. 5	96. 5 95. 3 94. 7 94. 9 95. 9	91.1 94.0 92.0 96.6 95.2	102. 1 99. 9 99. 3 98. 4 99. 1	94.3 93.0 92.9 93.0 94.8	93. 1 92. 2 91. 5 91. 5 92. 3	95. 9 94. 6 94. 2 94. 5 95. 4
1965	96.6 99.8 100.0 102.5 106.5	99. 3 105. 7 100. 0 101. 6 108. 4	97. 1 105. 9 100. 0 101. 3 109. 3	104. 5 106. 7 100. 0 102. 1 106. 9	93. 5 96. 3 100. 0 102. 3 106. 6	96. 8 99. 2 100. 0 102. 3 105. 8	97. 4 99. 3 100. 0 102. 2 105. 8	97.6 101.9 100.0 101.5 107.1	100. 0 100. 8 100. 0 101. 3 102. 4	96. 8 98. 6 100. 0 103. 3 109. 1	93. 8 97. 1 100. 0 102. 3 105. 5	96. 2 98. 8 100. 0 104. 9 110. 8
1970	110. 4 114. 0 119. 1 134. 7 160. 1	112. 3 115. 1 127. 6 174. 0 196. 1	112. 0 114. 2 127. 5 180. 0 189. 4	109. 8 110. 7 121. 9 161. 5 205. 4	122. 6 139. 0 148. 7 164. 5 219. 4	109. 9 114. 1 118. 7 131. 6 162. 9	110. 0 112. 8 117. 0 127. 7 162. 2	112.9 116.5 119.9 146.0 209.2	103. 8 105. 3 109. 4 121. 2 155. 2	114.7 118.2 123.8 133.7 171.7	111.1 114.8 117.6 121.4 139.9	112.6 119.7 126.2 136.7 161.6
1975 1976	174.9 182.9	196. 9 205. 1	191.8 190.2	188, 3 210, 3	271.5 314.7	180.0 189.2	178.7 185.4	209. 4 180. 6	174. 7 183. 5	188. 4 202. 2	158. 3 165. 4	176. 4 187. 9
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	171.8 171.3 170.4 172.1 173.2 173.7	189. 3 185. 8 182. 4 189. 4 196. 7 197. 1	182. 4 177. 1 172. 9 181. 7 190. 9 192. 1	184. 1 184. 7 184. 4 186. 2 188. 1 187. 6	266. 7 265. 2 256. 6 266. 3 276. 4 274. 1	179. 1 178. 8 178. 1 179. 0 178. 4 178. 4	180, 1 179, 7 178, 0 177, 9 177, 0 176, 3	245. 1 236. 4 220. 0 213. 7 200. 6 194. 1	172. 2 172. 4 171. 9 172. 7 173. 5 173. 3	187. 1 186. 9 186. 9 187. 6 187. 7 187. 3	155. 4 157. 3 157. 2 157. 3 157. 4 157. 9	171. 9 173. 7 173. 9 175. 2 177. 0
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	175. 7 176. 7	203. 0 204. 1 207. 5 206. 8 199. 8 201. 3	202. 1 201. 9 204. 9 204. 6 195. 4 195. 1	183. 8 189. 6 194. 2 192. 7 190. 6 193. 8	278. 0 273. 2 275. 6 274. 8 270. 0 281. 3	179. 3 180. 9 181. 0 182. 2 182. 3 182. 6	177. 4 178. 8 178. 6 180. 0 180. 1 179. 9	204. 0 210. 7 204. 1 200. 0 195. 3 189. 2	174. 0 175. 2 175. 9 177. 4 178. 7 179. 5	187. 1 187. 6 188. 1 191. 4 191. 2 191. 4	158. 1 158. 6 159. 0 159. 6 160. 5 160. 7	176. 9 177. 2 177. 6 178. 9 178. 9 179. 8
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	179. 3 179. 3 179. 6 181. 3 181. 8	201. 2 199. 5 199. 1 205. 3 205. 7 210. 2	193. 2 191. 6 188. 3 194. 5 194. 1 197. 8	199. 8 196. 3 200. 5 207. 0 208. 7 214. 3	279. 3 278. 5 286. 2 291. 6 293. 3 301. 8	183. 7 184. 5 185. 6 186. 8 187. 5 188. 9	180. 6 181. 4 182. 2 183. 6 184. 2 185. 1	186. 3 183. 0 183. 7 182. 9 183. 6 182. 1	180. 3 181. 0 181. 7 183. 2 183. 4 183. 5	192. 5 194. 6 195. 9 198. 0 199. 4 202. 0	161. 5 162. 0 162. 4 163. 0 163. 4 164. 0	181. 7 182. 9 184. 6 185. 9 186. 0
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	185.6	211.8 205.9 206.4 204.0 204.5 207.9	196. 3 188. 6 189. 0 182. 2 178. 8 187. 4	222. 8 216. 4 217. 2 213. 1 213. 3 213. 7	306. 0 315. 8 316. 0 356. 7 390. 4 361. 2	190. 4 190. 8 192. 4 192. 6 193. 0 193. 9	186. 6 186. 9 188. 0 188. 3 188. 6 189. 1	186. 8 178. 0 176. 5 174. 4 174. 7 175. 5	184. 4 184. 6 185. 1 184. 8 185. 1 184. 7	204. 2 205. 4 207. 3 208. 3 208. 5 209. 9	164. 6 166. 4 168. 0 169. 2 169. 5 170. 2	188. 2 189. 6 191. 5 192. 1 192. 4 193. 6

See next page for continuation of table and for footnotes.

TABLE B-54. - Wholesale price indexes by stage of processing and by special groupings, 1947-76-Continued

[1967 = 100]

			Finishe	d goods				Spe	cial group	ings	
		Con	sumer fi	nished ge	oods			Inter- me- diate	Con- sumer		actured ods
Year or month	Total	Total	Foods	Other non- dura- ble goods	Dura- ble goods	Pro- ducer fin- ished goods	Crude mate- rials ²	mate- rials, sup- plies, and com- po- nents 3	fin- ished goods exclud- ing foods	Total	Dura- ble
1947	74.0	80, 5	82. 8	80. 7	74. 6	55. 4	79. 2	70. 0	79. 0	72. 3	59. 4
1948	79.9	86, 5	90. 4	85. 8	79. 7	69. 4	92. 5	76. 1	84. 0	78. 2	65. 4
1949	77.6	82, 5	83. 1	82. 3	81. 8	63. 4	84. 0	74. 2	82. 2	75. 5	67. 3
1950	79. 0	83. 9	84. 7	83. 6	82. 7	64. 9	93. 6	77. 7	83. 5	78. 4	69. 6
1951	86. 5	91. 8	95. 2	90. 0	88. 2	71. 2	102. 9	87. 0	89. 5	87. 0	76. 3
1952	86. 0	90. 7	94. 3	87. 8	88. 9	72. 4	93. 1	84. 3	88. 3	85. 1	76. 7
1953	85. 1	89. 2	89. 4	88. 6	89. 6	73. 6	92. 4	85. 3	89. 1	85. 0	78. 4
1954	85. 3	89. 1	88. 7	88. 9	90. 3	74. 5	88. 0	85. 7	89. 4	85. 7	79. 4
1955	85. 5	88. 5	86. 5	89. 4	91. 2	76. 7	96. 6	88. 3	90. 1	86. 6	82, 2
	87. 9	89. 8	86. 3	91. 1	94. 3	82. 4	102. 3	92. 6	92. 3	90. 0	87, 5
	91. 1	92. 4	89. 3	93. 2	97. 1	87. 5	100. 9	95. 0	94. 6	92. 8	90, 9
	93. 2	94. 4	94. 5	92. 6	98. 4	89. 8	96. 9	94. 8	94. 7	93. 8	92, 2
	93. 0	93. 6	90. 1	94. 0	99. 6	91. 5	102. 3	96. 4	95. 9	94. 6	94, 0
1960	93.7	94. 5 94. 3 94. 6 94. 1 94. 3	92. 1 91. 7 92. 5 91. 4 91. 9	94. 7 94. 7 94. 8 95. 1 94. 8	99. 2 98. 8 98. 3 97. 8 98. 2	91. 7 91. 8 92. 2 92. 4 93. 3	98. 3 97. 2 95. 6 94. 3 97. 1	96. 8 95. 5 95. 3 95. 0 95. 6	96. 3 96. 2 96. 0 96. 0 95. 9	94. 8 94. 4 94. 5 94. 3 94. 8	94. 1 93. 6 93. 5 93. 5 94. 6
1965	95. 7	96. 1	95. 4	95. 9	97. 9	94. 4	100. 9	96. 9	96. 6	96. 3	95. 8
	98. 8	99. 4	101. 6	97. 8	98. 5	96. 8	104. 5	98. 9	98. 1	99. 1	97. 9
	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0
	102. 9	102. 7	103. 7	102. 2	102. 2	103. 5	102. 0	102. 6	102. 1	102. 6	103. 5
	106. 6	106. 6	110. 0	105. 0	104. 0	106. 9	110. 6	106. 1	104. 6	106. 3	107. 7
1970	110.3	109. 9	113. 5	108. 3	106. 9	112. 0	118. 9	109, 9	107. 7	110. 2	112. 0
	113.7	112. 9	115. 3	111. 7	110. 8	116. 6	122. 7	114, 3	111. 2	113. 9	117. 0
	117.2	116. 6	121. 7	113. 6	113. 2	119. 5	131. 1	118, 9	113. 5	117. 9	121. 1
	127.9	129. 2	146. 4	120. 5	115. 8	123. 5	155. 2	128, 1	118. 6	129. 2	127. 4
	147.5	149. 3	166. 9	146. 8	126. 3	141. 0	219. 1	159, 5	138. 6	154. 1	148. 6
1975 1976 1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	163. 4 170. 2 159. 3 159. 3 158. 9 160. 0 161. 2 162. 5	163. 6 168. 9 159. 8 159. 4 158. 5 159. 7 161. 1 162. 6	181. 0 180. 2 177. 0 175. 5 172. 6 174. 9 177. 7 180. 3	163. 0 173. 2 158. 2 158. 8 158. 9 159. 5 160. 4 161. 6	138. 2 144. 3 135. 9 136. 3 136. 9 137. 0 137. 0 137. 3	162. 5 173. 2 157. 4 158. 3 159. 7 160. 7 161. 2 161. 7	225. 1 250. 0 219. 4 221. 0 218. 4 222. 7 225. 8 226. 3	178. 6 189. 4 175. 0 175. 9 176. 4 177. 3 177. 7 177. 8	153. 1 161. 7 149. 4 149. 8 150. 2 150. 6 151. 1 152. 0	171. 1 178. 9 168. 2 168. 0 167. 8 168. 7 169. 5 170. 1	165. 6 175. 5 162. 0 163. 2 163. 7 164. 4 164. 9
July	164. 5	165. 0	184. 8	163. 2	137. 4	162. 4	223. 4	178. 3	152. 9	171. 4	165, 2
	164. 9	165. 3	183. 9	165. 1	137. 4	163. 0	225. 8	179. 3	154. 1	172. 3	165, 7
	166. 2	166. 7	186. 5	166. 1	137. 7	164. 0	231. 5	179. 9	154. 8	173. 0	166, 2
	168. 0	168. 3	187. 3	167. 2	141. 1	166. 5	228. 6	181. 4	156. 8	174. 5	168, 2
	168. 0	168. 1	185. 5	168. 0	141. 8	167. 4	226. 5	182. 0	157. 6	174. 4	168, 8
	168. 5	168. 5	185. 6	168. 9	142. 2	168. 0	231. 2	182. 6	158. 3	174. 7	169, 4
1976; Jan	168.7 168.2	168. 3 167. 4 166. 8 168. 0 168. 4 168. 8	183. 7 180. 2 178. 6 182. 1 183. 2 182. 1	169. 5 170. 2 169. 9 170. 2 170. 1 171. 7	142. 9 142. 9 143. 1 142. 9 142. 9 143. 5	169. 5 169. 9 170. 5 171. 1 171. 3 172. 0	233. 9 231. 8 237. 9 246. 0 246. 2 248. 6	183. 7 184. 8 185. 9 187. 3 187. 8 188. 7	158. 9 159. 4 159. 3 159. 3 159. 3 160. 5	175. 3 175. 6 176. 0 177. 0 177. 6 178. 7	170. 7 171. 4 172. 3 173. 1 173. 6 174. 6
July	170. 5	169. 5	182. 2	173. 5	143.5	172. 6	254. 2	190. 0	161. 5	179. 7	175. 6
	170. 0	168. 6	177. 9	174. 9	143.5	173. 1	254. 9	191. 2	162. 3	179. 7	176. 4
	170. 7	169. 2	178. 1	176. 0	144.1	174. 2	253. 0	192. 6	163. 2	180. 8	177. 7
	172. 2	169. 9	176. 8	176. 7	147.1	177. 4	261. 5	193. 1	164. 9	181. 5	179. 7
	172. 4	170. 1	176. 0	177. 5	147.4	177. 8	269. 6	193. 5	165. 5	181. 9	180. 0
	174. 1	172. 0	180. 9	178. 0	147.8	178. 9	262. 3	194. 1	165. 9	183. 2	181. 0

¹ Includes, in addition to subgroups shown, processed fuels and lubricants, containers, and supplies.
2 Excludes crude foodstuffs and feedstuffs, plant and animal fibers, oilseeds, and leaf tobacco.
3 Excludes intermediate materials for food manufacturing and manufactured animal feeds.

Note.—For a listing of the commodities included in each sector, see monthly report, "Wholesale Prices and Price Indexes," January-February 1967.

Table B-55.—Wholesale price indexes for selected groupings, seasonally adjusted, 1973-76 [1967=100, seasonally adjusted]

	Farm	nroduct	s and				Spec	ial group	ings			
	pro	product cessed fo and feed	ods		Inter- medi-		Con	sumer fir	ished go	ods	Manufa	ctured ods
Year and month	Total Total Proches and feeds Total Proches and feeds Total Proches and feeds Total Proches and components 2	rials, sup- plies, and com- po-	Pro- ducer fin- ished goods	Total	Foods	Other non- dura- ble goods	Dura- ble goods	Total	Dura- ble goods			
1973: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	141.1	144. 1 148. 6 159. 3 161. 0 170. 6 180. 6	131. 5 136. 3 141. 5 140. 7 146. 4 152. 1	139. 8 141. 2 141. 4 144. 6 147. 7 151. 6	121. 9 123. 0 124. 9 125. 9 127. 1 128. 0	120. 3 121. 1 121. 7 122. 4 123. 2 123. 5	120. 8 122. 1 125. 0 126. 4 127. 3 128. 7	130.6 132.2 138.7 141.3 142.9 145.8	115, 7 117, 4 118, 0 118, 6 119, 1 119, 6	113. 3 113. 7 114. 4 115. 2 115. 7 116. 0	121. 6 123. 6 125. 4 126. 5 128. 0 129. 8	122. 123. 125. 126. 127.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	183.1 172.9 168.3 167.0	169. 8 212. 0 199. 9 191. 2 188. 3 189. 6	144. 7 164. 7 155. 7 153. 7 153. 4 156. 2	154. 3 156. 5 162. 0 166. 5 174. 9 182. 5	127. 7 128. 7 129. 7 131. 1 133. 2 136. 2	123.6 124.0 124.4 124.9 125.6 126.6	128. 3 133. 9 133. 5 133. 5 134. 7 136. 0	144. 3 158. 0 156. 3 154. 8 155. 5 156. 6	120. 0 120. 5 121. 2 123. 0 125. 0 127. 2	116. 1 116. 5 116. 7 116. 4 117. 0 117. 5	128. 5 132. 7 131. 5 132. 3 133. 6 135. 8	127. 127. 128. 129. 130. 132.
974: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	178.8 175.7	201. 9 202. 3 195. 5 186. 4 181. 4 167. 3	160. 9 163. 9 163. 1 160. 1 160. 6 158. 2	189. 7 201. 3 210. 7 221. 7 213. 3 215. 6	138. 9 141. 2 146. 1 150. 3 155. 2 158. 8	128. 1 129. 3 131. 0 132. 6 136. 0 138. 8	139. 4 142. 3 143. 1 144. 9 146. 4 145. 6	161. 1 164. 6 162. 8 163. 9 163. 8 158. 2	130. 7 134. 1 137. 7 140. 9 143. 9 147. 0	119. 2 120. 1 120. 9 122. 0 123. 7 125. 1	138. 7 141. 0 143. 5 146. 3 149. 2 151. 2	134. 135. 138. 141. 145. 147.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	170. 7 182. 2 178. 7 186. 1 190. 9 187. 3	178. 0 188. 4 182. 6 189. 9 191. 7 186. 1	166. 0 178. 2 176. 2 183. 7 190. 4 188. 1	229. 8 230. 2 231. 0 231. 5 229. 6 224. 8	163. 4 168. 6 170. 1 172. 3 174. 0 174. 9	141. 7 145. 3 148. 3 151. 6 153. 8 155. 2	149. 1 151. 7 153. 5 156. 3 159. 7 159. 5	163. 3 167. 1 168. 8 172. 1 179. 4 177. 3	149. 9 152. 4 154. 4 156. 2 157. 1 157. 8	126. 8 127. 7 129. 4 132. 6 133. 8 134. 9	155. 6 161. 0 162. 1 165. 4 167. 0 167. 9	151. 154. 156. 158. 160. 161.
975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	182. 7 177. 8 174. 5 179. 7 183. 0 182. 0	178. 8 171. 7 169. 7 178. 1 186. 0 184. 5	185. 1 181. 6 177. 5 180. 7 181. 0 180. 4	221. 4 219. 2 217. 1 219. 6 222. 5 224. 1	176. 4 176. 8 176. 8 176. 8 176. 5 176. 5	157. 1 158. 4 159. 9 160. 9 161. 3 161. 8	159. 2 158. 5 157. 7 160. 0 161. 6 162. 9	175. 1 173. 2 170. 6 175. 9 179. 6 181. 7	158. 8 159. 0 158. 7 159. 2 159. 9 160. 8	135. 5 136. 2 136. 9 137. 0 137. 0 137. 3	168. 4 168. 3 167. 6 169. 0 169. 3 169. 8	162 163 164 164 164 164
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	185. 4 187. 8 189. 8 191. 7 188. 9 187. 8	189. 9 192. 7 196. 9 199. 9 196. 1 197. 2	182. 5 184. 8 185. 3 186. 6 184. 3 181. 8	224. 5 226. 5 232. 9 231. 4 227. 4 235. 4	177. 1 178. 2 179. 4 181. 6 183. 3 184. 6	162.6 163.1 164.3 166.3 167.1 167.9	164. 2 164. 9 167. 1 168. 7 169. 2 169. 4	183. 6 183. 2 186. 6 187. 9 187. 6 187. 0	162. 4 164. 4 166. 3 167. 9 169. 0 170. 1	137. 4 137. 8 138. 8 140. 7 141. 8 141. 9	170. 5 171. 4 172. 7 174. 7 175. 3 175. 8	164 165 166 168 169 170
976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	183. 8 180. 3 179. 9 184. 9 186. 8 187. 5	192. 6 187. 7 185. 9 193. 8 194. 9 195. 4	178. 3 175. 5 175. 9 179. 3 181. 6 182. 4	236. 0 230. 0 236. 5 242. 6 242. 6 246. 1	185. 2 185. 7 186. 3 186. 7 186. 5 187. 8	169. 1 170. 0 170. 7 171. 3 171. 4 172. 1	167. 9 166. 7 166. 0 168. 4 168. 9 169. 0	182. 0 178. 1 176. 6 183. 4 185. 3 183. 6	170. 2 170. 4 169. 7 169. 9 169. 6 170. 8	142. 5 142. 8 143. 1 142. 9 142. 9 143. 5	175. 5 176. 0 175. 8 177. 4 177. 4 178. 3	171. 171. 172. 172. 172. 173.
July	185. 7 180. 3 182. 1 180. 4 180. 8	193. 4 187. 7 191. 2 188. 9 188. 0 194. 9	180. 8 175. 6 176. 4 175. 1 176. 2 179, 7	255. 5 255. 7 254. 5 264. 7 270. 7 267. 1	188. 7 190. 1 192. 0 193. 3 194. 9 196. 3	172. 9 173. 2 174. 5 177. 0 177. 4 178. 7	168. 6 167. 9 169. 5 170. 1 171. 3 173. 0	180. 4 176. 4 177. 7 177. 0 178. 4 182. 7	172. 6 174. 2 176. 2 177. 4 178. 6 179. 3	143. 5 143. 9 145. 3 146. 7 147. 4 147. 5	178. 8 178. 8 180. 4 181. 7 182. 8 184. 3	174. 175. 177. 179. 180. 182.

Excludes crude foodstuffs and feedstuffs, plant and animal fibers, oilseeds, and leaf tobacco.
 Excludes intermediate materials for food manufacturing and manufactured animal feeds.

Table B-56.—Percent changes in wholesale price indexes, major groups, 1948-76

[Percent change]

V		AII	Indu	strial	Farm p	products	,	Cor	sumer fi	nished g	oods	
Year or month	comm	odities	comm	odities	foods a	ocessed nd feeds	To	otal	Fo	ods	All exc	ept foods
	Dec. to Dec. ¹	Year to year	Dec. to Dec. ¹	Year to year	Dec. to Dec.1	Year to year	Dec. to Dec.	Year to year	Dec. to Dec.1	Year to year	Dec. to Dec.1	Year to year
1948 1949	1.5 -6.1	8. 2 5. 0	5. 0 5. 0	8. 6 -2. 1	-6.8 -8.9	7.6 -11.7	1. 2 -5. 6	7.5 -4.6	-2. 4 -7. 4	9. 2 -8, 1	4. C -4. 5	6. 3 -2. 1
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	14. 7 1. 2 -3. 4 . 5 6	3.9 11.4 2.7 -1.4	14. 0 . 4 -1. 4 1. 4 . 2	3.6 10.4 -2.3 .8	17. 0 3. 5 -8. 2 -2. 3 -2. 6	4.8 13.8 -3.9 -6.5 3	10. 2 2. 7 -3. 1 1 6	1.7 9.4 -1.2 -1.7 1	13.3 5.3 -5.9 -2.2 -1.9	1.9 12.4 9 -5.2 8	8.2 .9 -1.1 1.6 .3	1.6 7.2 -1.3 .9
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	1.6 4.5 2.0 .5 3	3.3 2.9 1.4	4.3 4.2 1.1 .9 1.2	2. 2 4. 5 2. 8 . 3 1. 8	-6.4 6.0 4.2 2 -4.4	-4.7 7 3.4 4.7 -4.7	1 3.1 3.0 .2 7	7 1.5 2.9 2.2 8	-2.9 3.6 5.3 .4 -3.7	-2.5 2 3.5 5.8 -4.7	1.7 2.5 1.7 .2 .8	2.4 2.5 .1
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	5 2 0 1 .4	4 3 3	6 1 2 .5	0 5 0 1 .5	3.9 6 6 -2.1	0 1.1 -1.0 6	2.1 8 .1 4 .2	1.0 2 .3 5	5. 2 -1. 8 . 5 -1. 3 . 4	2.2 4 .9 -1.2	3 1 .1	1 2 0 1
1965. 1966. 1967. 1968. 1969.	3. 4 1. 7 1. 0 2. 8 4. 8	2. 0 3. 3 . 2 2. 5 3. 9	1. 4 2. 2 1. 9 2. 7 3. 9	1. 3 2. 2 1. 5 2. 5 3. 4	9. 5 -2 -1. 8 3. 5 7. 5	4, 2 6, 6 -3, 4 2, 4 5, 5	4. 0 1. 6 1. 2 3. 1 4. 9	1. 9 3. 4 . 6 2. 7 3. 8	9. 1 1. 4 -, 4 4. 8 8. 2	3.8 6.5 -1.6 3.7 6.1	. 9 1. 7 2. 1 2. 0 2. 9	. 7 1. 6 1. 9 2. 1 2. 4
1970 1971 1972 1973	2. 2 4. 1 6. 3 15. 4 20. 9	3. 7 3. 3 4. 5 13. 1 18. 9	3. 6 3. 4 3. 4 10. 7 25. 6	3. 8 3. 7 3. 3 6. 8 22. 2	-1. 4 6. 0 14. 4 26. 7 11. 0	3. 4 2. 0 7. 5 30. 0 11. 5	1. 4 3. 5 4. 3 13. 6 17. 1	3. 1 2. 7 3. 3 10. 8 15. 6	-2.5 5.9 8.0 22.5 13.0	3. 2 1. 6 5. 6 20. 3 14. 0	3. 9 1. 8 2. 2 7. 4 20. 5	3. 0 3. 2 2. 1 4. 5 16. 9
1975 1976	4.2 4.7	9. 2 4. 6	6. 0 6. 4	11.5 6.3	-1.3 -1.1	3.8 6	6. 2 2. 1	9.6 3.2	5, 5 -2, 5	8. 4 4	6. 7 4. 8	10, 5 5, 6
					Chang	e from p	receding	month				
	Unad- justed	Sea- sonally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- sonally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- sonally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- sonally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- sonally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- sonally ad- justed
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	0.2 3 5 1.0 .6	-0.2 7 5 .9 .6	0.8 .5 .3 .5 .4	0.8 .1 .1 .2 .2	-1.4 -2.3 -2.6 2.2 1.3	-2.5 -2.7 -1.9 3.0 1.8 5	0.7 3 6 .8 .9	-0.2 4 5 1.5 1.0	0.6 8 -1.7 1.3 1.6 1.5	-1.2 -1.1 -1.5 3.1 2.1 1.2	0.7 .3 .3 .3 .3	0.5 .2 .1 .2 .3
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	1. 2 . 6 . 6 . 7 4	.8 .9 .9 1.1 .1	.3 .6 .5 .9 .4	.4 .7 .9 1.2 .7	3. 2 . 4 . 7 . 1 -2. 3 1	1.9 1.3 1.1 1.0 -1.5 6	1.5 .2 .8 1.0 1	.8 1.3 1.0 .3	2.5 5 1.4 -1.0	1.0 2 1.9 .7 2 3	.6 .8 .5 1.3 .5	.7 .9 1.0 1.0 .8
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	0 .9 .3 .7	2 4 .2 .8 .3	.7 .4 .5 .6 .2	.4 .1 .3 .3 .1	8 -1.4 9 1.9 .7 1.4	-2.1 -1.9 2 2.8 1.0	1 5 4 .7 .2	9 7 4 1.4 .3	-1.0 -1.9 9 2.0 .6 6	-2.7 -2.1 8 3.9 1.0 9	.4 .3 1 0 0	.1 2 1 0
		1	I	I	,				1 .			1 -

¹ Changes from December to December are based on unadjusted indexes.

MONEY STOCK, CREDIT, AND FINANCE

TABLE B-57.-Money stock measures, 1947-76

[Averages of daily figures; billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted, except as noted]

	0ν	erall measur	es			Compo	nents an	d related	litems	
		M ₂ (M ₃ plus	M ₃		Depos	its at cor	nmercial	banks		U.S.
Year and month	M ₁ (Currency plus	time deposits at com-	(M 2 plus deposits at non- bank	Cur- rency 1	De-	Time	and sav	ings 3	Deposits at non- bank thrift	Govern- ment demand
	demand deposits)	mercial banks other than large CDs)	thrift institu- tions)		mand 2 Total Large CDs 4 Of		Other	institu- tions 5	deposits (unad- justed) •	
1947: Dec 1948: Dec 1949: Dec	111.5 111.2			26. 4 25. 8 25. 1	86.7 85.8 86.0	35. 4 36. 0 36. 4				1. 0 1. 8 2. 8
1950: Dec	.) 141. 1	210. 9	303, 8	25. 0 26. 1 27. 3 27. 7 27. 4 27. 8 28. 2 28. 3 28. 6 28. 9	91. 2 96. 5 100. 1 101. 1 104. 9 107. 4 108. 7 107. 6 112. 6 114. 5	36. 7 38. 2 41. 1 44. 5 48. 3 50. 0 51. 9 57. 4 65. 4 67. 4		67.4	92.9	2. 4 2. 7 4. 9 3. 8 5. 0 3. 4 3. 5 3. 9
1960: Dec	144. 2 148. 7 150. 9 156. 5 163. 7 171. 3 175. 7 187. 3	217. 1 228. 6 242. 9 258. 9 277. 1 301. 3 318. 1 349. 9 382. 9 392. 3	319.3 342.1 369.2 400.3 434.4 471.7 495.4 543.9 607.3	29. 0 29. 6 30. 6 32. 5 34. 3 36. 3 38. 3 40. 4 43. 4 46. 1	115. 2 119. 1 120. 3 124. 1 129. 5 134. 9 137. 3 146. 9 158. 7 162. 8	72. 9 82. 7 97. 6 112. 0 126. 2 146. 4 157. 9 183. 3 204. 3 194. 4	2.8 5.7 9.6 12.8 16.4 15.5 20.6 23.5 10.9	72. 9 79. 9 92. 0 102. 3 113. 4 130. 0 142. 4 162. 6 180. 8 183. 5	102.3 113.4 126.4 141.4 157.3 170.4 177.3 194.0 206.7 214.9	4. 7 4. 9 5. 6 5. 1 5. 5 4. 6 3. 4 5. 0 5. 6
1970: Dec	219. 6 233. 8 255. 3 270. 5 283. 1 294. 8	423. 5 471. 7 525. 3 571. 4 612. 4 664. 3 739. 5	656. 2 745. 1 844. 9 919. 5 981. 6 1, 092. 9 1, 236. 3	49. 1 52. 6 56. 9 61. 5 67. 8 73. 7 80. 7	170. 5 181. 3 198. 4 209. 0 215. 3 221. 0 231. 2	229. 2 271. 2 313. 6 364. 4 419. 1 452. 4 491. 5	25. 3 33. 3 43. 6 63. 5 89. 8 82. 9 63. 8	204. 0 237. 8 270. 0 300. 9 329. 3 369. 6 427. 6	232. 7 273. 4 319. 6 348. 0 369. 2 428. 6 496. 8	7.3 6.9 7.4 6.3 4.9 4.1
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	281. 9 284. 1 284. 9 287. 6	614. 5 618. 2 623. 0 626. 7 633. 7 642. 4	986. 7 994. 0 1,003. 7 1,012. 7 1,025. 3 1,040. 2	68. 2 68. 7 69. 4 69. 5 70. 2 71. 0	213. 7 213. 2 214. 7 215. 4 217. 4 220. 6	425. 4 428. 3 428. 7 430. 1 431. 2 435. 5	92. 7 92. 1 89. 8 88. 4 85. 1 84. 1	332.6 336.2 339.0 341.8 346.1 351.4	372. 2 375. 9 380. 7 386. 0 391. 6 397. 8	4. 0 3. 3 3. 8 4. 0 4. 1 4. 2
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	293. 2 293. 6 293. 4 295. 6	647. 5 650. 6 652. 9 655. 8 662. 1 664. 3	1,051.6 1,060.6 1,068.1 1,075.8 1,086.5 1,092.9	71. 3 71. 9 72. 0 72. 6 73. 4 73. 7	220. 6 221. 3 221. 6 220. 8 222. 1 221. 0	437. 6 436. 2 438. 3 443. 3 448. 3 452. 4	82. 1 78. 8 79. 1 80. 9 81. 8 82. 9	355. 5 357. 4 359. 2 362. 4 366. 5 369. 6	404. 1 410. 0 415. 2 420. 0 424. 4 428. 6	3. 4 2. 7 3. 9 3. 4 3. 5 4. 1
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	296.6 298.1 301.8	670. 0 677. 9 682. 6 690. 8 695. 7 698. 5	1, 103. 5 1, 116. 7 1, 126. 5 1, 140. 0 1, 150. 0 1, 157. 4	74.2 75.0 75.7 76.7 77.3 77.6	220. 9 221. 6 222. 4 225. 2 226. 2 225. 6	454. 1 456. 7 457. 6 460. 4 460. 4 465. 9	79. 2 75. 4 73. 2 71. 5 68. 2 70. 6	374. 9 381. 3 384. 4 388. 9 392. 2 395. 3	433. 5 438. 8 444. 0 449. 3 454. 3 458. 9	3. 8 4. 6 3. 9 3. 9 3. 8 4. 8
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec P	306. 4 306. 3 309. 8 309. 8	705. 4 710. 8 716. 4 725. 8 732. 0 739. 5	1, 169. 9 1, 182. 3 1, 195. 3 1, 211. 7 1, 223. 4 1, 236. 3	78. 1 78. 6 79. 1 79. 8 80. 3 80. 7	226. 8 227. 8 227. 2 230. 0 229. 5 231. 2	470. 0 468. 7 472. 5 478. 0 484. 2 491. 5	69. 6 64. 4 62. 4 62. 0 62. 1 63. 8	400. 4 404. 4 410. 1 416. 0 422. 2 427. 6	464. 5 471. 6 478. 9 485. 8 491. 4 496. 8	3. 4 3. 6 4. 9 3. 8 4. 0 4. 4

¹ Currency outside the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Banks, and the vaults of all commercial banks.
² Demand deposits other than those due to domestic commercial banks and the U.S. Government, less cash items in process of collection and Federal Reserve float, plus foreign balances at Federal Reserve Banks.
³ Time and savings deposits other than those due to domestic commercial banks and the U.S. Government. Effective June 1966, excludes balances accumulated for payment of personal loans (about \$1.1 billion).
¹ Negotiable time certificates of deposit (CDs) issued in denominations of \$100,000 or more by large weekly reporting

S Average of the beginning- and end-of-month deposits of mutual savings banks, savings capital at savings and loan associations, and credit union shares.

8 Deposits at all commercial banks.

Table B-58.—Commercial bank loans and investments, 1930-76 [Billions of dollars]

			(Dinions of donar	·		
	T	Lo	ans	Invest	ments	
End of year or month ¹	Total loans and invest- ments ²	Total 3	Commercial and industrial	U.S. Govern- ment securities	Other securities	Loans plus loans sold to bank affiliates a
1930: June 1933: June 1939	48. 9 30. 4 40. 7	34. 5 16. 3 17. 2		5. 0 7. 5 16. 3	9. 4 6. 5 7. 1	
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946	43. 9 50. 7 67. 4 85. 1 105. 5 124. 0 114. 0 116. 3	18. 8 21. 7 19. 2 19. 1 21. 6 26. 1 31. 1 38. 1		17. 8 21. 8 41. 4 59. 8 77. 6 90. 6 74. 8 69. 2	7. 4 7. 2 6. 8 6. 1 6. 3 7. 3 8. 1	
1948	114. 2	42, 4	0	62.6	9. 2	<u> </u>
			Seasonaii	y adjusted		
1948 1949	113. 0 118. 7	41. 5 42. 0		62. 3 66. 4	9. 2 10. 3	
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958	124. 7 130. 2 139. 1 143. 1 153. 1 157. 6 161. 6 166. 4 181. 2 188. 7	51. 1 56. 5 62. 8 66. 2 69. 1 80. 6 88. 1 91. 5 95. 6 110. 5	39. 4	61. 1 60. 4 62. 2 67. 6 60. 3 57. 2 56. 9 65. 1 57. 7	12. 4 13. 4 14. 2 14. 7 16. 4 16. 8 16. 3 17. 9 20. 5	
1960	197. 4 212. 8 231. 2 250. 2 272. 3 300. 1 4 316. 1 352. 0 390. 2 401. 7	116. 7 123. 6 137. 3 153. 7 172. 9 198. 2 4 213. 9 231. 3 258. 2 279. 4	42. 1 43. 9 47. 6 52. 1 58. 4 69. 5 78. 6 86. 2 95. 9 105. 7	59. 9 65. 3 64. 7 61. 5 60. 7 57. 1 53. 5 59. 4 60. 7 51. 2	20. 8 23. 9 29. 2 35. 0 38. 7 44. 8 4 48. 7 61. 3 71. 3	283. 3
1970	435. 5 485. 7 558. 0 633. 4 8 690. 4 721. 1	292. 0 9 320. 9 378. 9 449. 0 8 500. 2 496. 9	110. 0 116. 1 7 130. 2 156. 4 8 183. 3 176. 0	57. 8 60. 6 62. 6 54. 5 50. 4 79. 4	85. 7 6 104. 2 116. 5 129. 9 8 139. 8 144. 8	294, 7 6 323, 7 381, 5 453, 3 8 9 505, 0 501, 3
1976	767. 5	521. 6	176. 2	96. 5	149. 4	525. 4
1976: Jan P	723. 3 726. 7 731. 2 734. 5 737. 6 738. 8	497. 3 497. 8 499. 7 500. 5 500. 6 500. 7	176. 6 175. 1 10 171. 4 170. 5 170. 7 170. 2	81. 0 84. 4 88. 2 90. 0 93. 0 94. 0	145. 0 144. 5 143. 3 144. 0 144. 0 144. 1	501. 6 502. 3 503. 9 504. 7 505. 0 505. 2
July p Aug p Sept p Oct p Nov p Dec p	743. 1 748. 7 752. 5 760. 3 766. 3 767. 5	504. 7 507. 6 511. 4 519. 3 521. 8 521. 6	171. 0 171. 0 172. 0 174. 8 176. 7 176. 2	92. 7 95. 0 94. 0 93. 5 94. 3 96. 5	145. 7 146. 1 147. 1 147. 5 150. 2 149. 4	509. 2 511. 6 515. 3 523. 1 525. 6 525. 4

10 Loan reclassifications reduced these loans by \$1.2 billion as of March 1976.

¹ Data are for last Wednesday of month or year (except June 30 and December 31 call dates).
2 Adjusted to exclude all interbank loans beginning 1948 and domestic bank loans only beginning January 1959.
3 Beginning January 1959, loans and investments are reported gross, without valuation reserves deducted, rather than net of valuation reserves, as in earlier periods.
4 Effective June 1966, balances accumulated for payment of personal loans (about \$1.1 billion) are excluded from loans at all commercial banks, and certain certificates of CCC and Export-Import Bank totaling about \$1 billion are included in other securities rather than in loans.
4 Beginning June 1969, data include all bank promises substitizing and other significant majority-owned demestic

beginning June 1969, data include all bank-premises subsidiaries and other significant majority-owned domestic subsidiaries; earlier data include commercial banks only.
6 Beginning June 1971, Farmers Home Administration insured notes totaling about \$0.7 billion are classified as other securities rather than as loans.

⁷ Beginning June 1972, commercial and industrial loans were reduced by about \$0.4 billion due to loan reclassifications

at one large bank.

at one large bank.

Beginning June 1974, the merger of a large mutual savings bank and a nonmember commercial bank increased total loans and investments by \$0.6 billion, loans by \$0.5 billion, and other securities by \$0.1 billion.

Beginning November 1974, the liquidation of one large bank reduced total loans and investments by \$1.5 billion, total loans by \$1 billion, commercial and industrial loans by \$0.6 billion, and other securities by \$0.5 billion. In addition, commercial and industrial loans were increased by \$0.1 billion due to loan reclassifications at one large bank.

Beginning August 1974, reflects new cefinition of affiliates included and different group of reporting banks. Amount of total loans sold was reduced by \$0.1 billion.

Table B-59.—Private liquid asset holdings, nonfinancial investors, 1959-76 [Averages of daily figures; billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted]

		5	Curre	ncy and de	eposits		U.S. Tr	easurv		
V	T.4.1				Time d	eposits		rities	Nego- tiable	Other private
Year and month	Total liquid assets	Total	Cur- rency 1	De- mand de- posits 1	Com- mer- cial banks 1	Non- bank thrift institu- tions 2	Sav- ings bonds ³	Short- term market- able secu- rities 4	certifi- cates of de- posit ⁵	money market instru- ments ⁶
1959: Dec	372.9	290.6	28.9	104.2	64.7	92.9	46.1	35.3		0.9
1960: Dec	386. 2 410. 3 441. 8 479. 1 515. 2	305.7 326.3 352.2 382.3 414.6	29.0 29.6 30.6 32.5 34.3	104.6 106.3 106.5 109.7 114.3	69.9 77.0 88.8 98.6 108.8	102.2 113.5 126.4 141.5 157.3	45.7 46.5 46.9 48.1 49.0	32.1 31.9 33.4 35.0 33.0	2.7 5.3 9.0 11.6	2.8 3.1 4.0 4.8 6.9
1965: Dec 1966: Dec 1967: Dec 1968: Dec 1969: Dec	559. 2 587. 1 638. 6 697. 2 723. 2	451.1 474.3 521.0 565.3 582.8	36. 3 38. 3 40. 4 43. 4 46. 1	119.3 121.7 130.3 140.9 145.0	125.1 136.9 156.2 174.3 176.8	170. 4 177. 3 194. 0 206. 7 214. 9	49.6 50.2 51.2 51.8 51.7	35.8 37.8 34.8 40.9 53.2	15.1 14.6 19.3 22.5 9.1	7.5 10.3 12.4 16.6 26.4
1970: Dec	857.4 972.0	632.5 721.0 817.4 887.4 944.6	49.1 52.6 56.9 61.5 67.8	151.8 161.5 176.5 183.3 186.6	198. 9 233. 6 264. 4 294. 4 321. 1	232.7 273.4 319.6 348.0 369.2	52.0 54.3 57.6 60.4 63.3	42.0 31.7 34.5 43.2 47.1	23.0 30.2 39.8 58.1 79.8	21.4 20.2 22.7 34.6 40.4
1975: Dec		1, 053. 3	73.7	190.6	360.3	428.6	67.3	65.7	72.9	42.7
1975: Jan	1, 183. 5 1, 191. 5 1, 199. 5 1, 208. 3 1, 218. 2 1, 233. 1	949. 4 956. 1 965. 0 973. 5 985. 6 1, 000. 5	68. 2 68. 7 69. 4 69. 5 70. 2 71. 0	185. 2 184. 7 185. 6 186. 3 187. 9 190. 2	323, 8 326, 9 329, 3 331, 7 335, 9 341, 5	372. 2 375. 9 380. 7 386. 0 391. 6 397. 8	63. 6 63. 9 64. 2 64. 5 64. 8 65. 2	48. 0 48. 7 49. 0 49. 6 50. 7 52. 2	82. 6 82. 1 79. 7 78. 5 75. 1 73. 6	39. 9 40. 6 41. 7 42. 1 42. 0 41. 6
July	1, 245. 4 1, 254. 0 1, 262. 6 1, 274. 9 1, 291. 5 1, 301. 8	1, 012. 2 1, 021. 4 1, 028. 8 1, 036. 8 1, 047. 5 1, 053. 3	71. 3 71. 9 72. 0 72. 6 73. 4 73. 7	190. 8 191. 7 192. 0 191. 2 192. 5 190. 6	345. 9 347. 8 349. 6 353. 0 357. 1 360. 3	404. 1 410. 0 415. 2 420. 0 424. 4 428. 6	65. 6 65. 9 66. 2 66. 6 66. 9 67. 3	54. 6 57. 1 58. 2 60. 5 64. 0 65. 7	71. 9 69. 0 69. 1 70. 6 71. 6 72. 9	41. 2 40. 6 40. 2 40. 4 41. 5 42. 7
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June		1, 064. 5 1, 078. 1 1, 087. 6 1, 101. 6 1, 112. 2 1, 118. 9	74. 2 75. 0 75. 7 76. 7 77. 3 77. 6	191. 0 191. 8 192. 0 194. 5 196. 0 195. 0	365, 8 372, 5 375, 9 381, 1 384, 6 387, 4	433. 5 438. 8 444. 0 449. 3 454. 3 458. 9	67. 6 68. 0 68. 3 68. 6 69. 0 69. 4	66. 5 66. 8 67. 8 68. 5 69. 1 70. 0	69. 5 66. 1 64. 1 62. 3 58. 9 61. 1	43. 1 43. 3 43. 6 44. 4 45. 8 47. 2
July	1, 380. 9 1, 388. 7 1, 398. 3 1, 414. 2 1, 427. 1	1, 131. 2 1, 144. 0 1, 156. 4 1, 171. 8 1, 183. 3	78. 1 78. 6 79. 1 79. 8 80. 3	195. 9 196. 7 195. 7 198. 2 197. 5	392. 7 397. 1 402. 7 408. 0 414. 0	464. 5 471. 6 478. 9 485. 8 491. 5	69. 7 70. 3 70. 8 71. 1 71. 5	72. 0 71. 4 69. 6 69. 0 68. 8	60. 0 54. 9 53. 4 53. 7 54. 0	48. 0 48. 2 48. 3 48. 7 49. 5

¹ Money stock components (see Table B-57) after deducting foreign holdings and holdings by domestic financial institutions. The three columns add to M₂ held by domestic nonfinancial sectors.
 ² As published in money stock statistics.
 ³ Series E and H savings bonds, other savings bonds, and savings notes held by individuals.
 ⁴ Short-term marketable U.S. Treasury securities excluding official, foreign, and financial institution holdings.
 ⁵ Certificates over \$100,000 at weekly reporting banks, except foreign holdings.
 ⁶ Commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, Federal funds, security repurchase agreements, and money market mutual fund shares held outside banks and other financial institutions.

TABLE B-60.—Total funds raised in credit markets by nonfinancial sectors, 1968-76 [Billions of dollars]

ltem	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Total funds raised	98. 3	93. 5	100. 7	151.0	176.9	197.6	188. 8	210. 4
U.S. Government	13.6	-3.7	11.9	24.7	15. 2	8.3	12.0	85. 2
Public debt securities Agency issues and mortgages	10. 5 3. 1	-1.3 -2.4	12.9 -1.0	26.0 -1.3	14. 3 1. 0	7.9 .4	12.0 0	85. 8 6
Foreign	2.8	3.7	2.7	5. 2	4. 0	6. 2	15. 3	13.0
Corporate equities Debt instruments	2.7	. 5 3. 2	2. 7	. 0 5. 2	4 4. 4	2 6. 4	2 15. 5	. 1 12. 8
Private domestic nonfinancial sectors	81.9	93. 5	86. 1	121. 1	157. 7	183.1	161.6	112.2
Corporate equities Debt instruments	2 82. 1	3. 4 90. 1	5. 7 80. 4	11. 4 109. 7	10.9 146.8	7.9 175.3	4. 1 157. 5	9.9 102.3
Debt capital instruments	51.8	52. 5	60. 2	86.8	102.8	106.7	101.2	101.3
State and local government obligations Corporate bonds Mortgages	9. 5 12. 9 29. 4	9.9 12.0 30.6	11. 2 19. 8 29. 2 14. 4	17. 5 18. 8 50. 5	15. 4 12. 2 75. 2	16.3 9.2 81.2	19. 6 19. 7 61. 9	17. 3 27. 2 56. 8
Home Multi-family residential Commercial. Farm	29. 4 17. 3 3. 4 6. 6 2. 2	18. 1 4. 9 5. 7 1. 8	14. 4 6. 9 7. 1 . 8	50. 5 28. 6 9. 7 9. 8 2. 4	12. 2 75. 2 42. 6 12. 7 16. 4 3. 6	46. 4 10. 4 18. 9 5. 5	34. 6 7. 0 15. 1 5. 1	40. 8 1 10. 9 5. 2
Other debt instruments	30. 2	37.6	20. 1	22.8	44. 0	68.6	56. 3	1.0
Consumer credit Bank (oans n.e.c Open-market paper Other	10. 0 13. 8 1. 5 5. 0	10. 4 15. 5 1. 8 9. 9	5.9 6.7 2.6 5.0	11.6 6.5 4 5.1	18. 6 18. 1 . 8 6. 5	21. 7 34. 8 2. 5 9. 6	9. 8 26. 2 6. 8 13. 5	8.5 -14.5 -2.2 9.1
By borrowing sector: Total	81.9	93.5	86.1	121. 1	157.7	183. 1	161.6	112. 2
State and local governments	9. 8 32. 1 40. 0 2. 8 5. 3 31. 9	10. 7 33. 8 48. 9 3. 1 7. 5 38. 4	11. 3 25. 3 49. 4 2. 3 5. 7 41. 5	17. 8 42. 1 61. 2 4. 5 10. 3 46. 4	15. 2 64. 8 77. 7 5. 8 13. 1 58. 8	14. 8 73. 5 94. 8 9. 7 12. 3 72. 9	18.6 45.2 97.8 7.9 6.7 83.1	14.9 49.7 47.6 9.4 1.2 37.1
Total funds advanced to nonfinancial sectors	98. 3	93, 5	100.7	151.0	176. 9	197. 6	188. 8	210. 4
Financed directly or indirectly by:					İ			
Private domestic nonfinancial sectors	61.6	46. 9	64.0	87.0	120.1	134. 8	123.3	146.5
Deposits	48.5	5. 1	64.2	92.8	105.3	90.3	75.7	96.7
Demand deposits and currency_ Time and savings accounts At commercial banks At savings institutions	20.7	7.3 -2.2 -10.6 8.4	8. 9 55. 3 38. 7 16. 6	13.7 79.1 39.5 39.6	21. 6 83. 7 38. 3 45. 4	14. 1 76. 2 47. 8 28. 4	8. 3 67. 4 45. 0 22. 4	11. 9 84. 8 25. 7 59. 2
Credit market instruments, net	13. 2	41.8	2	-5.8	14.8	44. 5	47.6	49. 8
U.S. Government securities Private credit market instru-	8.6	17.5	-7.1	-10.8	4.2	19.4	17.9	23. 0
ments Corporate equities Less security debt	11.9 -6.5	27. 2 -4. 5 -1. 6	6.8 8 9	10. 9 -3. 7 2. 1	19.5 -4.5 4.3	27. 8 -6. 9 -4. 2	30.1 -1.2 8	30. 7 -1. 8 2. 2
Other sources:								
Foreign funds At banks Direct	5. 1 2. 6 2. 5	11.0 9.6 1.3	2. 8 -8. 1 10. 9	23.3 -3.9 27.2	16.1 5.3 10.8	10.5 6.9 3.6	26. 3 14. 5 11. 7	10. 3 4 10. 7
Change in U.S. Government cash balance	-1.2 5.2	3.1	2. 8 2. 8	3. 2 2. 8	3 1.8	-1.7 2.8	-4.6 9.8	2. 9 15. 1
Private insurance and pension re- servesOther	18. 9 8. 6	19. 7 12. 4	21. 9 6. 4	24. 4 10. 3	26. 1 13. 0	30. 6 20. 5	33. 2 . 8	40. 0 -4. 4

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE B-60.—Total funds raised in credit markets by nonfinancial sectors, 1968-76—Continued [Billions of dollars]

Item	197 qu	6 unadju arterly fl	isted ows	19 adjus	76 seasor ted annua	ally al rates
Tem	١	11	111	1	11	111
Total funds raised	50.8	63. 5	62.2	233. 6	250. 3	258, 8
U.S. Government.	24, 1	9.4	18.0	73. 4	74. 2	78.9
Public debt securitiesAgency issues and mortgages	24. 1 0	9.4 0	17.8 .2	73. 4 0	74.4 —. 2	78. I
Foreign	3.7	4.6	3.6	16.6	14.7	18.0
Corporate equities	3.6	4. 6	3.6	16.2	.2 14.5	17. 8
Private domestic nonfinancial sectors	23. 0	49.6	40.6	143.6	161.4	161.8
Corporate equities Debt instruments	3. 2 19. 9	3. 5 46. 1	1.5 39.1	12.6 131.0	14.0 147.4	6, 1 155, 7
Debt capital instruments	23. 2	33. 1	30.5	105.3	118.3	118.6
State and local government obligations Corporate bonds Mortgages Home Multi-family Commercial Farm	1.8 6.5 14.9 11.3 1.9 1.5	7. 3 5. 0 20. 9 15. 4 .2 3. 4 1. 9	4. 7 3. 9 21. 8 16. 6 . 7 3. 1 1. 5	8. 1 25. 8 71. 4 53. 6 1. 3 10. 3 6. 1	28. 6 15. 5 74. 2 55. 2 12. 7 5. 8	18. 0 18. 1 82. 4 61. 9 2. 5 11. 5
Other debt instruments	-3.3	12.9	8.7	25. 7	29. 1	37.2
Consumer credit	-1.1 -8.5 1.6 4.7	6. 8 2. 2 1. 6 2. 3	6.5 2 4 2.7	18.1 -16.4 7.5 16.5	20.6 -9.0 8.8 8.6	19. 2 7. 3 -3. 9 14. 6
By borrowing sector: Total	23.0	49.6	40.6	143.6	161.4	161,8
State and local governments Households Nonfinancial business Farm Nonfarm noncorporate Corporate	2.8 9.2 11.0 2.6 4 8.9	5. 5 20. 6 23. 5 4. 6 2. 2 16. 7	5. 0 23. 1 12. 6 3. 2 1. 7 7. 7	12. 0 71. 1 60. 5 10. 7 4. 4 45. 4	21. 4 74. 6 65. 5 11. 3 6. 0 48. 1	18. 9 87. 0 56. 0 11. 8 6. 2 38. 0
Total funds advanced to nonfinancial sectors	50.8	63.5	62.2	233.6	250,3	258.8
Financed directly or indirectly by:						
Private domestic nonfinancial sectors	30.6	39. 5	28. 5	153. 7	156.0	152.2
Deposits	16. 3	27.4	14.0	109.4	80.8	107.7
Demand deposits and currency Time and savings accounts At commercial banks At savings institutions	-12.7 29.0 7.4 21.6	7. 6 19. 8 4. 4 15. 4	-7.8 21.7 7.3 14.5	17. 9 91. 4 17. 4 74. 0	7. 6 73. 2 15. 3 57. 9	-3.2 111.0 40.3 70.7
Credit market instruments, net	14. 4	12.1	14.6	44. 3	75.3	44. 4
U.S. Government securities Private credit market instruments Corporate equities Less security debt.	9. 0 6. 0 4 . 3	3. 1 10. 3 . 4 1. 7	9. 8 6. 8 -1. 3 . 7	22. 2 30. 9 -7. 7 1. 2	36. 9 41. 2 3. 8 6. 7	26. 9 28. 1 7. 9 2. 7
Other sources:			.,		",	
Foreign fundsAt banks	2. 6 -2. 4 5. 0	5. 0 2. 0 3. 0	3.7 8 4.5	15. 2 7. 9 23. 2	19. 9 7. 8 12. 1	8. 9 2. 0 10. 9
Change in U.S. Government cash balance	7 2. 8 12. 0 3. 6	6. 9 . 2 10. 9 1. 2	1. 4 3. 3 11. 0 14. 3	. 2 12. 0 47. 9 4. 7	21. 4 —. 2 43. 7 9. 5	3. 3 12. 1 43. 9 38. 9

Table B-61.—Federal Reserve Bank credit and member bank reserves, 1929-76 (Averages of daily figures; millions of dollars)

		Reserve Bar	ık credit ou	tstanding		Memb	er bank re	serves
Year and month	Total	U.S. Govern- ment se- curities	Membe borro Total	r bank wings Seasonal	All other, mainly float	Total	Re- quired	Excess
1929: Dec	1, 643 2, 669 2, 612	446 2, 432 2, 510	801 95 3		396 142 99	2, 395 2, 588 11, 473	2, 347 11, 822 6, 462	48 1 766 5, 011
1940: Dec	2, 305 2, 404 6, 035 11, 914 19, 612 24, 744 24, 746 22, 858 23, 978 19, 012	2, 188 2, 219 5, 549 11, 166 18, 693 23, 708 23, 767 21, 905 23, 002 18, 287	3 5 4 90 265 334 157 224 134		114 180 482 658 654 702 822 729 842 607	14, 049 12, 812 13, 152 12, 749 14, 168 16, 027 16, 517 17, 261 19, 990 16, 291	7, 403 9, 422 10, 776 11, 701 12, 884 14, 536 15, 617 16, 275 19, 193 15, 488	6, 646 3, 390 2, 376 1, 048 1, 284 1, 491 900 986 797 803
1950: Dec	21, 606 25, 446 27, 299 27, 107 26, 317 26, 853 27, 156 26, 186 28, 412 29, 435	20, 345 23, 409 24, 400 25, 639 24, 917 24, 602 24, 765 23, 982 26, 312 27, 036	142 657 1, 593 441 246 839 688 710 557 906		1, 119 1, 380 1, 306 1, 027 1, 154 1, 412 1, 703 1, 494 1, 543 1, 493	17, 391 20, 310 21, 180 19, 920 19, 279 19, 240 19, 535 19, 420 18, 899 2 18, 932	16, 364 19, 484 20, 457 19, 227 18, 576 18, 646 18, 883 18, 843 18, 383 18, 450	1, 027 826 723 693 703 594 652 577 516 482
1960: Dec 1961: Dec 1962: Dec 1963: Dec 1964: Dec 1965: Dec 1965: Dec 1966: Dec 1968: Dec	29, 060 31, 217 33, 218 36, 610 39, 873 43, 853 46, 864 51, 268 56, 610 64, 100	27, 248 29, 098 30, 546 33, 729 37, 126 40, 885 43, 760 48, 891 52, 529 57, 500	87 149 304 327 243 454 557 238 765 1,086		1, 725 1, 970 2, 368 2, 554 2, 504 2, 514 2, 547 2, 139 3, 316 5, 514	19, 283 20, 118 20, 040 20, 746 21, 609 22, 719 23, 830 25, 260 27, 221 28, 031	18, 527 19, 550 19, 468 20, 210 21, 198 22, 267 23, 438 24, 915 26, 766 27, 774	756 568 572 536 411 452 392 345 455
1970: Dec 1971: Dec 1972: Dec 1973: Dec 1974: Dec 1974: Dec 1975: Dec	66, 708 74, 255 76, 851 85, 642 93, 967 99, 651 107, 757	61, 688 69, 158 71, 094 79, 701 86, 679 92, 108 100, 328	321 107 1,049 1,298 703 127 62	41 32 13 13	4, 699 4, 990 4, 708 4, 643 6, 585 7, 416 7, 367	29, 265 31, 329 3 31, 353 3 35, 068 3 36, 941 4 34, 989 35, 258	28, 993 31, 164 31, 134 34, 806 36, 602 34, 727 34, 967	272 16: 3219 3262 3339 4262 291
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	93, 002 91, 168 90, 819 93, 214 97, 845 95, 119	86, 039 84, 744 84, 847 87, 080 91, 918 88, 912	390 147 106 110 60 271	13 10 7 7 9	6, 573 6, 277 5, 866 6, 024 5, 867 5, 936	37, 492 35, 565 34, 779 35, 134 34, 492 34, 976	37, 556 35, 333 34, 513 35, 014 34, 493 34, 428	64 232 266 120 1 548
July	94, 144 92, 395 95, 277 96, 931 97, 817 99, 651	88, 166 86, 829 89, 191 90, 476 90, 934 92, 108	261 211 396 191 61 127	17 38 61 65 28 13	5, 717 5, 355 5, 690 6, 264 6, 822 7, 416	34, 655 34, 482 34, 646 34, 567 34, 571 434, 989	34, 687 34, 265 34, 447 34, 411 34, 281 34, 727	-32 217 199 156 290 4 262
1976: Jan	100, 172 101, 369 101, 336 100, 317 102, 951 103, 106	92, 998 94, 610 94, 880 93, 243 95, 967 95, 592	79 76 58 44 121 120	9 11 8 11 11 20	7, 095 6, 683 6, 398 7, 030 6, 863 7, 394	35, 575 33, 953 33, 967 34, 063 34, 228 33, 774	35, 366 33, 939 33, 531 33, 974 33, 846 33, 657	209 14 436 89 382 117
July	104, 799 105, 393 105, 880 107, 270 106, 522	97, 105 98, 458 98, 797 100, 374 99, 507 100, 328	123 104 75 66 84 62	24 28 31 32 21 13	7, 571 6, 831 7, 008 6, 830 6, 931 7, 367	34, 146 34, 141 33, 979 34, 305 34, 797 35, 258	34, 076 33, 844 33, 692 34, 116 34, 433 34, 967	70 297 287 189 364 291

¹ Data are for licensed banks only.
2 Beginning December 1959, total reserves held include vault cash allowed.
3 Beginning November 1972, includes \$450 million of reserve deficiencies on which Federal Reserve Banks were allowed to waive penalties for a transition period in connection with bank adaptation to Regulation J as amended effective November 9, 1972. Beginning 1973, allowable deficiencies included are (beginning with first statement week of quarter): first quarter, \$279 million; second quarter, \$172 million; third quarter, \$112 million; fourth quarter, \$58 million. Beginning 1974 allowable deficiencies included are: first quarter, \$67 million and second quarter, \$58 million. Transition period ended after second quarter 1974.
4 Effective November 1975 includes reserve deficiencies on which penalties are waived over a 24-month period when a nonmember bank merges into an existing member bank, or when a nonmember bank joins the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE B-62.—Aggregate reserves and member bank deposits, 1959-76 [Averages of daily figures; 1 billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted]

	Memb	oer bank res	erves ²	Deposits	subject to re	eserve requi	rements ³	Total member
Year and month	Total	Non-	Required	Total	Time and	Den	nand	bank deposits plus
	TOLET	borrowed	Kednilea	TULAS	savings	Private	U.S. Gov- ernment	non- deposit items 4
1959: Dec	18.63	17,68	18, 12	158.2	54.3	99.0	4.8	158, 2
1 960: Dec	18. 92	18, 84	18. 17	162. 5	58. 8	99. 1	4. 6	162. 5
1961: Dec	19. 75	19, 61	19. 16	175. 5	67. 7	102. 9	4. 9	175. 5
1962: Dec	19. 66	19, 40	19. 08	189. 0	79. 9	103. 3	5. 7	189. 6
1963: Dec	20. 31	19, 98	19. 82	203. 2	92. 1	105. 9	5. 2	203. 4
1964: Dec	21. 19	20, 92	20. 78	218. 7	103. 7	109. 1	5. 9	220. 1
1965: Dec	22. 18	21. 74	21, 76	238. 3	120. 7	112, 8	4. 9	239. 9
1966: Dec	23. 28	22. 75	22, 94	246. 3	128. 7	113, 9	3. 7	250. 4
1967: Dec	24. 76	24. 53	24, 38	275. 6	148. 9	121, 2	5. 5	280. 0
1968: Dec	27. 05	26. 30	26, 62	299. 7	164. 5	130, 4	4. 9	306. 8
1969: Dec	27. 93	26. 81	27, 65	287. 5	150. 5	131, 9	5. 2	306. 8
1970: Dec	29. 11	28. 77	28. 86	320. 8	178. 8	135. 9	6. 2	332. 9
1971: Dec	31. 24	31. 12	31. 06	360. 1	210. 5	143. 7	5. 8	365. 0
1972: Dec	31. 44	30. 39	31. 16	402. 3	241. 7	154. 4	6. 2	406. 6
1973: Dec	34. 98	33. 69	34. 68	442. 8	279. 7	158. 1	5. 0	449. 4
1974: Dec	36. 63	35. 90	36. 37	486. 9	322. 9	160. 6	3. 4	495. 3
1975: Dec	34. 75	34. 62	34. 49	506. 0	338. 7	164. 4	3. 0	514. 4
1976: Dec p	35. 02	34. 97	34. 72	530. 1	355. 5	171. 3	3. 2	539. 2
1975: Jan	36. 37	35. 97	36. 22	490. 1	328. 2	159. 3	2.6	497. 7
	35. 49	35. 34	35. 30	490. 9	329. 1	159. 9	1.9	497. 4
	34. 99	34. 88	34. 79	493. 4	329. 2	161. 7	2.5	499. 9
	35. 08	34. 97	34. 92	494. 1	329. 7	161. 7	2.7	500. 8
	34. 74	34. 67	34. 58	493. 7	328. 6	162. 6	2.5	501. 2
	35. 07	34. 85	34. 87	499. 5	330. 5	165. 8	3.2	506. 5
July	34. 98	34. 68	34. 79	498. 3	330, 8	164. 9	2.6	505. 1
	34. 88	34. 67	34. 69	496. 3	328, 4	165. 1	2.8	503. 3
	34. 99	34. 59	34. 80	498. 4	329, 8	165. 6	3.0	505. 5
	34. 79	34. 60	34. 58	500. 1	333, 1	164. 0	3.0	508. 0
	34. 73	34. 67	34. 44	505. 9	336, 1	165. 9	3.9	514. 1
	34. 75	34. 62	34. 49	506. 0	338, 7	164. 4	3.0	514. 4
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	34. 32 34. 05 34. 00 34. 02 34. 14 34. 34	34. 24 33. 97 33. 95 33. 98 34. 02 34. 21	34. 08 33. 83 33. 78 33. 87 33. 93 34. 12	506. 2 507. 6 507. 8 509. 8 507. 8 513. 9	338.9 339.5 339.4 340.2 338.3 342.3	164. 7 165. 5 165. 8 167. 2 167. 2 167. 9	2. 6 2. 5 2. 5 2. 3 3. 7	514. 1 515. 6 516. 0 517. 3 515. 3 522. 3
July	34. 39	34. 25	34. 15	514. 9	344. 2	168. 0	2.7	523. 6
	34. 52	34. 42	34. 32	513. 6	341. 1	168. 7	3.9	522. 5
	34. 36	34. 30	34. 16	515. 3	342. 6	168. 9	3.8	523. 5
	34. 49	34. 39	34. 27	519. 6	345. 9	170. 3	3.4	528. 6
	34. 88	34. 81	34. 62	525. 3	350. 0	170. 8	4.5	534. 4
	35. 02	34. 97	34. 72	530. 1	355. 5	171. 3	3.2	539. 2

¹ Except as noted in footnote 4.

² Member bank reserves series reflects actual reserve requirement percentages with no adjustment to eliminate the effect of changes in Regulations D and M.

³ Deposits subject to reserve requirements include total time and savings deposits and net demand deposits as defined by Regulation D. Private demand deposits include all demand deposits except those due to the U.S. Government, less cash items in process of collection and demand balances due from domestic commercial banks.

⁴ Total member bank deposits subject to reserve requirements, plus Eurodollar borrowings, loans sold to bank-related institutions (data relate to Wednesday figures), and certain other nondeposit items. This series for deposits is referred to as "the adjusted bank credit proxy."

TABLE B-63.—Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-76
[Percent per annum]

	U.S. Gov	ernment s	securities	Corporate bonds (Moody's)		High- grade munic-	Average rate on short- term	Prime com-	Dis- count rate,	Federal	New -
Year or month	3-month Treas- ury bills 1	3–5 year issues ²	Taxable bonds 3	Aaa	Baa	ipal bonds (Stand- ard & Poor's)	bank loans to busi- ness— selected cities	mer- cial paper, 4-6 months	Federal Reserve Bank of New York 4	funds rate 5	mort- gage yields (FHLBB) (⁶)
1929				4.73	5, 90	4, 27		5. 85	5. 16		
1933	0.515	2.66		4.49	7.76	4.71		1.73	2.56	 	
1939	. 023	. 59		3.01	4. 96	2.76	2.1	. 59	1.00		
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944	. 103	.50 .73 1.46 1.34 1.33	2. 46 2. 47 2. 48	2. 84 2. 77 2. 83 2. 73 2. 72	4. 75 4. 33 4. 28 3. 91 3. 61	2. 50 2. 10 2. 36 2. 06 1. 86	2.1 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.4	. 56 . 53 . 66 . 69 . 73	1.00 1.00 7 1.00 7 1.00 7 1.00		
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	. 375	1. 18 1. 16 1. 32 1. 62 1. 43	2.37 2.19 2.25 2.44 2.31	2.62 2.53 2.61 2.82 2.66	3. 29 3. 05 3. 24 3. 47 3. 42	1. 67 1. 64 2. 01 2. 40 2. 21	2. 2 2. 1 2. 1 2. 5 2. 68	. 75 . 81 1. 03 1. 44 1. 49	7 1.00 7 1.00 1.00 1.34 1.50		
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	1. 552 1. 766 1. 931	1.50 1.93 2.13 2.56 1.82	2. 32 2. 57 2. 68 2. 94 2. 55	2. 62 2. 86 2. 96 3. 20 2. 90	3. 24 3. 41 3. 52 3. 74 3. 51	1. 98 2. 00 2. 19 2. 72 2. 37	2. 69 3. 11 3. 49 3. 69 3. 61	1. 45 2. 16 2. 33 2. 52 1. 58	1. 59 1. 75 1. 75 1. 99 1. 60		
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	2.658	2.50 3.12 3.62 2.90 4.33	2.84 3.08 3.47 3.43 4.07	3. 06 3. 36 3. 89 3. 79 4. 38	3.53 3.88 4.71 4.73 5.05	2. 53 2. 93 3. 60 3. 56 3. 95	3. 70 4. 20 4. 62 4. 34 5. 00	2. 18 3. 31 3. 81 2. 46 3. 97	1.89 2.77 3.12 2.15 3.36	1. 78 2. 73 3. 11 1. 57 3. 30	
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	2. 928 2. 378 2. 778 3. 157	3. 99 3. 60 3. 57 3. 72 4. 06	4. 01 3. 90 3. 95 4. 00 4. 15	4. 41 4. 35 4. 33 4. 26 4. 40	5, 19 5, 08 5, 02 4, 86 4, 83	3. 73 3. 46 3. 18 3. 23 3. 22	5, 16 4, 97 5, 00 5, 01 4, 99	3. 85 2. 97 3. 26 3. 55 3. 97	3. 53 3. 00 3. 00 3. 23 3. 55	3, 22 1, 96 2, 68 3, 18 3, 50	5. 9: 5. 8:
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	4. 881 4. 321 5. 339	4. 22 5. 16 5. 07 5. 59 6. 85	4. 21 4. 66 4. 85 5. 25 6. 10	4, 49 5, 13 5, 51 6, 18 7, 03	4.87 5.67 6.23 6.94 7.81	3. 27 3. 82 3. 98 4. 51 5. 81	5. 06 6. 00 6. 00 6. 68 8. 21	4. 38 5. 55 5. 10 5. 90 7. 83	4. 04 4. 50 4. 19 5. 17 5. 87	4. 07 5. 11 4. 22 5. 66 8. 21	5. 81 6. 21 6. 46 6. 91 7. 8
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	4. 348	7. 37 5. 77 5. 85 6. 92 7. 81	6. 59 5. 74 5. 63 6. 30 6. 99	8. 04 7. 39 7. 21 7. 44 8. 57	9. 11 8. 56 8. 16 8. 24 9. 50	6. 51 5. 70 5. 27 5. 18 6. 09	8. 48 6. 32 5. 82 8. 30 11. 28	7. 72 5. 11 4. 69 8. 15 9. 87	5, 95 4, 88 4, 50 6, 45 7, 83	7. 17 4. 67 4. 44 8. 74 10. 51	8. 4 7. 7 7. 6 7. 9 8. 9
1975 1976	5.838	7.55 6.94	6.98 6.78	8.83 8.43	10.61 9.75	6.89 6.49	8. 65 7. 52	6. 33 5. 35	6.25 5.50	5.82 5.05	9, 0 8, 9

See next page for continuation of table and for footnotes.

TABLE B-63.—Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-76-Continued [Percent per annum]

,	U.S. Government securities			bò	Corporate bonds (Moody's)		Average rate on short- term	Prime com-	Dis- count rate,	F. J .	New- home
Year or month	3-month Treas- ury bills ¹	3–5 year issues ²	Taxable bonds 3	Aaa	Baa	ipal bonds (Stand- ard & Poor's)	bank loans to busi- ness— selected cities	mer- cial paper, 4-6 months	Federal Reserve Bank of New York 4	Federal funds rate 5	mort- gage yields (FHLBB)
1974: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	7, 755 7, 060 7, 986 8, 229 8, 430 8, 145	6. 94 6. 77 7. 33 7. 99 8. 24 8. 14	6. 56 6. 54 6. 81 7. 04 7. 07 7. 03	7. 83 7. 85 8. 01 8. 25 8. 37 8. 47	8. 48 8. 53 8. 62 8. 87 9. 05 9. 27	5. 20 5. 19 5. 36 5. 67 5. 96 6. 08	9. 91	8. 66 7. 83 8. 42 9. 79 10. 62 10. 96	71/2-71/2 71/2-71/2 71/2-71/2 71/2-8 8 -8 8 -8	9. 65 8. 97 9. 35 10. 51 11. 31 11. 93	8. 52 8. 62 8. 64 8. 67 8. 74 8. 85
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	7. 752 8. 744 8. 363 7. 244 7. 585 7. 179	8. 39 8. 64 8. 38 7. 98 7. 65 7. 22	7. 18 7. 33 7. 30 7. 22 6. 93 6. 78	8. 72 9. 00 9. 24 9. 27 8. 90 8. 89	9, 48 9, 77 10, 18 10, 48 10, 60 10, 63	6. 54 6. 58 6. 65 6. 46 6. 47 6. 93	12. 40	11. 72 11. 65 11. 23 9. 36 8. 81 8. 98	8 -8 8 -8 8 -8 8 -8 8 -8 8 -7 ³ / ₄	12. 92 12. 01 11. 34 10. 06 9. 45 8. 53	8. 96 9. 09 9. 19 9. 17 9. 27 9. 37
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	6. 493 5. 583 5. 544 5. 694 5. 315 5. 193	7. 29 6. 85 7. 00 7. 76 7. 49 7. 26	6. 68 6. 61 6. 73 7. 03 6. 99 6. 86		10. 81 10. 65 10. 48 10. 58 10. 69 10. 62	6. 66 6. 30 6. 61 6. 83 6. 81 6. 76	9. 94 8. 16	7. 30 6. 33 6. 06 6. 15 5. 82 5. 79	734-714 714-634 634-614 614-64 614-6 6 -6	7. 13 6. 24 5. 54 5. 49 5. 22 5. 55	9. 33 9. 12 9. 06 8. 96 8. 90 8. 96
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	6. 164 6. 463 6. 383 6. 081 5. 468 5. 504	7. 72 8. 12 8. 22 7. 80 7. 51 7. 50	6. 89 7. 06 7. 29 7. 29 7. 21 7. 17	8. 84 8. 95 8. 95 8. 86 8. 78 8. 79	10. 55 10. 59 10. 61 10. 62 10. 56 10. 56	6. 94 7. 02 7. 23 7. 22 7. 21 7. 06	8. 22	6. 44 6. 70 6. 86 6. 48 5. 91 5. 97	6 -6 6 -6 6 -6 6 -6 6 -6	6. 10 6. 14 6. 24 5. 82 5. 22 5. 20	8. 89 8. 89 8. 94 9. 01 9. 01 9. 01
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	4. 961 4. 852 5. 047 4. 878 5. 185 5. 443	7.18 7.18 7.25 6.99 7.35 7.40	6. 94 6. 92 6. 87 6. 73 6. 99 6. 92	8. 60 8. 55 8. 52 8. 40 8. 58 8. 62	10. 41 10. 24 10. 12 9. 94 9. 86 9. 89	6. 80 6. 91 6. 86 6. 62 6. 87 6. 85	7.54	5. 27 5. 23 5. 37 5. 23 5. 54 5. 94	6 -5½ 5½-5½ 5½-5½ 5½-5½ 5½-5½ 5½-5½	4.77 4.84 4.82 5.29	8. 99 8. 93 8. 93 8. 92 8. 97 8. 89
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	5. 278 5. 153 5. 075 4. 930 4. 810 4. 354	7. 24 7. 04 6. 84 6. 50 6. 35 5. 96	6. 85 6. 79 6. 70 6. 65 6. 62 6. 39	8. 56 8. 45 8. 38 8. 32 8. 25 7. 98	9. 82 9. 64 9. 40 9. 29 9. 23 9. 12	6. 64 6. 28 6. 20 6. 06 6. 05 5. 69	7.80	5. 67 5. 47 5. 45 5. 22 5. 05 4. 70	5½-5½ 5½-5½ 5½-5½ 5½-5½ 5½-5½ 5½-5¼	5. 25 5. 03 4. 95	8. 97 9. 02 9. 08 9. 07 9. 05 9. 10

¹ Rate on new issues within period. First issued in December 1929.

Rate on new issues within period. First issued in December 1929.

3 Selected note and bond issues.

3 First issued in 1941. Series includes bonds which are neither due nor callable before a given number of years as follows: April 1953 to date, 10 years; April 1952–March 1953, 12 years; November 1941–March 1952, 15 years.

4 Average effective rate for the year; opening and closing rate for the month.

5 Based on seven-day averages of daily effective rates for weeks ending Wednesday. Since July 19, 1975, the daily effective rate is an average of the rates on a given day weighted by the volume of transactions at these rates. Prior to that date, the daily effective rate was the rate considered most representative of the day's transactions, usually the one at which most transactions occurred.

⁶ Effective rate (in the primary market) on conventional mortgages, reflecting fees and charges as well as contract rate and assumed, on the average, repayment at end of 10 years. Rates beginning January 1973 not strictly comparable with prior rates

⁷ From October 30, 1942, to April 24, 1946, a preferential rate of 0.50 percent was in effect for advances secured by Government securities maturing in 1 year or less.

⁸ Series revised. Not strictly comparable with earlier data.

Sources: Department of the Treasury, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), Moody's Investors Service, and Standard & Poor's Corporation.

Table B-64.—Instalment credit extensions and liquidations, 1971-76 1
[Millions of dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

					Revo	lving	
Year or month	Total	Auto- mobile	Mobile home	Home improve- ment	Bank credit card	Bank check credit	All other
Extensions:				-			
1971	123, 086	34, 778	2, 628	3, 170	8, 377	2, 026	72, 107
1972	140, 072	40, 266	5, 036	3, 915	10, 390	2, 489	77, 976
1973	160, 228	46, 105	6, 011	4, 414	13, 863	3, 373	86, 462
1974	160, 008	43, 209	4, 899	4, 571	17, 098	4, 227	86, 004
1975	163, 483	48, 103	3, 452	4, 398	20, 428	4, 024	83, 079
1975	185, 900	55, 439	3, 101	5, 038	25, 493	4, 823	92, 006
1975: Jan	12, 435 12, 937 12, 593	3, 444 4, 002 3, 637 3, 612 3, 699 3, 865	307 271 275 280 281 270	334 333 354 336 350 373	1, 585 1, 570 1, 585 1, 627 1, 600 1, 678	330 322 314 320 313 302	6, 435 6, 440 6, 428 6, 662 6, 780 6, 700
July	14 048	4, 104 4, 143 4, 330 4, 354 4, 441 4, 642	284 268 292 289 345 313	372 371 382 384 408 421	1, 684 1, 743 1, 806 1, 781 1, 842 1, 839	336 342 339 352 341 396	7, 309 7, 181 7, 045 7, 450 7, 203 7, 618
1976: Jan	15. 132	4, 505	272	440	1, 921	361	7, 633
Feb		4, 523	266	405	2, 012	392	7, 447
Mar		4, 689	296	414	2, 118	380	7, 624
Apr		4, 583	247	413	1, 985	394	7, 382
May		4, 471	231	385	2, 103	422	7, 429
June		4, 600	272	410	2, 088	435	7, 786
July	15, 240	4, 477	282	381	2, 152	401	7, 546
	15, 685	4, 712	240	400	2, 183	413	7, 737
	15, 775	4, 769	253	434	2, 165	375	7, 779
	16, 055	4, 587	236	463	2, 198	413	8, 158
	15, 763	4, 632	261	464	2, 181	410	7, 815
	16, 275	4, 820	255	470	2, 245	435	8, 050
Liquidations:				}			
1971	113, 788	31, 303	1, 751	2, 939	7, 679	1, 901	68, 215
1972	124, 513	34, 705	2, 905	3, 238	9, 472	2, 175	72, 017
1973	140, 552	40, 137	3, 634	3, 381	12, 433	2, 894	78, 072
1974	151, 056	42, 883	4, 099	3, 767	15, 655	3, 684	80, 969
1975	156, 640	45, 472	3, 793	4, 150	19, 208	4, 010	80, 007
1976 2	169, 463	48, 311	3, 792	4, 249	23, 754	4, 636	84, 719
1975: Jan	12, 581 12, 621 12, 860 12, 820 13, 325 12, 738	3, 622 3, 657 3, 873 3, 748 3, 777 3, 727	308 313 307 305 316 312	368 334 349 347 341 359	1, 438 1, 483 1, 515 1, 527 1, 529 1, 555	334 335 331 343 330	6, 511 6, 499 6, 481 6, 564 7, 019 6, 456
July	12, 803	3, 719	314	321	1, 591	319	6, 539
	13, 211	3, 884	317	328	1, 634	327	6, 721
	13, 201	3, 869	306	334	1, 670	320	6, 702
	13, 429	3, 860	329	356	1, 696	324	6, 864
	13, 255	3, 835	322	334	1, 762	336	6, 667
	13, 738	3, 883	344	353	1, 832	386	6, 940
1976: Jan	14, 029	3, 966	364	331	1, 815	372	7, 181
	13, 923	3, 909	353	348	1, 881	374	7, 058
	14, 048	4, 026	314	344	1, 926	364	7, 074
	13, 576	3, 851	309	374	1, 846	359	6, 836
	13, 566	3, 819	286	314	1, 911	378	6, 859
	14, 261	4, 074	315	330	1, 990	421	7, 132
July	13, 937	3, 922	319	362	1, 981	374	6, 979
	14, 282	4, 090	292	361	2, 097	419	7, 023
	14, 294	4, 165	322	369	2, 000	358	7, 081
	14, 491	4, 059	307	390	2, 074	386	7, 274
	14, 520	4, 155	320	360	2, 110	404	7, 170
	14, 670	4, 190	315	370	2, 105	425	7, 265

¹ Excludes 30-day charge credit held by retailers, oil and gas companies, and travel and entertainment companies.
2 Preliminary; December by Council of Economic Advisers.

Note.—Consumer instalment credit consists of short- and intermediate-term credit extended through regular business channels to finance the purchase of goods and services for personal consumption, or to refinance debts incurred for such purposes, and scheduled to be repaid in two or more instalments. Mortgage credit is excluded.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (except as noted).

TABLE B-65.—Mortgage debt outstanding by type of property and of financing, 1939-76 [Billions of dollars]

-				Nonfarm (oropertie	s	No	onfarm p	roperties	by type	of mortg	age
							Gove	ernment	underwr	itten	Conve	ntional 2
End of year or quarter	All prop- erties	Farm prop- erties	Total	1- to 4- family	Multi- family prop-	Com- mer- cial		1- to 4	l-family	houses		1- to 4-
				houses	erties	prop- erties 1	Total	Total	FHA in- sured	VA guar- anteed	Total	family houses
1939	35. 5	6. 6	28. 9	16.3	5.6	7.0	1.8	1.8	1.8		27. 1	14.5
1940	36. 5	6. 5	30. 0	17. 4	5. 7	6. 9	2. 3	2. 3	2. 3		27. 7	15. 1
1941	37. 6	6. 4	31. 2	18. 4	5. 9	7. 0	3. 0	3. 0	3. 0		28. 2	15. 4
1942	36. 7	6. 0	30. 8	18. 2	5. 8	6. 7	3. 7	3. 7	3. 7		27. 1	14. 5
1943	35. 3	5. 4	29. 9	17. 8	5. 8	6. 3	4. 1	4. 1	4. 1		25. 8	13. 7
1944	34. 7	4. 9	29. 7	17. 9	5. 6	6. 2	4. 2	4. 2	4. 2		25. 5	13. 7
1945	35. 5	4. 8	30. 8	18. 6	5. 7	6. 4	4. 3	4. 3	4. 1	0. 2	26. 5	14. 3
	41. 8	4. 9	36. 9	23. 0	6. 1	7. 7	6. 3	6. 1	3. 7	2. 4	30. 6	16. 9
	48. 9	5. 1	43. 9	28. 2	6. 6	9. 1	9. 8	9. 3	3. 8	5. 5	34. 1	18. 9
	56. 2	5. 3	50. 9	33. 3	7. 5	10. 2	13. 6	12. 5	5. 3	7. 2	37. 3	20. 8
	62. 7	5. 6	57. 1	37. 6	8. 6	10. 8	17. 1	15. 0	6. 9	8. 1	40. 0	22. 6
1950	72. 8	6. 1	66. 7	45. 2	10. 1	11. 5	22. 1	18. 9	8. 6	10. 3	44. 6	26. 3
1951	82. 3	6. 7	75. 6	51. 7	11. 5	12. 5	26. 6	22. 9	9. 7	13. 2	49. 0	28. 8
1952	91. 4	7. 2	84. 2	58. 5	12. 3	13. 4	29. 3	25. 4	10. 8	14. 6	54. 9	33. 1
1953	101. 3	7. 7	93. 6	66. 1	12. 9	14. 5	32. 1	28. 1	12. 0	16. 1	61. 5	38. 0
1954	113. 7	8. 2	105. 4	75. 7	13. 5	16. 3	36. 2	32. 1	12. 8	19. 3	69. 2	43. 6
1955	129. 9	9. 0	120. 9	88. 2	14. 3	18. 3	42. 9	38. 9	14. 3	24. 6	78. 0	49. 3
1956	144. 5	9. 8	134. 6	99. 0	14. 9	20. 7	47. 8	43. 9	15. 5	28. 4	86. 8	55. 1
1957	156. 5	10. 4	146. 1	107. 6	15. 3	23. 2	51. 6	47. 2	16. 5	30. 7	94. 6	60. 4
1958	171. 8	11. 1	160. 7	117. 7	16. 8	26. 1	55. 1	50. 1	19. 7	30. 4	105. 5	67. 6
1959	190. 8	12. 1	178. 7	130. 9	18. 7	29. 2	59. 3	53. 8	23. 8	30. 0	119. 4	77. 0
1960	207. 5	12. 8	194. 7	141. 9	20. 3	32. 4	62.3	56. 4	26. 7	29. 7	132. 3	85, 5
	228. 0	13. 9	214. 1	154. 7	23. 0	36. 4	65.6	59. 1	29. 5	29. 6	148. 5	95, 6
	251. 4	15. 2	236. 2	169. 3	25. 8	41. 1	69.4	62. 2	32. 3	29. 9	166. 9	107, 1
	278. 5	16. 8	261. 7	186. 4	29. 0	46. 2	73.4	65. 9	35. 0	30. 9	188. 2	120, 5
	305. 9	18. 9	287. 0	203. 4	33. 6	50. 0	77.2	69. 2	38. 3	30. 9	209. 8	134, 1
1965	333. 3	21. 2	312. 1	220. 5	37. 2	54. 5	81. 2	73, 1	42. 0	31. 1	231. 0	147. 4
1966	356. 5	23. 1	333. 4	232. 9	40. 3	60. 1	84. 1	76, 1	44. 8	31. 3	249. 3	156. 9
1967	381. 2	25. 1	356. 1	247. 3	43. 9	64. 8	88. 2	79, 9	47. 4	32. 5	267. 9	167. 4
1968	410. 9	27. 4	383. 5	264. 8	47. 3	71. 4	93. 4	84, 4	50. 6	33. 8	290. 1	180. 4
1969	441. 4	29. 2	412. 2	282. 8	52. 3	77. 1	100. 2	90, 2	54. 5	35. 7	312. 0	192. 7
1970	474. 2	30. 3	443. 8	298. 1	60. 1	85. 6	109. 2	97.3	59. 9	37. 3	334. 6	200. 9
	526. 5	32. 2	494. 3	328. 9	69. 8	95. 5	120. 7	105.2	65. 7	39. 5	373. 5	223. 7
	603. 4	35. 8	567. 7	372. 8	82. 6	112. 3	131. 1	113.0	68. 2	44. 7	436. 5	259. 8
	682. 3	41. 3	641. 1	416. 9	92. 9	131. 3	135. 0	116.2	66. 2	50. 0	506. 0	300. 6
	742. 5	46. 3	696. 2	449. 9	99. 9	146. 4	140. 2	121.3	65. 1	56. 2	556. 0	328. 6
1975		50.9	750.7	491.7	100.3	158. 6	147.0	127. 7	66. 1	61.6	603. 7	364.0
1974:	696. 8	42. 1	654. 7	424. 7	95. 1	135. 0	136. 6	117. 7	66. 0	51. 7	518. 1	307. 0
	717. 0	43. 8	673. 2	436. 5	96. 9	139. 8	137. 7	118. 4	65. 5	52. 9	535. 5	318. 1
	731. 9	45. 2	686. 7	444. 7	98. 6	143. 4	138. 7	119. 7	65. 1	54. 5	548. 1	325. 1
V	742. 5	46. 3	696. 2	449. 9	99. 9	146. 4	140. 2	121. 3	65. 1	56. 2	556. 0	328. 6
1975: 	752. 2 768. 6 785. 4 801. 5	47. 6 49. 2 50. 2 50. 9	704.6 719.4 735.2 750.7	455. 2 467. 4 480. 0 491. 7	100. 5 100. 4 100. 5 100. 3	148. 9 151. 6 154. 7 158. 6	142. 0 142. 9 145. 0 147. 0	123. 3 123. 7 125. 7 127. 7	65. 5 65. 8 65. 9 66. 1	57.7 58.0 59.8 61.6	562.6 576.4 590.2 603.7	332. 0 343. 6 354. 3 364. 0
1976: 1 	817. 4 839. 2 861. 7	52. 4 54. 2 55. 7	765. 1 784. 9 806. 0	503. 4 519. 6 536. 6	100.7 101.0 101.8	161. 0 164. 4 167. 5	148. 3 150. 5	129. 1 131. 2	66. 2 67. 1	62.9 64.1	616. 8 634. 4	374. 3 388. 4

¹ Includes negligible amount of farm loans held by savings and loan associations.

3 Derived figures.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, estimated and compiled from data supplied by various Government and private organizations.

TABLE B-66:—Mortgage debt outstanding by holder, 1939-76
[Billions of dollars]

i	1		Major f	inancial inst	itutions		Other I	olders
End of year or quarter	Total	Total	Savings and loan associa- tions	Mutual savings banks	Com- mercial banks ¹	Life insurance com- panies	Federal and related agencies 3	Indi- viduals and others
1939	35. 5	18.6	3.8	4.8	4.3	5, 7	5. 0	11.
940 941 942 943 944	36. 5 37. 6 36. 7 35. 3 34. 7	19. 5 20. 7 20. 7 20. 2 20. 2	4. 1 4. 6 4. 6 4. 6 4. 8	4. 9 4. 8 4. 6 4. 4 4. 3	4.6 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.4	6. 0 6. 4 6. 7 6. 7	4.9 4.7 4.3 3.6 3.0	12. 12. 11. 11.
945946947948949	35. 5 41. 8 48. 9 56. 2 62. 7	21. 0 26. 0 31. 8 37. 8 42. 9	5. 4 7. 1 8. 9 10. 3 11. 6	4. 2 4. 4 4. 9 5. 8 6. 7	4.8 7.2 9.4 10.9 11.6	6. 6 7. 2 8. 7 10. 8 12. 9	2. 4 2. 0 1. 8 1. 8 2. 3	12. 13. 15. 16.
950 951952953954	72.8 82.3 91.4 101.3 113.7	51. 7 59. 5 66. 9 75. 1 85. 7	13. 7 15. 6 18. 4 22. 0 26. 1	8. 3 9. 9 11. 4 12. 9 15. 0	13.7 14.7 15.9 16.9 18.6	16. 1 19. 3 21. 3 23. 3 26. 0	2. 8 3. 5 4. 1 4. 6 4. 8	18. 19. 20. 21. 23.
955 956 957 958 958	129. 9 144. 5 156. 5 171. 8 190. 8	99. 3 111. 2 119. 7 131. 5 145. 5	31. 4 35. 7 40. 0 45. 6 53. 1	17. 5 19. 7 21. 2 23. 3 25. 0	21. 0 22. 7 23. 3 25. 5 28. 1	29. 4 33. 0 35. 2 37. 1 39. 2	5. 3 6. 2 7. 7 8. 0 10. 2	25. 27. 29. 32. 35.
960	207. 5 228. 0 251. 4 278. 5 305. 9	157. 6 172. 6 192. 5 217. 1 241. 0	60. 1 68. 8 78. 8 90. 9 101. 3	26. 9 29. 1 32. 3 36. 2 40. 6	28. 8 30. 4 34. 5 39. 4 44. 0	41. 8 44. 2 46. 9 50. 5 55. 2	11. 5 12. 2 12. 6 11. 8 12. 2	38. 43. 46. 49. 52.
965	333. 3 356. 5 381. 2 410. 9 441. 4	264. 6 280. 8 298. 8 319. 9 339. 1	110.3 114.4 121.8 130.8 140.2	44.6 47.3 50.5 53.5 56.1	49. 7 54. 4 59. 0 65. 7 70. 7	60. 0 64. 6 67. 5 70. 0 72. 0	13. 5 17. 5 20. 9 25. 1 31. 1	55. 58. 61. 65. 71.
970971972973974	474. 2 526. 5 603. 4 682. 3 742. 5	355. 9 394. 2 450. 0 505. 4 542. 6	150. 3 174. 3 206. 2 231. 7 249. 3	57. 9 62. 0 67. 6 73. 2 74. 9	73.3 82.5 99.3 119.1 132.1	74. 4 75. 5 76. 9 81. 4 86. 2	38. 3 46. 4 54. 6 64. 8 82. 1	79. 85. 98. 112. 117.
975	801.5	581.3	278.7	77.2	136.2	89. 2	101.0	119.
974: I	696. 8 717. 0 731. 9 742. 5	514. 1 528. 2 537. 4 542. 6	236. 1 243. 4 247. 6 249. 3	73. 9 74. 2 74. 8 74. 9	121. 9 127. 3 130. 6 132. 1	82. 2 83. 2 84. 4 86. 2	67. 5 72. 0 77. 2 82. 1	115. 116. 117. 117.
975: I	752, 2 768, 6 785, 4 801, 5	546. 7 558. 1 569. 9 581. 3	252. 4 261. 3 270. 6 278. 7	75, 2 75, 8 76, 5 77, 2	131. 9 133. 0 134. 5 136. 2	87. 2 88. 0 88. 3 89. 2	86. 3 91. 0 95. 9 101. 0	119. 119. 119. 119.
1976: I I	817. 4 839. 2 861. 7	592. 1 609. 1 626. 0	286. 6 299. 6 312. 2	77. 7 78. 7 79. 8	138.0 141.1 144.0	89. 8 89. 7 90. 0	105. 0 107. 4 111. 9	120. 122. 123.

¹ Includes loans held by nondeposit trust companies, but not by bank trust departments.

Includes former Federal National Mortgage Association and new Government National Mortgage Association, as well as Federal Housing Administration, Veterans Administration, Public Housing Administration, Farmers Home Administration, and in earlier years Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Homeowners Loan Corporation, and Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation. Also includes GNMA Pools and U.S.-sponsored agencies such as new FNMA, Federal Land Banks, and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. Other U.S. agencies (amounts small or current separate data not readily available) included with "individuals and others."

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, based on data from various Government and private organizations.

TABLE B-67.—Net public and private debt, 1929-751 'Billions of dollars!

			Public					Private					
								Indiv	dual and	noncorp	orate		
End of year	Total	Fed- eral	Fed- erally	State and	ind	Total Corporate	Total	Farm 4	Nonfarm				
÷		Gov- ern- ment 2	spon- sored credit agen- cies *	local gov- ern- ments	Total				Total	Mort- gage	Com- mer- cial and finan- cial 5	Con- sumer	
929	191.9	16.5		13.6	161.8	88. 9	72.9	12.2	60.7	31.2	22.4	7,	
933	168.5	24.3		16.3	127.9	76.9	51.0	9.1	41.9	26.3	11.7	3.	
939	183. 3	42.6		16.4	124. 3	73. 5	50.8	8.8	42.0	25.0	9.8	7.	
940	189. 8 211. 4 258. 6 313. 2 370. 6	44. 8 56. 3 101. 7 154. 4 211. 9		16. 4 16. 1 15. 4 14. 5 13. 9	128.6 139.0 141.5 144.3 144.8	75. 6 83. 4 91. 6 95. 5 94. 1	53. 0 55. 6 49. 9 48. 8 50. 7	9. 1 9. 3 9. 0 8. 2 7. 7	43.9 46.3 40.9 40.5 42.9	26. 1 27. 1 26. 8 26. 1 26. 0	9.5 10.0 8.1 9.5 11.8	8. 9. 6. 4. 5.	
1945	405. 9 396. 6 415. 7 431. 3 445. 8	252. 5 229. 5 221. 7 215. 3 217. 6	0.7 .6 .7	13. 4 13. 7 15. 0 17. 0 19. 1	140. 0 153. 4 178. 3 198. 4 208. 4	85. 3 93. 5 108. 9 117. 8 118. 0	54. 7 59. 9 69. 4 80. 6 90. 4	7.3 7.6 8.6 10.8 12.0	47. 4 52. 3 60. 7 69. 7 78. 4	27. 0 31. 8 37. 2 42. 4 47. 1	14.7 12.1 11.9 12.9 13.9	5. 8. 11. 14. 17.	
1950	486. 2 519. 2 550. 2 581. 6 605. 9	217. 4 216. 9 221. 5 226. 8 229. 1	1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3	21. 7 24. 2 27. 0 30. 7 35. 5	246. 4 276. 8 300. 4 322. 7 340. 0	142. 1 162. 5 171. 0 179. 5 182. 8	104.3 114.3 129.4 143.2 157.2	12.3 13.7 15.2 16.8 17.5	92. 0 100. 6 114. 2 126. 4 139. 7	54. 8 61. 7 68. 9 76. 7 86. 4	15. 8 16. 2 17. 8 18. 4 20. 8	21. 22. 27. 31. 32.	
1955	665. 8 698. 4 728. 3 769. 6 833. 0	229. 6 224. 3 223. 0 231. 0 241. 4	2. 9 2. 4 2. 4 2. 5 3. 7	41. 1 44. 5 48. 6 53. 7 59. 6	392. 2 427. 2 454. 3 482. 4 528. 3	212. 1 231. 7 246. 7 259. 5 283. 3	180. 1 195. 5 207. 6 222. 9 245. 0	18. 7 19. 4 20. 2 23. 2 23. 8	161. 4 176. 1 187. 4 199. 7 221. 2	98. 7 109. 4 118. 1 128. 1 141. 0	24. 0 24. 4 24. 3 26. 5 28. 7	38. 42. 45. 45. 51.	
1960	874. 2 930. 3 996. 0 1, 070. 9 1, 151. 6	239. 8 246. 7 253. 6 257. 5 264. 0	3. 5 4. 0 5. 3 7. 2 7. 5	64. 9 70. 5 77. 0 83. 9 90. 4	566. 1 609. 1 660. 1 722. 3 789. 7	302. 8 324. 3 348. 2 376. 4 409. 6	263. 3 284. 8 311. 9 345. 8 380. 1	25. 1 27. 5 30. 2 33. 2 36. 0	238. 2 257. 3 281. 7 312. 6 344. 1	151.3 164.5 180.3 198.6 218.9	30. 8 34. 8 37. 6 42. 3 45. 0	56. 58. 63. 71. 80.	
1965 1966 1967 1968	1, 245. 0 1, 339. 9 1, 439. 6 1, 583. 4 1, 737. 6	266. 4 271. 8 286. 4 291. 9 289. 3	8. 9 11. 2 9. 0 21. 5 30. 6	122.7	871. 4 952. 1 1, 031. 5 1, 147. 4 1, 284. 4	454. 3 506. 6 553. 6 631. 5 734. 2	417. 1 445. 5 477. 9 515. 9 550. 2	39. 3 42. 2 47. 9 51. 7 55. 2	377. 8 403. 3 429. 9 464. 2 495. 0	236. 8 251. 6 267. 0 284. 9 303. 9	51. 1 55. 4 62. 2 68. 5 70. 0	89. 96. 100. 110. 121.	
1970 1971 1972 1973	1, 869. 6 2, 050. 7 2, 275. 9 2, 532. 1 2, 768. 6	301. 1 325. 9 341. 2 349. 1 360. 8	38.8 39.9 41.4 59.8 76.4	144. 8 162. 8 176. 9 189. 5 206. 4	1, 384. 9 1, 522. 1 1, 716. 5 1, 933. 7 2, 124. 9	797. 3 871. 3 975. 3 1, 106. 7 1, 239. 0	587. 7 650. 8 741. 2 827. 0 885. 9	57.8 62.5 68.2 79.0 89.2	529. 8 588. 3 673. 0 748. 1 796. 6	332. 4 372. 6 426. 2 482. 8 523. 7	70. 3 76. 5 88. 9 84. 5 81. 5	127. 139. 157. 180. 191.	
1975		446. 3	78.8	216.1	2, 255. 9	1, 306. 2	949.7	98.0	851.7	566.1	88.8	196.	

¹ Net public and private debt is a comprehensive aggregate of the indebtedness of borrowers after eliminating certain

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), based on data from various Federal agencies and other sources.

The public and private debt is a comprehensive aggregate of the indebtedness of borrowers after eliminating certain types of duplicating government and corporate debt.

2 Net Federal Government debt is the outstanding debt held by the public, as defined in "The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1978."

3 Debt of agencies in which there is no longer any Federal proprietary interest. The obligations of the Federal Land Banks are included beginning with 1947, the debt of the Federal Home Loan Banks is included beginning with 1951, and the debts of the Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, and Banks for Cooperatives are included beginning with 1968.

4 Farm mortgages and farm production loans. Farmers' financial and consumer debt is included in the nonfarm categories 5 Debt to banks (other than consumer credit), security credit, policy loans, and some single-payments loans.

GOVERNMENT FINANCE

TABLE B-68.—Federal budget receipts, outlays, and debt, fiscal years 1968-78
[Millions of dollars; fiscal years]

			Act	ual		
Description	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
BUDGET RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS:						
Total receipts	153, 671	187, 784	193, 743	188, 392	208, 649	232, 225
Federal funds Trust funds Interfund transactions	114, 726 44, 716 -5, 771	143, 321 52, 009 7, 547	143, 158 59, 362 -8, 778	133, 785 66, 193 —11, 586	148, 846 72, 959 —13, 156	161, 357 92, 193 21, 325
Total outlays	178, 833	184, 548	196, 588	211, 425	232, 021	247, 074
Federal funds Trust funds Interfund transactions	143, 105 41, 499 —5, 771	148, 811 43, 284 -7, 547	156, 301 49, 065 8, 778	163, 651 59, 361 11, 586	178, 104 67, 073 —13, 156	186, 951 81, 447 21, 325
Total surplus or deficit (-)	25, 161	3, 236	-2, 845	-23, 033	23, 372	-14, 849
Federal funds Trust funds	-28, 379 3, 217	-5, 490 8, 725	-13, 143 10, 297	-29, 866 6, 832	-29, 258 5, 886	-25, 594 10, 746
OUTSTANDING DEBT, END OF YEAR:						
Gross Federal debt	369, 769	367, 144	382, 603	409, 467	437, 329	468, 426
Held by Government agencies Held by the public	79, 140 290, 629	87, 661 279, 483	97, 723 284, 880	105, 140 304, 328	113, 559 323, 770	125, 381 343, 045
Federal Reserve System Others	52, 230 238, 399	54, 095 225, 388	57, 714 227, 166	65, 518 238, 810	71, 426 252, 344	75, 182 267, 863
BUDGET RECEIPTS	153, 671	187, 784	193, 743	188, 392	208, 649	232, 225
Individual income taxes. Corporation income taxes. Social insurance taxes and contributions. Excise taxes. Estate and gift taxes. Customs duties. Deposit of earnings by Federal Re-	68, 726 28, 665 34, 622 14, 079 3, 051 2, 038	87, 249 36, 678 39, 918 15, 222 3, 491 2, 319	90, 412 32, 829 45, 298 15, 705 3, 644 2, 430	86, 230 26, 785 48, 578 16, 614 3, 735 2, 591	94, 737 32, 166 53, 914 15, 477 5, 436 3, 287	103, 246 36, 153 64, 542 16, 260 4, 917 3, 188
serve System	2, 091 400	2, 662 247	3, 266 158	3, 533 325	3, 252 381	3, 495 426
BUDGET OUTLAYS	178, 833	184, 548	196, 588	211, 425	232, 021	247, 074
National defense International affairs General science, space, and technology Natural resources, environment, and energy. Agriculture Commerce and transportation Community and regional development Education, training, employment, and social services.	79, 409 4, 612 5, 522 4, 010 4, 541 10, 637 1, 891	80, 207 3, 784 5, 016 3, 901 5, 779 7, 065 2, 224	79, 284 3, 564 4, 508 4, 043 5, 164 9, 090 3, 166	76, 807 3, 093 4, 180 4, 941 4, 288 10, 396 3, 632	77, 356 3, 868 4, 174 5, 521 5, 279 10, 601 4, 325	75, 072 3, 504 4, 030 5, 947 4, 855 9, 930 5, 529
social services. Health Income security Veterans benefits and services. Law enforcement and justice. General government. Revenue sharing and general purpose fiscal	7, 004 9, 708 33, 680 6, 882 650 1, 684	6, 871 11, 758 37, 281 7, 640 761 1, 649	7, 888 13, 051 43, 066 8, 677 952 1, 940	9, 045 14, 716 55, 423 9, 776 1, 299 2, 159	11, 694 17, 471 63, 911 10, 730 1, 650 2, 466	11, 874 18, 832 72, 958 12, 013 2, 131 2, 682
assistanceinterest	311 13, 751	365 15, 793	451 18, 312	488 19, 609	531 20, 582	7, 222 22, 813
AllowancesUndistributed offsetting receipts	-5, 460	-5, 545	-6, 567	—8, 427	-8, 137	-12, 318
Composition of undistributed offsetting re- ceipts:						
Employer share, employee retirement_ Interest received by trust funds Rents and royalties on the Outer Conti-	-1, 825 -2, 674	-2, 018 -3, 099	-2, 444 -3, 936	-2, 611 -4, 765	-2, 768 -5, 089	-2, 927 -5, 436
nental Shelf	-961	-428	-187	-1,051	-279	-3, 956

See next page for continuation of table and for footnotes.

TABLE B-68.—Federal budget receipts, outlays, and debt, fiscal years 1968-78—Continued [Millions of dollars; fiscal years]

Description BUDGET RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS: Total receipts	1974 264, 932 181, 219 104, 846 -21, 133	1975 280, 997	1976	Transition quarter	Estin	mate 1978
BUDGET RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS: Total receipts	264, 932		1976		1977	1978
Total receipts Federal funds Trust funds Interfund transactions Total outlays		280, 997				
Federal funds Trust funds Interfund transactions Total outlays		280, 997				
Trust funds	181, 219 104, 846		300, 005	81, 773	354, 045	393, 017
	-21, 133	187, 505 118, 590 25, 098	201, 099 133, 695 —34, 789	54, 085 32, 071 -4, 383	237, 405 153, 558 -36, 918	258, 926 170, 515 —36, 425
Federal funds	269, 620	326, 105	366, 466	94, 746	411, 243	439, 967
Federal funds	199, 920 90, 833 -21, 133	240, 031 111, 171 —25, 098	269, 969 131, 286 34, 789	65, 106 34, 023 4, 383	303, 136 145, 026 -36, 918	319, 335 157, 057 —36, 425
Total surplus or deficit (—)	-4, 688	-45, 108	-66, 461	—12, 973	57, 198	-46, 950
Federal funds	-18, 701 14, 013	-52, 526 7, 419	-68, 870 2, 410	-11, 021 1, 952	-65, 730 8, 532	-60, 409 13, 459
OUTSTANDING DEBT, END OF YEAR: Gross Federal debt	486, 247	544, 131	631,866	646, 379	716, 725	784, 973
Held by Government agencies	140, 194 346, 053	147, 225 396, 906	151, 566 480, 300	148, 052 498, 327	156, 398 560, 327	169, 146 615, 827
Federal Reserve System Others	80, 649 265, 404	84, 993 311, 913	94, 714 385, 586	96, 702 401, 625		
BUDGET RECEIPTS	264, 932	280, 997	300, 005	81, 773	354, 045	393, 017
Individual income taxes. Corporation income taxes. Social insurance taxes and contributions. Excise taxes. Estate and gift taxes. Customs duties. Miscellaneous receipts:	38, 620 76, 780 16, 844 5, 035	122, 386 40, 621 86, 441 16, 551 4, 611 3, 676	131, 603 41, 409 92, 714 16, 963 5, 216 4, 074	38, 801 8, 460 25, 760 4, 473 1, 455 1, 212	153, 097 56, 604 108, 883 17, 926 5, 907 4, 713	171, 217 58, 910 126, 068 18, 513 5, 806 5, 262
Deposit of earnings by Federat Reserve System All other	1	5, 777 934	5, 451 2, 575	1,500 112	6, 000 915	6, 400 841
BUDGET OUTLAYS	269, 620	326, 105	366, 466	94, 746	411, 243	439, 967
National defense International affairs General science, space, and technology Natural resources, environment, and energy Agriculture Commerce and transportation Community and regional development	13,056	86, 585 5, 862 3, 989 9, 537 1, 660 16, 010 4, 431	89, 996 5, 067 4, 370 11, 282 2, 502 17, 248 5, 300	22, 518 1, 997 1, 161 3, 324 584 4, 700 1, 530	100, 075 7, 150 4, 434 17, 050 2, 899 16, 106 7, 695	112, 262 7, 281 4, 725 19, 747 2, 333 19, 252 7, 868
Education, training, employment, and social services — Health — Income security — Veterans benef ts and services — Law enforcement and justice — General government — Revenue sharing and general purpose fiscal	11, 598 22, 074 84, 431 13, 386 2, 462 3, 327	15, 248 27, 647 108, 605 16, 597 2, 942 3, 089	18, 167 33, 448 127, 406 18, 432 3, 320 2, 927	5, 013 8, 720 32, 796 3, 962 859 878	21, 114 39, 251 138, 118 18, 388 3, 712 3, 731	19, 358 43, 205 143, 892 18, 279 3, 789 3, 930
assistance Interest	28,072	7, 005 30, 974	7, 119 34, 589	2, 024 7, 246	8, 926 37, 987	8, 089 39, 735 2, 651
AllowancesUndistributed offsetting receipts		-14, 075	-14, 704	-2, 567	-15, 393	-16, 429
Composition of undistributed offsetting receipts: Employer share, employee retirement. Interest received by trust funds Rents and royalties on the Outer Continental Shelf	-6,583	-3, 980 -7, 667 -2, 428	-4, 242 -7, 800 -2, 662	-985 -270 -1, 311	-4, 592 -8, 201 -2, 600	-4, 670 -8, 659 -3, 100

Note.—Under provisions of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the fiscal year for the Federal Government shifted beginning with fiscal year 1977. Through fiscal year 1976, the fiscal year runs from July 1 through June 30; starting in October 1976 (fiscal year 1977), the fiscal year runs from October 1 through September 30. The 3-month period from July 1, 1976 through September 30, 1976 is a separate fiscal period known as the transition quarter.

Sources: Department of the Treasury and Office of Management and Budget.

TABLE B-69.—Federal budget receipts and outlays, fiscal years 1929-78 [Millions of dollars]

Fiscal year	Receipts	Outlays	Surplus or deficit (—)
1929	3, 862	3, 127	734
1933	1, 997	4, 598	-2,602
1939	4, 979	8, 841	-3, 862
1940	6, 361 8, 621 14, 350 23, 649 44, 276	9, 456 13, 634 35, 114 78, 533 91, 280	3, 095 5, 013 20, 764 54, 884 47, 004
1945	45, 216 39, 327 38, 394 41, 774 39, 437	92, 690 55, 183 34, 532 29, 773 38, 834	-47, 474 -15, 856 3, 862 12, 001
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	39, 485 51, 646 66, 204 69, 574 69, 719	42, 597 45, 546 67, 721 76, 107 70, 890	-3, 112 6, 100 -1, 517 -6, 533 -1, 170
1955	65, 469 74, 547 79, 990 79, 636 79, 249	68, 509 70, 460 76, 741 82, 575 92, 104	-3, 041 4, 087 3, 249 -2, 939 -12, 855
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	92, 492 94, 389 99, 676 106, 560 112, 662	92, 223 97, 795 106, 813 111, 311 118, 584	269 —3, 406 —7, 137 —4, 751 —5, 922
1965. 1966. 1967. 1968.	116, 833 130, 856 149, 552 153, 671 187, 784	118, 430 134, 652 158, 254 178, 833 184, 548	1, 596 3, 796 8, 702 25, 161 3, 236
1970	193, 743 188, 392 208, 649 232, 225 264, 932	196, 588 211, 425 232, 021 247, 074 269, 620	-2, 845 -23, 033 -23, 372 -14, 849 -4, 688
1975 1976. Transition quarter 1977 ¹	280, 997 300, 005 81, 773 354, 045 393, 017	326, 105 366, 466 94, 746 411, 243 439, 967	45, 108 66, 461 12, 973 57, 198 46, 950

¹ Estimate.

Note.—Under provisions of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the fiscal year for the Federal Government shifted beginning with fiscal year 1977. Through fiscal year 1976, the fiscal year runs from July 1 through June 30; starting in October 1976 (fiscal year 1977), the fiscal year runs from October 1 through September 30. The 3-month period from July 1, 1976 through September 30, 1976 is a separate fiscal period known as the transition quarter.

Data for 1929-39 are according to the administrative budget and those beginning 1940 according to the unified budget. Certain interfund transactions are excluded from receipts and outlays beginning 1932. For years prior to 1932 the amounts of the processions are excluded from receipts and outlays beginning 1932.

of such transactions are not significant.
Refunds of receipts are excluded from receipts and outlays.

Sources: Department of the Treasury and Office of Management and Budget.

Table B-70.—Relation of the Federal budget to the Federal sector of the national income and product accounts, fiscal years, 1976-78

[Billions of dollars; fiscal years]

Descripts and our and thurse	1070	Transition	Estir	nate
Receipts and expenditures	1976	quarter	1977	1978
RECEIPTS				
Total budget receipts	300.0	81.8	354.0	39 3. 0
Government contribution for employee retirement (grossing) Other netting and grossing Adjustment to accruals Other	2. 3 6. 0	1.6 .6 2.3 —.2	6. 8 2. 7 -1. 8 -1. 1	7.5 3.0 3.2 -1.0
Federal sector, national income and product accounts, receipts EXPENDITURES	313. 6	86, 2	360. 7	405. 7
Total budget outlays	366. 5	94.7	411.2	440.0
Lending and financial transactions Government contribution for employee retirement (grossing)	2. 3 2. 6 2. 1	-1.3 1.6 .6 .8 1.1 9	-3.2 6.8 2.7 2.0 1.9 -1.5	-3.8 7.5 3.0 1.0 2.3 -2.8
Federal sector, national income and product accounts, expenditures	373.0	96. 7	419. 9	447. 1

Note.—See Note, Table B-69.
See Special Analysis A, "Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1978" for description of these categories.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Department of the Treasury, and Office of Management and Budget.

Table B-71.—Receipts and expenditures of the government sector of the national income and product accounts, 1929-76

	Tota	al governi	nent	Fede	ral Govern	ment		ate and lo governmer	
Calendar year or quarter	Re- ceipts	Ex- pendi- tures	Sur- plus or deficit (-), national income and prod- uct ac- counts	Re- ceipts	Ex- pendi- tures	Sur- plus or deficit (—), national income and prod- uct ac- counts	Re- ceipts	Ex- pendi- tures	Surplus or deficit (-), national income and product accounts
1929	11.3	10.3	1.0	3. 8	2.6	1.2	7.6	7.8	-0.2
1933	9.3	10. 7	-1.4	2. 7	4.0	-1.3	7. 2	7.2	1
939	15. 4	17.6	-2.2	6. 7	8.9	-2.2	9.6	9.6	.0
1940	17. 7 25. 0 32. 6 49. 2 51. 2 53. 2 51. 0 56. 9 58. 9 55. 9	18. 4 28. 8 64. 0 93. 3 103. 0 92. 7 45. 6 42. 5 50. 5	7 -3. 8 -31. 4 -44. 1 -51. 8 -39. 5 5. 4 14. 4 8. 4 -3. 4	8. 6 15. 4 22. 9 39. 3 41. 0 42. 5 39. 1 43. 2 43. 2 38. 7	10. 0 20. 5 56. 1 85. 8 95. 5 84. 6 35. 6 29. 8 34. 9	-1.3 -5.1 -33.1 -46.6 -54.5 -42.1 3.5 13.4 8.3 -2.6	10. 0 10. 4 10. 6 10. 9 11. 1 11. 6 13. 0 15. 4 17. 7 19. 5	9. 3 9. 1 8. 8 8. 4 8. 5 9. 0 11, 1 14. 4 17. 6 20. 2	.6 1.3 1.8 2.5 2.7 2.6 1.9 1.0
1950	69. 0 85. 2 90. 1 94. 6 89. 9 101. 1 109. 7 116. 2 115. 0 129. 4	61. 0 79. 2 93. 9 101. 6 97. 0 98. 0 104. 5 115. 3 127. 6 131. 0	8.0 6.1 -3.8 -6.9 -7.1 3.1 5.2 .9 -12.6 -1.6	50. 0 64. 3 67. 3 70. 0 63. 7 72. 6 78. 0 81. 9 78. 7 89. 8	40. 8 57. 8 71. 1 77. 1 69. 8 68. 1 71. 9 79. 6 88. 9 91. 0	9. 2 6. 5 -3. 7 -7. 1 -6. 0 4. 4 6. 1 2. 3 -10. 3 -1. 1	21. 3 23. 4 25. 4 27. 4 29. 0 31. 7 35. 0 38. 5 42. 0 46. 4	22. 5 23. 9 25. 5 27. 3 30. 2 32. 9 35. 9 39. 8 44. 3 46. 9	-1. 2 4 0 . 1 -1. 1 -1. 3 9 -1. 4 -2. 4
1960	139. 5 144. 8 156. 7 168. 5 174. 0 188. 3 212. 3 228. 2 263. 4 296. 3	136. 4 149. 1 160. 5 167. 8 176. 3 187. 8 213. 6 242. 4 268. 9 285. 6	3. 1 -4. 3 -3. 8 -7 -2. 3 -1. 3 -14. 2 -5. 5 10. 7	96. 1 98. 1 106. 2 114. 4 114. 9 124. 3 141. 8 150. 5 174. 7 197. 0	93. 1 101. 9 110. 4 114. 2 118. 2 123. 8 143. 6 163. 7 180. 6 188. 4	3.0 -3.9 -4.2 .3 -3.3 -1.8 -13.2 -5.8 8.5	49. 9 54. 0 58. 5 63. 2 69. 5 75. 1 84. 8 93. 6 107. 2 119. 7	49. 8 54. 4 58. 0 62. 8 68. 5 75. 1 84. 3 94. 7 106. 9 117. 6	1.0 4 5 1.0 0 1.1 2.1
970	302. 6 322. 2 367. 4 411. 2 454. 6 466. 4 530. 8	311. 9 340. 5 370. 9 404. 9 458. 8 530. 8 575. 3	-9.4 -18.3 -3.5 6.3 -4.2 -64.4 -44.5	192. 1 198. 6 227. 5 258. 3 288. 2 286. 5 330. 6	204. 2 220. 6 244. 7 265. 0 299. 7 357. 8 388. 9	-12.1 -22.0 -17.3 -6.7 -11.5 -71.2 -58.3	134. 9 152. 6 177. 4 193. 5 210. 2 234. 3 260. 5	132. 2 148. 9 163. 7 180. 5 203. 0 227. 5 246. 6	2. 8 3. 7 13. 7 13. 6 6. 9
1974: 	436. 1 450. 3 468. 1 463. 8	431. 4 450. 2 469. 1 484. 6	4.7 .2 -1.0 -20.8	276. 7 285. 8 297. 5 292. 9	280. 7 293. 4 306. 5 318. 2	-4.1 -7.6 -9.0 -25.3	201. 9 208. 0 214. 5 216. 6	193. 2 200. 2 206. 5 212. 0	8. 7 7. 8 8. 0 4. 5
1975: 	459. 6 431. 6 480. 7 493. 7	504. 7 524. 5 538. 7 555. 2	-45.0 -92.9 -58.1 -61.5	287. 2 254. 4 297. 7 306. 7	337. 0 354. 3 363. 7 376. 0	-49.8 -99.9 -66.0 -69.4	222. 2 230. 4 239. 7 245. 0	217. 5 223. 4 231. 8 237. 2	4. 7 6. 9 7. 9 7. 9
1976: 		560. 9 567. 4 580. 3 592. 5	-51.6 -44.9 -44.7	316. 5 324. 6 333. 8	380. 3 378. 7 391. 1 405. 6	-63.8 -54.1 -57.4	251, 6 254, 3 262, 0	239. 5 245. 0 249. 3 252. 4	12. 2 9. 2 12. 7

Note.—Federal grants-in-aid to State and local governments are reflected in Federal expenditures and State and local receipts and expenditures. Total government receipts and expenditures have been adjusted to eliminate this duplication.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Table P-72.—Receipts and expenditures of the Federal Government sector of the national income and product accounts, 1949-78

			leceipts					iy aqjus E	xpendit				Sur-
Year or quarter	Total	Per- sonal tax and non- tax re- ceipts	Cor- po- rate profits tax ac- cruals	Indi- rect bus:- ness tax and non- tax ac- cru- ais	Con- tribu- tions for social insur- ance	Total ¹	Pur- chases of goods and serv- ices	Trar payn To per- sons	To for-eign-ers	Grants- in-aid to State and local govern- ments	Net in- ter- est paid	Subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises	plus or defi- cit (—), na- tion- al in- come and prod- uct ac- counts
Fiscal year: 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1977 1978 1977 1978 Calendar year:	61. 1 65. 2 69. 4 65. 8 76. 3 81. 0 78. 1 85. 4 95. 0 104. 0 110. 0 132. 7 136. 0 190. 1 194. 9 192. 5 240. 5 240. 5 243. 6 360. 7	23. 2 28. 8 31. 4 30. 7 33. 6 7 36. 2 42. 5 43. 6 50. 7 51. 4 57. 5 49. 6 71. 4 90. 0 93. 6 87. 5 107. 3 122. 3 127. 3 127. 3 127. 5	21. 7 19. 4 19. 7 17. 3 18. 9 21. 5 20. 7 21. 4 20. 7 23. 3 20. 7 23. 3 30. 8 33. 0 33. 0 34. 0 41. 6 60. 6 65. 5	9. 5 9. 7 10. 7 10. 8 11. 7 12. 0 13. 3 14. 2 15. 6 16. 9 17. 16 19. 2 20. 7 20. 7 24. 5 24. 6 24. 6 26. 1	6.73 7.68 7.78 8.77.8 10.37 12.39 11.39 122.4.59 123.59 124.59 125.91 125.91 126.91 116.6	44. 7 66. 0 75. 9 74. 3 76. 0 82. 8 91. 3 98. 1 106. 1 117. 2 118. 5 132. 7 154. 9 172. 2 184. 7 232. 9 256. 2 278. 9 447. 1	25. 7 47. 2 56. 4 53. 9 44. 5 48. 1 51. 1 54. 8 52. 9 55. 8 63. 7 65. 9 64. 6 72. 4 98. 0 98. 0 97. 0 98. 0 91. 0 101. 7 104. 8 119. 0 127. 2 144. 8 160. 0	8. 1 9. 2 10. 5 12. 8 19. 9 20. 6 17. 8 19. 9 20. 6 25. 1 26. 5 27. 4 28. 4 37. 2 42. 7 55. 0 76. 1 153. 6 167. 7 175. 9	3.1 6 2.1 7 1.7 2.1.8 1.97 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3	2.45 2.28 2.29 3.3.27 4.72 6.99 6.76 6.96 7.83 9.89 10.78 11.88 10.27 11.88 12.26 12.26 13.36 14.63 15.66 16	4.45 4.66 4.68 4.68 5.56 6.44 6.77 7.72 8.96 10.5 113.62 114.1 115.9 19.8 21.8 21.8 21.8 20.8 30.0	1.8982764543101138216484197831 1.22223.44.4.54.6484197.55.78.	16. 4 -8. 5 -8. 5 -8. 5 -8. 5 -9. 2 -1. 5 -1. 5 -1. 5 -1. 5 -1. 5 -1. 5 -1. 5 -1. 7 -1. 7 -1
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1965 1966 1967 1968 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1975 1975 1975 1976 1975 1976 1975 1976 1975 1976 1975 1976 1976 1977 1978	70. 0 63. 7 72. 6 78. 0 78. 7 89. 8 96. 1 106. 2 114. 4 114. 9 124. 3 141. 8 150. 5 174. 7 192. 1 193. 6 227. 5 258. 3 228. 2 286. 5 330. 6 287. 2 254. 4 297. 7 306. 7	125. 7 145. 3 137. 6 99. 7 130. 5 135. 1	9.6 17.2 2 11.1 2 20.4 4 18.0 5 21.1 2 22.5 21.4 5 22.5 22.5 33.8 4 33.7 36.2 2 30.8 35.5 36.6 4 25.6 9 34.8 7 4 4 9.4 4 5 3.1 8 5 3.8 7 7 4 9.4 5 3.1 8	8. 0 9. 4 10. 3 10. 9 9. 7 10. 7 11. 8 11. 2 5 11. 8 11. 2 5 11. 6 . 5 16. 3 11. 5 . 6 16. 3 11. 2 20. 0 20. 0 21. 2 21. 7 23. 5 21. 9 23. 2 25. 5 22. 8 23. 3	5.0 9 5.1 7 7.4 4 8.2 9 9.4 6 112.3 20.5 5 24.0 0 25.0 1 36.7 8 47.0 4 54.9 8 92.8 9 92.8 9 92.8 9 92.8 9 92.8 9 94.7 9 96.6 6 102.6	41. 3 40. 8 57. 8 71. 1 77. 1 69. 8 68. 1 71. 9 91. 0 93. 1 101. 4 114. 2 118. 2 123. 8 143. 6 163. 7 180. 6 244. 7 255. 0 299. 7 357. 8 388. 9 376. 0 380. 3 378. 7	20. 4 18. 7 38. 3 52. 4 57. 5 44. 5 45. 9 53. 9 53. 7 63. 6 65. 2 67. 3 90. 9 97. 5 96. 2 102. 1 111. 6 124. 4 120. 3 122. 4 129. 2 131. 5	8.7 10. 8 8 8.8 4 9.1 11. 5 8 8.8 8.9 4 9.1 11. 5 9.1 12.4 4 115. 7 20.1 121.6 0 225.6 0.2 27. 9 9.3 23.5 3 40.1 14.3 14.5 9.0 135. 7 146.6 6 11.3 145.9 0 135.7 145.6 6 11.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5	5.16.3.6.1.3.1.2.1.8.8.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2	2.23 2.56 2.89 3.13 4.26 5.68 6.52 8.01 10.44 11.14 11.59 120.3 42.9 43.49 43.49 45.60 43.49 45.60 56.80 56.	4.4444.6461.5.5.5.22.66.82.83.64.99.84.29.35.5.5.22.33.66.62.23.66.62.27.7	.600 .871.054 .1054 .2244 .422.160 .44.293 .455 .457 .45.226 .565 .666.71 .542	-2.6 9.2 6.5 -3.7 -7.1 -6.0 4.4 6.1 3.0 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5

¹ Wage accruals less disbursements have been subtracted from total. These were (in billions of dollars at seasonally adjusted annual rates) .0 in each of the quarters of 1975 and 1976.
² Estimates.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Office of Management and Budget.

Table B-73.—Receipts and expenditures of the State and local government sector of the national income and product accounts, 1946-76

			Rec	eipts				Exp	enditure	s		Surplus
Calendar year or quarter	Total	Per- sonal tax and nontax receipts	Cor- porate profits tax accruals	Indirect busi- ness tax and nontax accruals	Contri- butions for social insur- ance	Fed- eral grants- in-aid	Total 1	Pur- chases of goods and serv- ices	Trans- fer pay- ments to per- sons	Net interest paid	Sub- sidies less current surplus of gov- ern- ment enter- prises	or deficit (—),
1946 1947 1948 1949	13. 0 15. 4 17. 7 19. 5	1.5 1.7 2.1 2.4	0, 5 . 6 . 7 . 6	9. 3 10. 7 12. 2 13. 3	0.6 .7 .8 .9	1. 1 1. 7 2. 0 2. 2	11. 1 14. 4 17. 6 20. 2	9. 9 12. 8 15. 3 18. 0	1. 7 2. 3 3. 0 3. 0	0. 2 .1 .1 .1	-0.7 8 8 9	1.9 1.0 .1 7
1950	21. 3 23. 4 25. 4 27. 4 29. 0	2. 5 2. 8 3. 0 3. 2 3. 5	.8 .9 .8 .8	14.6 15.9 17.4 18.8 19.9	1. 1 1. 4 1. 6 1. 7 2. 0	2.3 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.9	22. 5 23. 9 25. 5 27. 3 30. 2	19. 8 21. 8 23. 2 25. 0 27. 8	3. 6 3. 1 3. 3 3. 5 3. 6	.1 .0 .0 .0	9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2 -1.3	-1.2 4 0 -1.1
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	31.7 35.0 38.5	3. 9 4. 5 5. 0 5. 4 6. 1	1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0	21. 6 23. 8 25. 7 27. 2 29. 3	2. 1 2. 3 2. 6 2. 8 3. 1	3. 1 3. 3 4. 2 5. 6 6. 8	32. 9 35. 9 39. 8 44. 3 46. 9	30. 6 33. 5 37. 1 41. 1 43. 7	3.8 3.9 4.3 4.8 5.1	.1 .1 .1 .1	-1.5 -1.6 -1.7 -1.7 -2.0	-1.3 9 -1.4 -2.4 4
1960 1961 1962 1963	49. 9 54. 0 58. 5 63. 2	6. 7 7. 4 8. 2 8. 8 10. 0	1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.8	32. 0 34. 4 37. 0 39. 4 42. 6	3. 4 3. 7 3. 9 4. 2 4. 7	6. 5 7. 2 8. 0 9. 1 10. 4	49. 8 54. 4 58. 0 62. 8 68. 5	46. 5 50. 8 54. 3 59. 0 64. 6	5. 4 5. 8 6. 0 6. 4 6. 9	.1 .1 .1 .1	-2. 2 -2. 3 -2. 5 -2. 8 -2. 8	.1 4 .5 .5
1965 1966 1967 1968	75. 1 84. 8 93. 6 107. 2 119. 7	10. 9 12. 8 14. 6 17. 4 20. 6	2. 0 2. 2 2. 5 3. 1 3. 4	46. 1 49. 7 54. 0 60. 8 67. 4	5. 0 5. 7 6. 7 7. 2 7. 9	11. 1 14. 4 15. 9 18. 6 20. 3	75. 1 84. 3 94. 7 106. 9 117. 6	71. 1 79. 8 89. 3 100. 7 110. 4	7. 3 8. 1 9. 4 10. 6 12. 1	3 7 9 -1.2 -1.6	-3.0 -3.0 -3.1 -3.2 -3.3	0 -1.1 .3 2.1
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974		23. 1 26. 4 33. 0 36. 1 39. 2	3.7 4.2 5.0 5.7 6.8	74.7 83.1 91.0 99.0 106.7	9. 0 9. 9 10. 8 12. 1 13. 7	24. 4 29. 0 37. 5 40. 6 43. 9	132.2 148.9 163.7 180.5 203.0	123. 2 137. 5 151. 0 167. 3 191. 6	14.6 17.2 18.9 20.3 20.3	-2.0 -1.8 -2.1 -2.9 -4.6	-3.6 -3.8 -4.2 -4.4 -4.4	2.8 3.7 13.7 13.0 7.3
1975 1976		43. 1 48. 3	6. 7 8. 8	114. 7 126. 2	15. 4 17. 0	54. 4 60. 2	227. 5 246. 6	214. 5 232. 3	23. 1 25. 2	-5.7 -6.6	-4.5 -4.4	6. 9 13. 9
1974: 	201. 9 208. 0 214. 5 216. 6	37. 3 38. 3 40. 2 41. 1	6. 6 6. 9 7. 5 6. 3	102. 5 105. 9 109. 1 109. 2	13. 0 13. 4 13. 9 14. 3	42. 5 43. 4 43. 8 45. 7	193. 2 200. 2 206. 5 212. 0	181. 9 189. 1 195. 1 200. 4	19.3 20.0 20.7 21.3	-3.9 -4.5 -4.8 -5.2	-4.2 -4.4 -4.5 -4.5	8. 7 7. 8 8. 0 4. 5
1975: V	222. 2 230. 4 239. 7	41. 7 42. 5 43. 5 44. 7	5. 4 6. 1 7. 5 7. 7	110. 7 113. 3 116. 3 118. 7	14. 7 15. 2 15. 7 16. 0	49. 8 53. 2 56. 8 58. 0	217. 5 223. 4 231. 8 237. 2	205. 3 210. 9 218. 6 223. 4	22. 1 22. 7 23. 5 24. 2	-5.3 -5.6 -5.8 -6.0	-4.6 -4.5 -4.5 -4.4	4.7 6.9 7.9 7.9
1976: V p	254.3	46. 1 47. 6 48. 6 50. 8	8. 3 8. 7 8. 9	122. 0 124. 9 127. 2 130. 7	16.4 16.8 17.2 17.5	58. 8 56. 3 60. 1 65. 5	239. 5 245. 0 249. 3 252. 4	225. 5 230. 9 235. 0 238. 0	24. 6 25. 0 25. 4 25. 9	-6.2 -6.4 -6.6 -7.0	-4.4 -4.4 -4.4	12. 2 9. 2 12. 7

¹ Wage accruals less disbursements have been subtracted from total. These were (in billions of dollars, at seasonally adjusted annual rates) .0 in each of the quarters of 1974, 1975, and 1976.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-74.—State and local government revenues and expenditures, selected fiscal years, 1927-75 [Millions of dollars]

		Ge	eneral rev	enues b	source:	1		Gene	eral expe	nditures	by functi	on :
Fiscal year 1	Total	Prop- erty taxes	Sales and gross re- ceipts taxes	Indi- vidual income taxes	Corpo- ration net income taxes	Reve- nue from Federal Govern- ment	All other 3	Total	Edu- cation	High- ways	Public wel- fare	All other 4
1927	7, 271	4, 730	470	70	92	116	1, 793	7, 210	2, 235	1, 809	151	3, 015
1932 1934 1936 1938	7, 267 7, 678 8, 395 9, 228	4, 487 4, 076 4, 093 4, 440	752 1, 008 1, 484 1, 794	74 80 153 218	79 49 113 165	232 1,016 948 800	1, 643 1, 449 1, 604 1, 811	7, 765 7, 181 7, 644 8, 757	2, 311 1, 831 2, 177 2, 491	1,741 1,509 1,425 1,650	444 889 827 1,069	3, 269 2, 952 3, 215 3, 547
1940 1942 1944 1946 1948	9, 609 10, 418 10, 908 12, 356 17, 250	4, 430 4, 537 4, 604 4, 986 6, 126	1, 982 2, 351 2, 289 2, 986 4, 442	224 276 342 422 543	156 272 451 447 592	945 858 954 855 1,861	1, 872 2, 123 2, 269 2, 661 3, 685	9, 229 9, 190 8, 863 11, 028 17, 684	2, 638 2, 586 2, 793 3, 356 5, 379	1.672	1, 156 1, 225 1, 133 1, 409 2, 099	3, 862 3, 889 3, 737 4, 591 7, 170
1950 1952 1953 1954	20, 911 25, 181 27, 307 29, 012	7, 349 8, 652 9, 375 9, 967	5, 154 6, 357 6, 927 7, 276	788 998 1, 065 1, 127		2, 486 2, 566 2, 870 2, 966	6, 252	22, 787 26, 098 27, 910 30, 701	9,390	4, 987	2, 940 2, 788 2, 914 3, 060	10,619
1955 1956 1957 1958	31, 073 34, 667 38, 164 41, 219 45, 306	11,749 12,864 14,047	9, 467 9, 829	1,538 1,754 1,759	890 984 1, 018	3, 335 3, 843 4, 865	9, 250 9, 699	40, 375 44, 851	13, 220 14, 134 15, 919	6, 953 7, 816	3, 818	13, 399 14, 940 16, 547
1960 1961 1962 1963	50 505	16, 405 18, 002 19, 054 20, 089	12, 463 13, 494	2, 613 3, 037	1, 266 1, 308	7, 131 7, 871	13, 489	56, 201 60, 206	20, 574 22, 216	9,844	4,720 5,084	21, 063 22, 549
1962-63 5 1963-64 5 1964-65 5	62, 269 68, 443 74, 000	21, 241	15, 762	3, 791	1,695	10,002	15, 951	69, 302	26, 286	11, 664	5, 766	25, 586
1965-66 ⁸ 1966-67 ⁸ 1967-68 ⁸ 1968-69 ⁵ 1969-70 ⁸	_ 114. 55() 30.673	20,530 22,911 3 26,519	5, 826 7, 308 8, 908	s∣ 3.180	19, 153	3 26.118	82, 843 93, 350 102, 411 116, 728 131, 332	47. 238	13, 932 14, 481 15, 417	8, 218 9, 857 12, 110	33, 281 36, 915 41, 963
1970-71 ⁸ 1971-72 ⁸ 1972-73 ⁸ 1973-74 ⁵ 1974-75 ⁸	144, 927 166, 357 190, 214 207, 670 228, 19	37, 852 42, 133 4 45, 283 47, 705 51, 491	3 42, 047 5 46, 098	7 17, 99 3 19, 49	5, 425 1 6, 015	31,253 39,256 41,820	Ji 46.54.	150, 674 166, 873 181, 227 198, 959 230, 448	// / b. 833	18, 615 19, 946	21,070 23,582 25,085	61, 907 69, 316 78, 096

Note.—Data are not available for intervening years. See Table B-67 for net debt of State and local governments.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

¹ Fiscal years not the same for all governments. See footnote 5.
2 Excludes revenues or expenditures of publicly owned utilities and liquor stores, and of insurance-trust activities.
1 Intergovernmental receipts and payments between State and local governments are also excluded.
3 Includes licenses and other taxes and charges and miscellaneous revenues.
4 Includes expenditures for health, hospitals, police, local fire protection, natural resources, sanitation, housing and urban renewal, local parks and recreation, general control, financial administration, interest on general debt, and unallocable expenditures.
5 Data for fiscal year ending in the 12-month period through June 30. Data for 1963 and earlier years include local government amounts grouped in terms of fiscal years ended during the particular calendar year.

TABLE B-75.—Interest-bearing public debt by kind of obligation, 1967-76 (Millions of dollars)

	Total		Mark	etable			No	onmarketa	ble	
End of year or month	in- terest- bearing public debt	Total	Bills	Treasury notes	Treasury bonds 1	Total	U.S. savings bonds	Foreign govern- ment series ²	Govern- ment account series 3	Other 4
Fiscal year: 1967 1968 1969	322, 286 344, 401 351, 729	⁵ 210,672 226,592 226,107	58, 535 64, 440 68, 356	49, 108 71, 073 78, 946	97, 418 91, 079 78, 805	111, 614 117, 808 125, 623	51, 213 51, 712 51, 711	1, 514 3, 741 4, 070	56, 155 59, 526 66, 790	2, 731 2, 828 3, 051
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	396, 289 425, 360	232, 599 245, 473 257, 202 262, 971 266, 575	76, 154 86, 677 94, 648 100, 061 105, 019	93, 489 104, 807 113, 419 117, 840 128, 419	49, 135 45, 071	136, 426 150, 816 168, 158 193, 382 206, 663	51, 281 53, 003 55, 921 59, 418 61, 921	4, 755 9, 270 18, 985 28, 524 25, 011	76, 323 82, 784 89, 598 101, 738 115, 442	4, 068 5, 759 3, 654 3, 701 4, 289
1975 1976	532, 122 619, 254	315, 606 392, 581	128, 569 161, 198	150, 257 191, 758		216, 516 226, 673	65, 482 69, 733	23, 216 21, 500	124, 173 130, 557	3, 644 4, 883
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	508 581	286, 133 289, 827 299, 989 307, 202 314, 886 315, 606	123, 972	131, 790 132, 683 141, 915 144, 997 146, 505 150, 257	34, 149 34, 103 35, 298 36, 839	206, 995 208, 834 208, 592 208, 550 212, 144 216, 516	63, 725 64, 036 64, 371 64, 730 65, 094 65, 482		116, 870 118, 057 116, 812 116, 781 120, 060 124, 173	3, 438 3, 442 3, 440 3, 443 3, 487 3, 644
July	546, 722 552, 604 561, 063	323, 701 331, 080 338, 946 350, 906 355, 879 363, 191	133, 445 138, 086 142, 803 147, 053 151, 139 157, 483	153, 556 155, 239 158, 488 166, 255 166, 051 167, 077	37, 755 37, 655 37, 598 38, 689	213, 510 215, 642 213, 658 210, 157 209, 911 212, 466	65, 872 66, 176 66, 473 66, 812 67, 177 67, 464	21, 551 21, 468 21, 220 21, 283	121, 710 124, 084 121, 865 118, 220 117, 486 119, 385	3, 726 3, 830 3, 850 3, 904 3, 964 4, 052
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	592, 874 599, 224 600, 927	369, 316 378, 773 385, 296 386, 444 388, 021 392, 581	159, 645 162, 088 163, 140 161, 764 161, 840 161, 198	171, 110 177, 576 183, 143 185, 757 186, 473 191, 758	39, 110 39, 014 38, 922 39, 708	212, 544 214, 100 213, 928 214, 484 220, 056 226, 673	67, 826 68, 170 68, 567 68, 968 69, 394 69, 733	21, 689 21, 669 21, 612 21, 515	119, 041 120, 105 119, 438 119, 453 124, 570 130, 557	4, 076 4, 138 4, 254 4, 449 4, 577 4, 883
July	632, 291 633, 560 635, 062	397, 719 404, 314 407, 663 408, 590 415, 399 421, 276	161, 711	197, 204 202, 979 206, 319 207, 275 212, 986 216, 669	39, 902 39, 839 39, 769 40, 702	225, 861 227, 977 225, 897 226, 472 228, 243 231, 181	70, 428 71, 079 70, 752 71, 113 71, 506 71, 853	20, 814 22, 290 22, 487	128, 912 130, 591 128, 640 127, 162 127, 405 129, 744	5, 164 5, 340 5, 690 5, 906 6, 845 7, 285

Source: Department of the Treasury,

I Includes Treasury bonds and minor amounts of Panama Canal and postal savings bonds.

Nonmarketable certificates of indebtedness, notes, and bonds in the Treasury foreign series and foreign-currency-series issues.

Includes Treasury deposit funds and some special issues formerly included in "Other".

Includes depository bonds, retirement plan bonds, Rural Electrification Administration bonds, State and local bonds, and special issues held only by U.S. Government agencies and trust funds and the Federal home loan banks.

Includes \$5,610 million in certificates not shown separately.

TABLE B-76.—Estimated ownership of public debt securities, 1967-76

[Par values;1 billions of dollars]

				Tota	l public d	ebt securi	ties			
						Held by	private ir	nvestors		
End of year or month	Total ²	Held by Govern- ment accounts	Held by Federal Reserve Banks	Total 3	Com- mercial banks 4	Mutual savings banks and in- surance com- panies	Corpo- rations 5	State and local govern- ments 6	Indi- viduals ⁷	Miscel- laneous inves- tors 38
Fiscal year: 1967	322. 9 345. 4 352. 9	71. 8 76. 1 84. 8	46. 7 52. 2 54. 1	204. 4 217. 0 214. 0	55. 5 59. 7 55. 3	13. 2 12. 5 11. 6	11.0 12.0 11.1	23. 6 25. 1 26. 4	70.4 74.2 77.3	30. 7 33. 4 32. 3
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	370. 1 397. 3 426. 4 457. 3 474. 2	95. 2 102. 9 111. 5 123. 4 138. 2	57. 7 65. 5 71. 4 75. 0 80. 5	217. 2 228. 9 243. 6 258. 9 255. 6	52. 6 61. 0 60. 9 58. 8 53. 2	10. 4 10. 3 10. 2 9. 6 8. 5	8. 5 7. 4 9. 3 9. 8 10. 8	29. 0 25. 9 26. 9 28. 8 28. 3	81. 8 75. 4 73. 2 75. 9 80. 7	35. 0 49. 1 63. 2 76. 0 74. 2
1975 1976	533. 2 620. 4	145. 3 149. 6	84. 7 94. 4	303.2 376.4	69.0 91.8	10.6 15.6	13. 2 25. 0	29. 6 39. 5	87. 1 96. 4	93. 6 108. 0
1975: Jan	494. 1 499. 7 509. 7 516. 7 528. 2 533. 2	139. 0 139. 8 138. 5 138. 0 140. 9 145. 3	81. 3 81. 1 81. 4 87. 8 85. 6 84. 7	273. 8 278. 9 289. 8 290. 9 301. 7 303. 2	54. 6 56. 5 61. 8 64. 1 67. 7 69. 0	8. 9 9. 0 9. 5 10. 0 10. 5 10. 6	11. 3 11. 4 12. 0 12. 5 13. 7 13. 2	30. 0 30. 5 29. 7 29. 8 29. 8 29. 6	85. 3 85. 7 86. 1 86. 6 87. 1	83. 8 86. 2 91. 1 88. 5 93. 4 93. 6
July	538. 2 547. 7 553. 6 562. 0 566. 8 576. 6	142.5 144.8 142.3 138.9 137.7 139.3	81. 9 82. 5 87. 0 87. 2 85. 1 87. 9	313. 8 320. 4 324. 4 336. 0 343. 9 349. 4	71. 8 74. 8 78. 3 79. 3 82. 2 85. 1	11. 1 11. 4 11. 7 12. 1 13. 2 13. 8	16. 2 16. 0 15. 0 17. 5 20. 0 20. 2	31. 3 31. 2 32. 2 33. 8 33. 9 33. 8	87. 6 88. 7 89. 6 90. 6 91. 0 91. 4	95. 8 98. 4 97. 7 102. 7 103. 6 105. 1
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	584. 4 593. 9 600. 5 602. 0 610. 7 620. 4	139. 3 139. 8 139. 1 139. 1 143. 7 149. 6	89. 8 89. 0 89. 8 91. 8 90. 5 94. 4	355. 3 365. 0 371. 7 371. 0 376. 4 376. 4	86. 0 87. 2 91. 9 91. 7 91. 6 91. 8	14. 7 15. 0 15. 5 15. 4 15. 7 15. 6	21. 2 23. 2 23. 0 23. 8 26. 0 25. 0	34. 6 36. 4 37. 8 37. 7 37. 6 39. 5	91. 7 93. 9 94. 5 94. 7 95. 9 96. 4	107. 2 109. 5 108. 9 107. 6 109. 7 108. 0
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec P	624. 5 633. 3 634. 7 637. 6 644. 6 653. 5	147. 6 148. 0 146. 1 144. 6 144. 9 145. 0	90. 7 94. 0 96. 4 95. 7 91. 7 97. 0	386. 2 391. 3 392. 2 397. 3 408. 1 411. 5	94. 0 92. 5 93. 3 94. 8 99. 8	16. 4 17. 0 16. 9 17. 4 17. 6	27. 0 27. 8 25. 7 24. 7 24. 2	37. 2 38. 7 39. 1 41. 5 42. 1	97. 1 99. 7 99. 7 100. 0 100. 7	114. 7 115. 5 117. 5 118. 9 123. 7

1 U.S. savings bonds, series A-F and J, and U.S. savings notes are included at current redemption value.

2 As of July 31, 1974, public debt outstanding has been adjusted to exclude the notes of the International Monetary Fund to conform with the Budget presentation. This adjustment applies to the 1967–76 data in this table.

3 For comparability with 1975–76 published data, published data for 1967–74 have been adjusted to exclude notes of the International Monetary Fund. These adjustments amounted to \$3.3 billion in 1967, \$2.2 billion in 1968, and \$0.8 billion in each year 1969 through 1974. These adjustments were necessary in order to add to the total public debt figures as published by the Department of the Treasury.

4 Includes commercial banks, trust companies, and stock savings banks in the United States and Territories and island possessions; figures exclude securities held in trust departments. Since the estimates in this table are on the basis of par values and include holdings of banks in United States Territories and possessions, they do not agree with the estimates in Table B-58, which are based on book values and relate only to banks within the United States.

4 Exclusive of banks and insurance companies.

4 Includes trust, sinking, and investment funds of State and local governments and their agencies, and of Territories and possessions.

and possessions.

*Includes partnerships and personal trust accounts.
*Includes partnerships and loan associations, nonprofit institutions, corporate pension trust funds, dealers and brokers, certain government deposit accounts and government-sponsored agencies, and investments of foreign balances and international accounts in this country.

Source: Department of the Treasury.

Table B-77.—Average length and maturity distribution of marketable interest-bearing public debt held by private investors, 1967-76

	Amount		·	laturity clas	s			
End of year or month	out- standing	Within 1 year	1 to 5 years	5 to 10 years	10 to 20 years	20 years and over	Average	e length
	'		Years	Months				
Fiscal year: 1967 1968 1969	150, 321 159, 671 156, 008	56, 561 66, 746 69, 311	53, 584 52, 295 50, 182	21, 057 21, 850 18, 078	6, 153 6, 110 6, 097	12, 968 12, 670 12, 337	5 4 4	1
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	157, 910 161, 863 165, 978 167, 869 164, 862	76, 443 74, 803 79, 509 84, 041 87, 150	57, 035 58, 557 57, 157 54, 139 50, 103	8, 286 14, 503 16, 033 16, 385 14, 197	7, 876 6, 357 6, 358 8, 741 9, 930	8, 272 7, 645 6, 922 4, 564 3, 481	3 3 3 2	8 6 3 1 11
1975 1976	210, 382 279, 782	115, 677 150, 296	65, 852 90, 578	15, 385 24, 169	8, 857 8, 087	4, 611 6, 652	2 2	8
975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	183, 411 189, 375 198, 298 198, 857 209, 149 210, 382	101, 258 105, 341 108, 627 108, 820 115, 374 115, 677	55, 803 56, 765 61, 086 61, 670 64, 510 65, 852	13, 487 13, 190 15, 330 14, 209 15, 630 15, 385	8, 665 9, 834 9, 177 10, 181 8, 902 8, 857	4, 198 4, 245 4, 079 3, 978 4, 733 4, 611	2 2 2 2 2 2 2	8 9 8 8 9 6
July	221, 630 228, 446 232, 246 243, 786 251, 159 255, 860	123, 466 129, 571 130, 641 136, 249 145, 336 150, 116	69, 318 69, 176 72, 223 78, 164 74, 517 74, 657	15, 427 15, 611 15, 514 15, 541 16, 771 16, 689	8, 813 8, 738 8, 647 8, 637 8, 589 8, 524	4, 606 5, 350 5, 222 5, 196 5, 946 5, 876	2 2 2 2 2 2 2	67 77 66 5
976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	259, 831 270, 625 276, 434 275, 520 278, 929 279, 782	152, 077 151, 875 154, 258 153, 441 153, 464 150, 294	75, 179 82, 484 86, 214 86, 198 86, 242 90, 578	18, 310 21, 707 21, 538 21, 597 24, 336 24, 169	8, 466 8, 417 8, 350 8, 242 8, 172 8, 087	5, 800 6, 142 6, 074 6, 042 6, 716 6, 654	2 2 2 2 2 2 2	55777
July	289, 044 293, 627 294, 595 296, 211 307, 309 307, 843	156, 595 153, 304 153, 302 155, 179 158, 422 157, 469	91, 042 93, 396 94, 845 91, 795 101, 684 103, 747	26, 694 31, 523 31, 247 33, 922 31, 349 31, 019	8, 059 7, 986 7, 939 7, 897 7, 511 7, 399	6, 654 7, 418 7, 262 7, 419 8, 345 8, 209	2 2 2 2 2 2 2	6 10 9 9 10 9

Note.—All issues classified to final maturity.

Source: Department of the Treasury.

CORPORATE PROFITS AND FINANCE

Table B-78.—Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, 1946-76

[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

	Corporate		Profits after and capital	tax with invento consumption ad	ry valuation justments
Year or quarter	profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments	Corporate profits tax liability	Total	Dividends	Undistributed profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments
1946	16. 6	9. 1	7. 5	5. 6	2. 0
	22. 2	11. 3	10. 9	6. 3	4. 6
	29. 1	12. 4	16. 7	7. 0	9. 7
	26. 9	10. 2	16. 7	7. 2	9. 5
1950	33, 7	17. 9	15. 7	8. 8	6.9
1951	38, 1	22. 6	15. 5	8. 5	7.0
1952	35, 4	19. 4	16. 0	8. 5	7.5
1953	35, 5	20. 3	15. 2	8. 8	6.4
1954	34, 6	17. 6	17. 0	9. 1	7.9
1955	44. 6	22. 0	22.6	10. 3	12. 2
1956	42. 9	22. 0	20.9	11. 1	9. 8
1957	42. 1	21. 4	20.6	11. 5	9. 1
1958	37. 5	19. 0	18.5	11. 3	7. 2
1958	48. 2	23. 6	24.6	12. 2	12. 4
1960	46. 6	22. 7	23. 9	12. 9	11.0
	46. 9	22. 8	24. 1	13. 3	10.8
	54. 9	24. 0	30. 9	14. 4	16.5
	59. 6	26. 2	33. 4	15. 5	17.9
	67. 0	28. 0	39. 0	17. 3	21.7
1965. 1966. 1967. 1968.	77. 1 82. 5 79. 3 85. 8 81. 4	30. 9 33. 7 32. 5 39. 4 39. 7	46. 2 48. 9 46. 8 46. 4 41. 8	19. 1 19. 4 20. 1 21. 9 22. 6	27. 1 29. 4 26. 7 24. 4 19. 2
1970	67. 9	34. 5	33. 4	22. 9	10. 5
1971	77. 2	37. 7	39. 5	23. 0	16. 5
1972	92. 1	41. 5	50. 5	24. 6	25. 9
1973	99. 1	48. 7	50. 4	27. 8	22. 6
1973	84. 8	52. 4	32. 4	30. 8	1. 7
1975	91. 6	49. 2	42. 4	32. 1	10. 3
1976 p	118. 7	64. 7	53. 9	35. 1	18. 8
1974:	95. 7	50. 5	45. 2	29. 9	15. 3
	87. 8	53. 0	34. 8	30. 7	4. 1
	81. 7	57. 6	24. 1	31. 3	-7. 2
	74. 1	48. 6	25. 5	31. 1	-5. 6
1975:	69. 0	40. 2	28. 8	31. 7	-2.9
	86. 6	44. 8	41. 8	31. 9	9.9
	105. 3	54. 8	50. 4	32. 6	17.9
	105, 6	57. 2	48. 4	32. 2	16.2
1976: L	115. 1	61. 4	53. 7	33. 1	20. 6
	116. 4	63. 5	52. 9	34. 4	18. 5
	122. 0	65. 1	56. 8	35. 4	21. 4

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-79.—Corporate profits by industry, 1929-76

Corporate profits with inventory valuation adjustment and without capital consumption adjustment Domestic industries Financial 1 Nonfinancial Year or quarter Trans-Rest Total of the porta-Wholetion, Total world Federal Manusale com-Total Reserve banks Other Total factur-Other and municaing 3 retail tion, trade and services 3 1929..... 10.5 10.2 1.3 0.0 1.3 8.9 5.2 1.0 1.8 0.9 0.2 -1.2-1.2. 3 . 3 -1.5-.4 -.5 .0 -.7 . 0 1933_____ .0 1939_____ 6.3 6.1 . 8 .0 .8 5.3 3.3 .7 1.0 . 3 . 2 8.6 14.0 18.9 22.8 21.9 17.3 16.8 23.2 29.6 26.8 5. 5 9. 5 11. 8 13. 8 13. 2 9. 7 9. 0 13. 6 17. 6 9.8 15.2 20.3 24.4 23.8 19.2 19.3 25.6 33.0 9.6 15.0 20.1 24.1 23.5 18.9 18.9 24.9 32.2 29.9 9 1, 2 .2 .2 .2 .3 .2 .4 .7 .8 0: 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.7 2.1 1.7 2.6 3.1 1.3 2.0 3.4 4.4 3.9 2.7 1.8 2.2 3.0 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.1 2.9 3.6 3.1 1. 4 2. 2 3. 0 3. 2 3. 3 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.6 2.3 Ō 1943_____ Ō, 1944..... .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 1945..... 3. 8 4. 6 5. 5 4. 5 1946..... 1947..... 1948..... 16. 2 1949.... 30.8 3.0 37. 6 42. 7 39. 8 39. 5 37. 8 46. 7 20. 9 24. 6 21. 7 22. 0 19. 9 26. 0 24. 7 24. 0 19. 4 26. 2 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.8 1.9 1950_____ 36. 7 41. 5 38. 7 38. 4 36. 4 45. 1 44. 1 43. 5 39. 1 3. 1 .23.44.33.56.67 33. 5 37. 9 34. 7 33. 9 31. 8 40. 3 39. 1 38. 3 33. 5 42. 6 5.0 4.0 3.6 3.7 3.3 3.1 3.6 4.1 4.0 3.6 3.0 5. 0 4. 8 4.6 4.9 1951..... 1952..... 3.6 4.5 4.6 4.8 5.2 5.7 6.8 3.3 3.7 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.6 5.1 6.0 3. 8 3. 8 1953..... 5.0 4.7 5.6 5.9 5.8 5.9 7.0 1954_____ 1955_____ 5. 0 4. 5 4. 4 4. 6 5. 9 45. 9 45. 4 1956_____ 1957...... 1958_____ 1959_____ 40. 8 51. 2 7.4 7.8 8.4 9.3 9.9 39. 8 39. 3 43. 8 48. 1 54. 1 62. 5 67. 4 63. 6 68. 5 62. 9 23. 9 23. 0 26. 0 28. 7 31. 9 38. 3 41. 6 37. 9 41. 2 36. 8 1.9 2.6 2.6 3.1 3.3 2.8 3.0 3.2 48. 9 48. 7 53. 7 57. 6 64. 2 73. 3 78. 6 75. 6 82. 1 77. 9 47. 0 46. 3 51. 1 54. 9 61. 0 70. 1 75. 9 72. 6 78. 9 74. 2 7. 2 7. 0 7. 3 6. 8 6. 9 7. 5 8. 5 9. 0 10. 4 11. 3 1.0 .8 .9 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.5 3.1 4.9 4.9 5.7 5.9 7.4 7.9 6. 2 6. 3 6. 4 5. 8 5. 8 6. 2 7. 9 8. 2 3.5 3.8 4.2 4.9 5.3 6.1 1960..... 1961..... 1962..... 1963...... 1964..... 1965 8. 0 8. 9 10. 1 10. 1 11.8 10.7 10.7 1966_____ 1967..... 1968..... 6.5 10.2 1969..... 50. 1 58. 2 69. 3 74. 1 62. 6 84. 1 112. 5 27. 1 32. 4 40. 6 44. 1 36. 9 46. 4 66. 3 3.8 4.6 4.8 6.8 11.2 62. 6 72. 4 84. 7 90. 4 76. 7 97. 0 8. 2 8. 3 9. 0 8. 3 6. 0 7. 9 66. 4 76. 9 89. 6 97. 2 87. 8 9. 4 11. 7 13. 3 14. 7 1970 12.6 3.6 3.3 3.4 4.5 5.7 6.0 9.0 5.3 5.8 6.4 7.0 7.2 9.0 10.8 12.1 11.7 8.4 7.2 8.3 14. 1 15. 4 16. 2 14. 1 1971..... 1972..... 1973..... 1974..... 12. 4 20. 9 103. 1 134. 2 6. 2 7. 3 1975_____ 12.9 1976 🏿 126.8 14.3 39.4 39.0 37.7 31.6 95. 9 89. 7 85. 2 80. 4 81. 4 80. 8 75. 1 69. 5 5. 4 5. 7 5. 9 6. 0 5. 7 6. 4 6. 3 5. 7 14.6 9.0 10.1 9. 4 1974: 1 14.8 66.6 15.1 6.3 14. 0 14. 6 13. 1 8.3 8.7 7.1 66. 8 60. 5 56. 3 7. 0 7. 2 8. 3 ii... 14. 4 9. 4 10.6 11.0 17---77. 7 97. 9 117. 9 119. 1 29.7 43.5 57.0 5. 0 7. 3 9. 5 9. 7 9.0 8.9 8.4 9.7 5. 5 6. 3 6. 5 6. 4 72. 1 91. 7 111. 4 112. 7 13.9 12.5 12.1 12.9 58. 2 79. 2 99. 3 14. 5 1975: I..... 5.8 8. 1 19.6 24.4 5. 7 5. 4 5. 8 6.8 6.7 7.1 II.... 25.0 99.8 55.3 61.2 66.4 67.2 8.6 9.5 10.7 7.7 129.6 121. 9 14.0 6. 1 5. 9 5. 9 7. 9 107. 9 29. 0 26. 6 9. 1 1976: 1 8. 8 9. 3 6. 8 7. 2 125. 0 130. 5 13.8 7. 9 8. 5 111.2 116.0 131.8 137.6 28.8 111....

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE B-79.—Corporate profits by industry, 1929-76—Continued

Corporate profits before deduction of capital consumption allowances, with inventory valuation adjustment Domestic industries Financial ¹ Nonfinancial Year or Trans-Rest of the quarter Total porta-Total Whole tion, world Federal Manusale com Total Reserve banks Other Total Other facturand municaing 2 retail tion, and trade services 8 1929..... 14.7 14. 4 7.1 0.2 1.4 0.0 1.4 13.0 1 3 2 9 1.7 1933.... 2.6 2.6 . 4 . 4 2.2 1.3 -.2 .0 .0 .0 1.1 1939..... 4. 9 . 2 10.1 9.9 . 9 .0 . 9 9.0 1.0 2.0 1.1 13. 6 19. 5 25. 4 29. 7 29. 9 25. 5 13. 4 19. 3 25. 2 29. 5 29. 6 25. 3 0: 0: 1.4 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.9 3.8 4.6 .2222324788 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.7 2.2 1.8 2.7 3.3 1.5 1.7 2.6 3.3 3.5 4.2 5.2 5.4 2.3 3.1 4.8 5.8 5.5 4.6 3.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.6 2.7 2.5 3.0 1941..... 18. 1 23. 9 28. 1 27. 9 23. 6 21. 4 28. 9 36. 5 34. 6 11. 4 14. 2 16. 6 16. 5 13. 0 11. 2 16. 3 20. 8 19. 8 Ō 1943 .0.1.1.1.1.2.2 1945.... 23. 6 30. 7 39. 2 37. 9 1946 24. 0 31. 4 1946 1947 1948 3.6 4.7 4.8 40. 0 38. 7 1949..... 42. 2 48. 0 46. 0 1950..... 46. 5 53. 0 51. 3 52. 7 52. 8 64. 1 64. 9 66. 3 62. 9 74. 8 45. 5 3.3 4.2 4.8 4.9 5.4 5.7 6.1 7.3 .2 .3 .4 .3 .3 .5 .6 .7 3.1 3.5 3.9 4.4 4.8 4.9 5.5 6.5 24.9 6.0 6.2 6.1 5.1 5.2 6.7 6.3 6.6 8.0 6. 1 7. 1 7. 6 8. 1 8. 2 9. 8 10. 3 10. 5 5. 2 5. 4 5. 3 5. 6 7. 8 7. 8 8. 0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.7 51.8 50.2 51.6 1951 1952 29. 1 26. 9 -----46. 8 46. 5 57. 4 57. 7 58. 7 55. 0 65. 7 1953 1954 1955 28. 3 27. 1 34. 3 33. 6 33. 9 29. 8 37. 1 51. 6 62. 6 63. 1 64. 4 61. 2 73. 0 1956 1957 10. 9 12. 5 72. 2 72. 9 81. 5 87. 4 95. 6 107. 5 116. 5 116. 7 127. 0 127. 2 7.8 7.7 8.0 7.6 7.9 8.5 9.6 10.2 11.8 13.0 1.0 64. 4 65. 3 73. 6 79. 8 87. 7 99. 0 106. 9 106. 5 115. 1 114. 2 35. 5 35. 2 40. 2 43. 9 48. 0 55. 9 60. 5 58. 7 63. 9 61. 5 7. 3 7. 4 8. 4 8. 7 10. 4 11. 1 11. 5 12. 7 14. 3 14. 9 13. 3 14. 0 15. 4 16. 8 17. 9 19. 6 21. 3 21. 0 21. 9 22. 4 8. 4 8. 8 9. 6 10. 4 11. 4 12. 3 13. 6 14. 1 15. 0 15. 4 1960 74. 1 75. 3 84. 2 90. 0 98. 7 110. 8 119. 3 119. 7 130. 2 130. 9 6.8 6.9 7.1 6.6 7.2 7.9 8.3 9.9 1.9 2.6 2.6 3.3 2.8 3.3 3.7 1961..... .8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.5 3.1 1962 1963 1964 1965 1967 1968 1969..... 123. 0 137. 8 157. 4 170. 9 169. 4 192. 6 231. 5 119. 2 133. 3 152. 6 164. 1 158. 2 186. 4 224. 1 104. 7 116. 9 134. 6 144. 6 140. 3 169. 1 204. 8 53. 1 59. 8 69. 9 75. 0 70. 9 21. 4 23. 2 26. 3 27. 4 27. 3 15. 5 16. 4 18. 3 20. 2 21. 5 24. 7 14. 7 17. 5 20. 2 22. 1 20. 7 1970. 1971. 11. 0 13. 0 14. 7 14. 9 12. 2 11. 6 13. 3 3.8 14. 5 16. 3 18. 0 19. 5 17. 9 17. 3 19. 3 3. 4 3. 4 4. 5 5. 7 6. 0 4.6 4.8 6.8 11.2 1973 1974 83. 1 105. 9 6. 2 7. 3 30. Ó 31. 3 14. 6 9. 0 10. 1 11. 0 174. 4 170. 2 168. 2 164. 8 18. 3 17. 7 18. 5 17. 1 5. 4 5. 7 5. 9 6. 0 13. 0 12. 0 12. 5 11. 2 141. 5 143. 6 139. 6 136. 7 72.3 72.6 72.4 66.3 23. 0 22. 6 17. 8 19. 3 26. 0 27. 3 27. 8 27. 9 159.8 20. 2 1974: 1 161. 3 158. 1 153. 8 21. 1 21. 6 23. 2 II.... 18. 1 16. 8 16. 6 17. 6 5. 8 5. 7 5. 4 5. 8 27. 6 30. 2 33. 1 34. 1 24. 1 24. 4 24. 3 26. 0 164.1 158, 5 12.3 140.5 65. 4 23, 3 5. 5 6. 3 1975: I 185. 8 208. 4 211. 9 79. 6 94. 2 93. 4 28. 6 33. 7 34. 5 179. 5 201. 9 11. 1 11. 2 162. 8 185. 3 6. 5 6. 4 111... 188.0 205.6 11.8 223. 9 228. 0 235. 9 216. 2 221. 2 228. 7 18, 8 18, 7 19, 5 6. 1 6. 0 5. 9 99. 7 105. 5 107. 2 33. 3 34. 8 36. 4 25. 8 25. 7 26. 7 7.7 6.8 7.2 12.7 197. 4 38.6 1976: I 12. 8 13. 6 202. 5 209. 2 36. 4 38. 9 II...

¹ Consists of the following industries: Banking; credit agencies other than banks; security and commodity brokers' dealers, and services; insurance carriers; regulated investment companies; small business investment companies; and real estate investment trusts.

See Table B-80 for industry detail.
 Services consists of electric, gas, and sanitary services.

Note.—The industry classification is on a company basis and is based on the 1967 Standard Industrial Classification beginning with 1948 and on the 1942 Standard Industrial Classification prior to 1948.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,

Table B-80.—Corporate profits of manufacturing industries, 1929-76
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

			Nonc	urable g	oods				Di	rable goo	ds		
Year or quarter	Total manu- factur- ing	Total	Food and kind red prod- ucts	Chemicals and allied products	Petro- leum and coal prod- ucts	Other	Total	Primary metal indus- tries	Fabri- cated metal products	Machin- ery, except electri- cal	Electri- cal equip- ment and supplies	Motor vehicles and equip- ment	Other
1929	5. 2	2.6					2.6						
1933	4	. 0					4						
1939	3.3	1.7					1.7						
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947	5. 5 9. 5 11. 8 13. 8 13. 2 9. 7 9. 0 13. 6 17. 6 16. 2	2. 4 3. 1 4. 6 5. 7 5. 9 5. 2 6. 6 7. 8 10. 0 8. 1	1.9	1.7	2.8	3.7	3. 1 6. 4 7. 2 8. 1 7. 4 4. 5 2. 4 5. 8 7. 5 8. 1	1.6	0.8	1. 2	0.7	1. 4 2. 1	1. 9
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958	20. 9 24. 6 21. 7 22. 0 19. 9 26. 0 24. 7 24. 0 19. 4 26. 2	8. 9 11. 4 9. 9 10. 1 9. 4 11. 8 11. 9 10. 7 10. 0 12. 7	1.6 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.6 2.2 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.6	2.8 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.8 2.8 2.5 3.4	2.37 2.38 2.37 3.36 2.15	2.7 4.4 3.6 3.3 2.9 3.6 4.1 3.6 3.3	12. 0 13. 2 11. 7 11. 9 10. 5 14. 3 12. 8 13. 3 9. 3 13. 5	2. 3 3. 1 1. 9 2. 5 1. 7 2. 9 3. 0 3. 0 1. 9 2. 3	1.1 1.3 1.0 .9 1.0 1.0 1.1 .9	1.6 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.0 1.4 2.1	1. 2 1. 3 1. 5 1. 4 1. 2 1. 1 1. 2 1. 5 1. 3	3. 1 2. 4 2. 4 2. 6 2. 1 4. 1 2. 2 2. 6 9	2. 6 2. 8 2. 7 2. 7 2. 9 3. 1 2. 9 3. 4
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	23. 0 26. 0 28. 7 31. 9	11. 9 11. 7 11. 9 12. 8 14. 4 15. 8 18. 0 17. 3 18. 8 17. 7	2.1 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.6 3.3 3.1 3.2 2.9	3.1 3.2 3.6 3.9 4.5 4.8 4.2 5.0 4.6	2.5 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.8 3.8 3.6 3.3	4. 2 4. 3 4. 5 5. 8 6. 7 6. 2 7. 6	12. 0 11. 3 14. 1 15. 9 17. 5 22. 6 23. 5 20. 6 22. 4 19. 2	2. 1 1. 5 1. 6 1. 9 2. 4 3. 1 3. 6 2. 7 2. 0 1. 4	.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.2	1.8 1.8 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.8 4.4 4.0 4.1 3.6	1.3 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.6 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.2	3. 0 2. 5 4. 0 4. 7 6. 1 3. 9 5. 5 4. 8	2. 9 3. 1 3. 6 3. 9 4. 3 5. 2 4. 8 5. 2
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	27. 1 32. 4 40. 6 44. 1 36. 9 46. 4 66. 3	16.8 17.3 18.1 20.1 25.1 29.2 37.5	3.5 3.3 2.8 2.2 2.6 5.8	3.9 4.2 5.0 5.8 4.9 5.7	3.6 3.6 3.5 4.9 10.1 9.3	5.8 6.2 6.8 7.2 7.5 8.4	10.3 15.1 22.5 24.0 11.9 17.2 28.8	.9 .5 1.6 2.0 4.9 3.6	1. 2 1. 3 2. 1 2. 6 1. 5 3. 1	2.7 2.7 3.9 4.5 1.7 4.6	1. 1 1. 8 3. 0 2. 6 . 4 1. 2	1.4 4.9 5.9 5.8 .2 .9	3. 0 3. 8 6. 0 3. 2 3. 8
1974: I II III. IV	39. 4 39. 0 37. 7 31. 6	23. 8 26. 9 27. 0 22. 6	2.8 4.2 1.8 1.6	5. 6 5. 3 4. 8 3. 9	7. 4 10. 0 13. 5 9. 7	8. 0 7. 4 7. 0 7. 4	15.6 12.1 10.7 9.0	2.7 4.5 6.7 5.9	1. 8 1. 7 . 5 1. 8	3.6 2.0 .0 1.0	1.6 .7 3 3	1 7 1.6	5.9 4.0 2.2
1975: 1 - V		21. 3 28. 7 32. 6 34. 3	5. 0 6. 0 6. 3 6. 0	3. 5 5. 3 6. 8 7. 3	7. 5 10. 1 9. 2 10. 4	5. 3 7. 3 10. 4 10. 6	8. 4 14. 8 24. 3 21. 1	5. 9 2. 9 2. 7 2. 7	1. 8 3. 1 4. 1 3. 5	3. 0 4. 3 5. 8 5. 2	1. 3 1. 7 1. 4	-3.4 .2 3.9 2.8	3. 2 6. 1 5. 4
1976: I - -	61. 2 66. 4 67. 2	37.5 35.6 37.6	7.3 6.1 8.0	8. 3 8. 2 8. 5	11. 2 10. 4 10. 1	10.8 10.8 10.9	23. 7 30. 7 29. 6	3.3 4.5 3.5	3.6 4.3 4.1	5. 9 5. 9 6. 5	1.8 2.5 2.6	4.6 6.1 5.5	4.5 7.4 7.3

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE B-80.—Corporate profits of manufacturing industries, 1929-76—Continued
[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Corporate profits before deduction of capital consumption allowances, with inventory valuation adjustment Nondurable goods Durable goods Year or quarter Total manu-factur-Chem Petro-Food Machin-Electri-Motor Primary metal indusicals leum and Fabriand vehicles ery, except cal and allied cated metal ing Total kindred Other Total equip-Other and coal prodelectriment and equipprodprodtries products ment ucts cal supplies ucts ucts 1929.... 7.1 3, 6 3, 4 1933... . 2 1.3 1.1 2.3 1939... 4.9 2.6 1940 1941 1942 7. 2 11. 4 14. 2 16. 6 16. 5 13. 0 11. 2 16. 3 20. 8 19. 8 3. 4 4. 1 5. 9 7. 1 7. 5 7. 0 7. 9 9. 3 11. 8 10. 1 3.8 7.2 8.4 9.5 9.0 6.0 3.3 6.9 9.7 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.0 2. 0 2. 1 4.2 1.9 1.5 1948. 3.4 1.0 0.8 1.6 1949 1950.... 1951.... 24.9 29.1 26.9 28.3 27.1 34.3 33.6 33.9 29.8 37.1 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.7 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.3 11. 1 13. 9 12. 7 13. 2 13. 1 16. 0 16. 5 15. 7 15. 4 18. 4 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.6 3.6 2.7 3.2 2.8 2.8 3.9 3.8 3.6 4.6 3.1 3.6 3.2 3.9 4.1 4.6 4.9 4.4 4.0 13.7 15.3 14.2 15.0 14.1 18.3 17.2 18.2 14.4 18.7 2.8 3.6 2.6 3.5 4.2 4.3 4.5 3.6 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.9 2.6 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.8 2.7 2.9 3.3 5.1 4.4 4.1 3.8 4.6 5.2 4.7 5.7 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.0 1.8 2.2 3.3 2.7 2.7 3.0 2.5 4.6 2.9 3.3 1.6 3.7 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1957 1958 1959 35. 5 35. 2 40. 2 43. 9 48. 0 55. 9 60. 5 63. 9 61. 5 1960 17. 8 18. 0 19. 1 20. 5 22. 6 24. 4 27. 2 27. 1 29. 3 29. 2 3.2 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.2 4.9 4.7 4.9 4.4 4.5 4.8 5.3 5.7 6.5 6.8 7.3 7.1 4.5 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.8 6.3 7.3 7.1 5.8 5.7 6.5 7.5 8.9 9.9 10.2 17.7 17.2 21.1 23.3 25.5 31.4 33.3 31.6 34.6 32.3 2.7 2.8 3.4 3.5 4.3 5.8 5.7 6.0 5.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.3 3.4 4.0 4.0 4.4 4.6 5.3 5.8 6.2 7.4 7.4 8.5 3.4 2.9 3.3 3.7 4.3 5.1 5.7 4.5 4.0 1.4 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.0 4.0 3.5 5.2 6.3 6.3 7.5 6.4 7.5 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 4.1 1969 7.6 7.9 8.0 9.7 15.1 14.7 9. 2 9. 9 10. 8 11. 6 12. 1 13. 4 29. 0 30. 4 32. 2 35. 1 40. 9 46. 3 24. 1 29. 4 37. 6 39. 9 30. 0 36. 8 6.5 7.5 9.9 10.6 7.7 8.8 53. 1 59. 8 69. 9 75. 0 70. 9 83. 1 6. 6 7. 1 8. 2 9. 0 8. 3 9. 4 2. 3 2. 4 3. 2 3. 8 2. 8 4. 6 5. 2 5. 4 6. 8 7. 6 5. 0 8. 3 2.9 3.8 5.1 4.9 3.1 4.0 3.8 7.3 8.4 8.3 3.2 4.3 1970____ 5. 6 5. 5 5. 1 4. 8 5. 3 8. 8 3.5 3.1 4.1 4.6 8.2 6.9 1971.... 1972.... 1973.... 1974.... 1975.... 1976 »... 5. 5 6. 9 4. 6 4. 4 72. 3 72. 6 72. 4 66. 3 39. 3 42. 4 42. 8 39. 1 8, 8 8, 8 8, 3 7, 5 12. 4 14. 6 18. 3 15. 1 12.6 12.1 11.7 12.1 33. 0 30. 2 29. 6 27. 2 5.7 7.7 10.0 6. 9 5. 3 3. 6 4. 3 4. 2 3. 3 2. 4 2. 4 2.8 2.5 4.7 2.6 10.3 8.3 6.9 5.4 3. 1 3. 1 1. 9 3. 2 1974: I Ш. 9.2 65. 4 79. 6 94. 2 93. 4 7. 1 9. 0 10. 5 11. 1 12. 5 15. 4 14. 8 16. 1 10. 2 12. 1 15. 5 15. 9 27. 7 34. 2 44. 1 41. 3 37. 7 45. 5 50. 1 52. 1 7. 9 8. 9 9. 3 9. 0 9. 4 6. 1 6. 1 6. 0 3. 3 4. 5 5. 6 5. 0 6. 5 8. 0 9. 6 9. 0 3. 2 4. 0 4. 5 4. 2 5. 4 8. 0 11. 1 10. 5 1975: I.. -.1 3.5 7.2 6.6 II... III. 10. 3 9. 2 11. 1 6. 6 7. 9 6. 9 5. 1 5. 9 5. 7 9. 9 10. 0 10. 7 4. 7 5. 5 5. 6 8. 3 9. 9 9. 4 9.6 12.6 12.7 99. 7 105. 5 107. 2 55. 5 53. 8 56. 1 12. 2 12. 2 12. 6 16. 9 16. 2 16. 0 16. 0 16. 2 16. 3 44. 2 51. 7 51. 1 1976: I

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-81.—Sales, profits, and stockholders' equity, all manufacturing corporations, 1947-76 [Billions of dollars]

		All manu corpor		2	Di	urable god	ods indus	stries		Nondura indu	ble good stries	s
Year or quarter		Pro	fits	Charle		Pro	fits	Stock-		Pro	fits	
\	Sales (net)	Before income taxes 1	After income taxes	Stock- holders' equity 2	Sales (net)	Before income taxes 1	After income taxes	holders' equity 2	Sales (net)	Before income taxes t	After income taxes	Stock- holders' equity 2
1947 1948 1949	150. 7 165. 6 154. 9	16. 6 18. 4 14. 4	10. 1 11. 5 9. 0	65. 1 72. 2 77. 6	66. 6 75. 3 70. 3	7. 6 8. 9 7. 5	4. 5 5. 4 4. 5	31. 1 34. 1 37. 0	84. 1 90. 4 84. 6	9. 0 9. 5 7. 0	5. 6 6. 2 4. 6	34. 0 38. 1 40. 6
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	181. 9 245. 0 250. 2 265. 9 248. 5	23. 2 27. 4 22. 9 24. 4 20. 9	12.9 11.9 10.7 11.3 11.2	83. 3 98. 3 103. 7 108. 2 113. 1	86. 8 116. 8 122. 0 137. 9 122. 8	12.9 15.4 12.9 14.0 11.4	6. 7 6. 1 5. 5 5. 8 5. 6	39. 9 47. 2 49. 8 52. 4 54. 9	95. 1 128. 1 128. 0 128. 0 125. 7	10. 3 12. 1 10. 0 10. 4 9. 6	6. 1 5. 7 5. 2 5. 5 5. 6	43. 5 51. 1 53. 9 55. 7 58. 2
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	278. 4 307. 3 320. 0 305. 3 338. 0	28. 6 29. 8 28. 2 22. 7 29. 7	15. 1 16. 2 15. 4 12. 7 16. 3	141.1	142. 1 159. 5 166. 0 148. 6 169. 4	16. 5 16. 5 15. 8 11. 4 15. 8	8. 1 8. 3 7. 9 5. 8 8. 1	65. 2	136. 3 147. 8 154. 1 156. 7 168. 5	12. 1 13. 2 12. 4 11. 3 13. 9	7. 0 7. 8 7. 5 6. 9 8. 3	61. 3 66. 4 70. 6 74. 6 79. 2
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	345, 7 356, 4 389, 9 412, 7 443, 1	27. 5 27. 5 31. 9 34. 9 39. 6	15. 2 15. 3 17. 7 19. 5 23. 2	165. 4 172. 6 181. 4 189. 7 199. 8	173. 9 175. 2 195. 5 209. 0 226. 3	14. 0 13. 6 16. 7 18. 5 21. 2	7. 0 6. 9 8. 6 9. 5 11. 6	82. 3 84. 9 89. 1 93. 3 98. 5	171. 8 181. 2 194. 4 203. 6 216. 8	13. 5 13. 9 15. 1 16. 4 18. 3	8. 2 8. 5 9. 2 10. 0 11. 6	83. 1 87. 7 92. 3 96. 3 101. 3
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	492, 2 554, 2 575, 4 631, 9 694, 6	46. 5 51. 8 47. 8 55. 4 58. 1	27. 5 30. 9 29. 0 32. 1 33. 2	211. 7 230. 3 247. 6 265. 9 289. 9	257. 0 291. 7 300. 6 335. 5 366. 5	26. 2 29. 2 25. 7 30. 6 31. 5	14. 5 16. 4 14. 6 16. 5 16. 9	105. 4 115. 2 125. 0 135. 6 147. 6	235. 2 262. 4 274. 8 296. 4 328. 1	20. 3 22. 6 22. 0 24. 8 26. 6	13. 0 14. 6 14. 4 15. 5 16. 4	106. 3 115. 1 122. 6 130. 3 142. 3
1970 1971 1972 1973	708. 8 751. 4	48. 1 53. 2 63. 2 81. 4	28. 6 31. 3 36. 5 48. 1	306. 8 320. 9 343. 4 374. 1	363. 1 382. 5 435. 8 527. 3	23. 0 26. 5 33. 6 43. 6	12. 9 14. 5 18. 4 24. 8	155. 1 160. 6 171. 4 188. 7	345. 7 368. 9 413. 7 489. 9	25. 2 26. 7 29. 6 37. 8	15. 7 16. 7 18. 0 23. 3	151. 7 160. 3 172. 0 185. 4
1973: IV	275.1	21.4	13.0	386. 4	140.1	10.8	6.3	194. 7	135.0	10.6	6.7	191.7
New series: 3	1.060.6	92. 1	58.7	395.0	529.0	41.1	24.7	196.0	531. 6	51.0	34. 1	199. 0
1974 1975	i	79.9	49. 1	423. 4	521.1	35, 3	21.4	208. 1	544. 1	44. 6	27.7	215.3
1973: IV	236. 6	20.6	13. 2	368.0	122.7	10.1	6.2	185.8	113. 9	10.5	7.0	182.1
1974: [242. 0 269. 4 272. 1 277. 0	21. 2 25. 9 25. 0 20. 1	13. 5 16. 3 15. 5 13. 4	379. 0 389. 9 402. 7 408. 4	120. 3 136. 8 134. 8 137. 1	9. 5 12. 6 10. 5 8. 6	5. 7 7. 6 6. 2 5. 2	189. 4 194. 1 199. 9 200. 8	121. 7 132. 6 137. 3 140. 0	11.7 13.3 14.5 11.5	7. 8 8. 7 9. 4 8. 2	189. 6 195. 8 202. 8 207. 6
1975: 	247. 1 265. 8 271. 0	15. 4 20. 2 21. 7 22. 6	9. 3 12. 4 13. 2 14. 2	410. 7 420. 2 427. 4 435. 5	121. 3 132. 4 131. 0 136. 3	7. 0 9. 3 9. 1 10. 0	4. 1 5. 7 5. 5 6. 2	201. 7 207. 3 209. 7 213. 7	125. 8 133. 3 140. 0 145. 0	8. 4 10. 9 12. 7 12. 6	5. 2 6. 8 7. 7 8. 1	209. 0 212. 9 217. 6 221. 8
1976: 1	307.5	24. 4 29. 3 26. 1	14. 8 18. 0 16. 0	445. 3 458. 9 467. 7	138. 4 154. 4 146. 9	11, 2 14, 8 12, 2	6. 7 9. 0 7. 4	217. 6 224. 3 228. 0	145. 7 153. 1 154. 7	13. 2 14. 5 13. 9	8. 1 9. 1 8. 6	227. 7 234. 6 239. 7

In the old series, "income taxes" refers to Federal income taxes only, as State and local income taxes had already been deducted. In the new series, no income taxes have been deducted.
 2 Annual data are average equity for the year (using four end-of-quarter figures).
 3 See "Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations, First Quarter 1974," Federal Trade Commission.

Source: Federal Trade Commission.

Note.—Data are not necessarily comparable from one period to another due to changes in accounting procedures, industry classifications, sampling procedures, etc. For explanatory notes concerning compilation of the series, see "Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations," Federal Trade Commission.

TABLE B-82.—Relation of profits after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, all manufacturing corporations, 1947-76

	income	io of profits afte e taxes (annual i lders' equity—p	rate)		after income tax llar of sales—ce	
Year or quarter	All	Durable	Nondurable	All	Durable	Nondurable
	manufacturing	goods	goods	manufacturing	goods	goods
	corporations	industries	industries	corporations	industries	industries
1947	15. 6	14. 4	16. 6	6. 7	6. 7	6. 7
1948	16. 0	15. 7	16. 2	7. 0	7. 1	6. 8
1949	11. 6	12. 1	11. 2	5. 8	6. 4	5. 4
1950	1 1211	16. 9	14. 1	7. 1	7.7	6. 5
1951		13. 0	11. 2	4. 8	5.3	4. 5
1952		11. 1	9. 7	4. 3	4.5	4. 1
1953		11. 1	9. 9	4. 3	4.2	4. 3
1954		10. 3	9. 6	4. 5	4.6	4. 4
1955	12. 6	13. 8	11. 4	5. 4	5. 7	5. 1
1956	12. 3	12. 8	11. 8	5. 3	5. 2	5. 3
1957	10. 9	11. 3	10. 6	4. 8	4. 8	4. 9
1958	8. 6	8. 0	9. 2	4. 2	3. 9	4. 4
1959	10. 4	10. 4	10. 4	4. 8	4. 8	4. 9
1960	9. 2	8. 5	9. 8	4, 4	4. 0	4.8
1961	8. 9	8. 1	9. 6	4, 3	3. 9	4.7
1962	9. 8	9. 6	9. 9	4, 5	4. 4	4.7
1963	10. 3	10. 1	10. 4	4, 7	4. 5	4.9
1964	11. 6	11. 7	11. 5	5, 2	5. 1	5.4
1965	13. 0	13. 8	12. 2	5. 6	5. 7	5. 5
1966	13. 4	14. 2	12. 7	5. 6	5. 6	5. 6
1967	11. 7	11. 7	11. 8	5. 0	4. 8	5. 3
1968	12. 1	12. 2	11. 9	5. 1	4. 9	5. 2
1969	11. 5	11. 4	11. 5	4. 8	4. 6	5. 0
1970	9. 3	8. 3	10. 3	4.0	3, 5	4, 5
	9. 7	9. 0	10. 3	4.1	3, 8	4, 5
	10. 6	10. 8	10. 5	4.3	4, 2	4, 4
	12. 8	13. 1	12. 6	4.7	4, 7	4, 8
1973: IV	13, 4	12. 9	14.0	4.7	4.5	5. 0
New series: 3 1974 1975	14. 9 11. 6	12. 6 10. 3	17. 1 12. 9	5. 5 4. 6	4. 7 4. 1	6. 4 5. 1
1973: IV	14. 3	13. 3	15. 3	5.6	5.0	6.1
1974:	14. 3	12. 1	16. 4	5. 6	4, 8	6. 4
	16. 7	15. 6	17. 8	6. 0	5, 5	6. 6
	15. 4	12. 3	18. 5	5. 7	4, 6	6. 8
V	13. 2	10. 4	15. 8	4. 8	3, 8	5. 9
1975: I	9. 0	8. 1	10. 0	3. 7	3. 4	4. 1
II	11. 8	10. 9	12. 8	4. 7	4. 3	5. 1
III	12. 4	10. 5	14. 1	4. 9	4. 2	5. 5
IV	13. 1	11. 6	14. 5	5. 1	4. 5	5. 6
1976:	.] 15./	12. 3	14. 3	5. 2	4. 8	5. 6
		16. 0	15. 5	5. 9	5. 8	5. 9
		12. 9	14. 4	5. 3	5. 0	5. 6

¹ Annual ratios based on average equity for the year (using four end-of-quarter figures). Quarterly ratios based on equity at end of quarter only.

3 See "Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations, First Quarter 1974," Federal Trade Commission.

Note.—Based on data in millions of dollars. See also Note, Table B-81.

Source: Federal Trade Commission.

Table B-83.—Relation of profits after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, all manufacturing corporations, by industry group, 1975-76

	tax	tio of pr es (ann olders' e	ual rate) to stoo	ck-	Pro	fits afte dollar o	r incom f sales-	e taxes cents	per
Industry	19	75		1976		19	75		1976	
	111	IV	ı	IJ	Ш	111	IV	ı	П	Ш
All manufacturing corporations	12.4	13. 1	13. 3	15. 7	13. 7	4.9	5, 1	5. 2	5.9	5.3
Durable goods industries	10.5	11.6	12.3	16.0	12.9	4, 2	4.5	4.8	5.8	5. 0
Stone, clay, and glass products Primary metal industries	14. 8 6. 5	10. 8 7. 5	4. 8 7. 1	15. 5 10. 7	16. 1 8. 1	6. 0 3. 4	4.6 4.0	2.3 3.5	6. 2 4. 8	6. 2 3. 9
Iron and steej Nonferrous metals	8. 7 3. 1	10. 0 3. 6	8. 1 5. 3	11. 3 9. 5	8. 7 7. 0	4. 1 2. 0	4. 8 2. 2	3. 8 3. 1	4. 8 4. 7	3. 9 3. 7
Fabricated metal products	14. 8 13. 2 8. 3 7. 5	12.6 14.5 10.5 11.6	15. 0 14. 9 10. 2 16. 8	17. 7 16. 2 13. 5 20. 7	15. 8 15. 5 11. 9 10. 5	4. 7 6. 3 3. 0 2. 5	4. 0 6. 8 3. 7 3. 6	4. 8 7. 2 3. 7 5. 1	5.3 7.5 4.6 5.8	4. 9 7. 7 4. 2 3. 5
Motor vehicles and equipment. Aircraft, guided missiles, and	5.5	12.5	18.8	23.1	9.1	2.1	4. 3	6.0	6.9 3.6	3. 3 3. 7
parts Instruments and related products_ Other durable manufacturing prod-	12. 1 15. 1	10.9	12.3 12.2	14. 0 16. 3	13. 0 16. 3	3. 3 8. 4	2.9 7.7	3. 4 6. 9	8. 6	3. <i>7</i> 8. 6
ucts	10.9	10.4	10. 1	17.5	15. 2	3.4	3. 3	3. 2	5. 0	4. 4
Nondurable goods industries	14.1	14.5	14. 3	15.5	14. 4	5. 5	5.6	5.6	5. 9	5. 6
Food and kindred products	18. 4 7. 8 12. 6 13. 4	14. 6 15. 3 10. 4 14. 7 15. 7 15. 2	13. 3 15. 2 10. 0 14. 5 12. 3 16. 6	16. 3 16. 0 10. 1 16. 3 16. 3 17. 2	16. 8 16. 9 6. 6 13. 6 16. 3 15. 3	3. 7 11. 1 2. 5 5. 5 4. 9 7. 6	3. 2 8. 0 3. 0 6. 2 5. 4 7. 6	3. 1 8. 2 3. 0 6. 1 4. 4 8. 0	3. 7 9. 0 2. 9 6. 7 5. 6 8. 1	3. 8 9. 2 2. 0 5. 7 5. 4 7. 5
Industrial chemicals and syn- thetics Drugs	13. 7 18. 1	15. 5 15. 6	16. 2 18. 8	16.3 18.2	13. 5 18. 7	7. 0 12. 4	7. 8 10. 7	7. 8 12. 3	7.6 12.7	6. 7 12. 6
Petroleum and coal products Rubber and miscellaneous plastics	13.3	14.6	14.7	14. 8	14.0	8.0	8.6	8.7	9.0	8. 3
productsOther nondurable manufacturing	9. 4	11.0	10.6	13. 4	7.6	3. 5	4.0	3.9	4.5	2.8
products	14.5	16.5	13, 7	13.6	14.5	3.1	3.3	3.0	2.9	3. 1

¹ Ratios based on equity at end of quarter.

Source: Federal Trade Commission.

Table B-84. -- Sources and uses of funds, nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business, 1946-76 [Billions of dollars]

				Sources		-			Uses		
	_			E	xternal				Pur-	ln-	Discrep- ancy
Period	Total	Internal ¹		Credit	market 1	unds		Total	chase of physi-	crease in finan-	(sources less uses)
			Total	Total	Long- term ²	Short- term ³	Other		cal assets 4	cial assets	_
1946 1947 1948 1949	18. 4 26. 7 28. 4 19. 7	7.8 12.6 18.8 19.3	10.6 14.1 9.7 .4	6. 8 8. 3 6. 4 3. 0	3. 5 5. 3 6. 6 4. 8	3.3 3.0 2 -1.8	3.7 5.8 3.3 -2.7	24.6 23.6 27.7 20.8	26. 0 15. 2 22. 7 17. 3	-1.4 8.4 5.0 3.5	-6.2 3.1 .8 -1.2
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	41.8 35.9 28.9 27.3 28.2	17. 8 19. 7 21. 2 21. 1 23. 5	24.0 16.2 7.8 6.2 4.7	8. 0 10. 6 9. 2 5. 7 5. 5	4.1 6.4 7.8 6.1 5.7	3.9 4.2 1.4 3 3	15.9 5.6 -1.4 .5 8	46. 3 39. 3 28. 8 27. 7 26. 5	29. 9 31. 9 24. 2 25. 4 21. 6	16. 4 7. 4 4. 6 2. 3 4. 9	-4.5 -3.4 .2 4 1.7
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	51. 4 43. 8 41. 8 41. 1 55. 4	28.8 28.7 30.4 29.6 35.0	22.6 15.1 11.4 11.5 20.4	9.5 12.6 11.8 10.3 12.7	5.7 7.3 9.9 10.3 8.3	3.8 5.4 1.9 0 4.4	13.0 2.5 4 1.2 7.7	48. 3 40. 7 38. 7 38. 4 51. 9	31.8 36.7 34.5 27.6 37.7	16.5 4.0 4.2 10.8 14.2	3. 1 3. 1 3. 1 2. 6 3. 6
1960	47. 6 54. 1 58. 9 65. 9 72. 6	34. 7 35. 3 41. 6 44. 5 50. 1	12. 9 18. 8 17. 3 21. 4 22. 5	11.9 12.1 12.4 12.4 15.0	7.5 10.5 9.5 8.3 8.9	4.5 1.6 2.9 4.1 6.1	1. 0 6. 7 4. 9 9. 0 7. 4	40. 6 50. 1 54. 9 58. 9 64. 2	38. 0 36. 9 43. 8 44. 8 50. 8	2.7 13.2 11.1 14.2 13.4	7. 0 4. 0 4. 0 6. 9 8. 4
1965	96. 9 93. 3 114. 5	60. 5 61. 3 62. 3	34. 7 36. 4 32. 0 52. 2 56. 9	20. 4 25. 6 28. 9 31. 9 38. 4	9. 2 16. 0 21. 0 18. 9 20. 8	11. 2 9. 6 7. 9 13. 0 17. 7	14. 4 10. 9 3. 1 20. 3 18. 5	82, 1 88, 6 89, 4 106, 4 113, 4	61. 9 76. 0 72. 6 77. 6 85. 0	20, 2 12, 6 16, 8 28, 8 28, 4	8. 7 8. 3 3. 9 8. 1 5. 2
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	129.0 154.0 181.7	68. 6 80. 8 83. 8	46. 2 60. 4 73. 2 97. 8 105. 4	41. 5 46. 4 58. 8 72. 9 83. 1	32. 6 41. 6 41. 4 37. 4 39. 6	8. 9 4. 7 17. 3 35. 5 43. 5	4. 8 14. 0 14. 4 25. 0 22. 2	96. 1 115. 1 137. 5 165. 5 169. 9	80. 6 86. 2 101. 0 124. 4 134. 6	15. 4 28. 8 36. 5 41. 1 35. 3	9. 0 13. 9 16. 4 16. 1 13. 1
1975	145. 5	103. 4	42, 1	37. 1	49.8	-12.8	5.0	130.9	95.7	35, 2	14.5
				s	easonali	y adjusted	d annual r	ates			
1975: I II III IV	- 130. 7 - 171. 0	7 101.5 0 113.6	29. 2 57. 4	35, 0 32, 1 31, 1 50, 0	54. 4 37. 9	-18.0 -22.2 -6.8 -4.0	35. 0 2. 9 26. 3 31. 7	68. 6 115. 3 157. 9 182. 2	89. 8 80. 9 106. 8 105. 5	-21. 2 34. 4 51. 1 76. 7	14. 9 15. 4 13. 2 14. 6
1976: 1 II III	_ 200.1	l 121.3	78, 8	45. 4 48. 1 38. 0	43.0	-3.1 5.0 .2	34. 8 30. 6 32. 4	190. 9 195. 4 189. 2	129. 3 140. 5 143. 7	61. 6 54. 9 45. 5	9. 9 4. 6 9. 3

Undistributed profits (after inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments), capital consumption allowances, and foreign branch profits.
 Stocks, bonds, and mortgages.
 Bank loans, commercial paper, finance company loans, bankers' acceptances, and Government loans.
 Plant and equipment, residential structures, inventory investment, and mineral rights.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE B-85.—Current assets and liabilities of U.S. corporations, 1939-76 [Billions of dollars]

			Cu	rrent ass	ets				Curr	ent liabi	lities		
End of year or quarter	Total	Cash on hand and in banks ¹	U.S. Gov- ern- ment securi- ties ²	Re- ceiv- ables from U.S. Gov- ern- ment 3	Notes and ac- counts receiv- able	In- ven- tories	Other cur- rent as- sets 4	Total	Ad- vances and pre- pay- ments, U.S. Gov- ern- ment 3	Notes and ac- counts pay- able	Fed- eral in- come tax liabili- ties	Other cur- rent lia- bili- ties ⁵	Net work- ing capi- tal
				1			orporati		1		1		
1939	54. 5 60. 3	10. 8 13. 1	2. 2 2. 0	0.1	22. 1 23. 9	18.0 19.8	1.4	30.0 32.8	0.6	21.9 22.6	1.2	6.9	24.5 27.5
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1947 1948	72 0	13. 9 17. 6 21. 6 21. 7 22. 8 25. 0 25. 3 26. 5	4.0 10.1 16.4 20.9 21.1 15.3 14.1 14.8 16.8	4. 0 5. 0 4. 7 2. 7 . 7	27.4 23.3 21.9 21.8	25.6 27.3 27.6 26.8 26.3 37.6 44.6 48.9 45.3	1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 2.4 1.7 1.6 1.6	40.7 47.3 51.6 51.7 45.8 51.9 61.5 64.4 60.7	2. 0 2. 2 1. 8 . 9 . 1	25.6 24.0 24.1 25.0 24.8	2.5 7.1 12.6 16.6 15.5 10.4 8.5 10.7 11.5 9.3	7. 2 8. 7 8. 7 9. 4 9. 7 11. 8 13. 2 13. 5 14. 0	32.3 36.3 42.1 45.6 51.6 56.2 62.1 68.6 72.4
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1956 1957 1958	1 224 N	28. 1 30. 0 30. 8 31. 1 33. 4 34. 6 34. 8 34. 9 37. 4 36. 3	19.7 20.7 19.9 21.5 19.2 23.5 19.1 18.6 18.8 22.8	1. 1 2. 7 2. 8 2. 6 2. 4 2. 3 2. 6 2. 8 2. 8 2. 8	55. 7 58. 8 64. 6 65. 9 71. 2 86. 6 95. 1 99. 4 106. 9 117. 7	55. 1 64. 9 65. 8 67. 2 65. 3 72. 8 80. 4 82. 2 81. 9 88. 4	1.7 2.1 2.4 2.4 3.1 4.2 5.9 6.7 7.5	79. 8 92. 6 96. 1 98. 9 99. 7 121. 0 130. 5 133. 1 136. 6 153. 1	2.3 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.3	47.9 53.6 57.0 57.3 59.3 73.8 81.5 84.3 88.7 99.3	16. 7 21. 3 18. 1 18. 7 15. 5 19. 3 17. 6 15. 4 12. 9 15. 0	14. 9 16. 5 18. 7 20. 7 22. 5 25. 7 29. 0 31. 1 33. 3 37. 0	81.6 86.5 90.1 91.8 94.9 103.0 107.4 111.6 118.7
1960 1961	289. 0 306. 8	37. 2 41. 1	20. 1 20. 0	3. 1 3. 4	126. 1 135. 8	91.8 95.2	10.6 11.4	160. 4 171. 2	1.8 1.8	105.0 112.8	13.5 14.1	40.1 42.5	128. 6 135. 6
					N	onfinan	cial corp	oration					
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1967 1968	288. 2 305. 6 336. 0 364. 0 386. 2 426. 5 473. 6	34. 8 37. 1 39. 8 40. 5 42. 8 41. 9 45. 5 48. 2 47. 9	16. 5 16. 8 16. 7 15. 8 14. 4 13. 0 10. 3 11. 5 10. 6	3. 4 3. 7 3. 6 3. 4 3. 9 4. 5 5. 1 5. 1 4. 8	94. 5 99. 5 106. 9 116. 5 130. 2 142. 1 150. 2 168. 8 192. 2	95. 0 100. 5 106. 8 113. 1 126. 6 142. 8 153. 1 166. 0 186. 4	10. 5 12. 1 14. 4 16. 3 18. 1 19. 7 22. 0 26. 9 31. 6	123. 7 132. 4 145. 5 156. 6 178. 8 199. 4 211. 3 244. 1 287. 8	1. 8 2. 0 2. 5 2. 7 3. 1 4. 4 5. 8 6. 4 7. 3	82, 6 86, 7 94, 5 102, 2 118, 4 133, 1 141, 3 162, 4 191, 9	13. 3 14. 3 15. 7 16. 2 18. 3 17. 4 13. 2 14. 3 12. 6	26. 0 29. 4 32. 8 35. 5 39. 0 44. 5 51. 0 76. 0	131.0 137.3 142.7 149.0 157.2 164.6 174.9 182.4 185.7
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	529. 6 573. 5 643. 3 712. 2 731. 6	50. 2 53. 3 57. 5 61. 6 62. 7 68. 1	7.7 11.0 9.3 11.0 11.7 19.4	4.2 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6	201. 9 217. 6 240. 0 266. 1 289. 7 294. 6	193. 3 200. 4 215. 2 246. 7 288. 0 285. 8	35. 0 43. 8 48. 1 54. 4 56. 6 60. 0	304. 9 326. 0 352. 2 401. 0 450. 6 457. 5	6. 6 4. 9 4. 0 4. 3 5. 2 6. 4	204. 7 215. 6 230. 4 261. 6 287. 5 281. 6	20.7	83. 6 92. 4 102. 6 117. 0 134. 8 148. 8	187. 4 203. 6 221. 3 242. 3 261. 5 274. 1
1975: I II III IV	703. 2 716. 5 731, 6	60. 6 63. 7 65. 6 68. 1	12. 1 12. 7 14. 3 19. 4	3. 2 3. 3 3. 3 3. 6	281. 9 284. 8 294. 7 294. 6	285. 2 281. 4 279. 6 285. 8	55. 4 57. 3 59. 0 60. 0	438. 0 434. 2 444. 7 457. 5	5. 3 5. 8 6. 2 6. 4	271. 2 270. 1 273. 4 281. 6	21. 8 17. 7 19. 4 20. 7	139. 8 140. 6 145. 6 148. 8	260. 4 269. 0 271. 8 274. 1
1976: I II	775.4	68. 4 70. 8 71. 1	21. 7 23. 3 23. 9	3.6 3.7 4.3	307.3 318.1 324.2	288. 8 295. 6 302. 1	63.6 63.9 66.3	465. 9 475. 9 484. 1	6. 4 6. 8 7. 0	280. 5 287. 0 284. 7	23. 9 22. 0 24. 9	155. 0 160. 1 167. 5	287.6 299.4 307.7

¹ Includes time certificates of deposit.

Note.—Year-end data through 1971 are based on "Statistics of Income" (Department of the Treasury), covering virtually all corporations in the United States. "Statistics of Income" data may not be strictly comparable from year to year because of changes in the tax laws, basis for filing returns, and processing of data for compilation purposes. All other figures shown are estimates based on data compiled from many different sources, including data on corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Source: Securities and Exchange Commission.

³ Includes Federal agency issues.

[•] Includes receivables from and payables to the U.S. Government do not include amounts offset against each other on corporations' books or amounts arising from subcontracting which are not directly due from or to the U.S. Government. Wherever possible, adjustments have been made to include U.S. Government advances offset against inventories on corporations' books.

⁴ Includes marketable investments (other than Government securities and time certificates of deposit) as well as sundry current assets.

Includes commercial paper outstanding, the portion of long-term debt due in less than 1 year, and miscellaneous current liabilities not elsewhere classified.
 Excludes banks, savings and loan associations, and insurance companies.
 Excludes banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, investment companies, finance companies (personal and commercial), real estate companies, and security and commodity brokers, dealers, and exchanges.

TABLE B-86.—State and municipal and corporate securities offered, 1934-76 [Millions of dollars]

				Co	rporate sec	urities off	ered for ca	ish		
	State and municipal securities		Type of	corporate	security		Industry	of corpora	ate issuer	
Year or quarter	offered for cash (principal amounts)	Total corpo- rate offer- ings	Com- mon stock	Pre- ferred stock	Bonds and notes	Manu- fac- turing ¹	Elec- tric, gas, and water ²	Trans- porta- tion 3	Com- munica- tion	Other
1934	939	397	19	6	372	67	133	176		21
1939	1, 128	2, 164	87	98	1, 979	604	1, 271	186		103
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944	1, 238 956 524 435 661	2, 677 2, 667 1, 062 1, 170 3, 202	108 110 34 56 163	183 167 112 124 369	2, 386 2, 389 917 990 2, 670	992 848 539 510 1,061	1, 203 1, 357 472 477 1, 422	324 366 48 161 609		159 96 4 21 109
1945	795 1, 157 2, 324 2, 690 2, 907	6, 011 6, 900 6, 577 7, 078 6, 052	397 891 779 614 736	758 1, 127 762 492 425	4, 855 4, 882 5, 036 5, 973 4, 890	2, 026 3, 701 2, 742 2, 226 1, 414	2, 319 2, 158 3, 257 2, 187 2, 320	1, 454 711 286 755 800	902 571	211 329 293 1, 008 946
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954		6, 362 7, 741 9, 534 8, 898 9, 516	811 1, 212 1, 369 1, 326 1, 213	631 838 564 489 816	4, 920 5, 691 7, 601 7, 083 7, 488	1, 200 3, 122 4, 039 2, 254 2, 268	2, 649 2, 455 2, 675 3, 029 3, 713	813 494 992 595 778	399 612 760 882 720	1, 300 1, 058 1, 068 2, 138 2, 037
1955		10, 240 10, 939 12, 884 11, 558 9, 748	2, 185 2, 301 2, 516 1, 334 2, 027	635 636 411 571 531	7, 420 8, 002 9, 957 9, 653 7, 190	2, 994 3, 647 4, 234 3, 515 2, 073	2, 464 2, 529 3, 938 3, 804 3, 258	893 724 824 824 967	1, 132 1, 419 1, 462 1, 424 717	2, 757 2, 619 2, 426 1, 991 2, 733
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	7 230	10, 154 13, 165 10, 705 12, 211 13, 957	1, 664 3, 294 1, 314 1, 011 2, 679	409 450 422 343 412	8, 081 9, 420 8, 969 10, 856 10, 865	2, 152 4, 077 3, 249 3, 514 3, 046	2, 851 3, 032 2, 825 2, 677 2, 760	718 694 567 957 982	1, 050 1, 834 1, 303 1, 105 2, 189	3, 383 3, 527 2, 761 3, 957 4, 980
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	11, 148 11, 089 14, 288 16, 374 11, 460	14, 782 17, 385 24, 014 21, 261 25, 997	1, 473 1, 901 1, 927 3, 885 7, 640	724 580 881 636 691	12, 585 14, 904 21, 206 16, 740 17, 666	5, 414 7, 056 11, 069 6, 958 6, 346	2, 934 3, 666 4, 935 5, 293 6, 715	702 1, 494 1, 639 1, 564 1, 779	945 2, 003 1, 975 1, 775 2, 172	4, 787 3, 167 4, 396 5, 671 8, 985
1970	17, 762 24, 370 23, 070 22, 953 22, 824	37, 451 43, 219 39, 704 31, 684 37, 737	7, 037 9, 502 10, 707 7, 643 3, 986	1, 390 3, 682 3, 370 3, 341 2, 254	29, 023 30, 035 25, 627 20, 700 31, 497	10, 647 11, 625 6, 400 4, 835 10, 410	11, 009 11, 746 11, 314 10, 270 12, 835	1, 253 1, 166 859 811 1, 004	5, 291 5, 815 4, 835 4, 867 3, 928	9, 252 12, 867 16, 297 10, 899 9, 559
1975	29, 326	52, 527	7, 402	3, 459	41, 666	18, 649	15, 8 9 3	2, 636	4, 463	10, 884
1975: I II III	6, 526 7, 796 8, 236 6, 768	15, 118 15, 301 9, 232 12, 876	1, 431 2, 676 1, 419 1, 876	662 924 635 1, 238	13, 025 11, 700 7, 179 9, 762	6, 051 6, 698 2, 420 3, 480	4, 736 4, 407 3, 326 3, 424	85 507 291 1,753	1, 381 1, 190 678 1, 214	2, 865 2, 498 2, 516 3, 004
1976: I II	8, 274 8, 614 7, 854	13, 744 13, 852 10, 789	2, 788 2, 403 1, 423	764 720 439	10, 191 10, 729 8, 929	4, 496 3, 701 2, 972	4, 045 3, 139 3, 315	1, 087 605 1, 193	765 1, 876 377	3, 351 4, 529 2, 933

¹ Prior to 1948, also includes extractive, radio broadcasting, airline companies, commercial, and miscellaneous company issues.

² Prior to 1948, also includes telephone, street railway, and bus company issues.

³ Prior to 1948, includes railroad issues only.

Note.—Covers substantially all new issues of State, municipal, and corporate securities offered for cash sale in the United States in amounts over \$100,000 and with terms to maturity of more than 1 year; excludes notes issued exclusively to commercial banks, intercorporate transactions, and issues to be sold over an extended period, such as employee-purchase plans. Closed-end investment company issues are included beginning 1971.

Sources: Securities and Exchange Commission, "The Commercial and Financial Chronicle," and "The Bond Buyer,"

TABLE B-87.—Common stock prices and yields, 1949-76

			Com	mon stock	prices 1			Common (per	stock yields cent) ⁵
Period		New York S (Dece	Stock Excha mber 31, 19	inge index 65=50) ²	es	Dow- Jones	Standard & Poor's composite	Dividend-	Earnings-
	Com- posite	Indus- trial	Trans- portation	Utility	Finance	industrial average 3	index (1941-43= 10) 4	price ratio ⁶	price ratio ⁷
1949	9. 02					179. 48	15. 23	6. 59	15. 48
1950 1951	10.87 13.08					216, 31 257, 64 270, 76	18. 40 22. 34 24. 50 24. 73 29. 69	6. 57 6. 13	13. 99 11. 82
953 954	13. 81 13. 67 16. 19					275. 97 333. 94 442. 72	24. 73 29. 69 40. 49	5. 80 5. 80 4. 95 4. 08	10. 26 8. 5
950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959	21. 54 24. 40 23. 67 24. 56					493. 01 475. 71 491. 66	46. 62 44. 38 46. 24	4. 09 4. 35 3. 97	71. 6. 9. 4 10. 2 8. 5 7. 9 7. 5 7. 8 6. 2 5. 7
	24. 56 30. 73 30. 01					632. 12 618. 04	57.38	3.23	5, 90
961 962 963 964	35, 37 33, 49 37, 51 43, 76					691.55 639.76 714.81 834.05	55. 85 66. 27 62. 38 69. 87 81. 37	3. 47 2. 98 3. 37 3. 17 3. 01 3. 00 3. 40	4. 62 5. 82 5. 50 5. 32 5. 55
960	47. 39 46. 15 50. 77 55. 37 54. 67	46. 18 51. 97 58. 00 57. 44	50. 26 53. 51 50. 58 46, 96	45. 41 45. 43 44. 19 42. 80	44. 45 49. 82 65. 85 70. 49	910. 88 873. 60 879. 12 906. 00 876, 72	88. 17 85. 26 91. 93 98. 70 97. 84	3. 00 3. 40 3. 20 3. 07 3. 24	5. 59 6. 69 5. 79 5. 60
970	45. 72 54. 22 60. 29 57. 42 43. 84 45. 73 54. 46	48. 03 57. 92 65. 73 63. 08 48. 08 50. 52 60. 44	32. 14 44. 35 50. 17 37. 74 31. 89 31. 10 39. 57	37. 24 39. 53 38. 48 37. 69 29. 79 31. 50 36. 97	60, 00 70, 38 78, 35 70, 12 49, 67 47, 14 52, 94	753. 20 884. 76 950. 71 923. 88 759. 37 802. 49 974. 92	83. 22 98. 29 109. 20 107. 43 82. 85 86. 16 102. 01	3, 83 3, 14 2, 84 3, 06 4, 47 4, 31 3, 77	6. 4 5. 4 5. 5 7. 1 11. 5 9. 0
975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	38. 56 42. 48 44. 35 44. 91 47. 76 49. 22	41. 29 46. 00 48. 63 49. 74 53. 22 54. 61	28. 12 30. 21 31. 62 31. 70 32. 28 32. 38	29. 55 31. 31 31. 04 30. 01 31. 02 32. 79	44, 85 47, 59 47, 83 47, 35 50, 06 52, 20	659. 09 724. 89 765. 06 790. 93 836. 56 845. 70	72. 56 80. 10 83. 78 84. 72 90. 10 92. 40	5. 07 4. 61 4. 42 4. 34 4. 08 4. 02	10. 1
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	49. 54 45. 71 44. 97 46. 87 47. 64 46. 78	54. 96 50. 71 50. 05 52. 26 52. 91 51. 89	32. 90 30. 08 29. 46 30. 79 32. 09 31. 61	32. 98 31. 02 30. 65 31. 87 32. 99 32. 75	52. 51 46. 55 43. 38 44. 36 45. 10 43. 86	856. 28 815. 51 818. 28 831. 26 845. 51 840. 80	92. 49 85. 71 84. 67 88. 57 90. 07 88. 70	4. 02 4. 36 4. 39 4. 22 4. 07 4. 14	9. 1: 8. 6
976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	51. 31 53. 73 54. 01 54. 28 53. 87 54. 23	57. 00 59. 79 60. 30 60. 62 60. 22 60. 70	35, 78 38, 53 39, 17 38, 66 39, 71 40, 41	35, 23 36, 12 35, 43 35, 69 35, 40 35, 16	48. 83 52. 06 52. 61 52. 71 50. 99 51. 82	929, 34 971, 70 988, 55 992, 51 988, 82 985, 59	96, 86 100, 64 101, 08 101, 93 101, 16 101, 77	3. 80 3. 67 3. 65 3. 66 3. 76 3. 75	8. 29 8. 76
July	55. 68 55. 18 56. 29 54. 43 54. 17 56. 34	62. 11 61. 14 62. 35 60. 07 59. 45 61, 54	42, 12 40, 63 40, 36 38, 37 39, 28 41, 77	36, 49 37, 56 38, 77 38, 33 38, 85 40, 61	54. 06 54. 22 54. 52 52. 74 53. 25 57. 45	993. 20 981. 63 994. 37 951. 95 944. 58 976. 86	104. 20 103. 29 105. 45 101. 89 101. 19 104. 66	3. 64 3. 74 3. 71 3. 85 4. 04 3. 93	9. 0

¹ Averages of daily closing prices, except New York Stock Exchange data through May 1964 are averages of weekly closing

Note,-All data relate to stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

Sources: New York Stock Exchange, Dow-Jones & Co., Inc., and Standard & Poor's Corporation.

¹ Averages of daily closing prices, except New York Stock Exchange data through May 1964 are averages of weekly closing prices.
2 Includes all the stocks (more than 1,500) listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
3 Includes 50 stocks.
4 Includes 50 stocks.
5 Standard and Poor's series, based on 500 stocks in the composite index.
6 Aggregate cash dividends (based on latest known annual rate) divided by aggregate market value based on Wednesday closing prices. Monthly data are averages of weekly figures; annual data are averages of monthly figures.
7 Ratio of quarterly earnings (seasonally adjusted annual rate) to price index for last day of quarter. Annual ratios are averages of quarterly ratios.

TABLE B-88.—Business formation and business failures, 1929-76

	Î	1			Bus	iness failu	res ¹		
	Index of net	New business incorpo-	Busi-	Num	ber of fai	lures	Am liab	ount of cu ilities (mil of dollars	rrent lions)
Year or month	business formation (1967=100)	rations (num-	ness failure			ty size		Liabili cla	ty size
		ber)	rate 2	Total	Under \$100,000	\$100,000 and over	Total	Under \$100,000	\$100, 000 and over
1929 1933 *	112.6	132, 916 112, 897 96, 346 85, 640	103. 9 100. 3 69. 6 63. 0 54. 4 44. 6 16. 4 6. 5 4. 2 5. 2 14. 3 20. 4 34. 4	22, 909 19, 859 14, 768 13, 619 11, 848 9, 405 3, 221 1, 222 809 1, 129 3, 474 5, 250 9, 246	22, 165 18, 880 14, 541 13, 400 11, 685 9, 282 3, 155 1, 176 759 1, 003 3, 103 4, 853 8, 708	744 979 227 219 163 123 66 46 50 126 371 397 538	483. 3 457. 5 182. 5 166. 7 136. 1 100. 1 45. 3 31. 7 30. 2 67. 3 204. 6 234. 6 308. 1	261. 5 215. 5 132. 9 119. 9 100. 7 80. 3 30. 2 14. 5 11. 4 15. 7 93. 9 161. 4	221. 8 242. 0 49. 7 46. 8 35. 4 20. 5 15. 1 17. 1 18. 8 51. 6 140. 9 140. 7
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1957 1958	93. 1 93. 3 98. 2 94. 4 91. 3 99. 1	93, 092 83, 778 92, 946 102, 706 117, 411 139, 915 141, 163 137, 112 150, 781 193, 067	34. 3 30. 7 28. 7 33. 2 42. 0 41. 6 48. 0 51. 7 55. 9 51. 8	9, 162 8, 058 7, 611 8, 862 11, 086 10, 969 12, 686 13, 739 14, 964 14, 053	8, 746 7, 626 7, 081 8, 075 10, 226 10, 113 11, 615 12, 547 13, 499 12, 707	416 432 530 787 860 856 1,071 1,192 1,465 1,346	248. 3 259. 5 283. 3 394. 2 462. 6 449. 4 562. 7 615. 3 728. 3 692. 8	151. 2 131. 6 131. 9 167. 5 211. 4 206. 4 239. 8 267. 1 297. 6 278. 9	97. 1 128. 0 151. 4 226. 6 251. 2 243. 0 322. 9 348. 2 430. 7 413. 9
1960	92. 4 88. 3 90. 7 93. 3 97. 2 98. 6	182, 713 181, 535 182, 057 186, 404 197, 724 203, 897 200, 010 206, 569 233, 635 274, 267	57. 0 64. 4 60. 8 56. 3 53. 2 53. 3 51. 6 49. 0 38. 6 37. 3	15, 445 17, 075 15, 782 14, 374 13, 501 13, 514 13, 061 12, 364 9, 636 9, 154	13, 650 15, 006 13, 772 12, 192 11, 346 11, 340 10, 833 10, 144 7, 829 7, 192	1, 795 2, 069 2, 010 2, 182 2, 155 2, 174 2, 228 2, 220 1, 807 1, 962	938.6 1,090.1 1,213.6 1,352.6 1,329.2 1,321.7 1,385.7 1,265.2 941.0 1,142.1	327. 2 370. 1 346. 5 321. 0 313. 6 321. 7 321. 5 297. 9 241. 1 231. 3	611. 4 720. 0 867. 1 1, 031. 6 1, 015. 6 1, 000. 0 1, 064. 1 967. 3 699. 9 910. 8
1970	108. 0 111. 0 117. 9 117. 9 112. 4 108. 9	264, 209 287, 577 316, 601 329, 358 319, 149 326, 345	43. 8 41. 7 38. 3 36. 4 38. 4 42. 6	10, 748 10, 326 9, 566 9, 345 9, 915 11, 432	8, 019 7, 611 7, 040 6, 627 6, 733 7, 504	2, 729 2, 715 2, 526 2, 718 3, 182 3, 928	1, 887. 8 1, 916. 9 2, 000. 2 2, 298. 6 3, 053. 1 4, 380. 2	269. 3 271. 3 258. 8 235. 6 256. 9 298. 6	1, 618. 4 1, 645. 6 1, 741. 5 2, 063. 0 2, 796. 3 4, 081. 6
		nally adjust	ed						ļ
1975: Jan	102. 9 101. 7 103. 0 103. 4 104. 8 110. 7	24, 406 24, 298 24, 922 26, 506 26, 634 26, 231	46. 8 44. 9 46. 3 49. 1 43. 4 36. 5	1, 080 963 1, 145 1, 202 1, 045 805	677 627 774 756 728 572	403 336 371 446 317 233	391. 1 384. 8 343. 3 372. 1 357. 8 175. 9	30. 2 29. 9 29. 2 22. 5	365, 7 359, 8 313, 2 342, 2 328, 6 153, 4
July	113.7 112.6 113.1 112.0 112.5 116.0	28, 571 28, 632 29, 000 29, 469 28, 795 29, 704	41. 9 41. 4 42. 2 44. 9 37. 0 35. 4	904 891 853 987 801 756	553 608 559 645 521 484	351 283 294 342 280 272	242. 0 222. 4 205. 5 4 1, 295. 4 252. 9 136. 9	21. 7 23. 1 22. 7 25. 4 22. 4 20. 9	220. 4 199. 3 182. 8 1, 270. 0 230. 4 115. 9
1976: Jan	115. 4 114. 5 116. 3 115. 7 114. 9 118. 6	29, 604 28, 973 30, 910 29, 876 28, 637 31, 600	36. 9 38. 2 36. 3 35. 4 35. 0 32. 7	886 867 965 888 835 775	530 572 618 587 546 498	356 295 347 301 289 277	257. 1 211. 8 247. 7 206. 4 233. 3 373. 6	23. 1 23. 3 20. 3	235. 1 187. 8 221. 6 183. 3 210. 0 353. 3
July Aug Sept Oct Nov	117. 8 117. 8 118. 3 120. 0	30, 114 32, 746 32, 368 32, 887 33, 574	31. 2 35. 7 34. 9 34. 7	689 798 714 745	458 498 454 496	231 300 260 249	305. 6 264. 0 250. 3 183. 6	19. 1 21. 5 18. 4 20. 4	286, 5 242, 4 231, 9 163, 2

Commercial and industrial failures only. Excludes failures of banks and railroads and, beginning 1933, of real estate, insurance, holding, and financial companies, steamship lines, travel agencies, etc.
 Failure rate per 10,000 listed enterprises.
 Series revised; not strictly comparable with earlier data.
 Excluding W. T. Grant, current liabilities were \$264.9 billion.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.

AGRICULTURE

TABLE B-89.—Income of farm people and farmers, 1929-76

[Quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

	D.					Income	received 1	rom farmi	ng	
Year or	rec	sonal inco eived by t m populat	ota)	Realize	d gross	Produc-		farm ators	Net inco farm in net inv cha	entory
quarter	From all sources	From farm sources ¹	From non- farm sources ²	Total 3	Cash receipts from market- ings	tion ex- penses	Exclud- ing net inven- tory change	Includ- ing net inven- tory change 4	Current dollars	1967 dollars 5
				Billions o	f dollars				Dol	lars
1929				13. 9	11. 3	7. 7	6. 3	6. 2	945	1, 969
1933				7. 1	5. 3	4.4	2. 7	2.6	379	1, 115
1939	7. 4	4.8	2. 6	10.6	7. 9	6.3	4. 3	4.4	685	1, 851
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	7. 6 10. 1 14. 1 16. 5 16. 6 17. 2 20. 0 21. 1 23. 8 19. 5	4. 8 10. 1 12. 1 12. 2 12. 8 15. 5 15. 8 18. 0 13. 3	2.8 3.39 4.4 4.4 4.6 5.8 6.2	11. 1 13. 9 18. 8 23. 4 24. 4 25. 8 29. 5 34. 1 34. 7 31. 6	8. 4 11. 1 15. 6 19. 6 20. 5 21. 7 24. 8 29. 6 30. 2 27. 8	6. 9 7. 8 10. 0 11. 6 12. 3 13. 1 14. 5 17. 0 18. 8 18. 0	4. 2 6. 1 8. 8 11. 8 12. 1 12. 8 15. 0 17. 1 15. 9 13. 6	4. 5 6. 5 9. 9 11. 7 11. 7 12. 3 15. 1 15. 4 17. 7 12. 8	706 1, 031 1, 588 1, 927 1, 950 2, 063 2, 543 2, 615 3, 044 2, 233	1, 858 2, 578 3, 452 3, 706 3, 611 3, 619 4, 037 3, 534 3, 903 2, 977
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1957 1958	22.7	14. 1 16. 1 15. 3 13. 3 12. 4 11. 3 11. 1 10. 8 12. 5 10. 4	6.3 6.5 6.7 6.4 5.9 6.6 6.6 7.1	32. 3 37. 1 36. 8 35. 1 33. 7 33. 3 34. 4 34. 2 38. 1 37. 9	28. 5 32. 9 32. 5 31. 0 29. 8 29. 5 30. 4 29. 7 33. 5 33. 6	19. 5 22. 3 22. 8 21. 5 21. 8 22. 2 22. 7 23. 7 25. 8 27. 2	12. 8 14. 8 14. 0 13. 6 11. 9 11. 1 11. 7 10. 5 12. 3 10. 7	13.6 15.9 15.0 13.0 12.4 11.3 11.3 11.7	2, 417 2, 936 2, 878 2, 604 2, 579 2, 429 2, 493 2, 536 3, 111 2, 615	3, 180 3, 537 3, 426 3, 100 3, 070 2, 892 2, 933 2, 882 3, 496 2, 938
1960. 1961. 1962. 1963. 1964. 1965. 1966. 1967. 1968. 1969.	19.0 19.7	11. 1 11. 4 11. 4 11. 0 10. 0 12. 0 12. 6 11. 1 11. 3 12. 9	7. 2 7. 6 8. 3 9. 0 9. 7 10. 6 11. 2 11. 7 12. 8 13. 9	38. 5 40. 2 41. 7 42. 7 43. 1 45. 5 50. 6 49. 9 51. 7 56. 3	34. 2 35. 2 36. 5 37. 5 37. 3 39. 4 43. 4 42. 8 44. 2 48. 2	27. 4 28. 6 30. 3 31. 8 31. 8 33. 7 36. 5 38. 2 39. 5 42. 1	11. 1 11. 6 11. 4 11. 1 11. 3 11. 9 14. 0 11. 7 12. 2 14. 2	11.5 12.0 12.1 11.8 10.5 12.9 14.0 12.3 12.3 14.3	2, 907 3, 126 3, 267 3, 295 3, 035 3, 843 4, 286 3, 903 4, 013 4, 766	3, 230 3, 473 3, 590 3, 582 3, 263 4, 045 4, 373 3, 903 3, 859 4, 372
1970	27. 4 28. 7 34. 4	13. 0 13. 4 16. 8 29. 0 23. 5 22. 8 20. 0	14, 4 15, 3 17, 6 19, 5 21, 5 22, 7 24, 0	58. 6 60. 6 70. 1 95. 5 100. 2 98. 2	50. 5 52. 9 61. 2 87. 1 92. 6 89. 6	44. 4 47. 4 52. 3 65. 6 72. 4 75. 5	14. 1 13. 2 17. 8 29. 9 27. 8 22. 7	14. 2 14. 6 18. 7 33. 3 26. 5 25. 6	4, 790 5, 030 6, 504 11, 727 9, 371 9, 100	4, 202 4, 263 5, 288 8, 817 6, 206 5, 482
1974: 1 1		1		106. 8 97. 5 97. 0 99. 5	99. 4 90. 0 89. 3 91. 7	72. 6 71. 5 72. 7 72. 8	34. 2 26. 0 24. 3 26. 7	32. 7 25. 2 24. 3 23. 8	11, 550 8, 900 8, 590 8, 410	8, 080 5, 930 5, 580 5, 320
1975: I				88. 4 99. 6 105. 2 99. 6	80, 0 91, 1 96, 5 90, 8	73. 4 76. 1 76. 8 75. 7	15. 0 23. 5 28. 4 23. 9	18.5 24.8 30.0 29.1	6, 590 8, 830 10, 680 10, 360	4, 070 5, 380 6, 320 6, 060
1976: I II	1	1	1	101. 5 111. 1 103. 3	92. 4 101. 8 93. 8	79. 0 82. 5 81. 5	22. 5 28. 6 21. 8	22. 5 25. 6 20. 8	8, 100 9, 210 7, 490	4, 710 5, 300 4, 230

¹ Net income to farm operators including net inventory change, less net income of nonresident operators, plus wages and salaries and other labor income of farm resident workers to

salaries and other labor income of farm resident workers, less contributions of farm resident operators and workers to social insurance.

2 Consists of income received by farm residents from nonfarm sources, such as wages and salaries from nonfarm employment, nonfarm business and professional income, rents from nonfarm real estate, dividends, interest, royalties, unemployment compensation, and social security payments.

2 Cash receipts from marketings, Government payments, and nonmoney and other farm income furnished by farms (excluding net inventory change).

4 Includes net value of physical change in inventory of crops and livestock valued at average prices for the year.

I Income in current dollars divided by the index of prices paid by farmers for family living items on a 1967 base.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

TABLE B-90.-Farm production indexes, 1929-76 [1967=100]

						Сгор	S 2				Live	stock and	d produ	cts 2
Year	Farm out- put 1	Total ³	Feed grains	Hay and for- age	Food grains	Vege- tables	Fruits and nuts	Cot- ton	To- bacco	Oil crops	Total 3	Meat ani- mals	Dairy prod- ucts	Poul- try and eggs
1929	54	62	48	71	52	73	70	204	78	11	54	52	76	32
1933	51	56	44	62	36	65	72	178	70	9	57	58	80	32
1939	58	64	51	68	48	72	91	162	97	25	59	59	82	35
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944	60 63 70 69 71	67 68 76 72 75	52 56 64 58 62	76 75 82 80 79	52 60 63 54 67	74 75 79 86 82	88 93 92 80 92	173 148 176 157 168	74 64 72 71 99	27 29 40 41 36	61 64 71 77 74	60 63 72 81 73	85 89 92 91 93	36 39 45 52 52
1945 1946 1947 1948	70 72 69 76 74	73 77 73 84 79	60 65 50 72 63	81 77 74 74 73	70 72 85 81 70	84 93 81 86 83	84 100 95 87 92	124 119 163 205 220	101 118 107 101 100	35 34 39 47 45	73 71 70 68 72	70 68 67 66 69	95 94 93 90 93	54 50 50 49 54
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	74 76 79 80 80	77 78 82 81 80	64 59 63 61 64	78 81 79 81 81	65 64 83 76 67	85 80 80 84 82	93 94 91 93 93	137 208 208 208 208 226	103 119 114 105 114	46 47 46 47 49	75 78 79 80 82	74 79 79 78 81	93 92 92 97 98	57 59 60 61 64
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	83 83 81 87 89	83 82 81 89 89	68 68 74 80 84	86 82 89 89 85	63 66 62 91 73	85 91 88 90 89	93 97 89 96 99	188 202 183 150 157	112 111 85 88 91	53 60 58 69 64	84 85 83 85 89	86 83 80 82 88	99 101 101 101 100	63 69 70 74 76
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	91 92 92 96 95	93 92 92 96 93	87 78 79 86 75	90 90 93 93 94	87 80 74 77 86	90 96 94 94 90	93 97 97 95 95	170 195 204 211 232	99 105 118 119 113	68 77 78 81 81	88 91 92 95 98	85 89 90 95 98	101 104 105 104 105	76 82 82 84 87
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	98 95 100 102 102	99 95 100 103 104	88 89 100 95 99	98 97 100 99 100	88 88 100 106 98	96 97 100 104 101	100 98 100 98 116	205 130 100 148 137	94 96 100 87 91	95 97 100 114 116	95 97 100 100 101	92 96 100 101 102	104 101 100 99 98	90 96 100 98 100
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	101 111 110 112 108	101 112 113 120 110	89 116 112 115 93	99 105 104 109 104	91 107 102 112 120	101 100 101 102 103	109 116 104 130 124	139 145 187 175 158	97 86 88 88 101	117 121 131 155 127	105 108 108 105 106	108 112 110 108 110	100 101 102 98 98	106 107 109 106 106
1975 1976	111 111	122 118	113 117	108 100	141 138	100 100	131 139	112 133	111 105	151 128	100 103	101 102	98 101	102 109

Farm output measures the annual volume of net farm production available for eventual human use through sales from farms or consumption in farm households.
 Gross production.
 Includes certain items not shown separately.

TABLE B-91.—Farm population, employment, and productivity, 1929-76

ļ	Farm po (Apr	pulation I 1) ¹		n employn housands		!	Farm o	utput		
Year	Num-	As per-				Per	Per ho	ur of farn	n work	Crop produc- tion
	ber (thou- sands)	cent of total popu- lation 2	Total	Family workers	Hired workers	unit of total input	Total	Crops	Live- stock and products	per acre 4
							Inde	ex, 1967=	100	
1929	30, 580	25. 1	12, 763	9, 360	3, 403	54	16	16	26	56
1933	32, 393	25. 8	12, 739	9, 874	2, 865	55	16	16	25	50
1939	30, 840	23.5	11, 338	8, 611	2,727	60	19	20	27	60
1940 1941 1942 1943	30, 547 30, 118 28, 914 26, 186 24, 815	23. 1 22. 6 21. 4 19. 2 17. 9	10, 979 10, 669 10, 504 10, 446 10, 219	8, 300 8, 017 7, 949 8, 010 7, 988	2, 679 2, 652 2, 555 2, 436 2, 231	62 64 69 68 69	20 22 24 24 24	21 23 25 24 25	27 28 30 31 31	62 63 70 64 68
1945 1946 1947 1948	24, 420 25, 403 25, 829 24, 383 24, 194	17. 5 18. 0 17. 9 16. 6 16. 2	10, 000 10, 295 10, 382 10, 363 9, 964	7, 881 8, 106 8, 115 8, 026 7, 712	2, 119 2, 189 2, 267 2, 337 2, 252	69 72 70 75 72	26 28 28 31 32	27 29 29 33 33	31 32 33 34 35	67 71 67 75
1950 1951 1952 1953	23, 048 21, 890 21, 748 19, 874 19, 019	15. 2 14. 2 13. 9 12. 5 11. 7	9, 926 9, 546 9, 149 8, 864 8, 651	7, 597 7, 310 7, 005 6, 775 6, 570	2, 329 2, 236 2, 144 2, 089 2, 081	73 73 75 76 77	34 35 38 40 42	36 35 39 40 42	37 39 40 42 43	69 70 73 72 71
1955 1956 1957 1958	19, 078 18, 712 17, 656 17, 128 16, 592	11. 5 11. 1 10. 3 9. 8 9. 4	8, 381 7, 852 7, 600 7, 503 7, 342	6, 345 5, 900 5, 660 5, 521 5, 390	2, 036 1, 952 1, 940 1, 982 1, 952	80 81 82 89 89	45 48 51 57 60	45 48 53 61 61	46 49 50 54 59	74 76 77 86 81
1960 1961 1962 1963	15, 635 14, 803 14, 313 13, 367 12, 954	8. 7 8. 1 7. 7 7. 1 6. 8	7, 057 6, 919 6, 700 6, 518 6, 110	5, 172 5, 029 4, 873 4, 738 4, 506	1, 885 1, 890 1, 827 1, 780 1, 604	92 93 94 98 97	65 68 71 77 81	66 69 72 77 79	62 66 71 77 83	92 92 91 93 95
1965	12, 363 11, 595 10, 875 10, 454 10, 307	6. 4 5. 9 5. 5 5. 2 5. 1	5, 610 5, 214 4, 903 4, 749 4, 596	4, 128 3, 854 3, 650 3, 535 3, 419	1, 482 1, 360 1, 253 1, 213 1, 176	102 97 100 101 102	89 92 100 106 110	90 94 100 106 108	86 93 100 105 112	100 9: 100 10:
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	9, 712 9, 425 9, 610 9, 472 9, 264	4. 7 4. 6 4. 6 4. 5 4. 4	4, 523 4, 436 4, 373 4, 337 4, 389	3, 348 3, 275 3, 228 3, 169 3, 075	1, 175 1, 161 1, 146 1, 168 1, 314	101 110 109 110 107	112 126 129 133 132	110 120 124 128 118	121 130 138 144 156	10/ 11/ 11/ 11/ 10/
1975 1976 p	8, 864	4. 2 3. 9	4, 357 4, 376	3, 034 2, 997	1, 324 1, 379	113 110	141 140	131 130	160 161	11-

Sources: Department of Agriculture and Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census).

¹ Farm population as defined by Department of Agriculture and Department of Commerce, i.e., civilian population living on farms, regardless of occupation.

2 Total population of United States as of July 1 including Armed Forces overseas.

3 Includes persons doing farmwork on all farms. These data, published by the Department of Agriculture, Statistical Reporting Service, differ from those on agricultural employment by the Department of Labor (see Table B-29) because of differences in the method of approach, in concepts of employment, and in time of month for which the data are collected. See monthly report on "Farm Labor."

4 Computed from variable weights for individual crops produced each year.

Table B-92.—Indexes of prices received and prices paid by farmers and selected farm resource prices, 1929-76

[1967 = 100, except as noted]

	Prices re	ceived by	farmers	Prices	paid by fa	rmers	Se	lected reso	ource price	e s
Year or month	All farm products	Crops	Live- stock and products	All items, interest, taxes, and wage rates	Family living items	Produc- tion items	Tractors and self- pro- pelled ma- chinery	Ferti- lizer	Average hourly wage rate, all hired farm workers1	Average farm real estate value per acre ²
1929	59 28	60 31	58 25 39	47 32	48 34 37	51 34				27 16 19
1939	38 40 49 64 77 79 83 94 110 115	36 40 48 64 83 88 90 102 117 113	39 40 50 62 72 71 77 77 88 105 115	36 39 44 50 53 56 61 70 76	37 38 40 46 52 54 57 63 74 78	42 43 45 52 57 60 61 67 78 87 83			\$0.73	19 19 21 23 26 29 32 32 36 39
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1956 1957 1957	103 121 115 102 98 93 92 94 100 96	103 118 119 107 108 103 104 100 99 98	102 122 111 97 90 85 82 89 99	75 82 84 81 81 81 81 84 86	76 83 84 84 84 85 88 89	86 95 95 89 89 87 87 90 92 93			.69 .77 .81 .82 .82 .86 .88 .92	40 46 51 52 53 55 58 61 66
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1967	95 96 98 97 95 98 106 100 102	99 101 103 107 106 103 106 100 100 97	92 91 93 89 86 94 106 100 104	88 88 90 91 92 94 99 100 103 108	90 90 91 92 93 95 98 100 104	92 93 94 95 94 96 100 100 100	92 96 100 104 111	103 102 100 94 87	. 97 . 99 1. 01 1. 05 1. 08 1. 14 1. 23 1. 33 1. 44 1. 55	68 69 73 77 82 86 93 100 107 113
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975	110 113 125 179 192 186 186	100 108 114 175 224 201 198	118 118 136 183 165 172 177	112 120 125 144 166 181 194	114 118 123 133 151 166 176	108 113 121 146 166 182 196	116 122 128 137 161 195	88 91 94 102 167 217 185	1.64 1.73 1.84 2.00 2.25 2.43	117 122 132 150 187 214 244
1975: Jan 15	- 178 - 183 - 186 - 191 - 194 - 199	216 204 195 201 198 198 203 212 210 203 189 188	153 151 152 158 171 176 181 180 189 189 181	175 174 174 179 180 183 183 184 186 184 184	161 162 163 163 164 166 168 169 170 171	176 173 173 181 183 186 184 186 189 189 186 184	185 199 204	231	2.47	214
1976: Jan 15	- 186 - 187 - 186 - 189 - 191 - 196 - 195 - 187 - 178	191 193 195 193 198 211 215 201 204 195 187	185 184 179 175 172 165 162	190 191 192 193 193 195 196 195 194 193 195	172 172 173 174 174 175 177 177 178 179 180 181	191 193 194 197 196 199 199 198 197 195 194	211	182	2. 75 2. 66 2. 53 2. 80	244

Without room or board; on or about the first of January, April, July, and October.
 Average for 48 States. Annual data are for March 1 of each year through 1975 and for February 1 for 1976. Monthly data are for first of month.

TABLE B-93.—Selected measures of farm resources and inputs, 1929-76

					Index nu	mbers of i	nputs (19	57=100)		
Year	Crops har- vested (mil- lions of acres) 1	Total hours of farm work (bil- lions)	Total	Farm labor	Farm real estate	Me- chani- cal power and ma- chinery	Agri- cultural chemi- cals ²	Feed, seed, and live- stock pur- chases 3	Taxes and interest	Miscel- laneous
1929	365	23. 2	99	329	103	39	10	30	71	67
1933	340	22. 6	93	320	97	32	6	27	73	64
1939	331	20. 7	97	294	102	40	12	40	70	76
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944	341 344 348 357 362	20. 5 20. 0 20. 6 20. 3 20. 2	98 98 101 103 104	292 288 295 291 289	104 102 100 99 98	42 44 52 55 58	13 14 15 17 20	41 45 47 51 51	70 71 71 75 77	77 78 75 78 81
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	354 352 355 356 360	18. 8 18. 1 17. 2 16. 8 16. 2	101 100 100 101 103	271 260 246 239 231	99 103 103 104 105	59 58 64 73 80	20 21 24 26 28	53 52 54 55 60	78 79 79 77 80	79 80 81 86 90
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	345 344 349 348 346	15. 1 15. 2 14. 5 14. 0 13. 3	102 105 105 104 103	217 217 207 200 192	105 106 105 105 105	85 91 95 97 97	30 33 36 37 38	62 66 68 67 70	80 80 82 84 83	86 92 91 91 88
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	340 324 324 324 324 324	12. 8 12. 0 11. 1 10. 5 10. 3	103 102 99 99 100	185 174 162 155 151	105 103 102 101 102	98 99 98 98 99	40 41 41 44 50	71 74 73 78 82	85 85 84 85 90	92 88 92 97 101
1960 1961 1962 1963	324	9. 8 9. 4 9. 0 8. 7 8. 2	99 98 98 98 98	145 139 133 128 122	100 100 101 100 101	98 95 95 94 94	50 54 59 66 72	82 86 88 89 91	91 92 93 95 97	103 103 106 107 111
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	300	7. 3 6. 9 6. 7 6. 4 6. 2	96 98 100 101 100	109 103 100 97 93	100 100 100 99 98	95 97 100 101 101	77 86 100 106 110	92 97 100 101 103	97 99 100 102 102	107 103 100 106 105
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	305 293 321	6. 0 5. 9 5. 7 5. 6 5. 5	100 101 101 101 101	90 89 85 85 83	97 96 94 94 94	100 100 99 103 102	110 119 125 130 136	108 108 109 106 105	102 100 102 100 97	108 107 114 110 101
1975 1976 p	336 336	5.3 5.3	99 101	81 81	94 94	104 103	126 136	101 104	95 95	92 96

Acreage harvested (excluding duplication) plus acreages in fruits, tree nuts, and farm gardens.
 Fertilizer, lime, and pesticides.
 Feed, seed, and livestock purchases from nonfarm sources.

TABLE B-94.—Comparative balance sheet of the farming sector, 1929-77 [Billions of dollars]

]	Assets										ims	
				Other	physical	assets	Fir	nancial as	sets				
Beginning of year	Total	Real estate	Live- stock 1	Ma- chin- ery and motor vehi- cles	Crops ²	House- hold equip- ment and furnish- ings	De- posits and cur- rency	U.S. savings bonds	Invest- ment in co- opera- tives	Total	Real estate debt	Other debt	Pro- prie- tors' equi- ties
1929		48. 0	6.6	3. 2							9.8		
1933		30.8	3.0	2.5				 -			8, 5		
1939		34.1	5.1	3. 2						- -	6.8	- 	
1940 1941 1942 1943	52.9 55.0 62.9 73.7 84.6	33.6 34.4 37.5 41.6 48.2	5. 1 5. 3 7. 1 9. 6 9. 7	3. 1 3. 3 4. 0 4. 9 5. 4	2.7 3.0 3.8 5.1 6.1	4. 2 4. 2 4. 9 5. 0 5. 3	3. 2 3. 5 4. 2 5. 4 6. 6	0. 2 . 4 . 5 1. 1 2. 2	0. 8 . 9 . 9 1. 0 1. 1	52.9 55.0 62.9 73.7 84.6	6. 6 6. 5 6. 4 6. 0 5. 4	3. 4 3. 9 4. 1 4. 0 3. 5	42.9 44.6 52.4 63.7 75.7
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949		53.9 61.0 68.5 73.7 76.6	9. 0 9. 7 11. 9 13. 3 14. 4	6. 5 5. 4 5. 3 7. 4 10. 1	6. 7 6. 3 7. 1 9. 0 8. 6	5. 6 6. 1 7. 7 8. 5 9. 1	7. 9 9. 4 10. 2 9. 9 9. 6	3. 4 4. 2 4. 2 4. 4 4. 6	1. 2 1. 4 1. 5 1. 7 1. 9	94. 2 103. 5 116. 4 127. 9 134. 9	4.9 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.3	3. 4 3. 2 3. 6 4. 2 6. 1	85. 9 95. 107. 9 118. 0 123. 9
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	132. 5 151. 5 167. 0 164. 3 161. 2	75. 3 86. 6 95. 1 96. 5 95. 0	12.9 17.1 19.5 14.8 11.7	12. 2 14. 1 16. 7 17. 4 18. 4	7.6 7.9 8.8 9.0 9.2	8.6 9.7 10.3 9.9 9.9	9. 1 9. 1 9. 4 9. 4 9. 4	4. 7 4. 7 4. 7 4. 6 4. 7	2.7	132.5 151.5 167.0 164.3 161.2	5.6 6.1 6.7 7.2 7.7	6.8 7.0 8.0 8.9 9.2	120.1 138.4 152.1 148.1
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	165. 1 169. 6 177. 9 185. 8 202. 1	98. 2 102. 9 110. 4 115. 9 124. 4	11. 2 10. 6 11. 0 13. 9 17. 7	18, 6 19, 3 20, 2 20, 2 21, 8	9.6 8.4 8.3 7.6 9.3	10.0 10.5 10.0 9.9 9.8	9. 4 9. 5 9. 4 9. 5 10. 0	5. 0 5. 2 5. 1 5. 1 5. 2	3.2 3.5 3.7	165. 1 169. 6 177. 9 185. 8 202. 1	8. 2 9. 0 9. 8 10. 4 11. 1	9. 4 9. 8 9. 5 10. 0 12. 5	147. ! 150. 8 158. 6 165. 4 178. !
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964		130. 6 132. 2 138. 4 144. 3 152. 6	15. 3 15. 6 16. 4 17. 3 15. 9	22. 7 22. 2 22. 5 23. 5 23. 9	7. 7 8. 0 8. 8 9. 3 9. 8	9.6 8.9 9.1 9.0 8.8	9. 2 8. 7 8. 8 9. 2 9. 2	4. 7 4. 6 4. 5 4. 4 4. 2	4. 2 4. 5 4. 8 5. 0 5. 4	204. 0 204. 8 213. 3 222. 0 229. 8	12. 0 12. 8 13. 8 15. 1 16. 8	12. 8 13. 4 14. 7 16. 3 17. 6	179. 2 178. 6 184. 8 190. 6 195. 4
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969		161. 5 172. 8 182. 3 192. 5 201. 4	14. 5 17. 6 19. 0 18. 8 20. 2	24. 8 26. 0 27. 4 29. 8 31. 3	9. 2 9. 7 10. 0 9. 6 10. 6	8.6 8.6 8.5 9.1 9.7	9.6 10.0 10.3 10.9	4, 2 4, 1 3, 9 3, 8 3, 8	5, 6 5, 9 6, 2 6, 5 6, 8	238. 0 254. 7 267. 6 281. 0 295. 3	18. 9 21. 2 23. 1 25. 1 27. 4	17. 9 19. 5 21. 0 22. 3 23. 1	201. 2 214. 0 223. 1 233. 0 244. 8
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	306. 2 317. 7 343. 3 387. 8 476. 3	206. 9 215. 0 231. 5 260. 6 325. 3	23. 5 23. 7 27. 3 34. 1 42. 4	32. 3 34. 4 36. 6 39. 3 44. 3	10. 9 10. 7 11. 8 14. 5 22. 1	9. 8 10. 3 11. 2 12. 7 13. 6	11. 9 12. 4 13. 2 14. 0 14. 9	3. 7 3. 6 3. 7 4. 0 4. 2	7. 2 7. 6 8. 0 8. 6 9. 5	306. 2 317. 7 343. 3 387. 8 476. 3	29. 2 30. 3 32. 2 35. 8 41. 3	23. 8 24. 1 26. 9 29. 6 32. 8	253. 2 263. 3 284. 2 322. 4 402. 2
1975 1976		371. 1 422. 3	24. 6 29. 5	56. 5 65. 9	23. 3 19. 8	15. 3 16. 2	15. 0 15. 6	4. 3 4. 4	10.5 11.7	520. 6 585. 4	46. 3 50. 9	35. 5 39. 7	438. 494.
1977	634.0	460.3		14	10, 3			33.4		634.0	56.7	44.9	532.

Note.—Beginning 1960, data include Alaska and Hawaii.

¹ Beginning with 1961, horses and mules are excluded.
² Includes all crops held on farms and crops held off farms by farmers as security for Commodity Credit Corporation loans. The latter on January 1, 1977 totaled approximately \$0.5 billion.

INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS

Table B-95.—U. S. international transactions, 1946-76

[Millions of dollars; quarterly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted]

	М	erchandise	1 2	Militar	y trans	actions		nvest- income	Net		Bal-	Remit- tances,	Bai-
Year or quar- ter	Ex- ports	Imports	Net bal- ance	Direct expend- itures	Sales	Net bal- ance	Pri- vate 3	U.S. Gov- ern- ment	travel and trans- porta- tion re- ceipts	Other serv- ices, net ⁸	ance on goods and serv- ices 1 4	pen- sions, and other uni- lateral trans- fers ¹	ance on cur- rent ac- count
1946 1947 1948 1949	11, 764 16, 097 13, 265 12, 213	-5, 067 -5, 973 -7, 557 -6, 874	6, 697 10, 124 5, 708 5, 339	-493 -455 -799 -621	3333	-493 -455 -799 -621	554 807 975 989	6 50 85 73	733 946 374 230	310 145 175 208	7, 807 11, 617 6, 518 6, 218	-2, 922 -2, 625 -4, 525 -5, 638	4, 885 8, 992 1, 993 580
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954	10, 203 14, 243 13, 449 12, 412 12, 929	-9, 081 -11, 176 -10, 838 -10, 975 -10, 353	1, 122 3, 067 2, 611 1, 437 2, 576	$\begin{bmatrix} -2,054 \\ -2,615 \end{bmatrix}$	(7) (7) 192 182	-576 -1, 270 -2, 054 -2, 423 -2, 460	1, 146 1, 317 1, 267 1, 283 1, 594	78 151 140 166 213	120 298 83 238 269	242 254 309 307 305	1, 892 3, 817 2, 356 532 1, 959	-4, 017 -3, 515 -2, 531 -2, 481 -2, 280	-2, 125 302 -175 -1, 949 -321
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959	14, 424 17, 556 19, 562 16, 414 16, 458	-11, 527 -12, 803 -13, 291 -12, 952 -15, 310	2, 897 4, 753 6, 271 3, 462 1, 148	-2, 949 -3, 216 -3, 435	200 161 375 300 302	-2, 788 -2, 841 -3, 135	1, 775 2, 054 2, 174 2, 008 2, 147	180 40 4 168 68	-297 -361 -189 -633 -821	299 447 482 486 573	2, 153 4, 145 5, 901 2, 356 310	-2, 498 -2, 423 -2, 345 -2, 361 -2, 448	
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	19, 650 20, 108 20, 781 22, 272 25, 501	-14, 758 -14, 537 -16, 260 -17, 048 -18, 700	4, 892 5, 571 4, 521 5, 224 6, 801	-2, 998 -3, 105 -2, 961	335 402 656 657 747	-2, 596	2, 270 2, 832 3, 177 3, 227 3, 926	17 105 134 98 9	-1,309	579 594 809 960 1,041	4, 040 5, 529 5, 042 5, 897 8, 499	-2, 308 -2, 524 -2, 638 -2, 754 -2, 781	
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	26, 461 29, 310 30, 666 33, 626 36, 414	-21, 510 -25, 493 -26, 866 -32, 991 -35, 807	4, 951 3, 817 3, 800 635 607	-3,764 -4,378 -4,535	830 829 1, 152 1, 392 1, 528	-2, 122 -2, 935 -3, 226 -3, 143	4, 143 3, 543 3, 865 3, 941 3, 471	26 55 41 63 156	-1, 280 -1, 331 -1, 750 -1, 548 -1, 763	1, 387 1, 365 1, 612 1, 630 1, 833	7, 105 4, 514 4, 340 1, 578 977	-2, 854 -2, 932 -3, 125 -2, 951 -2, 994	
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	8 42, 469 43, 319 49, 381 71, 410 98, 310	* —39, 866 —45, 579 —55, 797 —70, 499 —103, 679	911	-4, 784 -4, 629	1, 501 1, 926 1, 163 2, 342 2, 952	-2.893	3, 631 5, 659 6, 208 8, 188 13, 461	-112 -956 -1, 888 -3, 010 -3, 234	-2, 023 -2, 315 -3, 028 -3, 086 -3, 107	2, 190 2, 509 2, 789 3, 188 3, 919	2, 938 —256 —5, 954 3, 905 3, 586	-3, 294 -3, 701 -3, 848 -3, 883 -7, 184	-356 -3, 957 -9, 802 22
1975	107, 088	-98, 058	9, 030	-4, 780	3, 897	ł	ì		-2, 503	4, 666	16, 316	-4, 620	11, 697
1974: V	22, 460 24, 212 25, 036 26, 602	-22, 605 -25, 700 -27, 374 -28, 000	-145 -1, 488 -2, 338 -1, 398	-1, 153 -1, 298 -1, 265 -1, 319	638 683 781 850	-515 -615 -484 -469	4, 056 2, 796 3, 173 3, 436	-772 -759 -816 -887	-680 -793 -771 -863	875 913 1, C21 1, 110	2, 819 54 -215 929	9 —2, 977 —1, 850 —1, 261 —1, 098	-158 -1, 796 -1, 476 -169
1975: V	27, 018 25, 851 26, 562 27, 657	-25, 570 -22, 568 -24, 483 -25, 437	1, 448 3, 283 2, 079 2, 220	-1, 317 -1, 185 -1, 093 -1, 185	915 807 978 1, 197	-402 -378 -115	2, 109 2, 349 2, 487 2, 485	-985 -818 -805 -815	-687 -498 -568 -750	1, 125 1, 146 1, 187 1, 205	2, 608 5, 084 4, 2€5 4, 357	-1, 179 -1, 146 -1, 044 -1, 251	1, 429 3, 938 3, 221 3, 106
1976: p	26, 836 28, 428 29, 581	-28, 510 -29, 771 -32, 614	-1, 674 -1, 343 -3, 033	-1, 150 -1, 219 -1, 221	1, 145 1, 073 1, 587	-5 -146 366	3, 066 3, 195 3, 480	-787 -735 -768	-754 -396 -485	1, 212 1, 161 1, 309	1, 058 1, 736 869	-1, 118 -920 -1, 925	-60 816 -1, 056

¹ Excludes military grants.
2 Adjusted from Census data for differences in valuation, coverage, and timing.
3 Adjusted from Census data for differences in valuation, coverage, and timing.
4 Rees and royalties from U.S. direct investments abroad or from foreign direct investments in the United States are excluded from net investment income and included in other services, net.
4 In concept, the sum of balance on current account and allocations of special drawing rights is equal to net foreign investment in the national income and product accounts, although the two may differ because of revisions, special handling of certain items, etc.

⁽Footnotes continued on following page.)

Table B-95, -U.S. international transactions, 1946-76-Continued

[Millions of dollars; quarterly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted]

			abroad, n al outflow		Foreig [incre	n assets ase/capit	in the U. al inflow	S., net (十)]		Stati discre	stical pancy		
Year or							official sets		Alloca-	Total	Of which:	offic rese asse	
quarter	Total	U.S. official reserve assets 5	Other U.S. Govern- ment assets	U.S. private assets	Total	Total	Assets of foreign official reserve agen- cies	Other foreign assets	drawing rights (SDR)	the items with sign re- versed)	Sea- sonal adjust- ment discrep- ancy	ne (una justo end per od)	
46		-623										20,	
4/		-3, 315 -1, 736										24,	
48 49		-1,736 -266										26,	
												1 '	
50		1, 758 33										24,	
52		-33 -415										24, 24, 24,	
53		1, 256										L Z3.	
54		480										22,	
55		182					i					22	
56		869										22, 23, 24, 22,	
57		-1, 165 2, 292										24,	
58		2, 292										22,	
59		1, 035										21,	
6C	-2, 833 -4, 484	2, 145	-1, 100	-3, 878 -4, 180	2, 120 2, 467 1, 697 2, 981	1, 473 765	1, 258 741	647		-1,019		19, 18,	
061	-4, 484	606	-910	-4,180	2, 467	765	741	1, 701		-988		18,	
)62)63	-2, 979	1, 533 377	-1,085	-3, 426	1,697	1, 270	1, 118	427		-1, 122		17,	
64	-5, 764 -8, 128	171	-1,662 -1,680	-4, 479 -6, 618	3, 317	1, 986 1, 661	1,558 1,363	1,656		-360 907		16, 16,	
	1		'	1		'		,					
165 166	-4, 176	1, 222 568	-1,605 -1,543	-3, 793 -4, 554	382 3, 320	132 -674	67 -787	249 3, 994		-457 628		15, 14,	
67	R 025	52	-2, 423	-5, 653	6, 938	3, 450		3, 488		-128		14,	
68	-8, 572	-880	-2, 423 -2, 274	1 −5. 418	9 439	-776	-761	10, 215		507		15.	
69	-8, 572 -8, 823	-1, 187	-2, 200	-5, 436	12, 270	-1,301	-1, 552	13, 571		-1,430		16,	
70	-6, 032	2, 477	-1,589	-6,920	5, 923	6, 907	7, 362	-984	867	-402	l	14,	
71	_ 0 506	2.348	1 224	10 [°] 060	5, 923 22, 445	26, 895	27, 405	-4, 450	717	-9, 609		12.	
72	—10. 245	32	-1,568	-8,708	21, 127	10, 705	10, 322	10, 422 12, 220	710	-1, 790 -2, 107		13, 14,	
1/5 174	-16, 434 -33, 392	209 -1, 434	-1, 568 -2, 645 9 365	-8, 708 -13, 998 -32, 323	21, 127 18, 519 32, 433	26, 895 10, 705 6, 299 10, 981	27, 405 10, 322 5, 145 10, 257	12, 220 21, 452		-2, 107 4, 557		14, 15,	
	1	-1, 434 607	-3, 463			6, 899		ļ				1	
	-31, 593			1				1		4, 570		16,	
)74: إ	-7, 915	210 358	9 1, 389 267	-9, 094	5, 906 11, 049	-1,072	-1,138	6, 977 6, 401		2, 167	1, 191	14,	
II	-10, 013 -5, 210	-1,003	-354	-9, 922 -3, 854	7 612	4, 648 3, 149	4, 490 2, 731	4, 462		761 -925	-235 -2, 498	14. 15.	
iŸ	-5, 210 -10, 252	137	–937	-9 , 453	7, 612 7, 867	4, 256	4, 174	3, 611		2,554	1, 542	. 15,	
	1)	1	1			1 '				'	1 '	
)75: 1 	-8, 001 -7 943	-325 -29	-899 -840	-6,777 -7,074	2, 837 3, 907 2, 708	3, 402 2, 331	1 912	-565 1 576		3, 735 98	1,328 -39	16,	
iii	-7, 943 -4, 411 -11, 238	-342	-772	-3, 297	2,708	-1,606	-i. 977	4, 313		-1, 517	-2, 561	16.	
íV	-11, 238	89		-3, 297 -10, 375	5, 874	-1, 606 2, 771	2, 958 1, 913 -1, 977 2, 272	3, 103		-1, 517 2, 258	-2, 561 1, 275	16, 16, 16, 16,	
976: 1	-10, 007	–773	-684	_8 550	5 300	!				4 671	1, 349	11	
//o: 	-9, 875	-1,578	-1,009		5, 396 7, 330	4, 105	2, 460 3, 308 1, 258	3, 225		4, 671 1, 729	1, 349 -76	18	
111 2.	-9, 875 -8, 901	-407	-1, 454	-7, 040	8, 471	3, 013	1, 258	5, 458		1, 485	-2, 829	16, 18, 18,	
IV P_	1	1	1 .	, .			1 '		1			18,	

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Department of the Treasury.

⁵ Consists of gold, special drawing rights, convertible currencies, and the U.S. reserve position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

⁶ Includes increases (in millions) as follows: for 1969, \$67 resulting from revaluation of the German mark in October 1969; for 1971, \$28 in dollar value of foreign currencies revalued to reflect market exchange rates as of December 31, 1971; for 1972, \$1,016 resulting from change in par value of the dollar on May 8, 1972; and for 1973, \$1,436 resulting from change in par value of the dollar on October 18, 1973.

Beginning July 1974, valuation of SDR and reserve position in the IMF based on a weighted average of exchange rates for the currencies of 16 member countries. On a pre-July 1974 basis, reserve assets for December 31, 1974 are \$15,812 million; for December 31, 1975, \$16,366 million; and for December 31, 1976, \$18,895 million.

Not available separately.
 Data beginning 1970 not strictly comparable with earlier data.
 Includes extraordinary U.S. Government transactions with India.

Note.—Quarterly data for changes in U.S. official reserve assets, U.S. private assets abroad, and foreign assets in the U.S. are not seasonally adjusted.

TABLE B-96.—U.S. merchandise exports and imports by commodity groups, 1958-76 [Millions of dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

		Mercha	ndise ex	ports1		İ	Mérch	andise i	mports		Mer	chandise balance	
Year or	Total do-	ı	omestic	export	s		Gen	eral imp	orts#		Ex- ports	Ex-	
month	mestic and foreign ex- ports ²	Total 23	Food, bever- ages, and to- bacco	Crude mate- rials and fuels 4	Man- ufac- tured goods ⁸	Total ³	Food, bever- ages, and to- bacco	Crude mate- rials and fuels f	Man- ufac- tured goods ⁵	Total, c.i.f. value ⁷	less im- ports, cus- toms value	ports less im- ports, f.a.s.	Exports less imports, c.i.f.
		F	.a.s. val	ue ⁸			Custom	s value					
1958 1959	16, 375 16, 426		2, 688 2, 852		11, 547 11, 179	1		4, 164 4, 615	5, 311 7, 117		2, 983 736		
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	1 20 226	19, 459 19, 982 20, 717 22, 182 25, 479	3, 167 3, 466 3, 743 4, 188 4, 637	3, 942 3, 864 3, 356 3, 775 4, 337	12, 583 12, 784 13, 668 14, 297 16, 529	15, 073 14, 761 16, 464 17, 207 18, 749	3, 392 3, 455 3, 674 3, 863 4, 022	4, 418 4, 334 4, 691 4, 755 5, 029	6, 863 6, 537 7, 649 8, 070 9, 106		4, 586 5, 465 4, 522 5, 260 7, 083		
1965 1966 1967 1968	26, 742 29, 490 31, 630 34, 063 37, 332	26, 399 29, 054 30, 646 33, 626	4, 519 5, 186 4, 710 4, 592	4, 273 4, 404 4, 726 4, 865	17, 433 19, 218 20, 844 23, 818 26, 785		4, 013 4, 590 4, 701 5, 365	5, 440 5, 718 5, 367 6, 031 6, 391	11, 244 14, 446 15, 756 20, 624 23, 011	28, 745 35, 320 38, 241	5, 315 3, 872 4, 141 837 1, 289		2, 283 -1, 257 -909
1970 1971 1972 1973	70, 823	48, 399 69, 730	5, 058 5, 076 6, 569 12, 938 15, 233	7, 091 10, 735	29, 344 30, 443 33, 740 44, 731 63, 523	39, 951 45, 563 55, 583 69, 476 100, 997	6, 230 6, 404 7, 379 9, 235 10, 701	6, 542 7, 268 8, 838 13, 446 31, 842	25, 907 30, 414 37, 767 45, 001 56, 202	42, 429 48, 342 58, 862 73, 573 107, 996	2, 708 -2, 014 -6, 384 1, 348 -3, 089		230 -4, 793 -9, 663 -2, 752 -10, 088
							F.a.s. 1	value 8					
1974 1975	97, 908 107, 130	96, 545 105, 641	15, 233 16, 793	15, 802 15, 197	63, 523 70, 951							-2, 343 11, 014	-10, 088 3, 741
1975: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	8, 756 8, 681 8, 649 8, 222		1, 375	1, 577 1, 310 1, 324 1, 187 1, 193 1, 147	5, 750 5, 680 5, 551 5, 727 5, 586 6, 038	7, 46, 7, 959 7, 263	784 795 826 785 740 8 856	1 2.952	4, 743 4, 351 4, 395 4, 161 3, 894 3, 990	10, 375 8, 501 8, 039 8, 547 7, 814 7, 651	-297 791 1, 126 615 876 1, 529	-259 829 1, 215 690 958 1, 613	102 408
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	9, 104 9, 226 9, 409		1, 295 1, 379 1, 358 1, 510 1, 493 1, 409	1, 258 1, 322 1, 199 1, 198 1, 330		7, 87 8, 196 8, 169 8, 20	9 800 1 867	2,706 2,716 3,005 2,912 2,896	4, 129 4, 178 4, 052 4, 288 4, 362 4, 582	8, 413 8, 478 8, 820 8, 794 8, 828 9, 161	983 1, 054	1, 039 1, 103 908 1, 056 1, 208 728	432
1976: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June.	8, 800 8, 950 9, 39 9, 578	0 5 4 	1, 510 1, 337 1, 305 1, 521 1, 427 1, 439	1, 223 1, 138 1, 165	5, 971	9, 170 8, 94 9, 60 9, 590 9, 18	872 889 7 1, 053 6 896 2 932	3, 233 2, 913 2, 885 3, 492		9, 880 9, 593 10, 301 10, 302 9, 873 10, 889	-213 -734 -302 282	l202	-793 -1, 345 -908
July_ Aug_ Sept_ Oct_ Nov_	9, 68 9, 87 9, 72	2	1, 563 1, 611 1, 433 1, 598 1, 253	1, 374		10, 44 10, 65 10, 42	1, 068 982 1 994 4 943	3, 881 3, 758 3, 724 3, 760		11, 650 11, 219 11, 448 11, 166 11, 282	-917 -848 -888 -762 -1,000	-779 -696	—1, 438

Beginning 1960, data have been adjusted for comparability with the revised commodity classifications effective in 1965.
Total excludes Department of Defense shipments of grant-aid military supplies and equipment under the Military Assistance Program.

⁸ Total includes commodities and transactions not classified according to kind.

Total includes commodities and transactions not classified account of the control o

Note.—Data are as reported by the Bureau of the Census adjusted to include silver ore and bullion reported separately prior to 1969. Export statistics cover all merchandise shipped from the U.S. customs area, except supplies for the U.S. Armed Forces. Exports include shipments under Agency for International Development and Food for Peace programs as well as other private relief shipments.

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census and Bureau of International Economic Policy and Research).

TABLE B-97.-U.S. merchandise exports and imports by area, 1970-76 [Millions of dollars]

	Ĭ .	l		i	<u> </u>	Γ	1
Area	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976 JanNov.
Exports (domestic and foreign and special category							
shipments)	43, 224	44, 130	49, 759	71, 339	98, 507	107, 592	104, 264
Developed countries	30, 877	30, 335	34, 319	47, 209	63, 021	64, 780	64, 006
Canada 1 Western Europe 2 Japan	9, 079 14, 463 4, 652	10, 365 14, 178 4, 055	12, 415 15, 361 4, 963	15, 104 21, 359 8, 313	19, 936 28, 637 10, 679	21, 744 29, 945 9, 563	22, 060 29, 125 9, 245
Japan Australia, New Zealand, and Republic of South Africa	1, 683	1,737	1, 580	2, 432	3, 769	3, 529	3, 577
Developing countries 3	12, 993	13, 410	14, 556	20, 963	32, 695	39, 215	36, 516
Petroleum exporting countries Other countries	2, 659 10, 334	2, 932 10, 478	3, 375 11, 181	4, 540 16, 423	8, 140 24, 555	12, 567 26, 648	13, 111 23, 405
Other Western Hemisphere Near East. East and South Asia Developing Africa	6, 532 1, 423 4, 029 940	6, 485 1, 816 4, 047 1, 009	7, 275 1, 954 4, 373 898	9, 929 3, 041 6, 600 1, 334	15, 809 5, 557 9, 196 2, 044	17, 099 8, 946 10, 093 2, 964	15, 319 9, 027 9, 370 2, 717
Socialist areas in Europe and AsiaUnidentified countries 1	354	384	883	2, 491 677	2, 239 552	3, 092 505	3, 369 374
General imports	39, 952	45, 563	55, 583	69, 476	100, 251	96, 116	109, 240
Developed countries	29, 259	33, 744	40, 822	48, 530	59, 786	55, 966	60, 820
Canada Western Europe ² Japan	11, 092 11, 169 5, 875	12, 691 12, 658 7, 259	14, 927 15, 423 9, 064	17, 715 19, 286 9, 676	21, 929 23, 521 12, 338	21, 729 20, 737 11, 268	23, 801 20, 685 14, 092
Japan Australia, New Zealand, and Republic of South Africa	1, 123	1, 136	1, 408	1, 853	2,000	2, 232	2, 242
Developing countries 3	10, 442	11, 549	14, 356	20, 313	39, 443	39, 252	47, 440
Petroleum exporting countries Other countries	2, 516 7, 920	3, 060 8, 489	3, 729 10, 627	6, 309 10, 004	20, 488 18, 955	21, 417 17, 835	26, 255 21, 185
Other Western Hemisphere Near East East and South Asia Developing Africa	5, 836 371 3, 397 860	6, 038 593 3, 941 930	7, 003 773 5, 264 1, 253	9, 607 1, 396 7, 043 2, 180	18, 403 4, 740 10, 242 5, 941	16, 044 5, 431 10, 224 7, 436	15, 337 8, 254 13, 366 10, 365
Socialist areas in Europe and AsiaUnidentified countries 4	227 24	229 41	354 51	593 40	1, 007 15	887 11	975 5

¹ Beginning January 1973, transshipments of certain grains and oilseeds through Canada are shown as exports to uniden-

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census and Bureau of International Economic Policy and Research).

tified countries.

2 Includes Finland, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey.

3 Includes developing countries in Oceania.

4 Consists of certain low-valued shipments not identified by country.

Note.—Exports are f.a.s. (free alongside ship); 1959–73 imports are Customs values, generally the market value in the foreign country; and 1974–76 imports are transaction values f.a.s. Petroleum exporting developing countries are as follows: OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)—Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela; and other petroleum exporting developing countries—Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Brunei, Egypt, Leeward and Windward Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Oman, Trinidad and Tobago, and Tunisia.

TABLE B-98.—U.S. overseas loans and grants, by type and area, fiscal years, 1962-75 [Millions of dollars]

		uonai si					
Type of program and fiscal period	Total	Near East and South Asia	Latin America	East Asia	Africa	Europe	Other and inter- regional
TOTAL ECONOMIC LOANS AND GRANTS (OBLI- GATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS) 1							
1962–74 average	5, 496 3, 179 2, 318	1, 324 961 363	1, 163 740 423	1, 244 548 696	413 213 202	621 595 27	726 119 607
1975 Loans Grants	7, 659 4, 429 3, 230	2, 006 1, 277 730	1, 466 931 535	1, 743 1, 285 457	583 336 248	504 489 13	1, 356 109 1, 247
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 2							
Obligations and loan authorizations: 1962–74 average 1975	3, 981 4, 892	1, 144 1, 785	867 776	969 737	336 334	49 13	616 1, 247
Loan repayments and interest receipts: 1962–74 average1975	675 783	421 330	75 144	93 103	34 71	48 133	4
Agency for International Development Obligations and Ioan authorizations: 1962-74 average	2, 160 2, 505	578 1, 012	463 239	597 507	189 171	4 13	329 563
Loan repayments and interest receipts: 1962–74 average 1975	290 374	170 153	42 115	35 45	23 42	19 18	1
Food for Peace							
Obligations: 1962-74 average 1975	1, 246 1, 328	555 767	127 128	345 217	125 135	44	48 81
Loan repayments and interest receipts: 1962–74 average	357 409	247 177	17 29	56 58	9 29	28 115	
Contributions and subscriptions to international							
financial institutions 3 Obligations: 1962–74 average	364 784		204 348				159 436
Other official development assistance, including	ļ	ļ	ļ ·		ļ		
Obligations: 1962-74 average	211 275	10 6	71 61	27 13	22 28		80 167
OTHER ECONOMIC LOANS AND GRANTS TO LESS					-		
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES			ļ				
Obligations: 1962–74 average 1975	866 2,026	180 221	296 690	157 783	79 249	149 83	2
Loan repayments and interest receipts: 1962–74 average 1975	513 1, 215	105 384	285 416	44 154	23 80	56 179	<u>-</u> 2
TOTAL ECONOMIC LOANS AND GRANTS TO DE-							
VELOPED COUNTRIES Obligations:							1
1962–74 average	649 740			118 223		423 408	108 109

Source: Agency for International Development (except as noted).

¹ Some data are preliminary.
2 Official development assistance is defined as concessional aid for development purposes. Countries have been classified "less developed" on the basis of the standard list of less developed countries used by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. On this basis, "less developed" countries include all countries receiving U.S. loans or grants except the following which are considered "developed": Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Republic of South Africa, Canada, and all of Europe except Malta, Spain, and Yugoslavia.
3 Includes paid-in capital subscriptions and contributions to the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and the Asian Development Bank.
4 Data for certain programs from Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-99.—International reserves, 1952, 1962, and 1972-76

[Millions of SDRs 1; end of period]

Area and country	1952	1962	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
							November
All countries	2 49, 311	62, 619	146, 519	152, 240	180, 068	194, 275	
Industrialized countries 3	36, 760	49, 249	97, 461	95, 750	97, 935	104, 112	111, 491
United States Canada Japan	24, 714 1, 944 1, 101	17, 220 2, 561 2, 022	12, 112 5, 572 16, 915	11, 919 4, 782 10, 151	13, 116 4, 758 11, 042	13, 568 4, 549 10, 947	16, 415 4, 418 14, 547
Austria	106 1, 133 686 960 722 950	1, 077 1, 753 4, 049 6, 957 4, 068 1, 943	2, 503 3, 564 9, 224 21, 907 5, 605 4, 407	2, 382 4, 228 7, 070 27, 497 5, 335 5, 427	2, 801 4, 366 7, 230 26, 461 5, 669 5, 682	3, 792 4, 952 10, 757 26, 510 4, 078 6, 073	3, 550 4, 225 8, 341 30, 118 5, 630 6, 271
mark, Norway, and Sweden). Switzerland United Kingdom	817 1, 667 1, 956	1, 362 2, 919 3, 308	3, 459 6, 960 5, 201	4, 499 7, 063 5, 368	3, 757 7, 360 5, 667	5, 288 8, 908 4, 663	4, 562 8, 844 4, 540
Other Europe	1, 559	2, 966	11, 748	13, 421	12, 273	11, 168	
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa	1, 509	2, 066	7, 612	6, 486	4, 956	4, 186	3, 518
Oil exporting countries	1, 699	2, 030	10, 043	12, 041	38, 407	48, 285	
Iran	500	211 289 268 583 679	884 346 2, 303 1, 595 4, 915	1, 025 483 3, 214 1, 999 5, 320	6, 847 4, 595 11, 667 5, 320 9, 978	7, 429 4, 957 19, 920 7, 569 8, 410	7, 935 4, 421 23, 205 7, 320
Other less developed areas	7, 324	6, 308	19, 655	24, 542	26, 498	26, 525	
Other Western Hemisphere	2, 224	1, 605	7, 492	9, 950	9, 709	8, 519	
Other Middle East	826	992	2, 695	3, 604	3, 884	4, 424	
Other Asia	3, 478	2, 663	7, 554	8, 791	10, 456	11, 188	
Other Africa	796	988	1, 915	2, 197	2, 449	2, 394	
	I	1	1	i	l	i	i .

¹ Special drawing rights. For conversion to U.S. dollars, use the following U.S. dollars per SDR for end of period: 1952—1.00000; 1962—1.00000; 1972—1.08571; 1973—1.20635; 1974—1.22435; 1975—1.17066; 1976: Nov.—1.14982.

2 Includes Cuba.
3 Includes Luxembourg.
4 Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates.

Note.—International reserves is comprised of monetary authorities' holdings of gold, special drawing rights (SDR) reserve positions in the International Monetary Fund, and foreign exchange, Data exclude U.S.S.R., other Eastern European countries, Mainland China, and Cuba (after 1960).

Source: International Monetary Fund, "International Financial Statistics."

TABLE B-100.- U.S. reserve assets, 1946-76 [Millions of dollars]

End of year or	Total reserve	Gold st	tock 1	Special drawing	Convertible foreign	Reserve position in
month	assets	Total	Treasury 2	rights (SDR) 3	currencies 4	International Monetary Fund
1946	20, 706	20, 706	20, 529			
1947	24, 021	22, 868	22, 754			1. 153
1948	25, 758	24, 399	24, 244			
1949	26, 024	24, 563	24, 427			1, 461
1950	24, 265	22, 820	22, 706			
1951	24, 299	22, 873	22, 695			
1952	24, 714	23, 252	23, 187			
1953	23, 458	22, 091	22, 030			1, 367
1954	22, 978	21, 793	21, 713			1, 185
1955	22, 797	21, 753	21, 690			1.044
1956	23, 666	22, 058	21, 949			1, 608
1957	24, 832	22, 857	22, 781			
1958	22, 540	20, 582	20, 534			1, 958
1959	21, 504	19, 507	19, 456			i, 997
1960	19, 359	17, 804	17. 767			1, 555
1961	18, 753	16, 947	16, 889		116	1, 690
1962	17, 220	16, 057	15, 978		99	1, 064
1963	16, 843	15, 596	15, 513		212	1, 035
1964	16, 672	15, 471	15, 388		432	769
1965	15, 450	13, 806	6 13, 733		781	* 863
1966	14, 882	13, 235	13, 159		1, 321	326
1967	14, 830	12, 065	11, 982		2, 345	420
1968	15, 710	10, 892	10, 367		3, 528	1, 290
1969	7 16, 964	11, 859	10, 367		⁷ 2, 781	2, 324
1970	14, 487	11, 072	10, 732	851	629	1, 935
1971	7 12, 167	10, 206	10, 132	1, 100	7 276	585
1972	7 13, 151	7 10, 487	7 10, 410	7 1, 958	241	7 465
1973	7 14, 378	7 11, 652	11.567	7 2, 166	271	7 552
1974	15.883	11,652	11,652	\$ 2, 374	5	\$ 1.852
1975	16, 226	11, 599	11,599	\$ 2, 335	80	\$ 2, 212
1976	8 18, 747	11, 598	11,598	\$ 2,395	320	8 4, 434
1976: Jan	16, 622	11, 599	11, 599	2, 376	333	2, 314
Feb	16, 661	11, 599	11, 599	2, 376	296	2, 390
Mar	16, 941	11, 599	11, 599	2, 351	571	2, 420
Apr	17, 438	11, 599	11, 599	2, 325	936	2, 578
May	17, 958	11, 598	11, 598	2, 309	938	3, 113
June	18, 477	11, 598	11, 598	2, 316	1, 365	3, 198
July	18, 246	11, 598	11, 598	2, 318	864	3, 466
Aug	18, 586	11, 598	11, 598	2, 325	845	3, 818
Sept	18, 945	11, 598	11, 598	2, 357	1, 038	3, 952
Oct	19, 013	11, 598	11, 598	2, 352	1, 066	3, 997
Nov	19, 416	11, 598	11, 598	2, 365	1, 146	4, 307
Dec	8 18, 747	11, 598	11, 598	8 2, 395	320	8 4, 434
500	10.17/	11,000	, 550	, ., ., .,	320	, 434

Includes gold sold to the United States by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the right of repurchase and gold deposited by the IMF to mitigate the impact on the U.S. gold stock of purchases by foreign countries for gold subscriptions on increased IMF quotas.
2 Prior to December 1974, excludes gold held by the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF). In December 1974,

equal to the United States quota.

Reserve position includes, and gold stock excludes, \$259 million gold subscription to the Fund in June 1965

o Reserve position includes, and gold stock excludes, \$2.59 million gold subscription to the Fund in June 1965 for a U.S. quota increase which became effective on February 23, 1966.

7 Includes increase (in millions as follows: for 1969, \$67 resulting from revaluation of German mark in October 1969 (\$13 in mark holdings); for 1971, \$28 in dollar value of foreign currencies revalued to reflect market exchange rates as of December 31, 1971; for 1972, \$1,016 in total assets resulting from the change in par value of the U.S. dollar on May 8, 1972 (\$828 total gold stock, \$822 Treasury gold stock, \$155 SDR, and \$33 reserve position); for 1973, \$1,436 in total assets resulting from the change in par value of the dollar on October 18, 1973 (\$1,165 total gold stock, \$1,157 Treasury gold stock, \$217 SDR, and \$54

**Be-inning July 1974, the IMF adopted a technique for valuing the SDR based on a weighted average of exchange rates for the currencies of 16 member countries. SDR holdings and reserve position in the IMF are also valued on this basis beginning July 1974. At valuation used prior to July 1974 SDR1=\$1.20635), end of

	Total reserve assets	SDR	Reserve position in IMF
1974: Dec	15, 812	2, 338	1, 817
1975: Dec	16, 366	2, 404	2, 283
1976: Dec	18, 895	2, 482	4, 495

Note.—Gold held under earmark at Federal Reserve Banks for foreign and international accounts is not included in the gold stock of the United States.

Sources: Department of the Treasury and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

² Prior to December 1974, excludes gold held by the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF). In December 1974, the Treasury acquired all the gold held by the ESF.

³ Includes initial allocation on January 1, 1970 of \$867 million, second allocation on January 1, 1971 of \$717 million, and third allocation on January 1, 1972 of \$710 million of special drawing rights (SDR) in the Special Drawing Account in the IMF, plus or minus transactions in SDR.

⁴ Includes holdings of Treasury and Federal Reserve System.

⁵ The United States has the right to purchase foreign currencies equivalent to its reserve position in the Fund automatically if needed. Under appropriate conditions the United States could purchase additional amounts

TABLE B-101.—International investment position of the United States at year-end, 1971-75 [Billions of dollars]

Type of investment	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 1
Net international position of the United States	56. 1	49. 6	61.9	77. 4	93. 6
U.S. assets abroad	179. 5	199. 5	225. 2	264, 8	304. 1
U.S. official reserve assets ²	12. 2 10. 2 1. 1	13. 2 10. 5 2. 0	14. 4 11. 7 2. 2	15. 9 11. 7 2. 4	16.2 11.6 2.3
(IMF) Foreign currencies	.6 .3	.5 .2	.6 .0	1.9 .0	2. 2 . 1
Other U.S. Government assets U.S. loans and other long-term assets 3	34. 2 31. 8	36. 1 34. 1	38. 8 36. 2	38. 4 36. 3	41. 8 39. 8
U.S. foreign currency holdings and U.S. short-term assets	2.4	2, 0	2,6	2.1	2.0
U.S. private assets	133. 1 83. 0 23. 5	150, 3 90, 5 27, 6	172. 0 103. 7 27. 8	210. 6 118. 8 28. 6	246, 1 133, 2 35, 2
U.S. claims on unaffiliated foreigners reported by U.S. nonbanking concerns. U.S. claims reported by U.S. banks, n.e.c.	9, 6 16, 9	11. 4 20. 7	13. 8 26. 7	17. 0 46. 2	18. 3 59. 5
Foreign assets in the United States	123. 3	149.9	163, 3	187. 4	210, 5
Foreign official assets U.S. Government securities. Other U.S. Government liabilities. U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks, n.e.c. Other foreign official assets		63, 2 52, 9 1, 6 8, 5	69. 6 53. 8 2. 8 12. € . 5	80. 3 57. 7 3. 5 18. 4 . 6	87. 0 63. 2 5. 2 15. 9 2. 7
Other foreign assets	70. 9 13. 9 30. 1	86. 7 14. 9 38. 8	93. 7 18. 3 36. 8	107. 1 22. 4 27. 8	123. 6 26. 7 36. 5
U.S. liabilities to unaffiliated foreigners reported by U.S. nonbanking concerns	9.2	10.7	11.7	13. 4	13. 5
Long-term liabilities	.8	.9	1.2	1.2	. 8
liabilities	16.9	21.5	25.7	42.3	46.0

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

¹ Preliminary.

² Reserve assets include increases from changes in the par value of the dollar, as officially implemented: on May 8, 1972, the increase totaled \$1,016 million, consisting of \$828 million gold stock, \$155 million SDR, and \$33 million reserve position in IMF; on October 18, 1973, the increase was \$1,436 million, consisting of \$1,165 million gold stock, \$217 million SDR, and \$54 million reserve position in IMF. Beginning July 1974 U.S. holdings of special drawing rights and the reserve position include changes in the SDR based on changes in a weighted average of exchange rates for currencies of 16 member countries of the IMF.

³ Includes loans repayable in dollars, such as paid-in subscriptions to international financial institutions and other miscellaneous claims, and indebtedness that the borrower may repay with its currency, with a third-party currency, or by delivery of materials or transfer of services.

TABLE B-102.—Price changes in international trade, 1968-76 [1970 = 100]

				}					1976
Area or commodity class	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	Third quarter
				Unit valu	ie indexes	by area	<u></u>	•	<u> </u>
Developed areas									
Total:	ĺ								
Exports Terms of trade ¹	91 99	94 99	100 100	105 99	114 100	138 99	172 87	192 89	193 89
United States:									
Exports Terms of trade ¹	92 101	95 101	100 100	103 98	106 94	124 93	158 79	176 82	184 82
Developing areas									
Total:									
Exports Terms of trade ¹	94 100	97 101	100 100	106 101	115 101	155 111	310 156	327 143	342 145
Latin America:									
Exports Terms of trade 1	90 96	92 97	100 100	101 98	110 100	154 116	251 135	255 128	2 270 2 131
Southern and Eastern Asia:									
Exports Terms of trade 1	92 96	97 99	100 100	100 100	106	143	209		
				World ex	port price	indexes			<u> </u>
Primary commodities: Total	92	97	100	110	127	182	308	303	313
Foodstuffs	91	95	100	106	122	175	232	219	206
Coffee, tea, and cocoa. Cereals	82 106	87 99	100 100	89 102	98 111	130 184	155 262	159 232	217 204
Other agricultural com- modities 3	94	101	100	104	122	196	224	196	225
Fats, oils, and oilseeds_ Textile fibers Wool Rubber	84 106 117 94	87 107 117 128	100 100 100 100	103 102 91 80	102 139 164 81	187 256 353 168	262 245 249 176	190 199 204 136	201 252 230 220
Minerals	92	96	100	119	131	173	473	494	507
Metal ores Fuels	89 95	95 96	100 100	101 125	107 140	130 189	175 577	206 588	213 610
Manufactured goods: Total 4	91	94	100	105	113	133	162	182	181
Nonferrous base metals 4	84	97	100	87	87	121	153	120	141

¹ Terms of trade indexes are unit value indexes of exports divided by unit value indexes of imports,
2 Data are for second quarter 1976.
4 Includes forest products.
4 Data for manufactured goods are unit value indexes.

Note.-Data exclude trade of socialist areas in Eastern Europe (except Yugoslavia) and Asia.

Sources: United Nations and Department of Commerce (Bureau of International Economic Policy and Research).

Table B-103.—Consumer price indexes in the United States and other major industrial countries, 1955-76

[1970=100]

Period	United States	Canada	Japan	France	Germany	Italy	Nether- lands	United Kingdom
1955	69. 0	69. 9	52.6	50. 4	70. 1	62. 2	57. 8	59. 0
1956	70. 0	70. 9	52.8	51. 4	71. 9	64. 3	58. 9	61. 9
1957	72. 5	73. 2	54.4	53. 2	73. 3	65. 2	62. 7	64. 2
1958	74. 5	75. 0	54.2	61. 2	75. 0	67. 0	63. 8	66. 2
1959	75. 1	75. 9	54.7	65. 0	75. 7	66. 7	64. 3	66. 5
1960	76.3	76.7	56.7	67.3	76. 7	68. 2	66. 4	67.2
1961	77.0	77.1	59.7	69.5	78. 5	69. 7	67. 0	69.5
1962	77.9	78.0	63.8	72.9	80. 9	72. 9	68. 3	72.5
1963	78.8	79.4	69.2	76.4	83. 3	78. 3	70. 9	73.9
1964	79.9	80.8	71.9	79.0	85. 2	83. 0	74. 8	76.3
1965	81. 3	82. 8	76. 7	81. 0	88. 1	86. 7	78. 7	80. 0
1966	83. 6	85. 9	80. 6	83. 2	91. 2	88. 8	83. 3	83. 1
1967	86. 0	88. 9	83. 8	85. 4	92. 5	91. 6	86. 0	85. 2
1968	89. 6	92. 6	88. 3	89. 3	93. 9	92. 8	89. 1	89. 2
1969	94. 4	96. 8	92. 9	95. 0	96. 4	95. 2	95. 8	94. 0
1970	100. 0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100. 0	100.0	100. 0
1971	104. 3	102.9	106.3	105.5	105.3	105. 0	107.5	109. 5
1972	107. 7	107.8	111.5	111.7	111.1	110. 9	115.9	117. 0
1973	114. 4	116.0	124.5	119.9	118.8	122. 4	125.2	126. 7
1974	127. 0	128.6	153.4	136.3	127.1	146. 2	137.3	147. 0
1975	138.6	142.5	171.4	152. 2	134. 7	171. 3	151.3	182, 5
1974:	121. 6	122. 7	144. 1	129. 0	124. 6	133, 6	131.9	137. 2
	125. 0	126. 8	150. 5	134. 3	126. 6	140, 8	135.9	145. 3
	128. 9	130. 6	156. 1	138. 7	127. 8	150, 4	138.3	149. 4
V	132. 6	134. 2	162. 7	143. 1	129. 5	160, 0	142.8	156. 1
1975: I	135. 0	137. 1	165. 3	147. 0	132. 0	164. 9	145. 8	165. 6
	137. 1	140. 1	171. 0	150. 6	134. 5	169. 3	149. 9	180. 7
	140. 1	144. 9	172. 7	153. 9	135. 5	172. 9	152. 9	188. 7
	142. 3	147. 9	176. 7	157. 3	136. 7	178. 1	156. 3	195. 2
1976: I	143.7	149. 8	180. 4	161. 1	139. 0	184.8	159. 0	200. 9
	145.5	152. 1	186. 6	164. 8	141. 1	196.5	164. 3	208. 0
	147.8	154. 3	189. 0	168. 6	141. 2	201.7	165. 4	214. 0
Oct	149. 0 149. 4	156. 1	192.8	171.8	141.5	211. 6	169. 5	219. 9

Sources: Department of Labor and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.





