



# **ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT**

**TRANSMITTED  
TO THE CONGRESS  
FEBRUARY 1974**





# Economic Report of the President



Transmitted to the Congress  
February 1974

TOGETHER WITH  
THE ANNUAL REPORT  
OF THE  
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
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**ECONOMIC REPORT  
OF THE PRESIDENT**





## ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

*To the Congress of the United States:*

The United States enters 1974 in a position of leadership in the world economy. The dollar is strong, we have constructive economic relations throughout the world, and we have the greatest freedom of action resulting from our great capacity to produce. We must take the responsibilities and the opportunities this position of leadership gives us.

Nineteen hundred and seventy-three was a year of problems and progress in the American economy. In some respects the problems were greater than we expected and the progress was less than we had hoped. But the areas of our solid achievements were more important than the areas of our disappointments. We and the world around us have difficult tasks ahead—primarily to deal with an old problem, inflation, and to deal with one that has just become acute, energy. But the United States confronts these difficulties with a strong and adaptable economy, which means an economy of capable and enterprising people.

In the middle of 1971, when the New Economic Policy was launched, the country had three economic objectives: to promote the expansion of output and reduce unemployment, to correct the persistent deficit in the U.S. balance of payments, and to check the inflation which had been going on for 5½ years. To achieve these objectives a comprehensive program of action was initiated. Taxes were reduced. Price and wage controls were instituted. The exchange rate of the dollar was set free to adjust to market conditions, and steps were initiated to improve the international monetary system.

There has been great progress toward two of these three objectives. Production and employment have risen rapidly. Total civilian employment was 6.8 million higher in December 1973 than in June 1971. The unemployment rate had fallen from 6 percent to a little under 5 percent. In 1973 a larger percentage of the civilian population over the age of 16 was employed than ever before.

With vigorously rising employment, and rising productivity as well, there was a big increase in output of goods and services, the essential ingredients of higher living standards. In the 2½ years of the New

Economic Policy, total output increased by 14 percent, which is about 35 percent above our average for a period of this length. The real income of American consumers per capita, after taxes, rose by 8½ percent, also well above our long-term rate. Both real output and real income, of course, reached record highs.

The second goal of the New Economic Policy, to strengthen the international financial position of the United States and of the world, was also largely achieved. The significance of this goal is commonly neglected in America. But a country whose currency is weak, whose currency others don't want to hold, is greatly limited in what its government and citizens can do—in buying goods abroad, in traveling freely, in investing freely, in maintaining forces abroad if necessary. And if a country goes on spending more abroad than it earns abroad, its freedom of action is going to be curtailed. There has been a dramatic change in our balance of trade, from a deficit of \$917 million in the first half of 1971 to a surplus of \$714 million in the second half of 1973. We have not only improved our own position but we have also taken the lead in strengthening the international system. The more flexible system we have promoted withstood numerous shocks during 1973, and at the same time the world economy and international trade and investment continued to expand.

It is the third of the three objectives of the New Economic Policy—the control of inflation—that has been our great difficulty. Until the end of 1972 the New Economic Policy, drawing on the results of earlier fiscal and monetary restraints, worked well in getting the rate of inflation down, even though worrisome rises in food prices appeared. But in 1973 inflation speeded up sharply. During the year, consumer prices increased by almost 9 percent.

Of course, the progress on the first two objectives was connected with the disappointment on the third. The rapid rise toward full employment, the expansion of our net exports, and the reduction in the value of the dollar to make the United States more competitive, all contributed to the resurgence of inflation. But there were other factors at work, less directly under our control. Food production lagged in major producing countries, including the United States. An extraordinary combination of booms in other countries boosted prices of industrial materials. Countries jointly controlling a large part of the world's exportable oil supplies decided to raise their prices substantially. During 1973 food prices accounted for 51 percent of the total rise of consumer prices, and energy prices accounted for another 11 percent.

The American people generally prospered despite the inflation in 1973. Their incomes, on the average, rose more than prices. But there were many families for which that was not true. We cannot accept continuation

of the inflation rate of 1973, and still less can we risk its acceleration. We must dedicate ourselves to carrying on the fight against inflation in 1974 and thereafter.

There are at least four lessons we can learn from our past experience in combating inflation:

1. *The importance of patience.* To correct a powerful trend of the economy which has been going on for some time requires time. Sharply squeezing down the economy in an effort to halt inflation would produce a severe drop in employment and economic activity and create demands for a major reversal of policy. Pumping up the economy to get quickly to full employment would risk setting off even swifter inflation. We need a greater steadiness of policy.

2. *The importance of the rest of the world.* The events of 1973 brought our external economic relations sharply to our attention. Most simply put, it will be exceedingly hard for us to have a stable economy in an unstable world. We must contribute a stabilizing influence to the world economy of which we are a large part. We must promote concerted efforts to maintain the health of the world economy.

3. *The importance of production.* Despite other vicissitudes, what determines the economic well-being of the American people more than anything else is the rate of production. The rapid increase of production has provided the rising real incomes of the American people. More specifically, increasing food production is the best way to deal with the food price problem, and increasing our energy supplies is the best way to deal with the energy shortage. We think of ourselves as a Nation with high and strongly rising output. We are. But we can do better and it is important that we do better.

4. *The importance of free markets.* In the past several years, under the pressure of emergency conditions, we have made great, but temporary, departures from reliance on free prices and free markets. In special circumstances and for short periods these departures have been helpful. But taken together, these experiences have confirmed the view that the free market is, in general, our most efficient system of economic organization, and that sustained and comprehensive suppression of it will not solve the inflation problem.

At the beginning of 1974 the three problems which have dominated economic policy for many years—inflation, unemployment, and the balance of payments—have been joined by a fourth—the energy problem. Or rather, the other three problems have been pervaded by the energy problem. The present oil situation means that we are paying much higher prices for imported oil than formerly and that the volume of imports at the present time is less than we would freely buy even at those prices. But the

prices and volumes are both highly uncertain and add uncertainties to the economic picture for the year.

The current and prospective oil situation will at the same time raise prices, limit production in some industries, and reduce demand in others. It will be the objective of the Administration's policy to do three things in this circumstance:

1. To keep the moderate slowdown of the economic boom from becoming excessive because of the energy shortage;
2. To keep the rise of fuel prices from spilling over unnecessarily into more inflation in other parts of the economy; and
3. To set the stage for stronger economic expansion with greater price stability after the initial price and output disruptions caused by the energy shortage have been absorbed.

Achieving these goals in this unpredictable economic environment will require alertness and adaptability. We cannot set a policy at the beginning of the year and let it run without further consideration. But we can describe the main elements of our present strategy.

1. We will maintain a budget of moderate economic restraint. Even though the combination of urgent requirements and inescapable commitments generates pressures for huge expenditure increases, the budget I will propose will keep the expenditures within the revenues that the tax system would yield at full employment.
2. We will be prepared to support economic activity and employment by additional budgetary measures, if necessary.
3. We urge the Congress to enact the legislation I proposed last year for improving the unemployment compensation system, with further strengthening amendments I will submit. This would provide better protection for workers who may lose their jobs, whether because of the energy shortage or for other reasons, and also help to protect the economy better against the secondary effects of their unemployment.
4. Working together with other consuming countries, including the developing countries, and with the oil-exporting countries, we will try to arrive at an understanding on mutually beneficial conditions of exchange.
5. We will try to manage the energy shortage in such a way as to keep the loss of jobs and production to a minimum, although some loss is inevitable in the short run. The allocation system is designed to assure an adequate flow of oil to those industries where lack of it would limit employment the most. We shall also have to provide

or permit incentives—including higher prices—for maximum imports, for maximum domestic exploration and production, and for efficient use of our scarce supplies. To prevent higher prices from causing excess profits, I have proposed an Emergency Windfall Profits Tax, which I urge the Congress to enact promptly.

6. We will work with other oil-importing countries to prevent the higher prices of oil and its limited supply from generating a downward spiral of recession. The higher prices will cause dislocations and impose burdens on all consuming countries; they do not have to cause a spreading recession if we manage our affairs cooperatively and wisely.
7. We will continue our policy of maximum agricultural production to help hold down food prices.
8. We will continue our policy of progressive removal of price and wage controls in order to restore the flexibility needed for efficiency and expansion in a time of economic strain.

The effort to maintain the stability of our economy in the face of the present unusual conditions will absorb a great deal of attention this year. But we must not neglect the fundamental factors which determine the prosperity of the American people in the longer run. One of these has come to general public attention with a rush—the need for adequate supplies of energy at reasonable cost. We are seeing the possible consequences of being deprived of these, and we must not allow it.

The energy problem has had two main parts for some time:

First, with rapidly rising world demand for energy, most of which comes from depletable resources, we could run into sharply increasing costs of energy unless vast investments are made in research, development, experimentation, and production.

Second, we are exposed to the danger of being thrown back upon inadequate or very expensive sources of energy earlier than necessary by joint action of a few countries that control a large part of the existing low-cost reserves of oil.

To deal with this problem I began proposing, almost 3 years ago, a number of governmental measures to permit or assist development of energy within the control of the United States. In 1973 the second part of the problem, which had formerly been a threat, became a reality at least temporarily, and this has demonstrated unmistakably the urgency of the steps I have recommended.

I propose that the United States should commit itself to “Project Independence” to develop the capacity for self-sufficiency in energy supplies at reasonable cost. One key element of Project Independence is a

5-year, \$10 billion program of federally financed research and development in the field of energy. My budget for fiscal year 1975 will include almost \$2 billion for this purpose. By far the largest part of the research, development, and production required by Project Independence will be private, and steps to stimulate the private contribution are essential. Among the numerous measures to this end which I called attention to in my latest energy message on January 23, were several tax proposals. Last April I proposed that the investment credit be extended to cover exploratory drilling for new oil and gas fields, while the tax shelters for wealthy taxpayers associated with such drilling would be eliminated. In my recent message I asked Congress to eliminate the depletion allowance given to U.S. companies for foreign oil production but to retain it for domestic production, in order to shift the incentive to exploration and production at home. I have also asked the Treasury Department to prepare proposals for revising the treatment of taxes paid by oil companies to foreign governments, both to improve tax equity and to increase the incentive for domestic production.

Energy is only the most dramatic example of the need for policies to promote a rising American standard of living by increasing production and assuring the stability of supplies. There are many others.

I. We have discovered that we no longer have a surplus of food, in the sense of producing more than we need either to consume at home or to sell abroad in order to pay for the things we buy abroad. We no longer have great reserves of food in storage and acreage withheld from use. We have freed the American farmer to produce as much as he can and we should keep him free. American agriculture is, and should be, heavily involved in exports. This means that the American food price level and the American consumer are directly influenced by the forces of world demand and supply. International cooperation is needed to promote food production and the maintenance of stocks adequate to shield consumers from the more extreme variations of output. At the call of the Secretary of State, preparations are now being made for a conference on this subject to be held under United Nations auspices.

II. Our ability to buy abroad what is produced more efficiently abroad, and to sell abroad what we produce more efficiently, contributes to the productivity of the American economy. At my recommendation the countries of the world are now preparing to negotiate new steps in foreign trade policy which will further invigorate this beneficial process. I urge the Congress to enact promptly the trade legislation I have proposed to permit the United States to participate in these negotiations.

III. One of our most essential industries—freight transportation—is unfortunately shot through with inefficiencies. Many of these inefficiencies are the result of obsolete, shortsighted, and excessive regulation. Hundreds of millions and probably billions of dollars a year could be saved by unleashing carriers and shippers to carry the freight on the most efficient mode of transportation, in the most efficient way. I have sent to the Congress new proposals to this end.

IV. In 1973, as in 1972, relatively few days of work were lost as a result of industrial disputes. Continuation of this record would be a valuable contribution to the level and stability of production. I have appointed a Commission on Industrial Peace, composed of leaders of management and labor with an impartial chairman, to make recommendations for bringing that about.

V. In addition to the major research and development effort to provide secure supplies of energy, without abusing our natural environment in doing so, this Administration is continuing its support of research and development projects that will help maintain a healthy rate of innovation and productivity growth in the rest of our economy. These activities will be supported at record levels in the coming year, and we are also trying to get a higher return for every dollar we spend.

VI. An indispensable source of economic growth is saving and investment in productive facilities. It should be the policy of government to interfere with this process as little as possible. The government should not absorb private savings into financing its deficits in times when private investment would otherwise utilize all the private saving. Our basic budget policy of balancing the budget or running a surplus under conditions of high employment carries out this principle. Moreover, taxation should not depress productive investment by unduly burdening its return. We should not indulge in demagogic and shortsighted attacks upon profits.

VII. We must push forward, as we have been doing, to remove barriers against the entry of women and minorities into any occupation and against their maximum training and advancement. The men and women of the country are its greatest economic resource. To fail to use any of this resource to its full potential is a serious loss to us all.

\* \* \* \* \*

Compared with our parents and grandparents we are enormously rich. We have protections against the ebbs and flows of economic life that they never expected and barely imagined. But I cannot assure the American

people of an easy time. Like our parents and grandparents, we have our own tests. If we meet them with fortitude and realism the period ahead can be one not only of material advance but also of spiritual satisfaction.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to be "Richard Nixon". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

*February 1, 1974.*



**THE ANNUAL REPORT  
OF THE  
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS**



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,  
*Washington, D.C., January 28, 1974.*

THE PRESIDENT:

SIR: The Council of Economic Advisers herewith submits its Annual Report, January 1974, in accordance with Section 4(c)(2) of the Employment Act of 1946.


Respectfully,



HERBERT STEIN,  
*Chairman.*



WILLIAM J. FELLNER.



GARY L. SEEVERS.



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## CHAPTER 1

# Economic Problems and Policies

**F**OR EIGHT YEARS economic policy and the news about the economy have been dominated by inflation. The story has been a frustrating one. Over the period from the end of 1965 to the end of 1973 consumer prices rose by 45 percent, or at an average rate of 4.8 percent a year. There were fluctuations. Twice during the period the rate of inflation declined significantly. But in the last of the 8 years the rate of inflation was higher than in any of the others. During the 8 years the inflation came in various forms—sometimes led by wages, sometimes by prices, by foods, by oil; sometimes it was domestic and sometimes imported. Many programs have been launched to stop it—without durable success. Inflation seemed a Hydra-headed monster, growing two new heads each time one was cut off. The problem was not confined to the United States; indeed inflation was worse in most other countries.

Several important points seem clear to us from the experience of the past 8 years. One is that while continued rapid inflation is not inevitable, the course of unwinding it will be long and difficult. There is by now a great deal of inflation built into our system. For one thing, both workers and employers are now used to high increases in money wages which reflect the expectation of rapid inflation, and only gradually can these be moderated. Inflation is similarly built into the level of interest rates. The public is highly sensitive to inflation and reacts in an inflationary way to any news which confirms its expectation of inflation. Against this background, to hope that we can “wring the inflation out of the system” by the end of some short period is to assure disappointment. Whoever undertakes now to fight inflation must be prepared to stay the long course. We think it is necessary to do this, and also to recognize why we must do it. Experience extending over almost a decade teaches us that if we do not fight inflation effectively it will accelerate.

The American people have prospered over the past 8 years. Our real incomes have risen. Our real consumption expenditures have risen, and our real assets have risen, in total and per capita. These are facts of great importance. But they do not relieve us of the need to bring inflation under control, and to accept the cost of doing so for the sake of avoiding the greater costs of an accelerating inflation.

We have specific problems, too, aside from the general inflation problem. There are many things the American people want to do, collectively or individually. They want to maintain an adequate defense, to clean up the environment, to provide more generously for the disadvantaged, to improve standards of health, and also to continue to raise the quality of their lives in all the ways that involve more private consumption. At the same time, we see unusual obstacles to more rapid increases of production—the increased costs of energy being the most obvious one at present. Beneath the tide of inflation the basic economic problem of increasing production goes on and requires attention, even in a country as rich as ours.

The problems of specific price increases must be distinguished from the general inflation problem. Increases in some individual product or service prices beyond the average are essential, if we are to maintain supplies and allocate shortages. The attempt to suppress the increase of particular prices, while it may be necessary in emergencies, is in general not an effective way to combat inflation and is harmful to production.

#### WHERE WE STAND AT THE OUTSET OF 1974

We enter 1974 in a condition of high inflation and in the early stage of a slowdown, one result of which will be to reduce the rate of inflation, although not immediately. All the features of this situation—the high rate of inflation, the slowdown of output, and the slowdown of demand—are intensified by the higher prices and reduced imports of oil. Moreover, the oil situation makes the period ahead even more than usually difficult to predict. Decisions of the oil-exporting countries, resulting from a mixture of economics and politics, cannot be foreseen. American businesses and consumers are faced with unprecedented increases in relative prices and curtailments in supply, and no one can tell just how they will react in their consumption and investment. Other oil-importing countries will be seriously affected by price and supply developments in oil, and their responses will have repercussions here.

The rapid price and wage increases that were being experienced at the end of 1973 will undoubtedly be carried on and passed through in the early part of 1974. In the fourth quarter of last year, wholesale industrial prices other than for energy products rose at an annual rate in excess of 11 percent. Much of this rise will appear in retail prices in early 1974. Similarly, large increases that have already occurred in crude oil prices have not yet been fully reflected in retail prices. Wholesale food prices were also rising as the year ended, and the outlook was that tight supplies would boost retail prices in the first months of 1974. The rate of wage increases had been drifting up during 1973, and since the cost of living was also continuing to rise rapidly, this trend of wages was unlikely to be reversed soon.

Thus, a high rate of price and wage increases, although possibly not as high a rate as in 1973, seems inevitable in the first part of 1974. But

beyond the early months, the course of inflation is as yet undetermined. Prices of oil and related products will not go on rising at the rate of late 1973 and early 1974, but will presumably reach some new high level from which they will be no more likely to rise than to fall. There is also a prospect of larger world food supplies. In general, as we go through the year the course of prices will be less and less a reverberation of what happened in 1973 and increasingly the outcome of events and policies in 1974.

The year 1974 also began with demand rising less rapidly than during most of 1973 and production possibly not rising at all. In the fourth quarter of 1973, total expenditures for the purchase of output rose at an annual rate of about  $9\frac{1}{2}$  percent, compared to about 12 percent in the year ending in the third quarter. Real output rose at the rate of about 1 percent after an increase of about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  percent in the preceding year. There seems little doubt that this sluggishness will continue in the early part of 1974 and that total output may decline. Automobile production is being cut back sharply, partly because of the effect of high prices and shortages of gasoline on the demand for large cars. The recent weakness of housing starts and permits indicates declining residential construction during the first part of the year. The high prices for oil being paid to foreign suppliers will hold down expenditures for U.S. output. There will be some cases, although one cannot be sure how many, in which production is held back by shortages of energy or energy-related materials.

Just as a high inflation rate seems predetermined for the early part of the year, so does a fairly low rate of increase of production, which might in fact for a while be negative. But the situation at the beginning of the year does not appear to presage a very long or severe slowdown. There are a number of factors tending to support the expansion of the economy, including substantial planned increases of business fixed investment. How soon a revival will come, and how strong it will be, also depend on events and policies of 1974.

#### GENERAL ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENERGY PROBLEM

The nature of the problems with which policy has to contend in 1974 depends substantially on the energy situation—on the volume of oil imports, on their prices, and on the policies adopted in the United States. Total imports of oil expected in 1974, before measures were taken by some exporting countries beginning in October 1973 to curtail shipments and raise prices, were about 40 percent of expected petroleum consumption in 1974. This was about 20 percent of expected energy consumption in 1974, since petroleum would have supplied about 50 percent of total energy use. The countries participating in the embargo of the United States had been expected to supply, directly and indirectly, about 16 percent of our petroleum use and 8 percent of our energy use. This would have been the extent of the initial supply reduction if the embargo had been fully effective.

This curtailment of supply does, of course, lead to adaptations. Prices of oil imported into the United States are free from price control, as are prices of oil produced by certain small (stripper) wells and of "new" oil produced by other wells in excess of their base period production. These prices can be passed on in prices of refined products. Thus, a shortage of oil in the United States raises the prices of oil in these categories and increases the supply, both of imported oil and of domestic oil, offsetting some of the initial effects of the curtailment. Also the higher prices reduce the quantity consumers and businesses want to buy. Therefore, the whole initial curtailment does not appear as a gap between desired quantities and available quantities.

In time, and despite the existence of the price controls, prices might rise enough to clear the market, and there would be no "shortage" in the sense of inability to buy petroleum products at the prevailing prices. The uncontrolled prices, whether of imports, of "new" oil, or of oil from stripper wells, would rise to a level which, when averaged in with the controlled prices, would equate the quantities demanded and supplied. Although prices of petroleum products in the United States rose very rapidly after October 1973, and this apparently served to cut down the desired consumption, they had not risen enough by the end of January to eliminate shortages. The impact of the remaining shortages is being distributed through the economy by allocations and other controls, by voluntary conservation measures, and to some extent by a first-come-first-served process.

The Secretary of State has recently expressed the hope that the embargo on the export of oil to the United States from some Arab countries would soon be lifted. The effect of such action on the U.S. economy would depend upon the price and production policies of the oil-exporting countries. The higher their production levels, and the lower the world price, the smaller will be the current economic problems for the United States and for other importing countries. In any case it seems necessary to reckon with a significantly higher price for imported oil in 1974 than in 1973, although how much higher is uncertain. This conclusion would imply smaller U.S. imports than would otherwise have occurred, but a larger dollar cost of imports. It is probably also reasonable to assume that the curtailment would increasingly be reflected in higher domestic prices rather than in shortages at the existing prices.

This combination of limited oil imports and higher prices will have four kinds of economic effects in the United States and in other oil-importing countries.

1. *Limitation on capacity to produce.* Beyond some point, inadequacy in the supply of energy can make it impossible to produce certain products, or high energy prices can make it impossible to produce certain products at costs at which they can be sold. However, it does not appear that this point will be exceeded or that our capacity to produce will be significantly curtailed by the energy situation. Part of the U.S. energy supply is utilized

directly for consumption, particularly for home heating and for personal transportation. Some is used in industry for lighting or heating that may be convenient but is not necessary for production. In general, it appeared when the embargo began that the initial curtailment of imports could be absorbed out of these "nonproductive" uses without impairing our capacity to produce. This would not have been entirely true, because there would have been shortages of particular products and in particular places. But it did not appear that the output and employment loss resulting from inability to produce would be substantial, although there would be other negative effects. This view has been fortified since it appears that the net curtailment of imports may be less than initially feared. Maintenance of capacity to produce in the presence of import curtailment will depend on limiting consumption use of petroleum products, especially the use of heating oil for homes and gasoline for personal transportation. This will cause inconvenience, although curtailment on the scale foreseen would not cause hardship. Concentration of the available supply in the uses most essential for production and employment will be brought about in part by higher prices. This can be, and is, supplemented by voluntary conservation measures and by mandatory allocations.

2. *Restraint on the demand for output.* The reduced availability and higher price of gasoline will curtail the demand for large automobiles, for the services of motels, and for other tourist services. The shortage of heating oil and gasoline will cut the demand for new houses. How serious these effects are will depend in part on the amount of the cut in oil supplies or on the rise in the price. One should note that the effect of a price rise can be as great as the effect of a shortage in diverting expenditures from oil-related products. All of these effects will also depend on how consumers react, not only in restricting purchases of petroleum-related products but also in switching purchases to other things. The problem is compounded by uncertainties, both about imports and about public policy, which may cause a more negative reaction than the most probable facts would justify.

3. *The real income loss due to costlier energy.* The foregoing are the transitional problems created by the present energy situation. The initial loss of capacity to produce caused by the curtailment of energy supplies will in time be offset by shifts of production in directions that use less energy. The initial loss of demand for output associated with energy will in time be compensated for by a shift of consumers' demands to other products, and possibly by an increase in demand for American products by the oil-exporting countries. In addition to these transitional problems there will be a continuing effect on the real standard of living of the American people as a result of being cut off from low-cost sources of oil. That means we shall have to pay more of our own products or assets to foreigners in exchange for their oil, that we shall have to devote more of our own resources to producing energy domestically, and that we shall have to accept methods of production or forms of

consumption we would not have chosen if more oil had been available at a lower price.

How much these costs will amount to is exceedingly difficult to estimate. A clue to their magnitude is given by the fact that the increased cost of U.S. oil imports due to the oil price rises of October and December 1973 would be less than 1 percent of the gross national product (GNP) in 1974, with a volume of imports that would have occurred at the pre-October prices. This is probably an outside estimate of the costs in 1974 (aside from the transitional costs already noted) because there would be adaptations of various kinds. The amount is large and justifies a strenuous effort to reduce it, by getting the foreign price down and by developing cheaper sources at home. Whether the cost will continue to rise, relative to GNP, will depend on the costs of producing additional amounts of energy from new sources.

4. *Balance of payments and other international consequences.* All of the other oil-importing countries of the world will suffer the effects of the cut in supplies and the increase in prices of oil. In fact, most of these countries will be more seriously affected than the United States, because their imports of oil are larger relative to their total supply of energy and to their total GNP. The position in the Western European countries is expected to be qualitatively similar to that in the United States. The short-run depressing effect on their domestic demand as a result of the high import prices will be greater than the cut in their ability to produce caused by the oil shortage. For Japan the situation may be different, and the effect on her ability to produce may be more severe. In any case there will be a marked slowdown, and possibly an absolute decline, in demand and output in most of the countries of the world with which we do business, except for the oil-exporting countries.

This outcome will influence the United States in a number of ways. It should help to retard the increases in prices of industrial raw materials, just as the worldwide boom contributed to their rise. The increase in the value of the dollar in the last quarter of 1973 should also help to slow down the rise of dollar prices of internationally traded commodities. The net effects on trade are not clear. Oil prices will be lower here than elsewhere, at least for a time, because of the price control on a large part of our oil supply; and this situation will tend to stimulate exports of products with a large oil component, such as petrochemicals. On the other hand, the reduction of income and activity abroad and the depreciation of foreign currencies will tend to cut our exports. This factor will probably be the dominant one, although its net effect is likely to be small except for one reservation to be noted.

At present prices of oil, the oil import bills of the industrialized countries will be so large that many if not all of them will have current account deficits—that is, their foreign expenditures for goods and services will exceed their foreign earnings. This will be true even after allowing for the added purchases that the oil-exporting countries may make from the industrialized countries. The oil-exporting countries will have large current account sur-



pluses, which in one form or another will be invested in financial or real assets in the industrialized countries.

This combination of transactions does not require any decline in the level of economic activity in the industrialized world—aside from the transitional difficulties already noted—or slowdown in the rate of growth. In fact, there may be a stimulus to the rate of growth, as the higher oil prices extract funds from consumption and return them to investment via the investment of the oil-exporting countries. However, there could be severe repercussions if the financial aspects of these transactions are not well managed.

Several possibilities can be envisaged which could lead to cumulative recession. One possibility is that some of the industrialized countries might lose large amounts of monetary reserves, or incur large liquid liabilities to the oil-exporting countries which would impel the industrialized countries to try to build up their reserves. Or industrialized countries having current account deficits might feel it important to correct those deficits, even though their overall balances of payments are not in deficit. Some countries will have overall deficits and might try to correct that situation. In any event, the single-country response is likely to be to try to export more and import less, either by squeezing down the economy at home or by checking imports and spurring exports. That is, the single-country response could well either create recession at home or export recession. If many countries are following this policy at once, the compound result could be a large and unnecessary decline in the world economy.

## GOALS FOR 1974

The goals for 1974 must be realistically connected with the conditions existing at the beginning of the year. As we have already explained, we believe that the conditions existing at the beginning of the year make it extremely likely that inflation will continue at a high rate through the early part of 1974. A slow rate of economic expansion is also likely during this period, and possibly a decline, with rising unemployment. After some period, probably after the first half of the year, the course of the economy will be influenced more by policies still to be adopted. The idea of a “goal” is more relevant to this later period than to the months immediately at hand. For this later period, three possible paths for the economy can be distinguished.

1. Total spending can accelerate strongly, bringing production quickly back to a full-employment level. This path would create new price pressures which would replace the diminishing pressures expected in energy and food and contribute to an acceleration of wage increases.
2. The contraction can continue, with unemployment rising throughout the year. Anti-inflationary pressure would be strengthened along this path.
3. The economy can begin a moderate expansion, one which will bring a halt to the rise in unemployment and yet resist an upsurge of inflation

outside the food and fuel sectors and get the benefit of a much lower rate of further price increase in these two sectors. There would be an expectation that a significant reduction of price increases in food and fuel would be followed in time by a reduction elsewhere if the economic environment is not overheated. This would be accompanied by a gradual decline of the unemployment rate.

The third possible path is most consistent with attaining as well as maintaining the goals of the Employment Act. The first is a prescription for undiminished and probably accelerating inflation. The second exacts too high a price in unemployment.

Of course, no one knows with certainty or precision the relations among output, unemployment, and prices along any of these paths. They only reflect general emphases which can be utilized as guides to policy. Moreover, even if the desired path could be precisely described, no one could precisely describe the policy that would achieve it. All of these usual uncertainties are heightened this year by the difficulty of foreseeing the effects of the radical change in the energy situation. This unusual degree of uncertainty makes it more important than ever that we be prepared with means for adapting policy if events seem to be moving outside a reasonable range of the roughly defined target path.

What is implied by the path that at present seems to us the best of the feasible ones for the economy, given the inescapable effects of the energy shortage, is an increase of about 8 percent in the nominal value of GNP from calendar 1973 to 1974, to about \$1,390 billion. Of this rise, about 1 percent would be an increase in real output and about 7 percent an increase of prices (as measured by the GNP deflator). Changes from calendar 1973 to 1974 are, of course, significantly influenced by what has already happened in 1973; and hence changes so expressed do not describe an expected path for 1974, though they are implied in any expected path. As for the expected path during 1974, this would leave real output approximately flat, and perhaps declining for an interval, in the first half of the year but would bring a rise by somewhat more than the normal trend rate in the second half. Inflation would be rapid in the early part of the year, mainly as a consequence of energy and food prices, and then subside to rates significantly below those experienced in 1973. Unemployment for the year would average a little above  $5\frac{1}{2}$  percent.

We would emphasize two aspects of this path. First, it is at the same time our view of a feasible target and a prediction of what will be achieved if the planned policy is carried through. Second, that the path is feasible and that it will be achieved by the planned policy are both uncertain to a significant degree. This means that the target or the policy may have to be changed as new information emerges, although changes involve costs and should not be made unless the case for them is clear.

A description of the implications of this path for the main sectors of the economy appears at the end of this chapter.

## POLICIES FOR ACHIEVING THE 1974 GOALS

The general contour of the economy described for 1974 is consistent with the private forces now apparently at work. In the early months of the year, consumers will make the move to spending a larger part of their income on an imported product—namely oil—because of the higher price. This will tend to reduce their spending for the purchase of other goods and services and will offset the rise of other categories of demand, such as business investment and government spending. But the adjustment to spending more money on imported oil will be completed early in the year; this drag on the expansion of the economy will then be removed and the expansive forces will become more effective. (Expenditures for foreign oil will not decline, but they will not be rising significantly.) As the year progresses, housing construction will rise in response to greater availability of credit and greater certainty about the distribution of fuel oil and gasoline; and production of new automobiles will increase as the manufacturers improve their ability to turn out small cars. Meanwhile, the period of maximum increase of energy prices and food prices should have passed.

The main functions of policy will be to keep the dip in the early part of the year from going too far and to assist the revival later in the year, but to avoid stimulating too rapid a surge.

1. *Fiscal policy.* The budget proposed by the President will tend to restrain the decline of the economy during 1974 but would inject no fiscal stimulus to push the economy above its average rate of expansion. If the economy were operating at about the same rate of utilization of the labor force in 1974 as in 1973, the size of the budget surplus would change very little between the 2 years. Thus one can say approximately that if the economy were moving along its normal growth path the budget would not be tending to divert the economy from that path in either direction.

However, if the economy operates, as expected, at a lower rate of activity relative to its potential in calendar 1974 than in calendar 1973, the budget will swing significantly toward deficit. This change will result chiefly from the lower level of receipts accruing to the Federal Government at lower levels of economic activity, and partly from higher unemployment compensation payments. As a consequence, private incomes after taxes rise relative to output, thus sustaining demand and moderating the slowdown of the economy.

In calendar year 1972, unlike 1973, Federal receipts were swollen by exceptionally large net overwithholding of personal income tax estimated to amount to about \$9 billion. An estimate of the economic effect of the budget in 1972 and 1973 depends heavily on the impact attributed to this overwithholding. If the amount overwithheld was less like a personal tax than like personal saving accruing in the form of a government obligation, fiscal policy moved in a restrictive direction from 1972 to 1973. Thus, if the amount overwithheld is subtracted from recorded receipts, there was a swing of

about \$14 billion from deficit to surplus between the 2 years on the assumption of a constant rate of economic activity at full employment. Over \$3 billion of that swing would have been due to the higher rate of inflation in 1973, but the remaining \$10 billion would represent an independent fiscal policy force restraining even the normal rate of growth. Such restraint was appropriate, given the inflationary condition of the time. Since we had in 1973 both a reduction of unemployment and an increase in the rate of inflation, the actual swing from deficit to surplus was larger—about \$17 billion, or about \$26 billion if overwithholding is excluded from actual 1972 receipts.

If the overwithheld amount is treated like any other tax receipt, little shift in the full-employment budget position appears between 1972 and 1973. However, exclusion of the overwithholding from receipts seems to us to come closer to representing the economic effect of the budget, and the full-employment estimates in Table 1 are calculated in that way. On this basis it appears that whereas the direction of fiscal policy was significantly restrictive from 1972 to 1973 it is fairly neutral from 1973 to 1974, offering support if the economy declines but otherwise not exerting any upward or downward push.

The foregoing observations relate to the balance of Federal receipts and expenditures in the national income and product accounts. These accounts are more useful for analysis of overall economic impact than the unified budget accounts stressed in the Budget Message, primarily because they exclude certain expenditures which do not enter directly into the stream of U.S. income or expenditure. The references to the behavior of the surplus or deficit at a constant rate of economic activity are to calculations of the surplus as it would be at the actual or forecast rate of inflation if the economy were operating at 4 percent unemployment and at an annual growth rate of 4 percent (rather than the 4.3 percent used in Council Reports of the past 4 years). The level of these surpluses depends on the unemployment rate chosen, but the year-to-year changes in the surplus are not sensitive to the unemployment rate chosen if the chosen rate is approximately stable from year to year. Reference to a higher unemployment rate would reduce the levels of the surpluses but not have much effect on the year-to-year changes.

It is also useful to try to take the effect of changing inflation rates out of the change in the surplus because such a procedure gives a clearer picture of the budget changes that are autonomous, that is, not responses to economic fluctuations. An increase in the inflation rate will affect both receipts and expenditures, but it will affect receipts much more promptly and hence increase the surplus. This increase in the surplus tends to restrain the expansion and thus the increase of the inflation rate. But it is also a symptom of not having prevented a rise of the inflation rate and so is evidence of anti-inflationary policy only in a rather negative sense. Unfortunately, the effect of the change in the inflation rate can be measured only very approximately.

Table 1 shows the annual surpluses and changes according to four different methods of measurement.

TABLE 1.—Federal budget surplus or deficit under alternative assumptions, national income accounts basis, calendar years 1969–74

[Billions of dollars]

Calendar year	Actual budget surplus or deficit (—)	Full-employment budget surplus or deficit (—) under alternative assumptions <sup>1</sup>		
		4 percent unemployment	4 percent unemployment, standardized inflation rate <sup>2</sup>	Variable unemployment rate <sup>3</sup>
Level:				
1969.....	8.1	8.8	-----	4.9
1970.....	—11.9	4.0	-----	.3
1971.....	—22.1	—2.1	-----	—5.0
1972.....	—15.9	—7.7	-----	—10.4
1973.....	.6	5.8	-----	3.1
1974 <sup>4</sup> .....	—4.6	6.0	-----	2.1
Change from previous year:				
1970.....	—20.0	—4.8	—4.8	—4.6
1971.....	—10.2	—6.1	—5.3	—5.3
1972.....	6.2	—5.6	—5.6	—5.4
1973.....	16.5	13.5	10.2	13.5
1974 <sup>4</sup> .....	—5.2	.2	.3	—1.0

<sup>1</sup> \$9 billion in overwithholding excluded from 1972 receipts.

<sup>2</sup> Change in surplus or deficit between 2 succeeding years assumes that inflation rate is constant at rate of first year.

<sup>3</sup> Assumes that unemployment rates of the civilian labor force are constant at their 1956 levels in each of four sex-age categories: Males and females 16–24 years and males and females 25 years and over. Instead of staying at 4 percent, the overall unemployment rate used to represent a constant rate of utilization of the labor force in this estimate rises to about 4.6 percent by 1973 because the labor force was increasingly composed of groups (females, youths) characteristically having higher unemployment rates than older males.

<sup>4</sup> Excludes transfer of \$2.1 billion worth of rupees to the Indian Government expected in the first half of 1974.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Office of Management and Budget, and Council of Economic Advisers.

In view of the uncertainties facing us, it is extremely important to be prepared with fiscal measures to support or restrain the economy if it is clearly running outside the general track described here for 1974. The Administration is now in the process of preparing for support action. A decision to take such measures would have to be made with great caution, however, in view of the additional supply bottlenecks that might be caused by the energy shortage.

Greater protection for those unemployed because of the prospective conditions, and greater assurance against an even more serious slowdown, would have been provided if Congress had enacted the proposal submitted by the Administration last year to improve the unemployment compensation system. The President has again strongly urged the Congress to act promptly on these proposals; he will also submit additional unemployment insurance amendments to extend the duration of benefits and expand coverage in labor market areas that have large increases in unemployment.

2. *Monetary policy.* Because of the lag which we believe exists between changes in money and changes in economic activity, the influence of monetary policy on the economy during 1974 will largely result from the monetary expansion during the second half of 1973 and the first half of 1974. The monetary expansion in the second half of 1973 can be described by an increase in the narrowly defined money stock ( $M_1$ ) of somewhat under 5 percent and an increase in the broadly defined money stock ( $M_2$ ) of about

8 percent, at annual rates. Continued growth in  $M_2$  at approximately this rate would be consistent with our expectations concerning the increase in money GNP during 1974. At present we expect money GNP to increase by about 8 percent during the year. For more than a decade the proportionate increase of money GNP tended to be the same as that of  $M_2$ , though in some years the deviations from this proportionality were substantial, and half-yearly deviations were often quite large. Hence, the foregoing conclusion seems reasonable, barring the emergence of further evidence as yet unforeseen.

The prospect for trends in interest rates is particularly difficult to appraise at present. Inflationary expectations tend to raise money rates, while the temporary slowdown of business activity is apt to have the contrary influence for a while, even though business fixed investment is likely to rise at a rate well above that of GNP. Among the interest-reducing influences, the prospective capital inflows resulting directly or indirectly from current account surpluses of the oil-exporting countries also need to be taken into account. All this relates to interest rates in general. Terms on which mortgage credit is available will be influenced by the success that depository institutions have in attracting new savings funds in competition with market alternatives, and by the subsidization policies of the Administration with respect to this category of borrowers.

As will be explained in Chapter 2, by steepening inflationary expectations an overgenerous increase in the money supply would steepen rather than moderate trends in money rates of interest.

3. *Housing policy.* The economic path described for 1974 implies a bottoming out of housing starts in the first quarter of 1974 at a level only slightly below the fourth quarter of 1973 followed by a rise beginning in the spring. The Administration took a number of steps in September 1973 to cushion the decline then under way. In January a two-pronged action was taken to revive the mortgage market. The Department of Housing and Urban Development was authorized to purchase mortgages on up to 200,000 housing units at  $7\frac{3}{4}$  percent, substantially below the prevailing market interest rate. In addition, the maximum interest rates on FHA-VA mortgages were lowered to  $8\frac{1}{4}$  percent from  $8\frac{1}{2}$  percent, thereby setting the pattern for reduced mortgage rates.

4. *Managing the energy shortage in the United States.* If the economy is to follow the general path we have outlined it will be essential that output not be seriously hampered by the shortage of energy. This stipulation means, first, that the total supply of fuels made available for industrial production, including transportation related to it, must be adequate to sustain the aggregate level of economic activity projected for the year. Second, the supply must be distributed among users in a way that avoids bottlenecks.

How easily these two conditions can be met will depend upon the volume of oil imports. We believe that the volume of imports will be sufficient to permit their fulfillment, but it would be imprudent to assume that they can be met without care in the distribution of energy among various uses.

The rise in prices of petroleum products which has been occurring helps to bring about the desired distribution. As the prices rise, the less valuable uses—which tend to be those which generate the least output and employment—are foregone. At a higher price, a factory which uses oil for space heating will cut down the temperature before it cuts down the use of oil in the production process. A higher price will cause a consumer to cut down the use of his car for pleasure driving, rather than for getting to work. It is commonly said that the use of energy will be reduced relatively little by a price increase. That may or may not be correct. But even if the cut in energy use is “relatively little” compared to a price increase, the price increases that have occurred or are in prospect are sufficiently large to have a substantial effect on the total use of energy and its distribution.

The oil price increases that have taken place under the controls program have been justified as a necessary means of increasing supply and maintaining orderly markets. Imported oil, “new” oil, and oil from small wells are exempt from control. Other oil is controlled and sells at prices considerably below those of uncontrolled oil, but the control price has been raised on two occasions to keep the price spread from becoming too large. Although necessitated by supply considerations, these price increases have played a useful role in the allocation of supply. To make sure that the price increases do not yield excessive profits that are not justified by their contribution to increasing supply, the Administration has proposed an Emergency Windfall Profits Tax. This tax would take a large proportion, up to 85 percent, of the additional revenue earned by producers of crude oil as a result of higher prices.

Other methods are being used to distribute supplies of oil in ways that will meet production requirements. The Federal Energy Office (FEO) has encouraged refineries to limit the production of gasoline in order to increase the production of other products more essential to industrial output. This enforces a cut in automobile driving, although it does not solve the question of who gets the available gasoline. The FEO has taken steps to prepare for coupon rationing of gasoline, although it is believed that a combination of increased supplies, higher prices, and conservation measures, largely voluntary, will make such rationing unnecessary.

The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 requires the establishment of a system of mandatory allocation of oil products, and the FEO has now set up such a system. It specifies limits to the amounts of petroleum products that refineries or distributors can deliver to described classes of customers (but stops short of individual consumers). The limits are generally described in percentages of current requirements or base-period use. The limits differ by class of user, in accord with FEO’s estimate of the essentiality of the use to the productive process and to society. Such a system necessarily involves elaborate paperwork and a large degree of arbitrariness. Confidence that the economy will not be seriously hampered rests upon the expectation that increased supply and higher prices will narrowly limit the shortages to be distributed by the allocation system.

A third method, which seems to have been highly effective, has been voluntary conservation. This has been especially useful in stretching out the supplies of gasoline and home heating oil, but it has also helped to bring about a reduction in the nonproductive use of energy in industry.

The measures taken in recent months to deal with the energy shortage are too numerous to recount here. What further steps may be needed cannot now be foreseen. It must be emphasized, however, that satisfactory progress through 1974 will depend upon a flexible use of prices, allocations, and voluntary measures to channel energy efficiently into industry.

5. *Wage and price controls.* When Phase IV controls were instituted in August, the President announced that it would be our policy to work our way and feel our way out of controls. There would be no pre-set terminal date and we should avoid a disorderly transition, but the determination would be to end the system of comprehensive controls. This policy has been followed in the last 5 months. A number of industries have been decontrolled since Phase IV began and the pace of decontrol has been accelerating.

Experience under Phase IV has shown the wisdom of pressing on with the removal of controls. The controls have not recently been very effective in restraining inflation, and the general uncertainty cast over the economic process by the actual or potential operations of a detailed control system endangers the healthy economic expansion we seek. The last point is very important. Too many business decisions for too long a period ahead are being influenced by puzzlement over the kinds of controls businesses will be subjected to. We badly need business investment and economic growth in the years ahead, and continuation of general controls tends to interfere with that aim.

Just how fast the process of decontrol should properly go, and what residue of controls will endure, if any, cannot now be precisely told. But achievement of the desired reduction of inflation during the year does not, in our opinion, depend upon any significant influence from the controls.

6. *International cooperation.* The ability of the United States to get through the economic uncertainties of 1974 successfully would be enhanced by reasonable stability in the rest of the world, especially in the industrialized countries that are the chief suppliers and customers of the United States. There are two main things the United States can do to further that stability.

First, the United States can take the lead in an international effort to bring about a reliable international flow of oil at reasonable prices. Powerful moves by the United States and other industrialized countries to develop energy sources as potential alternatives to the oil now controlled by a few nations will be helpful in normalizing the flow of oil. The President has called the first of a series of international meetings on this subject to take place February 11.



Second, the United States can participate in a common effort to assure that the effects of high oil prices on the balance of payments do not lead the industrialized countries into a round of competitive deflation, depreciation, or trade restriction. This effort should include consideration of possible ways to supplement the now existing means of providing temporary support to countries finding themselves in a critical financial condition as a result of greatly enlarged oil import costs.

## GOALS BEYOND 1974

Concern with the stabilization problems of 1974 should not divert attention from those other problems whose consequences will come chiefly after 1974 but which need to be dealt with now and continuously. Most of these problems arise from the need to increase our ability to produce—in total as well as in particular directions. This emphasis on ability to produce is essentially an emphasis on efficiency, on managing our resources so that we get as much out of them as we can. It is neutral about what should be produced and even about how much should be produced, only stressing the ability to produce more of what is wanted, if it is wanted.

We think emphasis on ability to produce is important at this time, because in the years ahead the desire of the American people for more output is likely to be especially strong, and unusual obstacles may hinder fulfillment of this demand. The need to devote more resources to obtaining energy will be a drag on output. The country is almost certainly ending the period of large transfers of the labor force out of agriculture into other pursuits. By 1980, we will probably come to the end of a period in which the labor force grew much more rapidly than the population and thus helped to raise output per capita. Environmental considerations may tend to slow down the growth of output, at least as output is usually measured.

For these reasons, emphasis on the capacity to produce—on efficiency and productivity—is especially important now. Of course, even in the field vaguely labeled “economic” the Nation always deals with a multiplicity of goals. For example, the distribution of the national income among persons will always be a subject of concern. We hope that the information presented in Chapter 5 will be illuminating in this connection. The Nation has other goals about the uses of the national output. One sees evidence, for example, of a great interest in devoting more of the national output to improvement of health, and in achieving that aim more efficiently. The President will be submitting suggestions to this end. It seems most useful for us to concentrate here on the problem of production.

Many aspects of Government policy affecting capacity to produce are discussed in more detail in later chapters of this report. We present here only a brief survey of the field.

## DEVELOPMENT OF LOW-COST ENERGY FOR THE FUTURE

Throughout the 1960's the United States employed quantitative restrictions on petroleum imports to limit dependence on foreign sources of supply. However, the availability of imported petroleum at a price below the domestic price led to a weakening of the import restrictions and in 1973 to abandonment of the quota system altogether. As a result, imports have provided a rapidly expanding share of the domestic market.

The energy crisis that occurred in late 1973 as a result of the embargo by some of the oil-exporting countries alerted the Nation to the risk of depending on imports for a commodity that is vital to our economic well-being, and the supply of which is largely controlled by a few countries. Reductions in oil shipments to the United States and a sharp rise in the price of imported oil have caused substantial economic disruption. Had these events occurred later, when the United States was projected to be even more dependent on imported petroleum, the loss of jobs and the effect on incomes might have been far greater.

Oil imports may become more readily available, and the price may decline. However, the possibility of a subsequent sharp price rise or supply curtailment makes it risky for the United States to remain heavily dependent on imports to supply domestic needs.

The Nation has the capability to become self-sufficient in energy production. This capability will, however, require substantial capital investment and large expenditure on research and development. The private sector will be willing to make the needed investment only if there is a reasonable assurance that returns will be adequate to justify the commitment of resources to long-term investments.

In response to this situation, the President has announced Project Independence, a program to develop the capability for self-sufficiency in energy production by 1980. The choice of policies to implement Project Independence should be made largely on economic grounds. Because energy can be expected to cost more in the 1980's than it did in 1972, important changes in production methods, in the composition of output, and in consumption will occur. These changes will develop most rapidly, and with the least cost to society, if relative prices are allowed to allocate resources and to influence production decisions. There are many uncertainties regarding which of the new energy technologies will prove to be economic. By relying on the market mechanism to guide production decisions, we can avoid becoming locked into production methods and energy sources that prove to be uneconomic.

A major component of Project Independence is a program of Government-funded research and development to accelerate the development of technologies that will ensure an adequate supply of low-cost energy for the future. Although the private sector will continue to undertake most of the energy research and development, there is a need for a more active Government role. In part this is because the returns from expenditure on research and development will be heavily influenced by Federal policies regarding en-

vironmental control, leasing of mineral rights, and import restrictions. In addition, the development of new energy technologies to some extent involves expanding our knowledge of fundamental processes. In such cases, although the research and development provides a large gain to the economy as a whole, there may be little opportunity for any one firm to derive a large enough part of this gain to warrant undertaking the research. Moreover, private research and development is usually oriented toward projects with a relatively quick payoff, whereas much of the needed expenditure must be devoted to the development of energy sources that may not be competitive for some time.

#### SAVING AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT

To keep output per worker rising rapidly, when the labor force is also rising rapidly, requires a high rate of investment in productive facilities. Our total investment requirements in the years ahead will be greatly increased by the need to invest in energy development and environmental improvements.

These energy and environmental investments do not raise productivity as conventionally measured, though the former may prevent a decline in productivity if energy shortages would otherwise continue, and the latter may also prevent an ultimate decline in productivity. Both types of investment thus represent part of the increased resource costs imposed on energy-using or environment-using industries, in one case by adverse supply developments and in the other by social choice. Environmental benefits enhance economic well-being, and increased reliance on domestic sources of energy adds to security of production. Still, one can probably say, the American people expect rapidly rising output of the ordinary, marketable kind; and this expectation will require rapidly rising total investment to accommodate rising energy and environmental investment along with increasing investments of other kinds.

Part of total investment is provided through the Federal budget, in the form of direct expenditures for capital purposes, loans to private businesses and individuals, or grants and loans to States and localities. The budget for fiscal 1975 includes \$19 billion for such outlays, excluding defense and excluding expenditures for education, training, health, and research and development. The largest single item is expenditures for transportation, primarily highways, followed by expenditures for public works.

These direct investments in the Federal budget make a useful contribution to economic growth, if they are wisely selected and well managed. Such direct investments have numerous advocates in the Federal budget-making process. But attention needs to be called to another way in which the Federal budget could contribute to investment and growth, although it has few advocates: running a budget surplus, or at least avoiding a budget deficit except under appropriate conditions.

If the Federal Government runs a deficit and borrows under conditions of strong private investment demand, its borrowing absorbs funds which

would otherwise have been invested in private projects. Unless all of that deficit is used to finance direct Government investment, which is unlikely, the deficit depresses total investment. On the other hand, if the Government runs a surplus in these circumstances, it will repay some of its debt and make more funds available for private investment, unless the surplus is generated by taxes all of which come out of private saving, an unlikely condition. When there is a great deal of slack in the economy, a budget deficit will help to support the level of economic activity needed to supply both the incentive to invest and the savings for investment. However, when productive resources are fully utilized, the smaller the Federal deficit is, or the larger the Federal surplus, the higher private investment is likely to be. This fact partly explains the principle adopted by the Administration that expenditures should not exceed, and at times may properly be less than, the receipts that would be collected at full employment.

Government policy affects incentives for private investment, in total and in particular sectors, in a number of ways, including policies relating to taxes, international trade, and international financial policy, as well as credit guarantees, subsidies, and so on. All of these involve well-known conflicts of objectives and difficulties of measuring costs and benefits. We may now be running into a problem which is new, at least in magnitude, and potentially very serious: the uncertainty created for private investment, and all private long-term commitments, by Government economic controls that are unprecedented in scope and unpredictable in operation. Taken together, the price and wage controls, the controls connected with the energy shortage, and the environmental regulations add up to a massive entry of Government into the affairs of almost every business in the country. The management of these controls involves a great many close or arbitrary decisions, to be made in many instances by a very few people. They could go either way, and the private businessman who must invest in the light of these controls cannot tell which way they will go.

These uncertainties could become a major obstacle to new private investment, even though we do not now see good evidence of its having already happened. Concern on this score is not a conclusive argument against any particular control, although it is a strong argument for avoiding controls. And it does argue for as much stability as can be achieved in the management of the controls that are inescapable.

## THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM

In his 1970 Economic Report the President said:

Because our expanding and dynamic economy must have strong and innovative financial institutions if our national savings are to be utilized effectively, I shall appoint a commission to study our financial structure and make recommendations to me for needed changes.

After studying the findings of this commission (the Hunt Commission), the President, on August 3, 1973, sent to Congress a series of recommendations. In them a more efficient financial system is envisioned, in which finan-

cial institutions can operate with greater freedom and less imposed specialization. By fostering more competition among financial institutions, the proposed measures would improve the efficiency of our financial system in channeling funds from savers to borrowers. Savings would earn the highest rate of return the competitive market structure could allow, and the savings would be put to the most productive use. Under such a system, interest rates would play a greater role in determining the volume and the distribution of funds. Social projects deserving priorities, such as low- and moderate-income housing, would be taken care of with subsidies instead of regulations.

Among the recommendations, interest rate ceilings on deposits would be phased out over a period of 5½ years. Federally chartered thrift institutions would be authorized to offer third party payment plans, including negotiable orders of withdrawal (NOW's) and credit cards to individuals and corporations; but they would also be given expanded lending powers in making consumer and real estate loans and in acquiring high-grade private debt securities. National banks would likewise be able to offer NOW accounts and make real estate loans with fewer restrictions. Interest ceilings on Government-backed mortgages would be removed, and a mortgage interest tax credit of up to 3½ percent to financial institutions and up to 1½ percent to individuals supplying mortgage funds would be made available.

The President's recommendations, if enacted by Congress, would strengthen the financial markets in general and mortgage markets in particular. The expanded lending and borrowing powers would increase the flow of funds into financial institutions. Further, the mortgage tax credit would reduce the dependence of the mortgage market on thrift institutions by encouraging other types of financial institutions, as well as individuals, to invest in mortgages. The resulting mortgage market would be less vulnerable to a credit squeeze than it has been, and the burden of monetary restraint would be more evenly distributed throughout the economy.

On another financial matter, the time may be at hand when a move in the direction of greater uniformity of reserve requirements among depository institutions is warranted. Varying reserve arrangements among State and federally supervised banks have resulted in removing an increasing proportion of the money supply from the direct influence of Federal Reserve requirements and have made short-term shifts of deposits among member and nonmember institutions a source of uncertainty in the implementation of monetary policy. Care must be taken that any change in the reserve structure of the Nation's banks should not work to the disadvantage of smaller institutions or change the balance among supervisory authorities; but within these constraints it now appears desirable that deposits which form the money supply should be subject to direct influence by the Federal Reserve, regardless of the source of supervision of the institutions that hold them. The Federal Reserve has recently submitted its own proposals in this field.

## TRANSPORTATION REFORM

Last year the Congress passed and on January 2, 1974, the President signed the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, which is a pragmatic attempt to deal with the pervasive insolvency of railroads in the heavily industrialized Midwest and Northeast. Several of the eight principal bankrupt railroads had threatened liquidation, and such a bill was needed because the risk of even a very short period of suspended service was too great to be tolerated. If the services of the Northeast's railroads are so vital to the rest of the economy, one must ask why so many of them were in such a weakened financial condition. Factors more general and basic than those that normally cause bankruptcy are responsible.

Poor management and unrealistically rigid labor contracts are popular explanations of the railroads' inability to adapt to changing technology and a changing economy. These proximate causes largely reflect, however, a more fundamental cause—inefficient and intransigent governmental regulation.

Governmental regulation of the railroads can be traced to two sources. The public wanted the Government to protect them from the industry in a time of near monopoly and the members of the industry wanted the Government to protect them from each other. This "protection" has been expensive for both the railroads and the public. The elaboration of regulations intended to provide this protection has created a complex set of specifications for the behavior of firms that has tended to ossify with time. As a result railroad companies have increasingly given up control of fundamental management decisions to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in return for the policing of industry competition by the agency. Moreover, railroad management's attention began to focus more on the rules that delimited its discretion than upon the underlying economic realities in the markets in which they operated. As these realities changed, railroad management found itself increasingly inept at adjusting—the result being an increasing incidence of bankruptcy.

### *The Transportation Improvement Act*

The Transportation Improvement Act of 1974, proposed by the Administration, is an important first step toward solving some of the more general problems of the railroad industry. It is also an imperative step toward a long-term solution of the problem of the bankrupt railroad; because the viability of the rail system that will emerge from the wreck of the Penn Central will depend in an important way upon successful regulatory reform. Among the more important reforms facilitated by the bill would be liberalization and rationalization of procedures for the "abandonment" of unprofitable lines. In 1971 the railroads were required by the ICC to maintain service on 21,000 miles, about 10 percent of the total, of lightly traveled track for which revenues were less than operating costs.

To cover these losses, railroads must charge higher rates on profitable routes. This subsidization distorts resource use and interferes with the effi-

ciency of the entire transportation system, and hence the entire economy, as well as increasing the financial problems of the rail industry. Requiring railroads to continue to operate short and uneconomic branch lines diverts traffic that could be carried more efficiently by truck; and conversely the higher rates on longer hauls result in a diversion to trucks of freight that could be moved more efficiently by rail. Since trucks use considerably more fuel (and emit more pollutants) than trains per ton-mile of freight carried, the magnitude of this inefficiency grows directly with the increasing relative scarcity of energy supplies.

The proposed act will also facilitate the substitution of truck transportation for rail services on abandoned lines, by more or less automatically authorizing truck service between any point on the abandoned line and connecting rail service points.

### *Need for Further Reform*

Although enactment of this bill will add to the efficiency of the rail industry, several basic problems remain on the agenda for transportation reform in the coming year. The longer-term viability of the Nation's railroads will require substantial investments in improved technology, and in improvement and diversification of types of freight service, as well as investments to rehabilitate deteriorating physical facilities.

It is vital, however, that a comprehensive evaluation of the regulatory and institutional structure of both the railroads and the entire surface transportation industry be completed *before* such investments are made. Many aspects of modern railroad operation are not determined by either technological or profitability considerations. They are adaptations to obsolete regulatory policies and labor practices. Investment in conventional railroad technology as it exists today may inhibit productivity and actually reinforce the resistance to the institutional reforms that will be required for the development of a more rational and efficient surface transportation system in the future.

Changes in corporate structure may also be desirable. Costs of transferring freight from one railroad to another significantly reduce the savings that rails enjoy relative to trucks on long-haul shipments. This would imply that end-to-end mergers of railroads might be important mechanisms for reducing the real cost of rail transportation. Yet formidable administrative barriers must be surmounted by companies attempting end-to-end mergers under current regulatory practices.

The Administration's concern with the efficiency of the surface transportation system is not limited to stopping the spreading insolvency that infects the railroad industry. It will be difficult to exploit fully the opportunities for increasing productivity in the railroad industry unless major changes take place concurrently in the trucking industry.

The regulation of trucks in interstate common carriage that began in the midst of the Great Depression has also evolved into a web of regulatory

constraints. Restrictions on entry into market areas, limitations on the type of goods carried, and mandated "gateways"—creating required routes which may be so circular as to be bizarre—have resulted in an industry burdened with regulatory inefficiency. Partially loaded trucks, often required to return empty even when alternative cargoes are available, are common. Such inefficiency is a result of regulatory policy. There are no technological reasons why the motor freight industry could not operate as an essentially competitive sector of the economy.

A comprehensive analysis of the trucking industry is now under way and will provide a basis for the design of a comprehensive set of regulatory reform proposals to be completed by the fall of 1974.

#### EFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE

Economic growth is significantly enhanced by an openness to foreign economies which permits a relatively free international exchange of goods and capital based on economic incentive. International trade makes goods available that might otherwise be lacking, or only available at much higher costs. It can also make available to domestic producers ideas about new products, new product designs, or new methods of production. For producers it can be an added incentive to adopt more efficient methods of production.

We have been reminded in recent months that in some circumstances there can be a danger, both political and economic, in excessive dependence on foreign supplies. The United States must guard itself against this danger, by unilateral or multilateral action. However, if this objective is realistically defined it will be found not to limit greatly the scope for beneficial expansion of international trade.

Despite a fairly extensive removal of trade barriers in the past 25 years, substantial barriers to international trade and investment remain in effect. The inefficient location of productive facilities because of these barriers constitutes a loss of economic welfare to the country as a whole. Efforts to negotiate a reduction of the remaining trade barriers are therefore important toward improving the efficiency of the U.S. economy. The trade legislation now before Congress would give the President authority to negotiate a substantial reduction of such barriers.

Negotiations in the trade area also have to deal with the economic interdependence that results from trade. Abrupt economic shifts emanating from abroad can from time to time create a temporary economic dislocation at home which needs to be moderated or offset by government measures. Since such measures will have further repercussions abroad, governments need to agree on some basic rules and procedures that they can follow when their interests conflict. Multilateral negotiations are designed to improve some of the current rules and procedures, as well as to reduce existing trade barriers.

An international monetary system is a prerequisite for the efficient exchange of goods and capital. Without such a system, international exchange is confined to barter. To function efficiently, the international monetary sys-



tem has to provide sufficient quantities of commonly accepted means of payment and a procedure for adjusting the relationship between one currency and another. It also has to provide a set of rules on such questions as the conversion of one currency into another, restrictions on the conversion of currencies, transfers of liquid funds from one country to another, as well as a set of procedures for resolving differences in national approaches to such problems. The current negotiations to reform the international monetary system are designed to improve the existing rules and procedures.

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## SUPPLEMENT

### Prospects for 1974

Earlier in this chapter we noted that 1974 would be a year of little output growth and considerable inflation but that in both respects the second half of the year should be better than the first. The energy crisis has clouded near-term prospects much more than usual. There is great uncertainty, not only about the overall GNP change and its distribution between price and real volume but also about the components of demand. It seems fairly likely that this year's 8 percent increase in nominal GNP should reflect slower rates of increase, compared to last year, in consumption, gross private domestic investment, and net exports, and a faster rate in combined government purchases. The specific changes are much less certain, but the Council presents the following projections of individual demand components underlying this year's overall total.

#### *Business Fixed Investment*

The Council expects nonresidential fixed investment to show a rise of about 12 percent from 1973 to 1974. It is likely to be the major source of strength in demand this year. Despite the small rise in production in the final quarter of 1973, the condition of shortages that prevailed in many industries earlier in 1973 continued through the end of the year. Capacity utilization was still very high, especially in the basic materials industries. Delivery times were still long. Aside from the automobile industry, inventories were rather low relative to output and sales. All of these were indicative of tight supply conditions that constituted a strong stimulus for business to invest in new plant and equipment in the coming year.

This is not to say that the character of investment demand will be the same as in 1972 or 1973. The slowdown of the rise in aggregate demand during 1973 and the leveling in profits are likely to bring a smaller rise in new investment initiatives than in the preceding 2 years. Even so, the large volume of new investment under way assures a sizable increase in real expenditures in 1974. Unfilled order backlogs in capital goods industries at the end of December were some 35 percent greater than they had been a year earlier.

In early 1974 the Commerce Department released a survey which showed that businessmen were planning a rise of 12 percent in capital expenditures in the coming year. The rise was particularly large for manufacturing—17 percent—and planned increases within manufacturing were above average (21 percent) for materials-producing industries. The Commerce Department survey is broadly consistent with a McGraw-Hill survey, which was run about 2 months earlier, projecting an overall rise of 14 percent from 1973 to 1974.

Neither of these surveys sheds any light on the effect of the energy crisis on investment plans; and because of variations in sample coverage and for other reasons, the difference in results between the two surveys is not considered significant. The Council believes that on balance the energy crisis may result in some reduction in business purchases of cars and trucks, but aside from this the negative and positive effects of the energy crisis on investment will be roughly offsetting. Some industries directly affected by the crisis have already cut back investment (airlines, for example), while some firms in other industries may be holding back on commitments until they understand the implications that the current crisis holds for future fuel supplies. On the other hand, the crisis is stimulating capital outlays to support the search for new energy sources in this country, and conversions to other types of fuel will entail new capital expenditures.

### *Inventory Investment*

Inventory investment is likely to be a little higher this year than in 1973—perhaps by \$2 billion. In the final quarter of 1973 there was a very large increase in inventory accumulation, a good part of which represented a rise of retail stocks of new cars. Even so, total nonfarm stocks relative to total output measured in real terms at the end of 1973 were low, gauged by post-World War II experience. The first half of this year should see a working off of unwanted automobile stocks at the same time that other industries continue to accumulate inventories in an effort to restore more normal relationships between stocks and output.

### *Residential Construction*

Housing starts in the final quarter of 1973 appeared to be reflecting the effects of the stringency in mortgage markets last summer, and possibly temporary effects arising out of the energy crisis. Very late in the year there were reports that builders were uncertain about the impact of reduced fuel supplies on new construction, while potential buyers of homes in outlying areas were hesitant because of uncertainty about the availability of gasoline for extended commuting. But this, and the extent to which homeowners were making new expenditures for better insulation of their homes, cannot be considered hard information. While there is no assurance about improved energy supplies, the coming months should at least dispel the present uncertainty and permit those builders and those consumers who can buy and rent new homes to make decisions.

A more fundamental factor concerns financial conditions. Net inflows into savings and loan associations have risen since late summer, and thrift institutions now have more funds available for mortgage lending. On the basis of past experience this improvement in the availability of mortgage funds should be reflected in a turnaround in starts this spring. Recent actions taken by the Federal Government should also help spur the recovery. The reduction in FHA and VA mortgage rates in January should help make these programs more attractive to home purchasers, and increased purchases of mortgages by GNMA should increase the supply of mortgage funds for these programs.

The underlying demand for housing—as measured by the need to provide shelter for new households and for the replacement of houses removed from the housing stock—remains strong. However, the inventory of unsold homes at the start of the year is likely to act temporarily as a brake on new starts and dampen the increase after this spring. For all of 1974 the Council foresees starts of approximately  $1\frac{2}{3}$  million private units, which would represent a decline of almost 20 percent from the 1973 total. Outlays are expected to decline by 15 percent.

#### *Government Purchases*

Federal purchases of goods and services, after rising very little from 1972 to 1973, are expected to increase about 10 percent in the coming year, with increases in both defense and nondefense outlays. State and local purchases, further supported by the revenue sharing program, are expected to rise by 12 percent, which is close to the increase of the preceding year.

#### *Net Exports*

Prior to the energy crisis it was expected that net exports would show a further improvement from 1973 to 1974. The effect of the devaluation of the dollar and the continued strength of foreign demand were expected to stimulate exports. The slower growth of output in the United States was expected to slow the growth in imports. Thus, a further moderate improvement over the high rate of net exports that prevailed in the second half of 1973 appeared to be a reasonable prospect.

The oil crisis has drastically modified this outlook. For the time being at least, foreign countries are expecting much slower real growth than they anticipated previously. While exports will be greater than in 1973, they will not rise as much as they would have without the crisis. The main factor affecting imports is the huge increase in prices of imported oil. Cutbacks in the physical volume of crude oil and refined products will be much more than offset by the rise in price. The full effect of the price rise should be felt by the second quarter. In nominal terms the net exports are expected to fall close to zero for 1974 as a whole.

### *Consumer Spending*

Consumer expenditures are likely to increase about as much as GNP in 1974. Spending should be rather sluggish in the first half but should show a marked improvement in the second.

Consumers had already shown a pronounced reaction to the energy crisis in late 1973, when they reduced their purchases of domestically produced cars from an annual rate of 10 million units in the third quarter to about 8 million units in the fourth. The decrease was much more than had been anticipated by forecasters prior to the energy crisis, and the fact that large car purchases were weak, while long delivery times were required for small car purchases, pointed up the special influence of the crisis on auto demand. It is not clear whether the cutback by consumers had run its course by early January, when dealer sales of domestic cars were running at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of about  $7\frac{1}{3}$  million units. As small car supplies improve through the year consumers should come into the market in increasing numbers, although the pickup in car purchases is not likely to be appreciable until this summer. Another reason for the improvement in consumer spending from the first to the second half of 1974 is that the major downward adjustment of demand resulting from reduced gasoline supplies and higher prices is likely to be completed in the first half of this year.

Prior to the energy crisis some slowdown in the growth of consumer spending had been expected in the first half of 1974 because of the earlier shift in fiscal and monetary policy and the independent effect of the housing decline. Offsetting these influences is the stimulation from sharp increases in Federal transfer payments. These include the 7 percent social security increase scheduled for this April and the further 4 percent increase in July; the rise in payments due to the federalization of adult welfare programs; increased payments for food stamps and increased retirement benefits for Federal workers and veterans. All told, Federal transfer payments to persons as measured in the national accounts are scheduled to rise by \$14 billion (annual rate) from the second half of 1973 to the first half of 1974. As an offset, the increase in the taxable wage base this January from \$10,800 to \$13,200 will reduce personal income by \$2 billion, as calculated in the national income accounts. In fact, this rise will be felt by those consumers whose wages exceed \$10,800 only in the second half of the calendar year, as employers make deductions from employees' earnings for a longer period than under the old taxable base. Although the net fiscal stimulus will have run its course by midyear, the pickup elsewhere in the economy in the second half should serve to increase consumer incomes and spending.

## CHAPTER 2

### Developments and Policy in 1973

**A** FEW FACTS STAND OUT about the American economy in 1973, and the story of the year is mainly the story of the relation among them:

1. From calendar 1972 to calendar 1973 real output rose about 6 percent; but from the end of 1972 to the end of 1973 it rose only 4 percent.
2. From calendar 1972 to calendar 1973 prices of this output rose about 5 percent; but from the end of 1972 to the end of 1973 prices rose 7 percent.
3. On both bases of comparison expenditures for the purchase of output rose by about 11 percent.

The explanation of the large increase in expenditures for the purchase of output in 1973 involves the following factors, although the relative weight to be given to each and which ones were active and which permissive are unclear and in dispute:


- Total output approached a ceiling early in the year, so that the price rise accelerated and demand for output was stimulated in anticipation of future shortages and price increases.
- During 1972 the money supply grew 7.7 percent as narrowly defined and 10.9 percent as broadly defined. In 1973 the corresponding figures were 6.1 percent and 8.8 percent.
- The shift to more restrictive fiscal policy turned out to be insufficient to prevent an excessive rise in demand in view of the other forces at work.
- Foreign demand for American output increased substantially.

These factors interacted and multiplied in various ways. The rise of prices boosted inflationary expectations which, either directly or through an effect on interest rates, made people willing to spend more relative to their money holdings. Rising expenditures generated more incomes and, in turn, more spending. Limited production of food, great foreign demand for it, and, later in the year, the embargo on oil had particularly sharp effects on the prices of food and energy. Different models of economic behavior would arrange these factors differently, but probably all models would invoke these factors in one way or another.

**Chart 1**

## Changes in GNP, Real GNP, GNP Price Deflator, and the Unemployment Rate

PERCENT CHANGE FROM PRECEDING QUARTER <sup>1/</sup>



<sup>1/</sup> SEASONALLY ADJUSTED ANNUAL RATES.

<sup>2/</sup> SEASONALLY ADJUSTED.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

The whole process depended, at least for its magnitude, on the fact that in 1973, at an earlier stage than had been anticipated, supply limitations made it impossible to obtain further rapid increases of production. If we could have increased output more readily in response to the strong demand, prices would have risen less, and the additional spur to demand resulting from the rising prices could have been avoided. The rise of output during 1973, especially after the first quarter, was limited by a slow growth of productivity while the labor force was growing quite fast. The slow growth of productivity, in turn, resulted from shortages of certain basic materials used for further production, retardation in the flow of labor out of agriculture, an increase in the proportion of less experienced workers in the labor force, and supply difficulties in agriculture. At the end of the year energy shortages may have been hurting productivity, although given the limited information now available this is not entirely clear and does not in any case bulk large in the statistics for 1973 as a whole.

The foregoing remarks and much of the remainder of this chapter are meant to explain what was unexpected and disappointing about the economy in 1973, notably the inflation. This question holds the most interest, and perhaps the most lessons, for the future. Worth emphasizing, however, is that in terms of the objectives of the Employment Act, "maximum employment, production, and purchasing power," 1973 was a successful year. Total employment was at a record high, as was the proportion of the working-age population employed. Production was also higher than ever before and close to its potential. The purchasing power of the American people, measured by consumers' real income after taxes, per capita, also reached a record level and was well above the 1972 average.

## DEMAND AND OUTPUT IN 1973

The year 1973 started out on a very expansive note. Closing figures for 1972 showed that from the third to the fourth quarter real GNP had increased at an annual rate of 8.1 percent and nominal GNP at a rate of 11.7 percent. These were followed by still larger increases in the first quarter (Chart 1). The real increases were unsustainable in terms of the economy's potential to produce, and the nominal increases were undesirable from the point of view of stabilization policy.

The slowdown that policy had aimed for finally came in the spring. In the second and third quarters of 1973 the deceleration of the rise was moderate for aggregate demand but substantial for total output. Against a background of strong and rising demand by business and foreigners, the slower rise in total expenditures took the form of some softening in automobile demand from extremely high levels reached early in the year and a weakening in housing. All of this had its impact on production, but the production rise was also held down by shortages of many basic materials and limitations on capacity in a number of industries.

During the fourth quarter the downturn in housing became more pronounced, and the adverse effects from the energy crisis began to be evident. A marked slump in automobile sales led to a build-up of inventories in dealers' hands and to cutbacks in production. It was clear from the pattern of sales that the fear of a gasoline shortage was the dominant influence on fourth quarter sales, since throughout the period demand for small cars increased, while demand for large cars declined.

TABLE 2.—Changes in gross national product in current and constant dollars, 1968 to 1973

[Percent]					
Component	1968 to 1969	1969 to 1970	1970 to 1971	1971 to 1972	1972 to 1973 <sup>1</sup>
<b>CURRENT DOLLARS</b>					
<u>Percent change:</u>					
Total GNP.....	7.6	5.0	8.0	9.4	11.5
Personal consumption expenditures.....	8.1	6.6	8.0	8.9	10.8
Durable goods.....	8.0	.6	13.5	13.3	11.7
Nondurable goods.....	6.5	7.3	5.7	7.6	12.1
Services.....	9.7	8.2	8.5	8.5	9.2
Gross private domestic investment.....	10.3	-1.9	12.4	16.4	13.0
Business fixed investment.....	10.9	2.1	3.8	13.2	15.1
Residential structures.....	8.5	-4.5	37.0	26.4	7.4
Government purchases.....	5.2	4.6	6.7	8.8	8.7
Federal purchases.....	.0	-2.6	2.0	6.5	2.4
State and local purchases.....	10.3	10.9	10.4	10.5	13.2
<u>Addendum:</u>					
Final sales.....	7.6	5.4	7.9	9.5	11.5
Domestic final sales.....	7.7	5.3	8.2	10.0	10.6
<u>Change in billions of dollars:</u>					
Inventory accumulation.....	.7	-3.3	1.5	.0	1.4
Net exports of goods and services.....	-.6	1.7	-2.8	-5.4	9.2
<b>CONSTANT (1958) DOLLARS</b>					
<u>Percent change:</u>					
Total GNP.....	2.7	-0.4	3.2	6.1	5.9
Personal consumption expenditures.....	3.6	1.8	3.9	6.1	5.3
Durable goods.....	5.3	-2.1	10.0	12.8	10.2
Nondurable goods.....	2.1	2.6	2.5	4.4	3.8
Services.....	4.5	2.7	2.8	4.9	4.5
Gross private domestic investment.....	5.0	-6.4	6.7	11.4	7.2
Business fixed investment.....	6.0	-3.6	-1.4	10.0	10.5
Residential structures.....	2.2	-6.3	30.6	19.3	-1.7
Government purchases.....	-1.2	-4.5	-.6	3.3	1.3
Federal purchases.....	-5.9	-12.5	-5.3	-.2	-5.8
State and local purchases.....	4.0	3.6	3.3	6.1	6.4
<u>Addendum:</u>					
Final sales.....	2.7	-.1	3.0	6.2	5.9
Domestic final sales.....	2.8	-.3	3.3	6.5	4.8
<u>Change in billions of dollars:</u>					
Inventory accumulation.....	.3	* -2.8	1.4	-.7	.6
Net exports of goods and services.....	-.8	2.1	-1.9	-2.4	8.0

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.



The 11.5 percent increase in nominal GNP from calendar 1972 to calendar 1973 was the largest annual rise in 22 years. It featured a dramatic shift from deficit to surplus in net exports, as well as unusually strong demand by consumers, especially for durable goods; by business for new plant and equipment; and by State and local governments. There is also reason to believe that inventory demand was strong last year but that supply conditions did not permit this demand to be satisfied. Federal purchases and housing rose less than average and decreased in real terms (Table 2).

Somewhat over half of the rise in demand from 1972 to 1973 was matched by increased physical volume, the 5.9 percent increase coming quite close to the 1972 rise and exceeding the long-term average of about 4 percent (Table 2). The inflation component of the rise in money GNP accelerated significantly from the 3.2 percent rate of 1972 and the 2.7 percent average of the past 25 years.

### NONRESIDENTIAL FIXED INVESTMENT

Last year's rise in nonresidential investment extended the upturn that began in 1971 after a year of declining real outlays. The investment expansion gathered strength in late 1971, when rising production increased capacity requirements and accelerated the rise in internal funds. The liberalized depreciation regulations and investment tax credit of late 1971 helped to bolster the rise in cash flow. The exceptionally large increases in output during late 1972 and early 1973, coinciding with similar production increases abroad, put severe pressure on domestic capacity in several industries, especially those producing basic materials. In view of these pressures it is not surprising that manufacturing firms, with a 21 percent rise, dominated last year's increase in plant and equipment outlays.

TABLE 3.—*Changes in manufacturing plant and equipment outlays and value of starts, 1971 to 1973*

Industry	Percent change	
	1971 to 1972	1972 to 1973 <sup>1</sup>
Total outlays <sup>2</sup> .....	5	21
Materials-producing industries <sup>3</sup> .....	4	26
Primary metals .....	-1	27
Paper .....	10	37
Chemical .....	(4)	25
Petroleum refining .....	-22	8
Rubber .....	29	45
Textile .....	20	8
Stone, clay, and glass .....	41	25
All other .....	8	23
Total starts .....	26	35

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary. Expenditures include anticipated outlays for fourth quarter 1973. For starts, fourth quarter 1973 was assumed by the Council of Economic Advisers to be equal to average of second and third quarters of 1973.

<sup>2</sup> As published by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. The two groups "materials-producing" and "all other" will not add up to the Commerce total because nonmanufacturing petroleum outlays ordinarily included in petroleum in this particular survey have been excluded by the Council of Economic Advisers from each group.

<sup>3</sup> Includes lumber not shown separately.

<sup>4</sup> Less than 0.05 percent.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (except as noted).

A number of points may be noted about recent changes in manufacturing plant and equipment outlays. First, 1973's large increase reflects in part the sharp rise in new starts in 1972 (Table 3). Second, the acceleration of the rise in outlays, as compared to the year before, was most pronounced in materials-producing industries. Third, the rise in manufacturing outlays in real terms since 1968 has been far below the previous postwar average. For materials-producing industries real outlays rose 1.9 percent per annum from 1968 through 1973, compared to a rise of 2.8 percent per annum from 1948 through 1968 (Table 4).

TABLE 4.—*Changes in manufacturing real plant and equipment outlays, 1948 to 1973*

Period	Percent change (annual rate)	
	Materials producing industries <sup>1</sup>	All others manufacturing industries
1948 to 1968 .....	2.8	4.1
1948 to 1953 .....	2.2	2.0
1953 to 1957 .....	4.7	4.3
1957 to 1965 .....	2.4	5.4
1965 to 1968 .....	2.1	4.1
1968 to 1973 <sup>2</sup> .....	1.9	2.4

<sup>1</sup> Consists of primary metals, paper, chemicals, petroleum refining, rubber, textiles, stone, clay, and glass, and lumber.

<sup>2</sup> Preliminary.

Note.—Based on expenditures in plant and equipment survey, deflated by the implicit price deflator for nonresidential fixed investment.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Council of Economic Advisers.

## INVENTORIES

Inventory investment was quite low in the first 3 quarters of 1973, contrary to the expectations of the Council and of most forecasters. Additions to inventories were only slightly higher in 1973 than in 1972, and gauged by the postwar ratio of stocks to output, inventories appeared low during the year. Two main explanations have been put forth to account for this behavior. The first is that businessmen were cautious in their inventory policy last year, partly because of their experience during the 1970 recession and partly because they expected that the rapid upsurge in demand and output in late 1972 and early 1973 could not be sustained. A second possibility, to which the Council attaches greater weight, is that the rise in demand was so strong and the limits to raising production so numerous that businessmen were unable to build up stocks to any significant extent until the end of the year.

The slowdown of the rise in final sales in the last quarter of the year (a decrease in real terms) was accompanied by a sharp rise in inventory accumulation. Much of this reflected the backing up of automobile inventories in the hands of dealers, since producers did not make an immediate adjustment to the pronounced decline in sales. Apart from automobiles the increase in inventory accumulation in real terms was not especially large.

## HOUSING

In early 1973 there were indications that the 3-year expansion in housing starts was coming to an end. Sales of single-family homes had grown little after the summer of 1972; and vacancy rates of rental housing, while not high, had been edging up. During the first half of 1973 the inflow of savings into thrift institutions showed a pronounced decline compared to 1972, and lenders consequently reduced the volume of their mortgage commitments. The situation became acute in July and August, when institutions experienced a net outflow of funds, although that was reversed late in the year. A further discussion of mortgage markets appears below.

From the first to the third quarter, starts fell from a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 2.4 million units to 2.0 million. In the final quarter, however, the summer stringency in mortgage markets was reflected in a precipitous decline in starts, which dropped to an annual rate of 1.57 million units. Starts for 1973 as a whole, not counting mobile homes, were some 13 percent below the 1972 total.

Despite the record volume of completions, the rise in housing vacancies from 1972 to 1973 remained moderate: 0.2 percentage point for rental units and 0.1 percentage point for homeowner units. Although both of these are up from the troughs reached in 1970 and 1971, they are low by the standards of the 1960's, mainly because household formation and losses from the housing inventory (due to demolitions and other factors) have remained very high.

## CONSUMER SPENDING

Consumer demand rose sharply from 1972 to 1973 under the influence of higher incomes. Rising wage and salary payments in the private sector and striking gains in incomes of farm proprietors played major roles in the 10¼ percent rise in personal income, the largest since 1951. Transfer payments were also up substantially for the year as a whole, mainly because of the 20 percent increase in social security benefits that became effective in the final quarter of 1972, although that influence was diminished by the rise in social security taxes starting in January 1973. Under ordinary circumstances disposable income (after tax) should have risen less than personal income, but taxes rose less than usual because of the refund early in 1973 of some \$9 billion in personal income taxes overwithheld in 1972; this figure also reflects smaller than usual final settlements on 1972 tax liabilities. The refund contributed about 1 percentage point to the 10¾ percent increase in disposable income.

The 11 percent rise in consumer spending was accompanied by little change in the saving rate for the year as a whole. In 1970 and 1971, when the economy was sluggish and the recovery weak, the rate had been very high, the 8.1 percent annual average for each year being the highest since just after the end of World War II. The vigorous recovery seems to have been a decisive factor in the decline in the saving rate to 6.2 percent in 1972. However, decisions by consumers to spend a still larger fraction of their disposable

income do not appear to have played a major part in last year's upsurge in consumer expenditures (Table 5).

TABLE 5.—*Disposition of disposable personal income, 1960-73*

[Percent of disposable personal income]

Disposition of income	Current dollars		
	1960-72 average	1972	1973 <sup>1</sup>
Personal consumption expenditures:			
Food <sup>2</sup> .....	17.4	15.7	15.7
Durable goods.....	13.7	14.7	14.9
Automobiles.....	4.8	4.9	4.9
All other expenditures.....	59.9	60.7	60.6
Total expenditures.....	91.0	91.2	91.2
Plus: Transfers and interest.....	2.5	2.6	2.7
Equals: Total outlays.....	93.5	93.8	93.9
Plus: Saving.....	6.5	6.2	6.1
Equals: Disposable income.....	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Constant (1958) dollars		
Personal consumption expenditures:			
Food <sup>2</sup> .....	17.7	15.5	14.3
Durable goods.....	15.4	18.0	18.8
Automobiles.....	5.4	6.1	6.2
All other expenditures.....	58.0	57.7	58.0
Total expenditures.....	91.1	91.2	91.2

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes alcoholic beverages.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

The influence on consumer spending of the overwithholding of Federal income taxes in 1972, and their subsequent refunding in 1973, remains uncertain. When taxes were overwithheld in 1972, it was feared that the overwithholding might have an adverse effect on consumption. Perhaps it did, but if so, this effect was swamped by decisions of consumers to reduce their saving rate. The Council's position last year was that the overwithholding was viewed as temporary by consumers and that in accordance with the permanent income hypothesis it affected saving rather than spending.

At the start of 1973 the Administration expected that consumers would begin to reduce their withholdings to some extent in order to eliminate the overwithholding that had started a year earlier. This expectation did not materialize. In effect, consumers seem to have changed their pattern of paying income tax liabilities for a given year. That is, they overpay in the year of liability and prefer to receive refunds the following year, giving the Government substantial interest-free loans.

Last year's refunds were not accompanied by a rise in the saving rate, but the exact manner in which the refunds affected expenditures is not clear. Refunds by the Internal Revenue Service did not become very large until the second quarter of 1973. However, the upsurge in consumer spending came in the first quarter, and spending increases then subsided. If the refunds were important in the spending rise of early 1973, the anticipation by consumers of

refunds must have contributed to the bulge, which was pronounced in durable goods.

Despite last year's large price rise, real personal consumption expenditures for 1973 were up some  $5\frac{1}{4}$  percent over 1972. This may be compared to the 6 percent real rise in 1972 and an average rise of 4 percent in the post-World War II years. Real spending in all major categories increased except for food expenditures, which declined by about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  percent.

In aggregate, real consumption gains after the first quarter were comparatively small, and the large increases in expenditures after early 1973 were absorbed mainly in higher prices. Several factors seem to have been at work here. Even before the fourth quarter there was some softening in auto demand from the exceptionally high levels of sales (12.5 million unit annual rate) reached in the first quarter, although reports were common in the spring and early summer that shortages of parts were holding back production and sales of automobiles. A leveling out in real purchases of durable goods other than autos after an exceptional rise early in the year may have been related to the decrease in housing. Real food consumption also declined after the first quarter because of the reduction in domestic output, the increase in exports, higher prices, and the shift to lower-cost foods. Whether the extraordinary increases in food prices also had an adverse effect on other types of spending taken as a whole is not clear. The saving rate did not change much. The question is complicated by the fact that the higher food prices were paid largely to American farmers, whose additional purchases of non-food items could partly offset any reduction in such expenditures by the rest of the population. In aggregate, real consumer outlays for all personal consumption except durables and food rose at an annual rate of 5 percent from the first to the fourth quarter of 1973.


#### NET EXPORTS

A major element in the big expansion of demand during 1973 was the change in our net export position. In the fourth quarter of 1972 the United States was a net importer of goods and services at the annual rate of \$3.5 billion. In the fourth quarter of 1973, net exports were at the annual rate of \$8.0 billion. This swing of \$11.5 billion was equal to 8.5 percent of the increase in spending during 1973. It exceeded the acceleration in total spending from 1972 to 1973; that is, if net exports are excluded, the rise in total spending is changed to 10.7 percent in 1972 and 10.3 percent in 1973. Not all of the increase of net exports may have been a net addition to total spending, since the financing of the net exports may have reduced some domestic spending. On the other hand, the direct effect of the increase in net exports would have a multiplied effect on *total* spending, because the initial effect would increase incomes in the United States and raise consumption.

The increase in net exports resulted from three developments. First, there was a boom in the rest of the industrial world, far exceeding expectations (Chart 2). Second, low food supplies in the rest of the world boosted the

Chart 2

# Changes in Real GNP



SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT.

volume and the prices of farm exports from the United States. Third, the depreciation of the U.S. dollar helped to increase exports from the United States and to restrain the growth of imports.

## THE LABOR MARKET

With aggregate output up substantially for the second year in a row the demand for labor remained strong. Civilian employment increased by 2.7 million persons in the course of the year, while the civilian labor force grew by 2.6 million. The 3.3 percent rise in employment was the largest December-to-December percentage increase since 1955. Unemployment declined through the first 3 quarters of the year and then edged up.

### THE LABOR FORCE

The civilian labor force expanded sharply during 1973 and for the entire year was 2.1 million above the average level in 1972. This 2.5 percent increase followed a 1972 gain of similar proportions and substantially exceeded the average rise of 1.8 percent a year in the preceding decade.

The civilian labor force can be augmented in three ways: (1) Through reductions in the Armed Forces; (2) through population increases in the working-age groups; and (3) through increases in the proportion of the population seeking work. By 1973 reductions in the Armed Forces had ceased to be a major factor in enlarging the civilian labor force. For the year as a whole the Armed Forces averaged about 100,000 less than in 1972, a marked contrast to the reductions of 400,000 which occurred in both 1971 and 1972. The 1.7 percent increase in the working-age population was in line with the long-term trend. The main factor accounting for the larger than average increase in the civilian labor force in 1973 was the sharp rise in the participation rate. In the fourth quarter of the year a record 61.2 percent of the civilian working-age population participated in the labor force, a large increase from the 60.4 percent participation rate a year earlier. In 1972 and 1973 the movement toward increased labor force participation was reinforced by the large expansion in demand.

The rise in participation was most pronounced for women from ages 20 to 24. In 1973, 61 percent of women in this age group were either at work or looking for a job, compared to 58 percent in 1971 and only 46 percent as recently as 1960. The long-term upward movement in the participation rate for young women has several causes. There has been a trend toward smaller families and toward starting them later. In addition, mothers with preschool children have increased their work outside the home. The continued strong expansion of the service industries, which typically employ a large percentage of women, the relative increase in university training of young women, and the broadening of all women's employment opportunities have contributed to this trend.

Men in the 20 to 24 age group also sharply increased their participation in the civilian labor force for the second year in a row, following 10 years

of essentially declining participation rates. One reason for these declines was the absorption into the Armed Forces of many young men who would otherwise have been part of the civilian labor force. In addition, selective service legislation, which provided exemption from the draft for those continuing their education, induced many others to stay in school. Recently the growth in college enrollments has slackened, and a number of young men who might otherwise have continued their schooling are instead entering the labor force either directly after high school or after a year or two of specialized training.

Teenagers have also displayed an increased tendency to join the labor force. A large proportion of teenagers in the labor force are in school, holding or seeking part-time jobs. During the past few years a wider availability of part-time jobs has contributed to the upward trend in the labor force participation of younger workers. The tight labor market of 1973 accelerated this rise as it did in 1955, 1966, and 1972.

### **EMPLOYMENT AND HOURS**

Last year's increase in the demand for labor took the form of a large increase in employment and little change in the average length of the workweek. The failure of weekly hours to rise is not an unusual cyclical development for an advanced stage of a business expansion. In the early phases of a business cycle upswing, employers prefer to lengthen hours rather than hire new employees, because the latter course of action is often more costly and employers are uncertain about the duration of the expansion. Part-time workers are consequently put on full-time schedules, and full-time workers are switched increasingly to overtime. There are limits to this kind of switching, however, because overtime involves premium pay; at some point it becomes more profitable to add additional workers, or an additional shift, when that option is available.

Another factor that served to hold down average weekly hours in 1973 was the behavior of labor turnover. Average weekly hours are total man-hours worked during the week divided by the number of persons on the payroll. Labor turnover was quite high during the year, because increased job availability led many workers to switch their jobs. As some employees quit and others are hired to take their place, an increased proportion of those listed on the payroll during the survey week have put in less than a full workweek.

### **UNEMPLOYMENT**

The overall unemployment rate averaged 4.9 percent in 1973, well below the 5.6 percent average of 1972. Unemployment declined for almost all demographic, occupational, or industry groups (Table 6).

Last year we described "maximum employment," which is the goal specified in the Employment Act, as "a condition in which persons who want work and seek it realistically on reasonable terms can find employment." We believe that condition was approximately met in 1973, even though the aver-



TABLE 6.—*Unemployment rates for selected groups, selected years, 1956–73*

[Percent]

Group	1956	1965	1972	1973
All civilian workers.....	4.1	4.5	5.6	4.9
RACE				
White.....	3.6	4.1	5.0	4.3
Negro and other races.....	8.3	8.1	10.0	8.9
AGE-SEX				
Men 20 years and over.....	3.4	3.2	4.0	3.2
Women 20 years and over.....	4.2	4.5	5.4	4.8
Both sexes 16–19 years.....	11.1	14.8	16.2	14.5
OCCUPATION				
White-collar workers.....	1.7	2.3	3.4	2.9
Professional and technical workers.....	1.0	1.5	2.4	2.2
Managers and administrators, except farm.....	.8	1.1	1.8	1.4
Sales workers.....	2.7	3.4	4.3	3.7
Clerical workers.....	2.4	3.3	4.7	4.2
Blue-collar workers.....	5.1	5.3	6.5	5.3
Craft and kindred workers.....	3.2	3.6	4.3	3.7
Operatives.....	5.4	5.5	6.9	5.7
Nonfarm laborers.....	8.2	8.6	10.3	8.4
Service workers.....	4.6	5.3	6.3	5.7
Farm workers.....	1.9	2.6	2.6	2.5
INDUSTRY				
Nonagricultural private wage and salary workers.....	4.7	4.6	5.7	4.8
Construction.....	10.0	10.1	10.3	8.8
Manufacturing.....	4.7	4.0	5.6	4.3
Durable goods.....	4.4	3.5	5.4	3.9
Nondurable goods.....	5.2	4.7	5.7	4.9
Transportation and public utilities.....	3.0	2.9	3.5	3.0
Wholesale and retail trade.....	4.5	5.0	6.4	5.6
Finance and service industries.....	4.0	4.1	4.8	4.3
Government workers.....	1.7	1.9	2.9	2.7
Agricultural wage and salary workers.....	7.4	7.6	7.6	6.9

Note.—Rates by occupation for 1956 refer to persons 14 years of age and older. Data for later years are for 16 years of age and older.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

age unemployment rate was 4.9 percent rather than the 4.0 percent which conventionally defines full employment. There is no single statistic which can signal the achievement of the condition which we seek. But the combination of evidence for 1973 is strongly suggestive. During the year the rise in total employment was extraordinarily large, and the proportion of the population over the age of 16 employed was at a postwar high.

A condition of "maximum employment" in overall terms will imply different rates of unemployment for different groups of the population. For example, under conditions of abundant employment opportunities, suppose that young men leave their jobs twice a year on the average and spend on the average 3 weeks each time searching for the job they prefer. In that case young men will have on the average an unemployment rate of 11½ percent, that is, 6 weeks of unemployment divided by 52 weeks in the labor force. Suppose that 20 percent of the employed adult men quit their jobs each year and spend on the average 5 weeks seeking a new one.

The unemployment rate for adult males would then be about 2 percent. If the labor force consisted of an equal number of young men and adult men, the average unemployment rate would be  $6\frac{3}{4}$  percent. But if it consisted of five times as many adults as youths, the average rate would be  $3\frac{2}{3}$  percent. This illustrates how changes in the composition of the labor force can greatly change the overall unemployment rate that is associated with a constant condition of maximum employment for each group of the labor force.

TABLE 7.—*Unemployment rates by sex and age, selected years, 1956–73*

[Percent]

Sex and age	1956	1965	1972	1973
<b>All civilian workers:</b>				
Actual.....	4.1	4.5	5.6	4.9
Standardized for age and sex <sup>1</sup> .....	4.1	4.3	4.9	4.1
<b>Males:</b>				
16–19 years.....	11.1	14.1	15.9	13.9
20–24 years.....	6.9	6.4	9.2	7.3
25–54 years.....	3.0	2.7	3.1	2.5
55 years and over.....	3.5	3.3	3.2	2.5
<b>Females:</b>				
16–19 years.....	11.2	15.7	16.7	15.2
20–24 years.....	6.3	7.3	9.3	8.4
25–54 years.....	4.1	4.3	4.9	4.4
55 years and over.....	3.3	2.8	3.5	2.8

<sup>1</sup> The standardized rate was computed by assuming that the age-sex composition of the labor force remained unchanged from 1956 to 1973.

Sources: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics), and Council of Economic Advisers.

One way of seeing how labor force composition affects the aggregate unemployment rate is to weight the actual unemployment rates for each age-sex group by the composition of the labor force at a specific time. If each age-sex group shown in Table 7 is weighted according to its importance in the labor force in 1956, when unemployment averaged 4.1 percent, one finds that the overall unemployment rate in 1973 would also have averaged 4.1 percent rather than the 4.9 percent actually experienced. This wide dis-

TABLE 8.—*Composition of the civilian labor force, selected years, 1956–73*

[Percent]

Sex and age	1956	1965	1972	1973
<b>Total civilian labor force.....</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Both sexes 16–19 years.....	6.5	7.9	9.3	9.5
Adult women.....	29.4	31.8	34.3	34.6
20–24 years.....	3.7	4.5	6.1	6.3
25–54 years.....	20.6	21.2	22.1	22.4
55 years and over.....	5.2	6.1	6.1	5.9
Adult men.....	64.1	60.2	56.4	55.8
20–24 years.....	5.2	6.6	7.7	8.0
25–54 years.....	45.6	41.7	38.1	37.8
55 years and over.....	13.3	11.9	10.6	10.0

Note.—Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

crepancy reflects the large increase in the proportion of the labor force made up of women and young workers of both sexes, two groups whose unemployment rates are substantially higher than the national average. The higher than average unemployment rates for women and for teenagers are closely related to their labor force participation patterns. In addition to their jobs, people in these groups have responsibilities in household management or schooling, which tend to weaken their attachment to the labor force. Since a new entry or a reentry into the labor force is generally followed by a period of searching, and hence unemployment, these groups have higher unemployment rates almost by definition. Even among persons in their early twenties, there are many who have not yet developed an attachment to a specific occupation and who thus change their jobs frequently.

Teenagers, persons in the 20 to 24 age group, and women 25 or older accounted for only 41 percent of the civilian labor force in 1956. By 1973 they accounted for 52 percent (Table 8). The gap between the actual unemployment rate and the fixed-weight unemployment rate follows this changing proportion closely. The difference between the two rates was 0.2 percentage point in 1965, 0.5 point in 1969, and 0.8 point in 1973.

A number of other aspects of the employment situation suggest that if we were not at "maximum employment" in 1973 we were at least very close to it (Table 9). The average duration of unemployment declined, and the proportion of the unemployed who were without jobs for 5 weeks or less was high, indicating a large turnover among the unemployed and relatively short durations of search for work. Only 38.7 percent of the unemployed had lost their last job, which was nearly the same as the proportion in 1968, when the overall unemployment rate was 3.6 percent. Aside

TABLE 9.—*Aspects of labor utilization, selected years, 1948-73*

Period	Unemployment rate (percent)		Job losers as percent of total unemployment	Average monthly labor turnover rate in manufacturing (per 100 employees)			Ratio of help-wanted ads to non-agricultural employment	Average weekly overtime hours in manufacturing
	Total	Adult males		Quits	Layoffs	New hires		
1948.....	3.8	3.2	(1)	3.4	1.6	(1)	1.03	(1)
1953.....	2.9	2.5	(1)	2.8	1.6	3.6	.86	(1)
1955.....	4.4	3.8	(1)	1.9	1.5	3.0	.77	(1)
1959.....	5.5	4.7	(1)	1.5	2.0	2.6	.73	2.7
1965.....	4.5	3.2	(1)	1.9	1.4	3.1	.91	3.6
1966.....	3.8	2.5	(1)	2.6	1.2	3.8	1.07	3.9
1967.....	3.8	2.3	41.3	2.3	1.4	3.3	1.00	3.4
1968.....	3.6	2.2	38.0	2.5	1.2	3.5	1.06	3.6
1969.....	3.5	2.1	35.9	2.7	1.2	3.7	1.13	3.6
1970.....	4.9	3.5	44.3	2.1	1.8	2.8	.86	3.0
1971.....	5.9	4.4	46.3	1.8	1.6	2.5	.76	2.9
1972.....	5.6	4.0	43.2	2.2	1.1	3.3	.91	3.5
1973 <sup>2</sup> .....	4.9	3.2	38.7	2.7	.9	3.9	<sup>3</sup> 1.07	3.8

<sup>1</sup> Not available.

<sup>2</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>3</sup> 11-month average.

Sources: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics) and The Conference Board.

from job losers, the remainder of the unemployed had either left their last job voluntarily, newly entered the labor force, or reentered it after a period of absence. The proportion of employees in manufacturing who quit was high, an indication of much voluntary turnover and confidence about finding other jobs. The proportion of employees laid off was similarly low. Available measures showed job vacancies were plentiful.

## PRODUCTIVITY AND POTENTIAL OUTPUT

Although the rise of employment during 1973 was exceptionally high, the rise of output was just about average. Consequently the rise of output per worker was significantly less than average. Hours of work per worker did not decline, as they had been doing on the average for a long time. Total hours of work rose even faster, relative to their long-term trend, than employment; and output per man-hour—commonly called productivity—lagged significantly below its trend rate of increase. The failure of productivity to rise more rapidly, and therefore of output to rise more rapidly, was partly a reflection of last year's excess demand. It also contributed to excess demand and to the inflation of 1973.

We have no good measures of productivity in the government sector. This sector is arbitrarily considered to have no productivity growth when total real output and its rate of increase are calculated, though changes in the importance of government relative to private sector output can affect the trend of total productivity. It is possible to say more, however, about productivity in the private sector of the economy.

In the past 25 years (1947–72), output per man-hour in the private economy rose at an annual rate of 3.2 percent, whereas in the private nonfarm economy it rose at an annual rate of 2.7 percent. The private total rose faster than the nonfarm, partly because productivity rose faster in the farm sector than in the nonfarm sector, and partly because of the continuing shift of workers from agriculture to the nonagricultural sector. This shift raises average productivity because productivity in agriculture is lower, even though it is rising more rapidly.

Recently, however, productivity has been rising less in the total private economy than in the private nonfarm economy. Productivity in agriculture declined between 1972 and 1973 instead of rising more than in the nonfarm sector. Moreover man-hours in agriculture as measured in the productivity series fell less than usual last year, and although the rise in nonagricultural man-hours was large the shift in the farm-nonfarm proportion was not as big as usual. These two factors together depressed the rise of total private productivity below the rise in private nonfarm productivity. Productivity in the nonfarm sector rose very strongly through 1972 and the first quarter of 1973. Thereafter it essentially leveled out for the remainder of the year, leaving the increase between 1972 and 1973 at 3.1

percent and much less during the year 1973. Productivity growth has a cyclical pattern, tending to be greatest in the period of most rapid expansion, then to slow down as output nears its peak and during the early period of contraction, but to revive before the recession ends.

Some decline in the rate of productivity growth in 1973 was anticipated as the economy passed beyond its period of most rapid expansion. The degree of the slowdown was unexpectedly great, however, considering that output at the beginning of the year was still more than 2 percent below its conventionally estimated potential. A number of relevant factors were at work:

1. Many industries had trouble achieving large output gains because it was hard to obtain raw and intermediate materials, such as chemicals, steel, paper, and copper. Capacity utilization in basic materials-producing industries was pushed to a postwar high as a consequence of surging demand after several years in which additions to capacity had been low. Capacity utilization in fabricating industries was not so high. Estimates of capacity utilization in manufacturing vary, but in any case output was limited by the lack of materials (Table 10). The shortage of some materials was aggravated by large exports which resulted from the foreign boom, the depreciation of the dollar, and the maintenance in the United States of price ceilings below world price levels.

The shortages of basic materials apparently did not prevent a large rise of manufacturing output and of productivity in manufacturing. We say "apparently" because the manufacturing figures are derived in a different way from that used for the nonfarm output figures, and the two may not be consistent. Nevertheless, the basic materials shortages may have prevented a still further rise of output and employment in manufacturing; and it may have diverted a higher proportion of the enlarged number of workers into nonmanufacturing industries, where productivity was lower and where the influx of workers depressed productivity further. As noted earlier, inventory accumulation was low most of last year, and a larger rise in manufacturing output might have permitted more normal ratios of stocks to sales.

2. The 1973 work force consisted to an unusual degree of new entrants to the labor force and reentrants—chiefly women and young people, all of whom on the average tend to work in less productive occupations than adult males with work experience.

3. An unusually high rate of turnover of workers occurred during 1973. A large number of people quit each month, and a large number of people were newly hired. This meant that a high proportion of the people in each job category were new to that work, if not to the labor force, and required training and experience before they became normally productive. Furthermore, this would give employers an incentive

to maintain a somewhat larger work force than they would otherwise require, as assurance against the departure of experienced workers.

4. Another factor that may have acted to restrain the rise in output per man-hour was the behavior of average weekly hours. As noted before, weekly hours in the private nonfarm sector remained virtually level throughout the year. Increases in man-hours resulting from increased hours rather than from increased employment will usually lead to a rise in output per man-hour, since a smaller proportion of total man-hours is lost to start-up and shut-down routines. In 1972, 35 percent of the increase in man-hours resulted from a longer workweek. In 1973, however, only 5 percent of the increase in man-hours in manufacturing was attributable to longer working hours.

TABLE 10.—*Aspects of capacity utilization, selected years, 1948-73*

Period	Capacity utilization (percent)				Percent of manu- facturers needing more capacity	Ratio of unfilled orders to ship- ments in durable goods manu- facturing	Percent of companies reporting		
	FRB manufacturing			FRB major materials			Wharton manu- facturing	Slower deliv- ery of materials	60 days or longer for commit- ments for materials
	Total	Primary processing	Advanced processing						
1948.....	92.7	98.1	89.8	87.9	92.4	(1)	(1)	32	(1)
1953.....	95.5	94.3	96.1	87.3	92.3	(1)	(1)	31	53
1955.....	90.0	93.7	87.7	89.8	90.9	(1)	4.27	66	63
1959.....	81.4	82.7	80.7	81.5	82.2	(1)	3.44	60	66
1965.....	89.0	91.1	87.8	90.7	90.2	47	3.12	67	64
1966.....	91.9	92.1	91.8	91.2	95.9	50	3.51	73	71
1967.....	87.9	85.7	89.1	86.8	92.9	45	3.38	44	65
1968.....	87.7	86.8	88.1	89.5	94.7	43	3.27	53	64
1969.....	86.5	88.5	85.4	90.7	96.0	45	3.13	65	63
1970.....	78.3	81.5	76.5	86.6	88.3	42	2.90	51	55
1971.....	75.0	79.3	72.7	85.8	85.6	31	2.59	48	54
1972.....	78.6	84.6	75.4	90.2	90.0	35	2.59	63	57
1973 <sup>2</sup> .....	83.0	89.8	79.4	94.9	95.8	49	4.30	88	78

<sup>1</sup> Not available.

<sup>2</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>3</sup> Average of first 3 quarters.

<sup>4</sup> Based on seasonally adjusted data through November.

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), Department of Commerce, and Wharton School of Finance.

Our experience in 1973 raises the question whether we were at "potential" even though output was, on the average for the year, 2¾ percent below the commonly measured figure of "potential" output. Being at potential does not mean that output cannot be raised further. In 1973, although employment was still rising rapidly, output increased slowly and the rate of productivity increase sagged and actually fell in the second and fourth quarters. A more rapid rise in output would probably have required an even more rapid increase of labor input, if it had been available, and would have depressed labor productivity further.

The conventional measurements of potential assume that the labor force and productivity rise, and that weekly hours of work decline, along an esti-

mated smooth trend from a period in which the unemployment rate was about 4 percent. A recent calculation by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, (*Monthly Labor Review*, December 1973) using these elements, leads us to the estimate that potential was growing by 4 percent per annum after 1969 if we assume that output was at potential in the second quarter of 1969. On this basis, actual output was about 2 percent below potential in 1973. What the experience of 1973 suggests, however, is that potential does not grow year by year at a constant rate. It is a simplification to assume that the labor force, hours of work, the stock of capital, the availability of supplies from abroad, and other determinants of potential move smoothly and continuously. Reliance on a reasonable simplification of this kind is inevitable for inferring the level of potential for those future years about which we have as yet no detailed evidence. But for the years that are past, and probably also for a period immediately ahead, we know more and should be able to do better than read the level of potential off the smooth trend. Looking at it in this way, it seems reasonable to say that the conditions peculiar to 1973 held "actual potential" below the trend, without at the same time saying that in the future the actual potential will always be below the trend derived from past data.

## THE BEHAVIOR OF PRICES

During 1973 prices rose more rapidly than at any time since the Korean war. From December 1972 to December 1973 the consumer price index (CPI) rose 9 percent and the wholesale price index 18 percent. The comprehensive GNP deflator rose 7 percent from the fourth quarter of 1972 to the fourth quarter of 1973. Its 8 percent annual rate of increase in the fourth quarter of last year was far above the rise projected by the Administration a year ago.


There is no simple explanation for this price behavior which was the most extraordinary in almost a generation and which confounded the Council and most other economists alike. The simultaneous upsurge in demand in the United States and in foreign countries, the shortfall in agricultural production of 1972 and early 1973, the decline in the international exchange value of the dollar, the unexpected capacity problems in materials industries, the increases in petroleum prices late in the year as a result of the Arab oil embargo, the shifting character of domestic price controls—all of these tell part of the story of last year's inflation. Chapter 3 deals with the Economic Stabilization Program and Chapter 4 with the problems of energy and agriculture. The present section touches briefly on some of the broad measures of prices and wages, chiefly in the context of the national income accounts.

Price behavior in the private sector of the economy, as measured by the deflator for private GNP, shows the same broad pattern as the overall GNP

Chart 3

## Changes in Selected Price Measures

PERCENT CHANGE FROM PRECEDING YEAR



SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.



deflator. The rate during 1973 was substantially above the high rates during 1969 and 1970, but the differences between 1973 and 1969-70 are greatly narrowed when attention is focused on the private nonfarm deflator alone (Table 11). Similarly, because farm and food prices have greater weights in the wholesale and consumer price indexes, the latter show larger increases from 1972 to 1973 than the private nonfarm deflator (Chart 3).

TABLE 11.—*Changes in gross national product price deflators, selected periods, 1948 to 1973*  
[Percent change; seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Period	Total GNP	Private GNP	Private nonfarm GNP	Nonfinancial corporations
1948 to 1973 average <sup>1</sup> .....	2.7	2.4	2.5	2.1
1968 IV to 1969 IV .....	5.3	5.0	4.8	2.8
1969 IV to 1970 IV .....	5.3	4.8	5.3	5.1
1970 IV to 1971 IV .....	3.6	3.1	2.9	1.6
1971 IV to 1972 IV .....	3.3	3.2	2.5	2.9
1972 IV to 1973 IV <sup>1</sup> .....	7.1	7.1	5.5	<sup>2</sup> 4.4

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>2</sup> Estimate by Council of Economic Advisers.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (except as noted).

Table 12 brings together changes during 1972 and 1973 for the major indexes and some of their components. The acceleration in the advance of prices is evident throughout the indexes, but the sharp advances in prices of farm products, food, and energy products dominate the extraordinary price behavior of last year.

The role of import prices is also noteworthy. The price deflator for imports rose 26 percent during 1973. If these rising import prices were merely passed through dollar for dollar to final purchasers in the United States, they would have accounted for about one-fourth of the rise in prices paid by U.S. purchasers in 1973.

The farm deflator rose 54 percent from the fourth quarter of 1972 to the corresponding quarter of 1973, reflecting exceptional increases in the first 3 quarters of the year. The great increase in U.S. farm and food prices began in 1972 as a reaction to the reduced world output caused by adverse weather in several parts of the world. The single most important shortfall occurred in the Soviet Union and led that country to enter world markets for extremely large quantities of food and feed grains. Poor weather in other countries also contributed to the tightening of world food markets, and the United States, as the major source of additional supplies, was faced with a huge increase in demand.

The sharp increase in demand continued in 1973. Rising incomes in this country contributed to an increase in the demand for food, especially during the first part of the year. International events again added to the demand pressures on U.S. food supplies. Two devaluations of the dollar in a 15-month period, followed by further depreciation in the dollar exchange rate after February, added to the export demand for U.S. food commodities, as

TABLE 12.—*Changes in selected price measures, 1971 IV to 1973 IV*  
[Percent; seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Price measure	1971 IV to 1972 IV	1972 IV to 1973 IV	1973 <sup>1</sup>			
			I	II	III	IV
<u>Implicit GNP price deflator:</u>						
Total GNP <sup>2</sup> .....	3.3	<sup>3</sup> 7.1	6.1	7.3	7.0	<sup>3</sup> 7.9
Private nonfarm GNP.....	2.5	<sup>3</sup> 5.5	4.3	6.0	4.5	<sup>3</sup> 7.0
Farm GNP.....	22.9	54.2	50.6	75.8	107.4	3.0
<u>Consumer price index:</u>						
All items.....	3.5	8.4	6.1	8.4	9.1	9.9
Food.....	5.2	19.4	18.6	20.2	24.6	14.5
Nonfood items.....	2.9	5.2	3.2	5.1	4.4	8.2
Energy <sup>4</sup> .....	2.9	12.8	8.2	11.6	5.7	27.0
Other nonfood.....	3.0	4.5	2.5	4.1	4.7	6.8
<u>Wholesale price index:</u>						
All commodities.....	5.6	17.3	17.4	22.7	18.8	10.7
Farm products and processed foods and feeds.....	11.4	31.0	49.1	41.2	49.9	-6.8
Industrial commodities.....	3.5	12.0	6.5	15.2	6.5	20.5
Energy <sup>5</sup> .....	5.6	46.0	12.8	41.3	22.2	133.2
Other industrials.....	3.3	8.2	5.9	12.6	4.9	11.3

<sup>1</sup> Changes from preceding quarter.

<sup>2</sup> Includes general government not shown separately.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>4</sup> Includes gasoline and motor oil, fuel oil and coal, and gas and electricity.

<sup>5</sup> Includes fuels and related products and power.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), and Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics)

did the widespread and strong economic expansion abroad. Exports of agricultural commodities rose sharply from \$9.4 billion during 1972 to \$17.5 billion in 1973, a development which was instrumental in the sharp increase in U.S. farm commodity prices.


Last year saw a continuation of the major changes in agricultural policy that were initiated during 1972 to further the expansion of supplies and thus restrain price increases. Farm and food product prices, nevertheless, reached new highs during the year. Wholesale farm product prices in December, although 12.4 percent below the August peak, were 36 percent above their level a year earlier, while retail food prices were 20 percent higher. Although the expansion in acreage lifted gross farm-food production, the production of livestock products declined slightly, and with exports higher, there was a 2.5 percent reduction in food supplies reaching consumers. Disruptions in the pattern of supplies occasioned by the controls created serious shortages during the third quarter of the year.

## COMPENSATION AND UNIT LABOR COSTS

The slowdown in productivity growth during 1973 was accompanied by a quickening of the rate of increase in compensation per man-hour. As a result, unit labor costs rose sharply and contributed to substantial price increases in the private nonfarm economy (Chart 4). Nevertheless, preliminary data suggest that these price increases fell short of the increase of unit

Chart 4

## Productivity, Compensation, and Unit Labor Costs in the Private Nonfarm Economy



NOTE.—DATA RELATE TO ALL PERSONS.

SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

labor costs in the same sector. This is true even though real compensation per man-hour—money compensation deflated by the consumer price index—is likely to have suffered a small decline instead of having risen as it usually does.

Wage rate adjustments under major collective bargaining agreements were substantially lower in 1973 than in 1972. For the first year of the contract, increases averaged 5.8 percent, down from 7.3 percent in 1972; the slowdown for wages and benefits combined was a little smaller. (See Chapter 3 for further treatment of wage rates.)

Wage changes under such bargaining agreements are limited in scope because only one-fourth of all workers are unionized and only one-half of these are covered by large contracts. A useful indicator of wage rate behavior is the Labor Department's index of adjusted average hourly earnings, which is applicable to all private nonfarm industries. The index holds constant overtime hours in manufacturing and industry mix, but it does not cover fringe benefits or compensation of employees other than

production workers, and it is sensitive to the occupational composition of the work force within industries, which tends to be related to age and sex.

From 1972 to 1973 the adjusted earnings index rose 6.2 percent, essentially the same increase as from 1971 to 1972. Although last year's increase was less than that of 1971, the index has shown a good measure of stability during the past 6 years (Table 13). Monthly data suggest some step-up in the rate of increase in the second half of 1973, although within the year the figures tend to be rather erratic. However, compensation per man-hour in the private nonfarm sector increased by 7.6 percent in 1973, the largest increase in more than 20 years. This acceleration was attributable mainly to a large rise in what is labeled benefits in Table 13, the major part of which in 1973 came from the increase in employers' social security taxes in the first quarter.

TABLE 13.—*Components of percent change in compensation per man-hour in the private nonfarm sector, 1965-73*

Period	Production workers			Employees other than production workers	Benefits, all employees	Compensation per man-hour, all employees
	Hourly earnings <sup>1</sup>	Overtime in manufacturing	Industry shifts			
Change from preceding year:						
1965.....	3.7	0.1	0.0	-0.4	0.2	3.6
1966.....	4.0	.3	.2	.7	.6	5.8
1967.....	4.6	- .3	- .4	.9	.0	5.6
1968.....	6.6	.2	- .5	.9	.3	7.5
1969.....	6.6	- .1	.2	- .3	.3	6.7
1970.....	6.7	- .2	- .6	.9	.4	7.2
1971.....	7.0	- .1	- .4	- .3	.8	7.0
1972.....	6.3	.3	- .2	.0	.4	6.8
1973 <sup>2</sup> .....	6.2	.1	.3	.1	.9	7.6

<sup>1</sup> Adjusted for overtime in manufacturing and interindustry shifts.

<sup>2</sup> Preliminary.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

From 1972 to 1973 labor costs per unit of output (unit labor costs) rose by 4.4 percent, or much more than the 2.6 percent rise in 1972. The acceleration in the increase of unit labor costs resulted partly from rising hourly labor costs and partly from a reduced rate of increase in productivity.

### *Nonfinancial Corporations*

Table 14 brings together for nonfinancial corporations the components of annual price change over the past few years. Although it constitutes a convenient set of accounts for examining prices, it does not permit one to draw inferences regarding causation. However, the previous remarks about factors underlying changes in productivity and hourly compensation would also be applicable here. The reader should keep in mind that the price deflators are not the equivalent of prices charged by corporations. The deflators apply only to the value added in production by nonfinancial corporations and not to the cost of goods and services purchased by corporations.

TABLE 14.—*Changes in prices, costs, and profits per unit of output for nonfinancial corporations, 1970 to 1973*

[Percent change]

Item	1970 to 1971	1971 to 1972	1972 to 1973
<b>Percent change per unit of output:</b>			
Prices.....	3.1	2.3	3.6
Employee compensation.....	1.6	2.7	3.9
<i>Compensation per man-hour.....</i>	<i>7.2</i>	<i>6.8</i>	<i>7.6</i>
<i>Output per man-hour.....</i>	<i>5.5</i>	<i>4.0</i>	<i>3.7</i>
Other costs.....	3.5	— .3	.0
Capital consumption allowances.....	4.0	1.5	.0
Indirect business taxes <sup>1</sup> .....	5.0	—2.4	.0
Net interest.....	—1.6	.0	.0
Profits <sup>2</sup> .....	12.6	6.0	9.9
Percent change in output.....	3.5	7.4	7.8

<sup>1</sup> Also includes business transfer payments less subsidies.

<sup>2</sup> Before taxes and including inventory valuation adjustment.

Note.—Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

The deflator for corporate output rose 3.6 percent from 1972 to 1973 after a 2.3 percent rise in the preceding year. Rising unit labor costs and profits plus inventory valuation adjustment account for all of last year's price rise. Nonlabor costs per unit, which make up about 22½ percent of price, showed little overall change; this was essentially the pattern of change from 1971 to 1972. The faster rise in unit labor costs last year in comparison with the year before reflected an acceleration of the rise in compensation per man-hour and a somewhat smaller increase in output per man-hour. Profits per unit rose quite sharply for the third straight year, but they still remained below the average level from 1964 through 1968.

The 10 percent rise in profits per unit of output and the 8 percent rise in output yielded a 19 percent rise in aggregate profits of nonfinancial corporations, the largest since 1959. Profits of domestic financial corporations rose somewhat faster, and profits originating abroad rose still more. The latter consist of earnings of foreign branches and affiliates remitted to U.S. parent corporations. Part of the increase in profits originating abroad was attributable directly to the depreciation of the dollar.

The profits mentioned thus far refer to profits inclusive of the inventory valuation adjustment (IVA). If this adjustment is excluded, the increase in reported or book profits was considerably greater: 31 percent, rather than 19 percent, for nonfinancial corporations. In 1972 the IVA resulted in a downward adjustment of \$7 billion in book profits; last year the corresponding downward adjustment was \$17 billion.

The IVA has been an integral part of the national income and product accounts since they were first established. The adjustment is made because

the profits that companies report are strongly affected by the accounting methods they use. Most companies rely on the first-in-first-out method. Under this system, when prices of purchased goods are rising, the prices at which purchases are charged to costs will ordinarily be less than the prices of goods in ending inventories. The effect is to reduce the cost of goods sold and to raise profits. The amount by which profits are inflated under such accounting procedures is analogous to capital gains resulting from inflation, which are not included in the calculation of national income. In the national accounts this correction is applied to the valuation of inventory change on the product side and affects proprietors' income and profits on the income side.

Although the share of profits plus IVA as a percentage of gross product originating in nonfinancial corporations rose for the third year in a row, the 1973 share was still lower than in any year from 1947 through 1969 (Table 15). Last year's increase in the profit share was matched by a decrease in all costs except employee compensation: indirect business taxes, capital consumption allowances, and net interest. The last two have shown a strong secular increase; and, as indicated below, they are partly responsible for the decrease in the profit share.

Over the postwar years depreciation laws and regulations have undergone many changes—in the direction of liberalization—that have influenced the level of profits. Holding constant these methods of calculating depreciation would still leave the 1973 profits share low in comparison to the years from 1947 to 1969. For example, according to a special analysis of the Commerce Department, if one used historical costs for the valuation of assets, service lives of assets equal to 85 percent of the Treasury Department's Bulletin F, and the double declining balance method of depreciation, the 1973 ratio of corporate profits to output would be raised by 0.3 percentage point, whereas for the 1947–69 period it would be essentially unchanged. A further allowance for interest, a return on capital whose importance has risen over the postwar years, would narrow the difference between 1973 and the 1947–69 average even more but would still leave the 1973 profit ratio lower by 2.7 percentage points. (Estimates for 1973 are those of the Council.)

Most companies use historical costs for calculating depreciation, and for the most part the Commerce Department accepts in the national accounts the depreciation reported for tax purposes. The current value of output should reflect current prices, and costs of production should reflect current costs. If depreciation is standardized with replacement rather than historical costs, last year's profit share would be reduced by 2.0 percentage points. In terms of depreciation calculated with replacement costs the spread in profits between 1973 and the 1947–69 average is considerably greater than the spread that reflects the use of historical costs.

The share accounted for by employee compensation, which as a rule has moved countercyclically, was unchanged from 1972 and was exceeded only

in 1970. Employee compensation consists of wages and salaries as well as of supplements, most of which are made up of employers' contributions for social insurance and for private pension and welfare funds. If all supplements to wages and salaries are excluded from employee compensation, the wage and salary share appears to have declined each year since 1970 and to be well below the postwar average of 59 percent. The 9 percent share accounted for by supplements was far above the average of 5.7 percent.

TABLE 15.—*Distribution of gross product originating in nonfinancial corporations, 1947-73*

[Percent]

Period	Total	Compensation of employees		All other costs				Profits <sup>2</sup>
		Total	Wages and salaries	Total	Capital consumption allowances	Indirect business taxes <sup>1</sup>	Net interest	
1947-----	100.0	65.9	62.8	14.8	4.8	9.3	0.7	19.4
1948-----	100.0	63.9	61.0	14.5	5.0	8.8	.7	21.6
1949-----	100.0	63.8	60.7	16.1	5.9	9.5	.8	20.1
1950-----	100.0	62.4	58.7	15.5	5.7	9.2	.6	22.1
1951-----	100.0	63.1	59.2	15.1	5.8	8.7	.6	21.7
1952-----	100.0	64.8	60.9	16.1	6.2	9.2	.7	19.1
1953-----	100.0	65.9	61.9	16.6	6.6	9.3	.7	17.4
1954-----	100.0	65.9	61.5	17.6	7.7	9.1	.8	16.6
1955-----	100.0	63.9	59.5	17.5	7.9	8.9	.7	18.6
1956-----	100.0	65.3	60.7	17.7	8.0	9.0	.7	16.9
1957-----	100.0	65.6	60.6	18.6	8.4	9.3	.9	15.8
1958-----	100.0	65.9	60.8	19.9	9.1	9.7	1.1	14.2
1959-----	100.0	64.7	59.3	19.1	8.7	9.3	1.0	16.2
1960-----	100.0	65.5	59.8	19.7	8.9	9.7	1.1	14.8
1961-----	100.0	65.1	59.3	20.4	9.2	9.9	1.3	14.5
1962-----	100.0	64.3	58.2	20.8	9.7	9.8	1.4	14.9
1963-----	100.0	63.9	57.7	20.9	9.7	9.8	1.4	15.2
1964-----	100.0	63.3	57.1	20.8	9.5	9.8	1.5	16.0
1965-----	100.0	62.6	56.3	20.4	9.4	9.5	1.6	17.0
1966-----	100.0	63.2	56.5	20.0	9.3	8.9	1.8	16.8
1967-----	100.0	64.0	57.2	20.9	9.7	9.1	2.1	15.1
1968-----	100.0	64.2	57.2	21.2	9.7	9.3	2.2	14.7
1969-----	100.0	65.7	58.4	21.8	9.9	9.3	2.5	12.5
1970-----	100.0	66.9	59.1	23.3	10.4	9.8	3.1	9.8
1971-----	100.0	65.9	57.8	23.4	10.5	9.9	3.0	10.7
1972-----	100.0	66.2	57.7	22.8	10.4	9.5	2.9	11.1
1973 <sup>3</sup> -----	100.0	66.3	57.3	22.0	10.0	9.2	2.8	11.7

<sup>1</sup> Also includes business transfer payments less subsidies.

<sup>2</sup> Before taxes and including inventory valuation adjustment.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary.

Note.—Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

### *Changes in Real Income*

In an evaluation of the year it is important to know whether the net effect of economic developments resulted in an increase or decrease in the economic well-being of the people. There are many different aspects to economic well-being, some of which are difficult or impossible to measure. Even with measurable dimensions of welfare, such as income, subjective reasons lead people to apply different weights to increases in income obtained by different recipients. There is no one statistic that is universally accepted as a measure of economic well-being.

Two measures of changes in income that receive particular attention are real per capita disposable personal income (DPI) and real net spendable weekly earnings for a worker with 3 dependents. From the fourth quarter of 1972 to the fourth quarter of 1973 real per capita DPI increased by 2.4 percent, whereas the real net spendable weekly earnings series declined by 3.1 percent.

Real per capita DPI, as published by the Commerce Department, refers to personal income less Federal and State income taxes; this is deflated by the deflator for personal consumption expenditures and the result is divided by the population. Personal income, which is net of deductions for personal contributions for social insurance, includes income in cash and kind; transfer payments as well as wage and other income earned in current production; and imputed income. Disposable personal income was somewhat low in 1972 because of the overwithholding of taxes, which were subsequently refunded in 1973.

The real net spendable weekly earnings series of the Labor Department reflects earnings of production workers in the private nonfarm economy. The average hourly earnings of all private nonfarm production and nonsupervisory workers listed on payrolls are multiplied by the average weekly hours of these workers to obtain average weekly earnings. The payroll and Federal income tax liability is computed on the assumption that these earnings are realized through the year and that the worker is married, has three dependents, and no other income. The weekly tax liability (which excludes State income taxes and which was unaffected by the overwithholding of Federal incomes taxes) is subtracted from the weekly earnings data to obtain net weekly earnings, which are then deflated by the consumer price index to obtain real net weekly spendable earnings. The Labor Department makes similar calculations for single persons.

As noted above, from the fourth quarter of 1972 to the fourth quarter of 1973 the change in per capita real DPI exceeded that of real net spendable weekly earnings by 5.5 percentage points. About 30 percent of this difference is explained by differential movements of after-tax income of the two series. The disposable personal income series rose 10.8 percent, compared to a rise of 9.2 percent in the net earnings of all production workers. Slightly more than half of the aggregate difference occurred because the number of production and nonsupervisory workers on private nonfarm payrolls grew faster than the total population: 4.0 percent for the former and only 0.7 percent for the latter. The remaining difference is due to the different price deflators: the deflator for personal consumption expenditures rose 7.4 percent during the period, while the CPI rose 8.4 percent.

The consumer price index, which is used to deflate the spendable earnings series, reflects weights as of 1960–61, whereas the DPI series uses current expenditure weights. One consequence is that food, whose relative importance in consumer budgets has tended to decrease over time, has a heavier



weight in the CPI than in the deflator. Also, the personal consumption expenditures deflator excludes and the CPI includes mortgage interest, which rose very rapidly last year. On the other hand, an alternative PCE deflator using fixed 1967 rather than current weights rose almost  $\frac{1}{2}$  percent more than the regular PCE deflator during 1973.

The spendable weekly earnings series as a measure of well-being may have a downward bias in periods of strongly rising employment. When economic opportunities are abundant, many married women, students, and retirees enter the labor force. On the average these groups have less training, are likely to earn less than the average hourly wage, and are more likely to work less than a full workweek. Both factors will tend to depress the average weekly earnings of those employed, although each worker has gained in economic well-being. There is also a tendency for multiple jobholdings to increase in periods of strong demand, which would have a similar effect. In addition, the spendable earnings series treats each worker as a family head, when in fact the number of employed persons per family may rise, especially in a period when total employment is rising rapidly, as in 1973.

### FISCAL POLICY IN 1973

After supporting the expansion of general business activity in 1972, fiscal policy moved toward restraint in 1973. This was accomplished by the successful control of expenditures. Deferrals, cutbacks, or terminations of non-essential programs helped keep Federal outlays at more than \$3 billion below the \$250 billion target for fiscal 1973 presented in the January 1973 budget. Receipts, on the other hand, rose more than was anticipated, partly because of unexpectedly high rates of inflation. With outlays moderately lower and receipts considerably higher than projected, the unified budget deficit for fiscal 1973 turned out to be \$14 billion, rather than the \$25 billion projected a year ago.

In January 1973 the Administration presented a budget of \$256 billion in receipts and \$269 billion in outlays for fiscal 1974. Since then, the estimate of receipts has been raised to \$270 billion, and projected outlays have been raised to \$274½ billion, the result being an estimated deficit of \$4½ billion in the unified budget. On the full-employment basis, however, a surplus of \$4 billion is estimated for fiscal 1974, compared to an approximate balance projected a year ago. In fiscal 1973 the budget showed a full-employment deficit of about \$2 billion.

### FEDERAL EXPENDITURES

On the national income accounts (NIA) basis, actual Federal expenditures rose from \$245 billion in calendar 1972 to \$265 billion in calendar 1973 (Table 16). The increase of 8 percent was smaller than the 10½ percent rise from 1971 to 1972. Last year was the first time since 1969 that Federal expenditures grew less rapidly than GNP.

About \$8 billion of the growth in expenditures from calendar 1972 to calendar 1973 was due to the 20 percent increase in benefits from old age, survivors, and disability insurance that went into effect in October 1972, and to the liberalization of retirement and entitlement provisions at the start of 1973. Federal purchases of goods and services rose much less last year than from 1971 to 1972. All of last year's rise in purchases is accounted for by pay increases for civilian and military employees. A 5.1 percent increase in the wages and salaries of Federal employees took effect in January 1973 and was followed by a 4.8 percent rise in October, but the simultaneous reduction in Federal employment (including the Armed Forces) caused Federal payrolls to rise by only 5 percent. The other half of total Federal purchases of goods and services, purchases from the private sector, changed little after a 7 percent rise the year before.

Grants-in-aid to State and local governments rose by \$3½ billion in 1973, when general revenue sharing had its first full year of operation. The general revenue sharing program, enacted in 1972, provides from \$6.0 to \$6.5 billion of grants-in-aid each year through calendar 1976. About \$10 billion has been distributed to more than 38,000 State and local governments from December 1972 through December 1973. About half of this amount had been authorized for 1972. The initial planned-use reports filed by most of the recipient units of government indicate that approximately half of them would spend shared revenues in such a way as to relieve tax pressures.

TABLE 16.—*Federal Government receipts and expenditures, national income accounts basis, calendar years 1972–73*

[Billions of dollars]

Receipt or expenditure category	1972	1973	
		January 1973 budget projection <sup>1</sup>	Actual <sup>2</sup>
Federal Government receipts.....	228.7	251.6	265.4
Personal tax and nontax payments.....	107.9	108.7	114.5
Corporate profits tax accruals.....	37.8	42.6	49.8
Indirect business tax and nontax accruals.....	19.9	20.8	21.0
Contributions for social insurance.....	63.0	79.6	80.1
Federal Government expenditures.....	244.6	265.6	264.7
Purchases of goods and services.....	104.4	106.3	106.9
Defense.....	74.4	72.8	74.2
Other.....	30.1	33.6	32.7
Transfer payments.....	82.9	96.6	95.4
Grants-in-aid to State and local governments.....	37.7	42.1	41.2
Net interest paid.....	13.5	15.6	15.9
Subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises.....	6.1	5.2	5.4
Surplus or deficit (—).....	—15.9	14.0	.6

<sup>1</sup> January 1973 projected percent changes applied to revised 1972 actual data.

<sup>2</sup> Preliminary.

Note.—Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Office of Management and Budget.

It is interesting to note that after rising by 24 percent from 1971 to 1972 the increase in personal tax and nontax receipts of State and local governments was halved from 1972 to 1973, even though increases in personal income were slightly larger in the latter period. General revenue sharing may well have contributed to this change.

The new program has also allowed a number of long delayed but high priority projects for capital improvement and construction by State and local governments. A 3-year decline in real public construction outlays stopped last year. More recently, general revenue sharing funds have been relied upon more and more to meet the current operating costs of human resource and economic development programs, primarily in public education, public safety and health, as well as in environmental protection, conservation, and public transportation. In sum, the financial stability, vitality, and independence of State and local governments has been increased noticeably by the general revenue sharing program.

### FEDERAL RECEIPTS

Federal receipts (NIA) grew from \$229 billion in calendar 1972 to \$265 billion in calendar 1973 (Table 16). The 16 percent increase was twice the rate of growth of expenditures. Little more than one-fourth of this increase can be attributed to a change in tax rates or in tax structure. For the most part, receipts grew automatically because of the increase in the various tax bases provided by the real growth of GNP and by inflation.

Compared to the January 1973 NIA estimates, personal tax and nontax receipts turned out to be higher in 1973, partly because the accelerated inflation affected personal incomes and partly because individuals permitted their Federal income taxes to be overwithheld at the same rate as they had in 1972. The projection of NIA receipts at the start of last year assumed that individuals would reduce their withheld taxes in order to bring about a closer balance between 1973 withholdings and 1973 tax liabilities. The estimated reduction of \$3.5 billion did not materialize. Corporate profits tax accruals were more than \$7 billion higher than had been anticipated at the start of the year. The rise in these taxes was due largely to the sharp increase in book profits produced by unexpectedly high rates of price inflation.

The only major discretionary change affecting 1973 receipts occurred in social security (OASDHI) taxes. Social security includes old age, survivors, disability, hospital, and supplementary medical insurance and accounts for most of the Federal receipts included in contributions for social insurance. At the start of 1973 the combined rate for employers and employees was raised from 10.4 percent to 11.7 percent of earnings. Simultaneously the maximum amount of annual earnings subject to the tax was increased from \$9,000 to \$10,800. These two measures together raised OASDHI tax receipts by \$10 billion and thus accounted for over one-quarter of the \$37 billion rise in total Federal receipts from 1972 to 1973. Including the automatic

effect of covered wage and employment growth, total OASDHI receipts rose by about \$14 billion.

By comparison, in 1969 the combined payroll tax rate was 9.6 percent and the maximum amount of earnings subject to the tax was \$7,800. From 1969 to 1973 social security taxes and contributions rose by 67 percent, compared to a rise of 39 percent in employee compensation and an increase of about 21 percent in the consumer price index. In 1969 contributions for social security represented 20 percent of Federal receipts, and OASDHI benefits accounted for 17 percent of Federal expenditures. In 1973 these ratios had risen to 24 and 23 percent respectively.

Rapid growth in the importance of payroll taxes in relation to total taxes lowers the elasticity of Federal receipts with respect to income. The average annual earnings of all covered employees were about \$8,000 in 1973. Those workers whose annual earnings exceeded the 1973 maximum of \$10,800 did not pay more tax when their earnings grew. The periodic increases that have been made in the tax ceiling on covered earnings mitigate the regressive effects of the payroll tax and provide for increased benefits. The latest rise to \$13,200 occurred January 1, 1974.

#### **BALANCES OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET**

As the economy moved towards full utilization of resources from 1971 to 1973, the actual Federal budget balance (NIA) rose from a deficit of \$22 billion to a slight surplus. At the same time, the full-employment budget balance increased about one-third as much as the actual balance, or by \$8 billion. The smaller rise in the full-employment balance reflects the fact that the actual real rate of growth from 1971 to 1973 exceeded the growth rate of potential GNP, which is used to calculate full-employment revenues. The calculations in this report are based on potential growth rates of 4 percent annually in constant dollars.

The traditional calculation of the full-employment budget involves adjusting actual Federal expenditures for those changes in unemployment benefits (normally reductions) which would be expected if the economy were operating at 4 percent unemployment. Apart from this adjustment, full-employment expenditures are assumed to be equal to actual expenditures. To estimate Federal receipts at full employment, one must project the shares in full-employment income of taxable personal income, corporate profits, and wages and salaries. Retrospectively, personal tax and nontax receipts at full employment are then calculated, as are corporate profits taxes and contributions for social insurance, by applying the respective average tax rates observed each quarter to the corresponding tax bases in potential GNP measured in current dollars. Total potential GNP is used as the tax base for indirect taxes. Prospective calculations also take into account changes in tax laws scheduled for future years, as well as a gradual rise in the average tax rate on personal incomes, a rise produced by the growth of incomes subject to progressive rates of taxation.

Comparisons between 1972 and 1973 show that the full-employment balance increased by \$14 billion. On a quarterly basis, however, the increase was uneven; the large rise in social security benefits ahead of taxes in the fourth quarter of 1972 and the phase-in of revenue sharing contributed to the full-employment deficit for that year. Furthermore, if the \$9 billion of overwithholding of individual income taxes that started in 1972 and has persisted since is included in full-employment receipts, as it is in actual receipts, the change amounts to only \$5 billion instead of \$14 billion. In 1972 overwithheld taxes were about \$9 billion, but in 1973 refunds of overwithheld 1972 taxes were offset by overwithholding of 1973 taxes.

The limitations of the traditional measures of potential output were discussed earlier in this chapter. Despite these limitations, the full-employment surplus calculation based on the traditional concept of the potential GNP that is consistent with 4 percent unemployment is useful in the long run for evaluating changes in fiscal policy. At a constant price level, changes in the balance at full employment—whatever consistent definition of full employment one may choose—reflect changes in full-employment expenditures, discretionary changes in tax receipts, that is, those produced by changes in tax laws, and changes in tax receipts along the full-employment path of output under given tax laws. When prices rise over time, changes in the full-employment budget surplus can also be produced automatically. As explained in the next section, this is particularly likely to occur in the short run when unexpected increases in the rate of inflation raise receipts more than expenditures.

#### INFLATION AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET AT FULL EMPLOYMENT

The increase in the Federal full-employment budget surplus from calendar 1972 to 1973 is reduced further if one takes account of the high rates of inflation that materialized in 1973. At the start of that year, the price level measured by the implicit GNP price deflator was expected to continue to rise by about 3 percent during the year, as it had during 1972. In fact, it rose by about 7 percent from the fourth quarter of 1972. Thus, for the year as a whole the level of the deflator was 2 percent above the level that had been assumed in budget planning.

In the short run, Federal receipts respond much more promptly than Federal expenditures to an unexpected increase in the rate of inflation. The bases for most taxes are raised automatically, but less than half of total expenditures will respond within a few months to an increase in the rate of inflation. Thus for each additional 1 percent rise in the price level, full-employment receipts increase by about 1.1 percent, but expenditures grow by perhaps only 0.5 percent in the short run. With the magnitudes of calendar 1973, a price level that is 2 percent higher on the average for the year raises full-employment receipts by around \$3 billion more than expenditures, leaving the full-employment surplus shown in Table 17 higher by that amount for the year than it would have been if the rate of inflation had not grown.

Since these apparent stabilization effects of the budget were called forth by an unexpectedly high rate of inflation, higher than in the past, they cannot be attributed to the fiscal policies intended at the start of the year. Rather, they may be regarded as part of the automatic stabilizing component of fiscal policy. Before one can infer changes in discretionary fiscal policies by comparing the full-employment balances of 1972 and 1973, the full-employment budget surplus for 1973 should first be adjusted for the rise in the rate of inflation from 1972 to 1973, even though the adjustment cited above is only a first approximation.

TABLE 17.—*Actual and full-employment Federal and State and local government receipts and expenditures, national income accounts basis, calendar years 1969–73*

[Billions of dollars; seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Calendar year	Federal Government			State and local government			Combined surplus or deficit (—)
	Receipts	Expenditures	Surplus or deficit (—)	Receipts	Expenditures	Surplus or deficit (—)	
<b>Actual:</b>							
1969.....	197.3	189.2	8.1	119.7	119.0	0.7	8.8
1970.....	192.0	203.9	—11.9	135.0	133.2	1.8	—10.1
1971.....	198.9	221.0	—22.2	152.3	148.3	4.0	—18.1
1972.....	228.7	244.6	—15.9	177.2	164.0	13.1	—2.8
1973 <sup>1</sup> .....	265.4	264.7	.6	194.8	183.8	11.0	11.6
1972: I.....	222.9	236.6	—13.8	166.2	157.8	8.4	—5.4
II.....	225.4	244.4	—19.0	175.9	160.8	15.2	—3.9
III.....	229.6	237.0	—7.4	175.3	165.9	9.5	2.0
IV.....	236.9	260.3	—23.4	191.2	171.6	19.6	—3.8
1973: I.....	253.6	258.6	—5.0	190.2	176.4	13.9	8.9
II.....	262.4	262.4	.0	192.8	181.2	11.5	11.6
III.....	269.5	265.6	4.0	196.0	185.7	10.4	14.3
<b>Full-employment:<sup>2</sup></b>							
1969.....	198.4	189.6	8.8	119.9	119.0	.9	9.7
1970.....	206.7	202.7	4.0	140.4	133.2	7.2	11.2
1971.....	216.5	218.6	—2.1	159.5	148.3	11.2	9.1
1972.....	234.9	242.6	—7.7	182.5	164.0	18.5	10.8
1973 <sup>1</sup> .....	269.5	263.7	5.8	198.0	183.8	14.2	20.0
1972: I.....	230.2	234.3	—4.1	173.0	157.8	15.2	11.1
II.....	232.6	242.3	—9.7	181.6	160.8	20.8	11.1
III.....	236.6	235.0	1.6	180.5	165.9	14.6	16.2
IV.....	240.1	258.7	—18.6	195.0	171.6	23.4	4.8
1973: I.....	258.4	257.3	1.1	192.4	176.4	16.0	17.1
II.....	265.9	261.2	4.7	195.2	181.2	14.0	18.7
III.....	272.4	264.6	7.7	198.8	185.7	13.1	20.8

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>2</sup> Over-withholding of personal income taxes is not included in full-employment receipts.

Note.—Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Office of Management and Budget, and Council of Economic Advisers.

## THE STATE AND LOCAL AND THE COMBINED BUDGET BALANCES

As shown in the preceding table, the actual balance of State and local government receipts and expenditures grew rapidly, from \$4 billion in calendar 1971 to \$11 billion in 1973. Last year's surplus amounted to almost 6 percent of total receipts.

Relationships among Federal transfers to State and local governments and the budget surpluses and tax efforts of these units have grown closer

since general revenue sharing was introduced in October 1972. For instance, of the \$3 billion received for the third entitlement period under general revenue sharing in April and July 1973, it is estimated that almost half is being spent to reduce taxes or prevent an increase in taxes. With State and local spending rising at a somewhat accelerated rate of 12 percent from 1972 to 1973, the surplus of State and local governments declined progressively during 1973.

This decline is somewhat more pronounced if one estimates the full-employment budget surplus for State and local governments. Here essentially the same procedure is used as in estimating the Federal budget. Only a few differences arise. Full-employment receipts from contributions for social insurance are assumed to be equal to the actual social insurance contributions received by State and local governments, since these programs cover only State and local employees and therefore do not fluctuate cyclically. Full-employment expenditures are assumed to be equal to actual expenditures, since unemployment benefits enter the national accounts only as Federal expenditures.

The difference between these full-employment receipts and expenditures yields the crude estimate of the full-employment budget balance of State and local governments used in this report for the analysis of fiscal policy. More refined estimates might take into account that some State and local expenditures vary automatically with cyclical conditions. There is also some evidence that tax rates tend to be raised when the gap between actual GNP and potential GNP widens. The average tax rates at full employment may therefore deviate systematically from the actual tax rates, contrary to the assumption made in estimating full-employment receipts. Nevertheless the State and local budget calculated in this way does give a better estimate of the stance of overall fiscal policy than the actual budget.

The full-employment budget balance of State and local governments can be added to the comparable balance of the Federal Government to obtain a rough indicator of the combined fiscal policy changes generated by all layers of government. The result shows that although State and local governments reduced their full-employment budget surplus in 1973 the combined budget surplus still rose by \$9 billion—from \$10.8 billion in 1972 to \$20.0 billion in 1973, on a national income accounts basis. If increases in the full-employment budget surplus produced by an unexpected rise in rates of inflation are not regarded as “discretionary” but as part of the automatic stabilizers, particularly at the Federal level, the increase in the full-employment surplus for all levels of government combined would be reduced to about \$6 billion. However, if overwithholding is included in Federal receipts for 1972, the full-employment surplus shows a decline from 1972 to 1973. As indicated in Chapter 1, the Council believes that overwithholding should be omitted from the calculation of full-employment receipts. Viewed in this manner, therefore, the full-employment surplus on a combined governmental basis indicates a shift toward restraint from 1972 to 1973, but the shift is less than in the Federal budget alone.

## MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS

For more than a decade, money GNP has tended to grow in a higher proportion than the narrowly defined money supply ( $M_1$ ) but in the same proportion as both the broadly defined money supply ( $M_2$ ) and privately held liquid assets as defined in Table 18. However, even with reasonable allowances for lags—with a 2-quarter lag of the growth of GNP behind the growth of  $M_2$  and of privately held liquid assets—deviations from these relationships of proportionality have been large in some years. A reduction in the rate of growth of these aggregates tends to have a moderating effect on the growth of money GNP, even if for some purposes the short-run deviations from long-run relations are uncomfortably large.

TABLE 18.—*Changes in aggregate monetary measures and gross national product, 1968 to 1973*  
[Percent change; seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Half year	$M_1$ (currency, plus demand deposits)	$M_2$ ( $M_1$ plus time deposits <sup>1</sup> )	Private liquid asset holdings <sup>2</sup>	Adjusted credit proxy <sup>3</sup>	GNP
1968: First half.....	6.5	7.5	8.2	5.4	10.4
Second half.....	8.4	10.4	10.0	12.6	7.8
1969: First half.....	6.2	6.3	6.9	3.2	7.6
Second half.....	2.2	.6	3.0	-1.5	5.6
1970: First half.....	5.5	4.8	5.3	4.4	4.6
Second half.....	6.0	10.7	8.0	10.7	4.4
1971: First half.....	8.9	14.9	11.9	10.5	11.4
Second half.....	4.3	7.8	9.1	8.5	7.3
1972: First half.....	6.9	10.8	12.3	11.7	11.0
Second half.....	8.6	10.9	12.5	11.1	10.2
1973: First half.....	7.4	9.1	13.1	14.4	12.5
Second half <sup>4</sup> .....	4.8	8.5	9.2	8.2	10.0

<sup>1</sup> Time deposits at commercial banks other than large certificates of deposit.

<sup>2</sup> Holdings of private nonfinancial investors: Currency, demand deposits, time deposits (including CD's) and savings accounts in commercial banks and thrift institutions, U.S. Government securities (savings bonds and short-term), and commercial paper.

<sup>3</sup> Consists of member bank deposits, bank-related commercial paper, Eurodollar borrowings of U.S. banks, and certain nondeposit items.

<sup>4</sup> Preliminary.

Note.—Half year changes are based on data for last quarter in each half year.

Using data for the last month of each half year would yield for the two halves of 1973 7.8 and 3.7 percent, respectively, for  $M_1$ , and 9.3 and 7.9 percent for  $M_2$ .

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

Appraising the effect of a change in the money supply on money rates of interest, particularly appraising its effects in the longer run, is a matter of some complexity because money rates depend not only on the "real" yield of the available physical resources, measured as if the general price level remained constant, but also on the inflation premium which lenders insist on receiving and borrowers are willing to pay. The immediate effect produced by a high rate of increase in the money stock is to increase the supply of credit; but such a policy also tends to increase the expected rate of



inflation and thus to raise the demand for credit. However, both the demand and the supply also depend significantly on real factors which would make for positive yields from investment even if these were estimated on the basis of an unchanging general price level.

Because the demand for credit continued to rise rapidly in 1973, upward pressures on interest rates were strong and rates at year-end were well above their levels at the start of the year (Chart 5). From December 1972 to December 1973 the Treasury bill rate rose from 5.1 to 7.4 percent, the prime commercial paper rate from 5.5 to 9.1 percent, and the rate on long-term bonds of the Federal Government from about 5.9 to 6.4 percent; the FHA mortgage yield from loans on new homes climbed from about 7.6 to 8.9 percent. Until late August the stock market declined, then it rose until October without fully recovering the earlier loss. After October, stock prices fell again, leaving a substantial net decline for the year as a whole. It is hard to tell to what extent the reduction in the market value of stock equities was caused by rising interest rates and to what extent by the rising uncertainty about profits, an attitude at least partly occasioned by the energy crisis late in the year.


### *Monetary Policy*

Monetary policy in 1973 applied somewhat more restraint than the year before, since it was aiming for a gradual return to a sustainable rate of growth in demand and output. According to preliminary estimates, from the fourth quarter of 1972 to that of 1973,  $M_1$  grew by 6.1 percent,  $M_2$  by 8.8 percent, and the stock of privately held liquid assets by 11.2 percent. For the preceding year these figures had been 7.7, 10.9, and 12.4 percent respectively. By the last quarter of 1973 the current growth of money GNP was reduced to about 9 percent at an annual rate from an 11.7 percent rate in the fourth quarter of 1972, a 15.2 percent rate in the first quarter of 1973, and rates of 9.9 and 10.6 percent in the second and third quarters of the year.

As market interest rates rose, deposits at commercial banks became less attractive than alternative open market assets, a financial market condition reminiscent of 1969. Contrary to the 1969 practice, however, when ceilings on large certificates of deposit (CD's) were set below open market interest rates—a move causing outflows of funds from commercial banks—measures were taken to ensure that commercial banks could compete for funds in the open market. The ceilings on large CD's (\$100,000 and over) maturing in less than 90 days had been removed in 1970, and the restrictions on large CD's maturing in 90 days or more were lifted in May 1973. In addition, the Federal Reserve Board in conjunction with other Federal regulatory agencies increased the maximum interest payable on time and savings deposits in July. Ceilings on CD's with maturities of at least 4 years and minimum denominations of \$1,000, but not more than \$100,000, were eliminated at the same time. In November, however, Congress passed legis-

lation requiring ceilings on all CD's of less than \$100,000. The volume of large CD's increased from \$44.4 billion in January to \$67.0 billion in August, a sharp contrast to the sizable decline in 1969.

**Chart 5** **Interest Rates**



SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, AND STANDARD & POOR'S CORPORATION.

However, steps were taken to keep credit expansion within bounds. The supply of reserves through open market operations was kept at a level where commercial banks had to borrow heavily from the Federal Reserve discount window to acquire additional reserves. The Federal funds rate, a good barometer of money market conditions, rose to about 11 percent in September from about 5½ percent at the beginning of the year.

Marginal reserve requirements on large CD's and on bank-related commercial paper were also raised from 5 to 8 percent in May to increase the effective cost of raising funds. As loans financed through large CD's continued to accelerate, these marginal reserve requirements were raised again in September, this time to 11 percent. The new regulation meant an additional \$465 million in required reserves for the banking system. Commercial banks raised the prime lending rate to a record 10 percent in response to the higher effective cost of large CD's and strong credit demand. The volume of large CD's outstanding declined from \$67 billion in August to about \$63 billion in December. The rapid rise of business loans at commercial banks came to an end. As a result, there occurred in September and October a significant rise in business borrowing by means of the placement of commercial paper by dealers in the market.

Recognizing these developments, the Federal Reserve Board lowered the marginal reserve requirement on large CD's and bank-related commercial paper from 11 to 8 percent in December. The move lowered the effective cost to banks of obtaining additional funds through the sale of large CD's and bank-related commercial paper and prevented short-term interest rates from rising even higher.

### *Long-Term Financing*

Long-term financing by corporations was lighter in 1973 than in 1972 but showed a substantial increase in the final quarter (Table 19). The reduction was partly a reflection of the large rise in internally generated funds. In the first 3 quarters of 1973 corporate profits after taxes plus capital consumption allowances were on average 16 percent greater than the annual average for 1972. Along with rising long-term rates, this contributed to the decline in bond market activity, while declining stock prices made financing through equity issues less attractive.

With the rise in profits slowing down after midyear, and with requirements for new capacity continuing to increase, scheduled new bond offerings rose substantially in the fourth quarter. These upward pressures on interest rates were counterbalanced when investors attempted to reshuffle their portfolios in favor of longer-term securities in response to declining short-term rates.

### *Mortgage Markets*

During the first 3 quarters of 1973 the sharp increase in short-term open market rates and the gap between those rates and yields on most types of

TABLE 19.—Offerings of new security issues, 1972-73

[Billions of dollars]

Period	Corporate securities			State and local government securities
	Total	Bonds and notes	Stocks	
1972.....	40.8	27.8	13.1	22.9
1973.....	33.1	21.8	11.3	22.8
1972: I.....	9.8	6.9	2.9	5.9
II.....	11.2	7.4	3.8	6.1
III.....	9.2	6.1	3.1	5.4
IV.....	10.6	7.4	3.3	5.6
1973: I.....	8.2	4.4	3.9	5.6
II.....	8.6	6.2	2.4	5.6
III.....	6.4	4.6	1.7	5.1
IV.....	9.9	6.6	3.3	6.4

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

Note.—Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Sources: Securities and Exchange Commission and *The Bond Buyer*.

savings deposits decreased the net inflow of funds into thrift institutions. The tightness in mortgage markets was less severe than in 1966 and 1969.

In 1972, conditions in credit markets were relatively easy, and net savings flows into thrift institutions were large (Table 20). The rate of this net inflow moderated during the first half of 1973, but it still remained substantial, partly because of unusually large tax refunds. Mortgage repayment flows were also ample. Mortgage loan commitments outstanding at all savings and loan associations reached a record \$15.1 billion in May. As short-term open market rates increased sharply, net savings inflows into thrift institutions excluding interest credited were reduced, and for the duration of the third quarter they turned into net outflows. Savings and loan associations decreased new commitments, borrowed heavily from the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB), and sold liquid assets in order to meet existing commitments. Inclusion of interest credited into the net savings flow would still yield a negative figure for the third quarter, though with seasonal adjustment the sharp diminution from earlier quarters would then leave the net third-quarter flow positive.

The progressive reduction of net savings flows to the thrift institutions tightened conditions in mortgage markets and induced Federal regulatory agencies to take steps to revive this market. In July, maximum interest rates payable on time and savings deposits by thrift institutions were adjusted upward. Also the Federal Home Loan Bank Board lowered liquidity requirements at member institutions, freeing additional funds for mortgage lending. Ceilings on FHA-VA mortgages were raised from 7 to 8½ percent in two steps in order to attract more funds to Government-backed mortgages.

## Assistance to Mortgage Markets

Mortgage markets received substantial support from federally sponsored housing agencies in 1973. These agencies channeled funds from the open market to mortgage markets and thus eased the availability of mortgage credit. In addition, the President announced measures to help the mortgage and housing sector in both the short and long run.

Federal Home Loan Bank advances outstanding to member savings and loan associations reached \$15 billion in December, compared to \$8 billion at the end of 1972. The \$7 billion net increase may be compared with a rise of \$4 billion during 1969.

TABLE 20.—*Net savings flows at thrift institutions, 1968–73*

(Billions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted)

Period	Net savings flows <sup>1</sup>
1968	3.9
1969	-1.8
1970	6.2
1971	26.3
1972	29.9
1973 <sup>2</sup>	10.2
1972: I	10.7
II	7.1
III	6.3
IV	5.9
1973: I	7.8
II	3.6
III	-3.7
IV <sup>2</sup>	2.5

<sup>1</sup> New deposits less withdrawals. Excludes interest credited.

<sup>2</sup> Estimate by Council of Economic Advisers.

Note.—Thrift institutions consist of mutual savings banks and federally insured savings and loan associations.

Sources: National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, and Federal Home Loan Bank Board (except as noted).

The Federal National Mortgage Association, the largest financial intermediary serving mortgage markets, bought \$6.1 billion worth of mortgages during 1973, an increase of \$2.4 billion over 1972.

The President announced a series of legislative and administrative proposals in September 1973 in order to ease the tight mortgage market conditions existing at the time. First, the Federal Home Loan Banks were authorized to make forward commitments up to \$2.5 billion at a predetermined rate of interest to member savings and loan associations. Second, the Government National Mortgage Association was authorized to reactivate the Tandem Plan and offer to buy up to \$3 billion of mortgages from various types of financial institutions. Third, Congress was requested to raise the maximum amount of a mortgage loan insurable by the Federal Housing Administration, a step which would make Government-backed loans available to a larger number of home buyers who cannot obtain conventional mortgage loans. The President also sent to the Congress several recommendations designed to make it easier for home buyers to obtain mortgages in the future.

## CHAPTER 3

# Inflation Control Under the Economic Stabilization Act

Public Law 93-28, the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, as amended, requires that the *Economic Report of the President* include a section "describing the actions taken under this title during the preceding year and giving his assessment of the progress attained in achieving the purposes of this title." This chapter is intended to fulfill that requirement. There is, however, no intent to represent the description of the control regulations contained herein as legally binding interpretations.

**P**PRICE AND WAGE CONTROLS, administered by the Cost of Living Council (CLC) under authority of the Economic Stabilization Act, remained in effect throughout 1973 but underwent several substantial modifications. After the move to Phase III early in the year, the changes were in the direction of greater stringency. They reflected the strain placed on the program when economic forces caused a sharp acceleration of inflation beginning early in the year and when this in turn generated public and political demand for changes in the nature of controls. However, the extent to which these changes could contain the inflation in 1973 was limited by the serious risks of disrupting markets and adversely affecting supply.

## THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM IN 1973

As 1973 began, economic conditions seemed propitious for a substantial modification in the Phase II system of controls. The rate of inflation had been moderate in 1972. The consumer price index (CPI) rose 3.4 percent during the year (Table 21). Wage increases had moderated from their very high rates of early 1971, a sign that expectations of future price increases had diminished. Industrial price increases had slowed to a 2.9 percent annual rate in the last half of 1972. ~~Thus~~ The fiscal and monetary policy supplemented by the controls program had ~~approximately~~ achieved their interim goals by the end of 1972.

TABLE 21.—*Measures of price and wage change during the Economic Stabilization Program*

[Percent change; seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Price or wage measure	Freeze and Phase II Aug. 1971 to Jan. 1973	Phase III Jan. 1973 to June 1973	Second freeze and Phase IV June 1973 to Dec. 1973	Calendar year during which controls were in effect throughout	
				Dec. 1971 to Dec. 1972	Dec. 1972 to Dec. 1973
PRICES					
Consumer price index:					
All items.....	3.3	8.3	9.6	3.4	5.8
Food.....	5.6	20.3	18.6	4.7	20.1
All items less food.....	2.7	5.0	6.9	3.0	5.6
Commodities less food.....	2.0	5.2	5.2	2.5	5.0
Services.....	3.5	4.3	8.4	3.6	6.2
Personal consumption expenditures deflator <sup>1</sup> .....	2.4	6.7	8.1	2.7	7.4
Wholesale price index:					
All commodities.....	5.7	24.4	14.3	6.5	18.2
Farm products and processed foods and feeds.....	13.3	49.8	8.8	14.4	26.7
Industrial commodities <sup>2</sup> .....	2.9	14.4	17.2	3.6	14.8
Finished goods, consumer and producer <sup>3</sup> .....	1.8	11.7	21.4	2.2	15.6
Crude and intermediate materials <sup>3</sup> .....	3.7	16.2	14.1	4.5	14.1
WAGES <sup>4</sup>					
Average hourly earnings, private nonfarm economy <sup>5</sup> .....	6.1	6.3	7.6	6.3	6.7
Average hourly compensation:					
Total private economy <sup>1</sup> .....	6.3	8.4	7.6	6.8	8.0
Nonfarm <sup>1</sup> .....	6.5	8.2	7.9	6.9	8.1
Average hourly earnings, private nonfarm economy <sup>1</sup> <sup>5</sup> .....	6.2	5.8	7.5	6.5	6.7

<sup>1</sup> Percent changes based on quarterly data: 1971 III to 1972 IV (col. 1), 1972 IV to 1973 II (col. 2), 1973 II to 1973 IV (col. 3), 1971 IV to 1972 IV (col. 4), and 1972 IV to 1973 IV (col. 5).

<sup>2</sup> Includes a small number of items not shown separately.

<sup>3</sup> Excludes foods but includes a small number of items not in the industrial commodity index.

<sup>4</sup> Average hourly earnings are for production workers or nonsupervisory employees and average hourly compensation for all employees.

<sup>5</sup> Adjusted for overtime (in manufacturing only) and interindustry shifts.

Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics) and Council of Economic Advisers.

With excess capacity declining at the end of 1972, there was a clear possibility that continuation of the Phase II controls program would interfere increasingly with production, productivity, and investment decisions, and raise administrative costs, especially if the economy continued to expand as expected.

### PHASE III (January 11 to June 13, 1973)

Against this backdrop it was decided to modify the price and wage controls program to make it more consistent with the further reduction in excess capacity foreseen at the time and also move toward the Administration's goal of eventually ending the controls. The new regimen of controls, known as Phase III, involved some basic changes in the regulations (Table 22).

(A more detailed presentation of the regulations of Phase III, the subsequent freeze, and Phase IV can be found in the *Quarterly Reports* of the Cost of Living Council.) To reduce the mounting delays and costs entailed in submitting requests for price increases, having them reviewed, and seeking detailed interpretations of increasingly complex rules, the basic principles of regulation developed during Phase II were to be self-administered in Phase III. The prenotification requirement was dropped in most sectors of the economy. Report-filing requirements were maintained only for the largest economic units. The Price Commission and Pay Board were absorbed into the staff of the Cost of Living Council; and this staff, together with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enforcement staff, was reduced. The Cost of Living Council retained authority, and subsequently used it, to impose specific, mandatory regulations where restraint seemed lacking, but in most sectors of the economy the system was not mandatory without further action by the CLC.

An important reason for the change to a self-administered program was the need for flexibility in administering the standards for wage and price behavior. Phase II had, in fact, provided important instances of flexibility, but the changed economic conditions suggested that even more was needed. In one of its first public pronouncements, on February 26, the newly formed Labor-Management Advisory Committee to the CLC made the point that no single standard or wage settlement can be expected to apply throughout the economy at any one time. This aspect of Phase III was important in the decision of leaders of labor, many of whom had earlier withdrawn from participation in the program, to join the Phase III effort.

The profit margin regulations were also modified in Phase III. The basis for calculating the profit margin limitation was changed to increase the number of fiscal years from which a firm could choose the 2 years they used in calculating their base. To permit firms to benefit from productivity increases if they practiced price restraint, the profit margin limit was waived if a firm's average price increase was no more than 1.5 percent in a year. A third change was to permit price increases "necessary for efficient allocation of resources or to maintain adequate levels of supply." Price changes were thus allowed in instances where economic growth led to exceptional demand pressures in particular markets and the alternative was shortages.

The Construction Industry Stabilization Committee and the Committee on Interest and Dividends were continued, and new committees were established in the field of health care. Special criteria were established for public utilities, making the program voluntary and ending the requirement that regulatory agencies obtain from the CLC certification that their actions accorded with Phase III controls.

Special steps were also taken to counter problems emerging in the food sector. Increases in farm product prices had led to a 7.1 percent annual



TABLE 22.—*Regulations of the controls program, Phases II, III, and IV*

Program	Phase II Nov. 14, 1971 to Jan. 11, 1973	Phase III Jan. 11, 1973 to June 13, 1973	Phase IV Aug. 12, 1973 to date
<b>General Standards:</b>			
Price increase limitations...	Percentage pass-through of allowable cost increases since last price increase, or Jan. 1, 1971, adjusted for productivity and volume offsets. Term limit pricing option available.	Self-administered standards of Phase II.	In most manufacturing and service industries dollar for dollar pass-through of allowable cost increase since last fiscal quarter ending prior to Jan. 11, 1973.
Profit margin limitations...	Not to exceed margins of the best 2 of 3 fiscal years before Aug. 15, 1971. Not applicable if prices were not increased above base level, or if firms "purified" themselves.	Not to exceed margins of the best 2 fiscal years completed after Aug. 15, 1968. No limitation if average price increase does not exceed 1.5 percent.	Same years as Phase III, except that a firm that has not charged a price for any item above its base price, or adjusted freeze price, whichever is higher, is not subject to the limitation.
Wage increase limitations...	General standard of 5.5 percent. Exceptions made to correct gross inequities, and for workers whose pay had increased less than 7 percent a year for the last 3 years. Workers earning less than \$2.75 per hour were exempt. Increases in qualified fringe benefits permitted raising standard to 6.2 percent.	General Phase II standard, self-administered. Some special limitations. More flexibility with respect to specific cases. Workers earning less than \$3.50 per hour were exempted after May 1.	Self-administered standards of Phase III. Executive compensation limited.
<b>Prenotification:</b>			
Prices.....	Prenotification required for all firms with annual sales above \$100 million, 30 days before implementation, approval required.	After May 2, 1973, prenotification required for all firms with sales above \$250 million whose price increase has exceeded a weighted average of 1.5 percent.	Same as Phase II except that prenotified price increases may be implemented in 30 days unless CLC requires otherwise.
Wages.....	For all increases of wages for units of 5,000 or more; for all increases above the standard regardless of the number of workers involved.	None.	None.
<b>Reporting:</b>			
Prices.....	Quarterly for firms with sales over \$50 million.	Quarterly for firms with sales over \$250 million.	Quarterly for firms with sales over \$50 million.
Wages.....	Pay adjustments below standard for units greater than 1,000 persons.	Pay adjustments for units greater than 5,000 persons.	As Phase III.
Special areas.....	Health, insurance, rent, construction, public utilities.	Health, food, public utilities, construction, petroleum.	Health, food, petroleum, construction, insurance, executive and variable compensation.
Exemptions to price standards.....	Raw agricultural commodities, import prices, export prices, firms with 60 or fewer employees.	Same as Phase II plus rents.	Same as Phase III plus manufactured feeds, cement, public utilities, lumber, copper scrap, long-term coal contracts, automobiles, fertilizers, non-ferrous metals except aluminum and copper, mobile homes, and semi-conductors.

<sup>1</sup> In some of these sectors wages were also exempted.

Source: Cost of Living Council (CLC).

rate of advance in grocery store food prices in the second half of 1972, and substantial increases were in prospect for early 1973. This development was a major threat to the moderate price behavior that had been achieved, as was obvious by comparison with nonfood prices in the CPI, which had slowed to a 3.0 percent annual rate of increase in the last 6 months of 1972. Specific mandatory controls were therefore retained on wages and prices in food processing and distribution in Phase III, a number of additional actions to expand supply were taken, and special committees were established to help coordinate activities that would moderate the increases in food prices. Prices of raw agricultural products continued to be exempt from controls.

By the spring it was clear that three specific assumptions underlying forecasts for 1973 had gone awry. In the first quarter of 1973, retail food prices, propelled by sharply higher farm prices, were already 8.1 percent above the first quarter of 1972, substantially higher than the average 3 percent increase for the first half of 1973 over the first half of 1972 that had been forecast by the Department of Agriculture in October 1972. The official year-over-year forecast had been revised by February to 6 percent; by May an earlier expectation that food prices would level off after mid-year began to appear less certain.

The second assumption concerned economic expansion in early 1973 both in the United States and abroad, which turned out to be much more robust than had been anticipated. In December 1972, after consultation with member countries, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) forecast that combined real GNP for its seven largest member countries, including the United States, would grow at an annual rate of 6½ percent from the second half of 1972 to the first half of 1973. By July 1973, before second quarter data were complete, the OECD had revised the estimate upward to 8¼ percent, considerably above the growth rate of potential output. The unexpected boom was widespread; the actual rate of growth exceeded earlier forecasts in all but one of the countries. At no time since the early 1950's had such strong expansion occurred simultaneously in the larger member countries of the OECD, and much more pressure was placed on capacity than had been anticipated. (For a view of the effect that rapid expansion had on inflation in OECD countries see Table 23.)

The rate of expansion in the United States from the second half of 1972 to the first half of 1973 was fairly close to that predicted by the Administration, but the rise in output in the first quarter of the year was steeper than expected. Production in some industries was pushed to its limit sooner than had been anticipated, and unexpected shortages also occurred in others.

The third change in the economic outlook concerned the large decline in the foreign exchange value of the dollar. The realignment of exchange rates on February 12 resulted in a decline in the value of the dollar of about 5 percent with respect to our major trading partners. From March 19, when

TABLE 23.—*Changes in consumer prices in OECD countries, selected periods, 1958–73*

[Percent change, annual rates]

Price item and country	1958–59 Average to 1970–71	Dec. 1971 to Dec. 1972	Dec. 1972 to Sept. 1973 <sup>1</sup>
<b>All items:</b>			
United States.....	2.6	3.4	8.7
Other OECD countries:			
Canada.....	2.5	5.1	9.7
Japan.....	5.5	5.3	18.1
France.....	4.2	6.9	7.6
Germany.....	2.6	6.5	6.8
Italy.....	3.6	7.4	12.0
United Kingdom.....	3.9	7.6	9.5
All other OECD countries.....	4.0	7.1	11.0
<b>Food:</b>			
United States.....	2.4	4.7	23.9
Other OECD countries:			
Canada.....	2.4	7.2	17.0
Japan.....	6.0	4.9	20.1
France.....	4.0	8.7	10.7
Germany.....	2.0	8.1	5.4
Italy.....	3.1	8.8	12.6
United Kingdom.....	3.7	7.5	13.4
All other OECD countries.....	4.0	7.8	11.4
<b>Nonfood items:</b>			
United States.....	2.7	3.0	4.5
Other OECD countries:			
Canada.....	2.6	4.1	6.2
Japan.....	5.0	5.6	16.4
France.....	4.3	5.8	5.5
Germany.....	3.1	5.6	7.4
Italy.....	4.0	6.4	11.2
United Kingdom.....	4.0	7.7	7.2
All other OECD countries.....	4.0	6.7	10.4

<sup>1</sup> Seasonally adjusted. Latest date for which comparable data are available.

Sources: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

other major countries ceased to support fixed exchange rates, to July it depreciated about 6 percent more. In a setting of rapidly rising demand and output here and abroad, the extent to which these exchange rate changes, and those that had previously occurred in the 14 months after the Smithsonian Agreement in December 1971, affected prices in the United States was substantial.

Prices of imported commodities and products, which were exempt from controls at first sale into U.S. commerce, rose as a direct result of the dollar depreciation. U.S. exports were drawn out of the country at a faster rate than before because they were less expensive in foreign currencies. The increased export demand raised domestic prices of commodities, like raw agricultural products, that were exempt from controls. In a growing number of cases products that remained under price controls were also drawn out of the country, because prices of internationally traded goods had risen markedly, and controls prevented U.S. prices from rising to world market levels.

In the first few months of Phase III the observed increases in the consumer price index and wholesale price index (WPI) showed that inflation was accelerating for some important raw commodities—important not only

to the economy but also in the sense that consumers' attention focused on them. Retail meat prices rose 5.4 percent a month in February and March as a result of a 39 percent increase in livestock prices from November 1972 to March 1973. Shortages of crude oil pushed up retail fuel oil prices 7.4 percent during the winter, and a rise of 16 percent in prices of lumber and wood products was reflected in the prices of new houses and indirectly influenced the prices of existing houses.

As a result of the acceleration of inflation, pressures mounted to tighten controls. While Phase II controls were in effect, public opinion polls indicated that the popularity of a return to a price freeze diminished, reaching a point in the last quarter of 1972 at which only about a fourth of the population supported such an action. According to the polls, however, by February, 43 percent of the population wanted a return to a price freeze, and these pressures for stricter controls were reflected within the Congress. One effect of this sentiment among the public and the Congress may have been to encourage price increases in anticipation of a freeze.

The Administration was sensitive to the growing pressures from consumers and Congress and was also concerned that the acceleration of inflation would undo the gains achieved by slowing the private nonfarm wage rate increases, as measured by average hourly earnings adjusted for inter-industry shifts and overtime in manufacturing, from a peak annual rate of 8.5 percent for the third quarter of 1970 to 5.0 percent for the first quarter of 1973. The situation posed a dilemma for policy makers, however, because the major source of inflation was in commodity markets, in which controls have only limited usefulness. The problems of hides and lumber that were encountered during Phase II had made this apparent. The most effective way to slow price increases for raw commodities is to increase their supply. Numerous actions, detailed in Table 24, were taken by means of agricultural programs, foreign trade policy instruments, and stockpile policies to expand supplies of lumber, agricultural products, metals, and petroleum products. While some of these policies increased supply quickly, others required more time to take effect and had little immediate impact on the rate of inflation.

### PHASE III IS TIGHTENED

The Administration recognized that controls were unlikely to be effective in holding down prices of those consumer goods that are derived almost directly from crude commodities. Nonetheless, in the face of mounting pressure, selected changes in the administration of controls were instituted in order to assure labor and consumers that everything possible was being done to contain price increases. Thus, on March 6, cost justification was required of major producers of crude oil and petroleum products who sought price increases yielding more than a 1 percent yearly addition to their revenues; for increases greater than 1.5 percent prenotification was required. This deterred price increases which would otherwise have been useful

TABLE 24.—*Supply-increasing actions of the Federal Government during 1973*

Commodity	Date of action	Action
Food-----	January 11-----	Direct subsidies ended for farm product exports. Mandatory wheat acreage set-asides suspended for 1973 crop. Grain to be sold from Government CCC reserves. Loans terminated on farm-stored grain. Review of Federal marketing orders initiated to encourage additional supply of fruits and vegetables. Livestock grazing permitted on set-aside acreages. Cabinet-level CLC Committee on Food established. CLC public Food Advisory Committee established.
	January 31-----	Feed grain acreage set-asides reduced for 1973 crop.
	March 8-----	Dairy price supports increased to mandatory minimums.
	March 26-----	Feed grain set-aside acreage further reduced.
	April 5-----	Interagency Task Force established to coordinate grain transportation policies.
	April 19-----	Rice acreage allotments increased for 1973 crop.
	April 25-----	Cheese import quotas increased.
	May 10-----	Import quotas increased on dry milk.
	June 27-----	Temporary export restrictions imposed on oilseed crops.
	July 5-----	Temporary export restrictions extended to 41 categories of agricultural commodities including edible oils, animal fats, and livestock protein feed.
	July 6-----	Exports of food under P.L. 480 reduced to minimum levels.
	July 18-----	Import quotas further increased on dry milk.
	July 19-----	Wheat and feed grain set-asides suspended for 1974 crops.
	August 10-----	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act signed, establishing target price system to support farm incomes.
	August 28-----	Import quotas increased further for nonfat dry milk.
	October 3-----	Agricultural production and food processing given high priority in propane allocation program.
	October 25-----	Fertilizer price decontrolled by CLC; export monitoring system established.
	November 1-----	Butter import quotas increased.
	November 27-----	Sugar import quotas increased.
Metals-----	December 20-----	Loans on 1973 crop wheat called for January 15, 1974 delivery.
	December 21-----	Meat import quotas suspended for 1974.
	April 16-----	President requests authority to sell excess stockpile items; sales of tin, aluminum, lead, zinc, magnesium, rubber, cobalt, manganese ore made throughout the year.
Lumber-----	May 22-----	Reporting requirements imposed for ferrous scrap exports.
	July 2-----	Licensing requirements set up for ferrous scrap exports. Japan agreed voluntarily to limit imports of U.S. ferrous scrap in second half of 1973.
	April 12-----	Japan agreed voluntarily to reduce imports of U.S. softwood logs in second half of 1973.
Petroleum-----	May 15-----	More efficient use of railroad cars as result of ICC changes in rail rates for lumber shipments.
	May 29-----	Increased sales of timber by Forest Service from national forests.
	April 18-----	Mandatory Oil Import Program quotas and tariffs suspended by Presidential order. Unlimited imports of crude oil and petroleum products permitted, subject to license fees on imports above former quota levels.
	August 19-----	Phase IV regulations removed ceiling price from "new" crude oil.
	November 27-----	Ceiling price removed from crude oil from stripper wells.

Source: Council of Economic Advisers.

in encouraging additional supplies from domestic sources and signaling the rising costs of petroleum products to consumers.

Meat prices were also singled out for additional control. Meats account for about one-fourth of the consumer food budget. Consumer complaints about high meat prices had become widespread; there was concern that they would add to inflationary expectations and accelerate wage demands. On March 29, ceilings on prices of red meats at all levels of processing and distribution

were imposed, limiting prices to the highest price level that had prevailed in the preceding 30 days for at least 10 percent of the sales of each meat item. Farm prices of livestock were not controlled directly, but it was expected that beyond some limit livestock price increases would squeeze margins of processors and retailers and thereby constrain what they could pay for livestock. It was recognized that the ceilings, while not binding at the time, would probably become so for a couple of months in the summer and thus create distortions, but after that meat prices were expected to drop below the ceilings. The ceilings were not expected to interfere in any basic way with incentives to expand production, because it was thought that livestock prices were, and would remain, sufficiently high in relation to production costs.

In the late winter and spring, prices of industrial commodities, which had been increasing by about one-third of 1 percent per month in 1972, began rising by somewhat more than 1 percent per month. These large increases reflected the impact of spiraling basic commodity prices here and abroad, stemming from the rapid expansion that occurred simultaneously in major countries and the decline in the foreign exchange value of the dollar. This development signaled the building up of cost pressures, particularly for purchasers of industrial materials, which in turn accelerated a rise in finished goods prices. To slow down the pass-through of these cost pressures, prenotification requirements were reinstated on May 2 for large firms that proposed weighted average price increases 1.5 percent above price levels either authorized or in effect on January 10, 1973.

#### THE FREEZE (June 13 to August 12, 1973)

The disappointingly high rate of inflation in the first 5 months of 1973 continued to arouse public dissatisfaction, and few signs appeared that the inflation would slow significantly in the second half of the year. Congress and the Administration were urged to take stronger actions to contain inflation. In the circumstances it seemed necessary to establish a more stringent controls system than Phase III, but one flexible enough to respond to economic developments. This would be better than being forced into one so comprehensive, rigid, and permanent that it would have adverse effects on the economy.

On June 13, the President announced a freeze on prices, to be followed by a new set of Phase IV controls. The freeze was to last no more than 60 days, ending just as soon as new controls could be put in place. Most prices, but not wages, were prevented from rising above their June 1-8 levels. Dividends and interest rates remained subject to voluntary controls. Rents and raw agricultural products at the first sale were also excluded from the action.

More instances of price increases turned up during the 1973 freeze than in the one begun in August 1971, partly because of the extreme upward

pressures on farm and some major nonfarm commodity prices. Bad weather had reduced worldwide supplies of farm commodities in 1972. Rapidly rising incomes both in the United States and abroad and increased foreign purchasing power, resulting from the dollar devaluation, lifted demand and produced the largest increase in farm commodity prices since World War I. Little could be done through the use of direct controls to stop the price surge without interfering with production and inducing additional exports. The meat price ceilings imposed on March 29 began to interfere with livestock production under these circumstances. Increases in livestock feeding costs arising from the sharp increases in feed costs between midspring and midsummer could not be passed on to packers, who were subject to ceilings, and consequently some livestock producers limited their expansion or cut back production.

Further negative effects on food production resulted from the extension of ceilings in the June 13 freeze action to all food prices except those of farm products at the point of first sale. Feed grain and oilseed prices remained high, stimulated by strong foreign demand. Like meat processors and distributors, processors of other food products requiring these grains and oilseeds, either as feeds or as inputs for further processing, were caught between rising costs and frozen prices. Poultry and egg producers began to cut back production, although not to the extent believed by consumers. Grain millers were especially hard hit by the rapid rise in prices of wheat. Cannery of processed fruits and vegetables also faced cost problems. Their selling prices were based on growers' prices a year earlier, but short supplies had subsequently pushed these prices upward. The well-publicized grocery store shortages during the freeze exemplified the developments in the food industry which hastened the move to Phase IV.

#### PHASE IV (August 12, 1973 to date)

Plans for a fourth phase of the controls program were prepared and either implemented or published for comment a month after the beginning of the freeze. On July 18, Stage A of the Phase IV food regulations was implemented because especially quick action was required in this sector. The new regulations permitted the dollar for dollar pass-through of all farm price increases and decreases except those for cattle, as the beef price ceilings remained in effect until September 10. On July 19 plans for Phase IV were announced and the health industry was returned to Phase III control. The final regulations were announced August 6-10 and put into effect on August 12 for the wholesale, retail, manufacturing, and service sectors.

The regulations adopted in Phase IV were designed to serve a number of ends. The main object, of course, was to slow the rate of inflation. It would be achieved, in part, by postponing some price increases in the expectation that monetary and fiscal policy would slow the rate of growth of demand and perhaps make them unnecessary. It had to be acknowledged, however, that holding prices down could have undesirable effects, among them the

spurring of domestic inflation by encouraging exports and discouraging the investment needed to ensure adequate supply in the long run. Plans for decontrol were also needed to serve the ultimate goal of return to a free market economy.

The considerations gave rise to a Phase IV system that was stricter than that of Phase II, though it contained some regulations developed earlier to deal with specific circumstances in particular industries. Phase IV was stricter than Phase II in three ways.

1. Price increases in manufacturing and service industries were limited to the dollar and cents amount of allowable cost increases, with no add-on permitted to maintain percentage markups.
2. Only cost increases since the last fiscal quarter of 1972 could be used to justify price increases. This rule wiped out some cost justification that had been built up earlier in the controls period.
3. In Phase IV new base prices were established to which actual prices could rise without cost justification; in some industry sectors these new base prices were below those of Phase II.

Special regulations were drawn up for the insurance and petroleum industries. Phase B of the food regulations took effect September 10. New regulations for the health industry were issued on January 16, 1974. The major aspects of Phase IV are summarized in Table 22 and discussed in more detail in the *Quarterly Reports* of the Cost of Living Council.

Phase IV also incorporated a new strategy for achieving a return to free markets: decontrol of selected industries in appropriate cases. Lumber, copper scrap, public utilities, and coal sold to utilities under long-term contracts were decontrolled at the outset. In the administration of Phase IV, each request for price and wage increases is reviewed individually. In suitable cases decontrol has been made contingent on agreements by the firms to expand output or capacity or to limit exports. In these and other instances, exemptions have been subject to a requirement that the firms furnish Government agencies with data on their prices, exports, and investment in new facilities.

Likely candidates for decontrol have been industries producing basic commodities for which there was excess demand, since low domestic prices promoted an unwanted rise in exports, as well as reducing supplies and providing less incentive to expand production. Thus, fertilizers and most nonferrous metals have been decontrolled during Phase IV.

In some sectors where there had not been a build-up of cost pressures, decontrol would not lead to a spurt in prices. No advantages would be gained by applying controls in these cases. Thus rents, which are difficult to regulate for administrative reasons, were exempt from Phase IV controls, as they had been in Phase III, and lumber was decontrolled for similar reasons. Partly for the same reason, both wages and prices were decontrolled in the auto industry, after a new wage contract for auto workers had been signed and



after three of the four automobile companies agreed not to raise prices of 1974 model year cars beyond those already approved by the CLC, unless economic conditions changed drastically.

Prices were decontrolled in other industries: cement, for example, where expanded capacity was needed and a long lead time is required for construction, and where there was some assurance of moderate price performance.

Areas that were decontrolled are still subject to periodic review to make certain that wage and price behavior remains acceptable and that firms are complying with agreements made at the time of decontrol.

## THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROLS

The most obvious question to ask about the controls program is whether it has helped to hold down the rate of inflation. As last year's *Report* noted, the answer to such a question is by no means obvious. A year ago, looking back at 1972, one could say that the rate of inflation had been lower during the controls program than earlier. Yet this was only a superficial answer. The real question was whether the inflation had been less than it would have been without the controls. Some argued that the rate of inflation had been declining before the controls were instituted. A continuation of the decline, they said, did not indicate the effectiveness of the controls but rather their ineffectiveness. This view was also superficial, because no one could be sure that the inflation rate would have continued to decline without the controls.

Last year's *Report* concluded that the controls had probably restrained inflation up to the end of 1972. The fact of the controls, plus their initial success, had reduced inflationary expectations, held down total spending, restrained the tendency to boost wages and prices, and permitted output to rise more rapidly than it would otherwise have done. This interpretation seemed at least to accord with the facts of 1971 and 1972.

The facts of 1973 are, of course, quite different. Price increases for raw commodities were extremely rapid. Farm prices rose at their fastest rate since 1917 and resulted in retail food price increases that accounted for 51 percent of the rise in the CPI during 1973. Another 11 percent of the rise in the index was accounted for by higher prices of energy purchased directly by consumers. The large rise in industrial materials prices also contributed to the rise in retail prices. As a result the rate of inflation did not diminish but increased; it outstripped the rate of the earlier period of controls as well as the rate of earlier periods without controls. But again one should ask what would have happened without controls in 1973? Would prices have risen even more than they actually did?

The answer will never be known with certainty. Still it is more difficult in 1973 than in 1972 to believe that controls have had a significant effect in reducing the rate of inflation. The reason is not simply that the inflation rate

was more than twice as high in 1973. It is partly that the scenarios on which it is usually argued that a controls system might restrain inflation do not seem plausible for 1973. Two different theories of controls might be envisioned.

1. *Equilibrium system.* The controls might either so restrain demand or increase output as to bring demand and supply into balance at a lower price level than would otherwise have prevailed. On the demand side, this might occur as a result of dampening inflationary expectations. On the supply side, because they know that controls preclude paying higher wages and charging higher prices, businesses may try to employ more workers and produce more than they would if wages and prices were uncontrolled and they could achieve larger profits by producing less. Workers may accept the controlled wage and be willing to work at it, even though they would not have been willing to work at it if they had been free to bargain for more.

2. *Disequilibrium system.* This course would imply that programs of control create shortages because at controlled prices, below market-clearing equilibrium prices, buyers want more than producers are willing to supply.

The controls system was not designed to create or deal with a shortage situation. From the beginning of 1973, and indeed throughout most of 1972, about half the prices and wages in the economy were uncontrolled, including farm prices, import and export prices, prices and wages in small business, and wages below \$2.75 per hour (below \$3.50 per hour after May 1, 1973). If controls held down prices and created shortages in controlled sectors, so that people could not spend money there, abundant opportunities existed for spending money in the uncontrolled sectors, where prices could rise. Moreover, and this is most important, many of the controlled sectors either processed or distributed products from the uncontrolled sectors. The controlled prices were margins over the uncontrolled prices. If the margins were held down enough to create a "shortage," which producers tried to fill, their action would pull up the prices of the uncontrolled materials and raise the final price until there was no shortage. This appears to have happened in the food sector during the first half of 1973 and may have contributed to the price increases for imported crude nonfood commodities.

In any case, the machinery of the system was not prepared to withstand acute shortages. That is, there was no enforcement apparatus capable of resisting the price pressures that widespread shortages would have created. Instead, the policy tried to correct shortages, either by expanding supply, or in acute cases by allowing prices to rise.

There were, of course, some shortages; but at the consumer level they were not very evident except temporarily with meat, and at the end of the year with gasoline and fuel oil. They did not cast serious doubt on the proposition that consumer prices were high enough to clear the market; in other words, people who wanted to buy things at those prices could find them.

If the proposition is true, then whether controls restrained the rate of inflation boils down to whether it can be demonstrated that they either re-

strained the rate of spending or increased the rate of production. There can be no doubt that the controls program restrained price increases in many cases. But the question, of course, is whether holding down these prices served to hold down prices on the average or only diverted the inflationary pressure from these particular prices to others. This question returns us to the effect controls may have had on total spending.

It is possible that when specific prices were held down—as they clearly were—consumers did not transfer their spending elsewhere but reduced their total spending. This might not show up as higher savings, because the lower expenditures would also mean lower incomes to someone. It might show up in a lower ratio of spending and income to the money supply, or even in a lower money supply, if at a lower price level the Federal Reserve felt less need to permit monetary expansion. However, as Chapter 2 pointed out, spending increased by an exceptionally large amount in 1973. In fact the increase was exceptional, even when the current and preceding behavior of fiscal and monetary policy is taken into account. Last year was not one in which the rise of spending was inexplicably slow and the controls could have provided a plausible explanation for the slowness. On the contrary, if the controls were holding down spending, its high rate of increase would be very hard to explain. The route by which controls are sometimes thought to hold down spending is through inflationary expectations. If controls make people confident that inflation will be moderate, they are less inclined to spend their money. To some extent this happened in 1972. But before long in 1973 people's confidence that the controls would assure price stability fell to a low point. Polls give much evidence of this sentiment, as well as of the spreading expectation of more inflation.

The supply side of the equation is more uncertain. Controls that held prices down may also have induced businesses to produce and sell more, since they did not have the alternative of profiting by raising prices. However, the increase of output during 1973 was about the same as the average annual increase in the past. Employment rose much more than the average; and output per worker, productivity, rose much less than the average. It is improbable that the controls system did anything to raise productivity. Its effect is more likely to have been in the other direction. The controls also held down U.S. prices relative to export prices, which were uncontrolled, and they encouraged export of some basic materials which, if used for further production in the United States, would have increased output. To an unknown extent this increment to exports was offset by additional imports, particularly of industrial materials, prices of which were not controlled.

So this leaves the question of whether output was increased because the controls program contributed to the rise of employment by holding down wage rates; that is, with the given increase in spending there would be, as a result of controls, more real demand for labor, more employment, more output, and lower prices. But this chain depends on the first link, namely, that the controls held down wages. The controls program undoubtedly restrained

wage increases in many cases, construction wages being an exceptionally important and well-documented instance. But whether they did, in fact, hold down the overall wage level is hard to tell.

At the beginning of 1973, the Administration and a few others believed that the year would be one of only moderate wage increases compared to those of the recent past. This view was based on the fact that wages had gained substantially over the cost of living in 1972 and that wages in different industries seemed in good balance. When consumer prices began to rise rapidly early in 1973, the question arose whether this moderate expectation would be upset, or whether the controls program would prevent such a development.

The wage picture is not clear because the measures of wage rates do not always agree, and no single ideal measure exists. Wage increases in new union contracts were lower in 1973 than in 1972 (Table 25). When fringe benefits are included, the 1973 contract increases were also lower than those of 1972, but not by so wide a margin; fringe benefits rose faster than wages. However, the index of hourly earnings, adjusted for overtime in manufacturing and for interindustry shifts, rose a little more during 1973 than during 1972 (Table 21). This index reflects not only new wage decisions but also the effects of old decisions and their implementation. It also reflects the so-called wage drift as individual workers are reclassified, but it does not reflect the relatively more rapid rise of fringe benefits.

TABLE 25.—*First year wage rate changes in collective bargaining agreements covering 1,000 workers or more, 1970-73*

Type of wage rate action <sup>1</sup>	Percent of workers affected							
	All industries				Manufacturing			
	1970	1971	1972	1973 <sup>2</sup>	1970	1971	1972	1973 <sup>2</sup>
All wage actions.....	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
No wage increase.....	( <sup>3</sup> )	1	3	1	( <sup>3</sup> )	1	2	( <sup>3</sup> )
Increase in wages.....	100	99	98	99	100	99	98	100
Under 1 percent.....		( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )		1		
1 and under 2 percent.....		( <sup>3</sup> )	2	1	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )
2 and under 3 percent.....	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	2	1	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	2	1
3 and under 4 percent.....	1	1	4	4	1	1	2	3
4 and under 5 percent.....	1	1	6	17	1	2	7	5
5 and under 6 percent.....	3	3	20	37	6	4	23	47
6 and under 7 percent.....	17	9	21	18	33	16	26	24
7 and under 8 percent.....	11	5	14	8	18	7	20	7
8 and under 9 percent.....	8	7	7	7	10	9	13	10
9 and under 10 percent.....	5	10	8	2	6	6	1	2
10 percent and over.....	54	61	13	3	24	53	5	( <sup>3</sup> )
Not specified.....	1	1	( <sup>3</sup> )		( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	
Number of workers (thousands).....	4, 675	3, 978	2, 424	5, 004	2, 184	1, 913	913	2, 318
Mean adjustment (percent).....	11.9	11.6	7.3	5.8	8.1	10.9	6.6	5.9
Median adjustment (percent).....	10.0	12.5	6.6	5.5	7.5	10.1	6.2	5.5

<sup>1</sup> Percent of estimated average hourly earnings excluding overtime.

<sup>2</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>3</sup> Less than 0.5 percent.

Note.—Detail may not add to total because of rounding.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The most comprehensive measure we have of what it costs an employer to purchase an hour of labor is the estimate of labor compensation per hour. This measure covers not only wages but also fringes, including the employers' share of social security contributions. Compensation per man-hour of employees and the self-employed in the private nonfarm sector of the economy rose at a more rapid rate during 1973 than during 1972, 8.0 percent in 1973 compared to 7.1 percent in 1972, partly because of the big increase in social security contributions. This rise in compensation occurred while the rate of productivity increase was declining, so that unit labor costs accelerated considerably, from an increase of 2.4 percent during 1972 to an increase of 7.1 percent during 1973. Prices, of course, also rose more rapidly in 1973 than in 1972. Nevertheless, whereas unit labor costs in the private nonfarm economy rose about as much as nonfarm prices during 1972, they rose more than nonfarm prices during 1973. This suggests—but only suggests—that labor compensation was not being held down to an unusual degree, if one considers the factors which affect employers' desire to hire labor, that is, the productivity of labor and the price of the product. Analysis of the probable behavior of wages in relation to a longer list of variables, including the condition of the labor markets, also makes it seem probable that wages rose as much as might have been expected without controls. If so, one might also conclude that the controls over wages did not raise employment and output and so restrain inflation in the demand conditions of 1973.

Despite the uncertainty about whether controls had affected inflation in 1973, no uncertainty exists about another and possibly more relevant proposition. The controls did not prevent a rate of inflation which was large compared to our past history, to the previous year, to our expectations for 1973, and to the goals of the program. This fact need not be interpreted as a criticism of the way the program was designed and managed or as implying a lack of cooperation by labor or business. It simply means that the situation the program ran into was more than it could successfully contend with.

### *Effectiveness During Phase III*

The shift from Phase II to Phase III coincided closely with the acceleration of inflation from its moderate 1972 pace. Phase III was perceived by many, largely because of the fact that it was self-administered, as a signal that controls had come to an end. This is reflected in survey findings that the sharp rise in consumer spending early in 1973 was partly due to expectations that price increases would accelerate. One would naturally like very much to know whether or not this shift released an inflation which had been kept in check by Phase II, and which could have remained in check if Phase II had been continued. Table 26 throws light on this question. It classifies the items in the consumer price index into three categories: (1) Items exempt from control in Phases II and III; (2) items subject to similar regulations in both phases; and (3) items for which the administration of Phase II rules was substantially relaxed in the transition to Phase III. The increase of the inflation rate between Phases II and III was a little

TABLE 26.—*Behavior of items in consumer price index during Phases II and III, classified by type of control applicable*

Item and control status	Relative importance, December (percent of all items)		Percent change, annual rates <sup>1</sup>		Percent contribution to change	
	1971	1972	Phase II Nov. 1971 to Jan. 1973	Phase III Jan. 1973 to June 1973	Phase II Nov. 1971 to Jan. 1973	Phase III Jan. 1973 to June 1973
All items.....	100.0	100.0	3.6	8.3	100	100
A. Items exempt from Phases II and III <sup>2</sup> .....	11.3	11.5	4.4	5.5	13	7
B. Items subject to similar regulations in Phases II and III:						
Food.....	22.2	22.5	6.5	20.3	38	51
Public utilities <sup>3</sup> .....	4.8	4.8	4.2	2.8	5	1
Medical care services.....	5.6	5.6	3.9	3.8	6	2
Mortgage interest rates.....	3.7	3.7	— .8	1.8	— 1	1
C. Items for which Phase II controls abolished or made self-administered: <sup>4</sup>						
Residential rents.....	5.1	5.1	3.8	4.4	5	3
Nonfood commodities.....	32.2	31.8	2.1	6.1	18	22
Services.....	15.2	15.1	3.3	6.2	16	13
Total A+B.....	47.6	48.1	4.8	11.7	61	63
Total C.....	52.4	51.9	2.6	6.0	39	37
Addendum: C excluding gasoline, motor and fuel oil, and coal.....	48.8	48.4	2.6	5.1	36	30

<sup>1</sup> Seasonally adjusted where possible. Major exceptions are property taxes, services, and residential rents.

<sup>2</sup> Major items are houses, used cars, and State and local taxes and user charges.

<sup>3</sup> Though the Phase II requirement for certification was dropped in Phase III, the basic regulations continued in force.

<sup>4</sup> Excludes components included in A and B above and does not take into account the small business exemption.

Note.—Detail may not add to total because of rounding.

Sources: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics) and Council of Economic Advisers.

greater for the first two categories, for which the rules did not change, than for the third category, for which the rules were relaxed. Consequently the first two categories contributed a little more to the inflation of Phase III than they did to the inflation of Phase II. Thus, little evidence can be found that consumer prices rose exceptionally fast in the areas in which the administration of controls was relaxed in Phase III.

This is also largely the case even with respect to the rapid increases in the WPI. Agricultural prices were not controlled under Phase II, so the shift to Phase III presumably had no effect on them. Much of the increase in prices of raw industrial commodities occurred in industries which had profit margins below their permitted ceilings and, in some important instances, those whose product prices at the beginning of 1973 were below Phase II ceilings. There was considerable room for profit margin expansion in industries like steel, primary nonferrous metals, and petroleum. Only a tightening of Phase II rules could have eliminated this gap; but, given worldwide demand and the devaluation of the dollar, such tightening might only have led to a further expansion of exports.

\*            \*            \*            \*            \*            \*            \*

During 1973, in all phases of the controls, there was a marked shift of relative prices. Prices of raw agricultural products and of industrial materials rose very much more than prices of finished goods and services. Undoubtedly this shift would have happened in 1973 without a controls

program. The worldwide lag in agricultural production, for which demand is quite price inelastic, would have caused a relative rise of agricultural prices. Industrial raw materials prices generally rise relative to the prices of finished goods in a boom, and in 1973 the boom affecting the world as a whole was exceptionally strong. Raw agricultural products were exempt from control, and some industrial raw materials were also exempt because they were imported. The controls, particularly the profit margin limitation, held down specific prices and may have compressed the prices representing the value added in processing and distribution, thereby diverting demand to the uncontrolled commodities. (Chart 6 shows changes in the relationship between materials prices and those of finished goods at the wholesale and retail level.) Extension of controls to these uncontrolled items would have meant more exports, less farm output, lower imports of industrial raw materials, less total output, and if not higher prices, at least more shortages.

One of the most constructive aspects of the Economic Stabilization Program, and one of the most valuable effects of the effort to control prices directly, was that it led the Federal Government to redouble its efforts to find ways of increasing supplies in many areas (Table 24). As prices skyrocketed in many sectors—chiefly food, but also lumber and other basic materials—and it became apparent that price controls would be ineffective, if not harmful, attention turned to dealing with the real problem, which was inadequacy of supply. In many cases it was discovered that the Federal Government was itself partly responsible for the limitation of supply.

The leading example is agriculture. The President, concerned with short supplies and rising prices, has brought about a dramatic change in agricultural policy during the past 2 years. The results have been striking: the elimination of many restrictions on agricultural production in the United States; a greater willingness to receive agricultural imports; removal of the subsidies to agricultural exports; and reductions of Government-owned stockpiles of farm products. These changes, more than anything that was done or could be done with direct price controls, are the Government's effective contribution to more stable food prices. Less spectacular, but still important, steps were taken to increase lumber production from the national forests and to sell excess Government stockpiles of industrial raw materials.

In any appraisal of the part the controls program played in checking inflation up to the end of 1973 or subsequently, one of the most obvious benefits must be the mobilized effort to increase supply and remove Government-imposed impediments to supply.



## FAIRNESS OF CONTROLS

A major challenge in the development and administration of controls is the assurance of equity. Whenever the Government has as strong a hand in the distribution of real incomes as it does in a price-wage controls program, many will complain of unfairness. It is rare for anyone to think that he has received his just deserts, and this is especially true where Government

Chart 6

# Changes in Related Wholesale and Consumer Prices

PERCENT CHANGE DURING PERIOD



\*RISE EXAGGERATED BY INCREASE IN REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS PRICES, WHICH ARE BASED ON SPOT MARKET QUOTATIONS NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF TOTAL MARKET IN 1973.  
SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS.



is concerned. Some may very well have been adversely affected by controls, just as others may suffer from the implementation of various other policies. There is no strong objective evidence, however, that the controls operated in a biased manner in 1973.

As should be clear from the preceding discussion, the effect of the controls on relative incomes or relative prices is hard to define. We know what happened during the year but not how much of it was due to the controls.

Several developments in the distribution of income are relevant to the issue of fairness in the economy's performance during 1973. Since controls first went into effect, the share of national income produced in the private sector and going to workers employed there has declined slightly, edging down from 70.6 percent in the second quarter of 1971 to 70.3 percent in the third quarter of 1973. Almost all of this decrease occurred during 1973 and was offset by a rise in the profit share of national income and the income of farm proprietors.

The implication of the relatively unchanged labor share during 1973 is that if workers bought a bundle of goods and services consisting only of those they produced—excluding imports, of course—and weighted in the same proportion as this output, they would have continued to command the same share of national output as they had done previously. And since output grew during the year, even on a per man-hour basis, an unchanged labor share means that workers, before tax changes in 1973, received more goods per hour of work.

The most dramatic event in the distribution of income in 1973 was the extraordinary rise of farm income. In the year ending in the third quarter of 1973 the income of farm proprietors increased by 37 percent, whereas the total national income rose by 12 percent. Net income per farm rose 39 percent, 24 percent in constant dollars. The large rise placed farm proprietors in a favorable position despite controls imposed on meat prices on March 29. Cash receipts from livestock products rose to record highs, but rises in production costs offset a major part of the increase. Nevertheless the higher receipts from farm marketings led to record incomes and an improved relative position for farm families.

## EFFECT OF CONTROLS ON COMPONENTS OF OUTPUT

Throughout 1973 considerable attention was drawn to shortages of goods, particularly in the manufacturing sector of the economy. Purchasing agents' reports that they could not obtain materials became widespread. High demand throughout the economy was the reason most frequently cited for such shortages. In some cases shortages also arose from a diversion of domestically produced supply to export markets, particularly for such materials as chemicals, metals, and lumber. Many shortages—of fertilizers and petrochemicals, for example—were traceable to the limited supply of crude oil

and natural gas. A complex set of factors can be blamed for this situation; the controls program intensified the problem but was not the only cause.

Except for meat and petroleum products, shortages of industrial materials did not carry over noticeably to consumer markets. One reason is that firms were able to substitute to some extent more plentiful materials for scarce ones in the production process, especially in finished durable goods and in the use of packaging materials. Inventories also helped to offset shortages of materials; inventories of some products would probably have been higher if materials supplies had been greater.

Flexibility in the administration of the controls program, enabling administrators to exempt some markets, decontrol others, and allow exceptions to the general rules regarding price increases, helped prevent shortages from becoming more pervasive and acute. Attention was also given to cases in which controls, without limiting current output, might discourage the investment needed to supply future output. The need to stimulate investment was, for example, an important consideration in decontrolling the cement industry and allowing a price increase by the paper industry.

Despite constant reminders by the Administration that it regarded controls as temporary, there was always the danger that the program might result in significant deferral or cancellation of investment plans. Probably the controls introduced an element of uncertainty that affected long-run planning. But the CLC did move to decontrol in important instances where it was shown that controls threatened to limit investment. And many investment plans with long lead times were undoubtedly undertaken on the likelihood that controls would be abolished by the time the new capacity came on stream.

In the agricultural sector the ceilings on meat prices contributed to subsequent reductions in livestock production. That the controls program to some extent limited the quantity of output and the investment required to produce future output is not surprising. Even the anticipation of a controls program can have this effect if producers raise prices, establish new marketing channels, or divert investment from the United States to other countries.

## SUMMARY

We repeat what was said at the outset: the effect of the controls program on the rate of inflation in 1973 cannot be known with certainty either today or ever.

Controls could have worked in many ways, and economists' knowledge of the quantitative relationships determining prices is not so precise as to rule out the possibility that inflation might have been even greater in 1973 without controls. We think it would not have been much greater, however, since with the controls the rate of spending was high relative to the money supply, and output was low relative to the labor supply.

Still no one can disprove the thesis that the controls had a significant effect, although 1973 makes it a hard thesis to believe. Doubts of this kind should

come as no surprise. There is much prior evidence that price and wage controls of the kind tolerated during peacetime in free societies cannot significantly restrain inflation under the supply and demand conditions experienced in 1973.

The effectiveness of controls obviously cannot be judged by 1973 alone. The operation of the controls during 1971 and 1972, bringing about a good balance in the structure of wages, may have helped to avoid a repetition in 1973 of the kind of wage spiral the country was experiencing before August 1971. On the other hand, if controls did hold down prices during 1973, the possibility remains that these prices will catch up in 1974 or later.

## CHAPTER 4

# Energy and Agriculture

**F**OR THE BASIC RESOURCE INDUSTRIES, 1973 was an unusually eventful year. Prices in all major categories of these industries—agriculture, energy, timber, and minerals and metals—rose sharply, even in relation to the rising average level of prices. In some cases additional supplies could not be obtained even at the higher prices. These conditions reflected a worldwide state of affairs.

The growing scarcity of resources in 1973 was a significant departure from the long-term trend. Since World War II prices of basic resources have increased much less than prices generally. Wholesale prices of crude materials, for instance, increased only 13.6 percent from 1947 to 1971, compared to a 53.4 percent increase in wholesale prices of finished goods. During the same period the consumer price index rose 81.3 percent, and the GNP deflator for the private economy 78.2 percent. Prices of basic resources thus declined by a considerable amount relative to prices in the entire economy throughout most of the postwar period.

This downward trend of relative prices began to be reversed in 1972, and in 1973 it changed significantly. Some have interpreted this reversal as an early indication that along with the rest of the world we are entering a new era of increased scarcity of basic resources, during which prices for these materials will rise faster than prices for other products. Others have attributed the reversal to the coincidence of essentially temporary factors. Neither generalization can be conclusively supported at this time.

With the exception of energy, basic resource demands and prices tend to exhibit strong fluctuations. The demand for timber rises when housing construction accelerates, and housing construction is highly cyclical. The demand for minerals and metals is tied closely to the cycle of economic activity, and the agricultural sector is influenced heavily by weather conditions and its own production cycles. Thus the unusual price pressures on basic resources in 1973 are to a significant extent explained by an exceptional combination of economic fluctuations that impinged upon all basic resource industries in the context of high total demand and output.

The reduction in oil exports by several Arab nations focused attention upon a severe shortage of energy resources. But in recent years the market demand for energy has been growing faster than our capacity to produce

it at the existing price. While the oil cutbacks created obvious new short-term problems for the economy, they also precipitated what was emerging as a serious long-run problem.

It would be naive to assume that so fundamental a question as whether or not we are entering a new era of scarcity for basic resources can be answered adequately on the basis of the limited information now available. The question is nevertheless important for the following reasons.

1. Basic resource industries utilize many minerals and metals that ultimately will be exhausted. Because the opportunities to correct faulty public policy and private decisions affecting exhaustible resources are also limited, a high value to society accrues from accurate information on future demands and supplies.
2. Public policy has played a particularly important role in the evolution of basic resource industries. Specific policies in varying degrees inhibited the capacity for adaptability that is inherent in the operation of the market system. During periods of sudden and substantial change in world patterns of production and demand, these industries may therefore experience particularly difficult problems of adjustment.
3. Most basic resource industries involve commodities that are traded very extensively in international markets. The volatility of these markets, the commonly strong cyclical nature of the domestic industry, and the rapidly expanding consumption in foreign countries can combine in such a way as to create significant political and economic tensions between nations. As international markets expand and nations become more economically interdependent, such tensions could become more serious.
4. The production processes in many basic resource industries interact with the environment in an important and complex way that has in the past resulted in abuse of the environment. Public policy to protect the environment in turn interacts with—and in an ultimate sense may well determine—the appropriate public policy toward basic resource industries.

The following sections of this chapter seek to separate the enduring from the transitory factors that shape the Nation's energy and agricultural industries. This is a risky business. In the past the initial stages of new trends have often been dismissed by wise men as unusual, even unique, events; and many an authoritative forecast of an imminent new trend has proved to be based upon random episodes.

## ENERGY

Energy prices have been generally lower in the United States than in other developed countries. Abundant supplies of coal, petroleum, and natu-

ral gas have contributed to the low market prices of these fuels. This situation coupled with relatively plentiful capital, and advanced technology, permitted rapid growth in conversion of fossil fuels to electric power. In addition, a generous depletion allowance and low excise tax rates have helped keep down consumer prices of energy.

Low prices and a high rate of economic growth have encouraged domestic consumption of energy to expand. From 1950 to 1972 U.S. gross consumption of energy increased at an annual rate of 3.5 percent (Table 27). In 1972 the United States consumed about one-third of the world's production of energy. Tables 28 and 29 show the distribution of U.S. energy use by sector and by source. Americans have often been accused of wasting energy, but the low prices prevailing until 1973 provided little reason to economize in its use. Because the price of labor was rising relative to the prices of capital and energy, it paid, both in industry and in the home, to substitute capital and energy for labor.

TABLE 27.—*Gross consumption of energy in natural units, selected years, 1950–72*

Year	Total (quadrillions of Btu's)	Natural gas (trillions of cubic feet)	Petroleum <sup>1</sup> (millions of barrels per day)	Coal <sup>2</sup> (millions of tons)	Hydropower (billions of kilowatt- hours)	Nuclear power (billions of kilowatt- hours)
1950.....	34.0	5.94	6.52	494	103	0.0
1960.....	44.6	12.27	9.89	398	154	.5
1970.....	67.4	21.37	14.70	525	253	21.8
1972 <sup>3</sup> .....	72.3	22.43	16.41	526	282	54.0

<sup>1</sup> Includes petroleum products refined and processed from crude oil, including still gas, liquefied refining gas, and natural gas liquids.

<sup>2</sup> Includes anthracite, bituminous, and lignite coals.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary.

Note.—Data relate to annual totals unless indicated otherwise.

Source: Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines.

TABLE 28.—*Consumption of energy, by user sector and source, 1972*

[Quadrillions of Btu's]

Source	Consumption of energy <sup>1</sup>			
	Total	Industrial	Transporta- tion	Household and commercial
Total consumption.....	59.6	23.2	18.1	18.3
Petroleum <sup>2</sup> .....	29.8	5.8	17.3	6.7
Natural gas.....	19.0	10.6	.8	7.6
Coal <sup>3</sup> .....	4.8	4.4	( <sup>4</sup> )	.4
Electric power.....	6.0	2.5	( <sup>4</sup> )	3.5

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>2</sup> Includes petroleum products refined and processed from crude oil, including still gas, liquefied refining gas, and natural gas liquids.

<sup>3</sup> Includes anthracite, bituminous, and lignite coals.

<sup>4</sup> Less than 0.05 quadrillions.

Note.—While in 1972, 18.6 quadrillion Btu's were used for generating electricity, the electricity so generated represented only 6.0 quadrillion Btu's. This accounts for the difference between 72.3 quadrillion Btu's of gross energy consumption in Table 27 and 59.6 quadrillion Btu's of consumption by user sector.

Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines.

TABLE 29.—*Use of energy inputs for electric power, 1972*

[Quadrillions of Btu's]

Energy input	Total uses <sup>1</sup>
Total uses.....	18.6
Petroleum.....	3.1
Natural gas.....	4.1
Coal.....	7.8
Hydropower.....	3.0
Nuclear power.....	.6

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.


Source: Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines.

Wholesale energy prices in the United States were quite stable, relative to other wholesale prices, during the 1960's. But toward the close of the decade the price of coal began to move upward, and in 1973 petroleum prices increased sharply (Table 30). Consumer prices of energy actually were declining from 1960 to 1972, relative to other consumer prices. For instance, the relative price of gasoline and motor oil fell 17.2 percent between 1960 and 1972 but began to increase steeply near the end of 1973 (Chart 7).

Chart 7

## Consumer Prices of Gasoline and Motor Oil

1967=100



SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

TABLE 30.—*Wholesale prices, all industrial commodities and selected fuels, selected periods, 1950–73*

[1967 = 100]

Periods	All industrial commodities	Coal	Crude petroleum	Gas fuels	Electric power
1950.....	78.0	83.3	83.2	(1)	(1)
1960.....	95.3	95.6	98.6	87.2	101.2
1970.....	110.0	150.3	106.1	103.6	105.9
1972.....	117.9	193.8	113.8	114.1	121.5
1973.....	127.0	218.1	126.0	126.7	129.3
December:					
1972.....	119.4	205.5	114.7	119.2	122.9
1973.....	137.1	240.7	146.2	137.6	135.9

<sup>1</sup> Not available.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

During 1973 the United States also experienced threats of shortages of petroleum and natural gas, and in some areas of the country electric power brownouts and blackouts. Shortages of petroleum intensified late in the year, following an October decision by several Arab nations to cut back crude oil production and to curtail shipments to the United States. By the end of 1973 our once abundant and secure energy supplies seemed to be seriously threatened; and what appeared earlier in the year as a problem turned into a crisis. To conserve scarce petroleum, a variety of restrictions previously unknown to peacetime America had to be adopted. They focused attention on the dependence of the economy on energy, the importance that oil imports have assumed, and the vulnerability of the economy to arbitrary acts by foreign states.

The energy crisis has its roots in events dating back a decade or more. To understand the present situation, it is necessary to examine the factors that have influenced energy supply and use in the United States.

### *Natural Gas*

Since 1954 the Federal Power Commission (FPC) has regulated the wellhead price of all natural gas sold to interstate pipeline companies. The FPC maintained prices at approximately the same level throughout the 1960's. In response to increased exploration costs and constant prices, producers cut back on exploration, so that the ratio of reserves to annual production declined rapidly from over 20 in 1960 to 10.5 in 1972. At the same time, the use of natural gas was expanding rapidly. With a growing gap between production and desired consumption, producers called for deregulation to permit higher prices and to stimulate exploration.

Beginning in 1969, the regulated price was permitted to rise. The natural gas shortage continued to intensify, however, as demand received an additional stimulus from environmental limitations imposed on the use of high-sulfur coal and high-sulfur oil. The FPC estimated that in 1973 the shortage reached 7 to 10 percent of demand at the prevailing price. To restrict con-



sumption to available supplies, the industry has been forced to curtail deliveries under both firm and interruptible contracts. In addition, many gas distributors have been unable to add new customers. Recently, arrangements were made to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) at a price several times the domestic price for natural gas. Because the gas price has been maintained below the market-clearing level, a heavier burden has been placed on other fuels, mainly oil.

### *Petroleum*

In 1959 the Mandatory Oil Import Program was adopted to limit dependence upon foreign sources of supply. This program was partly a response to the curtailment of Middle East oil exports during the Suez Crisis of 1956. Under the program, quotas were imposed on imports of oil, especially crude oil. These quotas increased the profitability of domestic production and led to additional drilling. The major oil-producing States had earlier established a maximum efficient rate of recovery (MER) for oil fields, and had limited production to some percentage of MER. This prorationing, together with import quotas, served to support the domestic price above the price of imports. In addition, prorationing resulted in excess capacity in crude oil production, in the form of production below MER.

After 1960 the only major new discoveries of petroleum in the United States were on the North Slope of Alaska and on the Outer Continental Shelf. In the "lower 48" States, the ratio of proved reserves of crude oil to annual production declined throughout the 1960's. Excess crude oil production capacity also declined as allowable rates of recovery were raised by the State regulatory agencies. This permitted output to increase rapidly during the 1960's. But after 1969 the increases in production failed to keep pace with the growing domestic demand. As an alternative to raising the supported price which would have stimulated domestic production and restrained demand, exceptions were made to the existing quotas, to permit a greater level of petroleum imports. Finally, in April 1973, the system of import quotas was abandoned altogether in favor of a flexible import fee. This fee is currently set at a low level to encourage importation.

Beginning in the late 1960's, the expansion of domestic refinery capacity failed to keep up with the growing demand for oil products. Frequent exceptions to oil import quotas and the continuing review of the Mandatory Oil Import Program gave rise to uncertainties about whether future policy would encourage importation of crude oil or of refined products. In the face of this uncertainty few new domestic refineries were built. In some cases domestic refinery construction may also have been discouraged by the difficulty of finding a site that would not arouse community objections for environmental and other reasons. In addition, the income tax credit to companies for income taxes paid to foreign governments may have increased the incentive to build refineries outside the United States.

The use of petroleum products in the United States increased by 66 percent from 1960 to 1972. Much of this increase occurred in the transporta-

tion sector, which in 1972 accounted for 53 percent of the Nation's total petroleum use. A low excise tax has made the retail price of gasoline lower in the United States than in most other developed countries. The low gasoline price and a rapid growth in incomes have contributed to large increases in the number of motor vehicles on the road and in the total mileage driven, and thus to the rapidly growing demand for gasoline. Gasoline consumption has also been increased by the trend toward heavier automobiles with air conditioners and automatic transmissions, and by the use of emissions control devices. This expansion in demand for petroleum products was underestimated, as was the need for additional refinery capacity to meet that demand, with the result that the United States became heavily dependent on imports of refined products.

Imports of crude oil and refined products rose from 22 percent of domestic consumption in 1969 to 36 percent in 1973, prior to the embargo. For the first 9 months of 1973 the U.S. share of total world oil imports amounted to 19 percent. This increased U.S. dependence on imports coincided with, and probably contributed to, a general tightening of the world petroleum market.

In the mid-1960's the governments of the oil-exporting countries gradually began to assume a greater measure of control over crude oil production and pricing decisions. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which was formed in 1960, began to function effectively as a cartel in the 1970's. Excess capacity in crude oil production had begun to disappear in the United States, Canada, and Venezuela, thereby strengthening the market power of the Middle Eastern nations. This market power was further increased by the rapid growth in demand for petroleum. For example, from 1960 to 1972, oil consumption grew at an annual rate of 11.0 percent in Western Europe and 17.4 percent in Japan. When it became apparent that the United States would also have to expand its oil imports, the exporting countries, working through OPEC, were in a strong position to raise prices and thus to realize monopoly profits.

### *Coal*

Although coal is our most plentiful energy resource, its use in the United States has not expanded since 1966. Enactment of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act in 1969, together with a host of labor problems, caused a large rise in the cost of underground mining, and a decline in output. The reduction in output, together with increased transportation rates, led to the rise in the price of coal referred to earlier. The higher price, coupled with the development of improved equipment, spurred an expansion in surface mining. But the price rise encouraged many industries and utilities to switch to other fuels. Environmental regulations imposed at both the Federal and State levels prevented the use of high-sulfur coal in some areas and accelerated the substitution of other fuels. Because of the unavailability of natural gas, most of the burden has fallen on oil.

## *Electric Power*

Until recently it was widely expected that nuclear power would be a major factor in meeting the increased demand for electricity in the early 1970's, but construction of nuclear reactors has fallen far behind schedule. Technical problems in their design and construction have been partly to blame, but there have also been unexpected delays associated with the siting of new power plants. To some extent both the construction delays and the siting delays are attributable to time-consuming litigation resulting from increased public concern about nuclear hazards and thermal pollution of water by these reactors.

Meanwhile the demand for electricity has continued to grow rapidly. So far the increased demand has been met largely by the use of fossil-fuel power plants, but in some regions the new construction of these plants has been insufficient to meet demand at existing prices. To some extent this situation may have come about because the delays in the construction and use of nuclear reactors were largely unforeseen. There is also evidence that some electric utilities underestimated the rate at which demand would rise; the rapid growth in the number of electrical appliances was not fully anticipated. At present, however, an even more serious problem for the electric utilities than the shortage of power plants is the shortage of natural gas and residual fuel oil, together with environmental restrictions on the use of coal.

## THE ENERGY CRISIS

The energy crisis originated in a large number of circumstances none of which was sufficient in itself to disrupt the economy seriously. Their convergence in 1972-73, however, touched off a dramatic change in the domestic energy supply-demand balance.

During most of the 1960's the United States retained the capability to become rapidly self-sufficient in energy production, but this capability quickly disappeared in the last part of the decade. The natural gas price was kept below the market-clearing price, thereby creating a shortage and leading to an increased demand for oil. The demand for oil was further increased by environmental restrictions on the use of high-sulfur coal as well as by delays in the construction of nuclear reactors. Domestic refinery capacity was unable to meet the rapid expansion in demand for petroleum products. Although the domestic price of crude oil was supported above the price of imports, the price was not sufficiently high to discourage a rapid growth in demand or to encourage an adequate expansion in domestic production.

Preventing a rapidly growing dependence on oil imports would have required maintaining a higher domestic price. Because the enormous oil reserves in the Persian Gulf area were expected to be available to us at a very low price, a decision was made to permit exceptions to the limitations on imports of petroleum products rather than allowing further increases in the domestic crude oil price. Partly because of this increased reliance by the

United States on oil imports, OPEC could more confidently reduce crude oil output and raise the price.

Near the close of 1973 the Federal Energy Office projected that the reduction of oil imports into the United States during the first quarter of 1974 would result in a deficit of 2.7 million barrels per day, or 14 percent of total U.S. petroleum consumption. The deficit was projected to increase to 17 percent by the fourth quarter if the import curtailment continued. This projection does not adjust for the effects of higher prices on domestic demand and production. In addition, the projection assumes that there will be no leakage in the embargo and no increases in oil imports from countries not participating in the embargo. For these reasons, the projected deficit overstates the amount by which petroleum use must be reduced through nonprice conservation measures.

### RECOVERY FROM THE CRISIS

The disruption generated by the unexpected reduction of oil imports has both a supply and a demand aspect. On the supply side the country has abundant energy resources for the long run, although at costs that are substantially above past levels. But in the short run there are constraints on the rate at which exploitation of these resources can be accelerated. Some increased oil and natural gas production can be obtained from existing fields, but large increases require development of new fields. There is a long gestation period for new investment in most energy-producing industries. New oil and gas fields do not begin to produce for at least a year and are not fully developed for several years. Pipelines, refineries, and nuclear reactors all take time to build. As a result the economy has less flexibility to expand energy production in the short run than over a longer period.

There is a comparable short-run inflexibility on the demand side. Most energy is used as a production input in conjunction with some item of capital equipment: for example, in a furnace to produce heat and in an automobile to produce passenger miles. To a large extent equipment design determines the energy requirements per unit of output. In some cases there is scope for reducing energy use per unit of output, but usually only to a limited extent. By increasing load factors in airline flights, for instance, the same number of passenger miles can be obtained with less jet fuel, although the inconvenience may be greater. In other cases, as in the use of clothes dryers or air conditioners, the energy-output ratio cannot be changed.

The Nation's capital stock was built during a period when energy prices were low and were expected to remain so. In view of the prices that are likely during the next few years, much of the capital stock is inappropriately designed. To obtain a major reduction in energy use without a decrease in output, we must replace the stock of capital with machines and equipment that use energy more efficiently.

A distinction should be made, however, between industrial output and household output. The latter refers to the services provided by the use

of consumer durables. There is considerable scope for conserving energy by reducing household output: for example, lowering thermostat settings and driving fewer miles. Unlike reductions in industrial output, these measures generate little unemployment, and for this reason they play an important role in the Administration's energy conservation program. During 1974, cutting back on energy used in the household will be the best available means of conserving energy without paying a high price in increased unemployment or reduced incomes.

### *Pricing Policy*

Because of these inflexibilities with respect to energy production and use, market equilibration of demand and domestic supply in the short run would require very large price increases, at least for a year or two. Even though price increases would gradually stimulate additional production at higher cost, profits would also increase—especially before the additional production is forthcoming—and this raises problems of equity.

If price increases are not allowed, however, there will be insufficient incentives for consumers to reduce demand and for producers to expand reserves and output. Substantial excess demand would then result, requiring an extensive system of controls, allocations, and rationing. Because of serious data limitations, it is impossible to design these measures so as to ensure that resources are efficiently used. Heavy reliance on such measures is likely to lead to an inefficient use not simply of energy resources but of all resources, and thus might delay our recovery from the crisis. One has reason therefore to question the efficacy of such controls for more than a very brief period.

In addition, holding prices down is likely to create expectations that prices will rise in the future, thus further discouraging increases in production and sales. Because fossil fuels are exhaustible resources, sales made today are at the expense of earnings in the future. If the rate of appreciation of the value of a resource is expected to exceed the rate of return on alternative investments, there is little incentive to sell. A greater return could be earned by holding back production and building up inventories than by immediate sale. It has been argued that the domestic output of natural gas has been held down during the past few years, partly because of expectations that large price increases would be permitted.

These considerations argue for letting energy prices rise so that markets will clear, and for initiating a tax to limit windfall profits. In this way, the price system is permitted to play an important role in guiding production decisions and encouraging consumers to conserve energy.

With respect to the price of domestically produced crude oil, a distinction has been made between "old oil" and "new oil," the latter referring to all oil produced on a property in excess of output in the same month of 1972. To stimulate increases in production, the ceiling price has been removed from new oil production. The ceiling price on old oil was raised to \$5.25 per barrel late in 1973 to reduce the widening gap between prices

of old oil and prices of imported and new crude. As required by the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, there is no price ceiling on oil produced from stripper wells, that is, those producing less than 10 barrels per day.

To limit windfall profits, the President recommended that Congress enact an Emergency Windfall Profits Tax. The proposed measure taxes increases in crude oil prices at rates graduated up to 85 percent on all sales of domestic crude oil at prices higher than base prices determined by reference to the December 1, 1973 ceiling set by the Cost of Living Council; the same price would apply in the case of uncontrolled oil. The tax, which would be phased out over 5 years, is designed to eliminate significant windfall profits resulting from short-term increases in crude oil prices, but to give producers enough incentive to invest in the expansion of crude oil output in the future.

Sound natural gas policy calls for more competitive pricing. The Administration has asked Congress to pass legislation deregulating prices on new interstate natural gas contracts. The Administration's proposal would permit the price to rise, in stages, toward the long-run, market-clearing level. Prompt steps in this direction are desirable as a means of avoiding the natural gas shortages that have recently occurred. Deregulating the interstate price will increase reserves and production and will permit users who depend on interstate pipelines for supplies to compete with intrastate users. Many electric utilities and industries now buy intrastate gas at a price above the regulated interstate rate. When the interstate price rises, more gas will flow in interstate commerce, where in many cases it will substitute for oil. Natural gas would thus be available where the need is most critical. Deregulation will also result in a greater output of natural gas liquids, a prime feedstock used by the petrochemical industry.

### *Prospects for Increasing Domestic Production*

Production of petroleum, and of associated natural gas, can be increased within a year by expanding output from existing oil fields. Part of this increase will result from the use of secondary and tertiary recovery methods. An additional increase can come from maintaining the production of stripper wells that would otherwise be abandoned. Some stripper wells can be reworked to yield a greater rate of flow.

In 1973 most wells in the United States were producing at 100 percent of the MER. In most States the law does not permit production in excess of the MER, which is in principle the maximum rate at which oil can be extracted without seriously reducing the total amount of the resource that can ultimately be recovered from the field. But the MER is an imprecise figure. In many instances total output would be reduced by only a small amount if production went beyond the MER for 2 or 3 years. Moreover the MER should reflect economic as well as technological factors. The economically efficient rate of production is a function of market prices, both present and future. An increase in the value of oil today, relative to the expected future value, should lead to a more rapid rate of

recovery today. In some cases, therefore, it would be in the national interest to adjust the MER's upward.

Progressively larger increases in the production of petroleum and associated natural gas can be expected after 1974. Increases in the price paid for the so-called new oil will stimulate exploration, mainly offshore, and an expansion in production. It is likely that offshore production of crude oil will begin to rise by 1976. The Prudhoe Bay fields in Alaska are expected to begin producing by 1977 or 1978 and to yield up to 2 million barrels of oil per day by 1980, to be delivered via the new trans-Alaska pipeline, which received final congressional authorization in December 1973. It is expected that another pipeline will be completed by 1980 to ship associated natural gas from the Prudhoe Bay fields to the "lower 48" States. In addition, major new refinery construction and expansion plans have been announced.

In 1973, natural gas exploration increased sharply in response to increases in the wellhead price and a stepped-up rate of offshore leasing. The annual total of gas well completions in that year surpassed by 15 to 25 percent the all-time high reached in 1961. This high level of drilling is expected to be maintained in 1974 and will lead to a build-up of reserves. Production is likely to begin to rise in 1974 and to increase more rapidly in the following years, particularly if higher prices are permitted.

### *Energy Conservation*

Higher producer prices for oil and natural gas will not only stimulate additional production but also dampen energy use and lead to a shift to coal in the industrial, commercial, and electric power sectors. An acceleration of the rate of construction of nuclear reactors and coal-fired power plants might lead to some substitution of electric power for oil and gas in the residential and commercial sectors.

Because the real prices of all fuels and electric power will be higher than in the past, there will be a substitution of other productive inputs for energy inputs, both in industry and in the household. Americans can be expected to drive cars that are smaller and have more efficient engines; to improve the insulation in their homes; and to pay greater attention to the energy requirements of appliances when making a purchase. In some parts of the country it will become economic to install solar space-conditioning systems that substitute energy from the sun for more conventional kinds. There will also be shifts in the composition of output away from energy-intensive goods and services toward those that use less energy.

These effects will restore the balance between domestic demand and production. The system of controls and allocations that was instituted at the close of 1973 to deal with the crisis will become increasingly less important, and it will be possible and desirable for energy resources to be allocated principally by the market system.

## LONG-TERM PROSPECTS

The price of imported oil is now probably far above the long-run cost of supplying the entire U.S. market from domestic production. Because of OPEC's monopoly power, it is possible that the world price will remain above the long-run domestic cost for some time. The probability of this occurrence would be significantly increased if the United States were to continue to depend heavily on imports. Even if the world price were to decline, moreover, there would be a risk of a subsequent sudden sharp price rise or a cutoff of supply.

These prospects argue for an accelerated development of domestic energy resources. The United States has sufficient energy resources to last for centuries, even if demand continues to grow as rapidly as in the past. The Nation has untapped oil and natural gas resources on the Outer Continental Shelf. Synthetic hydrocarbon liquids and gas can be obtained from our vast shale and coal resources. Nuclear power may still play the role once expected of it, and the development of the breeder reactor will greatly expand the power that can be ultimately obtained from domestic uranium resources. New technologies that are being developed may eventually permit an economic use of geothermal, solar, and fusion power.

However, large capital investments are required to expand domestic energy production. The private sector will be willing to undertake this investment only if there is a reasonable assurance that the price will remain sufficiently high to provide an adequate rate of return. As long as domestic producers face the possibility of a significant decline in their price, the domestic investment required to expand production will be held back.

The risk to the domestic energy industry comes from the very low cost of producing oil in many OPEC countries. Although OPEC is now able to charge a price that is many times the cost of production, there is always the chance that OPEC countries will lower their prices substantially. Such a price reduction might result from a deliberate decision by producing countries to undercut U.S. energy producers, or from a breakdown of the cartel.

A decision regarding energy self-sufficiency in petroleum production is complicated by the important effect that U.S. policy may have on the price of oil imports. A U.S. policy oriented toward one price level is likely to help bring about a different price level and thus make the policy appear costly. A growing dependence on imports, however, involves a potentially higher cost than would result from expanded domestic production and also poses a threat to our national security.

### *Project Independence*

In response to these considerations, in November 1973 the President inaugurated Project Independence, designed to ensure an expansion in domestic energy production so that the Nation would no longer be subject to economic disruption, or the threat of such disruption, from a sudden curtail-



ment of vital energy supplies. This program includes large proposed expenditures for research and development, which are described below.

The choice of policies to bring about the capability for self-sufficiency in energy production should depend primarily on economic criteria. Because domestic energy investment is now inhibited by the risk that the oil-exporting countries will disrupt the market for political or economic reasons, the policy should be oriented toward reducing that risk. It is important, however, to ensure that the incentives for efficient domestic production will continue, and that any reductions in costs are passed on to consumers. In addition, policy should be designed to permit prices of different sources of energy to reflect differences in quality (or desirability), so that resources will be used efficiently. This means that, while the Nation needs to be protected from dependence on unreliable supplies, domestic producers should not be isolated from the normal business risks arising from domestic competition. Policy should not protect against the risk of a decline in the price because of technical advances by other domestic producers; to reduce this risk would encourage inefficient production. There should be adequate incentives for development of new products, for innovation in production methods, and in general for measures that reduce the social cost of producing energy.

One way to achieve the capability for energy self-sufficiency is to provide selective incentives for the introduction of designated new sources of energy, such as shale oil or synthetic gas from coal. For example, the Government could agree to purchase a specified amount of shale oil, over a number of years, at a guaranteed price. If the market price is above the support level, there is no need for the Government to act; but if the price falls below the support level, the Government would make deficiency payments to producers. Such action would encourage the development and construction of the necessary shale oil production facilities, while market forces would determine prices to producers of other types of energy and to energy users. This proposal results in lower profits to producers of conventional energy resources, for which no price guarantee is made.

A drawback of the proposal is that different energy sources would have different prices, thereby leading to an inefficient resource use. Moreover, the Government would be required to determine which new sources of energy to support. There is also a likelihood that production from nonsupported energy sources would be discouraged and that the Government could be forced to support an ever-increasing part of the market. For these reasons many believe it would be preferable to rely on general market incentives rather than selective subsidization.

It is also important to recognize that the exercise of monopoly power by the oil-exporting countries has increased the real cost of energy to the United States. Although Project Independence will reduce energy prices below the prices currently charged for imports of petroleum and liquefied natural gas, the cost of energy is unlikely to return to the pre-1973 levels. It is therefore

important that the higher costs be reflected in the prices paid by consumers, to ensure that they economize on energy use.

Another way to achieve the capability for self-sufficiency is to give domestic energy producers assurance that import prices would not fall below certain levels. Variable tariffs could be used to ensure that prices of imported oil and natural gas do not fall below such levels. This would ensure competition among domestic producers and would encourage development of the lowest-cost domestic sources of energy. The price of all energy sources would reflect their value to consumers and would therefore encourage efficient use.

An important factor in selecting an appropriate policy is the responsiveness of domestic supply to changes in price. Restricting energy imports may appear to be an attractive option if it is believed that the long-run domestic price will be, say, \$5 per barrel of crude oil. But if the cost is expected to be triple that amount, import restrictions appear decidedly less attractive.

### *Role of Imports*

At least until 1980 the United States will continue to depend on oil imports to supplement domestic production. As domestic energy output expands, it will be possible gradually to reduce this dependence. If imports can be obtained at a sufficiently low price, however, without posing a threat to our national security, they can continue to play a role in our long-term energy policy.

The risks associated with petroleum imports could be substantially reduced by means of a storage program. Petroleum could be stored both in salt domes and in the form of oil fields with shut-in production capacity. In the event of an unexpected curtailment of oil imports, the salt dome storage would be immediately available to offset the loss of foreign supplies; and the shut-in capacity would be available within a few months to supply petroleum until it is possible to produce from new wells. On the basis of the level of imports and an assessment of the risk of an actual or threatened reduction in foreign supplies, the Government could determine the appropriate amounts of storage and shut-in capacity.

### *Energy Research and Development*

The principal object of a Federal energy research and development program is to develop new technologies that permit the production and use of energy at a lower cost to society, either by reducing the cost (including the environmental cost) of providing a given amount of energy or by reducing the quantity of energy needed to produce a given output of goods and services.

Until recently, most energy research and development has been conducted by the private sector. There is now a need for the Government to play a more active role, partly because of the long-term nature of many energy research and development projects and partly because of the fundamental nature of much of the research that is needed. There are other reasons. The

payoff from such projects depends critically on future Government policies with respect to environmental control, leasing of mineral rights, and import restrictions. It may therefore be unusually risky for private investors to undertake this research. Many kinds of research and development concerning energy involve benefits to society as a whole that cannot be fully captured by the investor, so that it is unprofitable for any one firm to conduct the research. Finally, the interdependence among projects provides a compelling case for the Government to provide an overview and to coordinate research and development in the energy field, though not necessarily to conduct the research itself.

There is an additional potential benefit that might result from an energy research and development program. By making a coordinated effort to develop those technologies required to ensure self-sufficiency, the United States will improve its bargaining power vis-a-vis the oil-exporting countries. In this way a federally coordinated energy research and development program may play an important role in forcing the world price of oil down to the competitive level.

A major component of Project Independence is a stepped-up program of energy research and development. The Administration has recommended an expenditure of \$10 billion over a 5-year period beginning with fiscal 1975. This program is principally addressed to the accomplishment of six tasks:

1. Improving the efficiency of energy use and of the conversion of fossil fuels to electric power.
2. Increasing the domestic production of petroleum and natural gas.
3. Expanding the use of coal.
4. Increasing the use of nuclear power.
5. Developing renewable energy sources.
6. Reducing the environmental effects associated with all stages of energy production and use.

The Administration's research and development program represents an important step in moving the economy toward an established capability of being self-sufficient in energy production. However, the program deals only with the technological aspect of energy production and use.

Energy production is limited not only by the state of current technology, but also by economic incentives. The prospect of higher energy prices will accelerate the development and application of technological advances by the private sector. If the private sector is given a larger role in Project Independence, expenditures on research and development will be more closely geared to those techniques likely to become commercially applicable, thus further assuring the success of the program.

## ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

The Nation's urgent need for adequate and dependable supplies of energy has raised concerns about how efforts to fill the need will affect the goal of

improving the environment. The fundamental premise of economic policy is that the Nation's total resources must be allocated as efficiently as possible. This concept includes careful allocation of our scarce environmental resources, but it does not follow that environmental policy should be insulated from other problems and policies.

In enacting laws to protect environmental quality, Congress was responding to the strong public demand that environmental resources—clean air, water, and land—should be enjoyed as amenities rather than used as receptacles to absorb residual wastes of production and consumption. The new legislation set environmental standards that would be costly to achieve, but it did so with the presumption that the goals were worth the costs. However, the standards also assumed certain basic cost relationships among the additional resources devoted to meeting the standards; the energy crisis has disrupted these relationships by sharply raising the cost of fuels.

As the price of energy increases, environmental policy provisions that call for significant consumption of energy become more expensive, and energy-conserving provisions become cheaper. If policy adjustments are not made, unnecessary amounts of society's scarce energy resources will be used to attain any given level of environmental quality. Adjustments to avoid such waste do not represent a change in the relative importance that either the Government or the public places upon environmental quality. Instead, they are similar to the reduction in consumption that occurs if the price of any commodity increases significantly while other nonprice influences on the consumption of that commodity remain unchanged. The appropriate short-term adjustments indicated in environmental policy because of energy price increases have two requirements: First, they must accurately reflect the increased scarcity of energy expected in the near future; second, they must not interfere unnecessarily with appropriate adjustments to the somewhat less intense scarcity of energy likely to prevail in the more distant future.

Thus, provisions of environmental policy that save energy become cheaper, and as a result comprehensive efficiency criteria indicate a greater use of them. For example, to achieve the air quality standards specified in the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has stated that a very substantial reduction in the number of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) by automobiles and lightweight trucks will be necessary in several large urban areas. This reduced fuel consumption would be desirable both in countering the energy crisis and in improving the environment. Since higher energy prices reduce the costs of such VMT reductions, efficiency criteria suggest faster implementation of this particular environmental policy. In accordance with this view, the Administration has acted to provide on a priority basis for substantial funding of mass transit in areas in which air quality will require large VMT reductions.

The theory of implementation in the Clean Air Act calls for the States to formulate plans to achieve the act's air quality standards. The act requires only that the more important primary or human health standards be

met in 1975, but stipulates a “reasonable period of time” for attainment of the secondary standards which are intended to protect esthetics and vegetation. However, some States required in their plans that the secondary and primary standards be reached at the same time, and this became legally binding under the Clean Air Act. Such advanced timing of the environmental goals would require much more low-sulfur coal than is now available domestically. It would also seriously constrain the ability of other States to reach the more urgent primary or health standards. Although estimates vary, the so-called clean fuels deficit is roughly equivalent to one-quarter to one-half of all coal burned in 1970. In States with advanced secondary standards and in States where the primary standards will not be met, the only legal course open to coal-burning utilities would be to switch to low-sulfur oil or natural gas. In a period of high prices and short supplies for these fuels, such substitution is inefficient.

The Administration has therefore proposed in the Emergency Energy Act to give the EPA the authority to postpone attainment of the secondary air quality standards in States where such action would reduce the clean fuels deficit. One longer-term danger of this action, however, is that it removes some of the incentive that users of high-sulfur coal would have to develop improved emission control technology. A relatively easy way to restore this incentive, and give it a more efficient form, would be congressional enactment of the Administration’s sulfur emissions tax proposal.

This example of the adjustments in environmental policy that are indicated by higher energy prices is only a postponement of an implementation schedule, not a lowering of standards or other change in the policy itself. As a short-run response to the energy crisis, postponement has two advantages over a structural policy change. It entails less risk of obstructing the realization of long-term goals of environmental policy; and it avoids adding to the uncertainty about these goals which might inhibit the investment required by both energy and environmental needs.

### *Efficient Environmental Policy: The Post-Crisis Challenge*

Although postponing the implementation of environmental standards is preferable to revising such standards, one should not conclude that current standards are optimal and need no revision. Indeed, the standards—particularly those in the Clean Air Act—should be regarded as interim and provisional targets that reflect the urgency of the Nation’s commitment to environmental protection at the time they were adopted. These standards may become more stringent or less stringent. In any event, they do not yet embody the careful distillation of scientific knowledge that will be required for the most efficient use of our scarce environmental resources in the longer run.

For example, air quality standards permit only specified concentrations of a limited number of particular pollutants in the ambient air. But, although concentrations of some pollutants might damage health or create other costs for some individuals, regulations to limit processes that release particular

pollutants into the atmosphere will also impose costs upon others. Standards ought to be based on a careful balancing of these risks, costs, and benefits, as they would be perceived and evaluated by fully informed individuals.

Not enough is known, however, about the ways in which activities that result in the release of pollutants are linked with ambient air quality to permit such a balancing, nor is enough known about the effects of various concentrations of pollutants upon human health. Another consideration is the efficiency of the means employed to reach optimal environmental standards once they are identified. Thus far, legal and administrative regulations and directives have been the principal instruments. Administrative capacity and legal enforceability require that these regulations be uniform and relatively simple. At the same time, the activity and organizations they seek to regulate are complex and varied. If individuals and enterprises had more discretion and flexibility, specified standards could be attained at a lower cost and with fewer scarce resources. Taxes, emission charges, and user charges are mechanisms that introduce this flexibility and efficiency into environmental protection.

## AGRICULTURE

The problems and policies of American agriculture since the 1930's have been predominantly related to excess productive capacity and the adjustment of resources to that condition. A related condition was an underlying instability in agricultural prices and incomes brought about by variability in food production and foreign demand, and intensified by a slow response by consumers and producers to changes in prices. Government restrictions on farm output, which were adopted to deal with the problem of excess capacity, as a by-product also tended to reduce price instability.

In 1972 circumstances began to change in agriculture. One reason was a sharp rise in the demand from abroad for U.S. farm products. By 1973 the higher level of exports had eliminated almost all excess capacity, and long-standing restrictive agricultural policies were modified to encourage all-out production. In an important sense the disappearance of chronic excess capacity should be recorded as a success. With its disappearance, however, the second problem, instability, has now taken on more significance.

Wide swings in farm and food prices contribute to instability throughout the economy. This became especially clear in 1973 when rising food prices accelerated the overall inflation rate. Although instability will at times lead to reduced farm prices, there are existing standby measures that cushion the decline in farm incomes. Comparable measures do not exist at present to moderate an acceleration in consumer food prices.

New conditions now face agriculture. They have raised a new set of issues that are discussed in this section.

### AGRICULTURE: FULLY EMPLOYED

The stabilization of agricultural markets, especially for grains, was an outgrowth of two related public policies designed to support farm income. There

was an underutilization of productive capacity in the farming sector, measured in terms of available cropland, underemployed labor, and underutilized capital equipment. In recent years this underutilization was a result of Government programs that provided payments to farmers and concurrently diverted or "set aside" land from production, usually on an annual basis. Since the early 1960's about one-sixth of the Nation's cropland was recorded as being withheld from production under Government land retirement programs. In addition to withdrawing land from production, farm programs caused sizable stocks of several commodities to be accumulated by the Government. Because of the stockpile program, substantial short-term fluctuations in either production or demand were largely offset by the accumulation or release of stocks of farm commodities under the various price support programs. These policies reduced instability in farm markets over the years at considerable cost in both Government budget outlays and intervention by the Government in the agricultural sector. As experience was gained, legislative and administrative actions were taken to "fine tune" production and restrict what was viewed as excessive accumulation of commodities under Government control. By the early 1970's the programs had become very effective in controlling total crop acreage to mesh prospective production with expected demand. Actual production varied, of course, with yields per acre, which were influenced by weather conditions. Nevertheless, a clear downward trend in stocks was evident and reflected the direction of Government policy (Table 31).

TABLE 31.—*U.S. grain stocks compared to grain utilization, selected periods, 1950-73*

Marketing year	End of marketing year stocks as a percent of total utilization			
	Wheat	Rice	Feed grains	Soybeans
Annual average:				
1950-54.....	52.1	8.5	24.9	2.9
1955-59.....	102.7	48.1	43.0	9.6
1960-64.....	96.5	14.0	49.4	8.6
1965-69.....	44.4	11.5	28.4	15.1
1970-73 <sup>1</sup> .....	45.8	14.6	21.2	9.2
1970.....	64.2	18.3	27.1	18.7
1971.....	48.6	23.0	18.9	7.8
1972.....	58.0	12.4	25.1	6.0
1973 <sup>1</sup> .....	21.7	5.7	15.0	4.6

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

### *Disappearance of "Excess Capacity"*

For years it was fashionable to talk of "excess capacity" in agriculture. The measure most widely referred to was the acres of cropland that were idled each year by Government programs. That measure seemed to be an adequate approximation, because if more output and hence more land were demanded the complementary inputs—labor, machinery, fertilizer, and seeds—would also be available to expand production. Several decades

of research and rapid mechanization had resulted in an abundance of these other inputs, particularly of labor, because of a continuous flow of work-saving technology into agriculture. If more production were needed—more crops, more livestock, or both—the resources were already on the farms of the Nation or could be readily purchased. Only during World War II, when vast amounts of manpower had been drawn off the farm, was a shortage of labor apparent. After that period, agriculture experienced a long succession of years with excess land, excess labor, and abundant supplies of purchased inputs.

This situation led to a widespread view that excess capacity was endemic in U.S. agriculture and that it would be large enough to cover almost any potential shortfall in world food production. Given time to expand production, the Nation's farmers could produce more of everything—more grain and soybeans, as well as more meat, milk, and other farm commodities—without substantial increases in costs or prices.

The amount of labor employed in agriculture adjusted downward throughout the 1950's and 1960's (Table 32). Without its being generally realized, the availability of labor to produce more livestock as well as crops slowly approached a balance with normal requirements for food production. So long as productivity of manpower in agriculture was growing rapidly from the addition of new capital equipment or other technological innovations, the remaining workers could meet the requirements for larger output without interfering with the continued exodus of workers from the agricultural sector.

TABLE 32.—*Change in inputs used in farming, 1950 to 1973*

Period <sup>1</sup>	Percent change (annual rate)			
	Cropland	Farm labor	Machinery	Fertilizer
1950 to 1955.....	-0.8	-3.7	2.9	5.9
1955 to 1960.....	-1.2	-4.5	-2	4.7
1960 to 1965.....	-1.3	-4.2	.7	8.2
1965 to 1970.....	.0	-3.6	1.4	6.9
1970 to 1973 <sup>1</sup> .....	2.8	-5	.3	2.6
1969 to 1970.....	1.0	-5.3	-1.0	2.7
1970 to 1971.....	4.1	-1.1	2.0	7.1
1971 to 1972.....	-3.6	-3.4	-1.0	-8
1972 to 1973 <sup>1</sup> .....	9.5	4.7	2.9	3.3

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

Labor productivity and farm output were moving uniformly upward until at least the mid-1960's. Then, recent evidence suggests, some of the trends flattened out. This was especially true in livestock production, which is more labor intensive than field crop production. The annual rate of increase in livestock output declined from 1.7 percent for each year in the 1960-65 period to 1.6 percent in 1965-70, and to only 0.9 percent annually after 1970 (Table 33). The reduced availability of labor placed new restraints on expansion of livestock production. Trade-offs between more crops or more



TABLE 33.—*Production and productivity in agriculture, selected years, 1950 to 1973*

Period	Percent change (annual rate)			
	Crop output	Livestock output	Crop output per acre	Livestock output per feed unit
1950 to 1955.....	0.9	2.1	1.3	1.3
1955 to 1960.....	2.3	1.3	3.7	-1.7
1960 to 1965.....	1.0	1.7	2.0	-.3
1965 to 1970.....	2.0	1.6	1.8	.1
1970 to 1973 <sup>1</sup> .....	4.2	.9	2.4	-1.5

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary.

Note.—Annual rates of change are based on 3-year centered averages for years shown except for 1973 which is for a single year.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

livestock became more significant, although their existence went largely unnoticed until the burst of additional export demands for farm products after mid-1972. When market prices and Government policy encouraged stepped-up farm production, the response was less than expected. Additional acres were planted, and crop production rose. Meanwhile livestock production declined in aggregate, and the indexes of labor used in agriculture, which have been declining steadily for years, either increased or declined only marginally in 1973. These results suggest that some significant changes had occurred in the structure and excess capacity of American agriculture.

The persistent decline in the hours of labor employed on farms at least temporarily bottomed out in the past year. If the long downward labor adjustment is largely over, agriculture will have to provide higher returns to labor in the future in order to compete with the nonfarm sector for workers.

The growth in productivity of all inputs used in farm production has shown some slowing, although there is no indication of a plateau. Nor has the rate of increase in yields of crops shown a decline. But the productivity of feedstuffs used in livestock production has shown some decline, partly because until recently it was economical to substitute feedstuffs for forages in dairy and beef enterprises. Dairy products and meat are an important part of consumer food budgets and continuous improvement in the efficiency of feed conversion would help to hold down their real cost. For this reason there may be a need to review the organization and use of public funds in livestock research.

### *Expanding Farm Exports*

Growing exports have been the immediate cause of the new pressures on agriculture's productive capacity and have contributed to the shift toward crop production, particularly since mid-1972. For years the United States has nurtured foreign markets for food and fiber with Government supported export promotion efforts. A few months before the burst of world demand for U.S. agricultural products, projections had suggested that a record \$10 billion of exports could be achieved by 1980, up from \$8.0 bil-

lion in fiscal 1972. Actually the accelerated foreign purchases since mid-1972 caused agricultural exports to reach \$12.9 billion in fiscal 1973 and \$17.5 billion in calendar 1973. About 60 percent of the increase in fiscal 1973 was caused by increased volume; the remainder came from higher prices.

*Causes of export growth.* An important question is whether the increased demand for exports is traceable to abnormally poor weather conditions in other countries or a longer-term rise in world demand. Both of these have contributed to export demand in the 1972-73 period. Poor crop harvests during 1972 in many countries were certainly a major factor: world grain production fell 2.7 percent below the previous year.

However, there are two reasons to believe that U.S. exports have moved to a higher plateau. First, the demand for red meat and poultry in Western Europe and Japan has been expanding as incomes improved. The sharp economic expansion of 1972-73 combined with the depreciation of the dollar to augment this basic trend in 1973. In fiscal 1973, Japan and Western Europe accounted for about one-half of the growth in export volume.

The second factor has been growing markets in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Eastern European countries. The key here is primarily how much these countries import in total, not how much they buy from the United States. The initial U.S. sales of grains to the U.S.S.R. in mid-1972 were caused partly by very poor Soviet crops, but they also stemmed from an earlier Soviet policy decision to improve consumers' diets. Implementation of the decision will mean higher Soviet grain imports, on average, in the future. Their grain purchases in 1972-73 together with Chinese purchases accounted for about a third of the increased export volume of U.S. grain in fiscal 1973. Even if such purchases are smaller in the future, they can be significant in maintaining exports at high levels.

*Domestic market complications.* Isolated from domestic food markets, the record on farm exports is impressive. However, the greatly expanded exports have had significant implications for domestic food markets. When more feedstuffs are shipped abroad, the result is increased competition and higher prices for the remaining supplies. This became clear in 1973 as the production of livestock products failed to respond to sharply higher livestock prices. The very large exports of feed grains and oilseeds raised the costs of livestock production, thus reducing incentives to producers.

The problem was highlighted in 1973 when the contracted supplies of soybeans for export were thought to have exceeded the amount that would be available after domestic demands were met. This finding led to a temporary embargo and a later licensing of exports of soybeans (and related products) for the months of July through September. After harvesting of large crops began in the fall months, all restrictions on exports were removed, although a newly instituted reporting system on forward export sales was continued under new farm legislation passed in 1973.

The controls on soybean exports seemed justified by special circumstances which made domestic processors and livestock producers unable to pay world prices for the available supplies of soybean products. The ceiling prices on red meats in March, the later freeze on all food prices in June, and the rising costs of feedstuffs combined to place producers in a severe profit squeeze. As a result, they cut back their production plans and began to slaughter breeding animals, a response that could have seriously reduced food supplies for many months and even years if it had continued. However, the export controls raised serious conflicts among a variety of national objectives. Removal of meat price ceilings and the earlier termination of all special efforts to expand exports gave domestic and foreign buyers equal access to U.S. supplies of feedstuffs and food commodities, thereby reducing the necessity of export controls.

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The recent shifts in resource use and output mix in agriculture have occurred in response to increased worldwide demands for agricultural products and tighter domestic supplies of farm resources. These changes have brought an end, at least temporarily, to the chronic excess capacity in agriculture. Exports have expanded swiftly, so much that large carryover stocks of grain commodities have been depleted. With supplies of feedstuffs for livestock extremely tight, livestock production has stopped expanding. Crop and livestock production are now competing more directly for the Nation's farm resources. Over the last year, extensive adjustments have occurred in agriculture in response to changing price relationships and sharply rising prices. Tightened markets for food have brought a new awareness of many interrelationships that could be safely ignored during periods of surpluses and have made policy decisions relating to food and agriculture more complex.

#### AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE FUTURE

Significant progress has been made in the past decade toward less Government intervention in and control of farm production. The agricultural acts passed in 1965 and 1970 moved the Government out of mandatory control programs for major farm commodities and provided a more flexible and effective means of controlling farm output. Another significant step toward making farm legislation more market oriented was taken when Congress passed the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, whose principal innovation is a system of target prices for wheat, feed grains, and cotton. When market prices are above the targets, no Government "deficiency payments" are made to farmers and the Government has little involvement in agriculture. In years when market prices fall below the target prices, Government payments to farmers make up the difference between target and market prices on base production. The Government also places a floor under market prices by being ready to purchase crops from farmers at relatively low prices. Farmers are thereby assured in two ways of at least

a minimum income. Unless prices fall so low that the Government begins to accumulate inventories of commodities, however, its role is limited to making deficiency payments when they are required.

With this change in basic farm programs, market prices assume more importance in guiding resources into production. Market prices will also have greater importance in allocating U.S. agricultural products among competing buyers. The intensity of market competition is likely to be much greater in the coming year than was true under the surplus conditions of the past.

### *The Need for Improved Information*

The 1973 act is particularly well suited to current conditions in agriculture. It permits the market to signal to farmers what priorities domestic and foreign purchasers are placing on various commodities and products. The act allows, and indeed mandates, the Government to provide market information to the private sector, so that decisions will be based upon the fullest possible knowledge about trends in market conditions. In fact, the production period for both crop and animal production is so long that current prices may be a misleading guide to the most profitable future operations. Under these conditions, advance information is especially necessary for efficient farm production.

Export demand is one important area in which a deficiency of information became apparent in 1973. The Administration has taken a number of steps to improve the flow of current economic intelligence regarding worldwide agricultural developments through consultations with other countries. Among other actions, it initiated a World Food Conference to be held in 1974 under the auspices of the United Nations. A bilateral agreement has been signed with the U.S.S.R. that will make possible more accurate forecasts of worldwide production and demand. The agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union will facilitate more prompt exchange of information on crop and livestock production. In June the Department of Commerce initiated a reporting system for forward export sales of major agricultural products. The new farm legislation later made this a permanent system under the administration of the Department of Agriculture.

Steps also have been initiated to improve domestic farm and food forecasting and planning. The Department of Agriculture has requested, and the 1975 budget will contain, increased funds to strengthen its information and analysis services to the rest of the Government and the private sector. The need and scope for such activities were less as long as agricultural reserves existed in the form of stockpiles or idle acres. Under today's conditions, it is essential to give high priority to this aspect of the Government's work.

### *Government Food Stockpiles*

One very important issue has emerged in 1973 and remains unresolved: What policy should the Government pursue on grain stockpiles? In the past two purposes have been served by such stocks: as "operating stocks"

which the private sector needs if it is to function normally, and thus would elect to hold; and as "contingency reserves" over and above normal operating requirements to cover variations in production or demand.

As discussed above, Government policies were directed toward and succeeded in gradually reducing grain stocks in recent years. In earlier years, a substantial fraction of stocks had been held by the Government; but virtually all of these were released in 1973, and total stocks reached the lowest level since 1953. Stocks of wheat, in particular, are only adequate to provide for normal operating inventories this year; contingency reserves are non-existent both in the United States and in the world.

The unusually low grain reserves mean that the world is at present more vulnerable to poor harvests than it has been for some time. But stock-piling obviously cannot begin until world production levels have been built up. Otherwise, such a step would cause already high prices to escalate further, or necessitate a system of nonmarket allocations. Once a more normal supply-demand food balance is restored, which should begin to occur in 1974-75, stocks can be accumulated again. In the past the world has sought protection against crop failure by relying upon stocks held principally by the United States and Canada. Although this arrangement has worked, the current supply-demand conditions provide an opportunity to improve on the system. The Administration is exploring several approaches which, through cooperative action, could improve supply stability:

1. As a minimum, improved worldwide information flows are necessary to signal a tightening of supply-demand conditions as promptly as possible. Producers and consumers will then have the best opportunity to react to higher market prices.
2. Beyond that, multiyear forward sales contracts negotiated either privately or by governments could be used to provide more supply stability. Events of 1973 have encouraged importing countries and exporting firms to seek commitments looking farther into the future. These contracts can contribute to greater stability because they provide valuable information on prospective export demand to supplying countries and because production can thus be planned to meet contract sales.
3. A broader approach has been put forth by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. It would seek to establish stock-piling guidelines that participating countries would follow in developing their national policies. The system would be voluntary; but to the extent that the guidelines were appropriately set and complied with this approach could increase supply stability.
4. A more rigorous approach would be to establish an essentially autonomous international agency having the resources to operate a buffer stock. Such schemes take various forms. They all present common problems, however, with regard to control, financing, and interference with desirable market activity.

The Administration supports the examination of multilateral approaches to the stockpile issue. It also recognizes that this country has an interest, as the world's major exporter, in maintaining necessary levels of stocks, since otherwise we could not be a reliable supplier of food for the world. It is also in this country's interest to have adequate stocks to provide a measure of domestic price stability. According to preliminary estimates a contingency reserve would not have to be large or costly in order to offset most instances of poor harvests or abnormal demand. Large costs in the past have grown out of excessively large stock build-ups under price support programs. The prospects are reasonably strong that market conditions will not again lead to excessive stock-building in the near future. Any accumulation of contingency reserves would therefore require that the Government purchase commodities in the market or have ready access to farm-held stocks under the Government loan program.

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Agriculture has always been a cyclical industry; and the fluctuations, though relatively minor, have been around a trend of general abundance in the United States. One cannot say with certainty whether the unusually tight markets of 1973 signal a turning point toward a period in which fluctuations will be around a trend of relative scarcity, or whether 1973 represents only an abnormally large cyclical swing. This increased uncertainty implies that agriculture must be prepared to adjust to market developments as promptly and efficiently as possible. The current Government policy, with minimum restrictions on market mechanisms, is designed to make that possible.

## CHAPTER 5

# Distribution of Income

**I**MPLICITLY OR EXPLICITLY, MOST DISCUSSIONS of the performance of the American economy and the economic role of the Government are concerned with the growth of national income and the way it is distributed.

Three fundamental principles of equity concerning the distribution of income are widely accepted: those who produce the same amount should be rewarded equally (horizontal equity); those who produce more should be rewarded more (vertical equity); and no individual or household should be forced to fall below some minimum standard of consumption regardless of productive potential. Although there is fairly general agreement on these principles, the desirability of any given amount of inequality in the income distribution remains a matter of personal judgment and of social and political debate.

One of the principal social debates has been about the extent to which those having high incomes should share with those having less. Among its chief objectives, the Government seeks the proper balance between redistributing income to the disadvantaged so that they may have the basic amenities of life and allowing a reward system which gives individuals incentives to work to their fullest capacity.

## OUTLINE AND SUMMARY

This chapter looks at the distribution of income among families and individuals and examines some of the government policies which have influenced it. The chapter considers the distribution of income among individuals and families and among various classifications of the population: age, sex, and race.

While the inequality of family income is quite stable over the long term, it varies over the business cycle. Inequality increases during a recession and decreases in an expansion. This is a consequence of the variation in weeks worked that occurs because of changes in the unemployment rate.

Because the concept of income used to measure inequality is essentially limited to money income before taxes, these measures need not reflect the true inequality of economic well-being. Some sources of income which are omitted would increase measured inequality and others would decrease it,

and estimates of some of these effects are given. While those omitted sources which would decrease family income inequality have been growing in importance over time, there exists no such presumption concerning the omitted sources that would increase it.

Many factors, such as schooling and on-the-job training, determine the inequality of earnings among workers. Differentials in the earnings of whites and blacks, and of males and females, are analyzed with respect to the contribution to the differential made by training and other factors that influence productivity. Past discrimination has contributed to current differences in productivity because of the once widespread barriers to equivalent schooling and on-the-job training. Because of the difficulties of measuring productivity, no conclusion could be reached about the magnitude of current labor market discrimination against blacks or women. For the same reason it is difficult to determine whether labor market discrimination has declined with time, although there is a strong presumption that it has. For men, the black-white earnings differential has narrowed, and much of the change may be due to a narrowing of educational differences. The narrowing of the differential has been much more dramatic for black women, however, and outside the South black women now receive a higher wage rate than white women. This development is largely due to black women's greater lifetime attachment to the labor force, and hence their greater level of experience and training.

The differential in hourly earnings between men and women has widened over time, and this change reflects the relative decline in education and experience of women in the labor force. With the rapid increase in the labor force participation of women, the female labor force has become increasingly composed of recent entrants with fewer years of schooling and of experience. Younger women are, however, showing less tendency to withdraw from the labor force for a prolonged period; as the age of these cohorts increases and they come to comprise a larger proportion of women in the labor force, the experience and earnings differential between men and women should decrease.

Widespread concern is felt about those whose incomes fall below a level needed to maintain an adequate living standard. There has been a marked decline in poverty, as conventionally defined, from 39 million persons in 1959 to 24 million persons in 1972, in large part because of economic growth, which increased wage rates and employment opportunities for men and women, and permitted larger social security and pension benefits. Increasingly the poor are living in families in which there is no adult worker, and increasingly the family is headed by a female.

The Federal Government has several programs—some operated on its own, others in conjunction with the States—which are intended to decrease poverty. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is the most important Federal-State program designed explicitly for poor families in which there is no employed male head. The 3.1 million AFDC families



in 1972 represent nearly a threefold increase in the number of AFDC families since 1965. This increase can be partly explained by the spread of knowledge about the program and the lessening of the social stigma attached to it. In addition, the faster rate of increase of benefits to AFDC families, compared to average wages, contributed to the change by making the incentives greater for an existing female family head to apply for benefits, as well as giving women an incentive to head a family.

Social Security is the largest single Federal transfer program, with 28 million recipients of old age, survivor, or disability benefits in fiscal 1973. Many of the recipients of old age and survivors' benefits were in families classified as in poverty. For many others, however, social security kept their income above the poverty level.

The Federal Government also transfers economic resources to aged and low-income families by subsidizing the price of food, medical care, and housing. The Food Stamp Program, initiated in 1961, subsidized the purchase of food for 12.6 million recipients from low-income families in fiscal 1973. The average monthly subsidy (of \$15.30 per individual recipient in July 1973) represents a substantial contribution to the economic well-being of many low-income families, although the food stamp subsidy is not counted in the measure of income used to define poverty.

A rapidly growing source of Federal transfers to the aged and the poor is medicare and medicaid, which lower the cost of medical care to the recipients. In fiscal 1973, 10.6 million people received medicare benefits, and 23.5 million received medicaid benefits.

The combined effects of the tax and transfer mechanisms of Federal, State, and local governments appear to redistribute income toward low-income families. Various studies have concluded that when accrued capital gains are included in income the tax system is roughly proportional in the income ranges in which most Americans are located, but regressive for very low incomes and progressive for very high ones. However, some government transfers have a strong effect of redistributing income to low-income families. These include public assistance programs, social security, food stamps, medicaid, and medicare.

## THE CHANGE IN INEQUALITY OF FAMILY AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME

Between 1947 and 1972 median family income, adjusted for the rise in prices, doubled. This rapid increase in the overall level of income tells us much about the change in living standards, but it tells only part of the story. The extent to which the gains from economic growth have been diffused throughout the population is also important.

### SECULAR CHANGES

There are various ways of illustrating the distribution of income among persons and of measuring the amount of inequality in the distribution.

Since families typically pool their incomes, the distribution of family income is a particularly useful indicator of the distribution of economic well-being. One common measure of inequality shows the percentage share of aggregate money income before taxes received by each fifth of families ranked by income. Quite remarkably, relative income shares measured in this way have hardly varied in the 25 years between 1947 and 1972 (Table 34). Thus in a relative sense the rich were not getting richer and the poor were not getting poorer. In this period the average income of each quintile increased at much the same rate. If anything, there seems to have been a slight tendency towards greater equality, since the share of measured income received by the top 5 percent declined somewhat from 1947 to 1972. The decline in the income share of the top 5 percent may be a consequence of the secular decrease in the share of national income received by the owners of nonlabor factors of production.

TABLE 34.—*Share of aggregate income before taxes received by each fifth of families, ranked by income, selected years, 1947–72.<sup>1</sup>*

[Percent]					
Income rank	1947	1950	1960	1966	1972
Total families .....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Lowest fifth.....	5.1	4.5	4.8	5.6	5.4
Second fifth.....	11.8	11.9	12.2	12.4	11.9
Third fifth.....	16.7	17.4	17.8	17.8	17.5
Fourth fifth.....	23.2	23.6	24.0	23.8	23.9
Highest fifth.....	43.3	42.7	41.3	40.5	41.4
Top 5 percent.....	17.5	17.3	15.9	15.6	15.9

<sup>1</sup> The income (before taxes) boundaries of each fifth in 1972 were: lowest fifth—under \$5,612; second fifth—\$5,612–\$9,299; third fifth—\$9,300–\$12,854; fourth fifth—\$12,855–\$17,759; highest fifth—\$17,760 and over; top 5 percent—\$27,837 and over. Income includes wages and salaries, proprietors' income, interest, rent, dividends, and money transfer payments.

Note.—Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

The general impression that no significant trend has developed in the relative inequality of income among families is confirmed by other measures of inequality. For example, the variance of the natural logarithm of income, a measure which takes into account dispersion throughout all ranges of income, shows no trend in the dispersion of family income throughout the post-World War II period. (See the supplement to this chapter for an explanation of this measure.)

A family's income depends on the amount of work the different family members perform, on the earnings they receive, on the monetary return from property owned by the family, and on transfers received from the government. Underlying the distribution of family income then is the distribution of individuals' incomes. For males 35 to 44 years old or those 25 to 64 there is no trend during the post-World War II period in income inequality. However, in all years inequality is greater for the 25–64 age group than for the 35–44 age group, and this reflects the change in earnings with age. Thus, measures of inequality for broad age groups merge the inequality resulting

from differences between lifetime incomes with the inequality that results because individuals do not earn the same income in successive phases of their lives.

An increase does occur over time, however, in the inequality of income for males 14 years of age and over, and in the inequality of income for all members (male and female) of the labor force. The increasing inequality for all male workers and all workers results mainly from the greater proportion of workers with part-time and part-year work schedules, rather than from an increase in the inequality of wage rates. The growth of part-time and part-year work may to some extent be attributed to a shift in industrial composition towards the service industries, where flexible hours are more common, and partly to the increasing desire among workers for flexible schedules with shorter hours. Such schedules are particularly attractive to students, semi-retired older workers, and married women. Associated with the increasing importance of these groups in the labor force has been a secular increase in the variability of annual hours worked and consequently in the variability of annual income for the labor force as a whole.

Since most families (75 percent in 1972) are husband-wife families with a working husband, the stability in the dispersion of adult male incomes has been one factor leading to stability in the distribution of family income. The increase in the proportion of wives with earned income evidently did not lead to increases in the relative inequality of family income, partly because husbands' and wives' annual earnings have not been positively correlated. In the future, if a strong positive correlation between husbands' and wives' annual earnings should develop, this correlation could be a factor in increasing the relative income inequality among families.

#### *Stability of Income Inequality Among Adult Males*

It is striking that there has been no change in the relative inequality of income among adult males. The greater opportunities for schooling among persons at all income levels and the larger subsidies for training less advantaged persons might have been expected to reduce earnings inequality in the past 20 years, but the relation between equal access to training or schooling and earnings inequality is not so straightforward.

The post-World War II period has brought a narrowing of differences in years of schooling among adult males, and this alone generally decreases the inequality of lifetime income. In the same period, however, the level of schooling has greatly increased. A recent study suggests that at higher levels of schooling the relative dispersion of wage rates tends to be greater than at lower levels, and that the effects on income inequality of the higher level and of the smaller variance in years of schooling have somewhat offset each other.

Greater equality of opportunity could also lead to increases in income inequality if investments in schooling or training became more closely related to ability. Generally, more able people receive a higher money return on an equal investment in education. In a world where financial access to schooling and training depend on family income (and assuming that family income and

ability were not perfectly correlated), extending equal financial access to such investments for all people, regardless of income, could result in those with more ability investing more. In that case inequality could increase.

Obviously many factors other than education influence earnings. However, the distribution of adult males by age, marital status, health, and union membership, and the profitability of investments in school and post-school training, have been essentially stable over the past 25 years, and this stability has undoubtedly contributed to the stability of the income distribution.

#### CYCLICAL CHANGES

The inequality of income among families and among individuals fluctuates with the business cycle. Inequality increases in a recession and decreases in an expansion. During a recession, wage rates tend to be sticky, and there is no substantial change in the inequality of wage rates. However, layoffs increase and there is an increase in the relative inequality of weeks of employment. The increase in the relative inequality in weeks worked during a recession shows up both within and across demographic groups (age, sex, race, and schooling).

During a recession, unemployment within a group of the same skill, age, and other characteristics is not experienced uniformly; rather, in any one year it is likely to affect some workers to a disproportionate degree. Thus, an increasing rate and duration of unemployment have a greater effect on the weeks of employment of some workers than on others and result in a greater inequality of employment within the group.

A recession also intensifies the inequality of weeks of employment among groups with different characteristics. Workers with higher levels of skill—that is, more schooling and longer labor market experience—usually work more weeks per year at all stages of the business cycle. During recessions, however, the disemployment is relatively greater for workers with less skill. For this reason, in a recession one finds a larger inequality of weeks worked between skill groups than during a business cycle peak.

#### OMITTED SOURCES OF REAL INCOME AND THE INEQUALITY OF WELL-BEING

Because the concept of income used in the measures of inequality just presented omits some sources of real income, it gives an imperfect description of the resources that families actually command. The omitted items can be very important. They include the imputed value of rental income received by homeowners living in their own homes, as well as capital gains. Employee fringe benefits paid by the employer are omitted, and so is the monetary value to the recipient of Government transfers in kind, such as food stamps, medical benefits, and housing allowances. Many goods and services are produced at home and are excluded from these income measures because of the difficulty of placing a value on production outside the market. Families with a working husband and wife may thus have more

measured income than some families in which the wife confines her work to caring for the home and children, although the extra expenses or loss of leisure time of the working couple could mean that they are really less well off. Finally, the data used here refer to income received in one year before payroll and income taxes.

The reason for not including these sources of income in census surveys of consumer income is that they are all extremely difficult to measure for individuals or families. Several studies have attempted to measure the magnitude and distribution of the different items, but so far the net effect on income inequality of all the items cannot be stated with complete confidence. Nor can we say how past changes in the importance of the different omitted sources may have affected the true trend in income inequality.

TABLE 35.—*Income inequality under alternative definitions of income, 1968*

Definition of income	Income inequality <sup>1</sup>
1. Money income.....	0.75
2. Line 1 plus rental value of owner-occupied homes.....	.74
3. Line 2 plus nonmoney wages and nonmoney farm income.....	.69
4. Line 3 plus medicare payments.....	.62
5. Line 4 plus imputed interest from banks and insurance companies.....	.61
6. Line 5 plus other imputations <sup>2</sup> equals money income plus imputed income.....	.61
7. Line 6 less direct taxes equals disposable family personal income.....	.52

<sup>1</sup> Income inequality is measured by the variance in the natural log of income. (See supplement to this chapter.)  
The income classes used are: Under \$2,000; \$2,000-\$3,999; \$4,000-\$5,999; \$6,000-\$7,999; \$8,000-\$9,999; \$10,000-\$14,999; \$15,000-\$24,999; \$25,000-\$49,999; and \$50,000 and over.

<sup>2</sup> Other imputations include services furnished without payment by banks and insurance companies, military clothing, and miscellaneous other items.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census) and Council of Economic Advisers.

Table 35 presents estimates of the effect that some of these omitted sources of income would have had on measured income inequality. For convenience the basic measure of income dispersion used in the calculation is the variance in the natural logarithm of income (see supplement to this chapter). The measure is zero when there is perfect equality of income, and it increases for greater income inequality. However, while a reduction from 0.7 to 0.6 conveys an acceptable suggestion about a decline in inequality, and a decline from 0.7 to 0.5 an acceptable suggestion about a greater decline, the statement that the second of these two declines is twice the first would not be meaningful.

The rental value of owner-occupied dwellings can be imputed by assuming that it is proportional to the value of the house. When the imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings is added to money income, the inequality of family income does not change significantly. Although the imputed rental value of housing rises with money income, it does not rise as a percentage of income.

Farm wages and farm income received in kind (such as food and lodging) and medicare payments are generally concentrated among the poor, and they reduce income inequality. The inclusion of imputed interest from banks and insurance companies does not significantly change inequality. When personal income taxes and payroll taxes are deducted from money income plus imputed income, the dispersion of income declines.

Because of the extreme difficulties involved, no effort was made to compute the distribution of capital gains or losses among families. Nor was an effort made to remove the effect of transitory influences on income in any one year. Capital gains and losses, however, tend to be concentrated among upper-income families, and for years of net capital gains their inclusion in the income concept would clearly increase family income inequality. Several studies suggest that if accrued capital gains are included in income a very high proportion of families earn incomes falling in ranges in which the tax system is essentially proportional.

The huge growth in Federal food, medical, and other in-kind subsidies to the poor during the past 10 years would certainly reduce inequality if they were included in the income measures. In addition, families differ in their use of government-subsidized goods and services, such as manpower training programs, public schools, national parks, and roads, but the incidence of benefits by income level is not known.

#### *Family Composition and Work in the Labor Market*

Families vary considerably in the hours they work in the labor market to produce measured money income. The difficulty of imputing a value to work done at home has already been noted. The fact that a wife does not work in the market can be taken to mean that she considers her productivity at home to be of more value than what she could earn in the market. Knowing that she does not work in the labor market is not sufficient, however, to determine the money value of the wife's work at home.

Table 36 indicates roughly how families at three levels of income differ in their composition and work in the labor market, and how this has changed. In both 1952 and 1972, families in the lowest fifth were much more likely to be headed by a woman or by a person either less than 25 years of age or older than 65 years. Partly because of these differences in age and sex, the heads of lower-income families are less likely to participate in the labor market, and so are the other family members.

Such families consequently depend more on income from sources other than earnings, such as social security, other retirement incomes, and public assistance. By contrast, upper-income families generally have many earners per family and are more likely to include a wife who works. Presumably these families have less time for work at home, and they must buy with their earnings some of the services that would otherwise be produced at home.

TABLE 36.—*Selected characteristics of the lowest, middle, and highest fifths of families ranked by money income, 1952 and 1972*

[Percent]

Family characteristic	Lowest fifth		Middle fifth		Highest fifth	
	1952	1972	1952	1972	1952	1972
Total families.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Female head.....	22.0	32.0	7.1	7.1	4.8	3.2
Head under 25 years of age.....	7.1	13.2	6.0	7.5	1.3	1.6
Head 65 years of age and over.....	30.1	32.8	7.8	7.9	7.9	5.9
No earners.....	25.3	36.4	1.2	2.4	.6	.8
2 earners or more.....	22.4	20.6	36.7	57.0	66.3	74.0
Husband-wife families.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Wife in paid labor force.....	18.9	19.9	21.2	41.3	38.1	51.6
Mean number of children.....	1.14	1.09	1.43	1.35	1.10	1.25

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

These differences in the characteristics of families by income class have become more intense. They raise problems of interpretation which are important for public policy designed to influence the distribution of income. Some of these issues are discussed below in the section on poverty.

## DETERMINANTS OF DIFFERENCES IN EARNINGS AMONG INDIVIDUALS

Wage rates and annual labor market earnings of individuals vary considerably. Much of this variation can be related statistically to individual differences in measurable characteristics—schooling, post-school training, region of residence, and other demographic characteristics, as well as restrictions on entry into occupations. How far such unmeasurable characteristics as innate ability, diligence, personal attractiveness, and contacts explain the remaining differences is not known. Nor can it be ascertained how important luck is in determining the distribution of income.

Other aspects of earnings are not included in earnings data. Psychic earnings from having a pleasant job or living in a pleasant locality are not measurable. Earnings received by individuals in kind, such as free lodging and fringe benefits purchased by the employer, are measurable in principle, but difficult to measure in practice.

### SCHOOLING

Schooling is an important determinant of the distribution of earnings. Table 37 shows average usual weekly earnings for males 35 to 44 years of age who worked full time. Those with more schooling have substantially higher earnings; and this relation has been persistent in many different sets of data.

**TABLE 37.**—*Average usual weekly earnings of male workers 35–44 years of age who worked full time, by years of schooling and race, 1973*

Years of schooling	White	Negro and other races
0-4 .....	\$150	\$96
5-7 .....	173	149
8 .....	202	165
9-11 .....	211	165
12 .....	231	178
13-15 .....	265	209
16 .....	321	241
Over 16 .....	333	284

*Note.*—Data are from a survey made in May 1973.

A full-time worker is defined as one who usually works 35 hours or more per week.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

One suggested reason why schooling and earnings are positively related is that schooling increases a worker's productivity. A mobile labor force and competitive markets translate the increased productivity into higher income for the worker. To test the hypothesis that schooling increases productivity and thereby increases income, one must have some measure of productivity other than income itself. Several studies have investigated the association between schooling and the productivity of self-employed farmers, as well as the association between schooling and efficiency in household activities and in interregional migration, and in scores on standardized ability tests. They indicate that, controlling for other variables, those people with more schooling are more productive.

Some say that those capable of higher productivity receive more schooling and that business firms use the amount of schooling as a means of sorting out those capable of better performance. It is therefore important to distinguish between schooling as a means of changing productivity and schooling as a means of identifying the more productive members of the population. The sorting hypothesis implies that firms regard the number of years of schooling as an index of individual qualities that the educational system can identify more efficiently than they can. The educational system, according to this theory, is effective in attracting persons possessing these qualities and discouraging the schooling of those without these qualities. Empirical tests of the sorting hypothesis have not been conclusive.

#### POST-SCHOOL TRAINING

Another important aspect of training is experience acquired on the job after schooling is completed. On-the-job training can vary from formal training programs within the firm to the informal process of learning by doing. Thus, particularly at younger ages, a worker may be involved in a process of investment with returns accruing later on. For this reason earnings would rise as age increases.


Charts 8 and 9 give the results of two different procedures to find the relation between age and income for males. Chart 8 presents the age-income profiles of a group of men over time (cohort profile). For a cohort, income



Chart 8

## Real Income Profiles of Cohorts of Men Born in Selected Years

REAL ANNUAL INCOME (1967 DOLLARS) <sup>1/</sup>



<sup>1/</sup>MEDIAN TOTAL MONEY INCOME FOR EACH AGE DEFLATED BY THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

increases with age, but for adults it does so at a decreasing rate. Income increases with age because the workers are acquiring experience and because of the rising productivity of workers as technology improves and physical capital grows. The cohort profiles are higher for younger workers because they have not only more years of schooling but also the benefits that accompany a growth of technology and physical capital.


Chart 9 presents the age-income profiles obtained from plotting the income of males of different ages in the same time period (cross-sectional profile). The tipping down for the oldest age groups (45 to 54 and 55 to 64 years of age) of the cross-sectional profile for annual income reflects the lower income of retired persons and, compared to younger males, the lower level of schooling and obsolescence of knowledge of those older males still in the labor force.

There are too few comparable data to determine whether the cohort profiles are becoming steeper over time for adult males, although there are some

Chart 9

## Real Incomes for Men in Different Age Groups

REAL INCOME (1967 DOLLARS) <sup>1/</sup>



<sup>1/</sup>MEDIAN TOTAL MONEY INCOME FOR EACH AGE DEFLATED BY THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX.

SOURCES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

hints to that effect. Increased high school and college attendance has increased the slope of the age annual income profile for younger males. If better data in the future indicate a steepening over time in the slope of the age-income profile, a constant income inequality within a broad age interval would imply a narrowing of income inequality for each age in the interval.

The relation between age and usual weekly earnings in 1973 for males with 12 and 16 years of schooling is shown in Table 38. For the same level of schooling, usual weekly earnings generally increase with age. The age-earnings profiles are steeper for those with more schooling and thus suggest a positive association of schooling and on-the-job training. Because women are more likely to participate discontinuously in the labor force, entering and leaving several times during their lives, their post-school training does not necessarily rise steadily with age.

TABLE 38.—*Average usual weekly earnings of males who worked full time, by age and years of schooling, 1973*

Age	Years of schooling	
	12	16
20-24 years.....	\$158	\$170
25-34 years.....	201	238
35-44 years.....	226	317
45-54 years.....	227	347
55-64 years.....	227	323

Note.—Data are from a survey made in May 1973.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

## EMPLOYMENT

The annual labor market earnings of a worker are a function of the worker's weekly earnings and the number of weeks of employment during the year. Weeks of employment can vary because of unemployment; but they also vary because of voluntary withdrawals from the labor force.

The number of weeks worked is greater for male workers 25 to 54 years of age than for younger, older, or married female workers. Younger persons work less because of school attendance and a greater incidence of unemployment. Students (who now make up 59 percent of the teenage labor force) ordinarily work during vacations or have part-time jobs for a few months during the year. Most new entrants and reentrants to the labor force are young people or married women, and most also experience some unemployment before taking their first job. One reason for the higher unemployment rate for young workers is that they voluntarily leave jobs to acquaint themselves with the labor market and to gain experience in various jobs. In addition, the instability of their employment is increased by the fact that their productivity is very close to the legal minimum wage, and they have a smaller amount of specific job training.

Employers make investments specific to the firm for some workers. Specific investments include the component of training a worker receives that is useful only in that firm, and also hiring and placement costs. The more important specific training is, the more costly it is for both the firm and the worker if the worker is separated from the firm. Workers with more specific training are therefore less likely to be subjected to layoffs or to quit, and they will work more weeks during the year. Workers with advanced schooling ordinarily work more weeks during the year, partly because their higher wage makes absence from work more costly, and partly because they have more specific training.

Married men work more weeks per year than men who have not married, but married women work fewer weeks than those who have never married. Most married women work less if they have young children. Older workers work less because of deteriorating health and partial retirement.

The weekly wage and the number of weeks worked are related. Those who work more weeks per year tend to have a higher weekly wage, partly,

because they have acquired more experience. On the other hand, it has been suggested that the weekly wage for each week worked is higher in some seasonal occupations in which there are fewer weeks of employment during the year.

## EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN GROUPS

In the last quarter century there has been substantial public concern with the causes and consequences of the observed earnings differential between groups differentiated by race and sex. This discussion has focused on investments in training and current and past discrimination, as factors that may explain the differential.

### DISCRIMINATION

Discrimination is said to exist when two or more groups that are differentiated on the basis of some characteristic irrelevant to an objective measure of productivity are not granted equal treatment in a particular activity. The differentiating characteristic may be race, sex, ethnic origin, marital status, age, or physical appearance. Obviously some forms of discrimination give rise to more social concern than others. Discrimination may also take several forms: the way individuals and business firms behave in the market place for jobs, housing, credit, and other goods and services; and discriminatory taxation or public expenditure policies by government. It may be so closely interwoven with the culture of a society that the stereotyping of roles is accepted by all with little or no question.

The income and employment of an individual can be influenced by past and present discrimination. Past discrimination affects the years and quality of an individual's schooling and the path to his present occupation and training. Current discrimination affects incomes when two workers are given a different wage for the same productivity and restrictions are placed on a worker's occupational mobility.

It is important to distinguish between the differences caused by discrimination and those from other causes. Observed differences between the wages or occupational distribution in two groups of individuals may be due to discrimination or to factors entirely unrelated to discrimination. Because many important variables are not measurable, one cannot fully quantify the effects of past or present discrimination on earnings and occupational choice. What can be quantified, however, is the extent of observed differences between groups that remain after making allowance for what is measurable.

### RACE DIFFERENTIALS

Data on the income or occupations of white and black males and females indicate a substantial racial difference that has persisted for the last century.\*

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\*Almost 90 percent of nonwhites are blacks, but many of the available data do not distinguish between blacks and other nonwhites.

The relative income difference widened in recessions or depressions and narrowed during periods of economic expansion, particularly during World War II. Evidence is accumulating, however, that there has been a long-run narrowing of the racial income difference. According to one recent study, for example, the median wage and salary income of black males increased at an annual rate of 3.2 percent from 1947 to 1971, compared to an annual increase of 2.6 percent for white males. For black and white females the rates were 4.9 percent and 1.7 percent respectively. In spite of this narrowing, substantial racial income differences continue, particularly for males.

#### *Why the Differential Narrowed*

There are several reasons for the narrowing of the black-white earnings differential. Important changes have occurred in the relative schooling of blacks and whites. The substantial discrimination against blacks that was evident in the public school expenditures of many States appears to have ended. For this and other reasons there has been a dramatic increase in the level of schooling for blacks. The median number of years of schooling among black males 18 years old and over in the labor force increased between 1952 and 1971 by 4.2 years, to 11.4 years. For white males the increase was 1.7 years, to a level of 12.5 years. During the same period, black females in the labor force increased their level of schooling by 4 years, to 12.1 years, compared to an increase for white females of only 0.4 year, to 12.5 years.

The substantial migration of blacks out of the South and into States in the northern and western regions may also have influenced the relative increase in the earnings of blacks. In 1940, 77 percent of the black population lived in the South; by 1970, the proportion was 53 percent. Earnings are lower in the South than in other regions for all workers, but the difference is particularly great for black workers, and in the past the difference between earnings in the South and elsewhere was even more pronounced. Thus blacks could increase their earnings by moving out of the South. Although whites have an even greater propensity than blacks to migrate between States or regions, this greater regional earnings differential for blacks, coupled with their greater concentration in the South, provided an important way for blacks to improve their earnings. Blacks are likely to have increased their earnings relative to whites through migration, despite their somewhat lower geographic mobility.

The changing occupational structure and labor force status of the population was another factor influencing the rate of growth of earnings. The labor force participation rate of married white females increased at a faster rate than that of married black females. The entry into the labor force of white females with little experience and the growth of part-time employment slowed the rate of growth of earnings among white females. The proportion of black females employed as household workers declined from 43 percent in 1949 to 18 percent in 1969.

Two important factors served as catalysts enabling these changes to take place. First, the American economy is highly competitive, and business firms

whose owners or white workers have less discriminatory attitudes toward blacks will be likely to employ more blacks. These firms prosper if blacks receive lower wages. When such firms expand, the demand for black workers increases and the discriminatory differential declines.

Competition may not be a fully effective weapon against discrimination, however, if prejudice is very widespread. The second factor, working with the first, was a change in attitudes toward discrimination against blacks. This development improved the relative income and occupational status of blacks by directly reducing labor market discrimination. It also facilitated the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other Federal and State legislation as well as court decisions prohibiting discrimination in wages and employment. Such changes in the legal system made discrimination more costly and therefore lessened it. The reduction in discrimination in housing and in public accommodations brought about increased contact between blacks and whites and presumably expanded the information sources and job opportunities for blacks.

### *Dead-End Jobs*

There is a widespread belief that, compared to white males, black males are relegated to poorly paid, dead-end jobs—that is, jobs in which earnings are initially low and do not rise with experience. This view originated as a result of examining the relation between age and income for white and black males at a moment in time (cross-section). For example, reading down the columns of Table 39 indicates a substantial decline for older age groups in the income of black males relative to white males. The appropriate procedure for a study of life-cycle income, however, is to follow a group (cohort) as it ages, as is shown along the diagonals of Table 39. For each

TABLE 39.—*Income of Negro males as percent of income of white males, by type of income and age, 1949, 1959, and 1969*

[Percent]			
Type of income by age group	1949	1959	1969
<b>Annual income:</b>			
25-34 years.....	57	57	65
35-44 years.....	48	52	56
45-54 years.....	46	49	53
55-64 years.....	45	48	51
<b>Weekly income:</b>			
25-34 years.....	61	61	67
35-44 years.....	52	57	58
45-54 years.....	48	52	55
55-64 years.....	47	51	53

Note.—Data for 1949 and 1959 relate to Negro and races other than white and therefore are not strictly comparable with data for 1969 which relate to the Negro race only.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census) and Council of Economic Advisers.

cohort, the ratio of black to white annual and weekly incomes either did not decline at all with age from 1949 to 1969, or declined at an appreciably slower rate than in the cross-section. Thus, experience appears to have a

similar relative effect on the incomes of white and black males. Although some black and some white males may be in dead-end jobs, this is not the situation of the average black or white worker.

### Current Differentials

Although the earnings differential between black and white females has become quite small, the differential that still exists between the earnings of black and white males is substantial. It does narrow, however, when the comparison is restricted to the States outside the South, and when differences in years of schooling are taken into account (Table 40). A further narrowing of the differential occurs if the comparison is restricted to married men. There are large differences in marital status between blacks and whites. In March 1972, 78 percent of white males 20 years old and over were married and living with their wives, compared to 61 percent for black males. Among both white and black males, marital status is closely related to earnings, married men having higher earnings than those not currently married. How the division of labor within the family affects the earnings of married men and women is discussed at greater length in the next section.

TABLE 40.—*Earnings of Negroes as a percent of earnings of whites, for persons 25–64 years of age, 1969*

Type of earnings by sex and region	All persons			Married, spouse present		
	All levels of schooling	High school graduate	College graduate or more	All levels of schooling	High school graduate	College graduate or more
<b>EARNINGS OF MEN</b>						
Annual earnings:						
All regions.....	60	68	71	61	61	72
South.....	53	60	64	55	61	( <sup>2</sup> )
North and West <sup>1</sup> .....	69	74	78	70	76	79
Hourly earnings:						
All regions.....	67	73	79	68	76	81
South.....	60	64	71	60	65	( <sup>2</sup> )
North and West <sup>1</sup> .....	77	81	87	79	85	93
<b>EARNINGS OF WOMEN</b>						
Annual earnings:						
All regions.....	80	93	104	88	102	108
South.....	69	80	105	75	88	112
North and West <sup>1</sup> .....	94	102	111	105	112	108
Hourly earnings:						
All regions.....	89	99	119	91	107	95
South.....	82	76	128	76	79	88
North and West <sup>1</sup> .....	101	118	109	111	128	107

<sup>1</sup> Includes Northeast and North-central.

<sup>2</sup> Fewer than 50 persons in the sample.

Note.—Education, region, marital status and age relate to 1970.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census) and Council of Economic Advisers.

Several factors can be mentioned to explain why black males still receive lower earnings than white males after adjustment for schooling, age, region, and marital status. Prior investments made in the child at home are important in determining the extent to which a student benefits from schooling. Black youths are more likely to come from poorer homes where the parents have less schooling, to have poorer diets, and to be less healthy. They are likely to start school with fewer advantages and skills than the typical white youth. Moreover, at least in the past, there was discrimination against black youths in public school expenditures. Later on, as adults, blacks have poorer health, and may have poorer information about better jobs. Some of the current wage differences may thus be a consequence of past discrimination. Many factors, such as health and information about labor markets, are difficult to measure, however, and their actual effects on earnings differences between blacks and whites have not been quantified. One cannot then reliably measure the extent of the occupational and wage rate discrimination that now exists, or the effect that current discrimination has on earnings.

### SEX DIFFERENTIALS

In 1972 the median annual earnings of women 14 years old and over who did full-time, year-round work were about 58 percent of that of full-time, year-round male workers. This low ratio cannot be taken as a measure of current market discrimination, however, since the average full-time work-week is shorter for women than for men, and their life time work experience has been vastly different.

#### *Specialization and Working Women*

Although the pattern is changing rapidly, the traditional economic organization of the family has been marked by a specialization of function: women tend to specialize in the work associated with child care and keeping up the home; men tend to specialize in labor market employment. In the past, when it was typical for families to have more children than they now do, this specialization of function was undoubtedly an efficient arrangement. Whether it now reflects societal discrimination or efficiency is a matter for speculation.

In many families a lesser degree of specialization and a greater sharing of home and labor market activities have come to be the preferred form of family organization, and women's participation in the labor force has increased greatly. In 1950, 28 percent of married women 35 to 44 years of age were in the labor force; in 1972 the proportion was 49 percent. However, most married men still work nearly continuously during their prime working years; and the labor force participation rate of married men from 25 to 55 years of age is over 95 percent.

The work histories of individual women cannot be ascertained from current labor force rates; special surveys are needed to provide informa-



tion about lifetime work experience. The National Longitudinal Survey (NLS), a large data source sponsored by the Department of Labor, has recently become available and provides much more detailed information on the work histories of women than has ever been previously compiled. The survey indicates that in 1967, among married women 30 to 44 years old with children, only 3 percent had worked at least 6 months every year since leaving school. On the average, married women worked at least 6 months in 40 percent of their years after leaving school, but the work was not likely to be continuous.

One study which used the NLS showed that earnings of women do rise with experience and that continuity of experience, as opposed to intermittent participation, commands a premium. Withdrawal from the labor force for a time resulted in a decline in earnings when work resumed, since previously accumulated skills, or human capital, actually depreciate during extended periods away from work. For the married women in the sample, the hourly wage rate was about 66 percent of that of married men in the same age group (30–44 years) in the same year (1966), after controlling for differences in years of schooling. At least half of the 34 percent differential resulted from differences in their measured experience. The remaining differential is unexplained.

It is not known to what extent current discrimination, as opposed to other unmeasured factors, contributed to this differential. For example, the study could not provide direct measures of the nature of the investments made in the productivity of women and men, other than years of formal schooling. Women do not appear to obtain as much training on the job as men for the same length of time in the labor force. Thus, although women's earnings rise with experience, the study found that they do not rise as steeply as men's. This difference could result partly from a faulty measurement of a year's experience for women; as noted above, in these data a year's work could be as little as 6 months of part-time employment. However, the measured effect of experience could also be interpreted as the result of discrimination. That is, employers may deny a woman on-the-job training or a promotion because of her sex, sometimes from sheer prejudice, sometimes because they think a woman is more likely to quit for personal reasons. One can also surmise that women themselves may not choose to invest in training at a cost of either lower current earnings or additional hours of work, when the payoff might be lost because of the uncertainty of their future work patterns.

For example, women in school have a lower enrollment rate in programs oriented toward the labor market—engineering, accounting, electronics—and a higher enrollment rate in courses that may be more applicable to work or leisure in the home—child development, languages, literature. This pattern may reflect greater uncertainty among women about their future attachment to the labor force. A choice of field of study may also be influenced

by social pressures, however, which make women feel less feminine and men feel less masculine if they enroll in courses traditionally selected by the other sex.

The study also relates lifetime work history to earnings for women who never married. A year's experience has a much greater effect on single women's earnings than on those of married women. Single women work much more continuously than married women, though less so than married men. Some single women may choose not to make investments related to work because they expect to marry. But many look forward to careers and may therefore delay marriage or never marry at all. This career orientation is consistent with the relatively greater number of years of schooling completed by single women compared to those who marry. It is also consistent with their observed higher earnings. Estimates of hourly wage and salary earnings from 1970 census data show that women 45 to 54 years of age who had never married earned 20 percent more than married women, and 28 percent less than married men, but only 2 percent less than men who had never married.

There is then also a differential between the earnings of married and single men, and it may be taken as another illustration of how specialization within families may affect career patterns and earnings. Single men have somewhat lower labor force participation rates; they also work fewer hours per year than married men. In part this may result from a higher incidence of disability, which influences both marriage and work. Although they have greater work participation than married women, single women also have higher disability rates than married women.

Because of differences in life-cycle participation in the labor force by women and men, the experience of women does not bear the same relationship to age as it does for men. Many women who have entered or reentered the market at older ages are really beginners. Men's earnings are at their peak when the men reach an older age, but women's earnings will represent a mixture in which a small minority have high earnings because of their considerable experience, but the majority have earnings closer to those at the start of a career. As age increases, it is therefore not surprising that the earnings differential between women and men widens. For example, a comparison of usual weekly earnings of workers who worked 35 hours a week or more in 1973 shows that the ratio of women's earnings to men's earnings declined from 0.70 at ages 20-24 to 0.59 at ages 45-54 for high school graduates. Of course the earnings ratios at older ages reflect the work histories of different cohorts of women. If the younger women maintain a greater attachment to the labor force during their lifetime (and there is some evidence that this is the case), then the ratio of women's earnings to men's may not decline as much with age in the future.

Differences in lifetime work experience also seem to explain why the ratio of black women's earnings to those of white women exceeds the ratio of earnings of black men to those of white men (Table 40). Indeed, in the

regions outside the South, within educational levels, black women earn more than white women. The differential between whites and blacks in quality of schooling, family background, and discrimination can be assumed to be similar for women and men. Black women have a much greater life-cycle attachment to the labor force, however, than white women do, although this differential is largely confined to married women. For example, in 1972 among women 35 to 44 years of age, with 4 years of high school or more, 71 percent of the black women were in the labor force, compared to 53 percent of the white women.

The greater tendency of black married women to work, compared to white married women, may be due in part to the relatively lower earnings of their husbands. Partly because of the relatively high earnings and work participation of black wives, the ratio of annual income of black husband-wife families to that of white husband-wife families is higher than the ratio of black men's to white men's income. For families headed by males 35 to 44 years old the ratio in 1969 was 75 percent, compared to 56 percent for males alone (Tables 39 and 41).

TABLE 41.—*Median income of Negro husband-wife families as percent of white husband-wife families, by region and age of husband, 1959, 1969, and 1972*

Age of husband	[Percent]				
	1959	1969	1972		
			Total	South	North and West <sup>1</sup>
All families.....	57	72	76	69	86
Under 35 years.....	62	80	85	84	93
35-44 years.....	60	75	76	67	80
45-54 years.....	55	66	71	63	78
55-64 years.....	51	62	59	53	79
65 years and over.....	57	65	72	67	98

<sup>1</sup> Includes Northeast and North-central.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

### *Trends in the Earnings Differential*

Much has been made of the rather puzzling observation that the ratio of earnings of all women to those of all men has declined during the past 20 years. This observation refers to annual earnings, or the earnings of full-time, year-round workers who are not necessarily representative of the total. But average hours and weeks worked during the year fell for women relative to men from 1949 to 1969. If annual wages and salaries are divided by total hours worked during the year, the result is a much modified decline in the hourly wage of women relative to the hourly wage of men (Table 42).

An additional factor which would produce a relative decline in women's earnings is the relative decline in their general educational level and their labor market experience during the period. In 1950, women in the labor force had on the average more schooling than men did; but this advantage

TABLE 42.—*Relation of wage and salary earnings and of total money earnings of women to those of men, 1949, 1959, and 1969*

Type of earnings	Earnings of women as percent of earnings of men		
	1949	1959	1969
Mean wage and salary earnings: <sup>1</sup>			
Annual.....	56	50	47
Hourly.....	67	66	63
Hourly adjusted for education <sup>2</sup> .....	63	65	63
Mean total money earnings: <sup>1</sup>			
Annual.....	(3)	48	46
Hourly.....	(3)	65	62
Hourly adjusted for education <sup>2</sup> .....	(3)	64	62

<sup>1</sup> Earnings for any year are for those in the experienced labor force the following year.

<sup>2</sup> Approximate adjustment based on differences in the educational distributions of men and women in the labor force in 1950, 1960, and 1970.

<sup>3</sup> Not available.

Source: Council of Economic Advisers.

was eliminated by 1970. Since education has an effect on earnings—both men's and women's earnings increase with education—it is important to take these changes into account. An approximate adjustment for educational level increases the differential in 1949 and 1959, because women in the labor force then had more education than men. After the educational adjustment, the differential shows little change from 1949 to 1969.

What has not been accounted for is the experience differential between men and women. As has been explained above, this difference seems to be the most important factor causing a divergence in hourly earnings. But since the labor force participation of women, particularly married women, was increasing rapidly during the period, it is very likely that the constant flow of entrants into the labor force resulted in a decline in the average experience of women in the labor force during the 20 years.

The foregoing suggests that if we could compare women and men with a given amount of experience and education the ratio of women's hourly earnings to men's might well show an increase over the 20 years—a narrowing in the gap. This would, of course, be compatible with the fact that women have dramatically increased their participation in the labor force during the past 20 years. The rapidly increasing opportunities offered them would be one reason why they have done so.

## OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENCES

The occupational distribution of blacks differs from that of whites. In 1970, for example, 27 percent of employed white males and 9 percent of employed black males were managers or professionals, whereas 7 percent of white males and 19 percent of black males were hired farm or nonfarm laborers; and 18 percent of employed black females were domestic household workers, compared to only 2 percent of white females. There is also consid-

erable occupational segregation by sex, and some believe that the sex segregation is even greater than the racial segregation. For example, 83 percent of managers and 87 percent of farm laborers were men; but only 3 percent of nurses and 16 percent of elementary school teachers were men.

Occupational segregation by race derives partly from differences in schooling and partly from the geographical distribution of blacks, who disproportionately live in the South. Moreover, there has been substantial discrimination against blacks who entered, or tried to enter, certain occupations. This discrimination, stemming from the attitudes of white employers, employees, and consumers of services, resulted in a smaller proportion of blacks entering these occupations. In some professions—for example, medicine, law, and the ministry—blacks were generally restricted to practicing in segregated black markets. In addition, blacks were not always granted equal opportunity to move up the occupational scale—for example, from laborer or operative to foreman or manager.

Some of the differences in occupational composition by sex can be attributed to differences in physical attributes. Undoubtedly, however, jobs requiring physical strength are on the decline, and it is questionable whether this factor was ever very important. One may also argue that prejudice on the part of employers, fellow employees, and consumers operates to exclude women from some activities in the labor market and to favor them in others.

Another hypothesis stresses the difference in role identification that leads to differences between the work careers and training of women and men. That is, women who anticipate combining some work with marriage seek occupations and work situations which are most complementary to home responsibilities, such as those in which hours are shorter or correspond to the children's school hours, or those offering work close to home. Another criterion is the penalty for interruptions in work. For example, women might avoid situations with rigid seniority rules, or they might choose careers in which skills are least likely to depreciate during a period spent at home. Some of the occupations stereotyped as women's, such as elementary school teaching and nursing, are indeed those where the same skills can be utilized in the home. According to this view occupational differences arise from choice, although the choice may be induced by a pervasive societal bias which dictates that home responsibilities are the women's major work. It is quite difficult to separate empirically the effects of discrimination in the labor market from the effects of personal considerations in women's occupational choices.

One may question whether the wage rates received by blacks and women have been affected by the occupational segregation. Earnings differ from occupation to occupation. If blacks or women were clustered in occupations that were low paying for all groups, including white males, then the lower average hourly earnings of blacks and women could be attributed to dif-

ferences in their mix of occupations, rather than to earnings differences within individual occupations. To estimate the effect of occupational mix on the earnings of black males, indexes were calculated to measure what black males would earn if they had the white male occupational distribution but the earnings of black males within each occupation. Similar indexes were computed to measure what white women would earn if they had the same occupational distribution as white men, but the earnings of white women within occupations.

Preliminary results, using 1970 census data on 443 detailed occupations, indicate that black males would have hourly earnings about 18 percent higher if they had the white male mix of occupations. Since white males earned 50 percent more than black males, occupational differences would appear to "explain" 35 percent of the differential. However, those with high levels of education have a very different occupational distribution compared to those with lower levels of education. Hence it may be that in adjusting for occupation one is really adjusting for education. Indexes calculated for separate education groups indicate a much smaller explanatory power of occupation. For example, among males who completed 12 to 15 years of schooling, the earnings of black workers would be increased by only 8 percent if they were given the white occupational distribution, and this would account for 22 percent of the race differential in earnings.

Comparing white women and white men 25 to 64 years old, the preliminary results for 1970 indicate that women would increase their earnings by about 11 percent if they had the occupational mix of men, and this would account for about 21 percent of the gross earnings differential between women and men. Since women have completed roughly the same average years of schooling as men, education would not be expected to interact so strongly with occupation. Within education groups, occupational mix seems to explain less for women below the college level than for women as a whole, but relatively more at the college level.

Since occupation alone does not explain very much of the overall earnings differential between men and women, it would seem that earnings differentials within occupations, as they are now defined, must be more important than earnings differentials between occupations. In other words, if custom or overt barriers to entry have relegated women to different occupations from those of men, this factor has not been the major one in lowering their earnings.

It has already been noted that earnings differences between women and men are in large part a consequence of differences in lifetime labor market experience. Since earnings differences between occupations may also be influenced by sex differences in the extent of post-school training between occupations, it may be necessary to make a distinction between the explanatory power of occupational mix per se and the explanatory power of occupational differences in experience. This requires data not currently available.

In conclusion, it appears that the different occupational distributions of white men, compared to black men and white women, explain at most about one-fourth of the existing earnings differentials between them. Because occupational differences can also be explained by other factors that differ between the races and the sexes, such as labor market experience (post-school training), and region, the true effect of occupation may be much smaller.

## THE LOW-INCOME POPULATION

The Government has assumed an ever larger role in helping to see that those in need reach an adequate standard of living; and a considerable share of the Federal budget is now devoted directly and indirectly to that end.

### THE DEFINITION OF POVERTY

There is not, and probably never will be, a consensus on any one definition of poverty. Many programs require, however, that we distinguish those who fall below a minimum income standard; and, accordingly, the concept of the low-income or poverty threshold has been developed. The Government concept is defined essentially as an amount about three times the estimated cost of a nutritionally adequate diet. The standard is adjusted for differences in family size, sex of family head, number of children, and farm-nonfarm residence; and different schedules are set for each group. The standard for each group is adjusted each year for changes in the overall consumer price index. Thus, the average threshold for a nonfarm family of four increased from \$2,973 in 1959 to \$4,275 in 1972.

Because the poverty threshold is, in real dollars, an absolute standard, it cannot be used to measure changes in the relative inequality of income. Indeed, as the average real income level of the population increases, the poverty standard lags farther behind the average. Thus the poverty threshold for a family of four declined from about 55 percent of median family income in 1959 to 38 percent in 1972.

Only cash income is used in determining low-income status, although a crude implicit adjustment is made for food grown at home by farm families. It has not been feasible to take account of the tremendous growth in the number and size of transfers in kind, such as public housing, food stamps, child care, and medical care. For example, in 1972, Federal and State government expenditures per poor person on the food subsidy and medicaid programs alone, valued at cost, were equal to about 50 percent of the money income of the average person in the low-income category.

It would be extremely difficult to determine the exact incidence or value of all the benefits. The programs for the low-income population are administered by different agencies and jurisdictions, they also have different aims and are distributed to somewhat different target populations. Moreover, the income in kind cannot be considered a perfect substitute, dollar for dollar, for cash income. For example, a public expenditure of \$100 a month

for public housing may be valued by the poor family at considerably less than \$100. Nevertheless, it seems safe to conclude that some low-income families with in-kind benefits are receiving real incomes in excess of the low-income threshold and that the proportion exceeding the threshold has increased with the growth of the programs. On the other hand, some persons classified as above the low-income threshold, who receive no in-kind benefits and who have unusual expenses—for example, because of poor health—may have their real income position overstated.

### THE DECREASE IN POVERTY

There has been a rapid decline in the number and proportion of persons in families with a cash income below the poverty line (Table 43). In 1972, 12 percent of all persons were classified as low income, compared to 22 percent in 1959. In all years the incidence of poverty is greater among blacks than among whites and much greater among female-headed families than among male-headed families. Since 1959 the decline in poverty has been particularly marked for both black and white male-headed families.

TABLE 43.—Persons below the low-income level and percent below the low-income level by family status, selected years, 1959–72

Family status	1959	1966	1969	1971	1972
Total persons below the low-income level (thousands).....	39, 490	28, 510	24, 147	25, 559	24, 460
Group below low-income level as percent of all persons in group:					
Total persons.....	22. 4	14. 7	12. 1	12. 5	11. 9
65 years and over.....	(1)	28. 5	(1)	21. 6	18. 6
Unrelated individuals.....	46. 1	38. 3	34. 0	31. 6	29. 0
Persons in families with male head:					
White.....	14. 7	8. 0	6. 0	6. 2	5. 6
Negro and other races.....	51. 0	31. 2	19. 8	19. 1	18. 5
Persons in families with female head:					
White.....	40. 2	29. 7	29. 1	30. 4	27. 4
Negro and other races.....	75. 6	64. 6	57. 8	55. 6	57. 7

<sup>1</sup> Not available.

Note.—Persons below the low-income level are those falling below the poverty index adopted by the Federal Interagency Committee in 1969. See text for explanation of index.

Years are not exactly comparable because of changes in definition and methodology.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

The principal factor behind the decline in poverty is economic growth. The basic forces underlying economic growth have raised the productivity of even the least skilled worker and have enabled millions of workers to rise above the low-income threshold through higher wage rates for those in the labor force. In addition, economic growth has increased the labor force participation of wives by increasing their labor market wage relative to the cost of consumer durables and other substitutes for time in the home. Thus the decline in poverty has been most pronounced for the working poor. In



1959, 14.6 percent of family heads who worked at all, and 9.4 percent of those who worked full time, year round were classified as low income; by 1972, the percentages had dropped to 6.0 and 2.9 percent respectively. Those heads of families who do not work but are no longer in poverty have benefited from increases in social security and pension income, which were made possible by economic growth.

More and more the low-income population is composed of families headed by a person who does not work because of disability, age, responsibilities in the home, or perhaps simply inability to cope with work (Table 44). Unemployment, perhaps surprisingly, does not play a major role in withdrawal from the labor force. Of those low-income family heads who did not work in 1972, 4.8 percent cited inability to find work as the reason for not working. Thus, the vast majority of the poor who do not work seem to be in a situation where work is not a feasible alternative. For some the inability to work is a permanent condition, but for others it may be temporary.

TABLE 44.—*Work experience of family heads below the low-income level by sex, 1959 and 1972*

Work experience of head	Total		Male head		Female head	
	1959	1972	1959	1972	1959	1972
Total families (thousands).....	8, 320	5, 075	6, 404	2, 917	1, 916	2, 158
Total families (percent).....	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0	100. 0
Worked <sup>1</sup> .....	67. 5	53. 5	74. 9	64. 9	42. 9	38. 1
50-52 weeks, full time.....	31. 5	19. 8	37. 6	29. 4	10. 9	6. 9
1-49 weeks, part time or full time.....	31. 0	30. 1	32. 1	31. 3	27. 1	28. 5
Worked part of year because unemployed.....	14. 4	11. 1	17. 3	14. 9	4. 9	5. 8
Did not work.....	30. 5	45. 9	22. 5	34. 0	57. 1	61. 9
Unable to find work.....	1. 2	2. 2	1. 0	1. 9	1. 5	2. 6
Keeping house.....	10. 9	19. 0	(2)	(2)	47. 5	44. 7
Ill, disabled, retired, and other.....	18. 3	24. 6	21. 5	32. 2	8. 1	14. 6
Head in Armed Forces.....	1. 9	. 6	2. 5	1. 0	(2)	(2)

<sup>1</sup> Includes those who worked part-time hours for 50-52 weeks, not shown separately.

<sup>2</sup> Not reported.

Note.—Persons below the low-income level are those falling below the poverty index adopted by the Federal Interagency Committee in 1969. See text for explanation of index.

Data for 1959 and 1972 are not exactly comparable because of changes in definition and methodology.

Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

## THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR

As the population in poverty has come to include a smaller proportion of families with a working adult, the demographic characteristics of the poor have changed. Male-headed families have decreased as a proportion of all poor families—dropping from 77 percent in 1959 to 57 percent in 1972—because male family heads are more likely to work than female family heads. The proportion of low-income families headed by a female has increased sharply from 1959 to 1972, from 23 to 43 percent for all females and from

8 to 20 percent for black females. In part this trend results from an increase in the proportion of all families headed by a woman, from 10 percent in 1959 to 12 percent in 1972. However, while the incidence of poverty among female-headed families declined in this period, it did not decline nearly as fast as for families headed by a male.

### *The Male-Headed Family*

Among male-headed families, the presence of children has a direct influence on poverty status, since for a given income the more children there are, the higher the poverty-income threshold. Children also indirectly affect the family's income, because it is more difficult for a wife to work outside the home when young children are present. In 1972, 31 percent of low-income families with a male head had three or more children, compared to 17 percent for families above the poverty line. The presence of a working wife can bring an otherwise poor family above the poverty line. Only 22 percent of the wives in low-income families headed by a male worked in 1972, compared to 48 percent of wives in families above the poverty line.

The number of children and the work experience of wives are also important variables affecting the ability of the poor to move up from poverty. One longitudinal survey which followed the poverty status of a cohort for 5 years, starting in 1967, found that about 20 percent of nonaged families headed by a male experienced steady income increases and ended the period out of poverty. This group had significantly fewer children than those who remained poor during those 5 years, and a larger proportion of wives who increased their labor market work over the period. However, a period of 5 years is too short to determine whether this group is permanently upwardly mobile or simply experiences long-term fluctuations in its income position.

Low earnings, per se, are still an important reason for poverty among male-headed families. Educational levels are very low for this group. In 1972 only 29 percent were high school graduates or better, compared to 63 percent among other male family heads. As might be expected, the poor were also much more concentrated in low-income jobs, particularly farming: 20 percent of employed men heading low-income families were farmers or farm laborers, compared to 4 percent among those not poor. In the future, as the level of education rises and as productivity change continues to increase earnings, one would expect that the incidence of poverty (under a fixed standard) may come close to disappearing for this group.

### *The Aged Poor*

The population 65 or more years old increased as a percentage of the poor from 1959 to 1970. Since then, however, the incidence of poverty has dropped sharply for this group, from 24.6 percent in 1970 to 18.6 percent in 1972, and the aged represent a declining proportion of the poor. This rapid change is primarily due to across-the-board increases in social security

benefits of about 50 percent from 1970–72. Since 1972 there has been further expansion in social security benefits. The increase in a widow's benefits to 100 percent of her deceased husband's benefits should reduce the extent of poverty among widows.

Undoubtedly, however, cash income understates real consumption by the aged poor compared to that of the other poor. Many of the aged have income in the form of imputed rents from owner-occupied homes. Elderly people often consume out of past savings, and many widows receive life insurance benefits which are not included in income data. In addition, compared to others classified as poor, the aged poor derive a larger proportion of their measured income from sources which are not taxed, such as social security and some pension income. The aged also have fewer expenses related to employment. The aged benefit disproportionately from medicare and medicaid, which are not counted in money income statistics, although in this case obviously their need is often greater because of poorer health. Even excluding the benefits of medicare and medicaid, however, it would appear that on average a two-person aged family may have a higher level of consumption than a two-person family which has the same measured cash income but whose members are under age 65.

### *The Female-Headed Family*

Perhaps the most important issue concerning poverty status in this country is the increasing identification of poverty with the female-headed family. Future progress in eliminating poverty will depend in large part on the extent to which poverty can be reduced for this group. If the proportion of families headed by women continues to increase, the problem may become still more difficult. Among families with a female head, 33 percent were classified as in poverty in 1972, compared to 6 percent for male-headed families. Among black female-headed families the proportion was 53 percent. The factors behind this very high incidence of poverty among families headed by women are complex.

As discussed earlier, the average married woman has not had the same labor market experience or vocationally oriented training as her husband. Since the incidence of marital breakup is greater among less educated couples, the woman who becomes a family head is more likely to have assumed during her marriage the traditional role of caring for children and the home, and she is less likely to have had work experience. Women who have children without having married tend to be young, with little work experience or formal education. Earnings for women in these circumstances tend to be much lower than for men of the same age and to be lower even than the earnings of other women, particularly those with considerable education. Moreover, the expenses of going to work are higher for a person with sole responsibility for child care. It is thus clear that if work is to be a sensible option in the single-parent family, earnings (after taxes) must be

sufficiently high to cover the additional costs of child care and other home expenses.

Not surprisingly, poverty status among women is strongly related to presence of children and to work participation. As noted above, among women in general the presence of children, particularly young children, has a strong inhibiting effect on work participation. About 70 percent of female family heads under 65 years of age have children under age 18. As one would also expect, mothers who head families are more likely to work than mothers living with their husbands. In 1972, 30 percent of the former and 17 percent of the latter worked full time, the year round. However, mothers heading families are much less likely than men to work full time, the year round. Among males heading families, the proportion was 68 percent.

Of the small proportion of female family heads with children who did have full-time, year-round jobs in 1972, 9.5 percent were in poverty, a markedly lower incidence than the 42 percent for all female family heads with children. One cannot, however, infer from this statistic that poverty would fall to that level for all women with children if they did full-time, full-year work. It is likely that those women who work extensively are relatively more productive in the labor market because of higher educational attainment, greater work experience in the past, or greater ability.

The poverty status of female-headed families is often the result of a marital breakup, and this situation is temporary for many. One longitudinal study which followed the poverty status of a cohort over a 5-year period, starting in 1967, discovered that of those persons in nonaged female-headed families who were poor at the start of the period, 27 percent experienced consistent increases in income and had moved out of poverty by the end of the period. (The comparable percentage for male-headed families was 20 percent.) Remarriage of the female family head was the primary factor associated with this upward mobility.

About 32 percent of the persons in female-headed families who started as poor in 1967 remained poor throughout the 5 years. The demographic characteristics associated with this more permanently poor group were low education, a large number of children, and residence in low-wage, rural areas with low public assistance payments. For this group, the high costs of child care and poor prospects of high earnings suggest that training and increased work in the labor market by the female family head could not be relied on as a route out of poverty.

The remaining 41 percent of persons in female-headed families who started in poverty moved in and out of poverty during the 5-year period. A large part of this change in poverty status was associated with a change in household arrangements.

Because of the lower work participation of low-income female heads of families, the major source of income for this group is public assistance. In 1972, public assistance accounted on the average for 51 percent of the income of low-income, female-headed families. Many in-kind benefits are given automatically to families receiving public assistance, specifically those in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, which is largely a program for female-headed families. Moreover, because public assistance income is not taxed, the real consumption of female-headed families is probably understated, compared to that of husband-wife families whose income depends more heavily on earnings.

The increase in female-headed families may, per se, be an important variable in determining the size of the poverty population in future years. There is some evidence, discussed below, that our system of welfare payments, which has been an important way of increasing income for mothers heading families, may itself have promoted some of the increase in female-headed families through the structure of incentives. This is clearly an important issue in the future design of transfer payments to the poor.

## GOVERNMENT TRANSFER PROGRAMS

All expenditures by government, directly or indirectly, have implications for the distribution of income. Analyses can be made of the direct income distribution effect of public transfers. It is far more difficult to identify the income distribution effects of other government expenditures.

Some of the transfer programs were initially viewed as public insurance mechanisms. Social security was intended as a public pension plan. Unemployment compensation and workmen's compensation are government mandated insurance. Veterans' compensation and benefits were adopted as a form of deferred payment for military service. Public assistance was and is explicitly intended as a mechanism for raising the income of those families that would otherwise fall below a socially desired level of consumption.

### FEDERAL TRANSFERS IN 1973

The Government gives transfers to individuals and families in the form of cash or subsidization of the price of particular goods and services. Of the two, transfers in cash are easier to administer, and they also have the advantage that the recipients presumably know better than the Government does how to allocate the transfer income so as to maximize their own well-being. Some transfers are given in kind, however, on the presumption that the goods are of such importance that the recipients should consume at least a minimum quantity. Food, medical care, and housing are examples.

Table 45 presents a summary of the Federal Government transfer expenditures in fiscal 1973. The poverty status of recipients is based on money income, including cash transfers but excluding the value of transfers in kind.

TABLE 45.—Federal Government transfer programs, fiscal year 1973

Program	Total expenditure (millions of dollars)	Number of recipients (thousands)	Monthly benefits per recipient <sup>1</sup>	Percent of recipients in poverty <sup>2</sup>
<b>Social Security:</b>				
Old age and survivors insurance.....	42,170	25,205	\$139	16
Disability insurance.....	5,162	3,272	132	24
<b>Public assistance:</b>				
Aid to families with dependent children.....	3,617	10,980	( <sup>3</sup> )	76
Blind.....	56	78	( <sup>3</sup> )	62
Disabled.....	766	1,164	( <sup>3</sup> )	73
Aged.....	1,051	1,917	( <sup>3</sup> )	60
<b>Other cash programs:</b>				
Veterans' compensation and benefits.....	1,401	7,203	74	( <sup>4</sup> )
Unemployment insurance benefits.....	4,404	5,409	68	( <sup>4</sup> )
<b>In kind:</b>				
Medicare.....	9,039	10,600	71	17
Medicaid.....	4,402	23,537	( <sup>3</sup> )	70
Food stamps.....	2,136	12,639	14	92
Public housing.....	1,408	3,319	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>4</sup> )
Rent supplements.....	106	373	24	( <sup>4</sup> )
Homeownership assistance (section 235).....	282	1,647	14	( <sup>4</sup> )
Rental housing assistance (section 236).....	170	513	28	( <sup>4</sup> )

<sup>1</sup> The number of recipients is for individuals, not families.

<sup>2</sup> Poverty is defined relative to the money income and the size of the recipient's family. Money income includes money transfer payments but excludes income received in kind. All percents are estimated.

<sup>3</sup> Programs with Federal-State sharing of expenses.

<sup>4</sup> Not available.

Source: Office of Management and Budget.

## AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is now the primary cash assistance program run by the States with Federal assistance.

### Eligibility

The original purpose of the program was to assist children in families where there was need for income because of the death, severe disability, or prolonged absence of the father. The financial aid was intended to enable mothers to stay at home and care for their children, rather than be compelled to work. If the mother did work, her welfare payments were generally reduced by one dollar for each dollar earned, a provision that eliminated the pecuniary incentive for her to go to work. Families with an able-bodied father present who earned little income were not eligible for any federally aided assistance.

The reasons why AFDC recipients lack the father's support have changed dramatically over time. In the 1930's, when the program began, about 75 percent of those receiving benefits from the program were children of fathers who had died or who were severely disabled. By 1971, only 14 percent of the fathers were in this category. The composition of AFDC families has thus shifted toward families with living fathers who are absent, either because of divorce or separation or because they are not married to the mother.

Attitudes have changed, and the AFDC rules have shifted toward encouraging mothers to work. Starting in 1956, appropriations were authorized

to help mothers to become self-supporting through services such as child care for dependent children and rehabilitation assistance for the mother. The 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act provided a work incentive for families by reducing the implicit tax on earnings and granting assistance in preparing for work through appropriations for services such as training, counseling, and child care (the Work Incentive Program or WIN).

The AFDC program has also been liberalized to allow limited assistance to needy families with an able-bodied father present. Since 1961 States have had the option of providing aid to families with an unemployed father, and 22 States in fact do so.

### *Growth of the Program*

During the 1950's the proportion of all families in the AFDC program was roughly stable (Table 46). Since then, however, the proportion of families receiving aid has grown dramatically, benefits per recipient have increased, and total expenditures in the program have increased even more sharply.

TABLE 46.—*AFDC benefits and families, selected years, 1950-72*

Year	AFDC benefits <sup>1</sup>		AFDC families	
	Total annual payments to recipients (millions of dollars)	Average December payment per recipient <sup>2</sup>	Total <sup>3</sup> (thousands)	Percent of all families <sup>4</sup>
1950.....	556	\$21	651	1.7
1955.....	633	24	620	1.5
1960.....	1,055	27	803	1.8
1965.....	1,809	33	1,054	2.2
1967.....	2,280	40	1,297	2.6
1969.....	3,565	45	1,875	3.7
1971.....	6,203	52	2,918	5.6
1972.....	7,020	53	3,123	5.9

<sup>1</sup> Aid to families with dependent children (AFDC).

<sup>2</sup> Average of all States for December of each year.

<sup>3</sup> As of December of each year.

<sup>4</sup> AFDC families as of December, and total families as of March (except for April in 1955).

Source: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Social and Rehabilitation Service).

Several factors seem to have contributed to the rapid rise in the number of families receiving public assistance. One is the larger number of families with children and with a female as head, although this increase in turn may be partly a consequence of the large rise in benefits. From 1950 to 1960 such families increased by 829,000, while AFDC families increased by 152,000. When benefits increased dramatically from 1960 to 1972, however, female-headed families with children increased by 1.5 million, but AFDC families increased by 2.3 million. A larger proportion of female-headed families with children may have become eligible for AFDC, many eligible families may have learned for the first time that they could join, or a large number no longer hesitated to receive welfare. The publicity

given to the problems of poverty during the 1960's may have informed the poor of their legal rights.

Undoubtedly, the AFDC program became more financially attractive during the period. The basic cash benefit level per recipient increased by 85 percent from 1960 to 1970; this may be compared to the increase in median earnings (full-time, year-round) in the same years amounting to 67 percent for men and 63 percent for women. In addition, AFDC families were made automatically eligible for many in-kind benefits which were introduced or expanded in this period. According to estimates, by 1971 virtually all AFDC families were eligible for medicaid, 68 percent actually participated in the food stamp or food distribution program, 59 percent benefited from the Federal school lunch program, and 13 percent from subsidized housing. In 1972 a family in New York City consisting of three children and a mother who did not work, which received all of the benefits listed above, would have received benefits which cost the government \$5,912, of which \$3,756 was cash income. Benefits vary widely, however, and in Atlanta the value of the same package of benefits for the same family would have been \$3,606, of which \$1,788 would be cash income. These amounts do not include the value of other benefits received, such as child care and manpower training.

The recipients may not, of course, value the various in-kind benefits at their actual cost. Benefits such as food stamps are similar to cash, and other benefits may subsidize basic goods and services. The value the recipients place on some programs, such as medicaid, would be more difficult to evaluate.

As the AFDC program with its related benefits became more generous, more people may have decided that the return was worth the difficulties and possible humiliation of applying. Much more study is needed before all the factors underlying the increase in the AFDC case load are understood.

#### *AFDC and Family Formation and Stability*

Another issue of social importance is how the increase in AFDC benefits affects the formation of female-headed families. One recent study of whether higher levels of stipends in AFDC did result in a higher rate of female headship used multivariate analysis to control for the effect of male wages and other relevant causal factors. The finding for 1960 was that across metropolitan areas, holding constant the male wage, a 10 percent higher AFDC stipend in an area was associated with a nearly 4 percent higher rate of female headship. Holding constant the AFDC stipend, an increase in the male wage was associated with a decline in female headships. The analysis was duplicated for 1970 with similar findings, although the relationships were somewhat weaker. By 1970, however, in-kind benefits would have formed a much larger unmeasured addition to the stipend; results for that year may consequently be less reliable.

From 1960 to 1970 women with children became more likely to head families. The proportion increased from 6 to 8 percent for white women



and from 19 to 28 percent for black women. In this period widows declined as a proportion of all female heads of families with children, but unmarried mothers accounted for an increasing share. It is quite possible that rising AFDC payments provided one incentive for young women to forgo marriage and set up a household of their own with their children.

The majority of both black and white female heads of families with children are separated or divorced. During the period 1960 to 1970, disrupted marriages continued to play a part in the total increase in female headships. Some of this increase, however, was the result of a decline in the proportion of divorced and separated mothers who lived with other relatives and an increase in the proportion who set up their own households and would then be counted as family heads. Rising levels of AFDC benefits may have made it financially possible to do so. For this group the effect of AFDC was not to cause the separation of couples, but to induce the mother to live alone with her children.

### *Work Incentives*

Important changes in the rules, intended to reduce welfare expenditures by providing a monetary incentive to work, were introduced during the 1960's. As noted earlier, AFDC recipients were initially subject to a dollar reduction in cash benefits for each dollar earned (an implicit marginal tax rate of 100 percent). In 1962 a modification of the tax on benefits was introduced, requiring the States to grant a deduction for work-related expenses. As a result of the 1967 amendments, AFDC recipients are allowed to retain the first \$30 of their earnings without any loss in benefits, after which cash benefits are reduced by 67 cents for each additional dollar earned.

Mothers in the AFDC program show no major change in their work in the labor market since the actual start of WIN in 1969 (Table 47). Yet this was a period when the labor force participation of women with children was increasing. The recession in 1971 may have weakened employment prospects in that year. However, the large increase in the percentage unemployed in 1973 may well be the result of the work requirement provisions imposed in June 1972, as a result of the 1971 amendments, whereby all employable welfare recipients were, as a condition of payment, required to register for work or for training in the WIN program. It should be noted, though, that the full long-term results of the program changes introduced at that time are not yet reflected in the data.

One explanation of the puzzling lack of response to the work incentives introduced in 1969 is that the rapid growth of in-kind benefits, each of which is reduced in amount as earnings increase, served to increase the actual reduction in total benefits faced by a recipient who started working. As an AFDC recipient's earnings rise, she thus pays a price not only in loss

TABLE 47.—*Trends in the employment status of mothers in the AFDC program, selected years, 1961-73*

Status of mother	1961	1967	1969	1971	1973
Total mothers (thousands) <sup>1</sup> .....	743.2	1,109.0	1,463.0	2,345.7	2,795.3
Total mothers (percent) .....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mothers not employed .....	84.3	85.5	85.3	85.1	83.8
Actively seeking work .....	(2)	6.5	5.9	5.7	11.5
Mothers employed .....	15.7	14.5	14.7	15.0	16.2
Full-time .....	5.6	7.0	8.3	9.0	9.9
Part-time .....	10.1	7.5	6.4	6.0	6.3

<sup>1</sup> Limited to mothers in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program who were living at home.

<sup>2</sup> Not available.

Note.—Data refer to status in January of each year. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Social and Rehabilitation Service).

of some of the AFDC grant but also in the loss of some food stamp, housing, and other benefits. According to this view, while the 1967 amendments alone would have given an incentive to work, their effects may well have been offset by the increasing benefits in kind, some of which would be lost for each increase in labor market earnings.

It is not clear, however, how important in practice this factor could be, since the reduction in cash benefits as earnings rise has become very small. Many States exempt large amounts of earnings before any reduction in benefits occurs, and this reduction is in addition to the \$30 a month income disregard established by the 1967 amendments. In Mississippi, for example, the State income disregard is large, and it is unlikely that the reduction in cash benefits ever exceeds 10 percent of earnings net of work expenses (the average cash benefit tax rate). Moreover, a change in 1969 in the method of entering work-related expenses into the cash benefits reduction formula further lowered the effective tax rate. One study estimated that the average net tax rate paid by the average working AFDC mother in Illinois and New Jersey (two relatively high tax States) fell from 94 percent to 42 percent between 1967 and 1971. In general, it would appear that the average tax rate on earnings must have fallen since 1969, even after accounting for the growth of in-kind benefits and their effect on the overall implicit tax rate.

An important factor discouraging work may have been the increase in the benefit level itself (including in-kind benefits), which—since many persons eligible for AFDC have low potential earnings—made it possible for many to maintain a higher living standard than could be obtained through work. Moreover, the average AFDC mother incurs substantial work expenses including child care, payroll taxes, transportation, and additional outlays for clothing and food. These expenses are likely to make up a large proportion of earnings that are not high to begin with. Thus, the actual dollar increment of earnings that could be retained, even if the benefit tax rates were zero, could well be too low to make it profitable to work.

## *Equity and Welfare Reform*

Many problems of equity have been raised with respect to the AFDC program. There are wide variations from State to State in the level of benefits. There are wide variations from family to family in the extent to which they receive in-kind benefits. And, perhaps most important, many poor families with a working parent earn less than the total benefits to a welfare family. In designing a reform of the public assistance program it will be important to pay attention to these inequities.

It will also be important to give women fewer incentives to have children without marrying or to separate if they are married. It may therefore be necessary to extend income supplements to the poor family with a working male head. In the long run, however, such a program would provide work disincentives for husbands and wives in intact families. This could be overcome by a moderate implicit reduction in benefits as earnings rise, but such a solution could be costly. Resolving the dilemma will be one of our most challenging problems.

## **SOCIAL SECURITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME**

Since the 1930's the Federal Government has provided funds for the aged, blind, and disabled and for the dependents of deceased workers. The current programs for these groups are known as Social Security and Supplemental Security Income.

### *Social Security*

The transfer program with the largest disbursement of funds and number of recipients in 1973 was Old Age and Survivors Insurance (Table 45). OASI provided \$42.2 billion in benefits to 25.2 million recipients. The recipients were either aged or the dependents of deceased workers. Approximately 16 percent of the recipients were classified as in poverty, on the basis of money income (including social security benefits). Over 3 million persons received disability benefits under social security, almost one-quarter of whom were in poverty.

Social security benefits have been rising rapidly in recent years. The minimum and maximum benefits for a worker retiring at age 65 under full benefits has increased from December 1970 to December 1973 by 54 percent and 66 percent respectively, to \$84.50 and \$266.10 per month. The consumer price index increased by 23 percent in the same period. In addition, across-the-board increases of 7 and 4 percent are scheduled for March and June 1974. Starting in 1975, social security benefits can be increased annually to reflect increases in the consumer price index.

One effect of the benefit increases is that the aged are now more likely to compose a separate family, rather than a subfamily within a larger family. Although increased social security benefits have reduced poverty in the past, most recipients at present are not in poverty. Across-the-board

benefit increases greater than the increase in the cost of living cannot be expected to reduce poverty markedly in the future.

Accompanying the increase in social security benefits has been a rise in the social security payroll tax. From 1937 to 1950 the tax rate paid by both the employer and employee was 1 percent of the worker's earnings up to \$3,000. In January 1974 the social security tax rate (for OASI, and disability and hospital insurance) was 5.85 percent of earnings up to \$13,200. There is reason to believe that part of the employer's tax is shifted to employees. Viewed solely as a tax, the social security levy is regressive. As a percentage of all Federal Government receipts, social security taxes increased from 4 percent in 1949 to 24 percent in 1973. The social security tax is unique in that there tends to be far less public opposition to raising revenue from this source than from other sources.

### *Supplemental Security Income*

As of January 1974, Federal grants-in-aid to States for public assistance to the aged, blind, and disabled were discontinued, and a new federally administered Supplemental Security Income program (SSI), financed out of general tax revenues, was instituted. The primary purpose of this new program is to provide a nationally established minimum income for these three specific categories of adults who in general cannot be expected to earn an adequate income. Most of the recipients of public assistance benefits under the old program for the aged, blind, and disabled were in poverty in 1973 (Table 45). The benefits under SSI for those with no other money income are \$140 a month for a single person and \$210 a month for a couple. These are to be increased to \$146 and \$219 respectively in July 1974. SSI recipients cannot purchase food stamps. With the federalization of assistance, benefits have increased for the aged, blind, and disabled poor in many States, and States can provide additional income supplements to SSI recipients.

### **FEDERAL FOOD SUBSIDY PROGRAMS**

Ever since the Great Depression of the 1930's, the subsidization of food consumption has been a major Federal Government program to aid the poor.

#### *Food Stamps*

Food stamps are a Federal program, initiated in 1961, to supplement the income of the poor in participating counties. The growth of the program has been phenomenal. In June 1965, 425,000 persons received food stamps at a cost to the Federal Government of \$33 million during fiscal 1965. By July 1973 there were 12.1 million recipients, and Federal costs in fiscal 1973 were \$2.1 billion. In June 1973 food stamps were available in 48 States and the District of Columbia, and the program will be mandated for the entire Nation in July 1974. An eligible family can buy food coupons for a price that is lower than the redemption value at the grocery store. The difference between the redemption value and the price of the coupons to the family is the subsidy.

Families on public assistance are automatically eligible for the program. Almost 40 percent of recipients in July 1973 were not on public assistance, however, although 92 percent of food stamp recipients were in the poverty population.

The average monthly subsidy per person in recipient households was \$15.30 in July 1973, or 55 percent of the redemption value of the average coupon. The maximum monthly subsidy for a family of four with no money income is \$116, and the subsidy declines for each additional dollar of income. A family of four with monthly income in excess of \$390 receives no subsidy. The income concept for eligibility is money income, including money transfers after deducting income and payroll taxes, child care expenses if needed because of work, rent payments exceeding 30 percent of money income, and other allowances.

#### *Other Food Programs*

There are two other Federal food programs. The family food distribution program provides free foodstuffs for low-income families. From a peak of 12.7 million recipients in fiscal 1939, the number has declined to 2.4 million in July 1973. Relatively few counties have both a food stamp and a food distribution program at the same time. The food stamp program has gradually replaced the family food distribution program, which will in general be terminated in July 1974.

The Federal school nutrition programs subsidize milk consumption as well as breakfast and lunch for children in participating schools, with larger subsidies for children from low-income families. In fiscal 1972, 25.4 million school children benefited from the school lunch program at a cost to the Federal Government of \$726 million.

#### **MEDICARE AND MEDICAID**

Since 1965 the Federal Government has been more directly involved in the subsidization of medical care for the aged and the poor through two new programs, medicare and medicaid.

#### *Medicare*

Medicare is a Federal Government health insurance program covering hospital care, post-hospital extended care, physicians' services, home health services, and certain other benefits for all persons aged 65 years and older. Since January 1974 medicare has been extended to those under 65 who have been entitled to benefits from social security disability insurance for at least 2 years, as well as to all those covered by social security and their dependents who require treatment for chronic kidney disease. The benefits under medicare are broad but with defined limits, and there are deductibles and cost sharing (coinsurance) that the recipient must pay.

In fiscal 1973, 10.6 million persons received medical care paid for through the medicare program. The average benefit was \$71 per month

(Table 45). Medicare is chiefly designed for the aged, many of whom are not poor. About 17 percent of the recipients of medicare benefits in fiscal 1973 were in poverty on the basis of current money income.

### *Medicaid*

Medicaid is a Federal-State health assistance program for welfare recipients and the medically indigent. Medicaid is administered by the States on a cost-sharing basis with the Federal Government. The eligibility requirements and the benefits differ among the States.

The medically indigent are those who are not necessarily poor by the Bureau of the Census poverty standard but are judged by the States to have incomes sufficiently low or medical expenses sufficiently high to qualify for assistance. In fiscal 1973, 70 percent of the medicaid recipients were in the poverty population. Some of the 23.5 million persons receiving medicaid in fiscal 1973 were among the aged poor and were using medicaid to pay the premium, deductibles, and coinsurance required by medicare. Medicaid benefits are received by many persons, such as children on AFDC and their mothers, who are not chronically ill and hence have small annual medical expenses, but who are nevertheless in poverty.

### *The Growth of the Programs*

Public expenditures for medicaid and medicare have been rising at an annual rate of 14 percent from 1970 to 1973. As knowledge of the programs has spread the number of recipients has increased. This source of increased expenditures is not likely to continue indefinitely. There has also been a large increase in the utilization of services per recipient, and in the prices charged per unit of service. Although part of the price increase may reflect quality improvements, some of it derives from pure increases in price.

Higher deductibles and coinsurance would reduce the growing cost of the programs due to the increase in services and prices per unit of service. At the same time, however, it would increase the out-of-pocket cost of medical care for the aged and the poor. A mechanism is needed that will provide adequate medical care for the aged and the poor and reduce the strong inflationary pressures built into medicaid and medicare, but that will do so without direct Government provision of medical care or extensive regulation of the medical care sector.

## **INCOME DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS OF MONEY TRANSFER PROGRAMS**

The transfer programs discussed above, as well as other government transfers affect the incomes of families. Comparisons between these money transfer payments and the total money income of families show the income redistribution effects of the transfers. How participation in the labor market and family formation are affected by money transfers is an important issue, but too little is known at the present time to quantify what the distribution of family income would be if there were no transfers.

## Money Transfers

As the data in Table 48 indicate, 38 percent of the families reported receiving some transfer payments in 1970. Social security and railroad retire-

TABLE 48.—*Proportion of families having transfer income from particular sources, 1970*

Income class <sup>1</sup>	Percent of families in each income class with transfer payments			
	Total	Social security and railroad retirement	Public assistance <sup>2</sup>	Other <sup>3</sup>
All families.....	38	24	7	15
Under \$1,000.....	41	27	13	3
\$1,000-\$1,999.....	77	60	24	8
\$2,000-\$2,999.....	72	55	19	17
\$3,000-\$3,999.....	60	43	12	17
\$4,000-\$4,999.....	50	35	9	17
\$5,000-\$5,999.....	42	27	5	19
\$6,000-\$6,999.....	35	21	4	16
\$7,000-\$7,999.....	30	16	3	17
\$8,000-\$9,999.....	29	14	3	17
\$10,000-\$14,999.....	26	11	2	17
\$15,000-\$24,999.....	24	11	1	16
\$25,000 and over.....	22	12	1	12

<sup>1</sup> Family income is family money income including transfer income in cash.

<sup>2</sup> Public assistance includes AFDC and assistance to the aged, blind, and disabled.

<sup>3</sup> Includes unemployment compensation, workmen's compensation, government employee pensions, veterans' benefits, and unidentified transfer payments.

Source: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Social Security Administration).

ment benefits were the most common form of transfer and were received by 24 percent of the families. Public assistance went to 7 percent of the families; both unemployment compensation and veterans' benefits were paid to approximately 5 percent of the families. Only 7 percent of money income was derived from transfers. The average transfer per family was \$696, of which 56.6 percent was from social security, 13.1 percent from public assistance, and 30.2 percent from other sources.

The higher the income, the smaller the proportion of families receiving a transfer. The percentage of income in each group derived from government transfers was also lower for higher levels of income. For example, those with incomes between \$1,000 and \$1,999 received an average of 68 percent of their income from transfers, but only 3 percent of the income in the \$15,000 to \$24,999 range was derived from transfers. Low-income families had approximately twice the dollar value of transfers that high-income families had. Except for the lowest two income groups, however, the mean income from government transfers for those who received transfer income was largely invariant with family income after transfers. High-income families receive a small proportion of their total income from government transfers, not because of a smaller dollar transfer per recipient, but because they have more income from other sources (earnings and property income) and fewer among them receive transfer income.

Public assistance is specifically designed to provide income supplements for those who would otherwise have little income. Since public assistance is heavily concentrated in the lowest income groups and the benefits per recipient are a very large fraction of the income of the poor, public assistance has a strong income redistribution effect. Social security and railroad retirement payments are largely received by aged families and younger families headed by a widow. Although these families tend to have low current income, the benefits are larger for those who had higher earnings in the past.

The target populations for the other forms of transfer payments, that is, the unemployed, those injured on the job, retired Government employees, and veterans, are not necessarily poor. Except for the lowest and highest income groups, approximately 17 percent of the families in each group received funds in 1970 from one or more of these four sources. Again except for the extremes of the distribution, there is virtually no change in dollar benefits per recipient for higher-income groups. The higher the other income of the family, the smaller the proportion of income derived from such benefits. These transfers have a mild income redistribution effect.

Within the category of other payments, unemployment compensation is more important for middle-income families (\$4,000 to \$15,000) than for the poorest and wealthiest of families. The members of the poorest families ordinarily have too little work experience to qualify for unemployment compensation. The income earners in the highest-income families have lower rates of unemployment.

### *Income Inequality Before and After the Transfers*

Table 49 presents a measure of income inequality, the variance in the natural logarithm of income, for family money income and family money income minus particular transfers (see supplement to this chapter). This permits a determination of the extent to which the different types of transfers reduce income inequality. Such an approach implicitly assumes that the transfers do not give rise to labor market or family formation responses by

TABLE 49.—*The effect of money transfers on family income inequality, 1970*

Type of income	Income inequality <sup>1</sup>
All income.....	0.74
All, excluding "other" transfers <sup>2</sup> .....	.77
All, excluding social security.....	1.16
All, excluding public assistance <sup>3</sup> .....	.85
All, excluding social security and public assistance <sup>3</sup> .....	1.45
All, excluding all transfer income.....	1.57

<sup>1</sup> Income inequality is measured by the variance in the natural log of income. (See Supplement to this chapter).

<sup>2</sup> "Other" transfers include unemployment benefits, workmen's compensation, government employee pensions, and veterans benefits. The income classes used were: Under \$2,000; \$2,000-\$2,999; \$3,000-\$3,999; \$4,000-\$4,999; \$5,000-\$5,999; \$6,000-\$6,999; \$7,000-\$7,999; \$8,000-\$9,999; \$10,000-\$14,999; \$15,000-\$24,999; and \$25,000 and over.

<sup>3</sup> Public assistance includes AFDC and assistance to the aged, blind, and disabled.

Sources: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Social Security Administration) and Council of Economic Advisers.



the recipients. The data suggest that social security and public assistance dramatically decreased the measured relative inequality of family income. The combined effect of the other transfers is a small decrease in income inequality.

### *The Tax Transfer System*

The success of the Government's programs for the redistribution of income cannot be judged from any one program or from an examination of taxes or transfers separately. Primarily because of public assistance, social security, medicaid, and food stamps, the transfer system is highly progressive in redistributing income to low-income families. It was shown above (Table 35) that the net effect of personal income and payroll taxes on cash and imputed income appears to be progressive. Several studies have examined the effect of the tax system on the distribution of income when accrued capital gains and losses are included in the income concept. These studies suggest that the tax system is roughly proportional over the income intervals in which most families belong, regressive for those with very low incomes, and progressive at the upper end. However, the combined direct effects of the tax and transfer systems clearly appear to be progressive.

## SUPPLEMENT

### The Variance of the Natural Logarithm of Income

The "variance of the natural logarithm of income" is the measure of overall income inequality used in the analysis of the distribution of income in this chapter. It can be written as:

$$S^2(\ln Y) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N (\ln Y_i - \overline{\ln Y})^2}{N} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_i$  is the income of the  $i$ th observation (individual or family),  $\ln$  designates natural logarithm, and there are  $N$  observations in the data. Larger values of  $S^2$  mean greater inequality of income, and  $S^2$  equals zero if there is no inequality. While a reduction of the measure from 0.7 to 0.6 conveys an acceptable suggestion about a decline in inequality, and a decline from 0.7 to 0.5 an acceptable suggestion about a greater decline, the statement that the second of these two declines is twice the first would not be meaningful.

The variance of the natural logarithm of income is a commonly used simple measure of relative inequality. A measure of relative inequality does not change in value if all of the observations have the same percentage change in income. If

$$Y^*_i = Y_i(1+k), \quad (2)$$

where  $k$  is the percentage change in income, the natural logarithm of both sides of equation (2) is

$$\ln Y^*_i = \ln Y_i + \ln(1+k). \quad (3)$$

Computing the mean of both sides of equation (3),

$$\overline{\ln Y^*} = \overline{\ln Y} + \ln(1+k). \quad (4)$$

Then, subtracting equation (4) from equation (3),

$$\ln Y_i^* - \overline{\ln Y^*} = (\ln Y_i + \ln(1+k)) - (\overline{\ln Y} + \ln(1+k)) = \ln Y_i - \overline{\ln Y}, \quad (5)$$

and 
$$S^2(\ln Y^*) = S^2(\ln Y). \quad (6)$$

Thus, a proportional tax on income or a proportional cash subsidy does not change relative income inequality.

Relative inequality decreases (increases) if the income of each observation is increased (decreased) by the same dollar amount. A \$100 per year grant to a poor family constitutes a larger percentage increase in income than an equal dollar grant to a wealthy family. Such a grant reduces the relative inequality of income.

A progressive tax is one in which the higher the level of income, the larger the proportion of income paid in taxes. In a regressive tax a smaller proportion of income is paid in taxes as income increases. A progressive tax reduces, and a regressive tax increases, relative income inequality ( $S^2(\ln Y)$ ).

## CHAPTER 6

# The International Economy in 1973

**I**NTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT grew at a near record rate during 1973, despite the strains placed on the international economy by massive capital flows, large fluctuations in exchange rates, and strong price pressures due to crop failures, capacity limitations, and cut-backs in oil production by the major producers. The existing international monetary and trading system proved resilient enough to enable governments to cope with the difficulties they experienced in managing their economies, without having to take measures that would have seriously disrupted international trade and investment flows. While individual governments adopted different policy instruments, including external measures, in seeking to stabilize their economies, potential policy conflicts were minimized by mutual accommodation. The common effort to arrive at pragmatic solutions to joint problems undoubtedly strengthened the international economic system.

As indicated elsewhere in this report, the major problem faced by the United States as well as the other major industrial nations during 1973 was inflation. In most economies, demand at the beginning of the year was fast approaching or was already in excess of the capacity to produce more goods. Demand pressures were intensified when large speculative capital flows led to excessive increases in the money supply in a number of countries. Superimposed on this generally inflationary environment were particularly large imbalances between demand and supply in particular sectors. Capacity limitations were especially severe in the processing of raw materials, like petroleum and steel. Moreover crop failures in many parts of the world put pressures on agricultural supplies in the United States and elsewhere, and in the latter part of the year the major oil producers in the Middle East cut back the oil they were supplying to the rest of the world.

General inflation combined with particularly large increases in the prices of basic foods and processed materials to create tremendous political pressures in most countries for government actions to reduce price increases. Among the policy measures governments took in response to such pressures were price controls and export controls. The latter measure had the unfortunate side effect of shifting the inflationary pressures to other countries. Nevertheless in most cases governments recognized the limits of beggar-my-neighbor

policies, and the tensions among countries resulting from the pursuit of such policies were successfully eased by means of diplomatic efforts.

In working out cooperative approaches to the various global problems governments benefited from discussions regarding a longer-term reform of international economic arrangements. In turn, the experiences of the past year provided a new perspective on plans for reform. Progress was made in each of the three major areas of reform: the international monetary system, the international trading system, and arrangements relating to international investment.

*The international monetary system.* Discussions on the future of the international monetary system were held in the framework of the Committee of Twenty, which was set up by the countries belonging to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). An indication of the current state of these discussions was provided by the chairman of that committee in a report to the annual meeting of the IMF in Nairobi in September.

*The international trading system.* Also in September, 105 countries reached agreement in Tokyo on some general objectives and a framework for a major new round of trade negotiations. They pledged to aim simultaneously for an expansion of international trade opportunities and improvements in the rules and procedures for coordinating trade policies. Prior to this meeting the Administration sent to the Congress draft legislation to authorize U.S. participation in a new round of trade negotiations and to improve the legislative provisions dealing with Presidential management of U.S. trade policy.

*International investment.* Discussions were held on investment questions in the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The preliminary conclusions reached on the basis of these discussions point to the desirability of some new procedures and guidelines which would assure an efficient international allocation of new capital.

## WHAT HAPPENED IN 1973?

In the area of international economic relations, the year 1973 may be characterized as one of continuing adjustment to past disequilibria as well as to new developments that entered the picture during the year. Early in the year the governments of most major countries abandoned attempts to fix exchange rates at negotiated levels. While central banks continued to intervene to some extent, foreign exchange markets played the major role in determining the exchange rates that would clear the market. This process was marked at times by unusually large fluctuations of market exchange rates. Nevertheless, the market performed its intermediating function well, and neither trade nor long-term capital flows were seriously disrupted at any time during the year.

The developments in the balance of payments accounts of individual countries reflected, in part, the developments in the foreign exchange markets. The appreciation and depreciation of individual currencies, achieved

either through formal measures by the authorities or as a result of free movement of exchange rates, continued to influence the flows of international commerce and thus the deficits and surpluses of individual countries. Special developments, such as the shortages of food in certain parts of the world and, later in the year, the emerging world energy crisis, also affected the direction and magnitude of trade and capital flows among countries.

### *What Happened to Exchange Rates?*

Developments during 1973 in the foreign exchange market can be conveniently broken into four periods, coinciding with the 4 quarters of the year. These developments are described in detail below. Briefly, in the first quarter, massive capital flows from the United States to Europe and Japan had two effects: First, foreign central banks added around \$10 billion in claims against the United States to their reserves as a result of their efforts to support the value of the dollar in terms of their own currencies. Second, when large-scale market intervention failed to restore stability to foreign exchange markets, fixed exchange rates were abandoned; consequently the dollar fell during the quarter by an average of 10 percent against the EC currencies floating jointly, and 7 percent against the currencies of 14 major industrial countries when each is weighted by that country's bilateral trade with the United States (Table 50). For the computation of the trade-weighted depreciation of the dollar see the supplement to this chapter.

In the second quarter the dollar depreciated against most continental European currencies, but remained in close relationship to the Japanese yen, the Canadian dollar, and a number of other currencies accounting for two-thirds of U.S. trade. The dollar dropped 11 percent against most EC currencies floating jointly, and around 5 percent against the group of 14 currencies. Net claims of foreign central banks on the United States during this period actually decreased by about \$0.7 billion.

In the third quarter the decline of the dollar was arrested, and its value remained roughly the same against the group of 14 currencies. In fact there was limited intervention by a number of central banks, including the United States, to prevent the dollar from rising.

TABLE 50.—*Changes in the foreign exchange value of the dollar, U.S. liabilities to official foreigners and U.S. liabilities to private foreigners, 1973*

Item	Percent change from preceding quarter			
	First quarter	Second quarter	Third quarter	Fourth quarter
Foreign exchange value of the dollar <sup>1</sup> .....	-6.9	-5.0	1.1	5.5
U.S. liabilities, official foreigners <sup>2</sup> .....	15.9	-.9	-1.3	(*)
U.S. liabilities, private foreigners <sup>4</sup> .....	-9.3	10.6	4.5	(*)

<sup>1</sup> Trade-weighted depreciation of the dollar against 14 major currencies; computed by Morgan Guaranty Trust Company.

<sup>2</sup> Liabilities to foreign central banks and governments.

<sup>3</sup> Not available.

<sup>4</sup> External liabilities to other banks and to other foreigners.

Sources: Morgan Guaranty Trust Company and International Monetary Fund.

In the fourth quarter the dollar rose sharply. It rose 12 percent against the German mark and around 5 percent against the group of 14 currencies. Central banks intervened substantially to slow the dollar's rise, and claims by foreign central banks on the United States declined.

*The first quarter of 1973: Fixed exchange rates are abandoned.* Foreign exchange markets were stable in the beginning of 1973. In most foreign exchange markets the dollar was above the level where central banks were committed to buy dollars to keep its value within the agreed margins. The stability was so fragile, however, that any disturbance had a highly unsettling effect on the market. The first such disturbance was an acceleration of the capital flight from Italy into Switzerland. Confronted with massive outflows, the Italian authorities allowed the lira to float, first for financial transactions and later for all transactions. In Switzerland, the influx of funds from abroad intensified an already high rate of inflation. To gain greater control over its monetary policy, Switzerland decided on January 22 to allow the franc to float. By terminating their purchases of foreign currencies in support of a fixed value of the franc vis-a-vis other currencies, the Swiss monetary authorities were able to avoid further involuntary increases in the Swiss money supply.

The floating of the franc by Switzerland, a country viewed by many as the epitome of financial orthodoxy, strengthened expectations that other exchange rate adjustments were inevitable, particularly for currencies of countries with large payments imbalances such as Japan and Germany. These expectations led to increasingly large speculative purchases of marks and yen for dollars. Such sales reached a peak in the first week of February, forcing the closing of foreign exchange markets on February 10. Extensive consultations among the monetary officials of major countries followed and culminated in a number of coordinated exchange rate adjustments. On February 12 the Administration announced that it would ask Congress to approve a 10 percent devaluation of the dollar in terms of Special Drawing Rights (SDR's). At the same time, the Japanese authorities announced that the Japanese yen would be allowed to float upward. The resulting exchange rate structure was endorsed by the 14 major industrial nations.

The multilateral adjustment of exchange rate patterns in February, including the devaluation of the dollar, did not, however, restore market confidence in the entire pattern of rates—in particular, the rate for the German mark. Large-scale flows of speculative funds out of dollars into marks and some other currencies continued until exchange markets were officially closed on March 2.

The exchange markets remained officially closed until March 19, although private trading of currencies continued. On March 19, five of the European Community (EC) countries—Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands—allowed their currencies to float jointly vis-a-vis the dollar and other currencies. As before, these countries decided to keep the exchange


rates between any two of their currencies within 2¼ percent of an agreed relationship. In addition, Norway and Sweden subsequently decided to peg their currencies to the jointly floating EC currencies.

*The second quarter of 1973: The dollar drops further.* Between the end of March and the end of June the markets were characterized by a substantial depreciation of the dollar against most European currencies. At the same time, the dollar remained relatively unchanged against the currencies of Japan, Canada, and a number of other countries. The dollar declined about 11 percent in terms of most EC currencies floating jointly and 5 percent in terms of the trade-weighted average of 14 currencies. The dollar declined by as much as 15 percent vis-a-vis the German mark, which was revalued by 5½ percent relative to the other EC currencies floating jointly. (Chart 10.)

There were three sources of downward pressure on the dollar in European exchange markets during this period. First, the United States continued to have a deficit vis-a-vis Europe on basic balance transactions—

Chart 10

## Change in the Value of the U.S. Dollar Relative to Selected Foreign Currencies



\* RELATIVE TO 14 MAJOR CURRENCIES; COMPUTED BY MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY.

NOTE: FOR INDIVIDUAL CURRENCIES, FRIDAY CLOSING PRICES WERE USED.

SOURCE: MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY.

which include trade, grants and other unilateral transfers, and long-term investment. This meant that the public was supplying more dollars through these transactions in exchange for European currencies than were being purchased with European currencies through these transactions. Second, many non-European countries besides the United States had deficits vis-a-vis Europe in basic transactions. Since most of these countries use the dollar as a reserve currency, they tended to finance their deficits vis-a-vis Europe with dollars. Dollars from non-American sources were thus competing with dollars from the United States in European exchange markets. Third, the dollar is widely held abroad not only by central banks but also by many private individuals, banks, and corporations. With the continuing decline of the dollar during the previous 2 years, many of these private foreign holders wanted to exchange their dollars for foreign currencies.

As long as markets clear, however, there can be no "additional" dollars remaining unsold. Exchange rates will change until enough sellers have been discouraged from selling or enough buyers have been encouraged to buy. Equilibrium in the market was established during this period by private foreigners on balance increasing their dollar holdings. Figures for dollars held by private foreigners in Europe are not available, but the changes in these holdings are reflected in the \$2 billion increase of U.S. liquid liabilities to all private foreigners from the end of March to the end of June. Foreign central banks decreased their holdings of dollars over this period by \$650 million.

The rapid drop of the dollar significantly below what many considered its longer-term value created widespread uncertainty regarding future exchange market trends; for a short period during the end of June and the beginning of July the spread between buying and selling rates widened, and it became increasingly difficult for traders to obtain forward coverage. Nevertheless foreign exchange markets remained open throughout this period, and normal international trade and investment transactions continued without major disruption. Fears by many that floating exchange rates would disrupt international trade proved to be without foundation.

*The third quarter of 1973: The dollar begins to rise.* The decline of the dollar relative to European currencies was reversed in the third quarter as an increasing body of opinion in the market held that the dollar had become undervalued, a view that was strengthened by the emergence of a sizable surplus in U.S. trade of goods and services. In this favorable atmosphere, some further impetus to the turn in market opinion came from the announcement on July 18 of U.S. intervention in the foreign exchange market in order to maintain orderly market conditions.

This move discouraged speculation against the dollar by raising the possibility that the U.S. authorities would buy as many dollars (or sell as many foreign currencies) as would be necessary to prevent a further decline. To make large-scale intervention by U.S. authorities in the foreign exchange market a credible possibility, it was announced at the same time that bi-



lateral swap facilities had been increased by \$6¼ billion; the amount of foreign currencies that the Federal Reserve could borrow from other central banks thus rose to nearly \$18 billion. In fact, intervention by the Federal Reserve amounted to only about \$250 million during the last 3 weeks of July. During this period the dollar rose by around 4 percent against the jointly floating European currencies.

*The fourth quarter of 1973: The dollar rises further.* During the fourth quarter the appreciation of the dollar continued, in part because it was thought that the United States was in a relatively better position than Western European countries and Japan to deal with the cutback of oil production in the Middle East and the simultaneous increase in world oil prices. At the same time, the surpluses in U.S. trade were becoming larger, and figures published for the long-term investment account began to show a surplus. Between September 28 and December 27 the dollar rose by about 11 percent against the jointly floating European currencies. By the end of the year the dollar was thus approximately back to its February post-devaluation level. The dollar was rising so fast, in fact, that some foreign central banks found it increasingly desirable to reduce their controls on capital inflows and to sell off some of the dollars which they had accumulated in the past. Foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Japan and the Bundesbank declined by \$1 billion each during the October to November period as a result of their dollar sales.

Increasingly in the fourth quarter the exchange markets became dominated by the energy crisis and the abrupt and massive additions to import costs of oil. Early in January 1974 both the yen and the European currencies floating jointly depreciated sharply, and in some cases reached levels lower than those prevailing immediately after the multilateral adjustment of February 1973. On January 21, the French franc was allowed to float freely, and immediately declined by 5 percent.

Over the year as a whole the functioning of the exchange market improved as traders gained experience with floating exchange rates. This can be seen, for instance, in the narrowing spread between the buying and selling rates of the major currencies traded and in the diminished day-to-day fluctuations of these currencies. In general, one has to conclude that despite the dramatic decline and the equally dramatic rise of the dollar against the major European currencies, foreign exchange markets functioned remarkably well, and only on a few days was it difficult to carry out foreign exchange transactions.

### *What Happened to All Those Dollars?*

Over the years a large volume of dollars has been accumulated by foreigners, both governments and private individuals. To a large extent these dollars are held because the dollar is the most widely used currency for international transactions, and a stock of dollars was therefore useful for all the reasons that induce people to hold money. Dollars are thus held voluntarily by private banks, corporations, and individuals. They are also held volun-

tarily by foreign central banks, even though central banks to some extent hold these dollars not because they want to increase their dollar reserves, but because they want to avoid a rise in the value of their currencies relative to the dollar.

Dollars held by foreigners are generally held in the form of dollar balances at commercial banks. However, not all of the dollars held by foreigners are dollars which are liquid liabilities of the United States, that is, dollar balances held in U.S. commercial banks. Some dollars are liabilities of European private banks which have accepted dollar deposits. These are generally known as Eurodollars. European banks can create new dollars by lending dollars to someone who will redeposit them in a Eurodollar bank. As long as the proceeds of new loans are left as deposits in the banking system, the banking system as a whole can continue to create new money in the form of bank deposits.

A number of central banks have participated in the creation of new dollars in the Eurodollar market by depositing their reserves with European commercial banks making Eurodollar loans. By so doing, these central banks not only facilitated the expansion of Eurodollars, but in many cases they ended up by creating new official reserves. Most major central banks, however, have now agreed to refrain from depositing new reserves in the Eurodollar market.

When they are sold in the foreign exchange market, dollars owned by foreigners become indistinguishable from dollars owned by Americans. That is, when they are sold they exert a downward pressure, and when they are purchased they exert an upward pressure on the market value of the dollar. Private American holders of dollars and private foreign holders of dollars, whether these are held in U.S. or in foreign banks, have similar economic motives in selling or buying dollars in the foreign exchange market. For instance, if the dollar is expected to fall relative to foreign currencies, holders of dollars will have an incentive to sell dollars and to buy foreign currencies. If the dollar is expected to rise relative to foreign currencies, holders of foreign currencies have an incentive to buy dollars and to sell their foreign currencies. While the average foreign holder of dollars is likely to be more sensitive to such changes in the foreign exchange value of the dollar than domestic holders of dollars, the experience of the last few years has shown that Americans will exchange large amounts of dollars for foreign currencies when they find it profitable to do so.

There is some reason to believe that during the first half of 1973 expectations of a future fall in the value of the dollar may have induced some dollar holders, both in the United States and abroad, to sell their dollars, thereby depressing the market value. Thus there were occasions when the value of the dollar was declining in the market, even though the United States was experiencing a rapid improvement in its underlying balance of payments. In the second half, expectations of a future rise of the dollar may have reinforced an upward trend by inducing both Americans and foreigners to shift from foreign currencies into dollars.

It is difficult to get a precise estimate of the total amount of dollars held by foreigners, because figures on dollar deposits in foreign banks are not easily available. Recorded liquid dollar liabilities of the United States—dollars held by foreigners which are liquid liabilities of either a U.S. bank or the U.S. Government—amounted to about \$83 billion at the end of 1972; of this, \$63 billion was held by official institutions, and about \$20 billion was held by private banks and other foreigners. In addition the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has estimated that at the end of 1972 the total liquid dollar liabilities of private banks in the EC, Sweden, and Switzerland amounted to almost \$100 billion. If interbank deposits made by these banks are taken out of this figure, and certain other adjustments are made, the BIS finds that the Eurodollar volume was about \$70 billion. The total volume of dollars held by foreigners as balances in both American and European banks was thus in the neighborhood of \$150 billion. Of this amount perhaps a little more than half was held by official institutions, and the remainder by foreign private banks, corporations, and individuals. In comparison, the domestic supply of dollars in the United States, in the form of currency and demand deposits, was about \$250 billion at the end of 1972.

During 1973 the total stock of dollars held abroad increased further. Total liquid dollar liabilities of the United States at the end of September amounted to \$92½ billion, of which \$72 billion was held by official institutions and \$20½ billion by private foreigners. Indications are that the volume of Eurodollars has expanded as well.

#### *What Happened to Trade and Investment?*

During the first 3 quarters of 1973 Americans exported \$3.0 billion more in goods and services than they imported, a large change from the first 3 quarters of 1972, when imports surpassed exports by \$3.7 billion. On a long-term basis, private foreigners invested \$1.4 billion more in the United States than Americans invested abroad during the first 3 quarters of the year; during the same period in 1972, U.S. private long-term investment abroad exceeded foreign private long-term investment in the United States by \$0.9 billion.

These developments in the balance of payments are consistent with what one might expect from the exchange rate realignments of the past 2 years. The depreciation of the dollar in terms of foreign currencies should lower the price of U.S. goods and services relative to foreign goods and services, thereby stimulating sales abroad and encouraging U.S. residents to purchase goods produced at home rather than abroad. By reducing the relative cost of production in the United States and thus adding to its profitability, the depreciation tended to encourage investment in the United States rather than abroad. Any interpretation of the effect of the depreciation on developments in trade and investment during 1973, however, is complicated by the changing business conditions in the United States and elsewhere, by crop failures abroad, by changes in the demand for and sup-

ply of oil, and by domestic price control programs, all of which also affected the U.S. balance of payments.

*Trade in goods and services.* The value of U.S. merchandise exports increased 41 percent from the first 3 quarters of 1972 to the first 3 quarters of 1973, while imports increased 24 percent over the same period. Higher prices resulting from intense inflationary pressures here and abroad during 1973 accounted for much of the increase in the value of U.S. trade. Adjusting for price increases, however, makes the turnabout in U.S. merchandise trade even more apparent. The volume of imports increased only 7 percent during the first 3 quarters of 1973, just over half the growth rate from 1971 to 1972, while the volume of exports increased 24 percent during the first 3 quarters of 1973, more than double the growth rate from 1971 to 1972.

The rapid growth of exports during 1973, following the realignment of exchange rates, is consistent with economic expectations. But factors other than the realignment of exchange rates also affected U.S. exports during 1973.

Shortfalls in foreign crops played a major part in increasing agricultural exports during the first 3 quarters of 1973. Drought in India and Africa, poor weather conditions in the Soviet Union, and the sharp reductions in Peruvian fishmeal production greatly reduced world production of grains and protein feeds in 1972, thus reducing supplies available for 1973. Because the United States was the largest supplier of foodstuffs with relatively open access to foreign buyers, these developments abroad had a particularly strong effect on U.S. agricultural exports. The depreciation of the dollar, however, was also an important factor in expanding agricultural exports by reducing the relative price of American crops. The value of agricultural exports in the first 3 quarters of 1973 equaled \$12.7 billion, up 88 percent from the same period in 1972. Although exports of agricultural products accounted for only one-fourth of the value of total exports, 40 percent of the increase in exports during the first 3 quarters of 1973 came from agricultural products. Prices of food exports during the third quarter were nearly 40 percent higher than a year earlier, a change which accounted for a large part of the increase in the value of these exports.

Domestic price control programs also stimulated exports during 1973, at the expense of domestic supplies. As prices of internationally traded goods rose, it became more profitable to sell abroad, where prices remained unconstrained, rather than at home, where prices were controlled.

The increase in U.S. exports, which resulted from food shortages and domestic price control programs, was offset in part by the rapid increase in imports of crude and refined petroleum products. The fact that the demand for oil in recent years has been growing more rapidly than domestic oil production has created a gap which could only be filled by imports. At the same time, the world price of oil increased dramatically during the year. Although the major Arab oil producers embargoed oil shipments to the

United States in October, this did not reduce the value of oil imports during the rest of the year. (For a more complete discussion of these developments see Chapter 4.)

The relatively slow growth of total imports during 1973, despite the rapid increase in imports of crude and refined petroleum products, is the most visible indicator of the impact of exchange rate realignment on U.S. trade. In the later stages of a cyclical expansion, imports should accelerate as domestic producers run low on domestic supplies and rely on foreign suppliers to meet their demands. The fact that the volume of imports did not grow very much faster during 1973 than it did in 1972 suggests that the dollar depreciation had a significant effect on trade.

Developments in U.S. bilateral trade provide some additional clues to the impact of exchange rate realignments. For countries whose currencies have shown a relatively large appreciation in relation to the dollar, one might expect that imports from the United States would grow more rapidly than exports to the United States. This appears to be true, both for Japan and for the EC. Japan, whose currency has risen sharply against the dollar, experienced a 73 percent increase in imports from the United States during the first 3 quarters of 1973, while Japanese exports to the United States increased only 9 percent. The EC, whose currencies also rose sharply in relation to the dollar, increased their imports from the United States by 40 percent, while their exports to the United States increased by 23 percent.

For countries whose currencies changed relatively little in relation to the dollar, the growth rates of exports to and imports from the United States should be more nearly alike. This appears to be true for Canada and the United Kingdom, whose currencies changed relatively little during 1973 in relation to the U.S. dollar. Exports by Canada to the United States and imports from the United States both increased by around 20 percent. Exports by the United Kingdom to the United States and imports from the United States both grew by around 30 percent.

U.S. trade with Communist countries in Europe, including the U.S.S.R., increased dramatically during 1973, not because of exchange rate realignments, but because of a normalization of trade relations combined with poor harvests in the Soviet Union. Exports to the Communist countries in Europe increased to \$1.4 billion for the first 3 quarters of 1973, while imports rose to \$0.4 billion. Most of the increase in exports was due to larger sales of agricultural products.

*Investments.* During the first 3 quarters of 1973 private foreigners made more long-term investments in the United States than Americans made abroad. The effective depreciation of the dollar encouraged foreign investment in the United States during the year because it reduced the relative cost of producing internationally traded goods in the United States rather than abroad. The relative cost of producing in the United States declined further as a result of a tendency for wages to rise more rapidly abroad than in the United States; foreign firms thus had a greater incentive to produce

in the United States. In view of the fairly large changes in relative labor costs (Table 51), the increase in foreign direct investment from none during the first 3 quarters of 1972 to \$1.5 billion during the first 3 quarters of 1973 may seem fairly small. Judging by the number and size of investment plans that have been announced by foreign companies, however, this flow can be expected to increase significantly in the next year.

TABLE 51.—*Relative labor costs in manufacturing, 1963-73*  
[1967=100]

Country and year	Hourly compensation in national currency	Output per man-hour	Unit labor cost in national currency	Value of foreign currency relative to the U.S. dollar	Unit labor cost in U.S. dollars <sup>1</sup>	Index of U.S. unit labor cost as percent of index of foreign unit labor cost
<b>United States:</b>						
1968.....	107.2	104.8	102.3	-----	102.3	-----
1969.....	114.0	107.3	106.3	-----	106.3	-----
1970.....	122.2	108.0	113.2	-----	113.2	-----
1971.....	130.8	115.7	113.0	-----	113.0	-----
1972.....	139.0	121.3	114.1	-----	114.1	-----
1973.....	150.0	127.5	117.6	-----	117.6	-----
<b>Germany:</b>						
1968.....	105.9	107.6	98.5	99.9	98.3	104.0
1969.....	115.5	113.8	101.5	101.6	103.1	103.1
1970.....	133.0	116.7	114.0	109.3	124.6	90.9
1971.....	152.1	122.4	124.3	114.7	142.5	79.3
1972.....	169.4	131.0	129.4	125.0	161.7	70.6
1973 <sup>2</sup> .....	190.5	140.5	135.5	150.5	204.0	57.6
<b>Japan:</b>						
1968.....	116.2	112.6	103.2	100.4	103.7	98.6
1969.....	137.3	130.0	105.8	101.1	106.9	99.4
1970.....	163.4	146.5	111.5	101.1	112.7	100.4
1971.....	189.0	151.7	124.6	104.2	129.9	87.0
1972.....	219.5	167.0	131.5	119.5	157.1	72.6
1973 <sup>2</sup> .....	265.1	198.4	133.7	133.7	178.7	65.8
<b>Canada:</b>						
1968.....	107.3	107.3	100.0	100.1	100.2	102.1
1969.....	115.3	113.2	101.9	100.2	102.1	104.1
1970.....	124.5	115.0	108.2	103.4	111.9	101.2
1971.....	134.5	121.6	110.6	106.8	118.2	95.6
1972.....	144.5	126.9	113.8	108.9	124.0	92.0
1973 <sup>2</sup> .....	157.4	133.5	117.9	107.9	127.2	92.5

<sup>1</sup> Indexes in national currency adjusted for changes in prevailing exchange rates.

<sup>2</sup> Based on seasonally adjusted data for first 9 months.

Note.—Data relate to all employees in manufacturing.

Sources: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics) and Council of Economic Advisers.

Foreign purchases of U.S. securities other than U.S. Treasury securities also increased, from \$2.6 billion during the first 3 quarters of 1972 to \$3.4 billion during the first 3 quarters of 1973. Such an increase is also consistent with what one would expect from the large depreciation of the dollar, inasmuch as the depreciation should increase the relative profitability of producing in the United States. Market expectations also exerted a strong influence on the flow of security transactions over the year. Foreign purchases of U.S. securities were quite large in the first quarter, reaching a total of \$1.7 billion. During the second quarter, purchases fell to \$0.5 billion, but increased again to \$1.2 billion in the third quarter.

Direct and portfolio investments abroad by Americans amounted to \$3½ billion during the first 3 quarters of 1973, as they had during the first 3

quarters of 1972. There are two possible reasons for the absence of a decline: First, economic conditions were buoyant throughout the world. Second, most of the outflow occurred in the first quarter, before the major exchange rate adjustments of 1973, and was probably motivated by the anticipation of subsequent exchange rate adjustments.

### *The U.S. Balance of Payments in 1973*

In a world characterized by the managed floating of exchange rates, measurement of the overall balance of payments has become less important. In a fixed exchange rate world, one of the major functions of overall measures of the balance of payments was to signal to policy makers when a given exchange rate had become untenable. To the extent that exchange rates are allowed to adjust automatically in response to payments imbalances, it is no longer necessary to communicate the desirability of an exchange rate adjustment to the policy maker. Of course, to the extent that exchange rates remain constrained by official intervention in the foreign exchange market, the balance of payments numbers will continue to indicate when such intervention may need to be relaxed.

The managed floating of exchange rates has changed in particular the analytical meaning of the official reserve transactions balance, which measures the net direction and magnitude of official intervention in the foreign exchange market over a period of time. In other words, it approximately shows the extent to which governments have bought or sold currencies to influence the exchange rate. It also includes government-to-government payments outside the foreign exchange market, but removing these transactions from the foreign exchange market has the same effect as direct intervention. As long as governments kept market exchange rates relatively fixed by buying and selling foreign exchange, the net amount of such official purchases or sales provided an estimate of the net deficit or net surplus of a given currency traded in the market. To the extent that governments no longer attempt to keep market exchange rates from falling below or rising above a fixed level, changes in the net demand or supply of a currency are reflected in a movement of the exchange rate rather than in a net loss or gain of reserves. Since exchange rates were at first fixed and then floating to varying degrees in 1973, changes in market pressures were reflected in part by changes in exchange rates and in part by net changes in international reserves, that is, by the official reserve transactions balance.

As measured by the official reserve transactions balance, the United States had a deficit of \$10½ billion in the first quarter, a surplus of \$½ billion in the second quarter, and a surplus of \$2 billion in the third quarter (Table 52). That is, in the first quarter, governments purchased roughly \$10½ billion to keep the dollar higher than it would otherwise have been; in the second quarter, governments more or less allowed the dollar to find its own level in the market; and in the third quarter, governments sold roughly \$2 billion, to keep the dollar lower than it would otherwise have been.

TABLE 52.—*U.S. balances on international transactions, 1972-73*

[Billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted]

Type of transaction	First 3 quarters		1972 IV	1973		
	1972	1973		I	II	III
Goods <sup>1</sup> .....	-5.2	-0.5	-1.7	-1.0	-0.2	0.7
Services.....	1.4	3.5	.9	1.1	.9	1.4
Military transactions.....	-2.7	-2.1	-.9	-.8	-.7	-.6
Investment income <sup>2</sup> .....	5.6	6.7	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.3
Other.....	-1.5	-1.1	-.5	-.4	-.5	-.3
GOODS AND SERVICES.....	-3.7	3.0	-.9	.2	.7	2.1
Unilateral transfers, net <sup>3</sup> .....	-2.9	-2.7	-.9	-.7	-1.0	-.9
CURRENT ACCOUNT.....	-6.6	.3	-1.8	-.6	-.4	1.2
Long-term capital.....	-1.7	.7	.2	-.4	-.2	1.3
U.S. Government <sup>4</sup> .....	-.8	-.6	-.6	-.3	.1	-.4
Direct investment.....	-2.6	-1.7	-.6	-1.8	-.4	.5
Other private.....	1.7	3.0	1.4	1.7	.1	1.2
CURRENT ACCOUNT AND LONG-TERM CAP- ITAL.....	-8.3	1.0	-1.6	-.9	-.6	2.5
Short-term claims.....	-1.8	-4.7	-1.2	-3.8	-.6	-.3
Short-term liabilities.....	2.3	.5	2.6	-1.8	1.1	1.2
Errors and unrecorded transactions, net.....	-1.6	-4.8	-1.5	-3.9	.4	-1.4
Allocations of SDR.....	.5		.2			
TOTAL <sup>5</sup> .....	-8.9	-8.1	-1.5	-10.5	.3	2.1

<sup>1</sup> Excludes transfers under military grants.<sup>2</sup> Includes direct investment fees and royalties.<sup>3</sup> Excludes military grants of goods and services.<sup>4</sup> Excludes official reserve transactions and includes transactions in some short-term U.S. Government assets.<sup>5</sup> Equals official reserve transactions balance.

Note.—Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Sources: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Department of the Treasury.

Another commonly used measure of the U.S. balance of payments is the current account and long-term capital balance, or the “basic” balance, as it is sometimes called. This balance is computed by adding up all the recorded transactions in the current and the long-term capital accounts, including unilateral transfers. It attempts to measure the extent to which the “long-term” or “underlying” demand for foreign exchange has exceeded the “long-term” or “underlying” supply of foreign exchange during a given period. If all such transactions were accurately recorded, this balance would also equal the changes in official reserves and the changes in short-term foreign assets of private banks, corporations, and individuals, net of changes in liabilities. Because some transactions may not be measured correctly, however, or may escape measurement altogether, a difference usually exists between recorded basic transactions above the line and recorded changes in reserves and short-term assets below the line. This difference appears as an errors-and-omissions item in the balance of payments statistics.

Deficits and surpluses in the *basic* balance need not necessarily imply any disequilibrium which requires corrective action by the government. To the extent that changes in net private holdings of short-term foreign assets are



voluntary, the existence of a surplus or deficit need not imply that it is either undesirable or unsustainable. When such changes are quite large in any one year, however, there is a strong possibility that the change is a temporary response to unusual circumstances, such as differences in interest rates. In these cases, some governments might be inclined to intervene to moderate the exchange rate fluctuations which could result from large shifts in short-term foreign assets.

The U.S. basic balance was in deficit by \$1 billion during the first and \$½ billion during the second quarter of 1973, while during the third quarter it was in surplus by about \$2½ billion. For the 3 quarters, the U.S. basic balance was in surplus by about \$1 billion. In other words, Americans in the first 3 quarters of 1973 earned \$1 billion more from current account and long-term capital transactions than they spent on similar transactions.

Table 52 also shows that during the first 3 quarters \$5 billion in net foreign currency expenditures were not recorded, while recorded short-term private claims on foreigners increased by \$4½ billion. These two items were "financed" by the \$1 billion current account surplus; a \$½ billion net increase in recorded short-term liabilities to private banks, corporations and individuals; and an \$8 billion net increase in U.S. liabilities to foreign official institutions.

### *The Net Foreign Asset Position*

At the end of 1972 the estimated value of American assets abroad was \$200 billion, and the value of American liabilities to foreigners was \$150 billion. The \$50 billion difference between the two is the estimated net American investment position abroad. The net investment position declined by about \$20 billion from 1970 to 1972, but data for the first 3 quarters of 1973 suggest that it probably increased last year.

Changes in the U.S. net asset position are brought about in part by surpluses or deficits in the balance on current account, a balance which includes U.S. transactions in goods and services, as well as unilateral transfers (Table 52). The largest changes occurred in the balance on goods and services. When the United States has a deficit in its trade balance as in 1971 and 1972, it imports more than it pays for with exports, thus increasing American liabilities to foreigners. With a trade surplus, as in the first 3 quarters of 1973, the United States acquires imports and an increase in net assets abroad in return for its exports. One would therefore expect an improvement of the U.S. net asset position during 1973.

The U.S. net asset position is also affected by several kinds of transactions and accounting adjustments that do not appear in the balance of payments. When foreign subsidiaries reinvest their earnings, this increases the value of U.S. assets abroad; and when foreign-owned subsidiaries in the United States reinvest their earnings, this increases U.S. liabilities to foreigners. During 1973, U.S. reinvestment of earnings may have exceeded foreign reinvestment by \$4 billion or more, thus adding to the U.S. net asset position. Changes in the valuation of outstanding assets and liabilities, which

result from changes in market value or changes in exchange rates, also have a small impact on the U.S. net asset position. Because of the small surplus on current account and the large level of net reinvested earnings, the net asset position of the United States must have improved markedly during 1973.

Balance of payments figures indicate, however, that the increase in liabilities to foreigners exceeded the increase in U.S. assets abroad by about \$4½ billion for the first 3 quarters of the year. This inconsistency can be partly explained by the net acquisition of unrecorded short-term foreign assets by Americans.

U.S. assets abroad are on the whole less liquid than U.S. liabilities to foreigners. At the end of 1972 about 90 percent of the \$200 billion in assets abroad were considered nonliquid. Direct investments amounted to about \$95 billion; holdings of long-term foreign securities were about \$25 billion. The remaining nonliquid assets include \$15 billion in nonliquid short-term assets held by private Americans, \$10 billion in private long-term claims by banks and others and \$35 billion in Government-owned assets. Most of the U.S. liquid assets are in the form of official monetary reserves. On the other hand, more than half of the \$150 billion in liabilities to foreigners are considered liquid; most of these liabilities are in the form of bank deposits, short-term Treasury securities, and negotiable certificates of deposit.

## HOW GOVERNMENTS BEHAVED IN THE MONETARY ARENA

During 1973 international monetary arrangements continued to evolve in response to changing needs. A major characteristic of these evolving arrangements is a considerable diversity in practices by different countries. Yet despite this diversity, countries cooperated with each other to a remarkable extent, as they had in 1972, and from their cooperation one could begin to see the development of some conventions to guide countries in their monetary relations. This process has benefited from the discussions taking place in the framework of the Committee of Twenty, a committee associated with the International Monetary Fund.

### *Exchange Rates and Intervention*

Exchange rates became more flexible in 1973, as the governments of most major countries reduced or suspended their commitments to maintain fixed exchange rates, and other governments changed their par values more frequently. While governments have continued to intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to influence the movement of the exchange rate, it can no longer be assumed that they will finance an excess demand or absorb an excess supply of foreign currencies at given exchange rates. The situation can best be described as one of managed floating.

In managing their exchange rates, countries followed widely differing practices, as can be seen in Table 53. Some countries have allowed their currencies to float within a rather wide range, resorting to only limited

TABLE 53.—*Maximum percent change in exchange rates between various foreign currencies and the dollar during 1973*

Type of intervention	Maximum percent change in rate during 1973			
	No change	1-8 percent	9-20 percent	More than 20 percent
Countries maintaining a joint float, with intervention to maintain a stable relationship within the group, but minimal intervention in outside currencies.			Sweden.	Belgium Germany Denmark France Netherlands Norway
Countries floating independently with some intervention in the foreign exchange market.		Italy Canada	United Kingdom Iceland Finland Portugal	Austria Switzerland
Countries undertaking considerable intervention to maintain a stable relationship vis-a-vis the dollar (except where another currency is noted).	Turkey Argentina Bolivia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Paraguay Peru Israel Philippines	Brazil Colombia Venezuela Republic of China Thailand Korea	Ghana India (pound) Pakistan Spain Egypt Ethiopia Iran Iraq Saudi Arabia Sri Lanka South Africa Greece Yugoslavia	Australia Uruguay Afghanistan Japan CFA Countries (French franc) Chile
Country fixing rate with respect to an average of other currencies.			Morocco	New Zealand

Note.—The procedure for computing maximum percentage changes was to find the largest end month deviation during the year from the dollar exchange rate in effect at the end of December 1972.

Sources: International Monetary Fund, and Council of Economic Advisers.

intervention in foreign exchange markets to maintain orderly market conditions. One group of countries, comprising Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, decided to keep their currencies relatively fixed with respect to each other. Whenever spot market exchange rates between any two currencies in the group deviate by more than 2¼ percent from an agreed relationship, the monetary authorities are obliged to intervene in terms of each other's currencies. However, in January 1974, the Government of France announced that it would sever the tie between the franc and the other EC currencies floating jointly. Some countries have decided to keep their currencies fixed to one or the other of the major currencies. A few countries have followed the practice of keeping their currencies fixed relative to an average of other currencies weighted according to their importance in bilateral trade.

Most countries, regardless of the exchange rate regime they have chosen, have continued to intervene in the foreign exchange market to varying degrees. Some countries, the United States among them, have restricted themselves to limited intervention with the object of maintaining orderly market conditions. Other countries, although they were officially floating,

TABLE 54.—*Major changes in capital controls, 1973*

Country	Controls on banks and other financial intermediaries	Controls on portfolio investment	Controls on direct investment
Australia.....	February—broadened coverage of restrictions on borrowing abroad. October—increase from 25 to 33½ percent in noninterest-bearing deposits required on borrowings from abroad with a maturity in excess of 2 years.		March—general ban on foreign investment in Australian real estate.
Belgium.....	March to early September—negative interest rate of ¼ percent per week on nonresident convertible franc holdings exceeding the daily average in the last quarter of 1972. Late September—negative interest rate reimposed.		
Canada.....			December—act calling for screening of new foreign direct investments in Canada passed.
France.....	March to early October—prohibition of interest payments on nonresident franc deposits of less than 180 days; increase (to 100 percent) in mandatory reserve requirements on excess of these deposits above their Jan. 4 level. March—restriction on banks' forward exchange transactions with nonresidents. April to late October—banks allowed to impose a negative interest rate of 0.75 percent per month on the increase in nonresident franc deposits above the January 4 level. September—banks prohibited from lending francs to nonresidents.	March to early October—nonresident purchases of short-term securities prohibited.	
Germany.....	February 4—prior authorization required (and as a rule not given) for contracting of foreign loans and credits in excess of DM 50,000. February 24—Government empowered to raise the cash deposit requirement against foreign borrowing from 50 to 100 percent (authority not yet invoked). July 1 to October 1—minimum reserve requirements against foreign liabilities effectively increased to 90–100 percent, as opposed to 8–20 percent on domestic liabilities.	February—new restrictions on sale of domestic securities to nonresidents.	February—authorization requirement for nonresident direct investment valued in excess of DM 500,000.
Italy.....		July—blocked noninterest bearing deposit of 50 percent (25 percent for mutual funds) required on portfolio investments abroad.	July—similar deposit required on direct investments abroad.
Japan.....	May—increase from 70 to 90 percent in allowable foreign currency financing of external operations, including direct investments overseas, purchases of real estate abroad, and prepayments for imports.	May—relaxation of controls governing acquisition of Japanese securities by foreign investors, and acquisition of foreign securities by Japanese investors.	May—continued relaxation of controls on direct foreign investment in Japan. With some exceptions, virtually all industries will be fully open to foreign ownership by the end of 1975.

TABLE 54.—*Major changes in capital controls, 1973—Continued*

Country	Controls on banks and other financial intermediaries	Controls on portfolio investment	Controls on direct investment
	<p>October 25—relaxed requirement that foreigners floating yen loans must immediately convert 90 percent of the proceeds into foreign currency.</p> <p>November 21—Government announced that it would make no further additions to its dollar financing of one-half of Japanese banks' import loans.</p> <p>December—marginal reserve requirement on free yen deposits by nonresidents lowered from 50 percent to 10 percent.</p>	<p>November—banned resident purchases of foreign bonds within 6 months of their maturity; ended requirement that security houses should balance foreign purchases and sales of Japanese stocks.</p> <p>December—foreigners allowed to purchase Japanese bonds without restrictions.</p>	
Netherlands.....	<p>March to May — noninterest bearing reserve requirement levied on increases in banks' net foreign guilder liabilities; special commission levied against increases in balances in convertible guilder accounts.</p>	<p>January—residents allowed to subscribe for new Euro-guilder notes issued by residents.</p>	
Switzerland.....	<p>January 29 to October 29—banks prohibited from having net liabilities in foreign currencies (spot and forward together).</p> <p>October 1—National Bank revoked the 2 percent per quarter negative interest rate on banks' franc deposit liabilities to nonresidents.</p>		
United States.....	<p>May 16—Federal Reserve Board (FRB) lowered reserve requirements against Eurodollar borrowings in excess of the reserve free base (from 20 to 8 percent), and took steps to eliminate gradually the reserve free bases.</p> <p>December 26—Federal Reserve Board announced effective Jan. 1, increased foreign lending and investment ceilings for banks and other financial institutions subject to the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program: ceilings raised on foreign loans by U.S. banks, by U.S. agencies and branches of foreign banks, and by U.S. nonbank financial institutions.</p> <p>January 1974—Controls on foreign lending by financial institutions suspended.</p>	<p>April—Interest Equalization Tax (IET) extended through June 1974.</p> <p>December 26—Treasury Department announced reduction of the IET from an annual rate of <math>\frac{3}{4}</math> to <math>\frac{1}{4}</math> percent per annum effective Jan. 1, 1974.</p> <p>January 1974—IET reduced to zero.</p>	<p>Continued liberalization: export credits extended by direct investors to their affiliated foreign nationals exempted from controls.</p> <p>December 26—Commerce Department announced, effective Jan. 1, increased minimum allowable direct investment abroad by U.S. firms from \$10 to \$20 million per year. In addition, various other regulations were relaxed.</p> <p>January 1974—Controls on foreign investment by U.S. corporations suspended.</p>

Sources: International Monetary Fund, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

have intervened on a broad scale to minimize day-to-day fluctuations in their rates. Still other countries have continued to intervene in order to keep their exchange rates stable with respect to a major currency, a group of currencies, or an average of all currencies.

Despite the great variety of exchange rate practices by different countries, relations among countries have remained fairly harmonious. Although no

attempt was made to agree on a code of conduct to guide governments in formulating their exchange rate and intervention policies, extensive consultations have led to wide acceptance of some basic tenets that should influence the formulation of policies in this area. An idea repeatedly expressed in official statements is that countries should intervene in the foreign exchange market when intervention is necessary to maintain orderly market conditions. On the other hand, interventions aimed at obstructing or accelerating a basic market trend would be generally regarded as harmful. There is probably also wide recognition that a country with meager reserves may need more latitude for allowing its exchange rate to decline than a country with ample reserves; and, conversely, a country with ample reserves may need more latitude for allowing its exchange rate to adjust upward than a country with meager reserves. Similarly, when its rate is rising, a country with meager reserves should have wider latitude to intervene in the foreign exchange market than a country with ample reserves, whereas a country with ample reserves should have a wider latitude to intervene in the foreign exchange market when its rate is falling.

The conceptual basis for these conventions, if one may call them that, is similar to the ideas put forward by the United States and some other countries for reforming the international monetary system. The continuing discussion in the Committee of Twenty can be expected to give these ideas more concrete form.

### *Capital Controls*

Another development during 1973 has been the adoption of new measures for controlling capital movements, as can be seen in Table 54. (Controls already in force at the beginning of the year are not shown in the table.) Capital controls were tightened further in the first part of 1973 by many major industrial countries, when exchange market developments put upward pressure on many of the European currencies and several countries sought to moderate this pressure by imposing restrictions on banks and other financial intermediaries. Some of the more common restrictions were discriminatory reserve requirements, and penalty rates or prohibition of interest payments on nonresident deposits. Capital controls did not, however, succeed in preventing large speculative short-term capital inflows, either prior to the revaluation of the dollar in February or from late May to early July.

Some countries, on the other hand, took steps to discourage capital outflows or encourage capital inflows. Italy required noninterest-bearing deposits against investments abroad in order to stem a continuing capital outflow. Japan relaxed controls on inward direct and portfolio investment to reduce the overall balance of payments deficit which developed in 1973.

Since the 1960's the United States has maintained three kinds of restraints on capital outflows: an interest equalization tax on purchases of foreign securities, restrictions on foreign direct investments by U.S. corporations, and limitations on foreign lending by U.S. financial institutions. These restraints were relaxed in December 1973, and removed entirely in January 1974.

### *Changes in International Liquidity in 1973*

Total international reserves increased by \$28 billion during the first 9 months of 1973, compared to \$28 billion in 1972 and \$38 billion in 1971. From the end of 1970 to the end of September 1973, total reserves doubled, increasing from \$93 billion to \$187 billion. As in previous years, most of the increase was in foreign exchange and resulted from intervention by foreign central banks in the foreign exchange market to slow down the appreciation of their currencies vis-a-vis the dollar. After the major European countries and Japan decided to allow their currencies to float in relation to the dollar, the further accumulation of foreign exchange was reduced. As can be seen from Table 55, foreign exchange reserves increased by \$22 billion during the first 9 months of 1973. Of this amount \$14 billion occurred in the first quarter, before the major European currencies were floated. The \$22 billion increase in foreign exchange reserves consisted of an \$8 billion increase in U.S. liabilities to foreign central banks. The remainder constituted increases in dollar balances of central banks held in commercial banks outside the United States, and reserves held in currencies other than the dollar. Toward the end of the year a reversal of this trend set in, as an increasing number of foreign central banks sold dollars to slow the decline of their currencies relative to the dollar.

Despite the large increase in foreign exchange holdings in 1973, the composition of reserves did not change significantly during the year. The proportion held in gold fell from 24 to 23 percent, while that held in foreign exchange increased from 65 to 67 percent of total reserves. Most of the increase in primary reserves (gold, SDR's, and reserve positions in the Fund) resulted from the devaluation of the dollar in terms of gold and SDR's, which automatically increased by 11 percent the dollar value of the existing stock of gold, SDR's, and reserve positions in the Fund.

TABLE 55.—*Composition of international reserve assets, 1970-73*

Type of reserve asset	Value of reserve assets <sup>1</sup> (millions of U.S. dollars)				Percent of total reserves			
	1970	1971	1972	September 1973	1970	1971	1972	September 1973
Total reserve assets.....	92.6	130.6	158.8	186.9	100	100	100	100
Gold stock.....	37.2	39.1	38.8	43.2	40	30	24	23
SDR.....	3.1	6.4	9.4	10.6	3	5	6	6
Reserve position in IMF.....	7.7	6.9	6.9	7.5	8	5	4	4
Foreign exchange.....	44.6	78.1	103.7	125.6	48	60	65	67
U.S. liabilities.....	23.8	50.7	61.5	69.8	26	39	39	37

<sup>1</sup> End of period.

Note.—Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The official price of gold was raised from \$35 per ounce to \$38 per ounce by the Smithsonian Agreement in December 1971. It rose from \$38 to \$42.22 an ounce in conjunction with the announcement early in 1973 that the dollar would be devalued in terms of SDR's. The price of gold in the private bullion market in London increased from \$65 at the end of 1972 to \$112 at the end of 1973, having reached a peak of \$127 on June 5 and July 6. Since the market price of gold has been almost three times as high as the price at which governments have fixed the price of gold for official transactions, countries that hold gold have been reluctant to use it in international settlements. As a first step to unfreezing gold, a number of countries which had previously agreed not to buy or sell official gold in the free market decided to end that agreement in November. While IMF rules still prohibit official gold purchases from the private market when the free market price is above the official price, official sales to the private market are permitted when the free market price is above the official price. Since the market price is now nearly three times the official price, central banks would now be in a position to sell gold from the market without violating IMF rules. No country has yet announced, however, whether or when it intends to sell gold to the market.

## PLANNING THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

Discussions begun in 1972 by the Committee of Twenty on reform of the international monetary system continued during 1973. The state of these discussions at the time of the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Nairobi during September was summarized in a document entitled *First Outline of Reform*. It is a report in which the chairman of the committee cites the issues on which some measure of agreement has been reached, points of disagreement, and suggestions by members of the committee about ways of dealing with outstanding issues.

The current international monetary arrangements have been evolving as countries have made pragmatic adjustments to changing realities in the international economy. In making these adjustments, governments have been influenced by the discussions in the Committee of Twenty, just as those discussions have been influenced by the experiences gained with the interim arrangements. In the discussion below, the long-term alternatives are examined within a framework that encompasses both the Bretton Woods system and the current interim arrangements.

### *The Exchange Rate Regime*

The central function of an international monetary system is to facilitate the exchange of one currency for another in such a way that trade and investments can take place across national frontiers almost as easily as within a given country. There are various ways of organizing the exchange of one currency for another. They differ chiefly in their methods of assuring that



over time a country's payments in foreign currencies equals its receipts in foreign currencies.

At one extreme, balance between the demand for and supply of a currency is achieved at all times through a free market in which currencies are traded at whatever exchange rate will clear the market. Many monetary authorities are opposed to this degree of flexibility, however, since they fear that large exchange rate fluctuations would create difficulties for international commerce. In order to overcome some of these difficulties, most governments have made it a practice to enter the market as buyers and sellers whenever changes in the private demand or supply of their currencies would otherwise lead to large fluctuations in exchange rates.

The exchange rate at which one government would like to fix the value of its currency relative to other currencies may not coincide with the exchange rate at which other governments would like to fix *their* currencies.. To avoid such potential conflicts, it is desirable to agree on some rules, which may specify when governments may or should intervene in the market, or when governments may or should allow exchange rates to change.

The rules could be very tightly written, allowing little national discretion; or they could be written with considerable room for nations to make their own judgments. The Bretton Woods system imposed a relatively strict discipline by requiring governments to intervene in the foreign exchange market whenever rates deviated by more than  $\frac{3}{4}$  percent from internationally agreed rates. Exchange rates could be changed only when it could be demonstrated that the existing rates created a disequilibrium which was regarded as fundamental.

Under the current arrangements agreed to in March, governments have accepted a general obligation to intervene in the foreign exchange market to assure orderly market conditions.\* In the future international monetary system, the Committee of Twenty has agreed, that exchange rate rules should be less rigid than they were under the Bretton Woods system, but that they should impose more precise obligations than exist under the present arrangements.

#### *When Should Countries Use Demand Management Policies?*

Changing the exchange rates is not the only way of removing an imbalance in international payments flows. In fact, it is theoretically possible to have a system of completely fixed exchange rates in which long-term balance between the demand for and supply of foreign currencies is achieved through changes in the level of domestic demand. Under the classical gold standard

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\*The communique issued on March 16, 1973, by the Group of Ten meeting in Paris stated that the participating countries "agreed in principle that official intervention in exchange markets may be useful at appropriate times to facilitate the maintenance of orderly conditions, keeping in mind also the desirability of encouraging reflows of speculative movements of funds."

system, these demand changes were assumed to take place automatically. Since exchange rates were established by the fixed price of gold in each country, payments equilibrium was assumed to be preserved by the impact of net transfers of gold on the domestic money supply and hence on the total demand for goods and services. However, since most governments today consider it their responsibility to manage domestic demand in accordance with their goals of employment and price stability, complete reliance on adjustments of domestic demand to keep the balance of payments "balanced" is therefore not considered reasonable. At the same time, any government following a rational policy will manage its domestic demand with regard to the side effects on international currency markets, since exchange rate movements have a feedback on domestic economic variables.

The methods by which a country equalizes its foreign currency payments and its foreign currency receipts affects not only its own economy but foreign economies as well, and hence there needs to be agreement on mutually acceptable conduct. The Bretton Woods Agreement, for instance, established a strong presumption that countries would use domestic demand management policies for balance of payments adjustment whenever that would not be inconsistent with domestic price stabilization and employment objectives.

Under present arrangements countries are free to decide on their own the extent to which demand management policies should contribute to a correction of payments imbalance. Nevertheless, in the course of international discussions related to current balance of payments developments, the impact of alternative adjustment measures on other countries is explored, and where conflicts are identified, mutually satisfactory solutions can usually be worked out.

In the future international monetary system, it is generally assumed, countries will continue to have considerable flexibility in choosing among alternative adjustment measures, and they will also continue to take into account the effect of their policies on other countries. It is expected that the adjustment policies of countries will be reviewed by a new committee that will be established in the International Monetary Fund to be composed of policy-making officials from national capitals.

#### *When Should Countries Use Controls?*

It would also be theoretically possible to have a system in which balance of payments equilibrium is maintained by government controls over international transactions. The Communist countries, in fact, have adopted such a system. In most non-Communist countries an adjustment system based exclusively on the use of controls would be unacceptable because it would entail unwarranted government interference with private decisions and because it would lead to inefficient production and consumption patterns. In some circumstances, however, governments have found it desirable to use controls to adjust the balance of payments.

The Bretton Woods Agreement permitted the use of controls to regulate international capital movements, but generally ruled out any restrictions on payments for transactions in the current account. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which spells out what restrictions countries may place on trade directly, as distinct from restrictions on payments for trade, provides that governments may temporarily impose quotas but may not impose or increase tariffs, in order to deal with a serious balance of payments deficit. In practice, tariff surcharges have been imposed but have remained in effect only for short periods, because other countries have exerted strong pressures to remove them promptly. Nothing has happened to change these rules during the time the present arrangements have been in effect. The *First Outline of Reform* indicates international agreement on a continued "strong presumption against the use of controls on current account transactions or payments for balance of payments purposes." It also rules out the use of controls over capital transactions "for the purpose of maintaining inappropriate exchange rates or, more generally, of avoiding appropriate adjustment action." There has also been wide agreement that, in choosing among different forms of adjustment actions, countries should take into account repercussions on other countries as well as domestic considerations.

#### *When Should Countries Correct Payments Imbalances?*

Another area of international concern is the timing of policy measures by countries to remove payments imbalances. This is of international concern because one country's surplus is another country's deficit, and vice versa. When one country fails to deal with a growing payments imbalance, it becomes more difficult for another country to deal with its payments imbalance. Under the Bretton Woods system the main provisions dealing with the timing of adjustment actions were focused on deficit countries. A country wanting to borrow from the International Monetary Fund had to satisfy the Fund that it was taking appropriate actions to reduce its deficit. The more such a country wanted to borrow, the tighter the discipline that the Fund imposed. The IMF Articles of Agreement also provided for pressures to be exerted on countries with persistently large surpluses, though this provision was never applied in practice. Under the current arrangements these provisions remain in effect, although they have become largely inoperative. According to the Chairman of the Committee of Twenty there is agreement that countries should "take such prompt and adequate adjustment action, domestic or external, as may be needed to avoid protracted payments imbalances." There is also agreement that a judgment of what constitutes "adequate adjustment action" should be based on both objective indicators, such as a country's level of international reserves, and an evaluation by an international body such as the IMF. The manner in which these elements might be best combined remains unsettled.

### *What Pressures Should Be Exerted on Countries?*

Once an obligation is established for countries to act in a timely fashion to remove payments imbalances, the question arises what, if any, pressures ought to be exerted on countries that fail to carry out their obligations. The Bretton Woods Agreement provided mainly for pressures on deficit countries, insofar as the credit facilities of the Fund were made contingent on a finding by the Executive Directors of the IMF that a country was taking adequate steps to remove the deficit in its balance of payments. Under current arrangements the strongest pressures are those exerted by the foreign exchange market. Attempts by a government to prevent an adjustment of the exchange rate in the face of a persistent surplus or deficit tend to trigger large speculative movements, and these in turn exert strong automatic pressure that countries have found difficult to ignore. The Chairman of the Committee of Twenty has indicated that a reformed system will provide for graduated pressures to be applied by the international community on both surplus and deficit countries in cases of large and persistent imbalance. It has not been agreed in the Committee of Twenty, however, what those pressures ought to be and how they ought to be activated.

### *The Convertibility Issue*

Another issue under discussion is the convertibility of national currencies into primary reserve assets such as SDR's and gold. This particular use of the term has to be distinguished from the exchange of one currency into another in the foreign exchange market. The issue of convertibility into primary reserve assets arises primarily in the context of an agreement to limit fluctuations of exchange rates by government intervention in the foreign exchange market. If a surplus country is obligated to buy the currency of a deficit country to forestall a decline of that currency in the foreign exchange market, the question arises to what extent the deficit country ought to buy back its currency with primary reserve assets. One argument in favor of such a requirement is that it limits the extent to which a surplus country is obligated to finance another country's deficit. Another argument is that it puts some pressure on the deficit country to accept "financial discipline" insofar as its deficit is due to excessively loose domestic policies.

Under the Bretton Woods system all countries except the United States intervened in the foreign exchange market to carry out an obligation to keep their exchange rates within internationally agreed margins. Since the currency used for such intervention was generally the U.S. dollar, the dollar itself was kept fixed in foreign exchange markets by the intervention of other central banks. The United States, in turn, accepted an obligation to convert dollars into gold or other reserve assets upon demand. The United States finally suspended this convertibility of the dollar into primary reserves on August 15, 1971, though the dollar remained convertible into other currencies in the foreign exchange market. Inconvertibility came after an extended period during which the American gold stock was very small

in relation to the country's liquid dollar obligations and the major central banks had abstained from converting large amounts of dollars into gold, despite the fact that they were continuing to accumulate a large number of dollars. The Committee of Twenty has agreed that in the context of long-term monetary reform it would be desirable to establish the convertibility of (the dollar as well as other) currencies into primary reserve assets insofar as it is decided to stabilize currencies within agreed margins. But whether such an obligation to convert should be mandatory or at the option of the country acquiring the currency is still at issue.

### *The Level, Distribution, and Composition of Reserves*

To support the value of their currencies in the foreign exchange market, most countries maintain an inventory of foreign currencies. In addition, countries accumulate international assets, such as SDR's or gold, which can be used to buy foreign currencies from the governments issuing them. Finally, countries maintain lines of credit with each other and with the International Monetary Fund so that they can borrow additional amounts of foreign currency when the need arises. Some might argue that the reserves a country keeps are its own affair. It is widely believed, however, that the reserves which countries keep are of interest to the whole world community because they affect the behavior of governments and in doing so also affect everyone else. There are three separate, though interrelated, aspects of the so-called liquidity issue: the level of world reserves; their distribution among countries; and their composition in terms of the types of assets held and the kind of borrowing facilities that are readily available.

The *level* of world reserves is important because if the level is not "right," countries on balance may be induced to adopt policy measures that have a disruptive effect on other countries. For instance, some fear that if reserves are inadequate, countries may not prevent changes in exchange rates considered excessive by the international community; or they may not gear domestic demand management policies to appropriate employment objectives, or they may impose controls on imports or capital outflows. On the other hand, it is feared that if reserves are excessive countries in payments deficit may keep their exchange rates at a fixed level long after an adjustment would have been desirable; or they may escape financial discipline and thus create an inflationary problem for themselves as well as for others; or they may impose controls on exports or capital inflows.

The *distribution* of reserves among countries becomes an issue once the decision is made to manage the global level of reserves. Judgment about the adequacy of world reserves from the point of view of any one country must be based on the relative distribution of those reserves among countries. Thus, while some countries might consider world reserves to be "excessive," they might not be willing to give up any of their own reserves. From the point of view of countries with inadequate reserves, global reserves can be excessive only to the extent that other countries are willing to give up "excess" reserves.

The *composition* of reserves among different assets becomes an issue because each asset (or borrowing facility) has its particular characteristics which determine its desirability and its most appropriate role relative to other types of assets. Moreover, one can affect the total volume of reserves only by affecting the volume of individual components.

The Bretton Woods Agreement sanctioned the use of both gold and foreign currencies as international reserves, but it did not make any provisions for international control of the level of those reserves. In practice the growth of the monetary gold stock was the result of the difference between newly mined gold and the private demand for gold. The growth of currency reserves (mostly dollars) was the result of the difference between the net amount of foreign currency acquired through intervention in the foreign exchange market and the conversion of such currency balances into gold or other assets. The Bretton Woods Agreement did provide one managed source of borrowed reserves in the form of controlled access to a stock of foreign currencies managed by the International Monetary Fund.

In the late 1960's two developments occurred which established some limited international influence over reserve creation. First, as a result of an arrangement made among a number of central banks, it was agreed to stabilize the stock of monetary gold. Second, the member countries of the International Monetary Fund decided to create a new reserve asset, called the SDR, which can be created and distributed on the basis of international consent. At the same time there was an increasing desire to limit the accumulation of currencies, but there was no effective means of doing so. The Committee of Twenty has agreed that in a reformed international monetary system, "countries will cooperate in the management of their currency reserves." No agreement has been reached, however, on how this is to be accomplished.

### *The Issue of the Numeraire*

The numeraire of the international monetary system is the common unit of account in terms of which the relative values of all currencies are measured. While it is of course possible to express the value of a currency in terms of any other currency, it is usually convenient to adopt a single reference point. In addition to being a convenient measuring stick, the numeraire is usually also the unit value in terms of which the obligations of countries to the international monetary system and the claims of countries on the system are expressed.

Under the Bretton Woods system, gold served as the formal numeraire, though the dollar became the *de facto* numeraire. The use of the dollar as the most commonly used unit of account was made legitimate by the official tie to gold. It was convenient because the dollar increasingly became the most important official as well as private international reserve asset.

When the convertibility of the dollar into gold was suspended in August 1971, the tie between the dollar and gold was broken. It was thus no longer possible to assume that international obligations of countries to the

International Monetary Fund, which in legal terms continued to be denominated in gold, would bear a fixed relationship to the dollar. It was also no longer possible to establish a firm relationship between the value of the SDR, the internationally created reserve asset, and individual currencies. It has thus been difficult for countries to discharge their obligations to the International Monetary Fund, and countries have been reluctant to use SDR's in settlement of their obligations to each other.

There is wide agreement that the SDR should become the formal numeraire of the future international monetary system. In order to make the SDR the numeraire not only formally but also in practice, it will be necessary, however, to establish an agreed procedure for calculating the value of the SDR in terms of individual currencies. Since the SDR is not traded in the market against currencies, there is no one relationship which suggests itself more strongly than another. The most widely suggested idea is that the SDR should be valued in terms of an average of the major currencies.

## HOW GOVERNMENTS BEHAVED IN THE TRADE ARENA

During the first half of 1973 the economies of most industrialized countries grew rapidly, and prices rose sharply. Real GNP in the United States grew at an annual rate of about 5.5 percent during the first half of the year, an annual rate well above the long-term average; but growth rates in many foreign economies were also high in relation to long-term growth. The worldwide boom was accompanied by inflation rates exceeding 6 percent in Canada, France, Italy, Japan and the United States. This rapid growth of demand, together with poor harvests and cutbacks in world oil production, created particularly strong upward pressures on the prices of food and some key raw materials. A number of national governments attempted to contain inflation by controlling prices, but by doing so they created widespread shortages and other economic distortions.

Shortages and soaring prices induced governments to add a new dimension to their trade policies. In addition to their traditional concerns about access for their products to foreign markets, they showed increasing concern about access to foreign sources of supply for key materials. Similarly, while governments continued across-the-board efforts to promote exports, they also showed an increasing tendency to limit the export of commodities in short supply.

### *What Countries Did to Encourage Imports*

On July 18 the Australian Government announced that it was unilaterally reducing all its tariffs by 25 percent. In an accompanying statement, the Government explained that "this reduction . . . is designed to restrain price increases by increased competition and by stimulating in the short run a sufficiently large inflow of additional imports to help meet pressing demand." It was estimated that "the tariff changes will have a direct impact on import

prices of approximately the same order of magnitude as a revaluation [of the Australian dollar] of slightly less than 6 percent." While this was certainly the most dramatic example of the new economic incentives prevailing in 1973, similar evidence was provided by the actions of many other countries.

In the United States large increases in the prices of foodstuffs became a particularly important public issue, and efforts to contain these prices became a prominent objective of domestic economic policy, as explained elsewhere in this report. This overall policy led to a review of the quotas on imported food products, which have long been part of U.S. agricultural programs designed to protect farm income at home. Since the problem in 1973 was soaring farm prices rather than falling farm income, the Administration decided to enlarge or suspend many of these quotas while supplies remained scarce. Quotas on meat imports were suspended for 1973; quotas on cheese, butter, and nonfat dry milk were all increased temporarily.

Many other countries took similar actions. Japan, for instance, reduced tariffs on about 5 percent of her import categories and expanded or eliminated some of the remaining quotas on imports of manufactured and agricultural products. Canada lowered tariffs on certain consumer goods and agricultural products. The European Community reduced, and in some cases suspended, tariffs on various industrial products, primarily chemicals. In addition, the variable levies which the EC imposes on food imports as part of its Common Agricultural Policy automatically fell to zero, as world prices exceeded the support price level in the Community.

#### *What Countries Did to Reduce Exports*

With the booming worldwide demand for foodstuffs and raw materials, prices of such commodities rose to record heights. This increase in domestic prices as a result of foreign demand pressure caused considerable resentment in many producing countries and led to public demands that domestic supplies be protected. The situation was further aggravated when some governments imposed price controls in an effort to contain the inflationary pressures. Since export prices remained uncontrolled, domestic producers had an increased incentive to export their goods, with the result that the domestic shortages created by the initial imposition of the price controls were aggravated by increased exports. To alleviate the domestic shortages, a number of governments imposed controls on exports.

The pressures of foreign demand for agricultural goods in 1973 had a particularly strong impact in the United States. In most of the other major countries exporting agricultural products, the government acts as the middleman between the domestic producer and the foreign buyer, and it can thus regulate the level of sales. In contrast, the United States has traditionally permitted foreign buyers to purchase freely in the U.S. market. Partly for this reason, and partly because the United States had the largest stocks, foreign buyers converged on the U.S. market, increasing U.S. agricultural exports by



88 percent. Since U.S. food prices had been significantly lower in the past than food prices in more protected markets, the resulting rise of food prices in the United States was larger than in most other countries. When ceilings were imposed on the prices of foodstuffs to contain the inflationary pressures, the export pressures increased even more.

The problems created by rapid increases in foreign demand became particularly pronounced with soybeans and related products. When it appeared that export contracts would exceed available supplies until new crops were harvested, temporary controls were imposed on exports of these commodities in early July. The export licensing provisions allowed each exporter to ship a fixed percentage of the exports he had contracted before June 14. Later the controls were extended to cover other high-protein feeds. All these controls were terminated by October 1. Despite the controls, exports of these products were substantially larger in 1973 than in 1972. The soybean crop harvested in late 1972 had been a record crop, and almost the entire increase in production was added to exports in 1973. The United States increased soybean exports by 18 percent and increased exports of soybean meal by 25 percent over the previous harvesting season.

Export pressures combined with controls on domestic prices also led to domestic supply shortages for a number of nonagricultural commodities, including steel scrap and logs. To alleviate shortages, the Government imposed temporary controls on the export of steel scrap in July. These controls were supplemented by a Japanese decision to reduce imports of ferrous scrap by 1 million tons during the remainder of 1973. Japan also agreed voluntarily to cut back her imports of U.S. logs.

A large number of countries besides the United States imposed export controls to protect domestic supplies of food and to ease inflationary pressures. Brazil, the world's other major exporter of soybeans, limited the export of soybeans and soybean products shortly after the United States imposed controls. Canada instituted an export licensing program for protein feed supplements, edible oils, animal fats, and livestock protein feed; export controls were also imposed on live cattle and hogs and on fresh, chilled, and frozen beef and pork. Australia tightened export controls on a similar list of feed products. Both the Canadian and Australian controls were lifted later in the year. The Common Market countries suspended export subsidies for several dairy products in July and in August banned the export of wheat and wheat products. The export bans were later replaced by export levies on wheat, as well as corn and barley.

Export controls of a more serious kind were imposed by some of the oil-producing countries in the Middle East, after renewed fighting broke out between Israel and some Arab states. In order to pressure third countries to support their cause, most Arab states cut back oil production and exports and imposed an embargo on shipments to the United States, the Netherlands, and several other countries. These controls on oil, as discussed earlier, severely threaten the economic prospects of all industrial nations. If sus-

tained, they would probably be felt most intensely in Japan and Western Europe because of their relatively high dependence on imported energy sources.

### *Lessons for the Future*

The world was caught unprepared when the shortages during 1973 caused a shift from a buyer's to a seller's market for certain products. Because a buyer's market had existed in varying degrees for several decades, most international trading rules focused on trade policy devices, such as tariffs and quotas, that protected producers in their domestic markets. The existing patterns of thought as well as existing trade rules were not well geared to dealing with trade policy measures aimed at restricting exports and preserving domestic sources of supply.

As the year wore on, countries began to seek practical accommodations on the new issues that arose; and in the future it will become desirable to focus greater attention on the possibility of new kinds of commitments by exporting countries on foreign access to their supplies when world demand is strong. Such issues will be explored in the forthcoming world conference on food, in the coming meeting of oil-consuming and oil-producing nations, and possibly at similar conferences in the future. At the same time the formulation of a more general code of good conduct for exporting countries, and the adoption of more systematic procedures for the resolution of disputes over the access to supplies, should be addressed in the context of the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations.

## PLANNING THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM

The United States reaffirmed its commitment to a continued expansion of world trade by joining 104 other countries in opening a new round of comprehensive trade negotiations in Tokyo during September. In a statement issued at the end of the meeting the participating countries expressed their willingness to pursue negotiations aimed at "the progressive dismantling of obstacles to trade and the improvement of the international framework for the conduct of world trade."

A new initiative in the trade area is timely for a number of reasons. First, the reductions in trade barriers negotiated during the Kennedy Round have been fully implemented, and this makes desirable the negotiation of new commitments. Second, with the lowering of tariffs as a result of past negotiations, nontariff barriers have become relatively more important as a source of distortion in international trade and have taken on greater importance in international economic relations. Third, expansion of the European Community to include the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland, as well as the substantial elimination of trade barriers between the expanded European Community and most of the other European countries have created the possibility of a significant decrease of trade opportunities between Europe and the rest of the world, including the United States.

A reduction of trade barriers on a global basis would reduce the resulting diversion of trade, just as the Kennedy Round cushioned the diversion of trade after the EC was formed. Fourth, the ongoing reform of the international monetary system will require mutually supportive improvements of the monetary and trading systems, in particular to ensure that efforts in one field are not frustrated in the other. Finally, recent years have seen an increase of political friction related to trade issues, both within the United States and between the United States and its major trading partners. While some friction is inevitable, given the large degree of economic interdependence among countries, the heightening of these tensions reflects in part a failure of the international institutions designed to resolve economic disputes before they spill over into the political arena.

An improvement in the functioning of the international trading system may be the most important outcome of the new round of trade negotiations, inasmuch as such improvement may be essential for alleviating the tensions which might otherwise lead to new obstacles to trade. A better international framework for resolving trade problems is required in five areas: nontariff barriers related to domestic economic and social policies; agricultural trade barriers related to domestic agricultural programs; safeguard measures to facilitate an orderly adjustment to new market conditions by producers in *importing* countries; subsidies and other government assistance to industries; and finally new understandings on the access of consuming countries to sources of supply, which might include safeguard arrangements to facilitate orderly adjustments to new market conditions by consumers in *exporting* countries.

Quite appropriately, however, the primary focus of the new round of negotiations will not be on maintenance of the status quo but on a continued dismantling of trade barriers. It should thus be possible to avoid confusing the end—the expansion of profitable trading opportunities—with the means—the negotiation of rules governing trade. Countries have benefited greatly from the rapid expansion of trade in the past quarter century; and should this trend cease or be reversed because of a failure of international cooperation, the economic welfare of all countries, including the United States, would be likely to suffer.

As in the past, a major focus of the negotiations will be on a reduction of tariffs. While past trade negotiations have reduced the relative importance of tariffs, they remain the most visible obstacle to trade.

Approximately 60 percent of all trade in industrial products remains subject to tariffs in the major industrial countries, and the average rate of such tariffs is about 10 percent. Moreover, while in the aggregate, tariffs have been substantially reduced, some very high tariffs remain on a few important consumer goods. Of all trade, 4 percent is still subject to tariffs of 20 percent or more. It is hoped that the negotiations will result in a substantial expansion of the duty-free category as well as a substantial reduction in the average tariff on the remaining dutiable items.

### *Reducing Nontariff Barriers*

In order to make possible the more effective management of the trading system, new understandings need to be negotiated with respect to a wide variety of nontariff barriers (NTB's), such as import quotas, preferential government procurement regulations, discriminatory standards, and unreasonable customs procedures. Some NTB's are imposed for the same reasons that tariffs are imposed, to protect a particular domestic economic activity. In negotiating reductions in NTB's the goal is the same as in negotiating reductions in tariffs: to remove or reduce the obstacles to free exchange of goods. Other NTB's, however, are merely the unintended by-product of programs designed to achieve various domestic social or economic objectives. The negotiating objective in such cases is to bring about modifications in the design or implementation of policies related to such an objective in order to avoid unnecessary distortion of trade. It may also be desirable to subject such policies to periodic review to make sure that the level of protection offered is the minimum necessary to achieve legitimate domestic goals.

There is a natural tension between the free market principle on which the GATT is based and the practical reality of extensive government intervention in the economy in most countries. The challenge for these negotiations is to devise arrangements that will give governments considerable leeway in forming and pursuing their own policies, while encouraging them to adopt policy measures that will minimize the disruption of the economic interests of other nations. Such arrangements in themselves will not eliminate potential policy conflicts among governments, but they can provide some guidelines for resolving such conflicts to everyone's satisfaction. The absence of such arrangements creates the danger that governments will try to protect themselves against the disruptive influence of actions by foreign governments in sensitive sectors by imposing new measures that distort trade.

### *Reforming Agricultural Trade*

Trade barriers and domestic social objectives are perhaps most intertwined in the agricultural sector, where domestic programs to support farm income and to guarantee the availability of food supplies from domestic sources have been sheltered by comprehensive tariff and nontariff barriers. The challenge facing the negotiators is to work out some arrangements that would permit governments to honor their commitments to both farmers and consumers at lower levels of protection. A reduction of the level of protection would not only benefit consumers by reducing real food prices, but encourage producers to use their resources in a manner more consistent with comparative advantage. It is also true, of course, that the necessary shifts in production patterns would be difficult for some producers, and provisions to ease the adjustment costs would be needed in many countries. For some countries this will mean new measures to transfer income to those farmers who suffer income losses in the short run from lower levels of protection.

In working out an approach to the negotiated reduction of agricultural trade barriers, one must distinguish between cyclical and structural reasons for agricultural protection. Cyclical problems arise when market prices rise above accepted norms or farm incomes drop below accepted norms. Structural problems arise if the norms for prices and incomes differ between one country and another.

*Cyclical problems.* Most farm programs are designed to put a floor under farm incomes when production increases sharply. During periods of peak production, therefore, governments tend to raise farm incomes either directly by making up any shortfalls with direct payments, or indirectly by keeping farm prices above the level that would prevail in a free market. Governments can use either domestic or international trade measures to keep prices high. Farm prices can be raised by reducing supply through cutbacks in the production or restrictions on imports, or by increasing demand through financing the build-up of domestic stocks or subsidizing exports.

Governments may also attempt to restrain price increases when export markets expand or production declines sharply. During such periods, governments try as far as possible to increase domestic supplies and reduce domestic prices of food by drawing down domestic stocks, increasing domestic production, reducing exports, and increasing imports. Of course if all countries simultaneously have a problem of inadequate production, attempts by one country to increase imports or reduce exports, or both, will make the problem worse for other countries. The more a country depends on exports or imports, the greater its exposure.

Some countries, the United States among them, permit agricultural prices to vary over a wider range than is true in other countries, for example, the members of the European Community. This difference has permitted countries with narrower margins for price fluctuation to increase the stability of their own supplies and prices through trade at the expense of countries with wider margins for price fluctuation. The reason is that, long before the country with wider margins takes such action, the country with the narrower margin tends to limit imports and to increase export incentives when prices are falling and to limit exports when prices are rising. As a result, surpluses and shortages are exaggerated for the latter when price pressures develop in either direction.

Two conclusions can be drawn from all this. First, unless governments can develop some understandings on the use of trade measures during a period of excess or inadequate food production throughout the world, tensions will be inevitable. Second, governments will be reluctant to increase their dependence on foreign trade as long as they cannot receive adequate assurances that other governments will not pursue policies which seek to shift the costs of moderating swings in farm incomes and food prices to their neighbors.

*Structural problems.* Agreements on a set of rules regarding cyclically related trade measures can be separated from negotiations designed to reduce agricultural trade barriers arising from structural differences between the farm sector in one country and another. While most governments are committed to preventing agricultural prices from falling below or rising above accepted levels, these levels differ between one country and another. Under conditions of free trade, however, market prices in different countries will generally not vary by more than the cost of transportation. To the extent therefore that one country wishes to support a market price that is either lower or higher than in other countries, it has to impose some limitation on trade flows. If agricultural trade barriers are to be reduced, countries will need to find some means to reduce the differences in market support prices.

*An approach to agricultural negotiations.* International negotiations on agricultural trade are timely because many foreign governments are in the process of reassessing their agricultural policies in response to considerable public dissatisfaction with the results of current agricultural programs. During normal times, changes in existing programs would be difficult to negotiate even if no economic interest were seriously affected. At a time when change has become inevitable, it is far easier to work out a greater harmonization of national approaches to agricultural problems.

These negotiations need to be approached in a fairly pragmatic manner. It would be impractical, as some have suggested, to negotiate tight international agreements regulating prices, production, inventories, and trade controls on individual commodities. On the other hand, governments will be reluctant to increase the dependence of their consumers on imports and the dependence of their producers on exports, without some agreement on the availability of such imports when food is in relatively short supply and the accessibility of such exports to foreign markets when food is in relatively excess supply. Undoubtedly some degree of international understanding on the use of trade controls relative to domestic measures will be required. As part of such an international understanding, it may be desirable to achieve a better coordination of those internal policies which are undertaken to moderate extreme fluctuations in food supplies and prices.

Better international understandings on improved access to supplies as well as access to markets should persuade countries on their own to undertake more of the long-term changes in their agricultural programs that would result in more efficient patterns of worldwide production. Important in such long-term reforms would be the adjustment of relative prices among farm products. Another element could be a greater shift toward more direct methods of supporting farm incomes while allowing prices more room to decline during bumper crop years.

### *Negotiating a New International Safeguard System*

New international agreements would also be useful with respect to the rules and procedures adopted by countries to deal with problems of import disruption. Most nations at one time or another find it desirable to limit the growth of imports for a transitional period so that domestic industry can have time to adjust. Since the current international rules and procedures have proved largely unworkable in practice, governments have generally worked out informal arrangements with each other. It would be desirable to bring these arrangements within an accepted international framework in which the interests of third parties could be better protected. The adoption of certain internationally accepted principles could also reduce some of the political friction which has tended to be associated with the negotiation of such arrangements. It would moderate the effects of adjustment, while giving the international community some better assurance that restrictive measures will not be any broader or continue any longer than necessary for domestic adjustment to take place.

### *Subsidies and Countervailing Duties*

Better international understanding is also needed on the use of subsidies and the imposition of countervailing duties designed to offset foreign subsidies. Governments commonly employ subsidies to achieve specific economic and social goals. When such subsidies are used to favor industries competing with export or import industries, they affect not only domestic economic activity but foreign economic activity as well. Foreign governments can try to neutralize the effect of the subsidy on their own trade by imposing an equivalent duty on imports or an equivalent subsidy on exports. Given the widespread use of subsidies by most governments, trade would become increasingly subject to new tariffs if governments actually countervailed against every form of foreign subsidy. Conversely, the competitive position of unsubsidized businesses in some countries could be increasingly affected by subsidized production in other countries. What is needed therefore is international agreement on the types of subsidies that are not internationally acceptable, and consequently subject to countervailing duties, and general agreement on the types of subsidies that are acceptable.

### *Access to Foreign Supplies*

The events of the past year have demonstrated that access to supplies can be as much of a problem as access to markets, and that international guidelines on access to supplies can be as valuable as international agreements about access to markets. The possibility has thus arisen of a new type of reciprocity in international trading relations: commitments by producing countries to consuming countries on access to supplies, and commitments by consuming countries to producing countries on access to markets. Similarly, safeguard arrangements which are designed to protect producers in consuming countries when excessively large increases in imports threaten to disrupt domestic production could be matched by safeguard

arrangements which are designed to protect consumers in producing countries when excessively large exports threaten to disrupt domestic markets in producing countries.

### *Pending Trade Legislation*

In order for the United States Government to be able to make such far-reaching international commitments on trade practices and policies, it is necessary to obtain public backing and the appropriate legislative mandate. Two approaches were considered early last year. One approach would be first to negotiate preliminary agreements with other countries, and then on the basis of such agreements to seek the necessary legislation. The other approach would be first to seek a broad enough legislative mandate to cover negotiating outcomes that could be foreseen and a procedure for congressional participation where negotiating outcomes could not be foreseen, and then to negotiate an agreement within the context of that legislative framework. The second alternative was chosen both because other governments could not be expected to put forward their maximum concessions if U.S. offers did not have the explicit support of the Congress, and because it would make possible more active participation of the Congress in an area where congressional prerogatives have traditionally been strong.

Accordingly, last April the President sent draft legislation to the Congress. After extensive hearings, the House of Representatives approved a bill that would provide the necessary authorities to negotiate both a comprehensive reform of the international trading system and increased access to foreign markets and supplies. It would also significantly improve the management of U.S. trade policy on a day-to-day basis. In the coming months the Senate is scheduled to consider this legislation.

Congressional passage of trade legislation has become more important than ever because of the strains that the massive increase in international oil prices is likely to place on the international trading system in the coming year. All countries will be under pressure to reduce their imports and to expand their exports to pay for the increased cost of oil, even though all *oil-consuming* countries together will not be able to improve their trade balance by more than the *oil-producing* countries are prepared to increase their imports. Given the large increases in oil revenues and the small populations of most oil-producing countries, only a fraction of such revenues is likely to be spent on goods in the short run. At the same time, a number of key products could be in short supply at current price relationships, and this could induce new international competition for such supplies. In order to negotiate effectively with other countries on the resolution of some of these problems and in order to protect U.S. economic interests in the absence of such agreements, a new legislative mandate is urgently needed.

The draft bill before the Congress would improve the President's ability to manage U.S. trade policies in several respects. It would give the President limited authority to impose a temporary import surcharge or other import



limitations, either to deal with a serious balance of payments deficit or to cooperate in correcting a balance of payments disequilibrium. He could also reduce or suspend import restrictions in order to reduce either a persistent balance of payments surplus or excessive inflationary pressures in specific commodity areas. Other permanent authority would permit the President full exercise of U.S. rights and obligations under trade agreements, and still another provision would revise and expand the President's authority to take action against foreign countries which maintain unjustifiable or unreasonable import restrictions or other policies which seriously injure U.S. trade. The legislation would also liberalize the criteria for granting adjustment assistance to firms and workers displaced by import competition and would temporarily limit the growth of imports when such growth might seriously injure a domestic industry.

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In the context of the postwar period, developments in the international economy during the past year appear rather turbulent. Massive capital flows led to fluctuations in exchange rates that were far in excess of any that attracted attention in the recent past. Inflation accelerated throughout much of the world, as demand for goods outgrew the productive capacity of the world economy. Shortfalls in farm output and cutbacks in oil production, combined with selective embargoes on oil exports, created intense international competition for food and energy. In all these different ways, the world received an effective demonstration of the extent to which economic interdependence has become a reality.

Despite the economic difficulties, most nations were able to record significant economic gains; and despite some stresses and strains in international economic relations, the postwar framework for economic cooperation among nations remained intact. This ability of the world economy to adjust to the new realities was in large part due to the willingness of most governments to accept greater flexibility in their economic relationships, while continuing to recognize the need for self-discipline in the pursuit of individual national goals. Certainly the introduction of more flexible exchange rate relationships facilitated the adjustment of economic relations among individual national economies experiencing widely different domestic circumstances. Equally important was the willingness of governments to negotiate pragmatic accommodations to politically difficult international monetary and trade issues.

In the coming year, the new arrangements for international cooperation that were evolving in the past year will be put to a strenuous test. The continuing constraints imposed on the production and export of oil by a number of countries in the Middle East will intensify the competition for energy supplies and chemicals. In addition, the recent large increase in world oil prices will require major adjustments in relative incomes both within and among nations, in relative prices of both domestic and internationally traded goods, in world patterns of production and trade, and in the worldwide flow of

capital and the means of putting this capital to its most productive uses. These adjustments are likely to pose severe hardships for some countries, and some domestic economic difficulties for all nations. The pressures to take unilateral measures at the expense of one's neighbors could become quite intense in such an environment. Were just one nation, and then others, to pursue such a course, however, the resulting disruption of international trade would be likely to cause even more serious losses of economic welfare for everyone. International conferences such as the recently concluded meeting of finance ministers in Rome, and the coming conferences on the world oil and the world food situation, will be useful in the search for cooperative solutions. At the same time, the international monetary discussions and the multilateral trade negotiations will be indispensable to a broader effort to strengthen the international framework for managing the increasing number of economic problems that are of global significance.

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## SUPPLEMENT

### Measurement of Effective Changes in Exchange Rates

Exchange rates between the United States and her trading partners have changed frequently over the past 3 years. Since such changes vary from currency to currency, it is useful to combine them into a single index number representing the effective change in the value of the U.S. dollar. Several methods of computing such a number have been developed, but the different methods produce different results. This supplement discusses the rationale behind some of the indexes that have been developed and examines the differences in results.

Each method of computing the effective change in the value of the dollar combines individual changes in exchange rates into a weighted average. The most commonly used weights are based on bilateral trade shares. The appreciation of the German mark, for example, would receive a greater weight than the appreciation of the French franc because Germany accounts for a larger share of overall U.S. trade.

The weights may be computed on the basis of export, import, or total trade shares, depending on the use of the index. The three sets of weights vary because the proportion of U.S. exports that goes to each trading partner will seldom equal the proportion of U.S. imports accounted for by that country. For instance, in 1972 Japan provided 16 percent of U.S. imports but purchased only 10 percent of our exports. The appreciation of the yen would therefore receive a larger weight in an import index than it would in an export index. A composite import-export index of the depreciation of the dollar might use weights equal to the sum of bilateral exports and imports as a fraction of total U.S. foreign trade.

Changes in exchange rates may be expressed in two ways: either as the increase in the value of a foreign currency in terms of dollars or as the decrease in the value of the dollar in relation to a foreign currency. The magnitude of the percentage change in each case differs. If the value of the mark expressed in dollars rises by 33 percent, for example, then the value of the dollar expressed in marks falls by only 25 percent. This is true for the same reason that 100 is 33 percent more than 75, but 75 is 25 percent less than 100. This confusing arithmetic fact has important implications for the calculation of these indexes, because the magnitude of the effective change in the value of the dollar will depend on how the changes in exchange rates are expressed.

An import-weighted index of exchange rate change is normally expressed in terms of the change in the dollar price of foreign currencies. If one assumes that foreign

exporters do not alter their prices, expressed in their own currency, then changes in the dollar value of foreign currencies accurately reflect the changes in dollar prices to American importers. Likewise, an export-weighted index is usually based on changes in the foreign currency prices of dollars, because changes in the value of the dollar reflect changes in prices to foreign purchasers if American exporters hold their dollar prices constant.

Selection of the countries to be included in the computation can markedly affect the value of the index. For completeness one might wish to include as many countries as possible in the sample, but because some countries account for only a small share of overall U.S. trade, limiting the sample to major U.S. trading partners should not significantly affect the value of the index. If a major trading partner were to be eliminated from the sample, however, the resulting index might not accurately reflect the effective depreciation of the dollar.

Bilateral trade shares of the United States have been shifting in the last 3 years in response to changes in exchange rates, further relaxation of trade barriers, and crop failures abroad. An index of the effective depreciation of the dollar could therefore be sensitive to the choice of the year for which bilateral trade shares are computed. In some cases, however, it is difficult to predict how these changes will affect trade shares. For instance, the depreciation of the dollar in relation to the currency of a trading partner should stimulate U.S. exports to that country but reduce U.S. imports from that country. Because these two results tend to offset each other, the net effect on total trade shares is uncertain.

Changes in exchange rates are computed in relation to the exchange rates in effect on some base date. Commonly used base dates include these: May 1970, the last month in which all major U.S. trading partners observed fixed exchange rate policies for their currencies; December 18, 1971, the day of the Smithsonian Agreement; and March 19, 1973, the first day of the float against the dollar for a number of foreign currencies. Because the value of the dollar generally declined from May 1970 to July 1973, indexes of effective depreciation of the dollar using an earlier base date for exchange rates will generally show a greater depreciation of the dollar than those based on a more recent date. Typical spot rates used are the daily noon spot rates quoted in New York or London.

#### *The Change in the Value of the Dollar: A Comparison of Several Indexes*

Two widely used indexes are the Morgan Guaranty index of effective exchange rate changes, published by the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, and the Reuters Currency Index, computed by Reuters, Limited, the London-based international news agency. Both are composite indexes, combining bilateral export and import trade shares in one index, but different techniques are used to compute them.

The Morgan Guaranty index uses a sample of 14 countries other than the United States, which together accounted for about two-thirds of total U.S. trade in 1972.\* Using separate export and import trade shares computed from 1972 trade data (before September 1973, trade data for 1971 were used), Morgan Guaranty first computes separate export and import indexes and then averages the two results according to the relative weights of exports to and imports from the other 14 countries in the sample. The export-weighted changes in the values of foreign currencies are expressed in foreign currency units per dollar; the import-weighted changes are expressed in dollars per foreign currency unit. Spot exchange rates are the daily noon dollar bid rates quoted in New York.

The Reuters Currency Index, which is followed closely by foreign central banks and foreign exchange markets, uses a sample comprising nine countries, eliminating

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\*The countries are: Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium-Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Australia.

Canada and four smaller countries used in the Morgan Guaranty sample. Each currency change is weighted by the sum of exports plus imports as a fraction of total U.S. trade. Trade weights are computed on the basis of average trade shares in 1970-71. Reuters uses noon spot rates in London for all currencies except the yen; for this they use the closing rate in Tokyo, because the yen market in London is thin and the quotations are not necessarily representative of world market conditions. All changes in exchange rates are expressed as changes in foreign currencies vis-a-vis the dollar. A comparison of these two indexes, plus three others that will be discussed below, is contained in Table 56.

TABLE 56.—*A comparison of several measures of the effective depreciation of the dollar from May 1970, 1971-73*

[Percent change]					
Year and month	Morgan Guaranty index	Reuters currency index <sup>1</sup>	Treasury index	Multilateral index	Trade model index
1971:					
June.....	(2)	(2)	-2.3	-1.85	-1.84
July.....	(2)	(2)	-2.5	-2.11	-2.04
Aug.....	(2)	(2)	-4.6	-3.39	-2.72
Sept.....	-6.31	(2)	-5.5	-4.69	-4.01
Oct.....	-6.93	(2)	-6.0	-4.78	-4.31
Nov.....	-7.20	(2)	-6.3	-5.20	-4.57
Dec.....	-9.05	-1.69	-8.2	-6.99	-5.91
1972:					
Jan.....	-9.95	-.15	-9.0	-7.89	-6.43
Feb.....	-10.73	.95	-9.7	-8.25	-7.08
Mar.....	-10.94	1.15	-10.1	-8.63	-7.24
April.....	-10.98	.92	-10.0	-8.50	-7.26
May.....	-11.54	1.09	-10.6	-8.80	-7.57
June.....	-11.26	.86	-10.4	-8.58	-7.29
July.....	-11.16	.69	-10.4	-8.48	-7.26
Aug.....	-11.10	.51	-10.3	-8.34	-7.19
Sept.....	-10.80	.18	-9.6	-7.97	-6.99
Oct.....	-10.57	-.39	-9.3	-7.70	-6.74
Nov.....	-10.25	-.21	-9.1	-7.76	-6.53
Dec.....	-10.29	-.37	-9.5	-7.76	-6.45
1973:					
Jan.....	-10.64	.49	-9.7	-8.52	-6.73
Feb.....	-17.23	10.37	-16.0	-14.34	-11.51
Mar.....	-16.52	10.22	-15.8	-13.74	-11.21
April.....	-16.34	10.01	-15.5	-13.37	-10.83
May.....	-18.34	13.14	-17.4	-15.76	-12.61
June.....	-20.72	17.45	-19.6	-18.67	-14.95
July.....	-21.18	18.32	-19.9	-19.39	-16.12
Aug.....	-19.25	15.58	-18.3	-17.23	-13.63
Sept.....	-19.88	16.65	-18.9	-17.97	-14.03
Oct.....	-19.90	16.07	-19.0	-17.82	-13.93
Nov.....	-16.34	9.72	-15.6	-15.12	-11.82
Dec.....	-15.49	7.85	-14.7	-13.22	(2)

<sup>1</sup> Measures the appreciation from December 1971 of a group of foreign currencies in relation to the dollar.

<sup>2</sup> Not available.

Note.—Data are for the last business day of each month. Base rates used are central rates in effect at the end of May 1970.

Sources: Morgan Guaranty Trust Company; Reuters, Limited; Department of the Treasury; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Economic Research; and Council of Economic Advisers.

On Friday, July 6, 1973, the Morgan Guaranty index registered the largest depreciation of the dollar during 1973: 22.45 percent from the central rates in effect at the end of May 1970. On the same day the Reuters Currency Index indicated that a group of nine foreign currencies had appreciated 20.90 percent against the dollar from the central rates established by the Smithsonian Agreement in December 1971. When the Reuters index is recomputed to show the change in the dollar since May 1970, thus permitting the two indexes to be compared, the Reuters index indicates a

foreign currency appreciation of 36.39 percent. This number must be reconciled with the 22.45 percent depreciation of the dollar shown by the Morgan Guaranty index. The techniques used to compute these two indexes differ widely, and some of these differences in approach affect the computations more than others. By successively modifying the approach used by Reuters until the two procedures are equivalent, one can identify the effect each difference in method has on the calculations.

Morgan Guaranty uses the depreciation of the dollar in relation to foreign currencies when calculating export-weighted changes in the dollar, and it uses the appreciation of foreign currencies vis-a-vis the dollar when calculating import-weighted changes. Reuters uses only the appreciation of foreign currencies vis-a-vis the dollar. Recalculating the Reuters index to conform to the Morgan Guaranty weighting procedure lowers the Reuters index 5.49 percentage points, to 30.90 percent, still a larger measure of the depreciation of the dollar than is yielded by the Morgan Guaranty index.

Noon spot rates in New York on July 6 differed significantly from the noon spot rates in London. Because the dollar generally declined during the day, noon rates in New York, taken 5 hours after the noon rates in London, show a greater depreciation of the dollar than the London rates. Recomputing the modified Reuters index using New York instead of London spot rates increases the measured depreciation of the dollar about half a percentage point, from 30.90 percent to 31.46 percent.

The use of trade weights based on U.S. bilateral trade in 1971, instead of an average of bilateral trade during 1970 and 1971, increases the modified Reuters index from 31.46 to 31.91.

With these adjustments the Reuters index has been modified so that the computation technique is identical to that used by Morgan Guaranty; only the sample of countries differs. Adding Canada to the Reuters sample of nine countries lowers the Reuters measure almost 10 percentage points, from 31.91 percent to 22.26 percent. The relatively small depreciation of the U.S. dollar against the Canadian dollar is given a large weight in the calculation because of the importance of Canadian trade to the United States. Adding the four remaining countries to the Reuters sample plus Canada raises the index of the depreciation of the dollar to 22.45 percent, the number published by Morgan Guaranty on July 6, 1973.

Three observations are suggested by the results. First, the calculation is affected to only a minor degree by some of the differences in approach—for instance, the choice of spot rates, the selection of a year from which to compute trade shares, and the decision to include several countries with relatively small shares of U.S. trade. Second, excluding a major trading partner like Canada can have a great impact on the measure of effective exchange rate change. Third, the choice of whether to express changes in exchange rates in terms of the appreciation of foreign currencies or the depreciation of the dollar is also important, especially if the changes in exchange rates are large for some important trading partners in the sample.

An index used internally by the Treasury Department is computed by a method similar to that used by Morgan Guaranty, except that it covers all OECD countries (22 other than the United States) and the weights used are derived from 1972 bilateral trade data. Changes in the dollar cost of foreign exchange are weighted by bilateral import shares. Changes in the foreign exchange cost of dollars are weighted by bilateral export shares. The resulting import- and export-weighted indexes are then weighted by the relative importance of imports and exports in U.S. total trade with the 22-country group and finally averaged to produce a single index of the effective depreciation of the dollar.

On July 6, 1973, the Treasury Department index showed that the dollar had depreciated 20.8 percent since May 1970 in relation to the currencies of the other OECD countries, 1.65 percentage points less than the Morgan Guaranty figure. Some of the difference derives from the addition to the sample of eight countries whose

currencies have appreciated relatively little in relation to the dollar. Any remaining difference is due to the use of trade shares based on bilateral trade in 1972 rather than 1971.

#### *Other Methods for Computing Weights*

One problem associated with the use of these indexes is that the weights take into account only bilateral trade with the United States, when, in fact, changes in any one exchange rate affect trade of other countries as well. When the mark and the yen appreciate, for example, U.S. exports to Japan and Germany increase and imports from those two countries decline. In addition, third countries now find German and Japanese imports relatively more expensive than imports from the United States. For this reason, U.S. exports to third countries should also increase.

One solution is to weight changes in each country's exchange rate by that country's importance in total world trade. The multilateral index presented in Table 56 is one such measure. For each of the countries in the Morgan Guaranty sample, the depreciation of the dollar against each foreign currency is weighted by the sum of each country's exports to and imports from the other 14 countries (including the United States), divided by 1972 total trade among the 15 countries. The spot rates used were daily closing rates in New York.

An additional revision of weights based on past trade shares might incorporate the use of price effects to anticipate the importance of changes in the value of each country's currency to U.S. trade. A country whose trade is more responsive to price changes should receive a greater weight because changes in its exchange rate would have a larger impact on the U.S. trade balance than its relative trade share alone would indicate. A multilateral trade model may be used to compute a set of weights proportional to the effects of bilateral exchange rate changes on the U.S. trade balance.

To construct a trade model index of the depreciation of the dollar, weights were calculated with the use of a preliminary version of a trade flow model developed by the Office of Economic Research of the Central Intelligence Agency. The model assumes that prices have a significant effect on trade among the 17 countries and groups of countries that are included. In the preliminary form of the model, producers of any one good which is traded internationally are assumed to react similarly to a change in the price of their product, no matter which country they live in. The U.S. supply of chemicals on the international market, for example, is no more sensitive to changes in the domestic currency price of chemicals than is the supply from any other country. Similarly, importers of any one good also react to price changes in the same fashion, no matter where they live. As a result of these assumptions, the response of any two countries to a similar change in their exchange rates differs primarily because the product mix of their trade differs.

For July 6, 1973, the multilateral index showed an effective depreciation of the dollar equal to 20.54 percent, about 2 percentage points less than the Morgan Guaranty index. For the same day the trade model index showed that the dollar had depreciated 16.81 percent from May 1970, if the change in each currency is weighted by its relative contribution to the change in the U.S. trade balance. One reason why both these indexes show a smaller change in the value of the dollar than the Morgan Guaranty index is that in both cases changes in exchange rates are expressed in terms of the depreciation of the dollar in relation to each foreign currency. The Morgan Guaranty index, on the other hand, uses the appreciation of foreign currencies in relation to the dollar for part of its calculation, and the magnitude of changes expressed in this manner is greater.

Another reason both these indexes may differ from the Morgan Guaranty index is that the weights are calculated differently. While no simple pattern emerges from a comparison of the trade model weights with the bilateral weights, there is a clear pattern suggested by a comparison of the multilateral weights with the bilateral

TABLE 57.—Changes in exchange rates from May 1970, 1970-73

[Percent change]

Year and month	German mark		Japanese yen		French franc		British pound	
	Dollar rate	Effective rate	Dollar rate	Effective rate	Dollar rate	Effective rate	Dollar rate	Effective rate
1970:								
June.....	0.75	0.51	0.31	-0.12	0.59	0.24	-0.10	-0.64
July.....	.79	.46	.17	-.38	.64	.24	-.39	-1.15
Aug.....	.79	.37	.49	.13	.58	.15	-.51	-1.21
Sept.....	.79	.34	.57	.08	.60	.07	-.61	-1.39
Oct.....	.76	.31	.61	.15	.55	.01	-.52	-1.25
Nov.....	.81	.27	.64	.14	.64	.06	-.40	-1.21
Dec.....	.42	-.06	.65	.14	.57	.14	-.39	-1.17
1971:								
Jan.....	.64	.04	.56	-.15	.64	.03	.24	-.69
Feb.....	.99	.33	.69	-.15	.65	-.12	.74	-.28
Mar.....	.79	.13	.70	-.15	.69	-.01	.78	-.26
Apr.....	.71	.06	.70	-.13	.68	.00	.75	-.27
May.....	3.01	1.81	.72	-.31	.50	-1.22	.78	-.76
June.....	4.21	3.87	.72	-.37	.49	-1.79	.78	-1.04
July.....	5.14	3.73	.73	-.38	.73	-1.60	.77	-1.12
Aug.....	7.15	4.86	1.21	-.34	.70	-2.85	1.44	-1.29
Sept.....	9.05	5.37	6.50	4.26	.60	-4.55	2.89	-1.07
Oct.....	10.04	5.57	8.73	5.99	.38	-5.72	3.77	-.92
Nov.....	9.82	5.07	9.50	6.68	.51	-5.73	3.89	-.98
Dec.....	11.97	5.28	12.50	8.78	3.02	-4.94	5.27	-1.13
1972:								
Jan.....	13.30	4.71	15.12	10.75	7.36	-2.23	7.12	-.63
Feb.....	14.89	5.01	17.97	12.70	9.14	-1.71	8.49	-.25
Mar.....	15.45	5.10	18.99	13.54	10.17	-.99	9.09	-.02
Apr.....	15.17	5.09	18.59	13.26	10.26	-.60	8.76	-.14
May.....	15.12	4.88	18.27	12.93	10.77	-.24	8.85	-.22
June.....	15.51	5.01	19.05	13.40	10.73	-.37	7.05	-2.02
July.....	15.78	5.28	19.59	14.20	11.03	-.04	1.86	-7.54
Aug.....	14.86	4.69	19.53	14.24	11.01	.25	2.09	-7.06
Sept.....	14.62	4.67	19.55	14.35	10.96	.43	1.71	-7.27
Oct.....	14.13	4.57	19.60	14.55	10.56	.51	-.22	-8.81
Nov.....	14.25	4.84	19.61	14.70	10.19	.26	-2.06	-10.97
Dec.....	14.42	5.13	19.51	14.47	9.18	-.82	-2.30	-11.16
1973:								
Jan.....	14.51	5.03	19.29	13.73	9.26	-.79	-1.83	-11.01
Feb.....	21.78	6.77	29.75	21.88	16.57	1.35	1.15	-12.90
Mar.....	30.11	9.29	37.48	25.16	23.25	2.18	3.02	-14.47
Apr.....	29.02	9.93	35.60	23.89	21.96	2.66	3.49	-12.92
May.....	31.18	10.38	36.03	23.75	24.09	3.11	5.44	-12.10
June.....	41.96	15.11	36.11	22.73	30.37	4.11	7.34	-13.78
July.....	56.72	21.36	36.08	21.52	36.94	3.82	5.73	-19.20
Aug.....	50.86	19.98	35.73	22.10	30.67	1.58	3.15	-19.76
Sept.....	50.96	19.63	35.60	21.75	30.33	.90	.76	-22.39
Oct.....	51.63	18.99	35.17	20.80	31.73	1.46	1.22	-22.73
Nov.....	41.88	16.24	29.39	17.35	26.01	1.69	-.54	-20.71
Dec.....	37.72	16.54	28.49	17.52	20.84	.37	-3.44	-21.54

Note.—Monthly figures are averages of daily figures.  
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company computes the effective change in the value of foreign currencies by applying the same techniques used to compute the effective depreciation of the dollar.

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Morgan Guaranty Trust Company.

weights. First, multilateral trade within the European Economic Community accounts for a large share of total trade among the 15 countries in the multilateral index sample, and hence the relatively large depreciation of the dollar in relation to most European currencies is given a relatively large weight in the multilateral index. Second, because Canada accounts for only 9 percent of total trade among the 15 countries, the small depreciation of the U.S. dollar in relation to the Canadian dollar receives a much smaller weight in the multilateral index than in an index based on bilateral trade shares. These two effects would tend to raise the level of the multilateral index and bring it closer to the Morgan Guaranty figure.

### *Effective Changes in Other Currencies*

Although the discussion in this supplement is directed specifically toward measuring the effective depreciation of the dollar, the same techniques are used to compute the effective change in the value of other currencies as well. An index of the effective changes in a foreign currency is useful because changes in the dollar rate alone can be deceptive. The sharp appreciation of the German mark in terms of dollars, for example, is a misleading indicator of the overall increase in the value of the mark, just as the depreciation of the dollar against any single currency may give a misleading impression of the decline in the value of the dollar. Changes in the dollar exchange rates and effective changes in the exchange rates for several foreign currencies are presented in Table 57 for comparison.



**Appendix A**  
**ACTIVITIES OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE**  
**ECONOMIC ROLE OF WOMEN**



## Activities of the Advisory Committee on the Economic Role of Women

In September 1972 the President announced the establishment of the Advisory Committee on the Economic Role of Women to provide a formal mechanism for improving the information and analysis available to policy makers about the economic problems women encounter and for assuring that the economic interests of women are given appropriate weight in policy considerations.

In January 1973 the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, who is also Chairman of the Advisory Committee, appointed the following persons from the private sector to serve on the committee:

Jacqueline Brandwynne	Gertrude Himmelfarb
Casey Eike	E. Marie Johnson
Cynthia Epstein	M. Jane Kay
Stephen Fuller	Sister Collette Mahoney
Julia Greer	Jacob Mincer
Jacqueline Gutwillig	Arthur Rasmussen
Ruth Handler	Bernice Sandler
Lenore Hershey	Ruth Washington

Also serving on the committee are the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and Anne Armstrong, Counsellor to the President.

The committee met four times during 1973. The first meeting, held in January, was in part organizational and in part a review of Chapter 4 of the 1973 Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers, which discusses the economic role of women. At this meeting the committee members suggested several topics that they felt were particularly relevant to women's economic opportunities.

The meeting of April 30 was devoted to a discussion of career development for women. Participating in the discussion were Dr. Sidney J. Marland, Jr., then Assistant Secretary for Education in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Robert J. Brown, Associate Manpower Administrator for the U.S. Employment Service; and Dr. Bennetta B. Washington, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Manpower. Dr. Helen Astin (University of California, Los Angeles), and Dr. Cynthia Epstein (Queens College, New York), who is also a com-

mittee member, presented results of research examining education, attitudes, and careers as they relate to women.

In its aim of furthering opportunities for women in business and industry, the Advisory Committee also sponsored a symposium on "The Advancement of Women in Industry" on September 20, 1973. The opening speech was given by Roy Ash, Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Representatives of several major firms reported on both the progress and the problems encountered in programs to improve the recruiting and promotion of women. Other speakers included representatives from government, labor unions, and universities.

As a result of the symposium, the nongovernment members of the committee prepared a set of recommendations urging the private sector to adopt particular actions that would facilitate the economic advancement of women. Guidelines are included for employers, unions, and the media, suggesting specific steps that can be taken to ensure equal opportunity for women. On December 5, 1973, the committee met to discuss the final recommendations. These will be published and distributed to leaders of industry and will also be available to the public.

On the same day, the committee members met together at the White House with members of the Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women and with delegates from 11 member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), who were in Washington to participate in an experts' meeting on "The Role of Women in the Economy." The occasion was a reception at which the Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities dedicated a bust of Susan B. Anthony.

The committee's plans for 1974 include intensive study of several topics which have important economic effects for women, including child care, social security taxes and benefits, and the income tax structure.

At the December 5 meeting, the committee adopted a resolution presented to the Administration, urging that evening school programs not be curtailed as a result of the fuel shortage, since many adults, both women and men, depend on evening classes to continue their schooling.

**Appendix B**  
**REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE ACTIVITIES**  
**of the**  
**COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS DURING 1973**



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,  
*Washington, D.C., December 31, 1973.*

THE PRESIDENT:

SIR: The Council of Economic Advisers submits this report on its activities during the calendar year 1973 in accordance with the requirements of the Congress, as set forth in Section 4(d) of the Employment Act of 1946.

Respectfully,

HERBERT STEIN, *Chairman.*  
WILLIAM J. FELLNER.  
GARY L. SEEVERS.





# Report to the President on the Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers During 1973

The Council of Economic Advisers was established by the Employment Act of 1946 to advise and assist the President in discharging his responsibilities under the act. During 1973 a wide range of economic policy-making issues arose. As the economy approached full employment, the pace of inflation accelerated and a shortfall in farm product supplies sent food prices sharply upward. Late in the year the embargo of petroleum supplies by the Arabian producers precipitated the onset of a major energy crisis.

Herbert Stein served as Council Chairman during 1973, his second year in that capacity. Mr. Stein is on leave of absence from the University of Virginia, where he is A. Willis Robertson Professor of Economics.

Several changes in the membership of the Council took place during 1973. On July 18, Gary L. Seevers succeeded Ezra Solomon, who had left the Council on March 26 to return to the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University, where he is Dean Witter Professor of Finance. Mr. Seevers was formerly Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Council.

On October 31, 1973, William J. Fellner became a Member of the Council, filling a vacancy created by the return of Marina v.N. Whitman to the University of Pittsburgh, where she is Professor of Economics. Mr. Fellner is Sterling Professor of Economics Emeritus at Yale University and Resident Scholar from the American Enterprise Institute, now on leave.

## ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING AND THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

### RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COUNCIL

The principal directive of the Employment Act of 1946 is "to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power." The basic responsibility of the Council is the analysis and interpretation of economic trends and developments to assist the President in reaching that goal. The Council also provides analysis and recommendations on other economic policy problems that warrant the attention of the Executive Office of the President. The Council prepares regular reports on current economic conditions and forecasts of the economic outlook. Its recommendations are an integral part of economic policy making.

*Past Council Members and their dates of service are listed below*

Name	Position	Oath of office date	Separation date
Edwin G. Nourse	Chairman	August 9, 1946	November 1, 1949.
Leon H. Keyserling	Vice Chairman	August 9, 1946	
	Acting Chairman	November 2, 1949	
John D. Clark	Chairman	May 10, 1950	January 20, 1953.
	Member	August 9, 1946	
	Vice Chairman	May 10, 1950	February 11, 1953.
Roy Blough	Member	June 29, 1950	August 20, 1952.
Robert C. Turner	Member	September 8, 1952	January 20, 1953.
Arthur F. Burns	Chairman	March 19, 1953	December 1, 1956.
Neil H. Jacoby	Member	September 15, 1953	February 9, 1955.
Walter W. Stewart	Member	December 2, 1953	April 29, 1955.
Raymond J. Saulnier	Member	April 4, 1955	January 20, 1961.
	Chairman	December 3, 1956	
	Member	May 2, 1955	
Joseph S. Davis	Member	December 3, 1956	October 31, 1958.
Paul W. McCracken	Member	November 1, 1958	January 31, 1959.
Karl Brandt	Member	May 7, 1959	January 20, 1961.
Henry C. Wallich	Member	January 29, 1961	January 20, 1961.
Walter W. Heller	Chairman	January 29, 1961	November 15, 1964.
James Tobin	Member	January 29, 1961	July 31, 1962.
Kermit Gordon	Member	January 29, 1961	December 27, 1962.
Gardner Ackley	Member	August 3, 1962	February 15, 1968.
	Chairman	November 16, 1964	
	Member	May 17, 1963	
John P. Lewis	Member	September 2, 1964	August 31, 1964.
Otto Eckstein	Member	November 16, 1964	February 1, 1966.
Arthur M. Okun	Member	February 15, 1968	January 20, 1969.
	Chairman	February 2, 1966	
	Member	February 15, 1968	
James S. Duesenberry	Member	July 1, 1968	June 30, 1968.
Merton J. Peck	Member	February 4, 1969	January 20, 1969.
Warren L. Smith	Member	February 4, 1969	January 20, 1969.
Hendrik S. Houthakker	Member	February 4, 1969	July 15, 1971.
Paul W. McCracken	Chairman	September 9, 1971	December 31, 1971.
Ezra Solomon	Member	March 13, 1972	March 26, 1973.
Marina v.N. Whitman	Member		August 15, 1973.

Under the Employment Act it is also the duty of the Council "to appraise the various programs and functions of the Federal Government" and "to make recommendations to the President" as to how economic policy might be better adjusted toward the achievement of employment, production, and price level objectives. This has involved the Council with an increasingly wide range of problems and has expanded the Council's direct advisory role within the Executive Office of the President. It has also created close working relationships with the departments, agencies, and offices in the executive branch both in evaluating current programs and in developing new ones. The Council also reviews legislation proposed by Congress and submits recommendations based upon the economic implications of these prospective programs and actions.

In addition to its duties in the analysis and forecasting of economic trends and developments, the Council and its staff in 1973 also participated in the examination of a wide range of economic issues incident to the formulation of programs and policies by the Administration. These included: the restructuring and modification of domestic farm programs in order to facilitate the further expansion of farm production and food supplies and the development of new farm legislation; measures to improve the efficiency, structure, and functioning of the Nation's financial markets and programs affecting environmental quality, transportation, and housing; the analysis of various aspects of the energy problem, including oil import policies and the impact of the oil embargo upon the economy; policies to

govern the exploitation of the resources of the seas; study of the lumber and plywood industry and the management of the Nation's timber resources; supply problems of minerals and materials, and the disposition of stockpiles of strategic materials; and the sale and lease of Government-financed technology. During 1972 the President requested the Chairman of the Council to organize an Advisory Committee on the Economic Role of Women; this is discussed separately in Appendix A. The Council also contributed to analysis of a number of other questions, including: youth unemployment problems and the effects of social legislation upon youth employment opportunities; ways in which the workmen's compensation system might be improved; proposals to improve health insurance; and many of the specific problems arising in the operation of the price and wage control system.

International trade and investment continued to be topics of major concern to the Council. The Council helps formulate the Administration's policies on overall international trade policy, and it also works on the resolution of specific trade problems. In 1973 the Council contributed to decisions relating to the easing of restrictions on imports of meats and dairy products, the reassessment of quota limitations on imports of other farm products, including wheat and cotton, the preparation of the U.S. negotiating position in the trade talks which are scheduled for 1974, and the legislation that would provide authority for the reciprocal reduction of trade barriers and improvement of Presidential authority for the day-to-day management of trade policy.

Early each year the President submits the *Economic Report of the President* to the Congress as required by the Employment Act. The Council assumes major responsibility for the preparation of this *Report*, which together with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers reviews the progress of the economy over the past year and outlines the Administration's policies and programs to achieve the goals of the act.

The Council works closely with the economic policy-making units of the Administration. The review and analysis of the overall performance of the economy is coordinated within the series of "Troika" working groups which are composed of representatives of the Council, the Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). At regular intervals senior staff economists from each of these agencies evaluate recent economic performance and formulate economic forecasts. These studies are then submitted to a second group, which is composed of a Council Member, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy, and the Economist for OMB. The analysis and projections are reviewed and cleared for consideration by the Troika, which includes the Chairman of the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of OMB. The Directors of the Council on International Economic Policy and the Cost of Living Council (CLC) commonly meet with the Troika, thus providing a means of coordinating international and domestic economic policy with the direct controls on prices and wages. The Troika, usually augmented by the Chairman of the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System to form the Quadriad, meets with the President from time to time to review the performance of the economy and discuss possible changes in economic policy.

The Chairman of the Council is a member of the Council on Economic Policy which was formed in January 1973 to provide for general coordination of all aspects of economic policy. The Council works closely with the Cost of Living Council, which supervises the operation of price and wage controls under the Economic Stabilization Program. Mr. Stein is Vice Chairman of this group and is a member of its committees on food and health. Mr. Seevers is a member of the CLC Deputies Group and also serves on the Committee on Food. Senior staff economists participate in a number of formal and informal CLC study and review groups. The Chairman is also a member of the Domestic Council, the Council on International Economic Policy, and the Federal Property Council. He and the Council Members serve on a number of subcommittees of these agencies in the Executive Office of the President.

In addition the Council and its professional staff served on more than 35 interagency study groups for analysis and review of economic problems and the coordination of policy.

The Joint Economic Committee (JEC), like the Council, was created by the Employment Act of 1946 to make a continuing study of matters relating to the *Economic Report* and to submit its own report and recommendations to the Congress. Since its inception, the Council has made itself readily available to the JEC. During 1973 the Chairman and Council Members appeared before the JEC or its subcommittees six times. On February 6 the Council presented testimony before the JEC on the *Economic Report*, and appeared again on August 1 to review economic developments during the first half of 1973. Mr. Stein appeared before the JEC Subcommittee on Consumer Economics on March 21, as did Mr. Seevers on September 25. On July 10 Mr. Stein presented testimony with Mrs. Whitman in connection with the economic role of women in the economy, and on December 4 he appeared before the JEC Subcommittee on International Economics to present testimony in connection with the effects of the oil embargo upon the economy. In addition to the Council's appearances before the JEC, on February 5 Mr. Stein testified on the Federal budget before the House Committee on Appropriations and presented testimony on the economic effects of the oil embargo on December 14 before the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee.

The Council continued its active role in the exchange of information and views on international economic developments and policies. The Chairman is the head of the U.S. delegation to the Economic Policy Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and also serves as vice chairman of the committee. Council Members and staff economists attended several working party meetings of the committee during the year. The Council also participated in a working group of the

Manpower and Social Affairs Committee of the OECD on the economic role of women in the economy, and in this regard the Council's staff coordinated the U.S. report and headed the U.S. delegation to an experts' meeting with 10 other countries.

In April Mrs. Whitman and a delegation of senior staff economists from the Council visited Tokyo to continue the semiannual exchange of information on economic problems and policies with the Economic Planning Agency for Japan, an exchange that was initiated during 1972. In October the Council was host to a delegation of economists from the Economic Planning Agency who visited Washington to continue these discussions. In October Mr. Stein, with Mr. Foss, a member of the CEA staff, visited Romania to continue the dialogue on economic planning that was also initiated in 1972.

## **PUBLIC INFORMATION**

The annual *Economic Report* is the main vehicle through which the Council informs the public of its work and its views. The *Report* presents a comprehensive review of economic conditions as well as forecasts for the coming year and an explanation of the Administration's overall economic policy. In recent years about 50,000 copies of the *Report* have been distributed. The Council also assumes primary responsibility for the monthly publication *Economic Indicators*, which is prepared by the Council's Statistical Office under the direction of Frances M. James and issued by the Joint Economic Committee with a distribution of about 10,000 copies.

The Council holds monthly press briefings at which it presents information and analysis of current economic problems and developments. Information is also provided through frequent speeches by the Chairman and Members of the Council and through participation in seminars and panels. The Council answers numerous requests for information from the Congress, the press, and individual citizens; it also receives individual visitors and representatives from business, academic, and other groups as often as is possible without interfering with other duties.

## **ORGANIZATION AND STAFF OF THE COUNCIL**

### **OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN**

The Chairman is responsible for communicating the Council's views to the President. This duty is performed through direct consultation with the President and regular reports on economic developments. The Chairman represents the Council at Cabinet meetings and at many other formal and informal meetings of Government officials. He also exercises ultimate responsibility for directing the work of the professional staff.

### **COUNCIL MEMBERS**

The two Council Members directly supervise the work of the staff, are responsible for all subject matter covered by the Council, and represent the

Council at a wide range of meetings, where they assume major responsibility for the Council's involvement. Whenever the Chairman is absent from Washington, one of the Council Members automatically becomes Acting Chairman.

In practice the Chairman and the Council Members work as a team. For operational reasons, however, subject matter is divided among them informally. Mr. Seever is responsible for the areas encompassing the Economic Stabilization Program, international trade, energy and natural resources, food and agriculture, urban and national growth policy, transportation, regulated industries, environmental problems, and antitrust.

Mr. Fellner's special responsibilities comprise business conditions, short-term forecasting, monetary and fiscal policy, international finance, manpower training and employment, financial markets, housing, the economic role of women, taxation, social security, and health, education, and welfare.

#### PROFESSIONAL STAFF

At the end of 1973 the professional staff consisted of 14 senior staff economists, two statisticians, and 10 members of the junior research staff. Members of the professional staff were responsible for economic analysis and policy recommendations in major subject areas involving the Council's interests and responsibilities. In addition, staff economists carried out many different Council and interagency assignments requiring the application of their knowledge and analytical skills. The professional staff and their special fields at the end of the year were:

##### *Senior Staff Economists*

George A. Akerlof.....	Labor and Manpower
Barry R. Chiswick.....	Labor, Human Resources, and Income Distribution
John D. Darroch.....	Prices and Industry Studies
John M. Davis, Jr.....	Special Assistant to the Chairman
Geza M. Feketekuty.....	International Finance and Trade
Murray F. Foss.....	Business Conditions, Analysis, and Forecasting
George M. von Furstenberg....	Fiscal Policy, Public Finance, and Housing
Mary W. Hook.....	Business Conditions, Analysis, and Forecasting
Benton F. Massell.....	Energy
Leo V. Mayer.....	Agriculture and Food
June A. O'Neill.....	Labor, Human Resources, and Income Distribution
Joel Popkin.....	Price Analysis
Allan G. Pulsipher.....	Regulated Industries, Science, Technology, Environment, and Transportation
Sung W. Son.....	Monetary Policy, Financial Institutions, Housing, and Interest Rates

##### *Statisticians*

Frances M. James.....	Senior Staff Statistician
Catherine H. Furlong.....	Statistician

### *Junior Staff Economists*

James S. Fackler.....	Labor, Human Resources, and Income Distribution
Eric B. Herr.....	Fiscal Policy, Housing, and Public Finance
David C. Munro.....	Business Conditions, Analysis, and Forecasting
Laura B. Peterson.....	International Finance and Trade
Rosemary Quintano.....	Econometrics and Forecasting
Lydia Segal.....	Price Analysis, Econometrics, and Forecasting
Carl I. Van Duyn.....	Monetary Policy, International Finance, and Trade

### *Research Assistants and Interns*

Mary P. Kane  
M. Cary Leahey  
Robert O. Mendelsohn

Frances M. James, Senior Staff Statistician, is in charge of the Council's Statistical Office and manages the Council's economic and statistical information system. She supervises the publication of *Economic Indicators* and the preparation of tables and charts for the *Economic Report* and for the Council's work. She also handles the fact checking of memoranda, testimony, and speeches. Catherine H. Furlong, Dorothy Bagovich, Natalie V. Rentfro, and Mary P. Kane assist Miss James.

The Council conducts a student intern program, employing a limited number of promising graduate and undergraduate students of economics for temporary periods, particularly during the summer months. Interns who served during 1973 were Lee J. Alston (Indiana University), Elizabeth L. Bailey (Simmons College), Irwin L. Collier, Jr. (Yale University), Robert S. Dohner (Harvard University), David R. Henderson (University of California, Los Angeles), and Steven B. Robkin (Duke University).

Each year the Council obtains the consulting services of several economists. Consultants who provided services during 1973 included Marion Clawson (Resources for the Future), John L. Cornwall (Southern Illinois University), George C. Eads (George Washington University), Karl A. Fox (Iowa State University), Hendrik S. Houthakker (Harvard University), Paul W. MacAvoy (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Richard N. Rosett (University of Rochester), and Roger P. Sherman (University of Virginia). James R. Golden (U.S. Military Academy) was a member of the professional staff during the summer.

In preparing the *Economic Report*, the Council relied upon the editorial assistance of Rosannah C. Steinhoff.

### **SUPPORTING STAFF**

The Administrative Office provides administrative support for the entire Council staff including preparation and analysis of the Council's budget; procurement of equipment and supplies; responding to correspondence and inquiries from the general public; and distribution of Council speeches, re-

ports, and congressional testimony. James H. Ayres served as Administrative Officer, assisted by Nancy F. Skidmore, Elizabeth A. Kaminski, Margaret L. Snyder, and Bettye T. Siegel. The duplicating, mail, and messenger department was operated by James W. Gatling, Frank C. Norman, and Kharl A. Williams.

The secretarial staff for the Chairman and Council Members consisted of Joyce A. Pilkerton, Mary C. Fibich, Patricia A. Lee, Alice H. Williams, and Margaret L. Snyder. Secretaries for the professional staff included D. Carolyn Fletcher, Dorothy L. Green, Bessie M. Lafakis, Jean P. Noll, Earnestine Reid, Linda A. Reilly, and Lillie M. Sturniolo. F. Denise Singletary supplemented the secretarial staff during the summer. Special assistance in connection with the *Report* was furnished by Dorothy L. Reid and Eleanor A. McStay, former members of the Council staff.

## DEPARTURES

The Council's professional staff is drawn primarily from universities and research institutions, and these economists normally serve for 1 or 2 years. Senior staff economists who resigned during the year were William E. Gibson (Brookings Institution), Ronald F. Hoffman (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare), William A. Johnson (Department of the Treasury), Nicholas S. Perna (Federal Reserve Bank of New York), Robert D. Tollison (Texas A&M), and Robert C. Vogel (Southern Illinois University). Junior economists who resigned in 1973 were Paul W. Boltz, Andrew J. Safir, and Mary E. Sullivan. Other resignations included Zell Berman, research assistant; and Cheryl L. Green and Julie L. Ohner, secretaries. Mayme Burnett, secretary, retired from Federal service during 1973.

The Council suffered a loss in August with the death of V. Madge McMahon, who had been with the Statistical Office since 1968.



Appendix C

STATISTICAL TABLES RELATING TO INCOME,  
EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTION



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#### General Notes

Detail in these tables may not add to totals because of rounding.

Unless otherwise noted, all dollar figures are in current dollars.

See Economic Report 1972 for data for intervening years not shown here.

Symbols used:

» Preliminary.

-- Not available (also, not applicable).



# NATIONAL INCOME OR EXPENDITURE

TABLE C-1.—*Gross national product or expenditure, 1929-73*

Year or quarter	Total gross national product	Personal consumption expenditures <sup>1</sup>	Gross private domestic investment <sup>2</sup>	Net exports of goods and services <sup>3</sup>	Government purchases of goods and services <sup>4</sup>				Percent change from preceding period, total gross national product <sup>5</sup>	
					Total	Federal				State and local
						Total	National defense <sup>6</sup>	Other		
Billions of dollars										
1929.....	103.1	77.2	16.2	1.1	8.5	1.3	1.3	7.2	-----	
1933.....	55.6	45.8	1.4	.4	8.0	2.0	2.0	6.0	-4.2	
1939.....	90.5	66.8	9.3	1.1	13.3	5.1	1.2	3.9	6.9	
1940.....	99.7	70.8	13.1	1.7	14.0	6.0	2.2	3.8	10.2	
1941.....	124.5	80.6	17.9	1.3	24.8	16.9	13.8	3.1	24.9	
1942.....	157.9	88.5	9.8	.0	59.6	51.9	49.4	2.5	26.8	
1943.....	191.6	99.3	5.7	-2.0	88.6	81.1	79.7	1.4	7.4	
1944.....	210.1	108.3	7.1	-1.8	96.5	89.0	87.4	1.6	9.7	
1945.....	211.9	119.7	10.6	-.6	82.3	74.2	73.5	.7	8.1	
1946.....	208.5	143.4	30.6	7.5	27.0	17.2	14.7	2.5	9.8	
1947.....	231.3	160.7	34.0	11.5	25.1	12.5	9.1	3.5	12.6	
1948.....	257.6	173.6	46.0	6.4	31.6	16.5	10.7	5.8	15.0	
1949.....	256.5	176.8	35.7	6.1	37.8	20.1	13.3	6.8	17.7	
1950.....	284.8	191.0	54.1	1.8	37.9	18.4	14.1	4.3	19.5	
1951.....	328.4	206.3	59.3	3.7	59.1	37.7	33.6	4.1	21.5	
1952.....	345.5	216.7	51.9	2.2	74.7	51.8	45.9	5.9	22.9	
1953.....	364.6	230.0	52.6	.4	81.6	57.0	48.7	8.4	24.6	
1954.....	364.8	236.5	51.7	1.8	74.8	47.4	41.2	6.2	27.4	
1955.....	398.0	254.4	67.4	2.0	74.2	44.1	38.6	5.5	30.1	
1956.....	419.2	266.7	70.0	4.0	78.6	45.6	40.3	5.3	33.0	
1957.....	441.1	281.4	67.9	5.7	86.1	49.5	44.2	5.3	36.6	
1958.....	447.3	290.1	60.9	2.2	94.2	53.6	45.9	7.7	40.6	
1959.....	483.7	311.2	75.3	.1	97.0	53.7	46.0	7.6	43.3	
1960.....	503.7	325.2	74.8	4.0	99.6	53.5	44.9	8.6	46.1	
1961.....	520.1	335.2	71.7	5.6	107.6	57.4	47.8	9.6	50.2	
1962.....	560.3	355.1	83.0	5.1	117.1	63.4	51.6	11.8	53.7	
1963.....	590.5	375.0	87.1	5.9	122.5	64.2	50.8	13.5	58.2	
1964.....	632.4	401.2	94.0	8.5	128.7	65.2	50.0	15.2	63.5	
1965.....	684.9	432.8	108.1	6.9	137.0	66.9	50.1	16.8	70.1	
1966.....	749.9	466.3	121.4	5.3	156.8	77.8	60.7	17.1	79.0	
1967.....	793.9	492.1	116.6	5.2	180.1	90.7	72.4	18.4	89.4	
1968.....	864.2	536.2	126.0	2.5	199.6	98.8	78.3	20.5	100.8	
1969.....	930.3	579.5	139.0	1.9	210.0	98.8	78.4	20.4	111.2	
1970.....	977.1	617.6	136.3	3.6	219.5	96.2	74.6	21.6	123.3	
1971.....	1,055.5	667.2	153.2	.8	234.3	98.1	71.6	26.5	136.2	
1972.....	1,155.2	726.5	178.3	-4.6	255.0	104.4	74.4	30.1	150.5	
1973 p.....	1,288.2	805.0	201.5	4.6	277.2	106.9	74.2	32.7	170.3	
Seasonally adjusted annual rates										
1971: I.....	1,027.2	650.0	145.5	3.8	227.9	96.1	72.3	23.9	131.8	
II.....	1,046.9	662.2	152.7	.5	231.5	96.7	71.3	25.4	134.8	
III.....	1,063.5	673.0	153.8	1.1	235.5	98.2	70.3	27.9	137.3	
IV.....	1,084.2	683.4	160.8	-2.2	242.2	101.2	72.4	28.8	141.0	
1972: I.....	1,112.5	700.2	167.5	-5.5	250.3	106.0	76.5	29.5	144.3	
II.....	1,142.4	719.2	174.7	-5.7	254.2	106.7	76.6	30.1	147.5	
III.....	1,166.5	734.1	181.5	-3.8	254.7	102.3	71.9	30.4	152.4	
IV.....	1,199.2	752.6	189.4	-3.5	260.7	102.7	72.4	30.3	158.0	
1973: I.....	1,242.5	779.4	194.5	.0	268.6	105.5	74.3	31.2	168.0	
II.....	1,272.0	795.6	198.2	2.8	275.3	107.3	74.2	33.1	168.0	
III.....	1,304.5	816.0	202.0	7.6	279.0	106.8	74.2	32.7	172.2	
IV p.....	1,334.0	829.0	211.2	8.0	285.8	107.8	74.0	33.8	178.0	

<sup>1</sup> See Table C-12 for detailed components.

<sup>2</sup> See Table C-13 for detailed components.

<sup>3</sup> See Table C-8 for exports and imports separately.

<sup>4</sup> Net of Government sales.

<sup>5</sup> This category corresponds closely to the national defense classification in the "Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1975."

<sup>6</sup> Changes are based on unrounded data and therefore may differ slightly from those obtained from published data.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-2.—Gross national product or expenditure in 1958 dollars, 1929-73

Year or quarter	Total gross national product	Personal consumption expenditures				Gross private domestic investment							Change in business inventories
		Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods	Services	Total	Fixed investment						
							Total	Nonresidential			Residential structures		
								Total	Structures	Producers' durable equipment			
Billions of 1958 dollars													
1929.....	203.6	139.6	16.3	69.3	54.0	40.4	36.9	26.5	13.9	12.6	10.4	3.5	
1933.....	141.5	112.8	8.3	58.6	46.0	5.3	9.7	7.6	3.3	4.3	2.1	-4.3	
1939.....	209.4	148.2	14.5	81.2	52.5	24.7	23.5	15.3	5.9	9.4	8.2	1.2	
1940.....	227.2	155.7	16.7	84.6	54.4	33.0	28.1	18.9	6.8	12.1	9.2	4.9	
1941.....	263.7	165.4	19.1	89.9	56.3	41.6	32.0	22.2	8.1	14.2	9.8	9.6	
1942.....	297.8	161.4	11.7	91.3	58.5	21.4	17.3	12.5	4.6	7.9	4.9	4.0	
1943.....	337.1	165.8	10.2	93.7	61.8	12.7	12.9	10.0	2.9	7.2	2.9	-2	
1944.....	361.3	171.4	9.4	97.3	64.7	14.0	15.9	13.4	3.8	9.6	2.5	-1.9	
1945.....	355.2	183.0	10.6	104.7	67.7	19.6	22.6	19.8	5.7	14.1	2.8	-2.9	
1946.....	312.6	203.5	20.5	110.8	72.1	52.3	42.3	30.2	12.5	17.7	12.1	10.0	
1947.....	309.9	206.3	24.7	108.3	73.4	51.5	51.7	36.2	11.6	24.6	15.4	-2	
1948.....	323.7	210.8	26.3	108.7	75.8	60.4	55.9	38.0	12.3	25.7	17.9	4.6	
1949.....	324.1	216.5	28.4	110.5	77.6	48.0	51.9	34.5	11.9	22.6	17.4	-3.9	
1950.....	355.3	230.5	34.7	114.0	81.8	69.3	61.0	37.5	12.7	24.8	23.5	8.3	
1951.....	383.4	232.8	31.5	116.5	84.8	70.0	59.0	39.6	14.1	25.5	19.5	10.9	
1952.....	395.1	239.4	30.8	120.8	87.8	60.5	57.2	38.3	13.7	24.6	18.9	3.3	
1953.....	412.8	250.8	35.3	124.4	91.1	61.2	60.2	40.7	14.9	25.8	19.6	.9	
1954.....	407.0	255.7	35.4	125.5	94.8	59.4	61.4	39.6	15.2	24.5	21.7	-2.0	
1955.....	438.0	274.2	43.2	131.7	99.3	75.4	69.0	43.9	16.2	27.7	25.1	6.4	
1956.....	446.1	281.4	41.0	136.2	104.1	74.3	69.5	47.3	18.5	28.8	22.2	4.8	
1957.....	452.5	288.2	41.5	138.7	108.0	68.8	67.6	47.4	18.2	29.1	20.2	1.2	
1958.....	447.3	290.1	37.9	140.2	112.0	60.9	62.4	41.6	16.6	25.0	20.8	-1.5	
1959.....	475.9	307.3	43.7	146.8	116.8	73.6	68.8	44.1	16.2	27.9	24.7	4.8	
1960.....	487.7	316.1	44.9	149.6	121.6	72.4	68.9	47.1	17.4	29.6	21.9	3.5	
1961.....	497.2	322.5	43.9	153.0	125.6	69.0	67.0	45.5	17.4	28.1	21.6	2.0	
1962.....	529.8	338.4	49.2	158.2	131.1	79.4	73.4	49.7	17.9	31.7	23.8	6.0	
1963.....	551.0	353.3	53.7	162.2	137.4	82.5	76.7	51.9	17.9	34.0	24.8	5.8	
1964.....	581.1	373.7	59.0	170.3	144.4	87.8	81.9	57.8	19.1	38.7	24.2	5.8	
1965.....	617.8	397.7	66.6	178.6	152.5	99.2	90.1	66.3	22.3	44.0	23.8	9.0	
1966.....	658.1	418.1	71.7	187.0	159.4	109.3	95.4	74.1	24.0	50.1	21.3	13.9	
1967.....	675.2	430.1	72.9	190.2	167.0	101.2	93.5	73.2	22.6	50.6	20.4	7.7	
1968.....	706.6	452.7	81.3	197.1	174.4	105.2	98.8	75.6	23.4	52.2	23.2	6.4	
1969.....	725.6	469.1	85.6	201.3	182.2	110.5	103.8	80.1	24.3	55.8	23.7	6.7	
1970.....	722.5	477.5	83.8	206.5	187.2	103.4	99.5	77.2	23.7	53.5	22.2	3.9	
1971.....	745.4	496.3	92.2	211.6	192.4	110.3	105.0	76.1	22.5	53.6	29.0	5.3	
1972.....	790.7	526.8	104.0	220.9	201.8	122.9	118.3	83.7	23.0	60.8	34.6	4.6	
1973 p.....	837.3	554.7	114.6	229.2	210.9	131.7	126.6	92.5	24.8	67.7	34.0	5.2	
Seasonally adjusted annual rates													
1971: I.....	735.1	489.5	89.3	210.2	189.9	106.6	100.7	74.8	22.9	51.9	25.9	5.8	
II.....	740.4	493.6	90.2	211.8	191.7	110.3	103.8	75.5	22.6	52.9	28.3	6.5	
III.....	746.9	498.0	93.6	211.5	192.9	109.5	105.5	75.6	22.4	53.2	29.9	4.0	
IV.....	759.0	504.1	95.8	213.0	195.3	114.8	110.1	78.4	22.1	56.3	31.7	4.7	
1972: I.....	768.0	512.5	99.2	215.0	198.2	116.5	115.4	81.5	23.0	58.4	34.0	1.1	
II.....	785.6	523.4	101.9	220.7	200.8	121.0	116.7	82.5	23.0	59.5	34.2	4.3	
III.....	796.7	531.0	105.8	222.2	202.9	124.8	118.2	83.4	22.7	60.7	34.7	6.6	
IV.....	812.3	540.5	109.2	225.8	205.4	129.1	122.8	87.5	23.1	64.3	35.3	6.3	
1973: I.....	829.3	552.7	117.0	228.8	207.0	130.2	126.9	91.2	23.8	67.4	35.6	3.3	
II.....	834.3	553.3	116.2	228.0	209.1	130.2	126.9	91.5	24.4	67.2	35.3	3.4	
III.....	841.3	558.1	115.4	230.2	212.5	130.8	127.7	93.2	25.2	68.0	34.5	3.0	
IV p.....	844.1	554.5	109.7	229.6	215.2	135.7	124.7	94.1	26.0	68.2	30.6	10.9	

See footnotes at end of table.



TABLE C-2.—Gross national product or expenditure in 1958 dollars, 1929-73—Continue

Year or quarter	Net exports of goods and services			Government purchases of goods and services <sup>1</sup>			Addendum: Gross private product	Percent change from preceding period <sup>2</sup>	
	Net exports	Exports	Imports	Total	Federal	State and local		Total gross national product	Gross private product
Billions of 1958 dollars									
1929.....	1.5	11.8	10.3	22.0	3.5	18.5	190.9		
1933.....	.0	7.1	7.1	23.3	6.0	17.3	127.5	-1.9	-2.7
1939.....	1.3	10.0	8.7	35.2	12.5	22.7	188.7	8.5	9.4
1940.....	2.1	11.0	8.9	36.4	15.0	21.4	205.6	8.5	9.0
1941.....	2.4	11.2	10.8	56.3	36.2	20.1	236.6	16.1	15.0
1942.....	-2.1	7.8	9.9	117.1	98.9	18.3	257.3	12.9	8.8
1943.....	-5.9	6.8	12.6	164.4	147.8	16.6	272.8	13.2	6.1
1944.....	-5.8	7.6	13.4	181.7	165.4	16.3	286.9	7.2	5.2
1945.....	-3.8	10.2	13.9	156.4	139.7	16.7	282.5	-1.7	-1.5
1946.....	8.4	19.6	11.2	48.4	30.1	18.4	275.1	-12.0	-2.6
1947.....	12.3	22.6	10.3	39.9	19.1	20.8	281.4	-.9	2.3
1948.....	6.1	18.1	12.0	46.3	23.7	22.7	295.0	4.4	4.8
1949.....	6.4	18.1	11.7	53.3	27.6	25.7	294.1	.2	-.3
1950.....	2.7	16.3	13.6	52.8	25.3	27.5	324.2	9.6	10.2
1951.....	5.3	19.3	14.1	75.4	47.4	27.9	344.6	7.9	6.3
1952.....	3.0	18.2	15.2	92.1	63.8	28.4	353.2	3.0	2.5
1953.....	1.1	17.8	16.7	99.8	70.0	29.7	371.1	4.5	5.0
1954.....	3.0	18.8	15.8	88.9	56.8	32.1	366.2	-1.4	-1.3
1955.....	3.2	20.9	17.7	85.2	50.7	34.4	397.2	7.6	8.5
1956.....	5.0	24.2	19.1	85.3	49.7	35.6	404.8	1.8	1.9
1957.....	6.2	26.2	19.9	89.3	51.7	37.6	410.5	1.5	1.4
1958.....	2.2	23.1	20.9	94.2	53.6	40.6	405.2	-1.1	-1.3
1959.....	.3	23.8	23.5	94.7	52.5	42.2	433.4	6.4	7.0
1960.....	4.3	27.3	23.0	94.9	51.4	43.5	444.0	2.5	2.4
1961.....	5.1	28.0	22.9	100.5	54.6	45.9	452.3	1.9	1.9
1962.....	4.5	30.0	25.5	107.5	60.0	47.5	482.9	6.6	6.7
1963.....	5.6	32.1	26.6	109.6	59.5	50.1	503.2	4.0	4.2
1964.....	8.3	36.5	28.2	111.2	58.1	53.2	532.0	5.4	5.7
1965.....	6.2	37.4	31.2	114.7	57.9	56.8	567.0	6.3	6.6
1966.....	4.2	40.2	36.1	126.5	65.4	61.1	603.5	6.5	6.4
1967.....	3.6	42.1	38.5	140.2	74.7	65.5	617.5	2.6	2.3
1968.....	1.0	45.7	44.7	147.7	78.1	69.6	647.0	4.7	4.8
1969.....	.2	48.4	48.3	145.9	73.5	72.4	664.9	2.7	2.8
1970.....	2.3	52.2	50.0	139.3	64.3	75.0	661.7	-.4	-.5
1971.....	.4	52.7	52.4	138.4	60.9	77.5	684.7	3.2	3.5
1972.....	-2.0	56.4	58.4	143.0	60.8	82.2	729.5	6.1	6.5
1973 <sup>p</sup> .....	6.0	67.3	61.3	144.8	57.3	87.5	774.8	5.9	6.2
Seasonally adjusted annual rates									
1971: I.....	2.4	52.8	50.4	136.7	60.1	76.6	674.6	9.1	9.9
II.....	-2	53.4	53.7	136.7	59.9	76.8	679.9	2.9	3.2
III.....	.8	54.9	54.1	138.6	61.1	77.5	686.1	3.6	3.7
IV.....	-1.6	49.7	51.3	141.6	62.5	79.1	698.2	6.6	7.2
1972: I.....	-3.7	55.4	59.1	142.7	63.0	79.7	707.3	4.9	5.4
II.....	-2.8	54.1	56.8	144.0	62.9	81.1	725.0	9.5	10.4
III.....	-.9	56.6	57.5	141.8	58.8	83.0	735.3	5.8	5.8
IV.....	-.8	59.6	60.3	143.5	58.6	85.0	750.3	8.1	8.4
1973: I.....	2.0	65.3	63.3	144.4	58.2	86.2	767.1	8.7	9.3
II.....	5.6	66.6	61.1	145.2	58.2	87.0	772.0	2.4	2.5
III.....	7.4	67.4	60.0	145.0	57.2	87.8	778.8	3.4	3.6
IV <sup>p</sup> .....	9.2	69.8	60.6	144.8	55.6	89.2	781.2	1.3	1.3

<sup>1</sup> Net of Government sales.<sup>2</sup> Changes are based on unrounded data and therefore may differ slightly from those obtained from published data.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-3.—Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-73

[Index numbers, 1958=100]

Year or quarter	Total gross national product <sup>1</sup>	Personal consumption expenditures				Gross private domestic investment <sup>1</sup>				
		Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods	Services	Fixed investment				Residential structures
						Total	Nonresidential			
							Total	Structures	Producers' durable equipment	
1929.....	50.64	55.3	56.4	54.5	56.1	39.4	39.9	35.7	44.6	38.1
1933.....	39.29	40.6	41.9	38.0	43.6	30.6	31.6	27.9	34.5	27.1
1939.....	43.23	45.1	46.0	43.2	47.7	37.7	38.7	33.1	42.2	35.7
1940.....	43.87	45.5	46.5	43.8	47.9	39.0	40.0	33.9	43.4	36.9
1941.....	47.22	48.7	50.4	47.7	49.8	42.0	42.7	36.4	46.3	40.3
1942.....	53.03	54.8	59.3	55.6	52.7	46.5	47.8	41.3	51.5	43.3
1943.....	56.83	59.9	64.2	62.5	55.3	49.3	49.9	46.8	51.1	47.0
1944.....	58.16	63.2	71.5	66.2	57.5	51.1	51.0	48.6	51.9	51.6
1945.....	59.66	65.4	75.9	68.7	58.7	51.5	51.0	49.2	51.7	54.9
1946.....	66.70	70.5	76.8	74.3	62.7	58.5	56.3	54.4	57.5	59.7
1947.....	74.64	77.9	82.7	83.6	67.9	66.7	64.5	64.4	64.6	71.7
1948.....	79.57	82.3	86.3	88.5	72.1	73.9	70.7	71.5	70.3	80.8
1949.....	79.12	81.7	86.8	85.6	74.3	74.7	72.8	71.2	73.6	78.5
1950.....	80.16	82.9	87.8	86.0	76.3	77.5	74.4	72.9	75.2	82.5
1951.....	85.64	88.6	94.2	93.3	80.0	83.1	80.4	79.3	80.9	88.6
1952.....	87.45	90.5	95.4	94.3	83.6	85.3	82.6	83.2	82.2	90.8
1953.....	88.33	91.7	94.3	93.9	87.7	86.6	84.0	84.9	83.5	91.9
1954.....	89.63	92.5	92.9	94.2	90.0	86.8	84.8	86.0	84.0	90.4
1955.....	90.86	92.8	91.9	93.6	92.0	89.0	86.7	88.1	85.9	92.9
1956.....	93.99	94.8	94.9	94.9	94.6	94.0	92.4	93.4	91.8	97.4
1957.....	97.49	97.7	98.4	97.7	97.3	98.5	97.9	98.6	97.5	99.8
1958.....	100.00	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1959.....	101.66	101.3	101.4	99.9	103.0	102.6	102.2	102.7	102.0	103.1
1960.....	103.29	102.9	100.9	101.2	105.8	103.4	102.9	104.0	102.2	104.5
1961.....	104.62	103.9	100.6	101.9	107.6	103.9	103.4	105.6	102.1	105.0
1962.....	105.78	104.9	100.8	102.8	109.0	104.9	104.1	107.1	102.3	106.7
1963.....	107.17	106.1	100.4	104.0	110.9	106.0	104.5	108.9	102.3	108.9
1964.....	108.85	107.4	100.4	104.9	113.1	107.6	105.7	111.1	103.0	112.3
1965.....	110.86	108.8	99.6	106.9	115.1	109.3	107.5	114.7	103.9	114.2
1966.....	113.94	111.5	98.7	110.7	118.3	111.8	110.2	118.9	106.0	117.4
1967.....	117.59	114.4	100.3	113.0	122.2	115.9	113.8	124.0	109.3	123.1
1968.....	122.30	118.4	103.4	117.1	126.9	120.4	117.5	129.8	112.0	129.7
1969.....	128.20	123.5	106.1	122.2	133.2	126.4	123.0	141.0	115.2	137.7
1970.....	135.24	129.3	108.9	127.8	140.2	132.5	130.2	152.6	120.3	140.2
1971.....	141.60	134.4	112.3	131.7	148.0	140.1	137.3	168.4	124.2	147.5
1972.....	146.10	137.9	112.8	135.7	153.2	145.7	141.3	181.7	126.0	156.3
1973 p.....	153.86	145.1	114.5	146.8	160.0	153.3	147.0	194.4	129.6	170.5
Seasonally adjusted										
1971: I.....	139.73	132.8	112.3	130.1	145.4	137.5	135.6	161.4	124.1	142.9
II.....	141.40	134.2	113.0	131.3	147.3	139.7	137.1	166.5	124.6	146.7
III.....	142.39	135.2	112.6	132.3	149.2	141.7	138.5	171.4	124.7	149.6
IV.....	142.85	135.6	111.4	133.1	150.1	141.3	137.8	174.4	123.4	149.9
1972: I.....	144.85	136.6	112.3	134.3	151.3	143.6	140.0	178.2	125.0	152.4
II.....	145.42	137.4	112.9	135.0	152.5	145.0	141.1	180.4	125.9	154.4
III.....	146.42	138.2	113.5	136.0	153.5	146.3	141.8	182.2	126.8	157.0
IV.....	147.63	139.2	112.5	137.6	155.3	147.6	142.1	186.0	126.3	161.2
1973: I.....	149.81	141.0	113.0	140.8	157.0	149.7	143.5	190.7	126.8	165.6
II.....	152.46	143.8	114.3	144.8	159.0	152.7	146.5	193.9	129.3	168.6
III.....	155.06	146.2	115.1	148.4	160.7	154.4	148.1	195.9	130.3	171.6
IV p.....	158.04	149.5	115.6	152.9	163.2	156.6	149.9	196.8	132.0	177.1

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-3.—Implicit price deflators for gross national product, 1929-73—Continued

[Index numbers, 1958=100]

Year or quarter	Exports and imports of goods and services <sup>1</sup>		Government purchases of goods and services			Gross national product by sector		
	Exports	Imports	Total	Federal	State and local	Private <sup>2</sup>		General government
						Total	Nonfarm	
1929.....	59.5	57.3	38.6	36.0	39.1	51.73	51.2	34.1
1933.....	33.7	28.8	34.5	33.1	35.0	39.92	42.1	33.5
1939.....	44.1	38.6	37.9	40.8	36.3	43.93	44.9	36.8
1940.....	48.6	40.8	38.5	40.2	37.3	44.69	45.4	36.0
1941.....	53.0	43.0	44.0	46.6	39.2	48.66	48.8	34.7
1942.....	61.5	48.3	50.9	52.5	42.3	55.51	54.8	37.3
1943.....	65.2	51.2	53.9	54.9	44.6	60.85	59.5	39.7
1944.....	69.9	53.2	53.1	53.8	46.1	62.02	60.8	43.3
1945.....	71.3	56.4	52.6	53.1	48.6	62.59	60.9	48.3
1946.....	75.4	64.9	55.8	57.3	53.2	68.25	65.8	55.4
1947.....	87.3	79.4	62.9	65.6	60.4	76.27	73.5	58.5
1948.....	92.7	86.4	68.1	69.8	66.4	81.40	78.6	60.8
1949.....	87.0	82.2	71.0	73.0	68.9	80.60	79.1	64.7
1950.....	84.9	88.7	71.8	72.9	70.8	81.41	80.0	67.1
1951.....	97.0	107.2	78.5	79.4	76.9	87.35	85.3	70.5
1952.....	98.8	103.6	81.0	81.2	80.6	88.99	87.4	74.4
1953.....	95.2	99.1	81.8	81.4	82.8	89.65	89.0	76.6
1954.....	94.3	100.8	84.1	83.5	85.3	90.77	90.5	79.5
1955.....	94.9	100.6	87.1	86.9	87.5	91.57	91.7	84.0
1956.....	97.5	102.5	92.1	91.7	92.7	94.53	94.8	88.7
1957.....	101.3	104.0	96.4	95.8	97.3	97.92	98.3	93.3
1958.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.00	100.0	100.0
1959.....	98.8	99.3	102.4	102.2	102.6	101.41	101.8	104.2
1960.....	99.9	101.0	105.0	104.2	105.9	102.76	103.2	108.6
1961.....	101.9	100.1	107.1	105.2	109.4	103.73	104.2	113.6
1962.....	100.8	98.5	109.0	105.6	113.2	104.73	105.1	116.6
1963.....	100.6	99.5	111.8	108.0	116.3	105.80	106.3	121.5
1964.....	101.5	101.5	115.7	112.2	119.5	107.05	107.7	128.4
1965.....	104.7	103.4	119.4	115.5	123.5	108.83	109.2	133.5
1966.....	107.7	105.6	124.0	118.8	129.4	111.56	111.6	140.3
1967.....	109.7	106.5	128.5	121.5	136.4	114.79	115.3	147.6
1968.....	110.9	107.7	135.1	126.5	144.8	118.90	119.3	159.1
1969.....	114.6	111.1	144.0	134.5	153.6	124.30	124.6	171.0
1970.....	120.5	118.6	157.6	149.5	164.6	130.32	130.9	188.9
1971.....	125.7	125.0	169.2	160.9	175.8	135.88	136.6	206.2
1972.....	130.2	133.6	178.3	171.7	183.2	139.78	139.8	221.5
1973 <sup>p</sup> .....	150.5	157.8	191.4	186.5	194.5	147.23	145.4	236.1
Seasonally adjusted								
1971: I.....	124.8	123.2	166.7	160.0	172.1	134.15	135.0	201.9
II.....	125.6	124.1	169.4	161.5	175.5	135.73	136.5	205.2
III.....	125.9	125.8	169.9	160.7	177.2	136.66	137.5	207.1
IV.....	126.6	127.1	171.0	161.9	178.2	136.93	137.5	210.7
1972: I.....	127.0	128.3	175.4	168.2	181.0	138.59	139.0	217.9
II.....	129.2	133.0	176.6	169.8	181.9	139.12	139.3	220.8
III.....	130.7	135.2	179.6	173.9	183.7	140.07	140.0	222.6
IV.....	133.7	137.8	181.6	175.5	185.9	141.27	140.9	224.6
1973: I.....	137.4	141.8	186.0	181.2	189.2	143.25	142.4	230.8
II.....	145.9	154.5	189.6	184.4	193.1	145.88	144.5	233.9
III.....	155.0	161.7	192.5	186.8	196.1	148.47	146.1	237.1
IV <sup>p</sup> .....	162.6	174.1	197.4	194.1	199.5	151.24	148.6	242.6

<sup>1</sup> Separate deflators are not available for total gross private domestic investment, change in business inventories, and net exports of goods and services.<sup>2</sup> Gross national product less compensation of general government employees. See also Tables C-9 and C-10.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-4.—*Implicit price deflators and alternative price measures of gross national product and gross private product, 1939-73*

Year or quarter	Gross national product price measures, 1958=100				Percent change from preceding period <sup>1</sup>					
	Total		Private		Total			Private		
	Implicit price deflator	Price index, 1967 weights	Implicit price deflator	Price index, 1967 weights	Implicit price deflator	Price index, 1967 weights	Chain price index	Implicit price deflator	Price index, 1967 weights	Chain price index
1939	43.23		43.93		-1.5			-1.6		
1940	43.87		44.69		1.5			1.7		
1941	47.22		48.66		7.7			8.9		
1942	53.03		55.51		12.3			14.1		
1943	56.83		60.85		7.2			9.6		
1944	58.16		62.02		2.3			1.9		
1945	59.66		62.59		2.6			.9		
1946	66.70		68.25		11.8			9.0		
1947	74.64		76.27		11.9			11.8		
1948	79.57		81.40		6.6			6.7		
1949	79.12		80.60		-1.6			-1.0		
1950	80.16		81.41		1.3			1.0		
1951	85.64		87.35		6.8			7.3		
1952	87.45		88.99		2.1			1.9		
1953	88.33		89.65		1.0			.7		
1954	89.63		90.77		1.5			1.2		
1955	90.86		91.57		1.4			.9		
1956	93.99		94.53		3.4			3.2		
1957	97.49		97.92		3.7			3.6		
1958	100.00		100.00		2.5			2.1		
1959	101.66		101.41		1.7			1.4		
1960	103.29		102.76		1.6			1.3		
1961	104.62		103.73		1.3			.9		
1962	105.78		104.73		1.1			1.0		
1963	107.17		105.80		1.3			1.0		
1964	108.85		107.05		1.6			1.2		
1965	110.86	110.75	108.83	108.65	1.8			1.7		
1966	113.94	114.06	111.56	111.62	2.8	3.0		2.5	2.7	
1967	117.59	117.58	114.79	114.78	3.2	3.1	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.9
1968	122.30	122.51	118.90	119.10	4.0	4.2	4.2	3.6	3.8	3.8
1969	128.20	128.61	124.30	124.67	4.8	5.0	4.9	4.5	4.7	4.6
1970	135.24	135.60	130.32	130.67	5.5	5.4	5.3	4.8	4.8	4.7
1971	141.60	142.55	135.88	136.64	4.7	5.1	5.1	4.3	4.6	4.5
1972	146.10	148.02	139.78	141.05	3.2	3.8	3.6	2.9	3.2	3.1
1973 *	153.86	157.07	147.23	149.50	5.3	6.1	5.8	5.3	6.0	5.6
Seasonally adjusted annual rates										
1971: I	139.73	140.36	134.15	134.65	5.5	6.9	6.8	4.3	5.4	5.4
II	141.40	142.17	135.73	136.34	4.9	5.3	5.2	4.8	5.1	5.0
III	142.39	143.48	136.66	137.58	2.8	3.7	3.6	2.8	3.7	3.6
IV	142.85	144.31	136.93	138.11	1.3	2.3	1.9	.8	1.5	1.3
1972: I	144.85	146.30	138.59	139.49	5.7	5.6	5.2	4.9	4.1	4.0
II	145.42	147.33	139.12	140.35	1.6	2.8	2.6	1.6	2.5	2.2
III	146.42	148.48	140.07	141.44	2.8	3.2	3.2	2.7	3.1	3.2
IV	147.63	149.95	141.27	142.87	3.3	4.0	3.9	3.5	4.1	3.9
1973: I	149.81	152.79	143.25	145.32	6.1	7.8	7.1	5.7	7.0	6.5
II	152.46	155.59	145.88	148.11	7.3	7.6	7.0	7.6	7.9	7.2
III	155.06	158.37	148.47	150.87	7.0	7.3	7.0	7.3	7.6	7.1
IV *	158.04	161.48	151.24	153.66	7.9	8.0	7.7	7.7	7.6	7.4

<sup>1</sup> Changes are based on unrounded data and therefore may differ slightly from those obtained from published indexes.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-5.—Gross national product by industry in 1958 dollars, 1947-72

[Billions of 1958 dollars]

Year	Total gross national product	Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries	Contract construction	Manufacturing			Transportation, communication, and utilities	Wholesale and retail trade	Finance, insurance, and real estate	Services	Government and government enterprises	All other <sup>1</sup>
				Total	Durable goods industries	Non-durable goods industries						
1947	309.9	17.9	12.9	91.8	52.3	39.4	29.6	52.7	35.6	30.6	32.4	6.7
1948	323.7	20.0	14.1	96.3	55.0	41.3	30.4	54.2	36.5	31.9	33.2	7.1
1949	324.1	19.4	14.7	90.9	50.5	40.4	28.7	55.2	37.8	32.1	34.7	10.6
1950	355.3	20.4	16.2	105.5	60.8	44.7	30.8	60.4	41.0	33.1	35.9	12.1
1951	383.4	19.5	18.2	116.2	69.0	47.2	34.3	61.4	42.9	34.0	43.9	13.0
1952	395.1	20.2	18.3	118.7	71.5	47.3	34.6	62.9	44.7	34.5	47.2	14.0
1953	412.8	21.2	18.9	128.6	79.1	49.5	35.7	64.9	46.8	35.3	47.1	14.3
1954	407.0	21.6	19.3	119.5	71.2	48.3	36.4	65.5	49.8	35.4	46.1	13.5
1955	438.0	22.1	20.8	133.6	80.7	52.9	38.6	71.6	52.7	38.2	46.0	14.4
1956	446.1	22.0	21.8	134.1	79.4	54.6	40.5	73.8	54.8	40.2	46.2	12.7
1957	452.5	21.5	21.1	134.6	79.6	54.9	41.3	75.1	57.0	41.8	46.9	13.1
1958	447.3	22.0	20.7	123.7	69.6	54.0	40.6	75.1	59.2	42.9	47.3	16.0
1959	475.9	22.3	22.0	138.9	79.9	59.0	43.3	80.8	61.4	45.1	47.9	14.1
1960	487.7	23.1	21.7	140.9	81.0	59.9	44.9	82.3	64.1	46.7	49.2	14.7
1961	497.2	23.4	21.4	140.4	79.7	60.7	46.0	83.5	67.1	48.3	50.6	16.3
1962	529.8	23.3	21.7	154.6	90.0	64.7	48.9	88.9	71.2	50.8	52.6	17.9
1963	551.0	24.0	21.9	162.4	95.6	66.8	51.9	92.8	74.4	52.2	53.9	17.4
1964	581.1	23.6	23.3	173.7	102.4	71.3	54.7	98.9	78.3	54.7	56.1	17.8
1965	617.8	25.0	23.5	190.5	114.8	75.7	59.2	104.8	83.1	57.7	58.0	15.8
1966	658.1	23.7	24.7	205.7	125.1	80.7	64.0	111.6	86.8	60.6	61.8	19.4
1967	675.2	25.2	23.1	205.4	123.9	81.4	66.5	113.9	91.6	63.4	65.5	20.6
1968	706.6	24.8	23.8	219.2	131.8	87.4	70.9	120.8	95.2	65.8	68.6	17.6
1969	725.6	25.4	24.1	228.6	136.9	91.7	75.4	124.2	95.5	67.7	70.3	14.3
1970	722.5	26.2	23.6	217.5	125.1	92.4	77.4	126.5	96.4	69.2	70.0	15.8
1971	745.4	27.4	24.1	223.7	127.7	96.0	81.0	131.5	99.9	69.6	70.0	18.3
1972	790.7	26.0	24.7	243.7	140.3	103.4	86.4	139.9	105.1	72.5	71.7	20.5

<sup>1</sup> Mining, rest of the world, and residual (the difference between gross national product measured as sum of final products and gross national product measured as sum of gross product by industries).

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-6.—Gross national product by major type of product, 1929–73

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Total gross national product	Final sales	Inventory change	Goods output									Services	Structures	Gross auto product
				Total			Durable goods			Nondurable goods					
				Total	Final sales	Inventory change	Total	Final sales	Inventory change	Total	Final sales	Inventory change			
1929.....	103.1	101.4	1.7	56.1	54.3	1.7	17.5	16.1	1.4	38.5	38.2	0.3	35.6	11.4	-----
1933.....	55.6	57.2	-1.6	27.0	28.6	-1.6	4.9	5.4	-0.5	22.1	23.2	-1.1	25.7	2.9	-----
1939.....	90.5	90.1	.4	49.0	48.6	.4	12.7	12.4	.3	36.3	36.2	.1	34.0	7.5	-----
1940.....	99.7	97.5	2.2	56.0	53.8	2.2	16.6	15.4	1.2	39.3	38.4	1.0	35.4	8.3	-----
1941.....	124.5	120.1	4.5	72.5	68.0	4.5	26.8	23.8	3.0	45.6	44.2	1.4	40.3	11.8	-----
1942.....	157.9	156.2	1.8	93.6	91.9	1.8	35.5	34.5	1.0	58.1	57.4	.7	50.3	14.0	-----
1943.....	191.6	192.2	-.6	120.4	121.0	-.6	54.2	54.2	0.0	66.2	66.8	-.6	62.5	8.7	-----
1944.....	210.1	211.1	-1.0	132.3	133.3	-1.0	57.9	58.5	-.6	74.4	74.8	-.3	71.8	6.1	-----
1945.....	211.9	213.0	-1.0	128.9	129.9	-1.0	48.9	50.2	-1.3	80.0	79.7	.2	76.5	6.5	-----
1946.....	208.5	202.1	6.4	124.9	118.5	6.4	36.9	31.6	5.3	88.0	86.9	1.1	68.0	15.6	-----
1947.....	231.3	231.8	-.5	139.7	140.1	-.5	46.0	44.3	1.7	93.7	95.9	-2.2	70.2	21.4	7.2
1948.....	257.6	252.9	4.7	154.2	149.4	4.7	48.7	48.0	.7	105.5	101.5	4.0	75.7	27.7	8.8
1949.....	256.5	259.6	-3.1	147.5	150.5	-3.1	47.8	49.9	-2.1	99.7	100.6	-1.0	80.8	28.3	11.9
1950.....	284.8	278.0	6.8	162.4	155.6	6.8	60.4	56.3	4.1	102.0	99.3	2.7	87.0	35.4	15.4
1951.....	328.4	318.1	10.3	189.7	179.4	10.3	73.7	66.8	6.9	116.0	112.6	3.4	101.2	37.5	13.5
1952.....	345.5	342.4	3.1	195.6	192.5	3.1	74.6	73.5	1.1	121.0	119.1	2.0	110.8	39.1	12.0
1953.....	364.6	364.1	.5	204.1	203.7	.4	79.4	78.5	.9	124.8	125.2	-.5	118.8	41.7	16.3
1954.....	364.8	366.4	-1.5	197.1	198.6	-1.5	72.1	74.6	-2.5	125.0	124.1	1.0	123.5	44.2	14.6
1955.....	398.0	392.0	6.0	216.4	210.4	6.0	85.7	82.7	3.0	130.7	127.7	2.9	132.6	49.0	21.2
1956.....	419.2	414.5	4.7	225.4	220.7	4.7	90.3	87.5	2.8	135.1	133.2	1.9	142.3	51.5	16.9
1957.....	441.1	439.8	1.3	234.6	233.3	1.3	94.4	93.1	1.3	140.2	140.2	.0	154.2	52.3	19.5
1958.....	447.3	448.8	-1.5	230.8	232.3	-1.5	83.6	86.4	-2.8	147.2	145.9	1.3	163.4	53.1	14.5
1959.....	483.7	478.9	4.8	249.1	244.4	4.8	95.6	93.2	2.3	153.6	151.1	2.4	176.2	58.3	19.1
1960.....	503.7	500.2	3.6	259.6	256.0	3.6	99.5	97.4	2.1	160.1	158.6	1.5	187.3	56.8	21.4
1961.....	520.1	518.1	2.0	262.3	260.2	2.0	96.5	96.6	-.1	165.8	163.7	2.1	199.5	58.3	17.9
1962.....	560.3	554.3	6.0	284.5	278.5	6.0	109.0	106.2	2.8	175.5	172.2	3.2	213.3	62.6	22.5
1963.....	590.5	584.6	5.9	298.6	292.7	5.9	116.1	113.3	2.8	182.5	179.4	3.1	226.2	65.7	25.1
1964.....	632.4	626.6	5.8	319.4	313.6	5.8	127.0	122.8	4.2	192.4	190.7	1.6	244.2	68.8	25.8
1965.....	684.9	675.3	9.6	347.2	337.6	9.6	139.6	133.0	6.7	207.6	204.7	3.0	262.9	74.8	31.8
1966.....	749.9	735.1	14.8	383.3	368.5	14.8	156.7	146.2	10.5	226.6	222.3	4.3	289.1	77.5	30.0
1967.....	793.9	785.7	8.2	398.9	390.7	8.2	161.1	156.5	4.7	237.7	234.2	3.5	316.5	78.6	28.9
1968.....	864.2	857.1	7.1	429.5	422.4	7.1	174.5	169.6	4.9	255.0	252.9	2.1	346.6	88.1	36.3
1969.....	930.3	922.5	7.8	457.5	449.7	7.8	187.3	182.3	5.0	270.2	267.4	2.8	377.9	94.9	36.6
1970.....	977.1	972.6	4.5	471.2	466.7	4.5	183.7	182.5	1.2	287.5	284.1	3.3	410.3	95.6	30.7
1971.....	1,055.5	1,049.4	6.1	497.1	491.1	6.1	193.1	191.1	2.0	304.0	299.9	4.1	447.4	110.9	40.9
1972.....	1,155.2	1,149.1	6.0	541.4	535.4	6.0	219.1	214.1	4.9	322.3	321.2	1.1	487.3	126.5	43.6
1973 p.....	1,288.2	1,280.8	7.4	614.3	606.8	7.4	249.2	242.1	7.0	365.1	364.7	.4	534.3	139.6	49.5
Seasonally adjusted annual rates															
1971: I.....	1,027.2	1,020.2	7.0	489.1	482.1	7.0	191.4	187.4	4.1	297.7	294.7	2.9	433.9	104.1	42.5
II.....	1,046.9	1,039.2	7.6	493.6	485.9	7.6	192.3	188.1	4.2	301.2	297.8	3.4	444.0	109.3	40.0
III.....	1,063.5	1,059.2	4.3	499.5	495.2	4.3	193.5	192.8	.7	306.0	302.4	3.7	450.8	113.2	42.2
IV.....	1,084.2	1,078.9	5.3	506.4	501.1	5.3	195.3	196.2	-0.9	311.0	304.9	6.2	460.9	117.0	39.0
1972: I.....	1,112.5	1,110.8	1.7	516.9	515.2	1.7	205.9	205.5	.4	311.0	309.7	1.3	471.8	123.8	40.1
II.....	1,142.4	1,136.9	5.5	536.4	531.0	5.5	214.6	211.4	3.2	321.9	319.6	2.3	481.5	124.4	42.1
III.....	1,166.5	1,157.8	8.7	548.6	539.9	8.7	222.6	216.8	5.8	326.0	323.1	2.9	491.8	126.2	46.5
IV.....	1,199.2	1,191.0	8.2	563.6	555.4	8.2	233.2	222.8	10.4	330.3	332.5	-2.2	503.9	131.7	45.6
1973: I.....	1,242.5	1,237.8	4.6	589.6	585.0	4.6	242.5	238.1	4.4	347.2	346.9	.3	514.8	138.1	51.5
II.....	1,272.0	1,267.5	4.5	604.2	599.6	4.5	249.7	242.4	7.3	354.5	357.3	-2.8	527.7	140.1	51.2
III.....	1,304.5	1,299.8	4.7	622.3	617.6	4.7	254.3	246.2	8.0	368.0	371.4	-3.4	540.8	141.4	49.6
IV p.....	1,334.0	1,318.1	15.9	641.0	625.1	15.9	250.2	241.8	8.4	390.8	383.4	7.5	554.1	133.9	45.7

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-7.—Gross national product by major type of product in 1958 dollars, 1929-73

[Billions of 1958 dollars]

Year or quarter	Total gross national product	Final sales	Inventory change	Goods output									Services	Structures	Gross auto product
				Total			Durable goods			Nondurable goods					
				Total	Final sales	Inventory change	Total	Final sales	Inventory change	Total	Final sales	Inventory change			
1929.....	203.6	200.1	3.5	103.9	100.4	3.5	33.6	30.9	2.7	70.4	69.5	0.8	69.3	30.3	-----
1933.....	141.5	145.9	-4.3	68.8	73.2	-4.3	11.7	13.4	-1.7	57.1	59.8	-2.7	63.0	9.8	-----
1939.....	209.4	208.2	1.2	110.7	109.5	1.2	27.6	27.0	.6	83.0	82.5	.6	76.9	21.8	-----
1940.....	227.2	222.3	4.9	124.0	119.0	4.9	35.6	32.8	2.7	88.4	86.2	2.2	80.0	23.2	-----
1941.....	263.7	254.1	9.6	143.4	133.8	9.6	50.0	43.5	6.6	93.4	90.3	3.1	89.8	30.5	-----
1942.....	297.8	293.8	4.0	158.1	154.1	4.0	57.2	54.4	2.9	100.9	99.7	1.2	107.7	31.9	-----
1943.....	337.1	337.3	-.2	187.4	187.6	-.2	85.6	85.2	.4	101.7	102.4	-.7	131.8	17.9	-----
1944.....	361.3	363.2	-1.9	204.8	206.7	-1.9	95.9	97.4	-1.5	108.8	109.3	-.4	144.0	12.4	-----
1945.....	355.2	358.2	-2.9	198.0	201.0	-2.9	84.3	87.4	-3.1	113.7	113.6	.2	144.3	12.9	-----
1946.....	312.6	302.6	10.0	172.1	162.1	10.0	54.7	46.1	8.6	117.4	116.0	1.4	113.3	27.2	-----
1947.....	309.9	310.1	-.2	172.2	172.4	-.2	60.1	58.6	1.5	112.2	113.8	-1.7	106.5	31.2	10.3
1948.....	323.7	319.1	4.6	178.4	173.8	4.6	61.3	60.0	1.2	117.1	113.8	3.3	109.3	36.1	11.4
1949.....	324.1	328.1	-3.9	174.2	178.1	-3.9	58.0	61.0	-3.0	116.2	117.1	-.9	112.4	37.5	14.8
1950.....	355.3	347.0	8.3	192.6	184.3	8.3	73.4	68.3	5.2	119.1	116.0	3.1	117.5	45.2	19.1
1951.....	383.4	372.5	10.9	208.4	197.5	10.9	84.1	76.1	8.0	124.3	121.4	2.9	130.5	44.4	15.9
1952.....	395.1	391.8	3.3	214.0	210.7	3.3	84.6	83.2	1.5	129.4	127.6	1.8	136.3	44.7	13.5
1953.....	412.8	411.8	.9	225.4	224.5	.9	91.0	89.9	1.2	134.4	134.6	-.2	140.3	47.0	18.7
1954.....	407.0	409.0	-2.0	215.1	217.1	-2.0	81.9	84.8	-3.0	133.2	132.3	.9	141.8	50.2	17.1
1955.....	438.0	431.6	6.4	236.1	229.7	6.4	96.5	93.0	3.4	139.7	136.7	3.0	147.5	54.3	24.6
1956.....	446.1	441.2	4.8	239.0	234.2	4.8	96.5	93.5	3.0	142.5	140.7	1.8	153.0	54.0	18.6
1957.....	452.5	451.2	1.2	239.8	238.5	1.2	96.2	95.0	1.2	143.6	143.6	.0	160.1	52.6	20.2
1958.....	447.3	448.8	-1.5	230.8	232.3	-1.5	83.6	86.4	-2.8	147.2	145.9	1.3	163.4	53.1	14.5
1959.....	475.9	471.1	4.8	247.7	242.9	4.8	94.0	91.6	2.4	153.7	151.2	2.5	171.2	57.0	18.5
1960.....	487.7	484.2	3.5	256.0	252.6	3.5	97.8	95.9	2.0	158.2	156.7	1.5	176.6	55.0	21.0
1961.....	497.2	495.2	2.0	257.3	255.3	2.0	94.9	94.9	.0	162.3	160.3	2.0	184.0	55.8	17.5
1962.....	529.8	523.8	6.0	277.3	271.3	6.0	107.0	104.1	2.8	170.3	167.2	3.1	193.7	58.8	22.0
1963.....	551.6	545.2	5.8	289.7	283.9	5.8	114.2	111.4	2.8	175.6	172.5	3.1	200.9	60.4	24.7
1964.....	581.1	575.2	5.8	308.6	302.8	5.8	124.6	120.4	4.1	184.1	182.3	1.7	210.8	61.6	25.5
1965.....	617.8	608.8	9.0	330.7	321.7	9.0	136.5	130.1	6.5	194.2	191.6	2.6	221.9	65.2	31.8
1966.....	658.1	644.2	13.9	356.8	342.9	13.9	151.8	141.9	9.8	205.1	201.0	4.1	236.3	65.0	30.6
1967.....	675.7	667.5	7.7	363.1	355.4	7.7	152.2	148.0	4.3	210.9	207.4	3.5	249.1	63.0	29.0
1968.....	706.6	700.2	6.4	379.7	373.3	6.4	160.7	156.2	4.4	219.0	217.0	2.0	259.7	67.2	35.4
1969.....	725.6	718.9	6.7	390.0	383.3	6.7	167.5	163.2	4.3	222.5	220.1	2.5	268.2	67.3	35.0
1970.....	722.5	718.5	3.9	385.4	381.4	3.9	159.0	158.0	.9	226.4	223.4	3.0	273.3	63.8	28.5
1971.....	745.4	740.1	5.3	396.1	390.8	5.3	163.0	161.3	1.7	233.1	229.5	3.6	280.1	69.1	36.4
1972.....	790.7	786.1	4.6	423.9	419.3	4.6	184.1	180.2	3.9	239.8	239.1	.7	292.6	74.2	39.0
1973 <sup>a</sup> .....	837.3	832.1	5.2	455.9	450.7	5.2	205.6	200.5	5.1	250.3	250.2	.1	305.9	75.5	44.0
Seasonally adjusted annual rates															
1971: I.....	735.1	729.3	5.8	391.4	385.5	5.8	161.2	158.0	3.3	230.1	227.6	2.6	276.6	67.2	37.2
II.....	740.4	733.8	6.5	392.4	385.9	6.5	161.3	157.8	3.5	231.1	228.1	3.0	279.4	68.5	34.8
III.....	746.9	742.9	4.0	397.1	393.1	4.0	163.2	162.4	.8	234.0	230.7	3.2	280.2	69.6	37.7
IV.....	759.0	754.3	4.7	403.4	398.6	4.7	166.2	166.9	-.7	237.2	231.7	5.5	284.3	71.3	35.9
1972: I.....	768.0	766.9	1.1	407.3	406.2	1.1	173.5	173.2	.3	233.8	233.0	.8	286.8	73.9	36.1
II.....	785.6	781.3	4.3	421.5	417.2	4.3	180.4	177.7	2.7	241.1	239.5	1.6	290.3	73.8	37.7
III.....	796.7	790.0	6.6	428.4	421.7	6.6	186.2	181.8	4.4	242.2	240.0	2.2	294.5	73.8	41.0
IV.....	812.3	806.0	6.3	438.4	432.1	6.3	196.3	188.0	8.2	242.1	244.1	-1.9	298.8	75.1	41.4
1973: I.....	829.3	826.0	3.3	452.1	448.7	3.3	203.4	200.3	3.2	248.7	248.5	.2	300.6	76.7	46.4
II.....	834.3	831.0	3.4	453.9	450.5	3.4	207.1	201.8	5.4	246.7	248.7	-2.0	304.1	76.3	45.5
III.....	841.3	838.3	3.0	456.8	453.7	3.0	208.1	202.4	5.7	248.7	251.3	-2.6	308.6	76.0	43.6
IV.....	844.1	833.2	10.9	460.7	449.8	10.9	203.7	197.6	6.1	257.0	252.2	4.8	310.4	73.0	40.6

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-8.—Gross national product: Receipts and expenditures by major economic groups, 1929-73

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Persons					Government						
	Disposable personal income				Personal saving or dis-saving (-)	Net receipts			Expenditures			Surplus or deficit (-), national income and product accounts
	Total <sup>1</sup>	Less: Interest paid and transfer payments to foreigners	Equals: Total excluding interest and transfers	Personal consumption expenditures		Tax and non-tax receipts or accruals	Less: Transfers, interest, and subsidies <sup>2</sup>	Equals: Net receipts	Total expenditures	Less: Transfers, interest, and subsidies <sup>2</sup>	Equals: Purchases of goods and services	
1929.....	83.3	1.9	81.4	77.2	4.2	11.3	1.8	9.5	10.3	1.8	8.5	1.0
1933.....	45.5	.7	44.9	45.8	-.9	9.3	2.7	6.7	10.7	2.7	8.0	-1.4
1939.....	70.3	.9	69.4	66.8	2.6	15.4	4.2	11.2	17.6	4.2	13.3	-2.2
1940.....	75.7	1.0	74.7	70.8	3.8	17.7	4.4	13.3	18.4	4.4	14.0	-.7
1941.....	92.7	1.1	91.6	80.6	11.0	25.0	4.0	21.0	28.8	4.0	24.8	-3.8
1942.....	116.9	.8	116.1	88.5	27.6	32.6	4.4	28.2	64.0	4.4	59.6	-31.4
1943.....	133.5	.8	132.7	99.3	33.4	49.2	4.7	44.4	93.3	4.7	88.6	-44.1
1944.....	146.3	.8	145.5	108.3	37.3	51.2	6.5	44.7	103.0	6.5	96.5	-51.8
1945.....	150.2	1.0	149.3	119.7	29.6	53.2	10.4	42.8	92.7	10.4	82.3	-39.5
1946.....	160.0	1.4	158.6	143.4	15.2	50.9	18.5	32.4	45.5	18.5	27.0	5.4
1947.....	169.8	1.8	168.0	160.7	7.3	56.8	17.3	39.5	42.4	17.3	25.1	14.4
1948.....	189.1	2.2	186.9	173.6	13.4	58.9	18.8	40.1	50.3	18.8	31.6	8.5
1949.....	188.6	2.4	186.2	176.8	9.4	56.0	21.3	34.7	59.1	21.3	37.8	-3.2
1950.....	206.9	2.9	204.1	191.0	13.1	68.7	22.9	45.8	60.8	22.9	37.9	7.9
1951.....	226.6	3.1	223.5	206.3	17.3	84.8	19.9	64.9	79.0	19.9	59.1	5.8
1952.....	238.3	3.5	234.8	216.7	18.1	89.8	19.0	70.8	93.7	19.0	74.7	-3.8
1953.....	252.6	4.3	248.3	230.0	18.3	94.3	19.5	74.8	101.2	19.5	81.6	-6.9
1954.....	257.4	4.6	252.9	236.5	16.4	89.7	21.9	67.8	96.7	21.9	74.8	-7.0
1955.....	275.3	5.1	270.2	254.4	15.8	100.4	23.4	76.9	97.6	23.4	74.2	2.7
1956.....	293.2	5.9	287.2	266.7	20.6	109.0	25.5	83.5	104.1	25.5	78.6	4.9
1957.....	308.5	6.4	302.2	281.4	20.7	115.6	28.7	86.8	114.9	28.7	86.1	7.7
1958.....	318.8	6.5	312.3	290.1	22.3	114.7	33.0	81.6	127.2	33.0	94.2	-12.5
1959.....	337.3	7.1	330.3	311.2	19.1	128.9	34.0	95.0	131.0	34.0	97.0	-2.1
1960.....	350.0	7.8	342.3	325.2	17.0	139.8	36.5	103.3	136.1	36.5	99.6	3.7
1961.....	364.4	8.1	356.3	335.2	21.2	144.6	41.3	103.3	149.0	41.3	107.6	-4.3
1962.....	383.3	8.6	374.6	355.1	21.6	157.0	42.8	114.2	159.9	42.8	117.1	-2.9
1963.....	404.6	9.7	394.9	375.0	19.9	168.8	44.4	124.3	166.9	44.4	122.5	-1.4
1964.....	438.1	10.7	427.4	401.2	26.2	174.1	46.7	127.3	175.4	46.7	128.7	-1.4
1965.....	473.2	12.0	461.3	432.8	28.4	189.1	49.9	139.2	186.9	49.9	137.0	2.2
1966.....	511.9	13.0	498.9	466.3	32.5	213.3	55.5	157.9	212.3	55.5	156.8	1.1
1967.....	546.3	13.9	532.4	492.1	40.4	228.9	62.8	166.2	242.9	62.8	180.1	-13.9
1968.....	591.0	15.1	575.9	536.2	39.8	263.5	70.7	192.7	270.3	70.7	199.6	-6.8
1969.....	634.4	16.7	617.7	579.5	38.2	296.7	77.9	218.8	287.9	77.9	210.0	8.8
1970.....	691.7	17.9	673.8	617.6	56.2	302.5	93.2	209.4	312.7	93.2	219.5	-10.1
1971.....	746.0	18.7	727.3	667.2	60.2	322.0	105.9	216.2	340.2	105.9	234.3	-18.1
1972.....	797.0	20.7	776.2	726.5	49.7	368.2	115.9	252.2	370.9	115.9	255.0	-2.8
1973 p.....	882.6	23.7	858.8	805.0	53.8	419.0	130.2	288.8	470.4	130.2	277.2	11.6
Seasonally adjusted annual rates												
1971: I.....	727.4	18.3	709.1	650.0	59.2	312.5	100.5	212.0	328.4	100.5	227.9	-15.9
II.....	744.0	18.3	725.7	662.2	63.5	319.0	107.3	211.8	338.8	107.3	231.5	-19.7
III.....	752.0	18.8	733.3	673.0	60.2	324.4	107.2	217.1	342.8	107.2	235.5	-18.4
IV.....	760.4	19.2	741.2	683.4	57.8	332.2	108.5	223.7	350.7	108.5	242.2	-18.6
1972: I.....	772.8	19.8	753.1	700.2	52.9	356.8	111.9	244.9	362.2	111.9	250.3	-5.4
II.....	785.4	20.3	765.1	719.2	45.9	363.4	113.0	250.4	367.2	113.0	254.2	-3.9
III.....	800.9	21.0	779.9	734.1	45.8	370.6	113.9	256.7	368.5	113.9	254.7	2.0
IV.....	828.7	21.7	807.0	752.6	54.4	381.9	125.0	256.9	385.7	125.0	260.7	-3.8
1973: I.....	851.5	22.1	829.4	779.4	50.0	402.7	125.2	277.5	393.8	125.2	268.6	8.9
II.....	869.7	23.1	846.6	795.6	51.0	414.7	127.8	286.9	403.2	127.8	275.3	11.6
III.....	891.1	24.1	867.0	816.0	51.1	425.0	131.7	293.3	410.7	131.7	279.0	14.3
IV p.....	918.0	25.6	892.4	829.0	63.3	-----	136.1	-----	421.9	136.1	285.8	-----

See footnotes at end of table.



TABLE C-8.—Gross national product: Receipts and expenditures by major economic groups, 1929-73—Continued

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Business			Net trans- fers to for- eigners by per- sons and Govern- ment	International			Excess of trans- fers or of net ex- ports (-) <sup>5</sup>	Total income or re- ceipts	Statistical dis- crepan- cy	Gross na- tional prod- uct or ex- pendi- ture
	Gross re- tained earn- ings <sup>3</sup>	Gross pri- vate dome- stic invest- ment <sup>4</sup>	Excess of in- vest- ment (-)		Net exports of goods and services						
					Ex- ports	Less: Im- ports	Equals: Net ex- ports				
1929.....	11.2	16.2	-5.1	0.4	7.0	5.9	1.1	-0.8	102.4	0.7	103.1
1933.....	3.2	1.4	1.8	.2	2.4	2.0	.4	-.2	55.0	.6	55.6
1939.....	8.4	9.3	-.9	.2	4.4	3.4	1.1	-.9	89.2	1.3	90.5
1940.....	10.5	13.1	-2.7	.2	5.4	3.6	1.7	-1.5	98.7	1.0	99.7
1941.....	11.4	17.9	-6.5	.2	5.9	4.6	1.3	-1.1	124.1	.4	124.5
1942.....	14.5	9.8	4.6	.2	4.8	4.8	0	.2	159.0	-1.1	157.9
1943.....	16.3	5.7	10.6	.2	4.4	6.5	-2.0	2.2	193.6	-2.0	191.6
1944.....	17.1	7.1	10.0	.3	5.3	7.1	-1.8	2.1	207.6	2.5	210.1
1945.....	15.1	10.6	4.6	.8	7.2	7.9	-.6	1.4	208.0	.3	211.9
1946.....	14.5	30.6	-16.1	2.9	14.7	7.2	7.5	-4.6	208.4	.1	208.5
1947.....	20.2	34.0	-13.8	2.6	19.7	8.2	11.5	-8.9	230.4	.9	231.3
1948.....	28.0	46.0	-18.0	4.5	16.8	10.3	6.4	-1.9	259.5	-2.0	257.6
1949.....	29.7	35.7	-6.0	5.6	15.8	9.6	6.1	-.5	256.2	.3	256.5
1950.....	29.4	54.1	-24.7	4.0	13.8	12.0	1.8	2.2	283.3	1.5	284.8
1951.....	33.1	59.3	-26.2	3.5	18.7	15.1	3.7	-.2	325.1	3.3	328.4
1952.....	35.1	51.9	-16.8	2.5	18.0	15.8	2.2	.3	343.3	2.2	345.5
1953.....	36.1	52.6	-16.5	2.5	16.9	16.6	.4	2.1	361.6	3.0	364.6
1954.....	39.2	51.7	-12.5	2.3	17.8	15.9	1.8	.5	362.1	2.7	364.8
1955.....	46.3	67.4	-21.1	2.5	19.8	17.8	2.0	.5	395.9	2.1	398.0
1956.....	47.3	70.0	-22.8	2.4	23.6	19.6	4.0	-1.5	420.4	-1.1	419.2
1957.....	49.8	67.9	-18.1	2.3	26.5	20.8	5.7	-3.4	441.1	.0	441.1
1958.....	49.4	60.9	-11.5	2.4	23.1	20.9	2.2	.2	445.8	1.6	447.3
1959.....	56.8	75.3	-18.5	2.4	23.5	23.3	.1	2.3	484.5	-.8	483.7
1960.....	56.8	74.8	-18.0	2.4	27.2	23.2	4.0	-1.7	504.8	-1.0	503.7
1961.....	58.7	71.7	-13.0	2.6	28.6	23.0	5.6	-3.0	520.8	-.8	520.1
1962.....	66.3	83.0	-16.8	2.7	30.3	25.1	5.1	-2.5	559.8	.5	560.3
1963.....	68.8	87.1	-18.4	2.8	32.3	26.4	5.9	-3.1	590.8	-.3	590.5
1964.....	76.2	94.0	-17.8	2.8	37.1	28.6	8.5	-5.7	633.7	-1.3	632.4
1965.....	84.7	108.1	-23.4	2.8	39.2	32.3	6.9	-4.1	688.0	-3.1	684.9
1966.....	91.3	121.4	-30.1	2.8	43.4	38.1	5.3	-2.4	750.9	-1.0	749.9
1967.....	93.0	116.6	-23.5	3.0	46.2	41.0	5.2	-2.2	794.6	-.7	793.9
1968.....	95.4	126.0	-30.6	2.9	50.6	48.1	2.5	.4	866.9	-2.7	864.2
1969.....	97.0	139.0	-42.0	2.9	55.5	53.6	1.9	1.0	936.3	-6.1	930.3
1970.....	97.0	136.3	-39.3	3.2	62.9	59.3	3.6	-.4	983.5	-6.4	977.1
1971.....	111.8	153.2	-41.4	3.6	66.3	65.5	.8	2.8	1,058.8	-3.4	1,055.5
1972.....	124.4	178.3	-53.9	3.7	73.5	78.1	-4.6	8.4	1,156.6	-1.5	1,155.2
1973 <sup>p</sup> .....	134.7	201.5	-66.8	3.6	101.3	96.7	4.6	-1.0	1,285.9	2.3	1,288.2
Seasonally adjusted annual rates											
1971: I.....	105.1	145.5	-40.3	3.2	65.9	62.1	3.8	-0.6	1,029.5	-2.3	1,027.2
II.....	109.9	152.7	-42.8	3.4	67.1	66.6	.5	2.9	1,050.7	-3.8	1,046.9
III.....	112.5	153.8	-41.3	3.8	69.1	68.0	1.1	2.7	1,066.9	-3.3	1,063.5
IV.....	119.5	160.8	-41.3	3.9	63.0	65.2	-2.2	6.1	1,088.3	-4.0	1,084.2
1972: I.....	117.4	167.5	-50.1	3.9	70.3	75.8	-5.5	9.4	1,119.2	-6.7	1,112.5
II.....	124.1	174.7	-50.5	3.8	69.9	75.6	-5.7	9.4	1,143.4	-1.0	1,142.4
III.....	124.5	181.5	-57.0	3.8	74.0	77.7	-3.8	7.6	1,164.9	1.6	1,166.5
IV.....	131.6	189.4	-57.8	3.5	79.7	83.2	-3.5	7.0	1,199.1	.2	1,199.2
1973: I.....	131.5	194.5	-63.0	3.0	89.7	89.7	.0	3.0	1,241.4	1.1	1,242.5
II.....	132.0	198.2	-66.2	3.3	97.2	94.4	2.8	.5	1,268.9	3.2	1,272.0
III.....	136.9	202.0	-65.1	3.5	104.5	97.0	7.6	-4.0	1,300.8	3.7	1,304.5
IV <sup>p</sup> .....	211.2	211.2	0	4.4	113.5	105.6	8.0	-3.5	1,334.0	0	1,334.0

<sup>1</sup> Personal income less personal tax and nontax payments (fines, penalties, etc.).

<sup>2</sup> Government transfer payments to persons, foreign net transfers by Government, net interest paid by government, subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises, and disbursements less wage accruals.

<sup>3</sup> Capital consumption allowances, corporate inventory valuation adjustment, undistributed corporate profits, and private wage accruals less disbursements.

<sup>4</sup> Private business investment, purchases of capital goods by private nonprofit institutions, and residential housing. See Table C-13.

<sup>5</sup> Net foreign investment less capital grants received by the United States, with sign changed.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-9.—Gross national product by sector, 1929-73

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Total gross national product	Gross private product <sup>1</sup>						Gross government product <sup>2</sup>
		Total	Business			Households and institutions	Rest of the world	
			Total	Nonfarm <sup>3</sup>	Farm			
1929.....	103.1	98.8	95.1	85.4	9.7	2.9	0.8	4.3
1933.....	55.6	50.9	48.9	44.3	4.6	1.7	.3	4.7
1939.....	90.5	82.9	80.3	74.0	6.3	2.3	.3	7.6
1940.....	99.7	91.9	89.1	82.6	6.5	2.4	.4	7.8
1941.....	124.5	115.1	112.2	103.3	8.9	2.5	.4	9.4
1942.....	157.9	142.8	139.5	126.5	13.0	2.9	.4	15.1
1943.....	191.6	166.0	162.4	147.2	15.3	3.2	.4	25.6
1944.....	210.1	177.9	173.8	158.5	15.3	3.7	.4	32.2
1945.....	211.9	176.8	172.3	156.4	15.9	4.1	.4	35.2
1946.....	208.5	187.7	182.7	163.9	18.8	4.5	.6	20.8
1947.....	231.3	214.6	208.6	188.5	20.2	5.1	.8	16.7
1948.....	257.6	240.1	233.5	210.2	23.3	5.6	1.0	17.4
1949.....	256.5	237.0	230.1	211.4	18.8	5.9	1.0	19.4
1950.....	284.8	263.9	256.3	236.3	20.0	6.4	1.2	20.9
1951.....	328.4	301.0	292.8	269.9	22.9	6.9	1.3	27.4
1952.....	345.5	314.3	305.8	283.7	22.2	7.2	1.3	31.2
1953.....	364.6	332.7	323.6	303.3	20.3	7.8	1.3	31.9
1954.....	364.8	332.4	322.7	303.1	19.6	8.1	1.6	32.5
1955.....	398.0	363.8	352.9	334.1	18.8	9.1	1.8	34.2
1956.....	419.2	382.6	370.8	352.2	18.6	9.8	2.1	36.6
1957.....	441.1	402.0	389.3	370.9	18.4	10.5	2.2	39.1
1958.....	447.3	405.2	391.7	370.9	20.8	11.4	2.0	42.1
1959.....	483.7	439.4	425.0	405.3	19.6	12.2	2.2	44.3
1960.....	503.7	456.3	440.7	420.2	20.5	13.2	2.4	47.5
1961.....	520.1	469.2	452.3	431.4	20.9	14.0	2.9	50.9
1962.....	560.3	505.7	487.4	466.2	21.2	15.0	3.3	54.7
1963.....	590.5	532.4	513.0	491.5	21.5	16.0	3.4	58.1
1964.....	632.4	569.4	548.2	527.6	20.6	17.3	4.0	63.0
1965.....	684.9	617.1	594.4	570.8	23.7	18.5	4.2	67.8
1966.....	749.9	673.3	648.9	624.0	24.9	20.2	4.1	76.6
1967.....	793.9	708.8	681.6	657.0	24.6	22.8	4.5	85.1
1968.....	864.2	769.3	739.0	713.9	25.2	25.5	4.7	94.9
1969.....	930.3	826.5	794.1	766.2	27.9	28.1	4.3	103.8
1970.....	977.1	862.4	827.0	797.9	29.0	30.8	4.6	114.7
1971.....	1,055.5	930.3	889.9	859.4	30.4	33.5	7.0	125.1
1972.....	1,155.2	1,019.7	975.4	941.0	34.4	36.8	7.5	135.4
1973 *.....	1,288.2	1,140.7	1,090.3	1,042.7	47.6	41.1	9.3	147.5
Seasonally adjusted annual rates								
1971: I.....	1,027.2	904.9	866.4	836.5	29.9	32.6	5.9	122.3
II.....	1,046.9	922.8	882.3	852.0	30.2	33.1	7.4	124.1
III.....	1,063.5	937.6	897.5	867.5	30.0	33.8	6.3	125.9
IV.....	1,084.2	956.0	913.3	881.7	31.6	34.5	8.2	128.2
1972: I.....	1,112.5	980.3	937.8	904.8	33.0	35.5	7.0	132.2
II.....	1,142.4	1,008.6	965.2	931.3	33.9	36.6	6.8	133.8
III.....	1,166.5	1,030.0	984.9	951.0	33.9	37.5	7.6	136.5
IV.....	1,199.2	1,060.0	1,013.6	976.9	36.7	37.8	8.7	139.2
1973: I.....	1,242.5	1,098.9	1,050.5	1,008.9	41.6	39.3	9.1	143.5
II.....	1,272.0	1,126.2	1,076.8	1,033.5	43.3	40.5	8.9	145.8
III.....	1,304.5	1,156.3	1,105.2	1,056.2	49.0	41.8	9.3	148.2
IV *.....	1,334.0	1,181.5	1,128.8	1,072.2	56.6	43.0	9.7	152.5

<sup>1</sup> Gross national product less compensation of general government employees.<sup>2</sup> Includes compensation of employees in government enterprises.<sup>3</sup> Compensation of general government employees.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-10.—Gross national product by sector in 1958 dollars, 1929-73

[Billions of 1958 dollars]

Year or quarter	Total gross national product	Gross private product <sup>1</sup>						Gross government product <sup>2</sup>
		Total	Business			Households and institutions	Rest of the world	
			Total	Nonfarm <sup>3</sup>	Farm			
1929.....	203.6	190.9	182.1	165.1	17.0	7.4	1.4	12.7
1933.....	141.5	127.5	120.6	103.0	17.5	5.7	1.2	14.0
1939.....	209.4	188.7	180.7	162.5	18.2	7.1	.9	20.6
1940.....	227.2	205.6	197.1	179.6	17.5	7.6	1.0	21.6
1941.....	263.7	236.6	228.1	209.3	18.8	7.5	.9	27.2
1942.....	297.8	257.3	248.7	228.0	20.6	7.8	.8	40.5
1943.....	337.1	272.8	264.9	245.3	19.6	7.2	.8	64.3
1944.....	361.3	286.9	278.9	259.5	19.4	7.1	.9	74.4
1945.....	355.2	282.5	274.6	256.5	18.1	7.1	.8	72.8
1946.....	312.6	275.1	267.0	248.6	18.5	7.1	.9	37.5
1947.....	309.9	281.4	272.8	255.8	17.0	7.5	1.1	28.6
1948.....	323.7	295.0	286.0	267.0	19.0	7.9	1.2	28.7
1949.....	324.1	294.1	284.7	266.2	18.4	8.2	1.2	30.1
1950.....	355.3	324.2	314.2	294.9	19.4	8.7	1.3	31.1
1951.....	383.4	344.6	334.5	316.2	18.4	8.8	1.2	38.8
1952.....	395.1	353.2	343.2	324.2	19.0	8.8	1.2	41.8
1953.....	412.8	371.1	360.7	340.7	20.0	9.1	1.3	41.7
1954.....	407.0	366.2	355.4	335.0	20.4	9.2	1.6	40.9
1955.....	438.0	397.2	385.4	364.4	20.9	10.1	1.8	40.7
1956.....	446.1	404.8	392.2	371.4	20.8	10.6	2.0	41.3
1957.....	452.5	410.5	397.5	377.2	20.3	10.9	2.1	41.9
1958.....	447.3	405.2	391.7	370.9	20.8	11.4	2.0	42.1
1959.....	475.9	433.4	419.4	398.3	21.1	11.7	2.2	42.5
1960.....	487.7	444.0	429.5	407.6	21.9	12.2	2.3	43.7
1961.....	497.2	452.3	436.9	414.8	22.2	12.4	2.9	44.8
1962.....	529.8	482.9	466.7	444.6	22.1	12.9	3.4	46.9
1963.....	551.0	503.2	486.6	463.8	22.8	13.2	3.4	47.8
1964.....	581.1	532.0	514.4	492.1	22.3	13.7	3.9	49.1
1965.....	617.8	567.0	548.9	525.2	23.7	14.0	4.1	50.8
1966.....	658.1	603.5	584.9	562.5	22.4	14.6	3.9	54.6
1967.....	675.2	617.5	597.8	573.9	23.9	15.4	4.3	57.6
1968.....	706.6	647.0	626.5	603.1	23.4	16.0	4.5	59.7
1969.....	725.6	664.9	644.6	620.5	24.1	16.3	4.0	60.7
1970.....	722.5	661.7	641.1	616.4	24.8	16.6	4.0	60.7
1971.....	745.4	684.7	662.2	636.3	26.0	16.8	5.6	60.7
1972.....	790.7	729.5	706.6	682.0	24.6	17.4	5.5	61.1
1973.....	837.3	774.8	750.9	727.7	23.2	18.3	5.6	62.5
Seasonally adjusted annual rates								
1971: I.....	735.1	674.6	652.9	626.4	26.5	16.8	4.8	60.6
II.....	740.4	679.9	657.0	631.2	25.9	16.8	6.0	60.5
III.....	746.9	686.1	664.3	638.3	25.9	16.8	5.0	60.8
IV.....	759.0	698.2	674.8	649.1	25.7	16.9	6.5	60.8
1972: I.....	768.0	707.3	684.7	659.2	25.6	17.2	5.4	60.7
II.....	785.6	725.0	702.6	677.4	25.2	17.4	5.0	60.6
III.....	796.7	735.3	712.3	688.7	23.6	17.5	5.5	61.3
IV.....	812.3	750.3	726.8	702.5	24.2	17.4	6.2	62.0
1973: I.....	829.3	767.1	742.9	718.1	24.8	18.0	6.3	62.2
II.....	834.3	772.0	748.3	725.9	22.4	18.2	5.5	62.4
III.....	841.3	778.8	754.7	733.6	21.2	18.5	5.4	62.5
IV.....	844.1	781.2	757.5	733.2	24.3	18.5	5.3	62.9

<sup>1</sup> Gross national product less compensation of general government employees.<sup>2</sup> Includes compensation of employees in government enterprises.<sup>3</sup> Compensation of general government employees.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-11.—Gross product originating in nonfinancial corporations and dollar costs per unit of output, 1948-73

Year or quarter	Gross product originating in nonfinancial corporations (billions of dollars)		Current dollar costs per unit of 1958 dollar gross product (dollars)							Corporate profits and inventory valuation adjustment		
	Current dollars	1958 dollars	Total costs <sup>1</sup>	Capital consumption allowances	Indirect business taxes <sup>2</sup>	Compensation of employees	Net interest	Total	Profits tax liability	Profits after taxes plus inventory valuation adjustment		
1948.....	137.0	172.9	0.793	0.040	0.070	0.507	0.005	0.171	0.069	0.103		
1949.....	133.3	165.6	.805	.047	.076	.514	.006	.162	.057	.104		
1950.....	151.7	186.4	.814	.046	.075	.507	.005	.180	.090	.090		
1951.....	174.3	203.5	.857	.049	.075	.541	.005	.186	.103	.083		
1952.....	182.0	207.1	.879	.054	.081	.570	.006	.168	.086	.082		
1953.....	194.7	219.8	.886	.059	.083	.584	.006	.154	.084	.070		
1954.....	191.6	213.4	.898	.069	.081	.591	.007	.149	.074	.075		
1955.....	216.3	237.2	.912	.072	.081	.582	.007	.170	.084	.086		
1956.....	231.2	244.0	.948	.076	.085	.619	.007	.160	.081	.079		
1957.....	241.9	247.2	.979	.082	.090	.642	.009	.155	.076	.078		
1958.....	236.0	236.0	1.000	.091	.097	.659	.011	.142	.069	.073		
1959.....	263.7	260.8	1.011	.088	.094	.654	.010	.164	.080	.084		
1960.....	273.1	267.1	1.022	.091	.099	.670	.011	.151	.073	.078		
1961.....	278.4	270.6	1.029	.095	.103	.670	.013	.149	.073	.076		
1962.....	302.8	292.9	1.034	.100	.101	.665	.014	.154	.071	.082		
1963.....	320.0	308.0	1.039	.100	.102	.664	.015	.158	.074	.084		
1964.....	346.0	329.7	1.050	.100	.103	.664	.015	.168	.074	.094		
1965.....	377.6	357.8	1.055	.099	.100	.660	.017	.179	.077	.102		
1966.....	413.0	385.0	1.073	.100	.096	.678	.019	.180	.078	.102		
1967.....	430.8	390.2	1.104	.107	.100	.707	.023	.167	.073	.094		
1968.....	469.9	415.0	1.132	.109	.105	.727	.025	.166	.082	.084		
1969.....	504.3	433.9	1.162	.115	.109	.764	.029	.145	.078	.067		
1970.....	519.1	427.7	1.214	.126	.119	.812	.038	.119	.064	.055		
1971.....	554.1	442.7	1.252	.131	.125	.825	.037	.134	.067	.067		
1972.....	608.9	475.5	1.281	.133	.122	.847	.037	.142	.074	.068		
1973.....	680.5	512.8	1.327	.133	.122	.880	.037	.156	.091	.064		
Seasonally adjusted annual rates												
1971: I.....	540.5	434.6	1.244	0.130	0.124	0.820	0.038	0.131	0.068	0.063		
II.....	550.6	440.0	1.251	.131	.124	.824	.037	.135	.070	.065		
III.....	557.4	443.5	1.257	.132	.125	.828	.037	.135	.068	.068		
IV.....	568.1	452.4	1.256	.132	.126	.828	.037	.133	.062	.071		
1972: I.....	587.4	462.3	1.271	.132	.122	.842	.036	.139	.072	.067		
II.....	601.9	471.9	1.276	.135	.122	.845	.036	.138	.072	.066		
III.....	612.9	477.8	1.283	.132	.122	.850	.037	.142	.074	.068		
IV.....	633.2	489.8	1.293	.133	.122	.853	.037	.148	.077	.071		
1973: I.....	656.7	503.4	1.305	.132	.122	.862	.036	.152	.088	.064		
II.....	672.5	509.6	1.320	.132	.122	.874	.037	.155	.095	.060		
III.....	689.3	517.2	1.333	.133	.122	.883	.037	.158	.092	.066		

<sup>1</sup> This is equal to the deflator for gross product of nonfinancial corporations, with the decimal point shifted two places to the left.

<sup>2</sup> Also includes business transfer payments less subsidies.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-12.—*Personal consumption expenditures, 1929-73*

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Total personal consumption expenditures	Durable goods				Nondurable goods					Services				
		Total	Automobiles and parts <sup>1</sup>	Furniture and household equipment	Other	Total	Food and beverages	Clothing and shoes	Gasoline and oil	Other	Total	Housing <sup>2</sup>	Household operation	Transportation	Other
1929...	77.2	9.2	3.2	4.8	1.2	37.7	19.5	9.4	1.8	7.0	30.3	11.5	4.0	2.6	12.2
1933...	45.8	3.5	1.1	1.9	.5	22.3	11.5	4.6	1.5	4.6	20.1	7.9	2.8	1.5	7.9
1939...	66.8	6.7	2.2	3.5	1.0	35.1	19.1	7.1	2.2	6.7	25.0	9.1	3.8	2.0	10.1
1940...	70.8	7.8	2.7	3.9	1.1	37.0	20.2	7.4	2.3	7.1	26.0	9.4	4.0	2.1	10.4
1941...	80.6	9.6	3.4	4.9	1.4	42.9	23.4	8.8	2.6	8.0	28.1	10.2	4.3	2.4	11.2
1942...	88.5	6.9	.7	4.7	1.6	50.8	28.4	11.0	2.1	9.3	30.8	11.0	4.8	2.7	12.3
1943...	99.3	6.6	.8	3.9	1.9	58.6	33.2	13.4	1.3	10.6	34.2	11.5	5.2	3.4	14.0
1944...	108.3	6.7	.8	3.8	2.2	64.3	36.7	14.4	1.6	11.7	37.2	12.0	5.9	3.7	15.6
1945...	119.7	8.0	1.0	4.6	2.5	71.9	40.6	16.5	1.8	13.0	39.8	12.5	6.4	4.0	16.8
1946...	143.4	15.8	4.0	8.6	3.2	82.4	47.4	18.2	3.0	13.8	45.3	13.9	6.8	5.0	19.7
1947...	160.7	20.4	6.2	10.9	3.3	90.5	52.3	18.8	3.6	15.7	49.8	15.7	7.5	5.3	21.4
1948...	173.6	22.7	7.5	11.9	3.4	96.2	54.2	20.1	4.4	17.5	54.7	17.5	8.1	5.8	23.3
1949...	176.8	24.6	9.9	11.6	3.2	94.5	52.5	19.3	5.0	17.7	57.6	19.3	8.5	5.9	23.9
1950...	191.0	30.5	13.1	14.1	3.3	98.1	53.9	19.6	5.4	19.2	62.4	21.3	9.5	6.2	25.4
1951...	206.3	29.6	11.6	14.4	3.6	108.8	60.4	21.2	6.1	21.1	67.9	23.9	10.4	6.7	26.9
1952...	216.7	29.3	11.1	14.3	3.9	114.0	63.4	21.9	6.8	21.7	73.4	26.5	11.1	7.1	28.7
1953...	230.0	33.2	14.2	14.9	4.1	116.8	64.4	22.1	7.7	22.7	79.9	29.3	12.0	7.8	30.8
1954...	236.5	32.8	13.6	15.0	4.2	118.3	65.4	22.1	8.2	22.6	85.4	31.7	12.6	7.9	33.2
1955...	254.4	39.6	18.4	16.6	4.6	123.3	67.2	23.1	9.0	24.0	91.4	33.7	14.0	8.2	35.5
1956...	266.7	38.9	16.4	17.5	5.0	129.3	69.9	24.1	9.8	25.4	98.5	36.0	15.2	8.6	38.6
1957...	281.4	40.8	18.3	17.3	5.3	135.6	73.6	24.3	10.6	27.1	105.0	38.5	16.2	9.0	41.3
1958...	290.1	37.9	15.4	17.1	5.4	140.2	76.4	24.7	11.0	28.2	112.0	41.1	17.3	9.3	44.3
1959...	311.2	44.3	19.5	18.9	5.9	146.6	78.6	26.4	11.6	30.1	120.3	43.7	18.5	10.1	48.0
1960...	325.2	45.3	20.1	18.9	6.3	151.3	80.5	27.3	12.3	31.2	128.7	46.3	20.0	10.8	51.6
1961...	335.2	44.2	18.4	19.3	6.5	155.9	82.9	27.9	12.4	32.7	135.1	48.7	20.8	10.6	54.9
1962...	355.1	49.5	22.0	20.5	6.9	162.6	85.7	29.6	12.9	34.4	143.0	52.0	22.0	11.0	58.0
1963...	375.0	53.9	24.3	22.2	7.5	168.6	88.2	30.6	13.5	36.3	152.4	55.4	23.1	11.4	62.5
1964...	401.2	59.2	25.8	25.0	8.5	178.7	92.9	33.5	14.0	38.2	163.3	59.3	24.3	11.6	68.1
1965...	432.8	66.3	30.3	26.9	9.1	191.7	98.8	35.9	15.3	41.1	175.5	63.5	25.6	12.6	73.8
1966...	466.3	70.8	30.3	29.9	10.5	206.0	105.8	40.3	16.6	44.4	188.6	67.5	27.1	13.6	80.4
1967...	492.1	73.1	30.5	31.4	11.2	215.0	108.5	42.3	17.6	46.6	204.0	71.8	29.1	14.5	88.5
1968...	536.2	84.0	37.5	34.3	12.3	230.8	115.3	46.3	19.0	50.2	221.3	77.3	31.2	15.5	97.3
1969...	579.5	90.8	40.7	37.1	13.5	245.9	120.6	50.2	20.9	54.2	242.7	84.1	33.8	16.6	108.2
1970...	617.6	91.3	37.3	39.6	14.4	263.8	130.0	52.8	22.2	58.7	262.6	90.9	36.4	18.3	117.0
1971...	667.2	103.6	46.6	42.1	14.9	278.7	136.6	57.0	23.5	61.5	284.9	98.5	39.7	20.4	126.3
1972...	726.5	117.4	52.8	48.1	16.5	299.9	145.3	62.3	25.5	66.8	309.2	105.5	43.8	21.8	138.0
1973 <sup>a</sup> ...	805.0	131.1	57.9	54.7	18.5	336.3	161.5	69.8	29.0	76.0	337.6	114.5	48.0	23.4	151.6
Seasonally adjusted annual rates															
1971:															
I...	650.0	100.3	44.7	41.3	14.4	273.5	134.1	55.7	22.9	60.7	276.1	95.4	38.4	19.4	122.8
II...	662.2	101.9	45.5	41.6	14.8	278.0	136.2	57.0	23.1	61.7	282.3	97.6	39.3	20.1	125.3
III...	673.0	105.4	48.3	41.9	15.2	279.8	137.6	57.4	23.6	61.2	287.8	99.5	40.3	20.6	127.4
IV...	683.4	106.7	47.8	43.6	15.3	283.5	138.4	58.1	24.5	62.6	293.2	101.4	40.7	21.2	129.9
1972:															
I...	700.2	111.5	49.4	46.6	15.4	288.8	141.0	59.4	24.7	63.6	300.0	103.1	41.8	21.6	133.5
II...	719.2	115.1	51.2	47.3	16.6	297.9	144.7	61.7	25.0	66.6	306.2	104.7	43.2	21.7	136.6
III...	734.1	120.2	55.0	48.6	16.6	302.3	146.5	62.9	25.8	67.2	311.6	106.3	44.5	21.8	138.9
IV...	752.6	122.9	55.7	50.0	17.3	310.7	149.1	65.1	26.6	70.0	319.0	107.9	45.7	22.2	143.1
1973:															
I...	779.4	132.2	60.5	53.7	18.0	322.2	154.7	68.3	27.5	71.7	325.0	110.6	46.5	22.8	145.1
II...	795.6	132.8	59.7	54.4	18.6	330.3	158.1	69.3	28.8	74.2	332.6	113.3	47.1	23.2	149.0
III...	816.0	132.8	59.2	55.0	18.6	341.6	164.3	70.3	29.4	77.5	341.6	115.8	48.7	23.7	153.4
IV <sup>b</sup> ...	829.0	126.8	52.1	55.8	18.9	351.1	169.0	71.2	30.2	80.6	351.2	118.4	49.7	24.2	158.9

<sup>1</sup> Includes consumer purchases of mobile homes.<sup>2</sup> Includes imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-13.—Gross private domestic investment, 1929–73

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Total gross private domestic investment	Fixed investment									Change in business inventories		
		Total	Nonresidential						Residential structures			Total	Non-farm
			Total	Structures		Producers' durable equipment		Total	Non-farm	Farm			
				Total	Non-farm	Total	Non-farm						
1929.....	16.2	14.5	10.6	5.0	4.8	5.6	4.9	4.0	3.8	0.2	1.7	1.8	
1933.....	1.4	3.0	2.4	.9	.9	1.5	1.3	.6	.5	.0	-1.6	-1.4	
1939.....	9.3	8.9	5.9	2.0	1.9	4.0	3.4	2.9	2.8	.1	.4	.3	
1940.....	13.1	11.0	7.5	2.3	2.2	5.3	4.6	3.4	3.2	.2	2.2	1.9	
1941.....	17.9	13.4	9.5	2.9	2.8	6.6	5.6	3.9	3.7	.2	4.5	4.0	
1942.....	9.8	8.1	6.0	1.9	1.8	4.1	3.5	2.1	1.9	.2	1.8	.7	
1943.....	5.7	6.4	5.0	1.3	1.2	3.7	3.2	1.4	1.2	.2	-.6	-.6	
1944.....	7.1	8.1	6.8	1.8	1.7	5.0	4.2	1.3	1.1	.1	-1.0	-.6	
1945.....	10.6	11.6	10.1	2.8	2.7	7.3	6.3	1.5	1.4	.1	-1.0	-.6	
1946.....	30.6	24.2	17.0	6.8	6.1	10.2	9.2	7.2	6.7	.5	6.4	6.4	
1947.....	34.0	34.4	23.4	7.5	6.7	15.9	14.0	11.1	10.4	.7	-.5	1.3	
1948.....	46.0	41.3	26.9	8.8	8.0	18.1	15.5	14.4	13.6	.9	4.7	3.0	
1949.....	35.7	38.8	25.1	8.5	7.7	16.6	13.7	13.7	12.8	.8	-3.1	-2.2	
1950.....	54.1	47.3	27.9	9.2	8.5	18.7	15.7	19.4	18.6	.8	6.8	6.0	
1951.....	59.3	49.0	31.8	11.2	10.4	20.7	17.7	17.2	16.4	.8	10.3	9.1	
1952.....	51.9	48.8	31.6	11.4	10.5	20.2	17.6	17.2	16.4	.8	3.1	2.1	
1953.....	52.6	52.1	34.2	12.7	11.9	21.5	18.6	18.0	17.2	.8	.4	1.1	
1954.....	51.7	53.3	33.6	13.1	12.3	20.6	18.0	19.7	19.0	.7	-1.5	-2.1	
1955.....	67.4	61.4	38.1	14.3	13.6	23.8	21.2	23.3	22.7	.6	6.0	5.5	
1956.....	70.0	65.3	43.7	17.2	16.5	26.5	24.2	21.6	20.9	.7	4.7	5.1	
1957.....	67.9	66.5	46.4	18.0	17.2	28.4	25.9	20.2	19.5	.7	1.3	.8	
1958.....	60.9	62.4	41.6	16.6	15.8	25.0	22.0	20.8	20.1	.6	-1.5	-2.3	
1959.....	75.3	70.5	45.1	16.7	15.9	28.4	25.4	25.5	24.8	.6	4.8	4.8	
1960.....	74.8	71.3	48.4	18.1	17.4	30.3	27.7	22.8	22.2	.6	3.6	3.3	
1961.....	71.7	69.7	47.0	18.4	17.7	28.6	25.8	22.6	22.0	.6	2.0	1.7	
1962.....	83.0	77.0	51.7	19.2	18.5	32.5	29.5	25.3	24.8	.6	6.0	5.3	
1963.....	87.1	81.3	54.3	19.5	18.8	34.8	31.2	27.0	26.4	.6	5.9	5.1	
1964.....	94.0	88.2	61.1	21.2	20.5	39.9	36.3	27.1	26.6	.5	5.8	6.4	
1965.....	108.1	98.5	71.3	25.5	24.9	45.8	41.6	27.2	26.7	.5	9.6	8.6	
1966.....	121.4	106.6	81.6	28.5	27.8	53.1	48.4	25.0	24.5	.5	14.8	15.0	
1967.....	116.6	108.4	83.3	28.0	27.3	55.3	50.0	25.1	24.5	.6	8.2	7.5	
1968.....	126.0	118.9	88.8	30.3	29.6	58.5	53.6	30.1	29.5	.5	7.1	6.9	
1969.....	139.0	131.1	98.5	34.2	33.5	64.3	59.2	32.6	32.0	.6	7.8	7.7	
1970.....	136.3	131.7	100.6	36.1	35.3	64.4	58.9	31.2	30.7	.5	4.5	4.3	
1971.....	153.2	147.1	104.4	37.9	37.0	66.5	60.9	42.7	42.2	.6	6.1	4.5	
1972.....	178.3	172.3	118.2	41.7	40.8	76.5	69.8	54.0	53.5	.6	6.0	5.6	
1973 p.....	201.5	194.0	136.0	48.3	47.3	87.7	79.3	58.0	57.4	.6	7.4	6.7	
Seasonally adjusted annual rates													
1971: I.....	145.5	138.5	101.4	37.0	36.2	64.4	58.6	37.1	36.6	0.5	7.0	5.8	
II.....	152.7	145.0	103.6	37.6	36.8	66.0	60.3	41.5	41.0	.5	7.6	6.3	
III.....	153.8	149.5	104.7	38.4	37.6	66.3	60.7	44.8	44.1	.7	4.3	2.4	
IV.....	160.8	155.6	108.0	38.5	37.7	69.5	64.0	47.5	46.9	.6	5.3	3.5	
1972: I.....	167.5	165.8	114.0	41.0	40.1	73.1	67.3	51.8	51.2	.6	1.7	1.4	
II.....	174.7	169.2	116.3	41.5	40.6	74.9	68.9	52.8	52.3	.6	5.5	4.8	
III.....	181.5	172.9	118.3	41.3	40.4	77.0	69.8	54.5	53.9	.6	8.7	8.4	
IV.....	189.4	181.2	124.3	43.0	42.1	81.2	73.4	56.9	56.4	.5	8.2	7.9	
1973: I.....	194.5	189.9	130.9	45.3	44.4	85.5	77.8	59.0	58.4	.6	4.6	4.4	
II.....	198.2	193.7	134.1	47.2	46.3	86.9	78.4	59.6	59.1	.5	4.5	4.4	
III.....	202.0	197.3	138.0	49.5	48.5	88.6	80.0	59.2	58.6	.6	4.7	3.2	
IV.....	211.2	195.3	141.1	51.1	50.1	90.0	80.9	54.2	53.6	.7	15.9	14.9	

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-14.—*Relation of gross national product and national income, 1929-73*

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Gross national product	Less: Capital consumption allowances	Equals: Net national product	Plus: Subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises	Less:			Equals: National income
					Indirect business tax and nontax liability	Business transfer payments	Statistical discrepancy	
1929 .....	103.1	7.9	95.2	-0.1	7.0	0.6	0.7	86.8
1933 .....	55.6	7.0	48.6	.0	7.1	.7	.6	40.3
1939 .....	90.5	7.3	83.2	.5	9.4	.5	1.3	72.6
1940 .....	99.7	7.5	92.2	.4	10.0	.4	1.0	81.1
1941 .....	124.5	8.2	116.3	.1	11.3	.5	.4	104.2
1942 .....	157.9	9.8	148.1	.2	11.8	.5	-1.1	137.1
1943 .....	191.6	10.3	181.3	.2	12.7	.5	-2.0	170.3
1944 .....	210.1	11.0	199.1	.7	14.1	.5	2.5	182.6
1945 .....	211.9	11.3	200.7	.8	15.5	.5	3.9	181.5
1946 .....	208.5	9.9	198.6	.9	17.1	.5	.1	181.9
1947 .....	231.3	12.2	219.1	-.2	18.4	.6	.9	199.0
1948 .....	257.6	14.5	243.1	-.1	20.1	.7	-2.0	224.2
1949 .....	256.5	16.6	239.9	-.1	21.3	.8	.3	217.5
1950 .....	284.8	18.3	266.4	.2	23.3	.8	1.5	241.1
1951 .....	328.4	21.2	307.2	.2	25.2	.9	3.3	278.0
1952 .....	345.5	23.2	322.3	-.1	27.6	1.0	2.2	291.4
1953 .....	364.6	25.7	338.9	-.4	29.6	1.2	3.0	304.7
1954 .....	364.8	28.2	336.6	-.2	29.4	1.1	2.7	303.1
1955 .....	398.0	31.5	366.5	-.1	32.1	1.2	2.1	331.0
1956 .....	419.2	34.1	385.2	.8	34.9	1.4	-1.1	350.8
1957 .....	441.1	37.1	404.0	.9	37.3	1.5	.0	366.1
1958 .....	447.3	38.9	408.4	.9	38.5	1.6	1.6	367.8
1959 .....	483.7	41.4	442.3	.1	41.5	1.7	-.8	400.0
1960 .....	503.7	43.4	460.3	.2	45.2	1.9	-1.0	414.5
1961 .....	520.1	45.2	474.9	1.4	47.7	2.0	-.8	427.3
1962 .....	560.3	50.0	510.4	1.4	51.5	2.1	.5	457.7
1963 .....	590.5	52.6	537.9	.8	54.7	2.3	-.3	481.9
1964 .....	632.4	56.1	576.3	1.3	58.4	2.5	-1.3	518.1
1965 .....	684.9	59.8	625.1	1.3	62.5	2.7	-3.1	564.3
1966 .....	749.9	63.9	685.9	2.3	65.7	3.0	-1.0	620.6
1967 .....	793.9	68.9	725.0	1.4	70.4	3.1	-.7	653.6
1968 .....	864.2	74.5	789.7	.7	78.6	3.4	-2.7	711.1
1969 .....	930.3	81.6	848.7	1.0	85.9	3.8	-6.1	766.0
1970 .....	977.1	87.3	889.8	1.7	93.5	4.0	-6.4	800.5
1971 .....	1,055.5	93.8	961.6	1.2	102.4	4.3	-3.4	859.4
1972 .....	1,155.2	102.4	1,052.8	1.7	109.5	4.6	-1.5	941.8
1973 <sup>a</sup> .....	1,288.2	109.6	1,178.6	.7	117.8	4.9	2.3	1,054.2
Seasonally adjusted annual rates								
1971: I .....	1,027.2	91.6	935.6	1.8	99.7	4.2	-2.3	835.9
II .....	1,046.9	92.7	954.1	1.0	101.1	4.3	-3.8	853.6
III .....	1,063.5	94.6	968.9	1.0	103.2	4.4	-3.3	865.6
IV .....	1,084.2	96.4	987.8	1.1	105.8	4.4	-4.0	882.7
1972: I .....	1,112.5	98.4	1,014.2	1.2	106.5	4.5	-6.7	911.0
II .....	1,142.4	103.6	1,038.8	1.5	108.4	4.6	-1.0	928.3
III .....	1,166.5	102.3	1,064.2	1.8	110.5	4.7	1.6	949.2
IV .....	1,199.2	105.1	1,094.1	2.2	112.8	4.7	.2	978.6
1973: I .....	1,242.5	106.9	1,135.5	.9	115.6	4.8	1.1	1,015.0
II .....	1,272.0	109.0	1,163.0	.4	117.2	4.9	3.2	1,038.2
III .....	1,304.5	110.5	1,194.0	.6	118.5	5.0	3.7	1,067.4
IV <sup>a</sup> .....	1,334.0	112.1	1,221.9	.9	120.2	5.1	-----	-----

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-15.—National income by type of income, 1929-73

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Total national income <sup>1</sup>	Compensation of employees			Business and professional income			Income of farm proprietors <sup>3</sup>	Rental income of persons	Corporate profits and inventory valuation adjustment			Net interest
		Total	Wages and salaries	Supplements to wages and salaries <sup>2</sup>	Total	Income of unincorporated enterprises	Inventory valuation adjustment			Total	Corporate profits before taxes <sup>4</sup>	Inventory valuation adjustment	
1929.....	86.8	51.1	50.4	0.7	9.0	8.8	0.1	6.2	5.4	10.5	10.0	0.5	4.7
1933.....	40.3	29.5	29.0	.5	3.3	3.9	-.5	2.6	2.0	-1.2	1.0	-2.1	4.1
1939.....	72.6	48.1	45.9	2.2	7.4	7.6	-.2	4.4	2.7	6.3	7.0	-.7	3.5
1940.....	81.1	52.1	49.8	2.3	8.6	8.6	.0	4.5	2.9	9.8	10.0	-.2	3.3
1941.....	104.2	64.8	62.1	2.7	11.1	11.7	-.6	6.4	3.5	15.2	17.7	-2.5	3.2
1942.....	137.1	85.3	82.1	3.2	14.0	14.4	-.4	9.8	4.5	20.3	21.5	-1.2	3.1
1943.....	170.3	109.5	105.8	3.8	17.0	17.1	-.2	11.7	5.1	24.4	25.1	-.8	2.7
1944.....	182.6	121.2	116.7	4.5	18.2	18.3	-.1	11.6	5.4	23.8	24.1	-.3	2.3
1945.....	181.5	123.1	117.5	5.6	19.2	19.3	-.1	12.2	5.6	19.2	19.7	-.6	2.2
1946.....	181.9	117.9	112.0	5.9	21.6	23.3	-1.7	14.9	6.6	19.3	24.6	-5.3	1.5
1947.....	199.0	128.9	123.0	5.9	20.3	21.8	-1.5	15.2	7.1	25.6	31.5	-5.9	1.9
1948.....	224.2	141.1	135.4	5.8	22.7	23.1	-.4	17.5	8.0	33.0	35.2	-2.2	1.8
1949.....	217.5	141.0	134.5	6.5	22.6	22.2	.5	12.7	8.4	30.8	28.9	1.9	1.9
1950.....	241.1	154.6	146.8	7.8	24.0	25.1	-1.1	13.5	9.4	37.7	42.6	-5.0	2.0
1951.....	278.0	180.7	171.1	9.6	26.1	26.5	-.3	15.8	10.3	42.7	43.9	-1.2	2.3
1952.....	291.4	195.3	185.1	10.2	27.1	26.9	.2	15.0	11.5	39.9	38.9	1.0	2.6
1953.....	304.7	209.1	198.3	10.9	27.5	27.6	-.2	13.0	12.7	39.6	40.6	-1.0	2.8
1954.....	303.1	208.0	196.5	11.5	27.6	27.6	.0	12.4	13.6	38.0	38.3	-.3	3.6
1955.....	331.0	224.5	211.3	13.2	30.3	30.5	-.2	11.4	13.9	46.9	48.6	-1.7	4.1
1956.....	350.8	243.1	227.8	15.2	31.3	31.8	-.5	11.4	14.3	46.1	48.8	-2.7	4.6
1957.....	366.1	256.0	238.7	17.3	32.8	33.1	-.3	11.3	14.8	45.6	47.2	-1.5	5.6
1958.....	367.8	257.8	239.9	17.9	33.2	33.2	-.1	13.4	15.4	41.1	41.4	-.3	6.8
1959.....	400.0	279.1	258.2	20.9	35.1	35.3	-.1	11.4	15.6	51.7	52.1	-.5	7.1
1960.....	414.5	294.2	270.8	23.4	34.2	34.3	.0	12.0	15.8	49.9	49.7	.2	8.4
1961.....	427.3	302.6	278.1	24.6	35.6	35.6	.0	12.8	16.0	50.3	50.3	-.1	10.0
1962.....	457.7	323.6	296.1	27.5	37.1	37.1	.0	13.0	16.7	55.7	55.4	.3	11.6
1963.....	481.9	341.0	311.1	29.9	37.9	37.9	.0	13.1	17.1	58.9	59.4	-.5	13.8
1964.....	518.1	365.7	333.7	32.0	40.2	40.3	-.1	12.1	18.0	66.3	66.8	-.5	15.8
1965.....	564.3	393.8	358.9	35.0	42.4	42.8	-.4	14.8	19.0	76.1	77.8	-1.7	18.2
1966.....	620.6	435.5	394.5	41.0	45.2	45.6	-.4	16.1	20.0	82.4	84.2	-1.8	21.4
1967.....	653.6	467.2	423.1	44.2	47.3	47.6	-.3	14.8	21.1	78.7	79.8	-1.1	24.4
1968.....	711.1	514.6	464.9	49.7	49.5	50.3	-.7	14.7	21.2	84.3	87.6	-3.3	26.9
1969.....	766.0	566.0	509.7	56.3	50.5	51.2	-.8	16.7	22.6	79.8	84.9	-5.1	30.5
1970.....	800.5	603.9	542.0	61.9	50.0	50.7	-.7	16.9	23.9	69.2	74.0	-4.8	36.5
1971.....	859.4	644.1	573.8	70.3	51.9	52.6	-.7	16.8	24.5	80.1	85.1	-4.9	42.0
1972.....	941.8	707.1	627.3	79.7	54.0	55.1	-1.1	20.2	24.1	91.1	98.0	-6.9	45.2
1973 p.....	1,054.2	785.3	691.5	93.9	57.5	60.0	-2.5	26.8	25.1	109.2	126.5	-17.3	50.4
Seasonally adjusted annual rates													
1971: I.....	835.9	627.6	559.6	67.7	50.9	51.7	-----	16.9	24.4	75.8	80.8	-5.0	40.2
II.....	853.6	638.8	569.3	69.6	51.7	52.3	-----	16.6	24.7	80.5	85.5	-5.0	41.4
III.....	865.6	648.8	577.6	71.1	52.3	53.3	-----	16.3	24.7	80.9	87.0	-6.1	42.7
IV.....	882.7	661.2	588.6	72.6	52.7	53.3	-----	17.5	24.4	83.4	86.9	-3.6	43.5
1972: I.....	911.0	684.3	607.3	77.0	53.1	53.1	-----	19.5	24.1	86.2	92.8	-6.6	43.9
II.....	928.3	699.6	620.8	78.9	53.3	53.3	-----	19.9	22.6	88.0	94.8	-6.7	44.8
III.....	949.2	713.1	632.5	80.5	54.3	54.3	-----	19.8	24.9	91.5	98.4	-6.9	45.7
IV.....	978.6	731.2	648.7	82.5	55.3	55.3	-----	21.8	24.9	98.8	106.1	-7.3	46.6
1973: I.....	1,015.0	757.4	666.7	90.8	56.3	56.3	-----	24.3	24.7	104.3	119.6	-15.4	47.9
II.....	1,038.2	774.9	682.3	92.6	57.1	57.1	-----	24.4	24.6	107.9	128.9	-21.1	49.4
III.....	1,067.4	794.0	699.3	94.7	57.9	57.9	-----	27.1	25.3	112.0	129.0	-17.0	51.1
IV p.....	815.0	717.6	617.5	97.5	58.7	58.7	-----	31.3	25.7	-----	-----	-15.6	53.0

<sup>1</sup> National income is the total net income earned in production. It differs from gross national product mainly in that it excludes depreciation charges and other allowances for business and institutional consumption of durable capital goods, and indirect business taxes. See Table C-14.

<sup>2</sup> Employer contributions for social insurance and to private pension, health, and welfare funds; compensation for injuries; directors' fees; pay of the military reserve; and a few other minor items.

<sup>3</sup> Includes change in inventories.

<sup>4</sup> See Table C-74 for corporate tax liability and profits after taxes.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.



TABLE C-16.—*Relation of national income and personal income, 1929-73*

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	National income	Less:			Plus:				Equals: Personal income
		Corporate profits and inventory valuation adjustment	Contributions for social insurance	Wage accruals less disbursements	Government transfer payments to persons	Interest paid by government (net) and by consumers	Dividends	Business transfer payments	
1929.....	86.8	10.5	0.2	0.0	0.9	2.5	5.8	0.6	85.9
1933.....	40.3	-1.2	.3	.0	1.5	1.6	2.0	.7	47.0
1939.....	72.6	6.3	2.1	.0	2.5	1.9	3.8	.5	72.8
1940.....	81.1	9.8	2.3	.0	2.7	2.1	4.0	.4	78.3
1941.....	104.2	15.2	2.8	.0	2.6	2.2	4.4	.5	96.0
1942.....	137.1	20.3	3.5	.0	2.6	2.2	4.3	.5	122.9
1943.....	170.3	24.4	4.5	.2	2.5	2.6	4.4	.5	151.3
1944.....	182.6	23.8	5.2	-.2	3.1	3.3	4.6	.5	165.3
1945.....	181.5	19.2	6.1	.0	5.6	4.2	4.6	.5	171.1
1946.....	181.9	19.3	6.0	.0	10.8	5.2	5.6	.5	178.7
1947.....	199.0	25.6	5.7	.0	11.1	5.5	6.3	.6	191.3
1948.....	224.2	33.0	5.2	.0	10.5	6.1	7.0	.7	210.2
1949.....	217.5	30.8	5.7	.0	11.6	6.5	7.2	.8	207.2
1950.....	241.1	37.7	6.9	.0	14.3	7.2	8.8	.8	227.6
1951.....	278.0	42.7	8.2	.1	11.5	7.6	8.6	.9	255.6
1952.....	291.4	39.9	8.7	.0	12.0	8.1	8.6	1.0	272.5
1953.....	304.7	39.6	8.8	-.1	12.8	9.0	8.9	1.2	288.2
1954.....	303.1	38.0	9.8	.0	14.9	9.5	9.3	1.1	290.1
1955.....	331.0	46.9	11.1	.0	16.1	10.1	10.5	1.2	310.9
1956.....	350.8	46.1	12.6	.0	17.1	11.2	11.3	1.4	333.0
1957.....	366.1	45.6	14.5	.0	19.9	12.0	11.7	1.5	351.1
1958.....	367.8	41.1	14.8	.0	24.1	12.1	11.6	1.6	361.2
1959.....	400.0	51.7	17.6	.0	24.9	13.6	12.6	1.7	383.5
1960.....	414.5	49.9	20.7	.0	26.6	15.1	13.4	1.9	401.0
1961.....	427.3	50.3	21.4	.0	30.4	15.0	13.8	2.0	416.8
1962.....	457.7	55.7	24.0	.0	31.2	16.1	15.2	2.1	442.6
1963.....	481.9	58.9	26.9	.0	33.0	17.6	16.5	2.3	465.5
1964.....	518.1	66.3	27.9	.0	34.2	19.1	17.8	2.5	497.5
1965.....	564.3	76.1	29.6	.0	37.2	20.5	19.8	2.7	538.9
1966.....	620.6	82.4	38.0	.0	41.1	22.2	20.8	3.0	587.2
1967.....	653.6	78.7	42.4	.0	48.7	23.6	21.4	3.1	629.3
1968.....	711.1	84.3	47.1	.0	56.1	26.1	23.6	3.4	688.9
1969.....	766.0	79.8	54.2	.0	61.9	28.7	24.3	3.8	750.9
1970.....	800.5	69.2	57.7	.0	75.1	31.0	24.7	4.0	808.3
1971.....	859.4	80.1	64.6	.6	88.9	31.0	25.1	4.3	863.5
1972.....	941.8	91.1	73.7	-.5	98.3	32.7	26.0	4.6	939.2
1973.....	1,054.2	109.2	92.1	-.1	112.5	37.1	27.8	4.9	1,035.5
Seasonally adjusted annual rates									
1971: I.....	835.9	75.8	63.3	0.0	82.6	31.1	25.3	4.2	840.0
II.....	853.6	80.5	64.1	.2	90.3	30.8	25.1	4.3	859.5
III.....	865.6	80.9	65.0	.6	90.6	31.0	25.2	4.4	870.2
IV.....	882.7	83.4	66.0	1.5	92.1	31.2	24.9	4.4	884.4
1972: I.....	911.0	86.2	71.7	-1.4	94.3	31.6	25.7	4.5	910.8
II.....	928.3	88.0	72.9	-.4	95.3	32.6	25.9	4.6	926.1
III.....	949.2	91.5	74.5	-.2	96.4	32.9	26.2	4.7	943.7
IV.....	978.6	98.8	75.8	.0	107.3	33.7	26.4	4.7	976.1
1973: I.....	1,015.0	104.3	89.3	.0	108.8	34.7	26.9	4.8	996.6
II.....	1,038.2	107.9	90.9	-.3	110.8	36.1	27.3	4.9	1,019.0
III.....	1,067.4	112.0	93.0	.0	113.7	38.0	28.1	5.0	1,047.1
IV.....			95.0	.0	116.8	39.6	29.0	5.1	1,079.2

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-17.—Disposition of personal income, 1929-73

Year or quarter	Personal income	Less: Personal tax and nontax payments	Equals: Disposable personal income	Less: Personal outlays				Equals: Personal saving	Percent of disposable personal income		
				Total	Personal consumption expenditures	Interest paid by consumers	Personal transfer payments to foreigners		Personal outlays		Personal saving
									Total	Consumption expenditures	
Billions of dollars									Percent		
1929.....	85.9	2.6	83.3	79.1	77.2	1.5	0.3	4.2	95.0	92.7	5.0
1933.....	47.0	1.5	45.5	46.5	45.8	.5	.2	-.9	102.0	100.6	-2.0
1939.....	72.8	2.4	70.3	67.7	66.8	.7	.2	2.6	96.3	95.0	3.7
1940.....	78.3	2.6	75.7	71.8	70.8	.8	.2	3.8	94.9	93.6	5.1
1941.....	96.0	3.3	92.7	81.7	80.6	.9	.2	11.0	88.2	86.9	11.8
1942.....	122.9	6.0	116.9	89.3	88.5	.7	.1	27.6	76.4	75.7	23.6
1943.....	151.3	17.8	133.5	100.1	99.3	.5	.2	33.4	75.0	74.4	25.0
1944.....	165.3	18.9	146.3	109.1	108.3	.5	.4	37.3	74.5	74.0	25.5
1945.....	171.1	20.9	150.2	120.7	119.7	.5	.5	29.6	80.3	79.7	19.7
1946.....	178.7	18.7	160.0	144.8	143.4	.8	.7	15.2	90.5	89.6	9.5
1947.....	191.3	21.4	169.8	162.5	160.7	1.1	.7	7.3	95.7	94.6	4.3
1948.....	210.2	21.1	189.1	175.8	173.6	1.5	.7	13.4	92.9	91.8	7.1
1949.....	207.2	18.6	188.6	179.2	176.8	1.9	.5	9.4	95.0	93.8	5.0
1950.....	227.6	20.7	206.9	193.9	191.0	2.4	.5	13.1	93.7	92.3	6.3
1951.....	255.6	29.0	226.6	209.3	206.3	2.7	.4	17.3	92.4	91.0	7.6
1952.....	272.5	34.1	238.3	220.2	216.7	3.0	.4	18.1	92.4	90.9	7.6
1953.....	288.2	35.6	252.6	234.3	230.0	3.8	.5	18.3	92.8	91.1	7.2
1954.....	290.1	32.7	257.4	241.0	236.5	4.0	.5	16.4	93.6	91.9	6.4
1955.....	310.9	35.5	275.3	259.5	254.4	4.7	.5	15.8	94.3	92.4	5.7
1956.....	333.0	39.8	293.2	272.6	266.7	5.4	.6	20.6	93.0	91.0	7.0
1957.....	351.1	42.6	308.5	287.8	281.4	5.8	.6	20.7	93.3	91.2	6.7
1958.....	361.2	42.3	318.8	296.6	290.1	5.9	.6	22.3	93.0	91.0	7.0
1959.....	383.5	46.2	337.3	318.3	311.2	6.5	.6	19.1	94.4	92.3	5.6
1960.....	401.0	50.9	350.0	333.0	325.2	7.3	.5	17.0	95.1	92.9	4.9
1961.....	416.8	52.4	364.4	343.3	335.2	7.6	.5	21.2	94.2	92.0	5.8
1962.....	442.6	57.4	385.3	363.7	355.1	8.1	.5	21.6	94.4	92.2	5.6
1963.....	465.5	60.9	404.6	384.7	375.0	9.1	.6	19.9	95.1	92.7	4.9
1964.....	497.5	59.4	438.1	411.9	401.2	10.1	.6	26.2	94.0	91.6	6.0
1965.....	538.9	65.7	473.2	444.8	432.8	11.3	.7	28.4	94.0	91.5	6.0
1966.....	587.2	75.4	511.9	479.3	466.3	12.4	.6	32.5	93.6	91.1	6.4
1967.....	629.3	83.0	546.3	506.0	492.1	13.2	.7	40.4	92.6	90.1	7.4
1968.....	688.9	97.9	591.0	551.2	536.2	14.3	.8	39.8	93.3	90.7	6.7
1969.....	750.9	116.5	634.4	596.2	579.5	15.8	.9	38.2	94.0	91.3	6.0
1970.....	808.3	116.6	691.7	635.5	617.6	16.8	1.0	56.2	91.9	89.3	8.1
1971.....	863.5	117.5	746.0	685.8	667.2	17.7	1.0	60.2	91.9	89.4	8.1
1972.....	939.2	142.2	797.0	747.2	726.5	19.7	1.0	49.7	93.8	91.2	6.2
1973 p.....	1,035.5	152.9	882.6	828.7	805.0	22.5	1.2	53.8	93.9	91.2	6.1
Seasonally adjusted annual rates									Seasonally adjusted		
1971: I.....	840.0	112.6	727.4	668.3	650.0	17.3	1.0	59.2	91.9	89.4	8.1
II.....	859.5	115.5	744.0	680.6	662.2	17.4	.9	63.5	91.5	89.0	8.5
III.....	870.2	118.1	752.0	691.8	673.0	17.7	1.1	60.2	92.0	89.5	8.0
IV.....	884.4	124.0	760.4	702.6	683.4	18.2	1.1	57.8	92.4	89.9	7.6
1972: I.....	910.8	138.0	772.8	720.0	700.2	18.8	1.0	52.9	93.2	90.6	6.8
II.....	926.1	140.7	785.4	739.5	719.2	19.4	.9	45.9	94.2	91.6	5.8
III.....	943.7	142.8	800.9	755.1	734.1	20.0	1.0	45.8	94.3	91.7	5.7
IV.....	976.1	147.4	828.7	774.3	752.6	20.7	1.1	54.4	93.4	90.8	6.6
1973: I.....	996.6	145.1	851.5	801.5	779.4	21.2	.9	50.0	94.1	91.5	5.9
II.....	1,019.0	149.3	869.7	818.7	795.6	22.0	1.0	51.0	94.1	91.5	5.9
III.....	1,047.1	156.0	891.1	840.1	816.0	23.0	1.1	51.1	94.3	91.6	5.7
IV p.....	1,079.2	161.2	918.0	854.6	829.0	23.8	1.8	63.3	93.1	90.3	6.9

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-18.—Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures in current and 1958 dollars, 1929-73

Year or quarter	Disposable personal income				Personal consumption expenditures				Population (thousands) <sup>1</sup>
	Total (billions of dollars)		Per capita (dollars)		Total (billions of dollars)		Per capita (dollars)		
	Current dollars	1958 dollars	Current dollars	1958 dollars	Current dollars	1958 dollars	Current dollars	1958 dollars	
1929.....	83.3	150.6	683	1,236	77.2	139.6	634	1,145	121,875
1933.....	45.5	112.2	362	893	45.8	112.8	364	897	125,690
1939.....	70.3	155.9	537	1,190	66.8	148.2	510	1,131	131,028
1940.....	75.7	166.3	573	1,259	70.8	155.7	536	1,178	132,122
1941.....	92.7	190.3	695	1,427	80.6	165.4	604	1,240	133,402
1942.....	116.9	213.4	867	1,582	88.5	161.4	656	1,197	134,860
1943.....	133.5	222.8	976	1,629	99.3	165.8	726	1,213	136,739
1944.....	146.3	231.6	1,057	1,673	108.3	171.4	782	1,238	138,397
1945.....	150.2	229.7	1,074	1,642	119.7	183.0	855	1,308	139,928
1946.....	160.0	227.0	1,132	1,606	143.4	203.5	1,014	1,439	141,389
1947.....	169.8	218.0	1,178	1,513	160.7	206.3	1,115	1,431	144,126
1948.....	189.1	229.8	1,290	1,567	173.6	210.8	1,184	1,438	146,631
1949.....	188.6	230.8	1,264	1,547	176.8	216.5	1,185	1,451	149,188
1950.....	206.9	249.6	1,364	1,646	191.0	230.5	1,259	1,520	151,684
1951.....	226.6	255.7	1,469	1,657	206.3	232.8	1,337	1,509	154,287
1952.....	238.3	263.3	1,518	1,678	216.7	239.4	1,381	1,525	156,954
1953.....	252.6	275.4	1,583	1,726	230.0	250.8	1,441	1,572	159,565
1954.....	257.4	278.3	1,585	1,714	236.5	255.7	1,456	1,575	162,391
1955.....	275.3	296.7	1,666	1,795	254.4	274.2	1,539	1,659	165,275
1956.....	293.2	309.3	1,743	1,839	266.7	281.4	1,585	1,673	168,221
1957.....	308.5	315.8	1,801	1,844	281.4	288.2	1,643	1,683	171,274
1958.....	318.8	318.8	1,831	1,831	290.1	290.1	1,666	1,666	174,141
1959.....	337.3	333.0	1,905	1,881	311.2	307.3	1,758	1,735	177,073
1960.....	350.0	340.2	1,937	1,883	325.2	316.1	1,800	1,749	180,671
1961.....	364.4	350.7	1,984	1,909	335.2	322.5	1,825	1,756	183,691
1962.....	385.3	367.3	2,065	1,969	355.1	338.4	1,903	1,814	186,538
1963.....	404.6	381.3	2,138	2,015	375.0	353.3	1,981	1,867	189,242
1964.....	438.1	407.9	2,283	2,126	401.2	373.7	2,091	1,948	191,889
1965.....	473.2	435.0	2,436	2,239	432.8	397.7	2,228	2,047	194,303
1966.....	511.9	458.9	2,604	2,335	466.3	418.1	2,372	2,127	196,560
1967.....	546.3	477.5	2,749	2,403	492.1	430.1	2,476	2,164	198,712
1968.....	591.0	499.0	2,945	2,486	536.2	452.7	2,671	2,256	200,706
1969.....	634.4	513.6	3,130	2,534	579.5	469.1	2,859	2,315	202,677
1970.....	691.7	534.8	3,376	2,610	617.6	477.5	3,015	2,331	204,879
1971.....	746.0	554.9	3,603	2,680	667.2	496.3	3,222	2,397	207,045
1972.....	797.0	577.9	3,816	2,767	726.5	526.8	3,479	2,523	208,842
1973 <sup>a</sup> .....	882.6	608.1	4,195	2,890	805.0	554.7	3,826	2,636	210,404
Seasonally adjusted annual rates									
1971: I.....	727.4	547.8	3,526	2,655	650.0	489.5	3,151	2,373	206,306
II.....	744.0	554.6	3,598	2,682	662.2	493.6	3,202	2,387	206,795
III.....	752.0	556.4	3,628	2,684	673.0	498.0	3,246	2,402	207,313
IV.....	760.4	560.9	3,658	2,698	683.4	504.1	3,288	2,425	207,862
1972: I.....	772.8	565.7	3,711	2,716	700.2	512.5	3,362	2,461	208,259
II.....	785.4	571.6	3,765	2,740	719.2	523.4	3,447	2,509	208,634
III.....	800.9	579.3	3,831	2,771	734.1	531.0	3,511	2,540	209,058
IV.....	828.7	595.1	3,955	2,841	752.6	540.5	3,592	2,580	209,514
1973: I.....	851.5	603.9	4,057	2,878	779.4	552.7	3,714	2,634	209,871
II.....	869.7	604.8	4,137	2,877	795.6	553.3	3,785	2,632	210,221
III.....	891.1	603.5	4,231	2,894	816.0	558.1	3,874	2,650	210,618
IV.....	918.0	613.9	4,350	2,909	829.0	554.5	3,928	2,627	211,036

<sup>1</sup> Population of the United States including Armed Forces overseas; includes Alaska and Hawaii beginning 1960. Annual data are for July 1; quarterly data are for middle of period, interpolated from monthly data.

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census).

TABLE C-19.—*Sources of personal income, 1929-73*

(Billions of dollars)

Year or quarter	Total personal income	Wage and salary disbursements <sup>1</sup>						Other labor income <sup>1</sup>	Proprietors' income	
		Total	Commodity-producing industries		Distributive industries	Service industries	Government		Business and professional	Farm <sup>1</sup>
			Total	Manufacturing						
1929.....	85.9	50.4	21.5	16.1	15.6	8.4	4.9	0.6	9.0	6.2
1933.....	47.0	29.0	9.8	7.8	8.8	5.2	5.1	.4	3.3	2.6
1939.....	72.8	45.9	17.4	13.6	13.3	7.1	8.2	.6	7.4	4.4
1940.....	78.3	49.8	19.7	15.6	14.2	7.5	8.4	.7	8.6	4.5
1941.....	96.0	62.1	27.5	21.7	16.3	8.1	10.2	.7	11.1	6.4
1942.....	122.9	82.1	39.1	30.9	18.0	9.0	16.0	.9	14.0	9.8
1943.....	151.3	105.6	48.9	40.9	20.1	9.9	26.6	1.1	17.0	11.7
1944.....	165.3	116.9	50.3	42.9	22.7	10.9	33.0	1.5	18.2	11.6
1945.....	171.1	117.5	45.8	38.2	24.8	12.0	34.9	1.8	19.2	12.2
1946.....	178.7	112.0	46.0	36.5	31.0	14.4	20.7	1.9	21.6	14.9
1947.....	191.3	123.0	54.3	42.5	35.2	16.1	17.4	2.3	20.3	15.2
1948.....	210.2	135.3	61.0	47.2	37.6	17.9	18.9	2.7	22.7	17.5
1949.....	207.2	134.6	57.7	44.7	37.7	18.6	20.6	3.0	22.6	12.7
1950.....	227.6	146.7	64.6	50.3	39.9	19.9	22.4	3.8	24.0	13.5
1951.....	255.6	171.0	76.1	59.4	44.3	21.7	28.9	4.8	26.1	15.8
1952.....	272.5	185.1	81.8	64.2	46.9	23.3	33.1	5.3	27.1	15.0
1953.....	288.2	198.3	89.4	71.2	49.8	25.1	34.1	6.0	27.5	13.0
1954.....	290.1	196.5	85.4	67.6	50.2	26.4	34.6	6.3	27.6	12.4
1955.....	310.9	211.3	92.8	73.9	53.4	28.9	36.2	7.3	30.3	11.4
1956.....	333.0	227.8	100.2	79.5	57.7	31.6	38.3	8.4	31.3	11.4
1957.....	351.1	238.7	103.8	82.5	60.5	33.9	40.4	9.5	32.8	11.3
1958.....	361.2	239.9	99.7	78.7	60.8	35.9	43.5	9.9	33.2	13.4
1959.....	383.5	258.2	109.1	86.9	64.8	38.7	45.6	11.3	35.1	11.4
1960.....	401.0	270.8	112.5	89.7	68.1	41.5	48.7	12.0	34.2	12.0
1961.....	416.8	278.1	112.8	89.8	69.1	44.0	52.2	12.7	35.6	12.8
1962.....	442.6	296.1	120.8	96.7	72.5	46.8	56.0	13.9	37.1	13.0
1963.....	465.5	311.1	125.7	100.6	76.0	49.9	59.5	14.9	37.9	13.1
1964.....	497.5	333.7	134.1	107.2	81.2	54.1	64.3	16.6	40.2	12.1
1965.....	538.9	358.9	144.5	115.6	86.9	58.3	69.3	18.7	42.4	14.8
1966.....	587.2	394.5	159.3	128.1	93.8	63.7	77.7	20.7	45.2	16.1
1967.....	629.3	423.1	166.5	134.2	100.3	70.5	85.8	22.3	47.3	14.8
1968.....	688.9	464.9	181.5	145.9	109.2	78.5	95.7	25.4	49.5	14.7
1969.....	750.9	509.7	197.5	157.6	120.0	88.1	104.1	28.4	50.5	16.7
1970.....	808.3	542.0	200.9	158.3	129.3	96.6	115.1	32.2	50.0	16.9
1971.....	863.5	573.3	206.3	160.5	138.3	104.7	123.9	36.6	51.9	16.8
1972.....	939.2	627.8	226.0	175.9	151.5	116.1	134.2	40.7	54.0	20.2
1973 <sup>a</sup> .....	1,035.5	691.5	252.0	196.8	165.1	129.0	145.4	44.9	57.5	26.8
Seasonally adjusted annual rates										
1971: I.....	840.0	559.8	202.5	158.5	134.7	101.3	121.4	34.8	50.9	16.9
II.....	859.5	569.1	205.3	159.9	137.2	103.6	123.0	36.1	51.7	16.6
III.....	870.2	577.0	207.0	160.6	139.2	105.9	125.0	37.2	52.3	16.3
IV.....	884.4	587.1	210.5	163.1	142.3	108.0	126.3	38.1	52.7	17.5
1972: I.....	910.8	608.8	218.2	168.9	147.5	111.6	131.6	39.1	53.1	19.5
II.....	926.1	621.1	223.7	174.0	150.0	114.9	132.6	40.2	53.3	19.9
III.....	943.7	632.7	227.3	177.0	152.5	117.9	135.0	41.3	54.3	19.8
IV.....	976.1	648.7	234.8	183.7	156.0	120.1	137.8	42.3	55.3	21.8
1973: I.....	996.6	666.7	241.6	189.1	159.5	123.9	141.6	43.3	56.3	24.3
II.....	1,019.0	682.6	248.6	194.8	163.3	126.9	143.7	44.2	57.1	24.4
III.....	1,047.1	699.3	255.3	199.1	167.0	130.9	146.1	45.3	57.9	27.1
IV <sup>a</sup> .....	1,079.2	717.6	262.3	204.3	170.7	134.2	150.3	46.7	58.7	31.3

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-19.—*Sources of personal income, 1929-73—Continued*

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Rental income of persons	Dividends	Personal interest income	Transfer payments					Less: Personal contributions for social insurance	Non-agricultural personal income <sup>1</sup>
				Total	Old age, survivors, disability, and health insurance benefits	State unemployment insurance benefits	Veterans benefits	Other		
1929 .....	5.4	5.8	7.2	1.5			0.6	0.9	0.1	77.6
1933 .....	2.0	2.0	5.7	2.1			.5	1.6	.2	43.2
1939 .....	2.7	3.8	5.5	3.0	0.0	0.4	.5	2.0	.6	66.9
1940 .....	2.9	4.0	5.4	3.1	.0	.5	.5	2.0	.7	72.3
1941 .....	3.5	4.4	5.5	3.1	.1	.3	.5	2.2	.8	87.8
1942 .....	4.5	4.3	5.3	3.1	.1	.3	.5	2.2	1.2	111.0
1943 .....	5.1	4.4	5.3	3.0	.2	.1	.5	2.2	1.8	137.3
1944 .....	5.4	4.6	5.6	3.6	.2	.1	.9	2.4	2.2	151.2
1945 .....	5.6	4.6	6.3	6.2	.3	.4	2.8	2.7	2.3	156.4
1946 .....	6.6	5.6	6.8	11.3	.4	1.1	6.7	3.1	2.0	161.0
1947 .....	7.1	6.3	7.5	11.7	.5	.8	6.7	3.7	2.1	173.0
1948 .....	8.0	7.0	7.9	11.2	.6	.8	5.8	4.1	2.2	189.4
1949 .....	8.4	7.2	8.5	12.4	.7	1.7	5.1	4.9	2.2	191.3
1950 .....	9.4	8.8	9.2	15.1	1.0	1.4	4.9	7.9	2.9	210.9
1951 .....	10.3	8.6	9.9	12.5	1.9	.8	3.9	5.9	3.4	236.4
1952 .....	11.5	8.6	10.6	13.0	2.2	1.0	3.9	6.0	3.8	254.1
1953 .....	12.7	8.9	11.8	14.0	3.0	1.0	3.7	6.3	4.0	271.9
1954 .....	13.6	9.3	13.1	16.0	3.6	2.0	3.9	6.5	4.6	274.7
1955 .....	13.9	10.5	14.2	17.3	4.9	1.4	4.3	6.8	5.2	296.4
1956 .....	14.3	11.3	15.7	18.5	5.7	1.4	4.3	7.2	5.8	318.5
1957 .....	14.8	11.7	17.6	21.4	7.3	1.8	4.4	7.9	6.7	336.6
1958 .....	15.4	11.6	18.9	25.7	8.5	3.9	4.6	8.7	6.9	344.3
1959 .....	15.6	12.6	20.7	26.6	10.2	2.5	4.6	9.4	7.9	368.5
1960 .....	15.8	13.4	23.4	28.5	11.1	2.8	4.6	10.0	9.3	385.2
1961 .....	16.0	13.8	25.0	32.4	12.6	4.0	4.8	10.9	9.6	400.0
1962 .....	16.7	15.2	27.7	33.3	14.3	2.9	4.8	11.2	10.3	425.5
1963 .....	17.1	16.5	31.4	35.3	15.2	2.8	5.0	12.2	11.8	448.1
1964 .....	18.0	17.8	34.9	36.7	16.0	2.6	5.3	12.9	12.5	480.9
1965 .....	19.0	19.8	38.7	39.9	18.1	2.2	5.6	14.0	13.4	519.5
1966 .....	20.0	20.8	43.6	44.1	20.8	1.8	5.7	15.7	17.7	566.3
1967 .....	21.1	21.4	48.0	51.8	25.7	2.1	6.6	17.5	20.5	609.4
1968 .....	21.2	23.6	52.9	59.6	30.3	2.1	7.3	20.0	22.8	668.8
1969 .....	22.6	24.3	59.3	65.8	33.0	2.1	8.3	22.4	26.3	728.3
1970 .....	23.9	24.7	67.5	79.1	38.5	3.9	9.7	27.1	28.0	784.9
1971 .....	24.5	25.1	73.0	93.2	44.5	5.7	11.2	31.8	30.9	839.8
1972 .....	24.1	26.0	78.0	103.0	49.6	5.5	12.7	35.1	34.7	911.5
1973 <sup>2</sup> .....	25.1	27.8	87.5	117.5	60.9	4.2	13.6	38.8	43.1	1,000.6
Seasonally adjusted annual rates										
1971: I .....	24.4	25.3	71.4	86.7	40.3	5.2	10.8	30.5	30.3	816.0
II .....	24.7	25.1	72.2	94.6	46.6	5.7	11.1	31.3	30.7	836.1
III .....	24.7	25.2	73.7	94.9	45.1	5.9	11.4	32.6	31.1	847.0
IV .....	24.4	24.9	74.7	96.5	45.9	5.9	11.7	33.1	31.5	859.8
1972: I .....	24.1	25.7	75.5	98.8	46.6	5.8	12.0	34.4	33.8	883.9
II .....	22.6	25.9	77.4	99.9	47.3	6.3	12.1	34.1	34.3	898.8
III .....	24.9	26.2	78.6	101.1	48.0	5.3	12.6	35.2	35.2	916.5
IV .....	24.9	26.4	80.3	112.0	56.4	4.7	14.1	36.8	35.7	946.7
1973: I .....	24.7	26.9	82.7	113.6	58.3	4.1	13.3	37.8	41.9	964.5
II .....	24.6	27.3	85.6	115.7	60.0	4.1	13.4	38.2	42.6	986.7
III .....	25.3	28.1	89.1	118.7	61.8	4.1	13.8	39.0	43.6	1,011.9
IV <sup>3</sup> .....	25.7	29.0	92.6	121.9	63.4	4.4	13.9	40.2	44.2	1,039.0

<sup>1</sup> The total of wage and salary disbursements and other labor income differs from compensation of employees in Table C-15 in that it excludes employer contributions for social insurance and the excess of wage accruals over wage disbursements.

<sup>2</sup> Includes change in inventories.

<sup>3</sup> Nonagricultural income is personal income exclusive of net income of unincorporated farm enterprises, farm wages, agricultural net interest, and net dividends paid by agricultural corporations.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-20.—Sources and uses of gross saving, 1929-73

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Gross private saving and government surplus or deficit, national income and product accounts							Capital grants received by the United States <sup>1</sup>	Gross investment			Statistical discrepancy
	Total	Private saving			Government surplus or deficit (—)				Total	Gross private domestic investment	Net foreign investment <sup>2</sup>	
		Total	Personal saving	Gross business saving	Total	Federal	State and local					
1929.....	16.3	15.3	4.2	11.2	1.0	1.2	-0.2	-----	17.0	16.2	0.8	0.7
1933.....	.9	2.3	- .9	3.2	-1.4	-1.3	- .1	-----	1.6	1.4	.2	.6
1939.....	8.8	11.0	2.6	8.4	-2.2	-2.2	(*)	-----	10.2	9.3	.9	1.3
1940.....	13.6	14.3	3.8	10.5	- .7	-1.3	.6	-----	14.6	13.1	1.5	1.0
1941.....	18.6	22.4	11.0	11.4	-3.8	-5.1	1.3	-----	19.0	17.9	1.1	.4
1942.....	10.7	42.0	27.6	14.5	-31.4	-33.1	1.8	-----	9.6	9.8	- .2	-1.1
1943.....	5.5	49.7	33.4	16.3	-44.1	-46.6	2.5	-----	3.5	5.7	-2.2	-2.0
1944.....	2.5	54.3	37.3	17.1	-51.8	-54.5	2.7	-----	5.0	7.1	-2.1	2.5
1945.....	5.2	44.7	29.6	15.1	-39.5	-42.1	2.6	-----	9.1	10.6	-1.4	3.9
1946.....	35.1	29.7	15.2	14.5	5.4	3.5	1.9	-----	35.2	30.6	4.6	.1
1947.....	42.0	27.5	7.3	20.2	14.4	13.4	1.0	-----	42.9	34.0	8.9	.9
1948.....	49.9	41.4	13.4	28.0	8.5	8.4	.1	-----	47.9	46.0	1.9	-2.0
1949.....	35.9	39.0	9.4	29.7	-3.2	-2.4	- .7	-----	36.2	35.7	.5	.3
1950.....	50.4	42.5	13.1	29.4	7.9	9.1	-1.2	-----	51.8	54.1	-2.2	1.5
1951.....	56.1	50.3	17.3	33.1	5.8	6.2	- .4	-----	59.5	59.3	.2	3.3
1952.....	49.5	53.3	18.1	35.1	-3.8	-3.8	(*)	-----	51.6	51.9	- .3	2.2
1953.....	47.5	54.4	18.3	36.1	-6.9	-7.0	.1	-----	50.5	52.6	-2.1	3.0
1954.....	48.5	55.6	16.4	39.2	-7.0	-5.9	-1.1	-----	51.3	51.7	- .5	2.7
1955.....	64.8	62.1	15.8	46.3	2.7	4.0	-1.3	-----	66.9	67.4	- .5	2.1
1956.....	72.7	67.8	20.6	47.3	4.9	5.7	- .9	-----	71.6	70.0	1.5	-1.1
1957.....	71.2	70.5	20.7	49.8	.7	2.1	-1.4	-----	71.2	67.9	3.4	.0
1958.....	59.2	71.7	22.3	49.4	-12.5	-10.2	-2.3	-----	60.7	60.9	- .2	1.6
1959.....	73.8	75.9	19.1	56.8	-2.1	-1.2	- .8	-----	73.0	75.3	-2.3	- .8
1960.....	77.5	73.9	17.0	56.8	3.7	3.5	.2	-----	76.5	74.8	1.7	-1.0
1961.....	75.5	79.8	21.2	58.7	-4.3	-3.8	- .5	-----	74.7	71.7	3.0	- .8
1962.....	85.0	87.9	21.6	66.3	-2.9	-3.8	.9	-----	85.5	83.0	2.5	- .5
1963.....	90.5	88.7	19.9	68.8	1.8	.7	1.2	-----	90.3	87.1	3.1	- .3
1964.....	101.0	102.4	26.2	76.2	-1.4	-3.0	1.7	-----	99.7	94.0	5.7	-1.3
1965.....	115.3	113.1	28.4	84.7	2.2	1.2	1.0	-----	112.2	108.1	4.1	-3.1
1966.....	124.9	123.8	32.5	91.3	1.1	- .2	1.3	-----	123.9	121.4	2.4	-1.0
1967.....	119.5	133.4	40.4	93.0	-13.9	-12.4	-1.6	-----	118.8	116.6	2.2	- .7
1968.....	128.3	135.2	39.8	95.4	-6.8	-6.5	- .3	-----	125.6	126.0	- .4	-2.7
1969.....	144.0	135.2	38.2	97.0	8.8	8.1	- .7	0.0	137.9	139.0	-1.0	-6.1
1970.....	143.1	153.2	56.2	97.0	-10.1	-11.9	1.8	.9	137.6	136.3	1.3	-6.4
1971.....	153.8	171.9	60.2	111.8	-18.1	-22.2	4.0	.7	151.1	153.2	-2.1	-3.4
1972.....	171.4	174.2	49.7	124.4	-2.8	-15.9	13.1	.7	170.6	178.3	-7.6	-1.5
1973 <sup>a</sup> .....	200.2	188.6	53.8	134.7	11.6	.6	11.0	.0	202.5	201.5	1.0	2.3
Seasonally adjusted annual rates												
1971: I.....	148.4	164.3	59.2	105.1	-15.9	-17.6	1.7	0.7	146.8	145.5	1.3	-2.3
II.....	153.6	173.3	63.5	109.9	-19.7	-23.5	3.7	.7	150.5	152.7	-2.2	-3.8
III.....	154.4	172.5	60.2	112.5	-18.4	-23.2	4.8	.7	151.8	153.8	-2.0	-3.3
IV.....	158.7	177.3	57.8	119.5	-18.6	-24.5	5.9	.7	155.4	160.8	-5.4	-4.0
1972: I.....	164.8	170.2	52.9	117.4	-5.4	-13.8	8.4	.7	158.9	167.5	-8.7	-6.7
II.....	166.2	170.0	45.9	124.1	-3.9	-19.0	15.2	.7	165.9	174.7	-8.7	-1.0
III.....	172.4	170.3	45.8	124.5	2.0	-7.4	9.5	.7	174.1	181.5	-6.9	1.6
IV.....	182.2	186.0	54.4	131.6	-3.8	-23.4	19.6	.7	183.1	189.4	-6.3	.2
1973: I.....	190.4	181.5	50.0	131.5	8.9	-5.0	13.9	.0	191.5	194.5	-3.0	1.1
II.....	194.5	183.0	51.0	132.0	11.6	.0	11.5	.0	197.7	198.2	- .5	3.2
III.....	202.3	188.0	51.1	136.9	14.3	4.0	10.4	.0	206.0	202.0	4.0	3.7
IV.....	-----	-----	63.3	-----	-----	-----	-----	.0	214.7	211.2	3.5	-----

<sup>1</sup> Allocations of special drawing rights (SDR).<sup>2</sup> Net exports of goods and services less net transfers to foreigners.<sup>3</sup> Surplus of \$32 million.<sup>4</sup> Deficit of \$41 million.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-21.—*Saving by individuals, 1946-73<sup>1</sup>*

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Increase in financial assets								Net investment in			Less: Increase in debt		
	Total	Total <sup>2</sup>	Cur- rency and demand deposits	Sav- ings ac- counts	Securities			Insur- ance and pension re- serves ( <sup>5</sup> )	Non- farm homes	Con- sumer du- rables	Non- cor- porate business assets	Mort- gage debt on non- farm homes	Con- sumer credit	Other debt <sup>4</sup>
					Gov- ernment secu- rities <sup>3</sup>	Corpo- rate and for- eign bonds	Corpo- rate equi- ties <sup>4</sup>							
1946.....	25.7	18.9	5.6	6.3	-1.4	-0.9	1.1	5.3	4.2	5.8	3.3	3.8	2.7	0.0
1947.....	20.8	13.2	—1	3.4	1.6	—8	1.1	5.4	6.9	7.5	3.2	4.3	3.2	2.5
1948.....	23.3	9.0	-2.9	2.3	1.3	—1	1.0	5.3	10.5	7.1	7.4	5.0	2.8	2.9
1949.....	18.9	10.0	-2.0	2.7	1.8	—4	.8	5.6	9.0	7.0	2.5	4.1	2.9	2.6
1950.....	26.9	13.8	2.6	2.5	—1	—8	.7	6.9	13.7	10.2	6.4	7.4	4.1	5.6
1951.....	30.3	18.8	4.6	4.9	—4	—0	1.6	6.3	13.5	5.5	4.6	7.1	1.2	3.8
1952.....	27.2	22.7	1.6	7.8	1.9	—0	1.6	7.8	12.8	3.6	2.5	6.4	4.8	3.0
1953.....	30.4	22.5	1.0	8.3	2.3	—1	.9	8.0	13.5	6.4	1.6	7.7	3.9	2.1
1954.....	28.2	22.7	2.2	9.3	.8	—3	.7	7.9	13.7	4.9	2.7	8.6	1.1	6.0
1955.....	34.1	28.4	1.2	8.8	6.0	1.0	1.1	8.5	17.7	9.9	3.5	12.2	6.4	6.8
1956.....	36.0	30.0	1.8	9.6	3.9	.9	1.9	9.5	16.4	5.9	1.9	11.2	3.5	3.4
1957.....	34.1	28.6	—5	12.1	2.2	1.1	1.5	9.5	13.8	4.9	2.3	8.8	2.6	4.2
1958.....	33.0	31.6	3.8	14.1	—2.4	1.3	1.5	10.4	12.7	.6	3.3	8.8	.2	6.2
1959.....	34.8	36.5	.8	11.3	9.0	.3	.6	11.9	16.5	5.5	3.2	12.6	6.4	7.9
1960.....	32.3	31.6	1.9	11.4	3.5	.6	—4	11.6	14.5	5.1	2.2	10.8	4.6	5.7
1961.....	31.7	35.1	2.5	16.5	.7	.1	.4	12.2	12.0	2.9	3.2	10.9	1.8	8.7
1962.....	37.1	39.1	1.7	25.7	—8	—1	—2.1	12.7	12.8	6.7	5.6	12.7	5.8	8.5
1963.....	39.1	45.1	3.0	24.6	4.4	.0	—2.9	14.1	12.6	8.9	6.9	14.8	7.9	11.8
1964.....	49.5	55.5	4.7	27.4	5.7	.1	—2	15.6	12.5	11.2	6.2	16.0	8.5	11.4
1965.....	55.2	58.1	7.8	28.0	4.2	1.0	—2.2	17.0	12.0	14.8	9.0	15.2	9.6	13.8
1966.....	65.2	62.7	3.9	20.5	11.4	2.1	—1.1	19.4	11.5	15.2	7.2	12.7	6.4	12.3
1967.....	64.8	68.5	11.3	34.8	—9	4.6	—4.5	19.6	9.2	12.4	8.2	10.4	4.5	18.6
1968.....	67.4	72.0	12.5	30.3	4.7	4.7	—7.9	20.1	12.8	16.7	7.9	14.6	10.0	17.3
1969.....	60.1	61.3	1.6	6.0	21.8	7.4	—4.3	20.8	13.3	16.2	9.0	16.1	10.4	13.3
1970.....	76.8	79.6	9.6	44.4	—8.2	10.1	—2.6	24.3	10.6	10.6	6.6	12.5	6.0	12.1
1971.....	89.8	99.9	11.0	70.5	—13.6	8.2	—5.4	28.3	17.4	13.0	11.0	24.1	11.2	19.2
1972.....	99.7	124.9	12.9	75.8	5.7	4.9	—5.9	28.0	24.1	23.6	12.1	38.4	19.2	27.3
Seasonally adjusted annual rates														
1971:														
1st half..	92.5	97.5	15.6	80.8	—24.2	8.6	—10.6	28.0	14.6	15.2	10.9	18.3	8.9	18.4
2nd half..	89.1	104.4	6.4	60.7	—1.6	7.7	—2	28.5	20.2	16.9	11.2	30.0	13.6	20.0
1972: I....	92.6	113.2	19.7	85.0	—7.2	7.2	—8.1	20.4	22.6	20.2	11.8	32.7	13.3	29.2
II....	98.8	125.8	6.9	71.6	10.6	1.8	—5.6	32.8	23.4	22.6	10.3	36.7	18.3	28.4
III....	104.8	127.2	14.6	76.1	.1	3.9	1.9	28.8	25.2	25.8	11.6	40.8	18.9	25.4
IV....	101.4	133.1	10.2	70.6	19.0	6.5	—11.7	30.2	25.2	25.9	14.4	43.5	26.2	27.7
1973: I....	105.3	118.1	9.0	87.1	4.5	.3	—6.9	30.3	27.9	32.8	16.1	38.3	25.3	26.0
II....	117.1	131.0	11.2	64.5	17.9	2.8	—4.5	33.7	30.3	31.1	14.1	43.0	24.1	22.3
III....	93.0	115.8	14.7	43.7	31.0	.7	—9.2	28.2	30.3	27.9	14.6	39.7	21.9	34.0

<sup>1</sup> Saving by households, personal trust funds, nonprofit institutions, farms, and other noncorporate business.<sup>2</sup> Includes commercial paper and miscellaneous financial assets, not shown separately.<sup>3</sup> Consists of U.S. savings bonds, other U.S. Treasury securities, U.S. Government agency securities and sponsored agency securities, and State and local obligations.<sup>4</sup> Includes investment company shares.<sup>5</sup> Private life insurance reserves, private insured and noninsured pension reserves, and government insurance and pension reserves.<sup>6</sup> Security credit, policy loans, noncorporate business mortgage debt, and other debt.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE C-22.—Number and money income (in 1972 dollars) of families and unrelated individuals by race of head, 1947-72

Year	Total				White				Negro and other races			
	Total number (mil-lions)	Median income	With incomes under \$3,000		Total number (mil-lions)	Median income	With incomes under \$3,000		Total number (mil-lions)	Median income	With incomes under \$3,000	
			Number (mil-lions)	Per-cent			Number (mil-lions)	Per-cent			Number (mil-lions)	Per-cent
FAMILIES <sup>1</sup>												
1947	37.2	\$5,665	7.6	20.4	34.1	\$5,909	5.9	17.4	3.1	\$3,023	1.5	49.6
1948	38.6	5,527	8.1	20.9	35.3	5,745	6.5	18.4	3.3	3,072	1.6	49.0
1949	39.3	5,443	8.8	22.5		5,662		19.8		2,903		51.5
1950	39.9	5,757	8.3	20.8		5,986		18.5		3,248		46.2
1951	40.6	5,975	7.7	18.9		6,224		16.3		3,279		45.8
1952	40.8	6,138	7.5	18.3		6,490		15.7		3,685		39.0
1953	41.2	6,630	7.3	17.6		6,877		15.7		3,868		37.5
1954	42.0	6,482	8.0	19.1	38.2	6,749	6.4	16.8	3.8	3,759	1.6	41.7
1955	42.9	6,898	7.2	16.8	39.0	7,212	5.7	14.7	3.9	3,977	1.5	38.3
1956	43.5	7,357	6.5	15.0	39.5	7,698	5.1	13.0	4.0	4,052	1.5	36.4
1957	43.7	7,365	6.6	15.1	39.7	7,669	5.2	13.0	4.0	4,106	1.5	36.5
1958	44.2	7,353	6.7	15.2	40.2	7,664	5.2	12.9	4.0	3,938	1.5	37.9
1959	45.1	7,769	6.4	14.3	40.9	8,104	4.8	11.8	4.2	4,178	1.6	37.5
1960	45.5	7,941	6.5	14.2	41.1	8,267	4.9	12.0	4.3	4,564	1.4	33.7
1961	46.3	8,019	6.5	14.1	41.9	8,390	5.1	12.1	4.5	4,461	1.5	33.4
1962	47.0	8,247	6.1	13.0	42.4	8,631	4.7	11.0	4.6	4,608	1.4	31.1
1963	47.4	8,543	5.8	12.2	42.7	8,946	4.4	10.3	4.8	4,751	1.4	29.3
1964	47.8	8,861	5.4	11.3	43.1	9,256	4.1	9.6	4.8	5,183	1.2	25.4
1965	48.3	9,221	5.2	10.7	43.5	9,612	4.0	9.1	4.8	5,349	1.2	24.8
1966	49.1	9,667	4.7	9.6	44.1	10,047	3.7	8.3	5.0	6,008	1.1	21.6
1967	49.8	9,940	4.5	9.1	44.8	10,318	3.5	7.8	5.0	6,380	1.0	20.2
1968	50.5	10,381	3.9	7.8	45.4	10,750	3.1	6.8	5.1	6,718	.9	17.9
1969	51.2	10,766	3.9	7.7	46.0	11,168	3.0	6.6	5.2	7,062	.9	17.3
1970	51.9	10,617	4.1	7.9	46.5	10,996	3.1	6.7	5.4	7,018	1.0	18.2
1971	53.3	10,578	4.1	7.7	47.6	10,948	3.1	6.6	5.7	6,936	1.0	18.4
1972	54.4	11,116	3.9	7.2	48.5	11,549	2.9	5.9	5.9	7,106	1.0	17.7
UNRELATED INDIVIDUALS <sup>2</sup>												
With incomes under \$1,500												
With incomes under \$1,500												
With incomes under \$1,500												
1947	8.2	\$1,866	3.5	43.2	7.2	\$1,955	3.0	41.8	1.0	\$1,397	0.5	52.6
1948	8.4	1,798	3.7	44.0	7.3	1,873	3.1	42.6	1.1	1,373	.6	53.8
1949	9.0	1,891	3.8	42.5		1,994		41.0		1,435		52.0
1950	9.4	1,877	4.1	43.3		1,959		41.8		1,420		52.0
1951	9.1	1,943	4.0	43.7		2,027		42.6		1,494		50.2
1952	9.7	2,235	3.7	38.2		2,405		36.9		1,664		46.0
1953	9.5	2,196	3.8	40.5		2,320		39.8		1,829		43.7
1954	9.7	1,915	4.2	43.4	8.3	2,052	3.4	41.4	1.4	1,359	.8	55.2
1955	9.9	2,064	4.0	40.3	8.5	2,209	3.3	38.4	1.4	1,462	.7	51.2
1956	9.8	2,209	3.8	39.0	8.5	2,275	3.2	37.8	1.3	1,714	.6	47.2
1957	10.4	2,267	3.9	37.6	8.9	2,397	3.2	35.7	1.5	1,510	.7	49.9
1958	10.9	2,207	4.1	37.9	9.2	2,340	3.3	36.2	1.6	1,562	.8	48.8
1959	10.9	2,268	4.0	37.0	9.3	2,404	3.3	35.0	1.6	1,544	.8	49.3
1960	11.1	2,442	3.9	35.1	9.6	2,630	3.2	32.9	1.5	1,509	.7	49.8
1961	11.2	2,456	3.8	34.3	9.6	2,644	3.1	32.0	1.6	1,619	.8	47.4
1962	11.0	2,431	3.5	31.6	9.5	2,607	2.8	29.5	1.5	1,733	.7	44.1
1963	11.2	2,461	3.5	31.3	9.7	2,592	2.9	29.4	1.5	1,769	.7	44.1
1964	12.1	2,686	3.6	29.6	10.4	2,830	2.9	28.0	1.6	1,929	.6	39.5
1965	12.1	2,863	3.3	26.9	10.5	2,979	2.7	25.6	1.7	2,171	.6	35.2
1966	12.3				10.7				1.6			
1967	13.1	2,980	3.3	25.5	11.3	3,117	2.7	24.2	1.8	2,284	.6	33.3
1968	13.8	3,349	3.0	21.7	12.0	3,537	2.5	20.5	1.8	2,426	.5	30.3
1969	14.5	3,351	3.1	21.7	12.5	3,511	2.5	20.1	2.0	2,480	.6	32.3
1970	15.4	3,383	3.2	20.7	13.4	3,537	2.6	19.1	1.9	2,428	.6	31.7
1971	16.3	3,426	3.2	19.6	14.2	3,594	2.6	18.1	2.1	2,402	.6	30.4
1972	16.8	3,521	3.0	17.9	14.5	3,677	2.4	16.6	2.3	2,731	.6	26.4

<sup>1</sup> The term "family" refers to a group of two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption and residing together; all such persons are considered members of the same family.

<sup>2</sup> The term "unrelated individuals" refers to persons 14 years old and over (other than inmates of institutions) who are not living with any relatives.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.



# POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND PRODUCTIVITY

TABLE C-23.—*Population by age groups, 1929-73*

[Thousands of persons]

July 1	Total	Age (years)						
		Under 5	5-15	16-19	20-24	25-44	45-64	65 and over
1929 .....	121,767	11,734	26,800	9,127	10,694	35,862	21,076	6,474
1933 .....	125,579	10,612	26,897	9,302	11,152	37,319	22,933	7,363
1939 .....	130,880	10,418	25,179	9,822	11,519	39,354	25,823	8,764
1940 .....	132,122	10,579	24,811	9,895	11,690	39,868	26,249	9,031
1941 .....	133,402	10,850	24,516	9,840	11,807	40,383	26,718	9,288
1942 .....	134,860	11,301	24,231	9,730	11,955	40,861	27,196	9,584
1943 .....	136,739	12,016	24,093	9,607	12,064	41,420	27,671	9,867
1944 .....	138,397	12,524	23,949	9,561	12,062	42,016	28,138	10,147
1945 .....	139,928	12,979	23,907	9,361	12,036	42,521	28,630	10,494
1946 .....	141,389	13,244	24,103	9,119	12,004	43,027	29,064	10,828
1947 .....	144,126	14,406	24,468	9,097	11,814	43,657	29,498	11,185
1948 .....	146,631	14,919	25,209	8,952	11,794	44,288	29,931	11,538
1949 .....	149,188	15,607	25,852	8,788	11,700	44,916	30,405	11,921
1950 .....	152,271	16,410	26,721	8,542	11,680	45,672	30,849	12,397
1951 .....	154,878	17,333	27,279	8,446	11,552	46,103	31,362	12,803
1952 .....	157,553	17,312	28,894	8,414	11,350	46,495	31,884	13,203
1953 .....	160,184	17,638	30,227	8,460	11,062	46,786	32,394	13,617
1954 .....	163,026	18,057	31,480	8,637	10,832	47,001	32,942	14,076
1955 .....	165,931	18,566	32,682	8,744	10,714	47,194	33,506	14,525
1956 .....	168,903	19,003	33,994	8,916	10,616	47,379	34,057	14,938
1957 .....	171,984	19,494	35,272	9,195	10,603	47,440	34,591	15,388
1958 .....	174,882	19,887	36,445	9,543	10,756	47,337	35,109	15,806
1959 .....	177,830	20,175	37,368	10,215	10,969	47,192	35,663	16,248
1960 .....	180,671	20,337	38,496	10,694	11,124	47,140	36,200	16,679
1961 .....	183,691	20,504	39,753	11,072	11,450	47,089	36,714	17,108
1962 .....	186,538	20,448	41,184	11,215	11,954	47,008	37,251	17,476
1963 .....	189,242	20,316	41,640	12,004	12,707	46,996	37,794	17,785
1964 .....	191,889	20,127	42,313	12,737	13,256	46,965	38,382	18,108
1965 .....	194,303	19,786	42,944	13,504	13,755	46,912	38,997	18,405
1966 .....	196,560	19,171	43,695	14,294	14,090	46,976	39,610	18,723
1967 .....	198,712	18,528	44,234	14,212	15,227	47,188	40,258	19,066
1968 .....	200,706	17,880	44,609	14,449	15,766	47,714	40,890	19,396
1969 .....	202,677	17,339	44,804	14,804	16,465	48,055	41,454	19,754
1970 .....	204,879	17,156	44,774	15,275	17,180	48,435	41,974	20,085
1971 .....	207,045	17,174	44,441	15,634	18,086	48,809	42,414	20,487
1972 .....	208,842	17,006	43,947	15,945	18,021	50,250	42,789	20,883
1973 .....	210,404	16,714	43,227	16,308	18,331	51,412	43,083	21,329

Note.—Includes Armed Forces overseas beginning 1940. Includes Alaska and Hawaii beginning 1950.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

TABLE C-24.—Noninstitutional population and the labor force, 1929-73

Year or month	Non-institutional population <sup>1</sup>	Total labor force (including Armed Forces)	Armed Forces <sup>1</sup>	Civilian labor force					Unemployment rate (percent of civilian labor force)	Labor force participation rate (total labor force as percent of non-institutional population)		
				Total	Employment			Unemployment				
					Total	Agricultural	Non-agricultural					
Thousands of persons 14 years of age and over											Percent	
1929		49,440	260	49,180	47,630	10,450	37,180	1,550	3.2			
1933		51,840	250	51,590	38,760	10,090	28,670	12,830	24.9			
1939		55,600	370	55,230	45,750	9,610	36,140	9,480	17.2			
1940	100,380	56,180	540	55,640	47,520	9,540	37,980	8,120	14.6	56.0		
1941	101,520	57,530	1,620	55,910	50,350	9,100	41,250	5,560	9.9	56.7		
1942	102,610	60,380	3,970	56,410	53,750	9,250	44,500	2,660	4.7	58.8		
1943	103,660	64,560	9,020	55,540	54,470	9,080	45,390	1,070	1.9	62.3		
1944	104,630	66,040	11,410	54,630	53,960	8,950	45,010	670	1.2	63.1		
1945	105,530	65,300	11,440	53,860	52,820	8,580	44,240	1,040	1.9	61.9		
1946	106,520	60,970	3,450	57,520	55,250	8,320	46,930	2,270	3.9	57.2		
1947	107,608	61,758	1,590	60,168	57,812	8,256	49,557	2,356	3.9	57.4		
Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over												
1947	103,418	60,941	1,591	59,350	57,039	7,891	49,148	2,311	3.9	58.9		
1948	104,527	62,080	1,459	60,621	58,344	7,629	50,713	2,276	3.8	59.4		
1949	105,611	62,903	1,617	61,286	57,649	7,656	49,990	3,637	5.9	59.6		
1950	106,645	63,858	1,650	62,208	58,920	7,160	51,760	3,288	5.3	59.9		
1951	107,721	65,117	3,100	62,017	59,962	6,726	53,239	2,055	3.3	60.4		
1952	108,823	65,730	3,592	62,138	60,254	6,501	53,753	1,883	3.0	60.4		
1953 <sup>2</sup>	110,601	66,560	3,545	63,015	61,181	6,261	54,922	1,834	2.9	60.2		
1954	111,671	66,993	3,350	63,643	60,110	6,206	53,903	3,532	5.5	60.0		
1955	112,732	68,072	3,049	65,023	62,171	6,449	55,724	2,852	4.4	60.4		
1956	113,811	69,409	2,857	66,552	63,802	6,283	57,517	2,750	4.1	61.0		
1957	115,065	69,729	2,800	66,929	64,071	5,947	58,123	2,859	4.3	60.6		
1958	116,363	70,275	2,636	67,639	63,036	5,586	57,450	4,602	6.8	60.4		
1959	117,881	70,921	2,552	68,369	64,630	5,565	59,065	3,740	5.5	60.2		
1960 <sup>2</sup>	119,759	72,142	2,514	69,628	65,778	5,458	60,318	3,852	5.5	60.2		
1961	121,343	73,031	2,572	70,459	65,746	5,200	60,546	4,714	6.7	60.2		
1962 <sup>2</sup>	122,981	73,442	2,828	70,614	66,702	4,944	61,759	3,911	5.5	59.7		
1963	125,154	74,571	2,738	71,833	67,762	4,687	63,076	4,070	5.7	59.6		
1964	127,224	75,830	2,739	73,091	69,305	4,523	64,782	3,786	5.2	59.6		
1965	129,236	77,178	2,723	74,455	71,088	4,361	66,726	3,366	4.5	59.7		
1966	131,180	78,893	3,123	75,770	72,895	3,979	68,915	2,875	3.8	60.1		
1967	133,319	80,793	3,446	77,347	74,372	3,844	70,527	2,975	3.8	60.6		
1968	135,562	82,272	3,535	78,737	75,920	3,817	72,103	2,817	3.6	60.7		
1969	137,841	84,240	3,506	80,734	77,902	3,606	74,296	2,832	3.5	61.1		
1970	140,182	85,903	3,188	82,715	78,627	3,462	75,165	4,088	4.9	61.3		
1971	142,596	86,929	2,817	84,113	79,120	3,387	75,732	4,993	5.9	61.0		
1972 <sup>2</sup>	145,775	88,991	2,449	86,542	81,702	3,472	78,230	4,840	5.6	61.0		
1973 <sup>2</sup>	148,263	91,040	2,326	88,714	84,409	3,452	80,957	4,304	4.9	61.4		

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-24.—Noninstitutional population and the labor force, 1929-73—Continued

Year or month		Non-institutional population <sup>1</sup>	Total labor force (including Armed Forces)	Armed Forces <sup>1</sup>	Civilian labor force					Unemployment rate (percent of civilian labor force)	Labor force participation rate (total labor force as percent of non-institutional population)
					Total	Employment			Unemployment		
						Total	Agricultural	Non-agricultural			
Seasonally adjusted											
1972:	Jan <sup>2</sup> -----	144,697	88,315	2,594	85,721	80,637	3,389	77,248	5,084	5.9	61.0
	Feb-----	144,895	88,179	2,540	85,639	80,672	3,387	77,285	4,967	5.8	60.9
	Mar-----	145,077	88,664	2,504	86,160	81,110	3,445	77,665	5,050	5.9	61.1
	Apr-----	145,227	88,568	2,463	86,105	81,153	3,353	77,800	4,952	5.8	61.0
	May-----	145,427	88,740	2,419	86,321	81,404	3,378	78,026	4,917	5.7	61.0
	June-----	145,639	88,854	2,393	86,461	81,623	3,351	78,272	4,838	5.6	61.0
	July-----	145,854	88,993	2,388	86,605	81,781	3,441	78,340	4,824	5.6	61.0
	Aug-----	146,069	89,337	2,396	86,941	82,083	3,593	78,490	4,858	5.6	61.2
	Sept-----	146,289	89,432	2,405	87,027	82,256	3,585	78,671	4,771	5.5	61.1
	Oct-----	146,498	89,623	2,415	87,208	82,338	3,650	78,688	4,870	5.6	61.2
	Nov-----	146,709	89,407	2,431	86,976	82,486	3,490	78,996	4,490	5.2	60.9
	Dec-----	146,923	89,701	2,440	87,261	82,841	3,577	79,264	4,420	5.1	61.1
1973:	Jan-----	147,129	89,404	2,404	87,000	82,619	3,489	79,130	4,381	5.0	60.8
	Feb-----	147,313	90,108	2,392	87,716	83,230	3,446	79,784	4,486	5.1	61.2
	Mar <sup>2</sup> -----	147,541	90,523	2,361	88,162	83,782	3,469	80,313	4,380	5.0	61.4
	Apr-----	147,729	90,622	2,350	88,272	83,854	3,356	80,498	4,418	5.0	61.3
	May-----	147,940	90,597	2,334	88,263	83,950	3,320	80,630	4,313	4.9	61.2
	June-----	148,147	91,133	2,315	88,818	84,518	3,430	81,088	4,300	4.8	61.5
	July-----	148,361	91,139	2,310	88,828	84,621	3,512	81,109	4,207	4.7	61.4
	Aug-----	148,565	91,011	2,307	88,704	84,513	3,425	81,088	4,191	4.7	61.3
	Sept-----	148,782	91,664	2,292	89,373	85,133	3,376	81,757	4,240	4.7	61.6
	Oct-----	149,001	92,038	2,289	89,749	85,649	3,455	82,194	4,100	4.6	61.8
	Nov-----	149,208	92,186	2,284	89,903	85,649	3,561	82,088	4,254	4.7	61.8
	Dec-----	149,436	92,315	2,282	90,033	85,669	3,643	82,026	4,364	4.8	61.8

<sup>1</sup> Not seasonally adjusted.

<sup>2</sup> Not strictly comparable with prior data due to the introduction of population adjustments in the period. The adjustment beginning January 1972 added 787,000 to the noninstitutional population, 333,000 to the civilian labor force, 301,000 to civilian employment and 32,000 to unemployment. The adjustment in March 1973 added 60,000 to the civilian labor force and civilian employment. Unemployment rates were not significantly affected by the adjustments.

Note.—Labor force data in Tables C-24 through C-27 are based on household interviews and relate to the calendar week including the 12th of the month. For definitions of terms, area samples used, historical comparability of the data, comparability with other series, etc., see "Employment and Earnings."

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE C-25.—Civilian employment and unemployment by sex and age, 1947-73

[Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over]

Year or month	Employment										Unemployment									
	Total	Males				Females				Total	Males				Females					
		Total	16-19 years	20 years and over		Total	16-19 years	20 years and over			Total	16-19 years	20 years and over		Total	16-19 years	20 years and over			
1947.....	57,039	40,994	2,218	38,776	16,045	1,691	14,354	2,311	1,692	270	1,422	619	144	475						
1948.....	58,344	41,726	2,345	39,382	16,618	1,683	14,937	2,276	1,559	255	1,305	717	152	564						
1949.....	57,649	40,926	2,124	38,803	16,723	1,588	15,137	3,637	2,572	352	2,219	1,065	223	841						
1950.....	58,920	41,580	2,186	39,394	17,340	1,517	15,824	3,285	2,239	318	1,929	1,049	195	854						
1951.....	59,962	41,780	2,156	39,626	18,182	1,611	16,570	2,055	1,221	191	1,029	834	145	689						
1952.....	60,254	41,684	2,106	39,578	18,570	1,612	16,958	1,883	1,185	205	980	698	140	559						
1953 <sup>1</sup> .....	61,181	42,431	2,135	40,296	18,750	1,584	17,164	1,834	1,202	184	1,019	632	123	510						
1954.....	60,110	41,620	1,985	39,634	18,490	1,490	17,000	3,532	2,344	310	2,035	1,188	191	997						
1955.....	62,171	42,621	2,095	40,526	19,550	1,548	18,002	2,852	1,854	274	1,580	998	176	823						
1956.....	63,802	43,380	2,164	41,216	20,422	1,654	18,767	2,750	1,711	269	1,442	1,039	209	832						
1957.....	64,071	43,357	2,117	41,239	20,714	1,663	19,052	2,595	1,841	299	1,541	1,018	197	821						
1958.....	63,036	42,423	2,012	40,411	20,613	1,570	19,043	4,602	3,098	416	2,681	1,504	262	1,242						
1959.....	64,630	43,466	2,198	41,267	21,164	1,640	19,524	3,740	2,420	398	2,022	1,320	256	1,063						
1960 <sup>1</sup> .....	65,778	43,904	2,360	41,543	21,874	1,769	20,105	3,852	2,486	425	2,060	1,366	286	1,080						
1961.....	65,746	43,656	2,314	41,342	22,090	1,793	20,296	4,714	2,997	479	2,518	1,717	349	1,368						
1962.....	66,702	44,177	2,362	41,815	22,525	1,833	20,693	3,911	2,423	407	2,016	1,488	313	1,175						
1963 <sup>1</sup> .....	67,762	44,657	2,406	42,251	23,105	1,849	21,257	4,070	2,472	500	1,971	1,598	383	1,216						
1964.....	69,305	45,474	2,587	42,886	23,831	1,929	21,903	3,786	2,205	487	1,718	1,581	386	1,195						
1965.....	71,088	46,340	2,918	43,422	24,748	2,118	22,630	3,366	1,914	479	1,435	1,452	395	1,056						
1966.....	72,895	46,919	3,252	43,668	25,976	2,469	23,510	2,875	1,551	432	1,120	1,324	404	921						
1967.....	74,372	47,479	3,186	44,293	26,893	2,497	24,397	2,975	1,508	448	1,060	1,468	391	1,078						
1968.....	75,920	48,114	3,255	44,859	27,807	2,525	25,281	2,817	1,419	427	993	1,397	412	985						
1969.....	77,902	48,818	3,430	45,388	29,084	2,686	26,397	2,832	1,403	441	963	1,429	412	1,016						
1970.....	78,627	48,960	3,407	45,553	29,667	2,734	26,933	4,088	2,235	599	1,636	1,853	506	1,347						
1971.....	79,120	49,245	3,470	45,775	29,875	2,725	27,149	4,993	2,776	691	2,086	2,217	567	1,650						
1972 <sup>1</sup> .....	81,702	50,630	3,750	46,880	31,072	2,972	27,100	4,840	2,635	707	1,928	2,205	595	1,610						
1973 <sup>1</sup> .....	84,409	51,963	4,017	47,946	32,446	3,219	29,228	4,304	2,240	647	1,594	2,064	579	1,485						
Seasonally adjusted																				
1972: Jan.....	80,637	49,922	3,625	46,297	30,715	2,927	27,788	5,084	2,807	747	2,060	2,277	648	1,629						
Feb.....	80,672	49,935	3,562	46,373	30,737	2,908	27,829	4,967	2,838	841	1,997	2,129	617	1,512						
Mar.....	81,110	50,214	3,657	46,557	30,896	2,948	27,948	5,050	2,811	785	2,026	2,239	612	1,627						
Apr.....	81,153	50,257	3,685	46,572	30,896	2,974	27,922	4,952	2,734	708	2,026	2,218	607	1,611						
May.....	81,404	50,391	3,726	46,665	31,013	3,020	27,993	4,917	2,699	700	1,999	2,218	526	1,692						
June.....	81,623	50,622	3,747	46,875	31,001	2,955	28,046	4,838	2,607	644	1,963	2,231	583	1,648						
July.....	81,781	50,705	3,718	46,987	31,076	2,938	28,138	4,824	2,550	620	1,930	2,274	598	1,676						
Aug.....	82,083	50,864	3,809	47,055	31,219	2,926	28,293	4,858	2,602	736	1,866	2,256	614	1,642						
Sept.....	82,256	51,022	3,836	47,186	31,234	2,954	28,280	4,771	2,564	712	1,852	2,207	591	1,616						
Oct.....	82,338	51,068	3,866	47,202	31,270	2,997	28,273	4,870	2,615	662	1,953	2,255	596	1,659						
Nov.....	82,486	51,108	3,839	47,269	31,378	3,070	28,308	4,490	2,431	695	1,736	2,059	566	1,493						
Dec.....	82,841	51,340	3,866	47,474	31,501	3,095	28,406	4,420	2,325	686	1,639	2,095	589	1,506						
1973: Jan.....	82,619	51,244	3,846	47,398	31,375	3,053	28,322	4,381	2,261	598	1,663	2,120	558	1,562						
Feb.....	83,230	51,458	3,945	47,513	31,772	3,085	28,687	4,486	2,334	652	1,682	2,152	652	1,500						
Mar <sup>1</sup> .....	83,782	51,761	4,067	47,694	32,021	3,187	28,834	4,380	2,311	632	1,679	2,069	573	1,496						
Apr.....	83,854	51,641	3,986	47,655	32,213	3,177	29,036	4,418	2,349	675	1,674	2,069	605	1,464						
May.....	83,950	51,597	3,929	47,668	32,353	3,208	29,145	4,313	2,315	658	1,657	1,998	607	1,391						
June.....	84,518	51,848	3,989	47,859	32,670	3,332	29,338	4,300	2,231	630	1,601	2,069	557	1,512						
July.....	84,621	52,037	3,950	48,087	32,584	3,103	29,481	4,207	2,164	639	1,525	2,043	543	1,500						
Aug.....	84,513	51,892	3,900	47,992	32,621	3,138	29,483	4,191	2,166	638	1,528	2,025	538	1,487						
Sept.....	85,133	52,290	4,152	48,138	32,843	3,326	29,517	4,240	2,172	659	1,513	2,068	586	1,482						
Oct.....	85,649	52,638	4,206	48,432	33,011	3,350	29,661	4,100	2,138	649	1,489	1,962	581	1,381						
Nov.....	85,649	52,584	4,159	48,425	33,065	3,361	29,704	4,254	2,193	692	1,501	2,061	582	1,479						
Dec.....	85,669	52,732	4,173	48,559	32,937	3,341	29,596	4,364	2,182	656	1,526	2,182	609	1,573						

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 2, Table C-24.

Note.—See Note, Table C-24.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE C-26.—Selected unemployment rates, 1948-73

[Percent]

Year or month	All workers	By sex and age			By color		By selected groups					Labor force time lost <sup>4</sup>
		Both sexes 16-19 years	Men 20 years and over	Women 20 years and over	White	Negro and other races	Experienced wage and salary workers	Household heads	Married men <sup>1</sup>	Full-time workers <sup>2</sup>	Blue-collar workers <sup>3</sup>	
1948	3.8	9.2	3.2	3.6	3.5	5.9	4.3				4.2	
1949	5.9	13.4	5.4	5.3	5.6	8.9	6.8		3.5	5.4	8.0	
1950	5.3	12.2	4.7	5.1	4.9	9.0	6.0		4.6	5.0	7.2	
1951	3.3	8.2	2.5	4.0	3.1	5.3	3.7		1.5	2.6	3.9	
1952	3.0	8.5	2.4	3.2	2.8	5.4	3.3		1.4	2.5	3.6	
1953	2.9	7.6	2.5	2.9	2.7	4.5	3.2		1.7		3.4	
1954	5.5	12.6	4.9	5.5	5.0	9.9	6.2		4.0	5.2	7.2	
1955	4.4	11.0	3.8	4.4	3.9	8.7	4.8		2.8	3.8	5.8	4.8
1956	4.1	11.1	3.4	4.2	3.6	8.3	4.4		2.6	3.7	5.1	5.1
1957	4.3	11.6	3.6	4.1	3.8	7.9	4.6		2.8	4.0	6.2	5.3
1958	6.8	15.9	6.2	6.1	6.1	12.6	7.2		5.1	7.2	10.2	8.1
1959	5.5	14.6	4.7	5.2	4.8	10.7	5.7		3.6		7.6	6.6
1960	5.5	14.7	4.7	5.1	4.9	10.2	5.7		3.7		7.8	6.7
1961	6.7	16.8	5.7	6.3	6.0	12.4	6.8		4.6	6.7	9.2	8.0
1962	5.5	14.7	4.6	5.4	4.9	10.9	5.6		3.6		7.4	6.7
1963	5.7	17.2	4.5	5.4	5.0	10.8	5.5	3.7	3.4	5.5	7.3	6.4
1964	5.2	16.2	3.9	5.2	4.6	9.6	5.0	3.2	2.8	4.9	6.3	5.8
1965	4.5	14.8	3.2	4.5	4.1	8.1	4.3	2.7	2.4	4.2	5.3	5.0
1966	3.8	12.8	2.5	3.8	3.4	7.3	3.5	2.2	1.9	3.5	4.2	4.2
1967	3.8	12.8	2.3	4.2	3.4	7.4	3.6	2.1	1.8	3.4	4.4	4.2
1968	3.6	12.7	2.2	3.8	3.2	6.7	3.4	1.9	1.6	3.1	4.1	4.0
1969	3.5	12.2	2.1	3.7	3.1	6.4	3.3	1.8	1.5	3.1	3.9	3.9
1970	4.9	15.2	3.5	4.8	4.5	8.2	4.8	2.9	2.6	4.5	6.2	5.3
1971	5.9	16.9	4.4	5.7	5.4	9.9	5.7	3.6	3.2	5.5	7.4	6.4
1972	5.6	16.2	4.0	5.4	5.0	10.0	5.3	3.3	2.8	5.1	6.5	6.0
1973	4.9	14.5	3.2	4.8	4.3	8.9	4.5	2.9	2.3	4.3	5.3	5.2
Seasonally adjusted												
1972: Jan.	5.9	17.6	4.3	5.5	5.3	11.0	5.6	3.5	3.0	5.4	7.1	6.3
Feb.	5.8	18.4	4.1	5.2	5.2	10.6	5.5	3.4	2.9	5.3	7.0	6.0
Mar.	5.9	17.5	4.2	5.5	5.3	10.4	5.5	3.4	2.8	5.3	7.0	6.2
Apr.	5.8	16.5	4.2	5.5	5.3	9.4	5.3	3.4	2.9	5.3	6.8	6.0
May	5.7	15.4	4.1	5.7	5.2	10.1	5.4	3.5	2.8	5.3	6.6	6.1
June	5.6	15.5	4.0	5.5	5.1	9.5	5.2	3.5	2.9	5.1	6.5	5.9
July	5.6	15.5	3.9	5.6	5.0	9.8	5.3	3.3	2.8	5.1	6.5	5.9
Aug.	5.6	16.7	3.8	5.5	5.1	9.7	5.3	3.2	2.6	5.1	6.4	6.0
Sept.	5.5	16.1	3.8	5.4	5.0	9.9	5.2	3.3	2.7	4.9	6.0	5.8
Oct.	5.6	15.5	4.0	5.5	5.1	10.1	5.3	3.4	2.8	5.1	6.0	5.9
Nov.	5.2	15.4	3.5	5.0	4.6	9.9	4.8	2.9	2.5	4.6	5.7	5.4
Dec.	5.1	15.5	3.3	5.0	4.5	9.6	4.8	2.8	2.4	4.5	5.6	5.4
1973: Jan.	5.0	14.4	3.4	5.2	4.6	8.9	4.6	3.0	2.4	4.6	5.6	5.3
Feb.	5.1	15.6	3.4	5.0	4.6	9.0	4.7	3.0	2.4	4.6	5.7	5.4
Mar.	5.0	14.2	3.4	4.9	4.4	9.0	4.6	3.0	2.5	4.5	5.5	5.3
Apr.	5.0	15.2	3.4	4.8	4.5	9.2	4.7	3.0	2.4	4.5	5.4	5.3
May	4.9	15.1	3.4	4.6	4.4	9.2	4.5	2.9	2.3	4.3	5.3	5.2
June	4.8	14.0	3.2	4.9	4.3	8.8	4.4	2.9	2.3	4.3	5.3	5.2
July	4.7	14.4	3.1	4.8	4.1	9.2	4.4	2.7	2.1	4.2	5.2	5.1
Aug.	4.7	14.3	3.1	4.8	4.2	8.8	4.4	2.8	2.1	4.2	5.2	5.1
Sept.	4.7	14.3	3.0	4.8	4.2	9.2	4.4	2.7	2.1	4.2	5.1	5.1
Oct.	4.6	14.0	3.0	4.4	4.1	8.4	4.2	2.7	2.1	4.1	5.1	5.1
Nov.	4.7	14.5	3.0	4.7	4.2	8.9	4.5	2.8	2.1	4.3	5.4	5.2
Dec.	4.8	14.4	3.0	5.0	4.4	8.6	4.6	2.8	2.2	4.4	5.2	5.4

<sup>1</sup> Married men living with their wives. Data for 1949 and 1951-54 are for April; 1950, for March.<sup>2</sup> Data for 1949-61 are for May.<sup>3</sup> Includes craft and kindred workers, operatives, and nonfarm laborers. Data for 1948-57 are based on data for January, April, July, and October.<sup>4</sup> Man-hours lost by the unemployed and persons on part-time for economic reasons as a percent of potentially available labor force man-hours.

Note.—See footnote 2 and Note, Table C-24.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE C-27.—*Unemployment by duration, 1947-73*

Year or month	Total unemployment	Duration of unemployment				Average (mean) duration in weeks
		Less than 5 weeks	5-14 weeks	15-26 weeks	27 weeks and over	
Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over						
1947.....	2,311	1,210	704	234	164	8.6
1948.....	2,276	1,300	669	193	116	10.0
1949.....	3,637	1,756	1,194	428	256	
1950.....	3,288	1,450	1,055	425	357	12.1
1951.....	2,055	1,177	574	166	137	9.7
1952.....	1,883	1,135	516	148	84	8.4
1953.....	1,834	1,142	482	132	78	8.0
1954.....	3,532	1,605	1,116	495	317	11.8
1955.....	2,852	1,335	815	366	336	13.0
1956.....	2,750	1,412	805	301	232	11.3
1957.....	2,859	1,408	891	321	239	10.5
1958.....	4,602	1,753	1,396	785	667	13.9
1959.....	3,740	1,585	1,114	469	571	14.4
1960.....	3,852	1,719	1,176	503	454	12.8
1961.....	4,714	1,806	1,376	728	804	15.6
1962.....	3,911	1,663	1,134	534	585	14.7
1963.....	4,070	1,751	1,231	535	553	14.0
1964.....	3,786	1,697	1,117	491	482	13.3
1965.....	3,366	1,628	983	404	351	11.8
1966.....	2,875	1,573	779	287	239	10.4
1967.....	2,975	1,634	893	271	177	8.8
1968.....	2,817	1,594	810	256	156	8.4
1969.....	2,832	1,629	827	242	133	7.9
1970.....	4,088	2,137	1,289	427	235	8.7
1971.....	4,993	2,234	1,578	665	517	11.3
1972.....	4,840	2,223	1,459	597	562	12.0
1973.....	4,304	2,196	1,296	475	337	10.0
Seasonally adjusted <sup>1</sup>						
1972: Jan.....	5,084	2,362	1,508	642	592	12.1
Feb.....	4,967	2,116	1,470	654	647	12.4
Mar.....	5,050	2,325	1,425	605	619	12.2
Apr.....	4,952	2,197	1,507	530	642	12.5
May.....	4,917	2,203	1,517	594	584	12.3
June.....	4,838	2,237	1,458	604	554	12.5
July.....	4,824	2,212	1,486	643	518	11.9
Aug.....	4,858	2,233	1,506	614	535	12.0
Sept.....	4,771	2,310	1,383	569	549	12.1
Oct.....	4,870	2,285	1,436	581	512	11.8
Nov.....	4,490	2,158	1,365	558	470	11.4
Dec.....	4,420	1,982	1,423	519	458	11.3
1973: Jan.....	4,381	2,081	1,369	510	407	10.9
Feb.....	4,486	2,264	1,264	533	365	10.5
Mar.....	4,380	2,168	1,337	496	373	10.5
Apr.....	4,418	2,207	1,487	467	320	10.0
May.....	4,313	2,251	1,287	470	348	10.0
June.....	4,300	2,244	1,210	463	326	9.7
July.....	4,207	2,225	1,267	478	277	9.8
Aug.....	4,191	2,206	1,220	446	331	10.0
Sept.....	4,240	2,158	1,339	476	292	9.4
Oct.....	4,100	2,001	1,283	431	325	10.3
Nov.....	4,254	2,243	1,235	469	351	10.0
Dec.....	4,364	2,308	1,270	409	331	9.3

<sup>1</sup> Because of independent seasonal adjustment of the various series, detail will not add to totals.

Note.—See footnote 2 and Note, Table C-24.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE C-28.—Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1946-73

Year or month	All programs			State programs						
	Covered employment <sup>1</sup>	Insured unemployment (weekly average) <sup>2,3</sup>	Total benefits paid (millions of dollars) <sup>2,4</sup>	Insured unemployment <sup>3</sup>	Initial claims	Exhaustions <sup>5</sup>	Insured unemployment as percent of covered employment		Benefits paid	
							Unadjusted	Seasonally adjusted	Total (millions of dollars) <sup>4</sup>	Average weekly check (dollars) <sup>6</sup>
Thousands			Weekly average, thousands			Percent				
1946.....	31,856	2,804	2,878.5	1,295	189	38	4.3		1,094.9	18.50
1947.....	33,876	1,793	1,785.5	997	187	24	3.1		775.1	17.83
1948.....	34,646	1,446	1,328.7	980	200	20	3.0		789.9	19.03
1949.....	33,098	2,474	2,269.8	1,973	340	37	6.2		1,736.0	20.48
1950.....	34,308	1,605	1,467.6	1,513	236	36	4.6		1,373.1	20.76
1951.....	36,334	1,000	862.9	969	208	16	2.8		840.4	21.09
1952.....	37,006	1,069	1,043.5	1,044	215	18	2.9		998.2	22.79
1953.....	38,072	1,067	1,050.6	990	218	15	2.8		962.2	23.58
1954.....	36,622	2,051	2,291.8	1,870	304	34	5.2		2,026.9	24.93
1955.....	40,018	1,399	1,560.2	1,265	226	25	3.5		1,350.3	25.04
1956.....	42,751	1,323	1,540.6	1,215	227	20	3.2		1,380.7	27.02
1957.....	43,436	1,571	1,913.0	1,446	270	23	3.6		1,733.9	28.17
1958.....	44,411	3,269	4,290.6	2,526	369	50	6.4		3,512.7	30.58
1959.....	45,728	2,099	2,854.3	1,684	277	33	4.4		2,279.0	30.41
1960.....	46,334	2,071	3,022.8	1,908	331	31	4.8		2,726.7	32.87
1961.....	46,266	2,994	4,358.1	2,290	350	46	5.6		3,422.7	33.80
1962.....	47,776	1,946	3,145.1	1,783	302	32	4.4		2,675.4	34.56
1963.....	48,434	1,973	3,025.9	1,806	298	30	4.3		2,774.7	35.27
1964.....	49,637	1,753	2,749.2	1,605	268	26	3.8		2,522.1	35.92
1965.....	51,580	1,450	2,360.4	1,328	232	21	3.0		2,166.0	37.19
1966.....	54,739	1,129	1,890.9	1,061	203	15	2.3		1,771.3	39.75
1967.....	56,342	1,270	2,221.5	1,205	226	17	2.5		2,092.3	41.25
1968.....	57,977	1,187	2,191.0	1,111	201	16	2.2		2,031.6	43.43
1969.....	59,999	1,177	2,298.6	1,101	200	16	2.1		2,127.9	46.17
1970.....	59,526	2,070	4,179.1	1,805	296	25	3.4		3,848.5	50.34
1971.....	59,375	2,313	5,498.2	2,150	295	38	4.1		4,957.0	54.02
1972 P.....		2,185	5,000.0	1,848	261	37	3.5		4,550.0	56.03
1973 P.....		1,783	4,441.8	1,627	246	30	2.8		4,105.0	58.50
1972: Jan P.....		3,097	530.1	2,524	385	40	4.8	3.5	484.7	55.50
Feb P.....		3,122	548.9	2,492	293	40	4.7	3.6	502.9	56.04
Mar P.....		2,922	593.2	2,279	242	40	4.3	3.6	541.9	57.21
Apr P.....		2,430	449.0	2,005	237	43	3.8	3.6	407.9	57.12
May P.....		2,105	423.1	1,740	216	39	3.3	3.6	381.2	56.40
June P.....		1,951	383.1	1,636	250	36	3.1	3.6	344.4	55.23
July P.....		2,087	375.2	1,823	321	35	3.4	3.6	338.6	55.75
Aug P.....		1,763	391.1	1,565	213	33	2.9	3.4	349.7	55.53
Sept P.....		1,554	307.8	1,388	190	29	2.6	3.4	274.7	60.16
Oct P.....		1,512	304.1	1,357	214	27	2.5	3.3	273.7	56.95
Nov P.....		1,692	325.3	1,507	253	28	2.7	3.2	294.4	57.59
Dec P.....		1,994	350.2	1,801	324	28	3.3	3.0	320.9	58.35
1973: Jan P.....		2,333	509.2	2,124	331	33	3.8	2.7	471.4	58.69
Feb P.....		2,250	447.0	2,061	249	32	3.7	2.8	416.4	59.08
Mar P.....		2,075	473.9	1,898	213	33	3.4	2.8	441.0	59.09
Apr P.....		1,828	393.3	1,669	216	33	2.8	2.7	365.7	59.41
May P.....		1,610	365.9	1,465	193	31	2.5	2.7	339.2	58.44
June P.....		1,523	309.4	1,384	206	28	2.4	2.7	286.6	58.12
July P.....		1,640	320.9	1,505	275	27	2.5	2.6	296.3	57.42
Aug P.....		1,572	346.9	1,436	212	27	2.4	2.7	316.3	57.46
Sept P.....		1,440	273.9	1,299	186	25	2.1	2.8	248.3	58.13
Oct P.....		1,451	309.3	1,298	210	24	2.1	2.8	280.7	58.97
Nov P.....		1,665	320.9	1,501	265	29	2.4	2.8	301.4	58.63
Dec P.....		2,003	371.2	1,889	395	32	3.1	2.9	341.6	58.71

<sup>1</sup> Includes persons under the State, UCFE (Federal employee, effective January 1955), and RRB (Railroad Retirement Board) programs. Beginning October 1958, also includes the UCX program (unemployment compensation for ex-service-men).

<sup>2</sup> Includes State, UCFE, RR, UCX, UCV (unemployment compensation for veterans, October 1952-January 1960), and SRA (Servicemen's Readjustment Act, September 1944-September 1951) programs. Also includes Federal and State extended benefit programs.

<sup>3</sup> Covered workers who have completed at least 1 week of unemployment.

<sup>4</sup> Annual data are net amounts and monthly data are gross amounts. Monthly data exclude extended benefit payments.

<sup>5</sup> Individuals receiving final payments in benefit year. Data for New Jersey not available for April-June 1971.

<sup>6</sup> For total unemployment only. Excludes data for New Jersey for April-December 1971.

<sup>7</sup> Programs include Puerto Rican sugarcane workers for initial claims and insured unemployment beginning July 1963.

<sup>8</sup> Latest data available for all programs combined. Workers covered by State programs account for about 89 percent of the total.

Source: Department of Labor, Manpower Administration.

TABLE C-29.—*Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-73*

[All employees; thousands of persons]

Year or month	Total wage and salary workers	Manufacturing			Min- ing	Con- tract con- struc- tion	Trans- porta- tion and pub- lic uti- lities	Whole- sale and retail trade	Fi- nance, insur- ance, and real estate	Serv- ices	Government	
		Total	Dura- ble goods	Non- dura- ble goods							Fed- eral	State and local
1929.....	31,339	10,702	-----	-----	1,087	1,497	3,916	6,123	1,509	3,440	533	2,532
1933.....	23,711	7,397	-----	-----	744	809	2,672	4,755	1,295	2,873	565	2,601
1939.....	30,618	10,278	4,715	5,564	854	1,150	2,936	6,426	1,462	3,517	905	3,090
1940.....	32,376	10,985	5,363	5,622	925	1,294	3,038	6,750	1,502	3,681	996	3,206
1941.....	36,554	13,192	6,968	6,225	957	1,790	3,274	7,210	1,549	3,921	1,340	3,320
1942.....	40,125	15,280	8,823	6,458	992	2,170	3,460	7,118	1,538	4,084	2,213	3,270
1943.....	42,452	17,602	11,084	6,518	925	1,567	3,647	6,982	1,502	4,148	2,905	3,174
1944.....	41,883	17,328	10,856	6,472	892	1,094	3,829	7,058	1,476	4,163	2,928	3,116
1945.....	40,394	15,524	9,074	6,450	836	1,132	3,906	7,314	1,497	4,241	2,808	3,137
1946.....	41,674	14,703	7,742	6,962	862	1,661	4,061	8,376	1,697	4,719	2,254	3,341
1947.....	43,881	15,545	8,385	7,159	955	1,982	4,166	8,955	1,754	5,050	1,892	3,582
1948.....	44,891	15,582	8,326	7,256	994	2,169	4,189	9,272	1,829	5,206	1,863	3,787
1949.....	43,778	14,441	7,489	6,953	930	2,165	4,001	9,264	1,857	5,264	1,908	3,948
1950.....	45,222	15,241	8,094	7,147	901	2,333	4,034	9,386	1,919	5,382	1,928	4,098
1951.....	47,849	16,393	9,089	7,304	929	2,603	4,226	9,742	1,991	5,576	2,302	4,087
1952.....	48,825	16,632	9,349	7,284	898	2,634	4,248	10,004	2,069	5,730	2,420	4,188
1953.....	50,232	17,549	10,110	7,438	866	2,623	4,290	10,247	2,146	5,867	2,305	4,340
1954.....	49,022	16,314	9,129	7,185	791	2,612	4,084	10,235	2,234	6,002	2,188	4,563
1955.....	50,675	16,882	9,541	7,340	792	2,802	4,141	10,535	2,335	6,274	2,187	4,727
1956.....	52,408	17,243	9,834	7,409	822	2,999	4,244	10,858	2,429	6,536	2,209	5,069
1957.....	52,894	17,174	9,856	7,319	828	2,923	4,241	10,886	2,477	6,749	2,217	5,399
1958.....	51,363	15,945	8,830	7,116	751	2,778	3,976	10,750	2,519	6,806	2,191	5,648
1959.....	53,313	16,675	9,373	7,303	732	2,960	4,011	11,127	2,594	7,130	2,233	5,850
1960.....	54,234	16,796	9,459	7,336	712	2,885	4,004	11,391	2,669	7,423	2,270	6,083
1961.....	54,042	16,326	9,070	7,256	672	2,816	3,903	11,337	2,731	7,664	2,279	6,315
1962.....	55,596	16,853	9,480	7,373	650	2,902	3,906	11,566	2,800	8,028	2,340	6,550
1963.....	56,702	16,995	9,616	7,380	635	2,963	3,903	11,778	2,877	8,325	2,358	6,868
1964.....	58,331	17,274	9,816	7,458	634	3,050	3,951	12,160	2,957	8,709	2,348	7,248
1965.....	60,815	18,062	10,406	7,656	632	3,186	4,036	12,716	3,023	9,087	2,378	7,696
1966.....	63,955	19,214	11,284	7,930	627	3,275	4,151	13,245	3,100	9,551	2,564	8,227
1967.....	65,857	19,447	11,439	8,008	613	3,208	4,261	13,606	3,225	10,099	2,719	8,679
1968.....	67,915	19,781	11,626	8,155	606	3,285	4,310	14,084	3,382	10,623	2,737	9,109
1969.....	70,284	20,167	11,895	8,272	619	3,435	4,429	14,639	3,564	11,229	2,758	9,444
1970.....	70,593	19,349	11,195	8,154	623	3,381	4,493	14,914	3,688	11,612	2,705	9,830
1971.....	70,645	18,529	10,565	7,964	602	3,411	4,442	15,142	3,796	11,869	2,664	10,191
1972.....	72,764	18,933	10,884	8,049	607	3,521	4,495	15,683	3,927	12,309	2,650	10,640
1973.....	75,570	19,821	11,634	8,187	625	3,649	4,610	16,294	4,053	12,865	2,624	11,028

See footnotes at end of table.



TABLE C-29.—*Wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments, 1929-73—Continued*

[All employees; thousands of persons]

Year or month	Total wage and salary workers	Manufacturing			Mining	Contract construction	Transportation and public utilities	Wholesale and retail trade	Finance, insurance, and real estate	Services	Government	
		Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods							Federal	State and local
Seasonally adjusted												
1971: Jan...	70,329	18,685	10,681	8,004	624	3,326	4,468	15,005	3,741	11,766	2,655	10,059
Feb...	70,276	18,611	10,625	7,986	622	3,303	4,487	15,020	3,744	11,762	2,655	10,072
Mar...	70,321	18,531	10,560	7,971	621	3,349	4,470	15,029	3,752	11,794	2,655	10,120
Apr...	70,457	18,530	10,562	7,968	624	3,396	4,462	15,059	3,764	11,808	2,660	10,154
May...	70,601	18,581	10,599	7,982	623	3,401	4,465	15,094	3,780	11,823	2,663	10,171
June...	70,570	18,519	10,569	7,950	621	3,400	4,451	15,092	3,795	11,844	2,652	10,196
July...	70,533	18,468	10,529	7,939	601	3,411	4,438	15,130	3,803	11,853	2,656	10,173
Aug...	70,529	18,410	10,478	7,932	613	3,405	4,401	15,175	3,808	11,853	2,668	10,196
Sept...	70,897	18,532	10,562	7,970	618	3,436	4,425	15,232	3,821	11,942	2,673	10,218
Oct...	70,861	18,486	10,540	7,946	519	3,472	4,406	15,254	3,835	11,951	2,672	10,266
Nov...	71,078	18,523	10,552	7,971	523	3,522	4,403	15,280	3,847	11,997	2,668	10,315
Dec...	71,264	18,499	10,537	7,962	611	3,475	4,432	15,333	3,855	12,030	2,664	10,365
1972: Jan...	71,545	18,544	10,573	7,971	615	3,519	4,455	15,391	3,863	12,069	2,669	10,420
Feb...	71,747	18,620	10,630	7,990	612	3,494	4,438	15,456	3,874	12,112	2,665	10,476
Mar...	72,033	18,694	10,682	8,012	613	3,512	4,482	15,520	3,885	12,151	2,662	10,514
Apr...	72,224	18,780	10,750	8,030	605	3,500	4,476	15,561	3,892	12,194	2,662	10,554
May...	72,534	18,864	10,821	8,043	605	3,532	4,481	15,624	3,913	12,252	2,665	10,598
June...	72,705	18,931	10,857	8,074	601	3,540	4,486	15,678	3,927	12,315	2,639	10,588
July...	72,694	18,893	10,867	8,026	601	3,499	4,477	15,685	3,927	12,341	2,613	10,658
Aug...	73,016	18,975	10,933	8,042	603	3,544	4,487	15,762	3,940	12,382	2,624	10,699
Sept...	73,268	19,069	11,003	8,066	606	3,551	4,507	15,794	3,953	12,403	2,633	10,752
Oct...	73,584	19,210	11,112	8,098	608	3,561	4,540	15,839	3,969	12,451	2,639	10,767
Nov...	73,835	19,312	11,194	8,118	608	3,524	4,549	15,911	3,981	12,497	2,644	10,809
Dec...	74,002	19,402	11,270	8,132	607	3,459	4,558	15,946	3,991	12,537	2,650	10,852
1973: Jan...	74,252	19,463	11,326	8,137	610	3,498	4,574	16,013	3,995	12,621	2,634	10,844
Feb...	74,715	19,586	11,421	8,165	612	3,594	4,580	16,114	4,014	12,682	2,628	10,905
Mar...	74,914	19,643	11,463	8,180	610	3,604	4,580	16,163	4,024	12,716	2,631	10,943
Apr...	75,105	19,727	11,534	8,193	608	3,571	4,591	16,217	4,031	12,746	2,628	10,986
May...	75,321	19,782	11,602	8,180	608	3,620	4,593	16,256	4,044	12,776	2,641	11,001
June...	75,526	19,856	11,654	8,202	629	3,654	4,597	16,262	4,049	12,820	2,613	11,046
July...	75,478	19,804	11,646	8,158	631	3,680	4,598	16,294	4,048	12,828	2,588	11,007
Aug...	75,747	19,861	11,692	8,169	634	3,676	4,617	16,352	4,064	12,906	2,599	11,038
Sept...	75,961	19,882	11,708	8,174	633	3,700	4,629	16,388	4,078	12,995	2,613	11,043
Oct...	76,363	20,016	11,802	8,214	639	3,694	4,671	16,465	4,088	13,044	2,626	11,120
Nov...	76,642	20,087	11,854	8,233	643	3,707	4,651	16,529	4,093	13,122	2,638	11,172
Dec...	76,677	20,113	11,870	8,243	646	3,753	4,633	16,456	4,099	13,127	2,623	11,227

Note.—Data in Tables C-29 through C-31 are based on reports from employing establishments and relate to full- and part-time wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments who worked during, or received pay for, any part of the pay period which includes the 12th of the month.

Not comparable with labor force data (Tables C-24 through C-27), which include proprietors, self-employed persons, domestic servants, and unpaid family workers, and which count persons as employed when they are not at work because of industrial disputes, bad weather, etc.

For description and details of the various establishment data, see "Employment and Earnings."

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

**TABLE C-30.—Average weekly hours and hourly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-73**

[For production or nonsupervisory workers]

Year or month	Average weekly hours				Average gross hourly earnings, current dollars				Adjusted hourly earnings, total private nonagricultural <sup>3</sup>				
	Total private nonagricultural <sup>1</sup>	Manufacturing	Contract construction	Retail trade <sup>2</sup>	Total private nonagricultural <sup>1</sup>	Manufacturing	Contract construction	Retail trade <sup>2</sup>	Index, 1967=100		Percent change from preceding period		
									Current dollars	1967 dollars <sup>4</sup>	Current dollars	1967 dollars	
1947.....	40.3	40.4	38.2	40.3	\$1.131	\$1.217	\$1.541	\$0.838	42.6	63.7	-----	-----	
1948.....	40.0	40.0	38.1	40.2	1.225	1.328	1.713	.901	46.0	63.8	8.0	0.2	
1949.....	39.4	39.1	37.7	40.4	1.275	1.378	1.792	.951	48.2	67.5	4.8	5.8	
1950.....	39.8	40.5	37.4	40.4	1.335	1.440	1.863	.983	50.0	69.3	3.7	2.7	
1951.....	39.9	40.6	38.1	40.4	1.45	1.56	2.02	1.06	53.7	69.0	7.4	—4	
1952.....	39.9	40.7	38.9	39.8	1.52	1.65	2.13	1.09	56.4	70.9	5.0	2.8	
1953.....	39.6	40.5	37.9	39.1	1.61	1.74	2.28	1.16	59.6	74.4	5.7	4.9	
1954.....	39.1	39.6	37.2	39.2	1.65	1.78	2.39	1.20	61.7	76.6	3.5	3.0	
1955.....	39.6	40.7	37.1	39.0	1.71	1.86	2.45	1.25	63.7	79.4	3.2	3.7	
1956.....	39.3	40.4	37.5	38.6	1.80	1.95	2.57	1.30	67.0	82.3	5.2	3.7	
1957.....	38.8	39.8	37.0	38.1	1.89	2.05	2.71	1.37	70.3	83.4	4.9	1.3	
1958.....	38.5	39.2	36.8	38.1	1.95	2.11	2.82	1.42	73.2	84.5	4.1	1.3	
1959.....	39.0	40.3	37.0	38.2	2.02	2.19	2.93	1.47	75.8	86.8	3.6	2.7	
1960.....	38.6	39.7	36.7	38.0	2.09	2.26	3.08	1.52	78.4	88.4	3.4	1.8	
1961.....	38.6	39.8	36.9	37.6	2.14	2.32	3.20	1.56	80.8	90.2	3.1	2.0	
1962.....	38.7	40.4	37.0	37.4	2.22	2.39	3.31	1.63	83.5	92.2	3.3	2.2	
1963.....	38.8	40.5	37.3	37.3	2.28	2.46	3.41	1.68	85.9	93.7	2.9	1.6	
1964.....	38.7	40.7	37.2	37.0	2.36	2.53	3.55	1.75	88.6	95.3	3.1	1.7	
1965.....	38.8	41.2	37.4	36.6	2.45	2.61	3.70	1.82	91.9	97.2	3.7	2.0	
1966.....	38.6	41.3	37.6	35.9	2.56	2.72	3.89	1.91	95.6	98.4	4.0	1.2	
1967.....	38.0	40.6	37.7	35.3	2.68	2.83	4.11	2.01	100.0	100.0	4.6	1.6	
1968.....	37.8	40.7	37.4	34.7	2.85	3.01	4.41	2.16	106.6	102.3	6.6	2.3	
1969.....	37.7	40.6	37.9	34.2	3.04	3.19	4.79	2.30	113.6	103.5	6.6	1.2	
1970.....	37.1	39.8	37.4	33.8	3.22	3.36	5.24	2.44	121.2	104.2	6.7	.7	
1971.....	37.0	39.9	37.3	33.7	3.43	3.56	5.69	2.57	129.7	106.9	7.0	2.6	
1972.....	37.2	40.6	37.0	33.6	3.65	3.81	6.06	2.70	137.9	110.1	6.3	3.0	
1973 P.....	37.1	40.7	37.1	33.2	3.89	4.06	6.46	2.86	146.5	110.1	6.2	.0	
Seasonally adjusted												Seasonally adjusted annual rates <sup>5</sup>	
1972: Jan.....	37.0	40.1	37.2	33.7	\$3.55	\$3.69	\$5.91	\$2.65	134.5	109.0	9.4	6.1	
Feb.....	37.2	40.5	37.3	33.6	3.56	3.71	5.93	2.65	134.8	108.8	3.0	-2.7	
Mar.....	37.1	40.4	37.2	33.7	3.59	3.74	5.96	2.66	135.6	109.3	7.4	6.1	
Apr.....	37.3	40.7	36.8	33.7	3.62	3.76	6.00	2.67	136.6	109.9	8.7	6.3	
May.....	37.1	40.5	36.8	33.7	3.62	3.78	6.01	2.68	136.7	109.7	1.3	-2.3	
June.....	37.1	40.6	36.9	33.8	3.63	3.79	6.01	2.69	137.2	109.9	4.3	2.8	
July.....	37.2	40.6	37.0	33.6	3.65	3.79	6.02	2.71	138.0	110.1	7.0	2.1	
Aug.....	37.1	40.6	37.0	33.6	3.67	3.83	6.07	2.72	138.5	110.2	4.3	1.0	
Sept.....	37.3	40.8	36.9	33.6	3.69	3.86	6.10	2.73	139.3	110.4	7.8	2.5	
Oct.....	37.3	40.7	37.4	33.5	3.73	3.88	6.15	2.74	140.4	110.9	9.3	5.1	
Nov.....	37.2	40.8	36.9	33.5	3.73	3.89	6.19	2.75	140.7	110.8	2.9	—8	
Dec.....	37.0	40.7	35.8	33.6	3.75	3.93	6.29	2.77	141.9	111.5	10.3	7.6	
1973: Jan.....	36.9	40.3	36.1	33.4	3.77	3.97	6.37	2.77	142.3	111.3	3.9	-2.1	
Feb.....	37.2	41.0	36.2	33.5	3.78	3.96	6.29	2.79	142.5	110.7	1.4	-6.6	
Mar.....	37.1	40.9	37.0	33.4	3.81	3.98	6.31	2.80	143.3	110.4	7.4	-3.2	
Apr.....	37.2	40.9	37.0	33.4	3.84	4.01	6.35	2.82	144.4	110.5	9.2	1.2	
May.....	37.2	40.7	37.5	33.4	3.85	4.02	6.34	2.83	144.7	110.1	3.0	-4.1	
June.....	37.1	40.6	37.4	33.5	3.87	4.04	6.43	2.86	146.0	110.4	10.6	3.4	
July.....	37.2	40.7	37.5	33.2	3.91	4.07	6.46	2.87	146.9	110.9	8.1	5.2	
Aug.....	37.0	40.5	37.1	33.0	3.92	4.09	6.50	2.89	147.6	109.3	5.6	-16.0	
Sept.....	37.2	40.8	36.7	33.2	3.96	4.13	6.59	2.92	149.0	110.0	11.9	7.7	
Oct.....	37.0	40.6	36.9	33.0	3.98	4.16	6.59	2.93	149.6	109.5	5.2	-4.9	
Nov P.....	37.1	40.7	38.5	33.0	3.99	4.16	6.64	2.94	150.2	109.1	4.7	-4.9	
Dec P.....	37.0	40.7	37.1	33.0	4.02	4.19	6.68	2.95	151.4	109.4	10.1	3.1	

<sup>1</sup> Also includes other private industry groups shown in Table C-29.

<sup>2</sup> Includes eating and drinking places.

<sup>3</sup> Adjusted for overtime (in manufacturing only) and for interindustry employment shifts.

<sup>4</sup> Current dollar earnings index divided by the consumer price index.

<sup>5</sup> Computed from indexes to two decimal places.

Note.—See Note, Table C-29.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE C-31.—Average weekly earnings in selected private nonagricultural industries, 1947-73

[For production or nonsupervisory workers]

Year or month	Average gross weekly earnings					Average spendable weekly earnings, total private nonagricultural <sup>4</sup>			
	Total private nonagricultural <sup>1</sup>		Manu- facturing	Contract construc- tion	Retail trade <sup>3</sup>	Amount		Percent change from preceding period	
	Current dollars	1967 dollars <sup>2</sup>	Current dollars			Current dollars	1967 dollars <sup>2</sup>	Current dollars	1967 dollars
1947 .....	\$45.58	\$68.13	\$49.17	\$58.87	\$33.77	\$44.64	\$66.73	-----	-----
1948 .....	49.00	67.96	53.12	65.27	36.22	48.51	67.28	8.7	0.8
1949 .....	50.24	70.36	53.88	67.56	38.42	49.74	69.66	2.5	3.5
1950 .....	53.13	73.69	58.32	69.68	39.71	52.04	72.18	4.6	3.6
1951 .....	57.86	74.37	63.34	76.96	42.82	55.79	71.71	7.2	— .7
1952 .....	60.65	76.29	67.16	82.86	43.38	57.87	72.79	3.7	1.5
1953 .....	63.76	79.60	70.47	86.41	45.36	60.31	75.29	4.2	3.4
1954 .....	64.52	80.15	70.49	88.91	47.04	60.85	75.59	.9	.4
1955 .....	67.72	84.44	75.70	90.90	48.75	63.41	79.06	4.2	4.6
1956 .....	70.74	86.90	78.78	96.38	50.18	65.82	80.86	3.8	2.3
1957 .....	73.33	86.99	81.59	100.27	52.20	67.71	80.32	2.9	— .7
1958 .....	75.08	86.70	82.71	103.78	54.10	69.11	79.80	2.1	— .6
1959 .....	78.78	90.24	88.26	108.41	56.15	71.86	82.31	4.0	3.1
1960 .....	80.67	90.95	89.72	113.04	57.76	72.96	82.25	1.5	— .1
1961 .....	82.60	92.19	92.34	118.08	58.66	74.48	83.13	2.1	1.1
1962 .....	85.91	94.82	96.56	122.47	60.96	76.99	84.98	3.4	2.2
1963 .....	88.46	96.47	99.63	127.19	62.66	78.56	85.67	2.0	.8
1964 .....	91.33	98.31	102.97	132.06	64.75	82.57	88.88	5.1	3.7
1965 .....	95.06	100.59	107.53	138.38	66.61	86.30	91.32	4.5	2.7
1966 .....	98.82	101.67	112.34	146.26	68.57	88.66	91.21	2.7	— .1
1967 .....	101.84	101.84	114.90	154.95	70.95	90.86	90.86	2.5	— .4
1968 .....	107.73	103.39	122.51	164.93	74.95	95.28	91.44	4.9	.6
1969 .....	114.61	104.38	129.51	181.54	78.66	99.99	91.07	4.9	— .4
1970 .....	119.46	102.72	133.73	195.98	82.47	104.61	89.95	4.6	— 1.2
1971 .....	126.91	104.62	142.04	212.24	86.61	112.12	92.43	7.2	2.8
1972 .....	135.78	108.36	154.69	224.22	90.72	120.79	96.40	7.7	4.3
1973 <sup>p</sup> .....	144.32	108.43	165.24	239.67	94.95	126.55	95.08	4.8	— 1.4
Seasonally adjusted									Seasonally adjusted annual rates
1972: Jan. ....	\$131.35	\$106.48	\$147.97	\$219.85	\$89.31	\$117.30	\$95.09	\$ 4.7	\$ 1.8
Feb. ....	132.43	106.84	150.26	221.19	89.04	118.15	95.32	9.1	2.9
Mar. ....	133.19	107.35	151.10	221.71	89.64	118.75	95.71	6.3	5.0
Apr. ....	135.03	108.63	153.03	220.80	89.98	120.20	96.70	15.7	13.1
May .....	134.30	107.72	153.09	221.17	90.32	119.63	95.95	— 5.5	— 8.9
June .....	134.67	107.88	153.87	221.77	90.92	119.92	96.07	2.9	1.5
July .....	135.78	108.35	153.87	222.74	91.06	120.79	96.39	9.1	4.1
Aug. ....	136.16	108.36	155.50	224.59	91.39	121.09	96.36	3.0	— .4
Sept. ....	137.64	109.07	157.49	225.09	91.73	122.26	96.89	12.2	6.8
Oct. ....	139.13	109.89	157.92	230.01	91.79	123.43	97.49	12.1	7.7
Nov. ....	138.76	109.28	158.71	228.41	92.13	123.14	96.98	— 2.8	— 6.1
Dec. ....	138.75	109.05	159.95	225.18	93.07	123.14	96.78	.0	— 2.4
1973: Jan. ....	139.11	108.79	159.99	229.96	92.52	122.51	95.81	\$ 2.1	\$ — 4.0
Feb. ....	140.62	109.22	162.36	227.70	93.47	123.70	96.08	12.3	3.4
Mar. ....	141.35	108.83	162.78	233.47	93.52	124.26	95.67	5.6	— 5.0
Apr. ....	142.85	109.30	164.01	234.95	94.19	125.42	95.96	11.8	3.7
May .....	143.22	108.94	163.61	237.75	94.52	125.70	95.61	2.7	— 4.3
June .....	143.58	108.60	164.02	240.48	95.81	125.98	95.29	2.7	— 3.9
July .....	145.45	109.77	165.65	242.25	95.28	127.42	96.16	14.6	11.5
Aug. ....	145.04	107.39	165.65	241.15	95.37	127.11	94.11	— 2.9	— 22.8
Sept. ....	147.31	108.72	168.50	241.85	96.94	128.86	95.11	17.8	13.5
Oct. ....	147.26	107.80	168.90	243.17	96.69	128.82	94.30	— .4	— 9.8
Nov. <sup>p</sup> .....	148.03	107.52	169.31	255.64	97.02	129.42	94.00	5.7	— 3.8
Dec. <sup>p</sup> .....	148.74	107.45	170.53	247.83	97.35	129.96	93.88	5.1	— 1.5

<sup>1</sup> Also includes other private industry groups shown in Table C-29.<sup>2</sup> Earnings in current dollars divided by the consumer price index.<sup>3</sup> Includes eating and drinking places.<sup>4</sup> Average gross weekly earnings less social security and income taxes for a worker with three dependents.<sup>5</sup> In annualizing the rates of change, the effect of the change in tax rates at the beginning of 1972 and 1973 is taken into account separately.

Note.—See Note, Table C-29.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE C-32.—Output per man-hour and related data, private economy, 1947-73

[1967=100]

Year or quarter	Output <sup>1</sup>		Man-hours <sup>2</sup>		Output per man-hour		Compensation per man-hour <sup>3</sup>		Unit labor costs		Implicit price deflator <sup>4</sup>	
	Total private	Private non-farm	Total private	Private non-farm	Total private	Private non-farm	Total private	Private non-farm	Total private	Private non-farm	Total private	Private non-farm
1947.....	45.6	44.5	88.8	78.0	51.3	57.1	36.2	38.3	70.6	67.1	66.4	63.8
1948.....	47.8	46.5	89.2	79.1	53.6	58.8	39.5	41.8	73.7	71.0	70.9	68.2
1949.....	47.6	46.4	86.2	76.0	55.3	61.1	40.1	43.0	72.5	70.3	70.2	68.7
1950.....	52.5	51.3	87.9	79.0	59.7	65.0	42.8	45.3	71.7	69.7	70.9	69.4
1951.....	55.8	55.0	90.7	82.9	61.5	66.3	46.9	49.3	76.3	74.3	76.1	74.0
1952.....	57.2	56.3	91.2	84.1	62.7	66.9	49.8	52.0	79.4	77.6	77.5	75.9
1953.....	60.1	59.1	92.0	85.9	65.3	68.9	52.9	54.9	81.0	79.7	78.1	77.2
1954.....	59.3	58.3	88.6	82.6	66.9	70.5	54.5	56.6	81.5	80.3	79.1	78.5
1955.....	64.3	63.4	92.1	86.1	69.9	73.6	55.9	58.6	80.1	79.6	79.8	79.5
1956.....	65.6	64.7	93.7	88.4	70.0	73.2	59.5	62.0	85.0	84.7	82.3	82.3
1957.....	66.5	65.7	92.3	87.9	72.0	74.8	63.3	65.5	87.9	87.6	85.3	85.3
1958.....	65.6	64.8	88.4	84.5	74.3	76.7	66.0	68.1	88.9	88.7	87.1	86.8
1959.....	70.2	69.5	91.2	87.6	76.9	79.3	69.0	71.0	89.8	89.5	88.3	88.3
1960.....	71.9	71.1	92.0	88.6	78.2	80.3	71.7	73.9	91.8	92.0	89.5	89.6
1961.....	73.2	72.5	90.6	87.7	80.9	82.7	74.4	76.3	92.1	92.3	90.4	90.4
1962.....	78.2	77.6	92.4	89.8	84.7	86.4	77.7	79.3	91.8	91.8	91.2	91.2
1963.....	81.5	80.9	92.9	90.9	87.7	89.1	80.8	82.2	92.1	92.3	92.2	92.3
1964.....	86.2	85.9	94.5	92.9	91.1	92.4	84.9	86.1	93.1	93.2	93.2	93.4
1965.....	91.8	91.5	97.4	96.3	94.2	95.1	88.4	89.2	93.8	93.9	94.8	94.8
1966.....	97.7	97.9	99.7	99.5	98.0	98.4	94.5	94.6	96.5	96.2	97.2	96.8
1967.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1968.....	104.8	105.1	101.8	102.1	102.9	102.9	107.6	107.3	104.6	104.3	103.6	103.5
1969.....	107.7	108.0	104.2	105.1	103.3	102.7	115.8	114.8	112.1	111.8	108.3	108.1
1970.....	107.2	107.3	102.6	103.8	104.4	103.4	124.6	123.2	119.3	119.1	113.5	113.5
1971.....	110.9	111.0	102.0	103.2	108.7	107.6	133.3	131.8	122.6	122.5	118.4	118.5
1972.....	118.1	118.7	104.7	106.0	112.8	112.1	142.4	140.9	126.2	125.7	121.8	121.3
1973 p.....	125.5	126.6	108.1	109.6	116.1	115.5	153.5	151.6	132.2	131.2	128.3	126.2
Seasonally adjusted												
1971: I.....	109.2	109.2	101.6	102.9	107.5	106.1	130.1	128.4	121.0	120.9	116.9	117.1
II.....	110.1	110.2	101.9	103.0	108.0	107.0	132.2	130.9	122.4	122.3	118.2	118.4
III.....	111.1	111.2	101.7	102.9	109.3	108.1	134.7	133.1	123.3	123.1	119.1	119.3
IV.....	113.1	113.3	102.7	103.8	110.1	109.1	136.1	134.6	123.6	123.3	119.3	119.3
1972: I.....	114.5	114.9	103.5	104.6	110.7	109.8	139.4	137.8	125.9	125.5	120.7	120.6
II.....	117.4	117.9	104.4	105.9	112.5	111.3	141.4	139.5	125.7	125.3	121.2	120.8
III.....	119.1	119.9	105.1	106.2	113.3	112.9	143.1	141.8	126.3	125.6	122.0	121.4
IV.....	121.5	122.3	105.9	107.1	114.8	114.2	145.7	144.2	126.9	126.2	123.1	122.3
1973: I.....	124.2	125.1	106.7	108.2	116.4	115.6	149.6	147.9	128.5	127.9	124.8	123.6
II.....	125.0	126.3	107.7	109.5	116.1	115.3	151.9	149.8	130.9	129.8	127.1	125.4
III.....	126.1	127.6	108.6	110.2	116.2	115.9	154.6	152.7	133.1	131.8	129.3	126.8
IV p.....	126.5	127.5	109.2	110.7	115.8	115.1	157.6	155.7	136.1	135.2	131.8	128.9

<sup>1</sup> Output refers to gross national product in 1958 dollars.<sup>2</sup> Hours of all persons in private industry engaged in production, including man-hours of proprietors and unpaid family workers. Man-hours estimates based primarily on establishment data.<sup>3</sup> Wages and salaries of employees plus employers' contribution for social insurance and private benefits plans. Also includes an estimate of wages, salaries, and supplemental payments for the self-employed.<sup>4</sup> Current dollar gross product divided by constant dollar product.

Note.—Data relate to all persons.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE C-33.—Changes in output per man-hour and related data, private economy, 1948-73

(Percent change from preceding period)

Year or quarter	Output <sup>1</sup>		Man-hours <sup>2</sup>		Output per man-hour		Compensation per man-hour <sup>3</sup>		Unit labor costs		Implicit price deflator <sup>4</sup>	
	Total private	Private non-farm	Total private	Private non-farm	Total private	Private non-farm	Total private	Private non-farm	Total private	Private non-farm	Total private	Private non-farm
1948.....	4.8	4.4	0.4	1.3	4.5	3.0	9.0	9.0	4.3	5.8	6.7	6.8
1949.....	-3	-1	-3.4	-3.9	3.2	4.0	1.5	2.9	-1.6	-1.0	-1.0	.8
1950.....	10.2	10.6	2.0	4.0	8.1	6.3	6.8	5.5	-1.2	-8	1.0	1.1
1951.....	6.3	7.0	3.2	4.9	3.0	2.0	9.6	8.7	6.4	6.6	7.3	6.5
1952.....	2.5	2.5	.5	1.5	1.9	.9	6.1	5.5	4.1	4.5	1.9	2.6
1953.....	5.1	5.1	.8	2.1	4.2	2.9	6.3	5.6	2.0	2.6	.7	1.8
1954.....	-1.3	-1.5	-3.7	-3.8	2.4	2.3	3.1	3.2	.6	.9	1.2	1.7
1955.....	8.5	8.8	3.9	4.2	4.4	4.4	2.6	3.5	-1.7	-9	.9	1.3
1956.....	1.9	2.0	1.7	2.6	.2	-6	6.4	5.8	6.2	6.4	3.2	3.4
1957.....	1.4	1.6	-1.5	-6	2.9	2.2	6.5	5.7	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.7
1958.....	-1.3	-1.5	-4.2	-3.9	3.1	2.5	4.2	3.8	1.1	1.3	2.1	1.7
1959.....	7.0	7.3	3.3	3.7	3.6	3.4	4.6	4.3	1.0	.9	1.4	1.8
1960.....	2.4	2.4	.8	1.1	1.6	1.2	3.9	4.1	2.2	2.8	1.4	1.4
1961.....	1.9	1.9	-1.5	-1.0	3.5	3.0	3.8	3.2	.3	.2	.9	.9
1962.....	6.8	7.1	2.0	2.5	4.7	4.6	4.4	4.0	-3	-5	.9	.9
1963.....	4.2	4.3	.6	1.2	3.6	3.1	4.0	3.6	.4	.5	1.0	1.2
1964.....	5.7	6.1	1.8	2.3	3.9	3.7	5.0	4.7	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.3
1965.....	6.6	6.6	3.1	3.6	3.4	2.9	4.1	3.7	.7	.8	1.7	1.4
1966.....	6.4	7.0	2.4	3.3	4.0	3.5	6.9	6.1	2.8	2.5	2.5	2.2
1967.....	2.3	2.2	.3	.5	2.1	1.6	5.8	5.7	3.7	4.0	2.9	3.3
1968.....	4.8	5.1	1.8	2.1	2.9	2.9	7.6	7.3	4.6	4.3	3.6	3.5
1969.....	2.8	2.8	2.3	2.9	.4	-1	7.6	7.0	7.1	7.2	4.5	4.5
1970.....	-5	-6	-1.5	-1.3	1.0	.7	7.6	7.3	6.5	6.6	4.8	5.0
1971.....	3.5	3.4	-6	-6	4.1	4.0	7.0	7.0	2.8	2.8	4.3	4.4
1972.....	6.5	7.0	2.7	2.7	3.8	4.2	6.8	6.9	2.9	2.6	2.9	2.3
1973 <sup>a</sup> .....	6.2	6.6	3.2	3.5	2.9	3.1	7.8	7.6	4.7	4.4	5.3	4.0
Seasonally adjusted annual rates												
1971: I.....	9.9	9.7	1.2	1.3	8.6	8.3	8.0	7.7	-0.6	-0.6	4.3	4.2
II.....	3.2	3.7	1.1	.6	2.0	3.1	6.6	8.0	4.5	4.7	4.8	4.4
III.....	3.7	3.8	-.9	-.4	4.7	4.3	7.7	6.9	2.9	2.5	2.8	3.0
IV.....	7.2	7.7	3.9	3.6	3.2	4.0	4.4	4.6	1.3	.7	.8	-.1
1972: I.....	5.4	5.6	3.2	3.0	2.1	2.5	9.9	9.9	7.6	7.2	4.9	4.4
II.....	10.4	11.0	3.6	5.0	6.5	5.7	5.9	5.2	-5	-5	1.5	1.0
III.....	5.8	7.0	2.6	1.3	3.1	5.6	4.9	6.7	1.7	1.0	2.8	1.9
IV.....	8.4	8.3	3.0	3.4	5.2	4.7	7.4	6.8	2.0	2.0	3.5	2.9
1973: I.....	9.3	9.2	3.3	4.0	5.8	5.0	11.3	10.7	5.2	5.4	5.7	4.3
II.....	2.6	3.9	3.8	4.8	-1.2	-.8	6.3	5.3	7.6	6.2	7.5	5.9
III.....	3.6	4.4	3.2	2.6	.4	1.8	7.3	8.0	6.9	6.1	7.3	4.7
IV <sup>a</sup> .....	1.2	-.4	2.5	2.1	-1.3	-2.4	8.0	8.3	9.3	10.9	7.7	6.9

<sup>1</sup> Output refers to gross national product in 1958 dollars.

<sup>2</sup> Hours of all persons in private industry engaged in production, including man-hours of proprietors and unpaid family workers. Man-hours estimates based primarily on establishment data.

<sup>3</sup> Wages and salaries of employees plus employers' contribution for social insurance and private benefits plans. Also includes an estimate of wages, salaries, and supplemental payments for the self-employed.

<sup>4</sup> Current dollar gross product divided by constant dollar product.

Note.—Data relate to all persons.

Percent changes are based on original data and therefore may differ slightly from percent changes based on indexes in Table C-32.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

# PRODUCTION AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY

TABLE C-34.—*Industrial production indexes, major industry divisions, 1929-73*

[1967=100]

Year or month	Total industrial production	Manufacturing			Mining	Utilities
		Total	Durable	Nondurable		
1929.....	21.6	22.8	22.6	23.0	44.4	7.2
1933.....	13.7	14.0	9.1	19.7	31.5	6.5
1939.....	21.7	21.5	17.8	25.9	43.4	10.4
1940.....	25.0	25.4	23.7	27.2	48.2	11.5
1941.....	31.6	32.4	31.6	32.9	51.2	13.0
1942.....	36.3	37.8	40.1	34.3	52.8	14.6
1943.....	44.0	47.0	54.5	36.7	54.0	16.1
1944.....	47.4	50.9	60.2	38.2	57.9	17.1
1945.....	40.6	42.6	45.5	38.1	56.8	17.4
1946.....	35.0	35.3	31.8	39.3	55.8	18.1
1947.....	39.4	39.4	37.9	40.9	63.1	19.6
1948.....	41.0	40.9	39.5	42.2	66.3	21.9
1949.....	38.8	38.7	35.9	41.5	58.8	23.3
1950.....	44.9	45.0	43.7	46.2	65.7	26.5
1951.....	48.7	48.6	49.2	47.8	72.1	30.3
1952.....	50.6	50.6	52.2	48.7	71.5	32.8
1953.....	54.8	55.1	59.0	50.7	73.4	35.6
1954.....	51.9	51.5	52.0	51.0	71.9	38.3
1955.....	58.5	58.2	59.5	56.6	80.2	42.8
1956.....	61.1	60.5	61.5	59.5	84.4	47.0
1957.....	61.9	61.2	61.9	60.5	84.5	50.2
1958.....	57.9	56.9	54.2	61.0	77.5	52.5
1959.....	64.8	64.1	62.2	67.0	81.1	57.8
1960.....	66.2	65.4	63.3	68.6	82.7	61.8
1961.....	66.7	65.6	62.1	70.7	83.2	65.3
1962.....	72.2	71.4	69.0	75.1	85.6	70.2
1963.....	76.5	75.8	73.5	79.2	89.0	75.1
1964.....	81.7	81.2	79.0	84.4	91.1	81.9
1965.....	89.2	89.1	88.5	90.0	93.9	86.9
1966.....	97.9	98.3	99.0	97.3	98.4	93.6
1967.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1968.....	105.7	105.7	105.5	106.0	103.9	109.4
1969.....	110.7	110.5	110.0	111.1	107.2	119.5
1970.....	106.6	105.2	101.4	110.6	109.7	128.3
1971.....	106.8	105.2	99.4	113.5	107.0	133.9
1972.....	115.2	114.0	108.4	122.1	108.8	143.4
1973 p.....	125.6	125.2	122.1	129.7	110.0	152.2
Seasonally adjusted						
1972: Jan.....	108.7	107.1	100.4	116.8	107.3	137.4
Feb.....	110.0	108.5	102.1	117.8	107.2	139.7
Mar.....	111.6	110.0	103.4	119.5	108.4	140.0
Apr.....	113.2	111.8	105.7	120.7	109.4	141.2
May.....	113.8	112.6	106.5	121.3	108.0	142.0
June.....	114.4	113.1	107.5	121.4	108.6	141.5
July.....	115.1	114.3	108.8	122.5	108.6	143.3
Aug.....	116.3	115.4	109.7	123.6	108.8	144.9
Sept.....	117.6	117.0	111.6	124.8	110.8	146.4
Oct.....	119.2	118.5	113.8	125.2	110.2	147.1
Nov.....	120.2	119.5	115.3	125.6	109.7	148.2
Dec.....	121.1	120.4	116.3	126.2	108.2	148.5
1973: Jan.....	122.2	121.4	117.5	127.0	108.5	151.0
Feb.....	123.4	122.7	118.7	128.4	110.2	150.5
Mar.....	123.7	123.4	119.9	128.6	109.5	149.6
Apr.....	124.1	123.8	120.6	128.4	109.0	148.7
May.....	124.9	124.9	121.9	129.2	109.1	149.5
June.....	125.6	125.6	123.0	129.3	109.5	151.6
July.....	126.7	126.5	123.8	130.6	111.0	154.8
Aug.....	126.5	126.1	122.6	130.9	111.5	154.8
Sept.....	126.8	126.3	123.3	130.7	111.8	155.8
Oct.....	127.0	126.3	123.6	130.3	111.3	156.2
Nov p.....	127.3	126.9	124.1	131.2	110.4	153.5
Dec p.....	126.6	127.1	124.0	131.4	108.9	144.5

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE C-35.—Industrial production indexes, market groupings, 1947-73

[1967=100]

Year or month	Total industrial production	Final products						Intermediate products	Materials <sup>2</sup>		
		Total	Consumer goods <sup>1</sup>			Equipment			Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods
			Total	Auto-motive products	Home goods	Total	Business				
1947 .....	39.4	38.3	42.7	47.8	39.1	29.7	38.0	42.5	39.7	39.1	38.8
1948 .....	41.0	39.7	44.0	50.0	40.8	31.2	39.5	44.9	41.4	40.2	40.9
1949 .....	38.8	38.5	43.8	49.6	37.7	27.9	34.5	42.6	37.8	36.0	37.8
1950 .....	44.9	43.4	50.0	62.4	52.0	30.2	37.0	49.6	45.2	45.3	43.6
1951 .....	48.7	46.8	49.5	55.2	44.8	42.1	45.2	52.0	50.0	51.6	47.1
1952 .....	50.6	50.3	50.6	49.7	44.8	50.5	51.2	51.7	50.7	52.7	47.3
1953 .....	54.8	53.7	53.7	62.8	50.7	54.7	53.2	55.3	56.3	61.5	50.2
1954 .....	51.9	50.8	53.3	58.4	46.8	47.9	46.8	55.1	52.0	53.1	50.3
1955 .....	58.5	54.9	59.5	77.7	55.2	48.9	50.7	62.6	61.5	65.0	56.9
1956 .....	61.1	58.2	61.7	63.9	58.1	53.7	58.7	65.3	63.1	65.2	59.5
1957 .....	61.9	59.9	63.2	66.9	56.8	55.9	61.0	65.3	63.1	65.1	59.3
1958 .....	57.9	57.1	62.6	53.2	53.6	50.0	51.5	63.9	56.8	54.8	58.1
1959 .....	64.8	62.7	68.7	66.8	61.6	54.9	57.9	70.5	65.5	65.3	65.0
1960 .....	66.2	64.8	71.3	76.4	62.0	56.4	59.4	71.0	66.4	66.1	65.9
1961 .....	66.7	65.3	72.8	69.8	63.9	55.6	57.7	72.4	66.4	64.6	68.2
1962 .....	72.2	70.8	77.7	84.5	69.4	61.9	62.7	76.9	72.4	71.8	72.9
1963 .....	76.5	74.9	82.0	92.5	74.9	65.6	65.8	81.1	77.0	76.6	77.1
1964 .....	81.7	79.6	86.8	96.8	81.7	70.1	74.7	87.3	82.6	82.7	82.1
1965 .....	89.2	86.8	93.0	112.3	91.4	78.7	84.4	93.0	91.0	93.0	88.5
1966 .....	97.9	96.1	98.6	108.8	100.7	93.0	98.8	99.2	99.8	103.0	96.3
1967 .....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1968 .....	105.7	105.8	106.6	117.9	106.9	104.7	103.4	105.7	105.7	105.0	106.9
1969 .....	110.7	109.0	111.1	117.4	111.6	106.1	107.9	112.0	112.4	112.2	112.8
1970 .....	106.6	104.5	110.3	99.9	107.6	96.3	101.4	111.7	107.7	103.2	112.5
1971 .....	106.8	104.7	115.7	119.5	112.6	89.4	96.8	112.5	107.4	101.7	114.1
1972 .....	115.2	111.9	123.6	127.7	124.5	95.5	106.1	121.1	117.4	113.5	122.5
1973 p.....	125.6	121.2	131.7	136.8	140.4	106.7	122.6	131.1	129.3	130.1	129.1
Seasonally adjusted											
1972: Jan...	108.7	106.4	118.5	116.6	118.1	89.5	98.4	115.9	109.2	103.5	116.0
Feb...	110.0	107.6	119.6	119.5	120.7	90.9	99.9	117.0	110.8	105.8	117.0
Mar...	111.6	108.5	119.9	121.3	119.1	92.6	101.5	117.5	113.7	107.8	121.2
Apr...	113.2	110.4	122.5	130.5	124.7	93.5	102.8	117.9	115.1	110.2	121.3
May...	113.8	110.8	122.6	125.8	124.3	94.1	104.0	118.9	115.8	111.3	121.6
June...	114.4	111.0	122.7	125.1	124.9	94.7	104.7	119.4	117.1	112.6	122.8
July...	115.1	111.6	123.3	125.3	124.1	95.3	105.5	119.8	117.8	113.0	124.0
Aug...	116.3	112.6	124.3	126.0	124.3	96.3	107.2	122.3	118.8	114.5	124.7
Sept...	117.6	113.6	125.2	125.4	125.8	97.7	109.6	122.8	120.9	118.1	124.6
Oct...	119.2	115.3	127.0	132.3	127.3	98.9	111.6	124.7	122.3	120.2	125.3
Nov...	120.2	116.3	127.4	138.3	126.9	100.7	113.4	127.6	122.8	121.4	124.6
Dec...	121.1	116.8	127.7	142.9	130.5	101.5	114.4	127.7	124.4	123.5	126.4
1973: Jan...	122.2	118.6	129.8	138.6	134.5	102.9	116.9	128.4	124.5	124.1	126.3
Feb...	123.4	119.3	130.2	141.7	135.8	104.1	118.2	129.5	126.7	126.6	127.7
Mar...	123.7	119.6	130.8	144.1	138.3	104.1	118.6	129.4	127.0	127.6	127.1
Apr...	124.1	120.0	130.9	141.7	139.8	104.7	119.6	129.3	127.7	127.9	128.5
May...	124.9	120.8	131.7	142.6	140.9	105.7	121.3	130.5	128.3	128.6	128.9
June...	125.6	121.3	131.9	142.6	141.3	106.6	122.5	132.0	129.0	129.2	129.4
July...	126.7	122.1	132.9	141.7	142.9	107.3	123.0	132.5	130.9	131.6	130.4
Aug...	126.5	121.4	131.2	121.1	141.1	107.6	124.6	132.1	130.9	131.8	130.6
Sept...	126.8	122.4	132.3	129.8	142.9	108.5	125.8	131.0	131.3	132.3	130.3
Oct...	127.0	122.8	132.8	130.9	142.3	108.8	126.2	130.5	131.5	133.0	129.9
Nov p.	127.3	123.2	133.2	134.1	141.5	109.3	127.1	131.2	131.3	133.4	129.5
Dec p.	126.6	122.0	130.7	122.9	141.0	109.9	127.6	131.0	131.0	133.6	129.7

<sup>1</sup> Also includes apparel and consumer staples, not shown separately.<sup>2</sup> Also includes industrial fuel and power, not shown separately.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE C-36.—Industrial production indexes, selected manufactures, 1947-73

[1967=100]

Year or month	Durable manufactures								Nondurable manufactures			
	Primary metals	Fabricated metal products	Machinery	Transportation equipment	Instruments	Ordinance, private and government	Lumber, clay, and glass	Furniture and miscellaneous	Textiles, apparel, and leather	Paper and printing	Chemicals, petroleum, and rubber	Foods and tobacco
1947.....	64.8	50.2	-----	31.0	24.5	7.8	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
1948.....	67.4	51.1	-----	33.9	25.2	9.0	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
1949.....	56.7	46.1	-----	34.0	22.5	9.2	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
1950.....	71.4	56.5	-----	40.7	26.1	11.4	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
1951.....	77.7	60.4	-----	45.4	30.0	42.2	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
1952.....	70.9	58.9	-----	52.8	35.7	52.0	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
1953.....	80.4	66.5	-----	66.2	39.2	63.2	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
1954.....	65.0	59.9	41.7	57.6	39.6	48.4	64.7	53.7	65.7	52.2	35.4	63.2
1955.....	84.5	68.3	46.7	66.3	44.2	36.1	73.8	65.8	73.4	57.8	41.2	66.6
1956.....	84.0	69.3	52.2	64.3	48.5	31.8	75.9	68.7	75.1	61.5	43.5	70.3
1957.....	80.4	71.1	52.0	68.9	50.7	35.9	73.3	67.1	73.4	62.2	45.8	71.5
1958.....	63.8	63.7	45.4	54.3	47.7	44.4	71.4	62.1	71.8	61.5	46.5	73.6
1959.....	74.5	71.5	53.9	61.5	55.2	46.1	82.2	68.7	79.6	67.0	53.8	77.2
1960.....	74.2	71.6	56.2	63.7	57.8	46.4	78.5	69.7	79.2	69.2	55.6	79.2
1961.....	72.9	69.8	57.1	59.9	57.3	39.2	79.7	70.6	80.2	71.0	58.3	81.5
1962.....	78.2	75.9	64.8	69.3	59.8	45.0	84.3	76.1	84.3	74.3	64.5	84.0
1963.....	84.3	78.4	67.9	75.9	66.4	51.6	88.9	79.5	86.9	78.4	70.0	87.0
1964.....	95.7	83.3	74.3	79.6	71.3	50.7	94.0	84.7	91.9	84.5	75.9	90.6
1965.....	104.0	92.6	84.1	91.3	82.9	60.5	98.7	93.8	97.8	90.5	83.8	92.6
1966.....	108.8	100.5	98.6	101.2	95.3	75.1	102.6	100.8	101.7	98.9	94.1	97.0
1967.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1968.....	103.2	106.3	101.9	109.7	106.7	113.7	105.6	106.2	104.9	104.2	109.6	103.6
1969.....	114.1	113.6	106.8	107.6	116.1	111.6	111.1	111.6	105.9	109.1	118.4	107.5
1970.....	106.9	109.4	100.3	90.4	110.8	95.3	106.3	108.8	100.2	107.8	118.2	110.8
1971.....	100.9	107.4	96.2	92.9	108.5	86.1	111.5	111.7	100.7	107.8	124.7	113.7
1972.....	113.1	114.8	107.5	99.0	120.2	86.0	120.0	122.7	108.1	116.1	137.8	117.6
1973 p.....	127.0	130.8	125.9	109.2	138.3	85.3	129.4	135.3	114.7	122.3	149.3	122.0
Seasonally adjusted												
1972: Jan.....	102.4	106.0	98.5	92.0	111.3	83.2	115.5	115.0	102.0	111.3	129.8	115.7
Feb.....	102.6	108.6	99.5	94.7	114.5	83.7	118.0	117.3	101.1	112.6	132.6	115.9
Mar.....	104.9	110.2	100.8	96.1	114.5	86.4	117.2	118.3	104.2	115.0	133.6	116.3
Apr.....	108.3	111.5	103.3	100.0	116.7	86.4	117.4	119.7	107.0	112.7	136.4	117.7
May.....	110.1	112.9	104.9	98.3	118.2	86.4	117.9	121.1	106.8	114.0	137.3	117.6
June.....	111.3	114.5	106.6	97.4	120.7	87.7	118.5	122.1	107.5	114.6	136.9	117.9
July.....	115.1	114.3	108.4	97.7	121.7	86.6	120.0	123.7	109.0	117.0	138.5	117.0
Aug.....	114.3	116.6	109.7	98.1	122.7	86.5	121.0	126.2	109.7	117.6	140.0	118.3
Sept.....	119.7	118.0	111.8	99.5	124.3	84.8	121.9	126.6	111.2	117.7	142.2	118.6
Oct.....	122.1	120.4	114.0	102.7	125.0	85.2	124.9	126.9	112.1	119.9	141.6	118.5
Nov.....	122.9	122.2	115.7	105.0	125.1	87.3	124.5	126.6	113.0	120.0	142.0	119.0
Dec.....	125.4	122.3	116.8	106.6	126.6	87.8	123.7	127.7	113.2	120.3	143.8	118.5
1973: Jan.....	123.1	125.7	118.4	107.6	130.1	87.0	126.4	130.3	113.4	120.0	145.5	119.6
Feb.....	124.7	126.2	119.1	110.0	131.9	87.6	127.3	132.8	114.4	121.5	146.3	122.0
Mar.....	123.5	128.4	121.4	110.3	133.8	87.1	129.1	133.4	114.6	122.4	146.3	121.5
Apr.....	125.8	128.9	122.6	110.0	134.7	86.4	129.9	133.1	114.0	120.8	147.9	120.7
May.....	126.1	130.3	124.7	111.0	138.9	85.4	130.3	136.0	113.3	121.9	150.2	121.5
June.....	124.5	133.4	126.9	112.2	140.2	86.7	129.2	135.4	115.0	122.8	149.8	119.5
July.....	128.1	133.5	127.6	112.1	140.8	86.7	129.8	135.9	114.5	123.8	151.8	121.3
Aug.....	125.6	133.8	128.5	105.7	140.9	83.8	129.2	137.5	115.4	124.5	151.0	122.0
Sept.....	127.8	131.5	130.0	107.3	141.5	83.7	128.8	138.2	117.5	122.1	150.9	122.2
Oct.....	130.8	132.6	128.5	108.9	141.0	83.9	129.7	136.1	116.2	121.3	151.1	121.9
Nov p.....	130.0	132.9	130.5	108.3	141.8	82.3	130.7	135.4	116.2	121.7	151.0	124.8
Dec p.....	130.4	134.1	131.0	103.3	143.5	83.3	132.5	137.3	116.0	122.6	151.6	124.4

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.



TABLE C-37.—Capacity utilization rate in manufacturing and major materials industries, 1948-73

Period	Manufacturing					Major materials industries, utilization rate <sup>2</sup>
	Output <sup>1</sup>	Capacity	Utilization rate <sup>2</sup>			
			Total	Primary processing	Advanced processing	
	1967 output=100		Percent			
1948	41.5	44.8	92.7	98.1	89.8	87.9
1949	39.1	47.3	82.7	83.8	82.1	77.0
1950	45.4	49.4	91.9	97.8	88.8	88.5
1951	49.3	51.8	95.1	100.1	92.5	91.4
1952	50.9	54.9	92.8	91.2	93.7	82.3
1953	55.4	58.1	95.5	94.3	96.1	87.3
1954	51.4	61.2	84.1	82.9	84.7	78.4
1955	58.1	64.4	90.0	93.7	87.7	89.8
1956	60.3	68.3	88.2	90.7	86.9	90.6
1957	61.1	74.8	84.5	85.2	84.1	84.5
1958	56.9	75.7	75.1	75.2	75.0	76.0
1959	64.0	78.6	81.4	82.7	80.7	81.5
1960	65.3	81.6	80.1	79.4	80.3	79.4
1961	65.6	84.5	77.6	78.2	77.3	79.8
1962	71.3	87.7	81.4	81.8	81.1	82.0
1963	75.7	91.2	83.0	84.0	82.5	85.0
1964	81.1	94.8	85.5	88.0	84.2	89.3
1965	89.0	100.0	89.0	91.1	87.8	90.7
1966	98.1	106.7	91.9	92.1	91.8	91.2
1967	100.0	113.7	87.9	85.7	89.1	86.8
1968	105.6	120.5	87.7	86.8	88.1	89.5
1969	110.4	127.7	86.5	88.5	85.4	90.7
1970	105.3	134.6	78.3	81.5	76.5	86.6
1971	105.2	140.3	75.0	79.3	72.7	85.8
1972	114.0	145.0	78.6	84.6	75.4	90.2
1973 <sup>p</sup>	125.1	150.7	83.0	89.8	79.4	94.9
Seasonally adjusted						
1968: I	103.5	117.9	87.9	86.1	88.8	90.6
II	105.3	119.6	88.1	87.6	88.3	90.6
III	106.3	121.3	87.6	86.6	88.2	88.4
IV	107.3	123.0	87.2	87.0	87.3	88.6
1969: I	109.5	124.9	87.7	88.6	87.1	89.8
II	110.4	126.7	87.1	88.7	86.2	90.3
III	111.8	128.6	86.9	88.9	85.8	91.1
IV	110.1	130.5	84.3	87.7	82.5	91.6
1970: I	106.8	132.2	80.8	83.5	79.3	88.2
II	106.8	133.8	79.8	82.4	78.4	86.0
III	105.9	135.3	78.3	81.7	76.5	86.5
IV	101.6	136.9	74.2	78.5	71.9	85.7
1971: I	103.8	138.3	75.0	79.4	72.7	87.0
II	105.6	139.6	75.6	81.1	72.7	87.6
III	105.3	141.0	74.7	78.0	72.9	83.7
IV	106.1	142.3	74.6	78.6	72.4	84.7
1972: I	108.5	143.5	75.6	80.8	72.9	87.7
II	112.5	144.5	77.9	83.5	74.9	89.9
III	115.5	145.5	79.4	85.9	75.9	91.0
IV	119.4	146.6	81.5	88.3	77.8	92.4
1973: I <sup>p</sup>	122.5	148.0	82.8	89.6	79.1	93.8
II <sup>p</sup>	124.8	149.8	83.3	90.1	79.7	94.5
III <sup>p</sup>	126.2	151.6	83.3	90.1	79.7	96.0
IV <sup>p</sup>	126.7	153.3	82.6	89.4	79.0	95.1

<sup>1</sup> May differ slightly from data shown in Table C-34 because of rounding.<sup>2</sup> Output as percent of capacity.

Note.—For description of series, see "Federal Reserve Bulletin," October 1971 and November 1966 issues for manufacturing series and August 1973 issue for major materials industries series

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, based on data of Federal Reserve, Department of Commerce, McGraw-Hill Information Systems Company, and various industry organizations.

TABLE C-38.—*New construction activity, 1929-73*

[Value put in place, billions of dollars]

Year or month	Total new construction	Private construction							Public construction		
		Total	Residential buildings <sup>1</sup>		Nonresidential buildings and other construction <sup>1</sup>				Total	Federally owned	State and locally owned <sup>3</sup>
			Total <sup>2</sup>	New housing units	Total	Commercial <sup>3</sup>	Industrial	Other <sup>4</sup>			
1929.....	10.8	8.3	3.6	3.0	4.7	1.1	0.9	2.6	2.5	0.2	2.3
1933.....	2.9	1.2	.5	.3	.8	.1	.2	.5	1.6	.5	1.1
1939.....	8.2	4.4	2.7	2.3	1.7	.3	.3	1.2	3.8	.8	3.1
1940.....	8.7	5.1	3.0	2.6	2.1	.3	.4	1.3	3.6	1.2	2.4
1941.....	12.0	6.2	3.5	3.0	2.7	.4	.8	1.5	5.8	3.8	2.0
1942.....	14.1	3.4	1.7	1.4	1.7	.2	.3	1.2	10.7	9.3	1.3
1943.....	8.3	2.0	.9	.7	1.1	.0	.2	.9	6.3	5.6	.7
1944.....	5.3	2.2	.8	.6	1.4	.1	.2	1.1	3.1	2.5	.6
1945.....	5.8	3.4	1.3	.7	2.1	.2	.6	1.3	2.4	1.7	.7
1946.....	12.6	10.4	4.8	3.3	5.6	1.2	1.7	2.8	2.2	.9	1.4
New series											
1946.....	14.3	12.1	6.2	4.8	5.8	1.2	1.7	3.0	2.2	.9	1.4
1947.....	20.0	16.7	9.9	7.8	6.9	1.0	1.7	4.2	3.3	.8	2.5
1948.....	26.1	21.4	13.1	10.5	8.2	1.4	1.4	5.5	4.7	1.2	3.5
1949.....	26.7	20.5	12.4	10.0	8.0	1.2	1.0	5.9	6.3	1.5	4.8
1950.....	33.6	26.7	18.1	15.6	8.6	1.4	1.1	6.1	6.9	1.6	5.2
1951.....	35.4	26.2	15.9	13.2	10.3	1.5	2.1	6.7	9.3	3.0	6.3
1952.....	36.8	26.0	15.8	12.9	10.2	1.1	2.3	6.8	10.8	4.2	6.6
1953.....	39.1	27.9	16.6	13.4	11.3	1.8	2.2	7.3	11.2	4.1	7.1
1954.....	41.4	29.7	18.2	14.9	11.5	2.2	2.0	7.2	11.7	3.4	8.3
1955.....	46.5	34.8	21.9	18.2	12.9	3.2	2.4	7.3	11.7	2.8	8.9
1956.....	47.6	34.9	20.2	16.1	14.7	3.6	3.1	8.0	12.7	2.7	10.0
1957.....	49.1	35.1	19.0	14.7	16.1	3.6	3.6	9.0	14.1	3.0	11.1
1958.....	50.2	34.7	19.8	15.4	14.9	3.6	2.4	8.9	15.5	3.4	12.1
1959.....	55.3	39.2	24.3	19.2	15.0	3.9	2.1	8.9	16.1	3.7	12.3
1960.....	54.6	38.8	23.0	17.3	15.8	4.2	2.9	8.8	15.9	3.6	12.2
1961.....	56.3	39.1	23.1	17.1	16.0	4.7	2.8	8.6	17.1	3.9	13.3
1962.....	60.0	42.1	25.2	19.4	16.9	5.1	2.8	9.0	17.9	3.9	14.0
1963.....	64.6	45.2	27.9	21.7	17.3	5.0	2.9	9.4	19.4	4.0	15.4
1964.....	67.4	47.0	28.0	21.8	19.0	5.4	3.6	10.1	20.4	3.9	16.5
1965.....	73.4	51.4	27.9	21.7	23.4	-----	-----	-----	22.1	4.0	18.0
1966.....	76.0	52.0	25.7	19.4	26.3	-----	-----	-----	24.0	4.0	20.0
1967.....	77.5	52.0	25.6	19.0	26.4	-----	-----	-----	25.5	3.5	22.1
1968.....	86.6	59.0	30.6	24.0	28.5	7.8	6.0	14.7	27.6	3.4	24.2
1969.....	93.4	65.4	33.2	25.9	32.2	9.4	6.8	16.0	28.0	3.3	24.7
1970.....	94.2	66.1	31.9	24.3	34.2	9.8	6.5	17.9	28.1	3.3	24.8
1971.....	109.2	79.4	43.3	35.1	36.1	11.6	5.4	19.1	29.9	4.0	25.9
1972.....	122.8	92.6	54.2	44.7	39.5	13.5	4.7	21.3	30.2	4.4	25.8
1973 <sup>6</sup> .....	135.1	102.8	57.9	47.8	44.9	15.5	6.0	23.4	32.2	4.9	27.4

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-38.—*New construction activity, 1929-73—Continued*

[Value put in place, billions of dollars]

Year or month	Total new construction	Private construction							Public construction		
		Total	Residential buildings <sup>1</sup>		Nonresidential buildings and other construction <sup>1</sup>				Total	Federally owned	State and locally owned <sup>5</sup>
			Total <sup>2</sup>	New housing units	Total	Commercial <sup>3</sup>	Industrial	Other <sup>4</sup>			
Seasonally adjusted annual rates											
1972: Jan.....	119.9	88.6	49.8	40.6	38.8	13.2	4.9	20.7	31.3	4.4	26.9
Feb.....	121.5	91.1	52.0	42.8	39.1	13.2	4.7	21.2	30.4	4.4	26.0
Mar.....	123.0	92.6	53.3	44.0	39.4	13.2	4.8	21.4	30.4	4.6	25.7
Apr.....	120.8	91.7	52.9	43.6	38.9	13.4	4.6	20.9	29.0	4.2	24.9
May.....	122.5	92.7	52.7	43.4	40.0	14.1	4.7	21.2	29.8	4.5	25.2
June.....	121.6	92.6	53.3	43.8	39.3	13.3	4.8	21.1	29.0	4.8	24.3
July.....	121.6	92.4	53.8	44.1	38.7	13.2	4.6	20.8	29.2	4.4	24.8
Aug.....	123.0	93.9	54.5	44.7	39.4	13.4	4.7	21.3	29.2	4.1	25.1
Sept.....	125.1	94.5	55.5	45.9	39.0	13.4	4.5	21.0	30.6	4.3	26.4
Oct.....	128.5	96.2	56.4	46.9	39.8	13.7	4.3	21.8	32.3	4.4	27.9
Nov.....	126.8	97.5	57.2	47.8	40.3	13.6	4.6	22.1	29.3	4.4	24.9
Dec.....	131.6	98.5	57.5	48.0	40.9	13.9	4.8	22.3	33.1	4.4	28.7
1973: Jan.....	135.7	102.0	59.4	48.1	42.7	15.0	5.3	22.4	33.7	5.1	28.6
Feb.....	136.4	104.1	61.5	49.4	42.6	14.9	5.2	22.6	32.3	4.9	27.4
Mar.....	137.5	103.8	60.7	49.6	43.1	15.1	5.5	22.5	33.6	5.5	28.1
Apr.....	133.8	101.2	58.0	48.9	43.2	15.5	5.3	22.4	32.6	4.5	28.0
May.....	134.1	101.8	57.5	49.2	44.3	16.1	5.3	22.9	32.3	5.3	27.0
June.....	133.8	102.8	58.2	49.5	44.6	15.7	5.9	23.0	31.0	4.8	26.1
July.....	136.9	105.4	59.4	49.5	45.9	16.1	6.3	23.5	31.5	4.9	26.6
Aug.....	136.9	105.8	59.8	49.3	46.0	15.8	6.7	23.5	31.1	4.6	26.5
Sept.....	136.9	103.7	59.0	48.2	44.7	15.1	6.3	23.3	33.2	4.6	28.6
Oct.....	134.9	102.7	56.3	46.0	46.4	15.6	6.6	24.3	32.2	4.8	27.4
Nov.....	134.0	101.8	54.6	44.0	47.2	15.6	6.8	24.8	32.3	4.8	-----

<sup>1</sup> Beginning 1960, farm residential buildings included in residential buildings; prior to 1960, included in nonresidential buildings and other construction.

<sup>2</sup> Total includes additions and alterations and nonhousekeeping units, not shown separately.

<sup>3</sup> Office buildings, warehouses, stores, restaurants, garages, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Religious, educational, hospital and institutional, miscellaneous nonresidential, farm, public utilities, and all other private.

<sup>5</sup> Includes Federal grants-in-aid for State and locally owned projects.

<sup>6</sup> Preliminary estimates by Council of Economic Advisers.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, except as noted.

TABLE C-39.—*New housing starts and applications for financing, 1929-73*

(Thousands of units)

Year or month	Housing starts							New private housing units authorized <sup>5</sup>	Proposed home construction <sup>6</sup>	
	Private and public <sup>1</sup>		Private <sup>1</sup>							
			Total (farm and non-farm)	Non-farm	Total (farm and nonfarm)		Government home programs (nonfarm) <sup>2</sup>			
	Total	Type of structure <sup>2</sup>			FHA <sup>4</sup>	VA				
		One family					Two or more families			
1929		509.0								
1933		93.0								
1939		515.0				144.7			179.8	
1940		602.6				176.6			231.2	
1941		706.1				217.1			288.5	
1942		356.0				160.2			238.5	
1943		191.0				126.1			144.4	
1944		141.8				83.6			62.9	
New series										
1945		326.0				38.9	18.8		56.6	
1946		1,023.0				67.1	91.8		121.7	
1947		1,268.0				178.3	160.3		286.4	
1948		1,362.0				216.4	71.1		293.2	
1949		1,466.0				252.6	90.8		327.0	
1950		1,952.0				328.2	191.2		397.7	
1951		1,491.0				186.9	148.6		192.8	164.4
1952		1,504.0				229.1	141.3		267.9	226.3
1953		1,438.0				216.5	156.5		253.7	251.4
1954		1,551.0				250.9	307.0		338.6	535.4
1955		1,646.0				268.7	392.9		306.2	620.8
1956		1,349.0				183.4	270.7		197.7	401.5
1957		1,224.0				150.1	128.3		198.8	159.4
1958		1,382.0				270.3	102.1		341.7	234.2
1959	1,553.7	1,531.3	1,517.0	1,234.0	283.0	307.0	109.3	1,208.3	369.7	234.0
1960	1,296.1	1,274.0	1,252.2	994.7	257.4	225.7	74.6	998.0	242.4	142.9
1961	1,365.0	1,336.8	1,313.0	974.3	338.7	198.8	83.3	1,064.2	243.8	177.8
1962	1,492.5	1,468.7	1,462.9	991.4	471.5	197.3	77.8	1,186.6	221.1	171.2
1963	1,634.9	1,614.8	1,603.2	1,012.4	590.8	166.2	71.0	1,334.7	190.2	139.3
1964	1,561.0	1,534.0	1,528.8	970.5	558.3	154.0	59.2	1,285.8	182.1	113.6
1965	1,509.7	1,487.5	1,472.8	963.7	509.1	159.9	49.4	1,239.8	188.9	102.1
1966	1,195.8	1,172.8	1,164.9	778.6	386.3	129.1	36.8	971.9	153.0	99.2
1967	1,321.9	1,298.8	1,291.6	843.9	447.7	141.9	52.5	1,141.0	167.2	124.3
1968	1,545.4	1,521.4	1,507.6	899.4	608.2	147.7	56.1	1,353.4	168.9	131.7
1969	1,499.5	1,482.3	1,466.8	810.6	656.2	153.6	51.2	1,323.7	187.6	138.2
1970	1,469.0	( <sup>8</sup> )	1,433.6	812.9	620.7	233.5	61.0	1,351.5	315.0	143.7
1971	2,084.5	( <sup>8</sup> )	2,052.2	1,151.0	901.2	301.2	94.0	1,924.6	366.8	217.9
1972	2,378.5	( <sup>8</sup> )	2,356.6	1,309.2	1,047.5	198.4	104.0	2,218.9	225.2	209.4
1973 p	2,053.8	( <sup>8</sup> )	2,041.6	1,131.4	910.2	73.6	86.1	1,771.3	83.2	161.8

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-39.—*New housing starts and applications for financing, 1929-73—Continued*

(Thousands of units)

Year or month	Housing starts							New private housing units authorized <sup>5</sup>	Proposed home construction <sup>6</sup>	
	Private and public <sup>1</sup>		Private <sup>1</sup>							
	Total (farm and non-farm)	Non-farm	Total (farm and nonfarm)			Government home programs (nonfarm) <sup>2</sup>				
			Total	Type of structure <sup>3</sup>		FHA <sup>4</sup>	VA			
				One family	Two or more families					
Seasonally adjusted annual rates										
1972: Jan. ....	150.9	(9)	2,439	1,395	1,044	350	115	2,265	325	232
Feb. ....	153.6	(9)	2,540	1,281	1,260	285	118	2,168	323	226
Mar. ....	205.8	(9)	2,313	1,310	1,003	260	123	2,153	264	209
Apr. ....	213.2	(9)	2,204	1,215	989	221	104	2,146	227	243
May. ....	227.9	(9)	2,318	1,308	1,011	197	100	2,045	222	198
June. ....	226.2	(9)	2,315	1,283	1,032	182	99	2,201	221	219
July. ....	207.5	(9)	2,244	1,319	925	176	107	2,196	224	200
Aug. ....	231.0	(9)	2,424	1,373	1,051	179	103	2,281	207	202
Sept. ....	204.4	(9)	2,426	1,382	1,045	175	106	2,366	166	192
Oct. ....	218.2	(9)	2,446	1,315	1,131	149	98	2,318	147	189
Nov. ....	187.1	(9)	2,395	1,324	1,071	125	92	2,226	162	207
Dec. ....	152.7	(9)	2,369	1,207	1,162	106	86	2,399	131	194
1973: Jan. ....	147.3	(9)	2,497	1,450	1,047	87	96	2,233	124	222
Feb. ....	139.5	(9)	2,456	1,372	1,084	111	105	2,209	100	217
Mar. ....	201.1	(9)	2,260	1,245	1,015	92	101	2,129	93	201
Apr. ....	205.4	(9)	2,123	1,202	921	74	100	1,939	68	169
May. ....	234.2	(9)	2,413	1,271	1,142	81	111	1,838	89	161
June. ....	203.4	(9)	2,128	1,124	1,004	80	88	2,030	103	166
July. ....	203.2	(9)	2,191	1,247	944	80	87	1,780	93	135
Aug. ....	199.9	(9)	2,094	1,125	969	69	91	1,750	70	143
Sept. ....	148.9	(9)	1,804	982	822	68	71	1,596	94	133
Oct. ....	149.5	(9)	1,646	956	690	52	62	1,316	50	141
Nov. <sup>7</sup> .....	132.9	(9)	1,696	936	760	57	56	1,314	57	136
Dec. <sup>8</sup> .....	88.6	(9)	1,355	762	593	37	64	1,231	30	119

<sup>1</sup> Units in structures built by private developers for sale upon completion to local public housing authorities under the Department of Housing and Urban Development "Turnkey" program are classified as private housing. Military housing starts, including those financed with mortgages insured by FHA under Section 803 of the National Housing Act, are included in publicly owned starts but excluded from total private starts and from FHA starts.

<sup>2</sup> Not available prior to 1959 except for nonfarm for 1929-44.

<sup>3</sup> Data are not available for new homes started under the Department of Agriculture, Farmers Home Administration program.

<sup>4</sup> Units are for 1- to 4-family housing.

<sup>5</sup> Authorized by issuance of local building permit: in 14,000 permit-issuing places beginning 1972; 13,000 for 1967-71; 12,000 for 1963-66; and 10,000 prior to 1963.

<sup>6</sup> Units in mortgage applications or appraisal requests for new home construction.

<sup>7</sup> Monthly estimates for September 1945-May 1950 were prepared by Housing and Home Finance Agency.

<sup>8</sup> Not available separately beginning January 1970.

Sources: Department of Commerce, Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Veterans Administration (except as noted).

TABLE C-40.—Business expenditures for new plant and equipment, 1947-74<sup>1</sup>

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Total	Manufacturing			Nonmanufacturing							
		Total	Durable goods	Non-durable goods	Total	Mining	Transportation			Public utilities	Communication	Commercial and other <sup>2</sup>
							Rail-road	Air	Other			
1947.....	19.33	8.44	3.25	5.19	10.89	0.69	0.91	0.17	1.13	1.54	1.40	5.05
1948.....	21.30	9.01	3.30	5.71	12.29	.93	1.37	.10	1.17	2.54	1.74	4.42
1949.....	18.98	7.12	2.45	4.68	11.86	.88	1.42	.12	.76	3.10	1.34	4.24
1950.....	20.21	7.39	2.94	4.45	12.82	.84	1.18	.10	1.09	3.24	1.14	5.22
1951.....	25.46	10.71	4.82	5.89	14.75	1.11	1.58	.14	1.33	3.56	1.37	5.67
1952.....	26.43	11.45	5.21	6.24	14.98	1.21	1.50	.24	1.23	3.74	1.61	5.45
1953.....	28.20	11.86	5.31	6.56	16.34	1.25	1.42	.24	1.29	4.34	1.78	6.02
1954.....	27.19	11.24	4.91	6.33	15.95	1.28	.93	.24	1.22	3.99	1.82	6.45
1955.....	29.53	11.89	5.41	6.48	17.64	1.31	1.02	.26	1.30	4.03	2.11	7.63
1956.....	35.73	15.40	7.45	7.95	20.34	1.64	1.37	.35	1.31	4.52	2.82	8.32
1957.....	37.94	16.51	7.84	8.68	21.43	1.69	1.58	.41	1.30	5.67	3.19	7.60
1958.....	31.89	12.38	5.61	6.77	19.51	1.43	.86	.37	1.06	5.52	2.79	7.48
1959.....	33.55	12.77	5.81	6.95	20.78	1.36	1.02	.78	1.33	5.14	2.72	8.44
1960.....	36.75	15.09	7.23	7.85	21.66	1.30	1.16	.66	1.30	5.24	3.24	8.75
1961.....	35.91	14.33	6.31	8.02	21.58	1.29	.82	.73	1.23	5.00	3.39	9.13
1962.....	38.39	15.06	6.79	8.26	23.33	1.40	1.02	.52	1.65	4.90	3.85	9.99
1963.....	40.77	16.22	7.53	8.70	24.55	1.27	1.26	.40	1.58	4.98	4.06	10.99
1964.....	46.97	19.34	9.28	10.07	27.62	1.34	1.66	1.02	1.50	5.49	4.61	12.02
1965.....	54.42	23.44	11.50	11.94	30.98	1.46	1.99	1.22	1.68	6.13	5.30	13.19
1966.....	63.51	28.20	14.06	14.14	35.32	1.62	2.37	1.74	1.64	7.43	6.02	14.48
1967.....	65.47	28.51	14.06	14.45	36.96	1.65	1.86	2.29	1.48	8.74	6.34	14.59
1968.....	67.76	28.37	14.12	14.25	39.40	1.63	1.45	2.56	1.59	10.20	6.83	15.14
1969.....	75.56	31.68	15.96	15.72	43.88	1.86	1.86	2.51	1.68	11.61	8.30	16.05
1970.....	79.71	31.95	15.80	16.15	47.76	1.89	1.78	3.03	1.23	13.14	10.10	16.59
1971.....	81.21	29.99	14.15	15.84	51.22	2.16	1.67	1.88	1.38	15.30	10.77	18.05
1972.....	88.44	31.35	15.64	15.72	57.09	2.42	1.80	2.46	1.46	17.00	11.89	20.07
1973 <sup>3</sup> .....	100.08	38.00	19.39	18.61	62.07	2.76	1.94	2.41	1.60	19.09	13.03	21.24
1974 <sup>3</sup> .....	112.11	44.40	22.61	21.79	67.71	3.14	2.27	2.16	1.62	22.16	36.36	
Seasonally adjusted annual rates												
1971: I.....	79.32	30.46	14.21	16.25	48.86	2.04	1.46	1.29	1.33	14.64	10.70	17.39
II.....	81.61	30.12	14.06	16.06	51.50	2.08	1.88	2.28	1.40	14.91	11.21	17.72
III.....	80.75	29.19	13.76	15.43	51.56	2.23	1.72	1.68	1.48	15.87	10.73	17.85
IV.....	83.18	30.35	14.61	15.74	52.82	2.30	1.64	2.26	1.33	15.74	10.44	19.10
1972: I.....	86.79	30.09	15.06	15.02	56.70	2.42	2.10	1.96	1.48	16.92	11.71	20.10
II.....	87.12	30.37	14.77	15.60	56.75	2.38	1.88	2.89	1.53	16.60	11.59	19.88
III.....	87.67	30.98	15.67	15.31	56.70	2.40	1.50	2.67	1.41	17.01	11.56	20.16
IV.....	91.94	33.64	16.86	16.78	58.30	2.46	1.71	2.33	1.42	17.53	12.63	20.21
1973: I.....	96.19	35.51	17.88	17.63	60.68	2.59	2.11	2.21	1.53	18.38	12.34	21.53
II.....	97.76	36.58	18.64	17.94	61.18	2.77	1.75	2.72	1.62	18.08	12.70	21.55
III.....	100.90	38.81	19.73	19.08	62.09	2.82	1.95	2.49	1.79	18.58	13.12	21.36
IV <sup>3</sup> .....	104.94	40.54	20.94	19.60	64.40	2.85	1.98	2.22	1.53	21.20	34.63	
1974: I <sup>3</sup> .....	108.16	42.92	22.21	20.71	65.24	2.90	2.43	2.16	1.74	21.57	34.43	
II <sup>3</sup> .....	111.92	45.12	22.69	22.43	66.80							

<sup>1</sup> Excludes agricultural business; real estate operators; medical, legal, educational, and cultural service; and nonprofit organizations. These figures do not agree precisely with the nonresidential fixed investment data in the gross national product estimates, mainly because those data include investment by farmers, professionals, institutions, and real estate firms, and certain outlays charged to current account.

<sup>2</sup> Commercial and other includes trade, service, construction, finance, and insurance.

<sup>3</sup> Estimates based on expected capital expenditures reported by business in October-December 1973. Includes adjustments when necessary for systematic tendencies in expectations data.

Note.—Annual total is the sum of unadjusted expenditures; it does not necessarily coincide with the average of seasonally adjusted figures.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-41.—Sales and inventories in manufacturing and trade, 1947-73

(Amounts in millions of dollars)

Year or month	Total manufacturing and trade			Manufacturing			Merchant wholesalers			Retail trade		
	Sales <sup>1</sup>	Inventories <sup>2</sup>	Ratio <sup>3</sup>	Sales <sup>1</sup>	Inventories <sup>2</sup>	Ratio <sup>3</sup>	Sales <sup>1</sup>	Inventories <sup>2</sup>	Ratio <sup>3</sup>	Sales <sup>1</sup>	Inventories <sup>2</sup>	Ratio <sup>3</sup>
1947				15,513	25,897	1.58				10,200	14,241	1.26
1948	35,260	52,507	1.42	17,316	28,543	1.57	6,808	7,957	1.13	11,135	16,007	1.39
1949	33,788	49,497	1.53	16,126	26,321	1.75	6,514	7,706	1.19	11,149	15,470	1.41
1950	38,596	59,822	1.36	18,634	31,078	1.48	7,695	9,284	1.07	12,268	19,460	1.38
1951	43,356	70,242	1.55	21,714	39,306	1.66	8,597	9,886	1.16	13,046	21,050	1.64
1952	44,840	72,377	1.58	22,529	41,136	1.78	8,782	10,210	1.12	13,529	21,031	1.52
1953	47,987	76,122	1.58	24,843	43,948	1.76	9,052	10,686	1.17	14,091	21,488	1.53
1954	46,443	73,175	1.60	23,355	41,612	1.81	8,993	10,637	1.18	14,095	20,926	1.51
1955	51,694	79,516	1.47	26,480	45,069	1.62	9,893	11,678	1.13	15,321	22,769	1.43
1956	54,063	87,304	1.55	27,740	50,642	1.73	10,513	13,260	1.19	15,811	23,402	1.47
1957	55,879	89,052	1.59	28,736	51,871	1.80	10,475	12,730	1.23	16,667	24,451	1.44
1958	54,233	86,922	1.60	27,280	50,070	1.84	10,257	12,739	1.24	16,696	24,113	1.43
1959	59,661	91,891	1.50	30,219	52,707	1.70	11,491	13,879	1.15	17,951	25,305	1.40
1960	60,746	94,747	1.56	30,796	53,814	1.76	11,656	14,120	1.22	18,294	26,813	1.45
1961 <sup>4</sup>	61,133	95,648	1.54	30,896	54,939	1.74	11,988	14,488	1.20	18,249	26,221	1.43
1962	65,417	101,090	1.51	33,113	58,213	1.72	12,674	14,936	1.16	19,630	27,941	1.38
1963	68,969	105,477	1.49	35,032	60,043	1.69	13,382	16,048	1.15	20,556	29,386	1.39
1964	73,685	111,457	1.47	37,335	63,386	1.64	14,527	16,977	1.13	21,823	31,094	1.40
1965	80,276	120,900	1.45	41,003	68,221	1.60	15,595	18,274	1.14	23,677	34,405	1.39
1966	87,178	136,729	1.47	44,869	77,965	1.62	16,979	20,691	1.14	25,330	38,073	1.44
1967	89,698	145,164	1.57	46,449	84,655	1.76	17,099	21,557	1.21	26,151	38,952	1.46
1968	97,100	155,376	1.55	50,282	90,875	1.74	18,329	22,528	1.20	28,490	41,973	1.43
1969	103,104	166,813	1.56	53,555	97,074	1.76	19,726	24,363	1.19	29,824	45,376	1.46
1970	104,708	174,875	1.63	52,860	101,645	1.89	20,554	26,604	1.23	31,294	46,626	1.47
1971	112,267	183,622	1.60	55,917	102,445	1.82	22,280	28,916	1.23	34,071	52,261	1.47
1972	124,680	194,151	1.51	62,466	107,719	1.67	24,850	31,732	1.21	37,365	54,700	1.42
1973 <sup>5</sup>	144,094	215,646	1.42	72,032	118,435	1.56	30,083	36,283	1.13	41,979	60,928	1.37
Seasonally adjusted												
1972: Jan	118,299	184,068	1.56	59,062	102,561	1.74	24,351	29,049	1.19	34,886	52,458	1.50
Feb	117,998	184,571	1.56	59,120	102,906	1.74	23,533	29,181	1.24	35,345	52,484	1.48
Mar	120,239	184,856	1.54	59,905	103,043	1.72	23,884	29,174	1.22	36,450	52,639	1.44
Apr	121,352	185,655	1.53	60,886	103,267	1.70	24,170	29,574	1.22	36,296	52,814	1.46
May	122,673	186,816	1.52	61,272	103,685	1.69	24,260	29,729	1.23	37,141	53,402	1.44
June	122,347	187,194	1.53	61,295	104,260	1.70	24,230	29,641	1.22	36,822	53,293	1.45
July	122,783	187,681	1.53	61,047	104,685	1.71	24,394	30,056	1.23	37,342	52,940	1.42
Aug	126,792	189,093	1.49	63,686	105,822	1.66	25,137	30,164	1.20	37,969	53,107	1.40
Sept	127,656	190,486	1.49	64,503	106,168	1.65	25,407	30,657	1.21	37,746	53,661	1.42
Oct	130,336	191,583	1.47	65,451	106,617	1.63	25,779	31,032	1.20	39,106	53,934	1.38
Nov	131,918	192,921	1.46	66,993	106,974	1.60	26,212	31,289	1.19	38,713	54,758	1.41
Dec	133,483	194,151	1.45	67,104	107,719	1.61	26,962	31,732	1.18	39,417	54,700	1.39
1973: Jan	136,863	196,295	1.43	68,401	108,187	1.58	27,755	32,582	1.17	40,707	55,526	1.36
Feb	138,910	198,172	1.43	69,245	109,082	1.58	28,423	33,051	1.16	41,242	55,039	1.36
Mar	141,010	199,525	1.41	69,719	110,174	1.58	29,312	33,245	1.13	41,979	56,106	1.34
Apr	141,274	200,787	1.42	70,468	110,577	1.57	29,621	33,574	1.13	41,185	56,636	1.38
May	142,682	202,896	1.42	71,284	111,625	1.57	29,675	33,985	1.15	41,723	57,285	1.37
June	142,311	205,252	1.44	71,616	113,025	1.58	29,528	34,148	1.16	41,167	58,079	1.41
July	146,458	206,813	1.41	73,248	113,910	1.56	30,443	34,653	1.14	42,767	58,250	1.36
Aug	146,068	208,668	1.43	73,021	114,907	1.57	30,692	34,934	1.14	42,355	58,797	1.39
Sept	146,241	210,354	1.44	73,060	116,114	1.59	30,645	35,266	1.15	42,535	58,974	1.39
Oct	150,257	212,417	1.44	75,269	117,224	1.56	31,918	35,379	1.11	43,070	59,814	1.39
Nov <sup>6</sup>	152,957	215,645	1.41	77,019	118,435	1.54	32,903	36,283	1.10	43,035	60,928	1.42
Dec <sup>6</sup>										42,463		

<sup>1</sup> Monthly average for year and total for month.<sup>2</sup> Seasonally adjusted, end of period.<sup>3</sup> Inventory/sales ratio. For annual periods, ratio of weighted average inventories to average monthly sales; for monthly data, ratio of inventories at end of month to sales for month.<sup>4</sup> Manufacturing data prior to 1961 not completely comparable with later data. See Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Series M3-1.1," September 1968.<sup>5</sup> Based on seasonally adjusted data through November.

Note.—The inventory figures in this table do not agree with the estimates of change in business inventories included in the gross national product since these figures cover only manufacturing and trade rather than all business, and show inventories in terms of current book value without adjustment for revaluation.

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census).

TABLE C-42.—Manufacturers' shipments and inventories, 1947-73

(Millions of dollars)

Year or month	Shipments <sup>1</sup>			Inventories <sup>2</sup>								
	Total	Dura- ble goods indus- tries	Non- durable goods indus- tries	Total	Durable goods industries			Nondurable goods industries				
					Total	Materials and sup- plies	Work in process	Fin- ished goods	Total	Materials and sup- plies	Work in process	Fin- ished goods
1947.....	15,513	6,694	8,819	25,897	13,061	-----	-----	-----	12,836	-----	-----	-----
1948.....	17,316	7,579	9,738	28,543	14,662	-----	-----	-----	13,881	-----	-----	-----
1949.....	16,126	7,191	8,935	26,321	13,060	-----	-----	-----	13,261	-----	-----	-----
1950.....	18,634	8,845	9,789	31,078	15,539	-----	-----	-----	15,539	-----	-----	-----
1951.....	21,714	10,493	11,221	39,306	20,991	-----	-----	-----	18,315	-----	-----	-----
1952.....	22,529	11,313	11,216	41,136	23,731	-----	-----	-----	17,405	-----	-----	-----
1953.....	24,843	13,349	11,494	43,948	25,878	8,966	10,720	6,206	18,070	8,317	2,472	7,409
1954.....	23,355	11,828	11,527	41,612	23,710	7,894	9,721	6,040	17,902	8,167	2,440	7,415
1955.....	26,480	14,071	12,409	45,069	26,405	9,194	10,756	6,348	18,664	8,556	2,571	7,666
1956.....	27,740	14,715	13,025	50,642	30,447	10,417	12,317	7,565	20,195	8,971	2,721	8,622
1957.....	28,736	15,237	13,499	51,871	31,728	10,608	12,837	8,125	20,143	8,775	2,864	8,624
1958.....	27,280	13,571	13,708	50,070	30,095	9,847	12,294	7,749	19,975	8,671	2,800	8,498
1959.....	30,219	15,545	14,674	52,707	31,839	10,585	12,952	8,143	20,868	9,089	2,928	8,857
1960.....	30,796	15,817	14,979	53,814	32,360	10,286	12,780	9,190	21,454	9,113	2,935	9,353
1961 <sup>3</sup> .....	30,896	15,544	15,352	54,939	32,509	10,242	13,211	9,056	22,430	9,464	3,193	9,773
1962.....	33,113	17,103	16,010	58,213	34,605	10,798	14,205	9,602	23,608	9,841	3,304	10,463
1963.....	35,032	18,247	16,786	60,043	35,813	11,001	14,997	9,815	24,230	10,003	3,410	10,817
1964.....	37,335	19,347	17,701	63,386	38,436	11,927	16,253	10,256	24,950	10,185	3,519	11,246
1965.....	41,003	22,216	18,788	68,221	42,227	13,299	18,152	10,776	25,994	10,488	3,823	11,683
1966.....	44,869	24,633	20,236	77,965	49,818	15,501	21,978	12,339	28,147	11,220	4,237	12,690
1967.....	46,449	25,212	21,236	84,655	54,931	16,445	25,017	13,469	29,724	11,746	4,434	13,544
1968.....	50,282	27,694	22,586	90,875	59,112	17,418	27,605	14,089	31,763	12,299	4,849	14,615
1969.....	53,555	29,459	24,096	97,074	63,371	18,668	29,175	15,528	33,703	12,823	5,152	15,728
1970.....	52,860	28,231	24,629	101,645	66,768	19,000	30,393	17,375	34,877	13,130	5,278	16,469
1971.....	55,917	29,948	25,969	102,445	66,050	19,270	29,142	17,638	36,395	13,578	5,647	17,170
1972.....	62,466	33,892	28,573	107,719	70,218	20,010	32,074	18,134	37,501	13,865	5,968	17,668
1973 <sup>4</sup> .....	72,032	39,563	32,469	118,435	77,645	23,444	35,519	18,682	40,790	15,868	6,416	18,506
Seasonally adjusted												
1972: Jan.....	59,062	31,556	27,506	102,561	66,283	19,181	29,320	17,782	36,278	13,564	5,675	17,039
Feb.....	59,120	31,758	27,362	102,906	66,534	19,178	29,492	17,864	36,372	13,673	5,683	17,016
Mar.....	59,905	32,188	27,717	103,043	66,569	19,083	29,595	17,891	36,474	13,527	5,799	17,148
Apr.....	60,886	33,003	27,883	103,267	66,725	19,039	29,726	17,960	36,542	13,599	5,753	17,190
May.....	61,272	33,241	28,031	103,685	67,161	19,110	30,014	18,037	36,524	13,589	5,690	17,245
June.....	61,295	32,919	28,376	104,260	67,502	18,900	30,380	18,222	36,758	13,708	5,722	17,328
July.....	61,047	32,803	28,244	104,685	67,734	19,317	30,323	18,094	36,951	13,706	5,751	17,494
Aug.....	63,686	34,687	28,999	105,822	68,568	19,596	30,563	18,409	37,254	13,776	5,813	17,665
Sept.....	64,503	35,249	29,254	106,168	68,875	19,558	30,932	18,385	37,293	13,827	5,871	17,595
Oct.....	65,451	36,302	29,149	106,617	69,308	19,790	31,412	18,106	37,309	13,780	5,928	17,601
Nov.....	66,993	36,870	30,123	106,974	69,613	19,902	31,639	18,072	37,361	13,808	5,927	17,626
Dec.....	67,104	36,614	30,490	107,719	70,218	20,010	32,074	18,134	37,501	13,865	5,968	17,668
1973: Jan.....	68,401	37,773	30,628	108,187	70,590	20,252	32,286	18,052	37,597	13,965	5,960	17,672
Feb.....	69,245	38,122	31,123	109,082	71,136	20,463	32,559	18,114	37,946	14,251	6,006	17,689
Mar.....	69,719	38,064	31,655	110,174	71,873	20,659	33,005	18,209	38,301	14,406	6,048	17,847
Apr.....	70,468	38,651	31,817	110,577	72,213	20,887	33,114	18,212	38,364	14,531	6,093	17,740
May.....	71,284	39,284	32,000	111,625	72,867	21,198	33,318	18,351	38,758	14,660	6,134	17,964
June.....	71,616	39,257	32,359	113,025	73,801	21,424	33,735	18,642	39,224	15,010	6,151	18,063
July.....	73,248	40,779	32,469	113,910	74,278	21,721	33,944	18,613	39,632	15,350	6,177	18,105
Aug.....	73,021	39,633	33,388	114,907	75,213	22,080	34,461	18,672	39,694	15,514	6,250	17,930
Sept.....	73,060	40,162	32,898	116,114	76,249	22,621	34,742	18,886	39,865	15,554	6,298	18,013
Oct.....	75,269	41,567	33,702	117,224	76,951	23,064	35,082	18,805	40,273	15,772	6,323	18,178
Nov.....	77,019	41,896	35,123	118,435	77,645	23,444	35,519	18,682	40,790	15,868	6,416	18,506
Dec.....	-----	40,646	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

<sup>1</sup> Monthly average for year and total for month.<sup>2</sup> Book value, seasonally adjusted, end of period, except as noted.<sup>3</sup> Data prior to 1961 not completely comparable with later data. See Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Series M3-1.1," September 1968.<sup>4</sup> Based on seasonally adjusted data through November.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.



TABLE C-43.—*Manufacturers' new and unfilled orders, 1947-73*

[Amounts in millions of dollars]

Year or month	New orders <sup>1</sup>			Unfilled orders <sup>2</sup>			Unfilled orders-shipments ratio <sup>3</sup>		
	Total	Durable goods industries		Total	Durable goods industries	Non-durable goods industries	Total	Durable goods industries	Non-durable goods industries
		Total	Capital goods industries, non-defense						
1947	15,256	6,388	-----	8,868	34,473	28,579	5,894	-----	-----
1948	17,693	8,126	-----	9,566	30,736	26,619	4,117	-----	-----
1949	15,614	6,633	-----	8,981	24,045	19,622	4,423	-----	-----
1950	20,110	10,165	-----	9,945	41,456	35,435	6,021	-----	-----
1951	23,907	12,841	-----	11,066	67,266	63,394	3,872	-----	-----
1952	23,204	12,061	-----	11,143	75,857	72,680	3,177	-----	-----
1953	23,586	12,147	-----	11,439	61,178	58,637	2,541	-----	-----
1954	22,335	10,768	-----	11,566	48,266	45,250	3,016	3.42	4.12
1955	27,465	14,996	-----	12,469	60,004	56,241	3,763	3.63	4.27
1956	28,368	15,365	-----	13,003	67,375	63,880	3,495	3.87	4.55
1957	27,559	14,111	-----	13,448	53,183	50,352	2,831	3.35	4.00
1958	26,903	13,171	-----	13,733	48,882	45,739	3,143	2.60	3.49
1959	30,672	15,948	-----	14,724	54,494	50,654	3,840	2.85	3.44
1960	30,115	15,223	-----	14,893	46,133	43,401	2,732	2.58	3.21
1961 <sup>4</sup>	31,086	15,699	-----	15,387	48,395	45,241	3,154	2.52	3.01
1962	33,005	17,025	-----	15,980	47,307	44,485	2,822	2.46	2.95
1963	35,322	18,521	-----	16,801	50,940	47,958	2,982	2.40	2.89
1964	37,952	20,258	-----	17,694	58,506	55,623	2,883	2.49	2.99
1965	41,803	22,986	-----	18,817	68,146	64,920	3,226	2.62	3.12
1966	45,944	25,720	-----	20,224	81,029	77,964	3,065	2.93	3.51
1967	46,763	25,526	-----	21,238	84,994	81,904	3,090	2.81	3.38
1968	50,243	27,666	6,971	22,577	84,177	81,240	2,937	2.71	3.27
1969	53,646	29,549	7,694	24,097	85,286	82,334	2,952	2.59	3.13
1970	52,063	27,431	7,021	24,632	75,585	72,599	2,986	2.39	2.90
1971	55,732	29,751	7,339	25,981	73,282	70,152	3,130	2.15	2.59
1972	63,514	34,867	8,983	28,648	86,020	81,986	4,034	2.18	2.59
1973 <sup>4</sup>	74,605	42,073	11,016	32,531	114,324	109,606	4,718	2.53	3.00
Seasonally adjusted									
1972: Jan.	59,739	32,156	7,895	27,583	73,959	70,752	3,207	2.13	2.57
Feb.	59,544	32,039	8,152	27,505	74,383	71,033	3,350	2.14	2.58
Mar.	60,260	32,453	8,304	27,807	74,738	71,298	3,440	2.12	2.55
Apr.	61,747	33,803	8,700	27,944	75,599	72,098	3,501	2.10	2.52
May	62,051	33,992	8,932	28,059	76,378	72,849	3,529	2.11	2.52
June	63,817	35,396	8,981	28,421	78,900	75,326	3,574	2.18	2.62
July	61,486	33,207	8,954	28,279	79,339	75,730	3,609	2.17	2.61
Aug.	64,809	35,772	8,899	29,037	80,462	76,815	3,647	2.14	2.56
Sept.	66,620	37,292	9,727	29,328	82,579	78,858	3,721	2.18	2.60
Oct.	66,355	37,127	9,625	29,228	83,483	79,683	3,800	2.15	2.55
Nov.	67,726	37,462	9,699	30,264	84,216	80,275	3,941	2.13	2.53
Dec.	68,908	38,325	9,991	30,583	86,020	81,986	4,034	2.18	2.59
1973: Jan.	70,016	39,218	10,277	30,798	87,635	83,431	4,204	2.17	2.57
Feb.	71,022	39,765	10,105	31,257	89,412	85,074	4,338	2.18	2.58
Mar.	72,806	41,021	10,572	31,785	92,499	88,031	4,468	2.25	2.66
Apr.	73,325	41,341	10,619	31,984	95,354	90,719	4,635	2.28	2.70
May	74,535	42,449	10,919	32,086	98,602	93,882	4,720	2.32	2.75
June	75,361	43,016	11,415	32,345	102,355	97,647	4,708	2.41	2.85
July	75,145	42,697	11,404	32,448	104,246	99,560	4,686	2.41	2.84
Aug.	76,113	42,689	11,032	33,424	107,344	102,621	4,723	2.51	2.98
Sept.	75,129	42,259	11,267	32,870	109,410	104,716	4,694	2.57	3.02
Oct.	77,758	44,037	11,595	33,721	111,897	107,185	4,712	2.52	2.97
Nov.	79,441	44,315	11,970	35,126	114,324	109,606	4,718	2.53	3.00
Dec. <sup>5</sup>	-----	41,655	12,176	-----	-----	110,619	-----	-----	-----

<sup>1</sup> Monthly average for year and total for month.<sup>2</sup> Seasonally adjusted, end of period.<sup>3</sup> Ratio of unfilled orders at end of period to shipments for period; excludes industries with no unfilled orders. Annual figures relate to seasonally adjusted data for December, except as noted.<sup>4</sup> Data prior to 1961 not completely comparable with later data. Comparable data for new orders (total, durable, and nondurable) are available for 1958, 1959, and 1960 only. See Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Series M3-1.1," September 1968, for these data.<sup>5</sup> Based on seasonally adjusted data through November.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

# PRICES

TABLE C-44.—Consumer price indexes by expenditure classes, 1929-73

For urban wage earners and clerical workers

[1967=100]

Year or month	All items	Food	Housing		Apparel and upkeep	Transportation	Medical care	Personal care	Reading and recreation	Other goods and services
			Total	Rent						
1929.....	51.3	48.3	-----	76.0	48.5	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
1933.....	38.8	30.6	-----	54.1	36.9	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
1939.....	41.6	34.6	52.2	56.0	42.4	43.0	36.7	40.3	45.3	46.9
1940.....	42.0	35.2	52.4	56.2	42.8	42.7	36.8	40.2	46.1	48.3
1941.....	44.1	38.4	53.7	57.2	44.8	44.2	37.0	41.2	47.7	49.2
1942.....	48.8	45.1	56.2	58.5	52.3	48.1	38.0	45.2	50.0	50.7
1943.....	51.8	50.3	56.8	58.5	54.6	47.9	39.9	49.9	54.1	53.3
1944.....	52.7	49.6	58.1	58.6	58.5	47.9	41.1	53.4	60.0	54.7
1945.....	53.9	50.7	59.1	58.8	61.5	47.8	42.1	55.1	62.4	56.9
1946.....	58.5	58.1	60.6	59.2	67.5	50.3	44.4	59.0	64.5	58.8
1947.....	66.9	70.6	65.2	61.1	78.2	55.5	48.1	66.0	68.7	63.8
1948.....	72.1	76.6	69.8	65.1	83.3	61.8	51.1	68.5	72.2	66.8
1949.....	71.4	73.5	70.9	68.0	80.1	66.4	52.7	68.3	74.9	68.7
1950.....	72.1	74.5	72.8	70.4	79.0	68.2	53.7	68.3	74.4	69.9
1951.....	77.8	82.8	77.2	73.2	86.1	72.5	56.3	74.7	76.6	72.8
1952.....	79.5	84.3	78.7	76.2	85.3	77.3	59.3	75.6	76.9	76.6
1953.....	80.1	83.0	80.8	80.3	84.6	79.5	61.4	76.3	77.7	78.5
1954.....	80.5	82.8	81.7	83.2	84.5	78.3	63.4	76.6	76.9	79.8
1955.....	80.2	81.6	82.3	84.3	84.1	77.4	64.8	77.9	76.7	79.8
1956.....	81.4	82.2	83.6	85.9	85.8	78.8	67.2	81.1	77.8	81.0
1957.....	84.3	84.9	86.2	87.5	87.3	83.3	69.9	84.1	80.7	83.3
1958.....	86.6	88.5	87.7	89.1	87.5	86.0	73.2	86.9	83.9	84.4
1959.....	87.3	87.1	88.6	90.4	88.2	89.6	76.4	88.7	85.3	86.1
1960.....	88.7	88.0	90.2	91.7	89.6	89.6	79.1	90.1	87.3	87.8
1961.....	89.6	89.1	90.9	92.9	90.4	90.6	81.4	90.6	89.3	88.5
1962.....	90.6	89.9	91.7	94.0	90.9	92.5	83.5	92.2	91.3	89.1
1963.....	91.7	91.2	92.7	95.0	91.9	93.0	85.6	93.4	92.8	90.6
1964.....	92.9	92.4	93.8	95.9	92.7	94.3	87.3	94.5	95.0	92.0
1965.....	94.5	94.4	94.9	96.9	93.7	95.9	89.5	95.2	95.9	94.2
1966.....	97.2	99.1	97.2	98.2	96.1	97.2	93.4	97.1	97.5	97.2
1967.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1968.....	104.2	103.6	104.2	102.4	105.4	103.2	106.1	104.2	104.7	104.6
1969.....	109.8	108.9	110.8	105.7	111.5	107.2	113.4	109.3	108.7	109.1
1970.....	116.3	114.9	118.9	110.1	116.1	112.7	120.6	113.2	113.4	116.0
1971.....	121.3	118.4	124.3	115.2	119.8	118.6	128.4	116.8	119.3	120.9
1972.....	125.3	123.5	129.2	119.2	122.3	119.9	132.5	119.8	122.8	125.5
1973.....	133.1	141.4	135.0	124.2	126.8	123.8	137.7	125.2	125.9	129.0
1972: Jan.....	123.2	120.3	127.3	117.5	120.2	118.9	130.5	118.1	121.4	123.5
Feb.....	123.8	122.2	127.6	117.8	120.7	118.3	131.0	118.4	121.5	124.3
Mar.....	124.0	122.4	127.9	118.0	121.3	118.4	131.4	118.7	121.7	124.6
Apr.....	124.3	122.4	128.2	118.4	121.8	118.6	131.7	119.1	122.3	125.1
May.....	124.7	122.3	128.5	118.6	122.5	119.5	132.0	119.7	122.5	125.4
June.....	125.0	123.0	129.0	119.0	122.1	119.8	132.4	120.0	122.9	125.6
July.....	125.5	124.2	129.5	119.2	121.1	120.2	132.7	120.0	123.0	125.8
Aug.....	125.7	124.6	129.9	119.6	120.8	120.5	132.9	120.2	123.0	126.0
Sept.....	126.2	124.8	130.2	119.9	123.1	121.0	133.1	120.5	123.7	126.2
Oct.....	126.6	124.9	130.4	120.3	124.3	121.2	133.9	120.8	124.0	126.4
Nov.....	126.9	125.4	130.8	120.5	125.0	121.4	134.1	121.0	124.1	126.4
Dec.....	127.3	126.0	131.2	121.0	125.0	121.3	134.4	121.5	124.0	126.5
1973: Jan.....	127.7	128.6	131.5	121.8	123.0	121.0	134.9	121.8	124.1	126.7
Feb.....	128.6	131.1	132.0	122.3	123.6	121.1	135.3	122.4	124.3	127.1
Mar.....	129.8	134.5	132.4	122.8	124.8	121.5	135.8	123.1	124.5	127.6
Apr.....	130.7	136.5	132.8	123.2	125.8	122.6	136.2	123.8	125.2	128.2
May.....	131.5	137.9	133.3	123.7	126.7	123.5	136.6	124.4	125.6	128.5
June.....	132.4	139.8	133.9	124.0	126.8	124.6	137.0	124.9	125.9	129.0
July.....	132.7	140.9	134.2	124.4	125.8	124.8	137.3	125.3	126.2	129.5
Aug.....	135.1	149.4	135.2	125.0	126.5	124.5	137.6	125.7	126.1	129.4
Sept.....	135.5	148.3	136.6	125.4	128.3	123.9	138.3	126.3	126.8	129.9
Oct.....	136.6	148.4	138.1	125.9	129.6	125.0	140.6	127.3	127.2	130.3
Nov.....	137.6	150.0	139.4	126.3	130.5	125.8	140.9	128.1	127.5	130.8
Dec.....	138.5	151.3	140.5	126.9	130.5	126.7	141.4	129.2	127.6	131.3

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE C-45.—Consumer price indexes by commodity and service groups, 1939–73

For urban wage earners and clerical workers

[1967=100]

Year or month	All items	Commodities					Services			Special indexes		
		All commodities	Food	Commodities less food			All services	Rent	Services less rent	All items less food	All items less shelter	Non-durable commodities
				All	Durable	Non-durable						
1939.....	41.6	40.2	34.6	47.7	48.5	44.3	43.5	56.0	38.1	47.2	39.7	38.4
1940.....	42.0	40.6	35.2	48.0	48.1	44.7	43.6	56.2	38.1	47.3	39.9	38.9
1941.....	44.1	43.3	38.4	50.4	51.4	46.7	44.2	57.2	38.6	48.7	42.4	41.6
1942.....	48.8	49.6	45.1	56.0	58.4	51.6	45.6	58.5	40.3	52.1	47.7	47.6
1943.....	51.8	54.0	50.3	58.4	60.3	53.8	46.4	58.5	42.1	53.6	51.3	51.8
1944.....	52.7	54.7	49.6	61.6	65.9	56.6	47.5	58.6	44.2	55.7	52.2	52.2
1945.....	53.9	56.3	50.7	64.1	70.9	58.6	48.2	58.8	45.1	56.9	53.6	53.7
1946.....	58.5	62.4	58.1	68.1	74.1	62.9	49.1	59.2	46.7	59.4	59.0	59.6
1947.....	66.9	75.0	70.6	76.8	80.3	72.2	51.1	61.1	49.0	64.9	68.5	71.9
1948.....	72.1	80.4	76.6	82.7	86.2	77.8	54.3	65.1	51.9	69.6	73.9	77.2
1949.....	71.4	78.3	73.5	81.5	87.4	76.3	56.9	68.0	54.5	70.3	72.6	74.9
1950.....	72.1	78.8	74.5	81.4	88.4	76.2	58.7	70.4	56.0	71.1	73.1	75.4
1951.....	77.8	85.9	82.8	87.5	95.1	82.0	61.8	73.2	59.3	75.7	79.2	82.5
1952.....	79.5	87.0	84.3	88.3	96.4	82.4	64.5	76.2	62.2	77.5	80.8	83.4
1953.....	80.1	86.7	83.0	88.5	95.7	83.1	67.3	80.3	64.8	79.0	81.0	83.2
1954.....	80.5	85.9	82.8	87.5	93.3	83.5	69.5	83.2	66.7	79.5	81.0	83.2
1955.....	80.2	85.1	81.6	86.9	91.5	83.5	70.9	84.3	68.2	79.7	80.6	82.5
1956.....	81.4	85.9	82.2	87.8	91.5	85.3	72.7	85.9	70.1	81.1	81.7	83.7
1957.....	84.3	88.6	84.9	90.5	94.4	87.6	75.6	87.5	73.3	83.8	84.4	86.3
1958.....	86.6	90.6	88.5	91.5	95.9	88.2	78.5	89.1	76.4	85.7	86.9	88.6
1959.....	87.3	90.7	87.1	92.7	97.3	89.3	80.8	90.4	79.0	87.3	87.6	88.2
1960.....	88.7	91.5	88.0	93.1	96.7	90.7	83.5	91.7	81.9	88.8	88.9	89.4
1961.....	89.6	92.0	89.1	93.4	96.6	91.2	85.2	92.9	83.9	89.7	89.9	90.2
1962.....	90.6	92.8	89.9	94.1	97.6	91.8	86.8	94.0	85.5	90.8	90.9	90.9
1963.....	91.7	93.6	91.2	94.8	97.9	92.7	88.5	95.0	87.3	92.0	92.1	92.0
1964.....	92.9	94.6	92.4	95.6	98.8	93.5	90.2	95.9	89.2	93.2	93.2	93.0
1965.....	94.5	95.7	94.4	96.2	98.4	94.8	92.2	96.9	91.5	94.5	94.6	94.6
1966.....	97.2	98.2	99.1	97.5	98.5	97.0	95.8	98.2	95.3	96.7	97.4	98.1
1967.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1968.....	104.2	103.7	103.6	103.7	103.1	104.1	105.2	102.4	105.7	104.4	104.1	103.9
1969.....	109.8	108.4	108.9	108.1	107.0	108.8	112.5	105.7	113.8	110.1	109.0	108.9
1970.....	116.3	113.5	114.9	112.5	111.8	113.1	121.6	110.1	123.7	116.7	114.4	114.0
1971.....	121.3	117.4	118.4	116.8	116.5	117.0	128.4	115.2	130.8	122.1	119.3	117.7
1972.....	125.3	120.9	123.5	119.4	118.9	119.8	133.3	119.2	135.9	125.8	122.9	121.7
1973.....	133.1	129.9	141.4	123.5	121.9	124.8	139.1	124.2	141.8	130.7	131.1	132.8
1972: Jan.....	123.2	118.7	120.3	117.7	117.3	118.1	131.5	117.5	134.1	124.0	120.9	119.2
Feb.....	123.8	119.4	122.2	117.8	117.1	118.4	131.8	117.8	134.4	124.2	121.5	120.3
Mar.....	124.0	119.7	122.4	118.2	117.3	118.9	132.1	118.0	134.6	124.5	121.8	120.6
Apr.....	124.3	119.9	122.4	118.5	117.7	119.1	132.4	118.4	135.0	124.9	122.0	120.7
May.....	124.7	120.3	122.3	119.2	118.4	119.7	132.7	118.6	135.3	125.5	122.4	121.0
June.....	125.0	120.7	123.0	119.4	119.2	119.5	133.1	119.0	135.7	125.7	122.7	121.2
July.....	125.5	121.2	124.2	119.4	119.6	119.3	133.5	119.2	136.1	125.9	123.1	121.7
Aug.....	125.7	121.4	124.6	119.5	119.7	119.4	133.8	119.6	136.4	126.1	123.2	122.0
Sept.....	126.2	122.0	124.8	120.3	119.8	120.8	134.1	119.9	136.7	126.7	123.8	122.8
Oct.....	126.6	122.3	124.9	120.8	120.1	121.3	134.6	120.3	137.2	127.1	124.2	123.1
Nov.....	126.9	122.7	125.4	121.0	120.3	121.7	134.9	120.5	137.6	127.4	124.6	123.5
Dec.....	127.3	122.9	126.0	121.1	120.3	121.7	135.4	121.0	138.0	127.6	124.8	123.8
1973: Jan.....	127.7	123.4	128.6	120.5	119.9	120.9	135.7	121.8	138.3	127.5	125.3	124.7
Feb.....	128.6	124.5	131.1	120.9	119.9	121.6	136.2	122.3	138.7	127.9	126.4	126.2
Mar.....	129.8	126.1	134.5	121.5	120.2	122.4	136.6	122.8	139.2	128.4	127.8	128.3
Apr.....	130.7	127.4	136.5	122.3	121.0	123.3	137.1	123.2	139.6	129.1	128.9	129.7
May.....	131.5	128.3	137.9	123.0	121.8	124.0	137.6	123.7	140.1	129.7	129.7	130.7
June.....	132.4	129.4	139.8	123.7	122.3	124.7	138.1	124.0	140.7	130.3	130.6	132.0
July.....	132.7	129.7	140.9	123.5	122.4	124.4	138.4	124.4	141.0	130.4	131.0	132.4
Aug.....	135.1	132.8	149.4	123.8	122.6	124.7	139.3	125.0	141.9	130.9	133.5	136.6
Sept.....	135.5	132.8	148.3	124.3	122.6	125.5	140.6	125.4	143.4	131.8	133.6	136.5
Oct.....	136.6	133.5	148.4	125.4	123.2	127.0	142.2	125.9	145.2	133.1	134.5	137.4
Nov.....	137.6	134.7	150.0	126.3	123.3	128.5	143.0	126.3	146.1	134.0	135.6	138.9
Dec.....	138.5	135.7	151.3	127.1	123.2	130.0	143.8	126.9	146.9	134.7	136.5	140.3

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE C-46.—Consumer price indexes, selected commodities and services, 1939–73

For urban wage earners and clerical workers

[1967=100]

Year or month	Durable commodities				Nondurable commodities less food			Services less rent				
	Total <sup>1</sup>	New cars	Used cars	Household durables	Total	Apparel commodities	Nondurables less food and apparel	Total	Household services less rent	Transportation services	Medical care services	Other <sup>2</sup>
1939.....	48.5	43.2	-----	56.6	44.3	43.0	46.3	38.1	-----	36.1	32.5	-----
1940.....	48.1	43.3	-----	55.9	44.7	43.5	46.8	38.1	-----	36.1	32.5	-----
1941.....	51.4	46.6	-----	59.8	46.7	45.8	48.4	38.6	-----	36.3	32.7	-----
1942.....	58.4	-----	-----	66.9	51.6	53.5	51.1	40.3	-----	38.2	33.7	-----
1943.....	60.3	-----	-----	69.5	53.8	55.9	53.2	42.1	-----	38.2	35.4	-----
1944.....	65.9	-----	-----	76.0	56.6	59.8	54.7	44.2	-----	38.2	36.9	-----
1945.....	70.9	-----	-----	81.8	58.6	63.0	55.8	45.1	-----	38.2	37.9	-----
1946.....	74.1	-----	-----	86.5	62.9	69.5	58.2	46.7	-----	39.0	40.1	-----
1947.....	80.3	69.2	-----	95.6	72.2	80.4	66.2	49.0	-----	40.3	43.5	-----
1948.....	86.2	75.6	-----	101.7	77.8	85.4	72.3	51.9	-----	44.9	46.4	-----
1949.....	87.4	82.8	-----	99.0	76.3	82.0	72.4	54.5	-----	50.0	48.1	-----
1950.....	88.4	83.4	-----	100.2	76.2	81.1	72.9	56.0	-----	53.3	49.2	-----
1951.....	95.1	87.4	-----	109.8	82.0	88.7	77.5	59.3	-----	58.3	51.7	-----
1952.....	96.4	94.9	-----	106.9	82.4	87.7	79.0	62.2	-----	62.4	55.0	-----
1953.....	95.7	95.8	89.2	105.7	83.1	86.7	81.0	64.8	-----	66.4	57.0	-----
1954.....	93.3	94.3	75.9	102.9	83.5	86.3	81.8	66.7	-----	69.2	58.7	-----
1955.....	91.5	90.9	71.8	100.1	83.5	85.8	82.1	68.2	-----	69.4	60.4	-----
1956.....	91.5	93.5	69.1	99.7	85.3	87.3	84.1	70.1	71.2	70.5	62.8	71.1
1957.....	94.4	98.4	77.4	101.4	87.6	88.2	87.4	73.3	75.4	73.8	65.5	73.9
1958.....	95.9	101.5	80.2	102.1	88.2	88.2	88.3	76.4	79.4	78.5	68.7	76.2
1959.....	97.3	105.9	89.5	102.0	89.3	89.0	89.6	79.0	81.6	81.2	72.0	78.0
1960.....	96.7	104.5	83.6	101.9	90.7	90.3	90.9	81.9	85.0	83.3	74.9	80.8
1961.....	96.6	104.5	86.9	100.7	91.2	90.8	91.3	83.9	86.0	85.3	77.7	83.4
1962.....	97.6	104.1	94.8	100.6	91.8	91.2	92.1	85.5	87.1	86.6	80.2	85.6
1963.....	97.9	103.5	96.0	100.3	92.7	92.0	93.1	87.3	89.0	87.5	82.6	87.7
1964.....	98.8	103.2	100.1	100.2	93.5	92.8	93.9	89.2	90.4	89.6	84.6	90.1
1965.....	98.4	100.9	99.4	98.7	94.8	93.6	95.5	91.5	92.1	92.9	87.3	92.6
1966.....	98.5	99.1	97.0	98.6	97.0	96.0	97.5	95.3	95.7	96.8	92.0	96.2
1967.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1968.....	103.1	102.8	( <sup>3</sup> )	103.3	104.1	105.6	103.3	105.7	105.9	104.0	107.3	105.6
1969.....	107.0	104.4	103.1	107.4	108.8	111.9	107.0	113.8	115.3	111.3	116.0	110.6
1970.....	111.8	107.6	104.3	110.2	113.1	116.5	111.2	123.7	126.8	123.1	124.2	116.7
1971.....	116.5	112.0	110.2	112.9	117.0	120.1	115.2	130.8	132.6	133.0	133.3	122.5
1972.....	118.9	111.0	110.5	115.0	119.8	122.7	118.2	135.9	139.2	136.0	138.2	125.8
1973.....	121.9	111.1	117.6	118.8	124.8	127.1	123.4	141.8	146.8	136.9	144.3	131.6
1972: Jan.....	117.3	112.2	105.3	113.7	118.1	120.3	116.8	134.1	136.9	135.6	135.8	124.3
Feb.....	117.1	111.9	103.0	113.6	118.4	120.9	117.0	134.4	137.3	135.6	136.4	124.5
Mar.....	117.3	111.7	103.9	114.1	118.9	121.6	117.3	134.6	137.6	135.4	136.9	124.7
Apr.....	117.7	111.7	106.4	114.4	119.1	122.1	117.4	135.0	138.0	135.6	137.3	125.1
May.....	118.4	111.4	110.0	114.8	119.7	122.9	117.9	135.3	138.4	135.8	137.6	125.3
June.....	119.2	111.3	112.0	115.1	119.5	122.4	117.9	135.7	138.8	136.0	138.0	125.6
July.....	119.6	111.0	112.7	115.3	119.3	121.3	118.2	136.1	139.5	136.3	138.4	125.8
Aug.....	119.7	110.6	112.4	115.4	119.4	120.9	118.6	136.4	140.0	136.3	138.6	125.9
Sept.....	119.8	109.6	113.6	115.6	120.8	123.5	119.3	136.7	140.3	136.3	138.9	126.7
Oct.....	120.1	110.1	115.2	115.8	121.3	124.9	119.3	137.2	140.7	136.2	139.9	127.0
Nov.....	120.3	110.2	116.0	116.0	121.7	125.6	119.4	137.6	141.3	136.3	140.1	127.4
Dec.....	120.3	110.6	115.0	116.2	121.7	125.5	119.5	138.0	141.9	136.4	140.5	127.7
1973: Jan.....	119.9	111.1	112.8	116.1	120.9	123.1	119.7	138.3	142.3	136.0	141.0	128.1
Feb.....	119.9	111.0	112.4	116.3	121.6	123.8	120.4	138.7	142.8	136.1	141.5	128.6
Mar.....	120.2	110.8	113.7	116.9	122.4	125.2	120.8	139.2	143.2	136.3	142.2	129.2
Apr.....	121.0	111.1	117.3	117.7	123.3	126.2	121.7	139.6	143.6	136.5	142.7	129.9
May.....	121.8	111.1	120.6	118.5	124.0	127.2	122.2	140.1	144.2	136.6	143.1	130.6
June.....	122.3	111.0	122.3	119.2	124.7	127.2	123.3	140.7	144.9	137.0	143.6	131.3
July.....	122.4	110.9	122.7	119.4	124.4	126.0	123.5	141.0	145.3	137.0	143.9	131.7
Aug.....	122.6	110.6	121.3	119.6	124.7	126.6	123.6	141.9	146.8	137.1	144.3	132.1
Sept.....	122.6	109.1	120.3	120.1	125.5	128.7	123.8	143.4	149.3	137.2	145.1	133.3
Oct.....	123.2	111.9	118.5	120.4	127.0	130.0	125.3	145.2	151.7	137.4	147.8	134.0
Nov.....	123.3	112.2	116.1	120.8	128.5	130.8	127.3	146.1	153.2	137.4	148.2	134.8
Dec.....	123.2	112.0	112.6	121.0	130.0	130.7	129.6	146.9	154.2	138.1	148.7	135.3

<sup>1</sup> Includes certain items not shown separately.<sup>2</sup> Includes the services components of apparel, personal care, reading and recreation, and other goods and services.<sup>3</sup> Not available.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE C-47.—*Consumer price indexes, seasonally adjusted, 1970-73*  
*For urban wage earners and clerical workers*

[1967=100, seasonally adjusted]

Year and month	Special indexes			Commodity groups						Selected expenditure classes				
	All items less food	All items less shelter	All items less medical care	All commodities	Food	Commodities less food			Shelter	Fuel and utilities	Apparel and upkeep	Transportation	Medical care	
						Total	Durable	Non-durable						
1970: Jan.....	113.4	112.2	113.2	111.4	113.6	110.3	109.1	111.0	118.4	105.0	114.2	109.5	116.5	
Feb.....	114.1	112.6	113.8	111.9	114.3	110.6	109.3	111.5	119.6	105.2	114.6	110.0	117.2	
Mar.....	114.7	112.8	114.4	112.1	114.3	110.8	109.8	111.7	121.2	105.8	114.8	110.0	118.1	
Apr.....	115.4	113.5	115.0	112.6	114.6	111.5	110.3	112.4	122.0	106.4	115.1	111.3	118.9	
May.....	116.0	113.9	115.6	113.1	115.0	111.9	111.0	112.7	122.8	106.7	115.4	111.9	119.5	
June.....	116.5	114.2	115.9	113.3	114.9	112.4	111.6	112.9	123.6	106.8	115.9	112.4	120.4	
July.....	117.0	114.6	116.3	113.6	115.0	112.6	111.8	113.3	124.0	107.6	116.1	113.2	121.2	
Aug.....	117.3	114.9	116.7	113.7	115.1	112.9	112.2	113.5	124.8	108.1	116.6	113.8	121.9	
Sept.....	118.0	115.4	117.2	114.2	115.6	113.4	113.0	113.9	125.8	108.7	117.0	113.7	122.5	
Oct.....	118.7	116.0	117.9	114.7	115.8	114.0	113.7	114.4	126.4	109.6	117.3	115.0	123.0	
Nov.....	119.4	116.4	118.3	115.1	115.7	114.6	114.2	114.8	127.0	110.6	117.8	115.9	123.8	
Dec.....	120.1	116.8	118.8	115.6	115.6	115.3	115.1	115.4	127.8	111.2	118.3	116.9	124.6	
1971: Jan.....	120.4	117.2	119.0	115.7	115.7	115.5	115.2	115.6	128.0	112.0	118.4	117.1	125.2	
Feb.....	120.6	117.6	119.2	115.7	116.1	115.5	115.3	115.7	127.6	112.9	118.7	117.7	125.9	
Mar.....	120.7	118.0	119.5	116.2	117.1	115.7	115.7	115.9	126.7	113.5	118.8	118.2	126.7	
Apr.....	120.9	118.5	119.8	116.6	117.7	115.9	115.9	116.1	126.6	113.8	119.2	118.3	127.2	
May.....	121.6	119.1	120.4	117.2	118.2	116.5	116.5	116.6	127.5	114.3	119.8	118.6	127.8	
June.....	122.2	119.6	121.0	117.7	118.8	116.9	116.9	116.9	128.4	114.8	120.0	119.1	128.5	
July.....	122.4	119.8	121.3	117.9	119.0	117.1	117.1	117.1	128.8	115.6	120.1	119.2	129.0	
Aug.....	122.8	120.2	121.6	118.1	119.3	117.5	116.9	117.7	129.4	116.1	120.2	119.3	129.7	
Sept.....	123.1	120.2	121.7	118.1	119.0	117.4	116.9	118.0	129.9	116.3	120.4	119.4	130.1	
Oct.....	123.3	120.3	122.0	118.3	119.3	117.5	116.9	118.1	130.5	116.6	120.6	118.9	129.9	
Nov.....	123.5	120.5	122.2	118.5	119.8	117.6	116.9	118.1	131.2	116.3	120.7	118.6	130.1	
Dec.....	123.8	120.9	122.6	118.9	120.5	117.7	117.1	118.3	131.5	117.5	120.8	118.4	130.5	
1972: Jan.....	124.1	121.1	123.0	119.1	120.5	118.1	117.3	118.5	132.4	118.3	121.0	118.5	130.8	
Feb.....	124.4	121.6	123.5	119.6	122.4	118.2	117.6	118.8	132.9	118.8	121.3	118.5	131.1	
Mar.....	124.6	121.8	123.7	119.8	122.4	118.6	117.9	119.1	132.8	118.9	121.5	118.9	131.3	
Apr.....	124.9	121.9	123.9	119.9	122.3	118.6	118.1	119.2	133.1	119.2	121.9	118.8	131.4	
May.....	125.4	122.3	124.3	120.3	122.3	119.1	118.3	119.6	133.8	119.7	122.0	119.3	131.7	
June.....	125.6	122.5	124.5	120.5	122.5	119.2	118.7	119.5	134.2	120.0	122.0	119.3	132.3	
July.....	125.9	122.9	125.0	121.0	123.3	119.5	119.2	119.8	135.0	120.1	122.0	120.0	132.4	
Aug.....	126.2	123.2	125.3	121.3	123.9	119.9	119.7	119.9	135.4	120.3	122.1	120.5	132.6	
Sept.....	126.7	123.8	125.9	122.0	124.8	120.3	120.3	120.4	135.6	120.9	122.9	122.0	132.8	
Oct.....	126.8	124.2	126.2	122.3	125.5	120.3	119.9	120.7	135.9	121.2	123.3	120.8	134.2	
Nov.....	127.1	124.7	126.6	122.7	126.4	120.5	119.9	121.1	136.1	121.6	123.6	121.3	134.5	
Dec.....	127.5	124.8	126.8	122.8	126.3	120.7	120.1	121.2	136.7	121.9	124.0	121.2	134.8	
1973: Jan.....	127.6	125.6	127.6	123.8	128.9	120.9	119.9	121.3	137.0	122.7	123.9	120.6	135.2	
Feb.....	128.2	126.5	128.3	124.7	131.4	121.3	120.4	122.0	137.7	123.9	124.2	121.3	135.4	
Mar.....	128.5	127.8	129.6	126.2	134.5	121.9	120.8	122.6	137.7	124.2	125.1	122.0	135.7	
Apr.....	129.1	128.8	130.5	127.4	136.4	122.4	121.4	123.4	138.1	124.7	125.9	122.8	135.9	
May.....	129.7	129.6	131.3	128.3	137.9	122.9	121.7	123.9	139.0	125.3	126.2	123.3	136.3	
June.....	130.2	130.3	132.1	129.1	139.2	123.5	121.8	124.7	139.5	125.9	126.7	124.1	136.9	
July.....	130.4	130.7	132.4	129.4	139.9	123.6	122.0	124.9	139.7	125.8	126.7	124.6	137.0	
Aug.....	131.0	133.5	135.0	132.7	148.5	124.2	122.6	125.2	141.0	126.6	127.9	124.5	137.3	
Sept.....	131.8	133.6	135.4	132.8	148.3	124.3	123.1	125.1	142.8	127.3	128.0	124.9	138.0	
Oct.....	132.8	134.5	136.4	133.5	149.1	124.9	123.0	126.4	144.6	129.2	128.6	124.6	140.9	
Nov.....	133.7	135.7	137.5	134.7	151.2	125.8	122.9	127.9	145.5	132.0	129.1	125.7	141.3	
Dec.....	134.6	136.5	138.3	135.6	151.6	126.7	123.0	129.5	146.3	135.8	129.5	126.6	141.8	

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE C-48.—Percent changes in consumer price indexes, major groups, 1948-73

[Percent change from preceding period<sup>1</sup>]

Year or month	All items		Food		Commodities less food		Services <sup>2</sup>
	Un-adjusted	Seasonally adjusted	Un-adjusted	Seasonally adjusted	Un-adjusted	Seasonally adjusted	Un-adjusted
1948	2.7		-0.8				
1949	-1.8		-3.7				
1950	5.8		9.6				
1951	5.9		7.4				
1952	.9		-1.1				
1953	.6		-1.3				
1954	-5.5		-1.6				
1955	.4		-9				
1956	2.9		3.1				
1957	3.0		2.8		2.2		4.5
1958	1.8		2.2		.8		2.7
1959	1.5		-8		1.5		3.7
1960	1.5		3.1		-3		2.7
1961	.7		-9		.6		1.9
1962	1.2		1.5		.7		1.7
1963	1.6		1.9		1.2		2.3
1964	1.2		1.4		.4		1.8
1965	1.9		3.4		.7		2.6
1966	3.4		3.9		1.9		4.9
1967	3.0		1.2		3.1		4.0
1968	4.7		4.3		3.7		6.1
1969	6.1		7.2		4.5		7.4
1970	5.5		2.2		4.8		8.2
1971	3.4		4.3		2.3		4.1
1972	3.4		4.7		2.5		3.6
1973	8.8		20.1		5.0		6.2
1971: July	.2	0.2	.5	0.2	-.1	0.2	.5
Aug.	.2	.4	.2	.3	.1	.3	.4
Sept.	.1	.1	-.8	-.3	.3	-.1	.4
Oct.	.2	.2	-.2	.3	.5	.1	.1
Nov.	.2	.2	.1	.4	.1	.1	.3
Dec.	.4	.3	1.1	.6	.0	.1	.3
1972: Jan.	.1	.2	.0	.0	-.3	.3	.6
Feb.	.5	.5	1.6	1.6	.1	.1	.2
Mar.	.2	.1	.2	.0	.3	.3	.2
Apr.	.2	.2	.0	-.1	.3	.0	.2
May	.3	.3	-.1	.0	.6	.4	.2
June	.2	.1	.6	.2	.2	.1	.3
July	.4	.4	1.0	.7	.0	.3	.3
Aug.	.2	.3	.3	.5	.1	.3	.2
Sept.	.4	.4	.2	.7	.7	.3	.2
Oct.	.3	.3	.1	.6	.4	.0	.4
Nov.	.2	.3	.4	.7	.2	.2	.2
Dec.	.3	.2	.5	-.1	.1	.2	.4
1973: Jan.	.3	.5	2.1	2.1	-.5	.2	.2
Feb.	.7	.7	1.9	1.9	.3	.3	.4
Mar.	.9	.9	2.6	2.4	.5	.5	.3
Apr.	.7	.6	1.5	1.4	.7	.4	.4
May	.6	.6	1.0	1.1	.6	.4	.4
June	.7	.6	1.4	.9	.6	.5	.4
July	.2	.2	.8	.5	-.2	.1	.2
Aug.	1.8	1.9	6.0	6.1	.2	.5	.7
Sept.	.3	.3	-.7	-.1	.4	.1	.9
Oct.	.8	.8	.1	.5	.9	.5	1.1
Nov.	.7	.8	1.1	1.4	.7	.7	.6
Dec.	.7	.5	.9	.3	.6	.7	.6

<sup>1</sup> Annual changes are from December to December.<sup>2</sup> Percent changes for services are based on unadjusted indexes since these prices have little seasonal movement.

Note.—The seasonally adjusted changes for the all items index are based on seasonal adjustment factors and seasonally adjusted indexes carried to two decimal places.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

TABLE C-49.—Wholesale price indexes by major commodity groups, 1929-73

[1967=100]

Year or month	All commodities	Farm products and processed foods and feeds			Industrial commodities				
		Total	Farm products	Processed foods and feeds	Total	Textile products and apparel	Hides, skins, leather, and related products	Fuels and related products, and power	Chemicals and allied products
1929	49.1		64.1		48.6		48.9	59.4	
1933	34.0		31.4		37.8		36.3	47.6	47.4
1939	39.8		40.0		43.3		42.8	52.3	51.5
1940	40.5		41.4		44.0		45.2	51.4	52.4
1941	45.1		50.3		47.3		48.4	54.6	57.0
1942	50.9		64.8		50.7		52.8	56.2	63.3
1943	53.3		75.0		51.5		52.7	57.8	64.1
1944	53.6		75.5		52.3		52.2	59.5	64.8
1945	54.6		78.5		53.0		52.9	60.1	65.2
1946	62.3		90.9		58.0		61.1	64.4	70.5
1947	76.5	94.3	109.4	82.9	70.8	103.6	83.3	76.9	93.7
1948	82.8	101.5	117.5	88.7	76.9	108.1	84.2	90.5	95.9
1949	78.7	89.6	101.6	80.6	75.3	98.9	79.9	86.2	87.6
1950	81.8	93.9	106.7	83.4	78.0	102.7	86.3	87.1	88.9
1951	91.1	106.9	124.2	92.7	86.1	114.6	99.1	90.3	101.7
1952	88.6	102.7	117.2	91.6	84.1	103.4	80.1	90.1	96.5
1953	87.4	96.0	106.2	87.4	84.8	100.8	81.3	92.6	97.7
1954	87.6	95.7	104.7	88.9	85.0	98.6	77.6	91.3	98.9
1955	87.8	91.2	98.2	85.0	86.9	98.7	77.3	91.2	98.5
1956	90.7	90.6	96.9	84.9	90.8	98.7	81.9	94.0	99.1
1957	93.3	93.7	99.5	87.4	93.3	98.8	82.0	99.1	101.2
1958	94.6	98.1	103.9	91.8	93.6	97.0	82.9	95.3	102.0
1959	94.8	93.5	97.5	89.4	95.3	98.4	94.2	95.3	101.6
1960	94.9	93.7	97.2	89.5	95.3	99.5	90.8	96.1	101.8
1961	94.5	93.7	96.3	91.0	94.8	97.7	91.7	97.2	100.7
1962	94.8	94.7	98.0	91.9	94.8	98.6	92.7	96.7	99.1
1963	94.5	93.8	96.0	92.5	94.7	98.5	90.0	96.3	97.9
1964	94.7	93.2	94.6	92.3	95.2	99.2	90.3	93.7	98.3
1965	96.6	97.1	98.7	95.5	96.4	99.8	94.3	95.5	99.0
1966	99.8	103.5	105.9	101.2	98.5	100.1	103.4	97.8	99.4
1967	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1968	102.5	102.4	102.5	102.2	102.5	103.7	103.2	98.9	99.8
1969	106.5	108.0	109.1	107.3	106.0	106.0	108.9	100.9	99.9
1970	110.4	111.7	111.0	112.1	110.0	107.1	110.3	106.2	102.2
1971	113.9	113.8	112.9	114.3	114.0	108.6	114.0	114.2	104.2
1972	119.7	122.4	125.0	120.8	117.9	113.6	131.3	118.6	104.2
1973	135.5	159.1	176.3	148.1	127.0	123.8	143.1	145.5	110.0
1972: Jan.	116.3	117.4	117.8	117.2	115.9	111.3	117.8	116.0	103.4
Feb.	117.3	119.6	120.7	118.8	116.5	112.0	119.1	116.1	103.5
Mar.	117.4	119.1	119.7	118.6	116.8	112.1	123.0	116.5	103.4
Apr.	117.5	118.3	119.1	117.7	117.3	112.6	127.2	116.9	104.1
May	118.2	120.0	122.2	118.6	117.6	113.3	129.5	117.5	104.4
June	118.8	121.3	124.0	119.6	117.9	113.6	130.9	118.2	104.3
July	119.7	124.0	128.0	121.5	118.1	114.0	131.6	118.6	104.2
Aug.	119.9	123.8	128.2	121.0	118.5	114.1	134.6	119.7	104.4
Sept.	120.2	124.5	128.6	121.8	118.7	114.3	135.7	120.3	104.4
Oct.	120.0	123.3	125.5	121.8	118.8	114.8	139.8	120.6	104.4
Nov.	120.7	125.3	128.8	123.1	119.1	115.1	144.0	121.3	104.7
Dec.	122.9	132.6	137.5	129.4	119.4	115.6	142.2	121.9	104.8
1973: Jan.	124.5	137.0	144.2	132.4	120.0	116.6	143.9	122.2	105.1
Feb.	126.9	142.4	150.9	137.0	121.3	117.4	144.9	126.0	105.6
Mar.	129.7	149.0	160.9	141.4	122.7	119.0	143.5	126.7	106.7
Apr.	130.7	147.9	160.6	139.8	124.4	120.8	145.0	131.8	107.7
May	133.5	154.9	170.4	145.0	125.8	122.3	142.2	135.5	109.3
June	136.7	163.6	182.3	151.8	126.9	123.7	140.9	142.8	110.4
July	134.9	156.9	173.3	146.5	126.9	124.2	141.4	142.8	110.8
Aug.	142.7	184.5	213.3	166.2	127.4	125.2	143.0	142.9	111.0
Sept.	140.2	173.5	200.4	156.3	128.1	126.8	143.8	144.8	111.5
Oct.	139.5	166.8	188.4	153.1	129.6	128.5	143.8	150.5	112.7
Nov.	141.8	164.4	184.0	151.9	133.5	130.0	143.0	179.2	113.5
Dec.	145.3	168.0	187.2	155.7	137.1	131.4	141.9	201.3	115.6

See next page for continuation of table and for footnotes.

TABLE C-49.—Wholesale price indexes by major commodity groups, 1929-73—Continued

[1967=100]

Year or month	Industrial commodities—Continued								Miscellaneous products
	Rubber and plastic products	Lumber and wood products	Pulp, paper, and allied products	Metals and metal products	Machinery and equipment	Furniture and household durables	Nonmetallic mineral products	Transportation equipment: Motor vehicles and equipment <sup>1</sup>	
1929.....	59.4	25.0	-----	40.2	-----	55.8	51.2	41.9	-----
1933.....	40.2	19.0	-----	30.7	-----	44.6	47.2	34.8	-----
1939.....	61.2	24.8	-----	37.6	41.3	52.6	49.1	39.1	-----
1940.....	57.1	27.4	-----	37.8	41.4	53.8	49.1	40.4	-----
1941.....	61.5	32.7	-----	38.5	42.1	57.2	50.2	43.2	-----
1942.....	71.6	35.6	-----	39.1	42.8	61.8	52.3	47.2	-----
1943.....	73.6	37.7	-----	39.0	42.4	61.4	52.4	47.2	-----
1944.....	72.7	40.6	-----	39.0	42.1	63.1	55.7	47.5	-----
1945.....	70.5	41.2	-----	39.6	42.2	63.2	55.7	48.3	-----
1946.....	70.8	47.2	-----	44.3	46.4	67.1	59.3	56.0	-----
1947.....	70.5	73.4	72.5	54.9	53.7	77.0	66.3	64.1	73.5
1948.....	72.8	84.0	75.7	62.5	58.2	81.6	71.6	70.8	76.5
1949.....	70.5	77.7	72.4	63.0	61.0	82.9	73.5	75.7	78.0
1950.....	85.9	89.3	74.3	66.3	63.1	84.7	75.4	75.3	79.2
1951.....	105.4	97.2	88.0	73.8	70.5	91.8	80.1	79.4	83.9
1952.....	95.5	94.4	85.7	73.9	70.6	90.1	80.1	84.0	83.4
1953.....	89.1	94.3	85.5	76.3	72.2	91.9	83.3	83.6	85.6
1954.....	90.4	92.6	85.5	76.9	73.4	92.9	85.1	83.8	86.4
1955.....	102.4	97.1	87.8	82.1	75.7	93.3	87.5	86.3	86.5
1956.....	103.8	98.5	93.6	89.2	81.8	95.8	91.3	91.2	87.6
1957.....	103.4	93.5	95.4	91.0	87.6	98.3	94.8	95.1	90.2
1958.....	103.3	92.4	96.4	90.4	89.4	99.1	95.8	98.1	92.0
1959.....	102.9	98.8	97.3	92.3	91.3	99.3	97.0	100.3	92.2
1960.....	103.1	95.3	98.1	92.4	92.0	99.0	97.2	98.8	93.0
1961.....	99.2	91.0	95.2	91.9	91.9	98.4	97.6	98.6	93.3
1962.....	96.3	91.6	96.3	91.2	92.0	97.7	97.6	98.6	93.7
1963.....	96.8	93.5	95.6	91.3	92.2	97.0	97.1	97.8	94.5
1964.....	95.5	95.4	95.4	93.8	92.8	97.4	97.3	98.3	95.2
1965.....	95.9	95.9	96.2	96.4	93.9	96.9	97.5	98.5	95.9
1966.....	97.8	100.2	98.8	98.8	96.8	98.0	98.4	98.6	97.7
1967.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1968.....	103.4	113.3	101.1	102.6	103.2	102.8	103.7	102.8	102.2
1969.....	105.3	125.3	104.0	108.5	106.5	104.9	107.7	104.8	105.2
1970.....	108.3	113.6	108.2	116.6	111.4	107.5	112.9	108.7	109.9
1971.....	109.2	127.0	110.1	119.0	115.5	109.9	122.4	114.7	112.8
1972.....	109.3	144.3	113.4	123.5	117.9	111.4	126.1	118.0	114.6
1973.....	112.4	177.2	122.1	132.8	121.7	115.2	130.2	119.2	119.7
1972: Jan.....	109.5	134.9	110.8	121.4	116.5	110.2	124.3	117.9	113.7
Feb.....	109.2	137.7	111.6	122.6	117.1	110.8	124.6	118.0	114.0
Mar.....	108.9	139.5	112.3	123.4	117.3	110.9	124.8	118.0	114.2
Apr.....	108.7	141.1	112.8	123.5	117.6	111.0	125.6	118.1	114.1
May.....	108.8	142.7	113.2	123.6	117.9	111.1	125.9	118.1	114.1
June.....	108.9	144.2	113.5	123.6	118.1	111.2	125.8	118.5	114.2
July.....	109.2	146.1	113.7	123.5	118.3	111.4	126.2	118.4	114.9
Aug.....	109.5	148.1	114.1	123.7	118.3	111.7	126.7	118.5	115.1
Sept.....	109.5	148.5	114.3	124.0	118.3	112.0	126.9	118.5	115.2
Oct.....	109.5	149.2	114.7	124.1	118.4	112.0	127.3	116.9	115.0
Nov.....	109.8	149.4	115.0	124.1	118.5	112.3	127.3	117.0	115.0
Dec.....	109.8	149.8	115.1	124.4	118.6	112.4	127.4	118.4	115.1
1973: Jan.....	110.0	151.0	115.8	125.6	118.9	112.6	128.2	118.2	115.8
Feb.....	110.1	161.0	116.5	126.9	119.4	113.1	128.4	118.2	117.1
Mar.....	110.3	173.2	118.3	129.2	120.0	113.5	129.0	118.6	117.9
Apr.....	110.6	182.0	119.8	130.5	120.8	114.1	130.0	119.0	118.6
May.....	111.5	186.9	120.7	131.7	121.5	115.1	130.5	119.1	119.5
June.....	112.6	183.1	122.0	132.5	121.9	115.2	131.1	118.9	120.2
July.....	112.9	177.8	122.3	132.8	122.0	115.2	130.0	119.0	120.9
Aug.....	113.1	178.8	123.3	133.7	122.3	115.9	130.0	119.0	121.0
Sept.....	112.8	181.9	124.4	134.4	122.6	116.0	129.9	118.3	121.1
Oct.....	114.0	180.3	125.8	135.9	123.1	116.6	130.9	120.0	121.0
Nov.....	114.8	184.7	127.6	138.5	123.8	117.2	131.5	120.1	121.3
Dec.....	116.5	186.1	128.7	141.8	124.6	117.5	132.6	121.4	121.6

<sup>1</sup> Index for total transportation equipment is not shown but is available beginning December 1968.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.



TABLE C-50.—Wholesale price indexes by stage of processing, 1947-73

[1967=100]

Year or month	All commodities	Crude materials				Intermediate materials, supplies, and components <sup>1</sup>						
		Total	Food-stuffs and feed-stuffs	Non-food materials except fuel	Fuel	Total	Materials and components for manufacturing				Materials and components for construction	
							Total	Materials				Components
								For food manufacturing	For non-durable manufacturing	For durable manufacturing		
1947.....	76.5	101.2	111.7	90.6	66.6	72.4	72.1	94.0	95.2	54.4	58.3	66.0
1948.....	82.8	110.9	120.8	100.7	78.7	78.3	77.8	96.9	100.8	61.4	63.0	73.1
1949.....	78.7	96.0	100.3	91.6	78.3	75.2	74.5	83.3	91.9	63.1	64.2	73.2
1950.....	81.8	104.6	107.6	104.7	77.9	78.6	78.1	86.7	96.5	66.7	66.6	77.0
1951.....	91.1	120.1	124.5	120.7	79.4	88.1	88.5	96.6	111.8	74.1	75.6	84.3
1952.....	88.6	110.3	117.2	104.6	79.9	85.5	84.8	92.9	100.6	74.3	75.7	83.7
1953.....	87.4	101.9	104.9	100.1	82.7	86.0	86.2	93.0	99.8	77.6	77.1	85.1
1954.....	87.6	101.0	104.9	98.2	79.0	86.5	86.3	92.2	98.2	79.3	77.5	85.5
1955.....	87.8	97.1	95.1	103.8	78.8	88.1	88.4	89.3	98.6	83.3	80.9	88.9
1956.....	90.7	97.6	93.1	107.6	84.4	92.0	92.6	89.7	100.1	88.5	88.3	93.5
1957.....	93.3	99.8	97.2	106.2	89.2	94.1	94.8	91.3	101.4	91.4	91.8	94.0
1958.....	94.6	102.0	103.0	102.2	90.3	94.3	95.2	93.4	100.4	92.0	92.5	94.0
1959.....	94.8	99.4	96.2	105.8	91.9	95.6	96.5	90.0	102.1	94.2	93.6	96.6
1960.....	94.9	97.0	95.1	101.4	92.8	95.6	96.5	91.1	102.1	94.3	93.1	95.9
1961.....	94.5	96.5	93.8	102.5	92.6	95.0	95.3	94.0	99.9	93.0	92.2	94.6
1962.....	94.8	97.5	95.7	102.0	92.1	94.9	94.7	92.0	99.3	92.9	91.5	94.2
1963.....	94.5	95.4	92.9	100.7	93.2	95.2	94.9	96.6	98.4	93.0	91.5	94.5
1964.....	94.7	94.5	90.8	102.4	92.8	95.5	95.9	95.2	99.1	94.8	92.3	95.4
1965.....	96.6	99.3	97.1	104.5	93.5	96.8	97.4	97.6	100.0	96.8	93.8	96.2
1966.....	99.8	105.7	105.9	106.7	96.3	99.2	99.3	101.9	100.8	98.6	97.1	98.8
1967.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1968.....	102.5	101.6	101.3	102.1	102.3	102.3	102.2	101.5	101.3	103.3	102.3	104.9
1969.....	106.5	108.4	109.3	106.9	106.6	105.9	105.7	107.1	102.4	109.1	105.6	110.7
1970.....	110.4	112.2	112.1	109.8	122.3	109.8	110.0	112.9	104.0	115.1	111.1	112.6
1971.....	113.9	115.0	114.2	110.5	138.5	114.0	113.0	116.2	105.6	118.8	114.7	119.5
1972.....	119.1	127.6	127.5	121.9	148.7	118.7	117.0	119.9	109.4	123.8	117.6	126.2
1973.....	135.5	174.0	179.6	161.5	164.5	131.9	127.8	146.0	121.5	133.7	121.4	136.7
1972: Jan.....	116.3	120.2	119.3	115.4	145.4	115.9	114.9	117.9	107.0	121.5	116.0	123.1
Feb.....	117.3	123.1	122.9	117.3	145.6	116.7	115.7	119.4	107.4	122.7	116.5	124.2
Mar.....	117.4	123.1	122.0	119.5	146.2	117.2	115.9	118.6	107.5	123.3	116.6	124.9
Apr.....	117.5	123.0	121.0	121.3	146.9	117.7	116.4	117.8	108.7	123.7	117.0	125.5
May.....	118.2	125.5	124.0	123.2	147.3	118.2	116.9	118.5	109.3	123.9	117.6	125.9
June.....	118.8	127.2	126.7	122.7	147.2	118.5	117.1	119.2	109.6	123.8	118.0	126.3
July.....	119.7	130.1	131.2	122.6	147.5	118.8	117.3	120.1	109.7	123.8	118.1	126.7
Aug.....	119.9	130.3	130.7	124.2	148.5	119.2	117.5	119.8	110.0	124.3	118.2	127.2
Sept.....	120.2	130.3	131.4	122.2	149.1	119.7	117.7	120.3	110.2	124.6	118.1	127.4
Oct.....	120.0	129.2	129.6	122.3	149.9	119.9	118.0	121.2	110.7	124.6	118.1	127.7
Nov.....	120.7	130.4	129.9	124.7	154.4	120.6	118.2	120.9	111.3	124.6	118.2	127.8
Dec.....	122.9	138.3	140.7	127.2	156.3	122.3	118.8	125.1	111.8	124.7	118.2	127.9
1973: Jan.....	124.5	143.3	146.4	132.1	155.5	123.1	119.7	126.9	112.6	125.9	118.5	128.6
Feb.....	126.9	151.3	156.0	138.1	156.3	125.1	121.1	130.8	113.8	127.7	118.8	130.9
Mar.....	129.7	159.0	166.2	141.4	156.9	127.4	123.5	136.0	115.7	130.9	119.6	134.2
Apr.....	130.7	158.8	164.2	144.6	160.4	128.5	125.1	136.4	117.9	132.7	120.1	136.8
May.....	133.5	167.7	173.7	154.2	161.6	131.5	126.6	138.1	120.0	134.0	121.0	138.5
June.....	136.7	177.5	185.4	161.8	162.6	134.3	127.8	142.6	121.9	134.3	121.3	137.9
July.....	134.9	170.9	177.7	155.9	163.0	131.9	128.1	143.3	122.7	134.1	121.6	136.7
Aug.....	142.7	207.5	226.2	172.7	164.4	136.1	130.6	163.5	123.6	134.5	122.0	137.3
Sept.....	140.2	197.1	205.2	174.7	169.2	133.9	130.8	157.6	125.1	135.0	122.3	138.3
Oct.....	139.5	185.7	189.2	180.8	169.9	134.6	131.7	158.7	126.3	135.9	122.9	138.7
Nov.....	141.8	182.7	184.2	180.8	175.0	136.4	132.8	156.0	127.6	137.8	123.8	140.7
Dec.....	145.3	186.4	185.3	190.5	179.5	139.6	135.7	162.6	130.2	141.7	124.5	142.0

See next page for continuation of table and for footnotes.

TABLE C-50.—Wholesale price indexes by stage of processing, 1947-73—Continued

[1967=100]

Year or month	Finished goods					Special groups of industrial products			
	Total	Consumer finished goods				Pro-ducer finished goods	Crude materials <sup>2</sup>	Inter-mediate materials, supplies, and com-ponents <sup>3</sup>	Con-sumer finished goods excluding foods
		Total	Foods	Other non-durable goods	Dur-able goods				
1947.....	74.0	80.5	82.8	80.7	74.6	55.4	79.2	70.0	79.0
1948.....	79.9	86.5	90.4	85.8	79.7	60.4	92.5	76.1	84.0
1949.....	77.6	82.5	83.1	82.3	81.8	63.4	84.0	74.2	82.2
1950.....	79.0	83.9	84.7	83.6	82.7	64.9	93.6	77.7	83.5
1951.....	86.5	91.8	95.2	90.0	88.2	71.2	102.9	87.0	89.5
1952.....	86.0	90.7	94.3	87.8	88.9	72.4	93.1	84.3	88.3
1953.....	85.1	89.2	89.4	88.6	89.6	73.6	92.4	85.3	89.1
1954.....	85.3	89.1	88.7	88.9	90.3	74.5	88.0	85.7	89.4
1955.....	85.5	88.5	86.5	89.4	91.2	76.7	96.6	88.3	90.1
1956.....	87.9	89.8	86.3	91.1	94.3	82.4	102.3	92.6	92.3
1957.....	91.1	92.4	89.3	93.2	97.1	87.5	100.9	95.0	94.6
1958.....	93.2	94.4	94.5	92.6	98.4	89.8	96.9	94.8	94.7
1959.....	93.0	93.6	90.1	94.0	99.6	91.5	102.3	96.4	95.9
1960.....	93.7	94.5	92.1	94.7	99.2	91.7	98.3	96.8	96.3
1961.....	93.7	94.3	91.7	94.7	98.8	91.8	97.2	95.5	96.2
1962.....	94.0	94.6	92.5	94.8	98.3	92.2	95.6	95.3	96.0
1963.....	93.7	94.1	91.4	95.1	97.8	92.4	94.3	95.0	96.0
1964.....	94.1	94.3	91.9	94.8	98.2	93.3	97.1	95.6	95.9
1965.....	95.7	96.1	95.4	95.9	97.9	94.4	100.9	96.9	96.6
1966.....	98.8	99.4	101.6	97.8	98.5	96.8	104.5	98.9	98.1
1967.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1968.....	102.9	102.7	103.7	102.2	102.2	103.5	102.0	102.6	102.1
1969.....	106.6	106.6	110.0	105.0	104.0	106.9	110.6	106.1	104.6
1970.....	110.4	109.9	113.4	108.2	107.1	111.9	118.8	110.0	107.7
1971.....	113.5	112.7	115.2	111.3	110.9	116.6	122.7	114.3	111.2
1972.....	117.2	116.6	121.7	113.6	113.2	119.5	131.1	118.9	113.5
1973.....	129.5	131.2	146.4	125.9	115.8	123.5	155.2	128.4	121.9
1972: Jan.....	115.5	114.7	118.7	112.0	112.9	118.4	125.6	116.4	112.3
Feb.....	116.3	115.6	120.6	112.1	113.2	118.8	127.0	117.2	112.5
Mar.....	116.1	115.2	119.4	112.4	113.1	119.0	129.1	117.6	112.7
Apr.....	115.8	114.8	118.0	112.7	113.2	119.3	129.3	118.2	112.9
May.....	116.4	115.5	119.5	113.1	113.1	119.4	129.9	118.6	113.1
June.....	116.9	116.1	120.7	113.5	113.2	119.6	129.8	119.0	113.4
July.....	117.8	117.3	123.3	113.8	113.5	119.7	130.2	119.2	113.7
Aug.....	117.9	117.4	123.1	114.2	113.6	119.8	132.3	119.5	114.0
Sept.....	118.2	117.7	123.6	114.5	113.7	119.9	132.6	119.8	114.2
Oct.....	117.6	117.1	122.3	114.7	112.7	119.7	133.8	120.1	113.9
Nov.....	118.3	117.9	124.1	115.0	112.8	119.9	136.3	120.3	114.1
Dec.....	119.5	119.3	127.1	115.2	113.7	120.3	136.8	120.5	114.6
1973: Jan.....	121.0	121.2	131.8	115.4	113.8	120.6	139.1	121.2	114.8
Feb.....	122.5	122.9	134.1	117.4	114.0	121.2	142.3	122.6	116.0
Mar.....	124.6	125.5	140.2	117.8	114.5	121.7	142.5	124.8	116.5
Apr.....	125.6	126.6	140.7	119.8	115.3	122.3	146.8	126.6	118.0
May.....	126.8	127.9	141.9	121.6	115.7	123.1	149.6	128.0	119.3
June.....	128.7	130.2	145.0	124.7	115.9	123.4	152.8	128.9	121.3
July.....	128.8	130.4	145.4	124.5	116.1	123.5	153.5	128.7	121.2
Aug.....	132.9	135.4	158.6	124.5	116.3	123.9	156.0	129.5	121.3
Sept.....	132.2	134.5	156.1	124.8	115.8	124.2	161.0	130.3	121.3
Oct.....	132.8	135.0	153.6	128.2	116.7	125.1	164.7	131.2	123.7
Nov.....	136.8	139.9	153.7	140.9	117.0	125.7	174.2	133.5	131.6
Dec.....	140.7	144.7	155.7	151.1	117.9	126.7	179.8	135.9	138.2

<sup>1</sup> Includes, in addition to subgroups shown, processed fuels and lubricants, containers, and supplies.<sup>2</sup> Excludes crude foodstuffs and feedstuffs, plant and animal fibers, oilseeds, and leaf tobacco.<sup>3</sup> Excludes intermediate materials for food manufacturing and manufactured animal feeds.

Note.—For a listing of the commodities included in each sector, see monthly report, "Wholesale Prices and Price Indexes," January-February 1967.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE C-51.—Percent changes in wholesale price indexes, major groups, 1948-73

[Percent change from preceding period<sup>1</sup>]

Year or month	All commodities		Industrial commodities		Farm products and processed foods and feeds		Consumer finished goods					
							Total		Foods		All except foods	
	Unadjusted	Seasonally adjusted	Unadjusted	Seasonally adjusted	Unadjusted	Seasonally adjusted	Unadjusted	Seasonally adjusted	Unadjusted	Seasonally adjusted	Unadjusted	Seasonally adjusted
1948.....	1.5	-----	5.0	-----	-6.8	-----	1.2	-----	-2.4	-----	4.0	-----
1949.....	-6.1	-----	-5.0	-----	-8.9	-----	-5.6	-----	-7.4	-----	-4.5	-----
1950.....	14.7	-----	14.0	-----	17.0	-----	10.2	-----	13.3	-----	8.2	-----
1951.....	1.2	-----	.4	-----	3.5	-----	2.7	-----	5.3	-----	.9	-----
1952.....	-3.4	-----	-1.4	-----	-8.2	-----	-3.1	-----	-5.9	-----	-1.1	-----
1953.....	.5	-----	1.4	-----	-2.3	-----	-1	-----	-2.2	-----	1.6	-----
1954.....	-6	-----	.2	-----	-2.6	-----	-6	-----	-1.9	-----	.3	-----
1955.....	1.6	-----	4.3	-----	-6.4	-----	-1	-----	-2.9	-----	1.7	-----
1956.....	4.5	-----	4.2	-----	6.0	-----	3.1	-----	3.6	-----	2.5	-----
1957.....	2.0	-----	1.1	-----	4.2	-----	3.0	-----	5.3	-----	1.7	-----
1958.....	.5	-----	.9	-----	-.2	-----	.2	-----	.4	-----	.2	-----
1959.....	-.3	-----	1.2	-----	-4.4	-----	-.7	-----	-3.7	-----	.8	-----
1960.....	.5	-----	-.6	-----	3.9	-----	2.1	-----	5.2	-----	.4	-----
1961.....	-.2	-----	-.1	-----	-.6	-----	-.8	-----	-1.8	-----	-.3	-----
1962.....	.0	-----	-.2	-----	.6	-----	.1	-----	.5	-----	-.1	-----
1963.....	-.1	-----	.5	-----	-2.1	-----	-.4	-----	-1.3	-----	.1	-----
1964.....	.4	-----	.6	-----	.0	-----	.2	-----	.4	-----	.1	-----
1965.....	3.4	-----	1.4	-----	9.5	-----	4.0	-----	9.1	-----	.9	-----
1966.....	1.7	-----	2.2	-----	.2	-----	1.6	-----	1.4	-----	1.7	-----
1967.....	1.0	-----	1.9	-----	-1.8	-----	1.2	-----	-.4	-----	2.1	-----
1968.....	2.8	-----	2.7	-----	3.5	-----	3.1	-----	4.8	-----	2.0	-----
1969.....	4.8	-----	3.9	-----	7.5	-----	4.9	-----	8.2	-----	2.9	-----
1970.....	2.2	-----	3.6	-----	-1.4	-----	1.4	-----	-2.5	-----	3.9	-----
1971.....	4.0	-----	3.2	-----	6.0	-----	3.3	-----	5.9	-----	1.8	-----
1972.....	6.5	-----	3.6	-----	14.4	-----	4.5	-----	8.0	-----	2.2	-----
1973.....	18.2	-----	14.8	-----	26.7	-----	21.3	-----	22.5	-----	20.6	-----
1971: July.....	.3	0.2	.5	0.6	-.3	-1.0	-.1	-0.5	-.7	-1.7	.4	0.4
Aug.....	.3	.7	.5	.5	-.3	1.2	.3	1.0	.4	2.1	.1	.2
Sept.....	-.3	-.2	-.1	-.0	-1.4	-.9	-.5	-.6	-1.0	-1.3	-.2	-.1
Oct.....	-.1	.1	.0	-.1	.0	.8	-.2	.7	.1	1.9	.3	.0
Nov.....	.1	.1	-.1	.1	.5	.3	.2	.1	.6	-.1	.0	.1
Dec.....	.8	.6	.3	.3	2.0	1.5	1.0	.6	1.7	.9	.4	.4
1972: Jan.....	.8	.4	.5	.3	1.3	.5	.4	.2	.8	.3	.2	.1
Feb.....	.9	.5	.5	.4	1.9	.9	.8	.7	1.6	.6	.2	.3
Mar.....	.1	.2	.3	.3	-.4	.0	-.3	-.3	-1.0	-1.0	.2	.3
Apr.....	.1	.3	.4	.4	-.7	.1	-.3	.1	-1.2	-.2	.2	.3
May.....	.6	.5	.3	.3	1.4	.8	.6	.3	1.3	.7	.2	.2
June.....	.5	.4	.3	.4	1.1	.5	.5	.3	1.0	.5	.3	.2
July.....	.8	.7	.2	.2	2.2	1.7	1.0	.6	2.2	1.1	.3	.2
Aug.....	.2	.6	.3	.3	-.2	1.3	.1	.7	-.2	1.4	.3	.4
Sept.....	.3	.5	.2	.3	.6	1.4	.3	.3	.4	.3	.2	.4
Oct.....	-.2	.0	.1	.1	-1.0	-.3	-.5	.0	-1.1	.7	-.3	-.4
Nov.....	.6	.7	.3	.4	1.6	1.6	.7	.5	1.5	.8	.2	.3
Dec.....	1.8	1.5	.3	.2	5.8	5.0	1.2	.8	2.4	1.6	.4	.3
1973: Jan.....	1.3	.9	.5	.3	3.3	2.6	1.6	1.4	3.7	3.1	.2	.1
Feb.....	1.9	1.6	1.1	1.0	3.9	3.0	1.4	1.2	1.7	1.8	1.0	1.1
Mar.....	2.2	2.3	1.2	1.2	4.6	5.0	2.1	2.2	4.5	4.5	.4	.5
Apr.....	.8	1.0	1.4	1.3	-.7	.1	.9	1.4	.4	1.4	1.3	1.4
May.....	2.1	2.0	1.1	1.2	4.7	4.1	1.0	.7	.9	.3	1.1	1.1
June.....	2.4	2.3	.9	1.0	5.6	5.0	1.8	1.6	2.2	1.7	1.7	1.6
July.....	-1.3	-1.4	.0	.1	-4.1	-4.6	.2	-.2	.3	-.8	-.1	-.2
Aug.....	5.8	6.2	.4	.4	17.6	19.3	3.8	4.5	9.1	10.8	.1	.2
Sept.....	-1.8	-1.5	.5	.7	-6.0	-5.2	-.7	-.6	-1.6	-1.7	.0	.2
Oct.....	-.5	-.3	1.2	1.1	-3.9	-3.3	.4	.9	-1.6	.3	2.0	1.8
Nov.....	1.6	1.8	3.0	3.2	-1.4	-1.5	3.6	3.5	.1	-.6	6.4	6.5
Dec.....	2.5	2.2	2.7	2.6	2.2	1.4	3.4	3.0	1.3	.5	5.0	4.9

<sup>1</sup> Annual changes are from December to December.

Note.—The seasonally adjusted changes for all commodities and industrial commodities are based on seasonal adjustment factors and seasonally adjusted indexes carried to two decimal places.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

# MONEY STOCK, CREDIT, AND FINANCE

TABLE C-52.—*Money stock measures, 1947-73*

[Averages of daily figures; billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted]

Year and month	Overall measures			Components and related items						
	M <sub>1</sub> (Currency plus demand deposits)	M <sub>2</sub> (M <sub>1</sub> plus time deposits at commercial banks other than large CD's)	M <sub>3</sub> (M <sub>2</sub> plus deposits at non-bank thrift institutions)	Currency <sup>1</sup>	Deposits at commercial banks			Deposits at non-bank thrift institutions <sup>5</sup>	U.S. Government demand deposits (unadjusted) <sup>6</sup>	
					De-mand <sup>2</sup>	Time and savings <sup>3</sup>				
						Total	Large CD's <sup>4</sup>	Other		
1947: Dec	113.1			26.4	86.7	35.4			1.0	
1948: Dec	111.5			25.8	85.8	36.0			1.8	
1949: Dec	111.2			25.1	86.0	36.4			2.8	
1950: Dec	116.2			25.0	91.2	36.7			2.4	
1951: Dec	122.7			26.1	96.5	38.2			2.7	
1952: Dec	127.4			27.3	100.1	41.1			4.9	
1953: Dec	128.8			27.7	101.1	44.5			3.8	
1954: Dec	132.3			27.4	104.9	48.3			5.0	
1955: Dec	135.2			27.8	107.4	50.0			3.4	
1956: Dec	136.9			28.2	108.7	51.9			3.4	
1957: Dec	135.9			28.3	107.6	57.4			3.5	
1958: Dec	141.1			28.6	112.6	65.4			3.9	
1959: Dec	143.4	210.9	299.4	28.9	114.5	67.4		67.4	4.9	
1960: Dec	144.2	217.1	314.4	29.0	115.2	72.9		72.9	4.7	
1961: Dec	148.7	228.6	336.5	29.6	119.1	82.7	2.8	79.9	4.9	
1962: Dec	150.9	242.8	362.9	30.6	120.3	97.6	5.7	92.0	5.6	
1963: Dec	156.5	258.9	393.2	32.5	124.1	112.0	9.6	102.3	5.1	
1964: Dec	163.7	277.1	426.3	34.3	129.5	126.2	12.8	113.4	5.5	
1965: Dec	171.3	301.4	462.7	36.3	134.9	146.3	16.2	130.2	4.6	
1966: Dec	175.4	317.8	485.2	38.3	137.0	157.9	15.4	142.4	3.4	
1967: Dec	186.9	349.7	532.8	40.4	146.5	183.1	20.4	162.7	5.0	
1968: Dec	201.5	382.4	577.1	43.4	158.1	204.2	23.3	180.9	5.0	
1969: Dec	208.6	392.1	593.8	46.1	162.5	194.4	10.9	183.5	5.6	
1970: Dec	221.2	425.2	641.2	49.1	172.2	229.2	25.3	203.9	7.3	
1971: Dec	235.2	473.0	726.9	52.6	182.6	270.9	33.0	237.9	6.9	
1972: Dec	255.7	525.5	822.4	56.9	198.7	313.3	43.4	269.9	7.4	
1973: Dec <sup>p</sup>	270.4	570.7	893.2	61.6	208.8	363.1	62.8	300.3	6.3	
1972: Jan	235.5	477.3	735.2	52.9	182.6	275.2	33.4	241.8	7.4	
Feb	238.2	482.9	745.0	53.2	184.9	278.7	33.9	244.7	7.4	
Mar	240.5	487.6	753.5	53.6	186.9	280.7	33.7	247.1	7.9	
Apr	242.0	490.6	760.0	53.8	188.2	283.6	35.1	248.5	7.7	
May	242.8	494.1	766.5	54.1	188.7	287.9	36.5	251.3	10.5	
June	244.2	498.4	774.1	54.3	189.8	291.7	37.4	254.3	6.9	
July	246.6	503.7	783.3	54.6	192.0	295.0	37.9	257.1	7.3	
Aug	247.9	507.8	791.1	54.9	193.0	298.6	38.7	259.9	5.3	
Sept	249.5	511.9	798.8	55.3	194.2	302.1	39.8	262.4	6.0	
Oct	251.3	516.6	807.2	55.8	195.6	305.5	40.2	265.3	6.7	
Nov	252.6	520.1	813.9	56.3	196.3	309.4	41.9	267.5	6.3	
Dec	255.7	525.5	822.4	56.9	198.7	313.3	43.4	269.9	7.4	
1973: Jan	256.7	529.6	830.4	57.1	199.6	317.6	44.7	272.8	8.1	
Feb	257.9	532.3	836.7	57.5	200.4	323.5	49.1	274.4	9.9	
Mar	258.1	534.6	841.7	58.0	200.1	331.1	54.6	276.6	10.4	
Apr	259.4	538.3	847.7	58.6	200.8	337.3	58.4	278.9	8.3	
May	262.4	543.6	855.0	58.9	203.4	342.6	61.3	281.3	8.7	
June	265.5	549.4	863.5	59.4	206.2	345.8	62.0	283.8	7.1	
July	266.4	552.0	867.9	59.5	207.0	349.4	63.9	285.6	6.5	
Aug	266.2	554.9	870.9	59.8	206.4	355.0	66.3	288.7	4.1	
Sept	265.4	556.6	873.2	60.2	205.2	357.9	66.7	291.2	5.3	
Oct	266.5	561.6	879.8	60.4	206.1	358.9	63.8	295.1	6.0	
Nov	268.8	566.7	886.9	60.9	207.9	359.9	62.0	297.8	4.3	
Dec <sup>p</sup>	270.4	570.7	893.2	61.6	208.8	363.1	62.8	300.3	6.3	

<sup>1</sup> Currency outside the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Banks, and the vaults of all commercial banks.

<sup>2</sup> Demand deposits other than those due to domestic commercial banks and the U.S. Government, less cash items in process of collection and Federal Reserve float, plus foreign demand balances at Federal Reserve Banks.

<sup>3</sup> Time and savings deposits other than those due to domestic commercial banks and the U.S. Government. Effective June 1966, excludes balances accumulated for payment of personal loans (about \$1.1 billion).

<sup>4</sup> Negotiable time certificates of deposit issued in denominations of \$100,000 or more by large weekly reporting commercial banks.

<sup>5</sup> Average of the beginning- and end-of-month deposits of mutual savings banks and savings capital at savings and loan associations.

<sup>6</sup> Deposits at all commercial banks.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE C-53.—Commercial bank loans and investments, 1930-73

[Billions of dollars]

End of year or month <sup>1</sup>	Total loans and investments <sup>2</sup>	Loans		Investments		Loans plus loans sold to bank affiliates <sup>2</sup>
		Total <sup>3</sup>	Commercial and industrial	U.S. Government securities	Other securities	
1930: June.....	48.9	34.5	-----	5.0	9.4	-----
1933: June.....	30.4	16.3	-----	7.5	6.5	-----
1939.....	40.7	17.2	-----	16.3	7.1	-----
1940.....	43.9	18.8	-----	17.8	7.4	-----
1941.....	50.7	21.7	-----	21.8	7.2	-----
1942.....	67.4	19.2	-----	41.4	6.8	-----
1943.....	85.1	19.1	-----	59.8	6.1	-----
1944.....	105.5	21.6	-----	77.6	6.3	-----
1945.....	124.0	26.1	-----	90.6	7.3	-----
1946.....	114.0	31.1	-----	74.8	8.1	-----
1947.....	116.3	38.1	-----	69.2	9.0	-----
1948.....	114.2	42.4	-----	62.6	9.2	-----
Seasonally adjusted						
1948.....	113.0	41.5	-----	62.3	9.2	-----
1949.....	118.7	42.0	-----	66.4	10.3	-----
1950.....	124.7	51.1	-----	61.1	12.4	-----
1951.....	130.2	56.5	-----	60.4	13.4	-----
1952.....	139.1	62.8	-----	62.2	14.2	-----
1953.....	143.1	66.2	-----	62.2	14.7	-----
1954.....	153.1	69.1	-----	67.6	16.4	-----
1955.....	157.6	80.6	-----	60.3	16.8	-----
1956.....	161.6	88.1	-----	57.2	16.3	-----
1957.....	166.4	91.5	-----	56.9	17.9	-----
1958.....	181.2	95.6	-----	65.1	20.5	-----
1959 <sup>4</sup> .....	188.7	110.5	39.4	57.7	20.5	-----
1960.....	197.4	116.7	42.1	59.9	20.8	-----
1961.....	212.8	123.6	43.9	65.3	23.9	-----
1962.....	231.2	137.3	47.6	64.7	29.2	-----
1963.....	250.2	153.7	52.1	61.5	35.0	-----
1964.....	272.4	172.9	58.4	60.8	38.7	-----
1965.....	300.1	198.2	69.5	57.1	44.8	-----
1966.....	<sup>4</sup> 316.1	<sup>4</sup> 213.9	78.6	53.5	<sup>4</sup> 48.7	-----
1967.....	352.0	231.3	86.2	59.4	61.3	-----
1968.....	390.2	258.2	95.9	60.7	71.3	-----
1969 <sup>5</sup> .....	401.7	279.1	105.7	51.5	71.1	283.0
1970.....	435.5	291.7	110.0	57.9	85.9	294.7
1971.....	484.8	<sup>6</sup> 320.3	115.9	60.1	<sup>6</sup> 104.4	<sup>6</sup> 323.1
1972.....	556.4	377.8	<sup>7</sup> 129.7	61.9	116.7	380.4
1973 <sup>8</sup> .....	625.4	444.5	156.3	53.2	127.7	448.8
1973: Jan.....	564.7	385.8	133.3	61.8	117.1	388.4
Feb.....	575.4	397.2	138.1	60.6	117.6	400.3
Mar.....	583.6	405.8	141.8	60.4	117.4	409.0
Apr.....	589.6	411.1	143.9	61.0	117.5	414.7
May.....	597.7	417.4	146.8	61.0	119.3	421.1
June.....	602.0	420.3	148.2	61.6	120.1	423.8
July <sup>9</sup> .....	608.2	427.3	151.4	59.6	121.3	431.3
Aug <sup>9</sup> .....	616.0	435.3	153.6	57.7	123.0	440.0
Sept <sup>9</sup> .....	618.2	438.1	154.0	56.3	123.8	442.7
Oct <sup>9</sup> .....	621.7	440.0	154.0	54.9	126.8	444.6
Nov <sup>9</sup> .....	624.6	443.6	155.5	54.5	126.5	447.9
Dec <sup>9</sup> .....	625.4	444.5	156.3	53.2	127.7	448.8

<sup>1</sup> Data are for last Wednesday of month (except June 30 and December 31 call dates).<sup>2</sup> Adjusted to exclude all interbank loans beginning 1948 and domestic bank loans only beginning January 1959.<sup>3</sup> Beginning January 1959, loans and investments are reported gross, without valuation reserves deducted, rather than net of valuation reserves, as in earlier periods.<sup>4</sup> Effective June 1966, balances accumulated for payment of personal loans (about \$1.1 billion) are excluded from loans at all commercial banks, and certain certificates of CCC and Export-Import Bank totaling about \$1 billion are included in other securities rather than in loans.<sup>5</sup> Beginning June 1969, data include all bank-premises subsidiaries and other significant majority-owned domestic subsidiaries; earlier data include commercial banks only.<sup>6</sup> Beginning June 1971, Farmers Home Administration insured notes totaling about \$0.7 billion are classified as other securities rather than as loans.<sup>7</sup> Beginning June 1972, commercial and industrial loans were reduced by about \$0.4 billion due to loan reclassifications at one large bank.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE C-54.—Total funds raised in credit markets by nonfinancial sectors, 1965-73

[Billions of dollars]

Item	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Total funds raised.....	69.9	67.7	82.2	94.6	91.4	97.5	146.7	166.1
U.S. Government.....	1.8	3.6	13.0	13.4	-3.6	12.8	25.5	17.3
Public debt securities.....	1.3	2.3	8.9	10.3	-1.3	12.9	26.0	13.9
Budget agency issues.....	.5	1.3	4.1	3.1	-2.4	-.1	-.5	3.4
All other nonfinancial sectors.....	68.1	64.1	69.2	81.2	95.0	84.7	121.2	148.8
Corporate equities.....	.2	.8	2.2	-1.4	3.4	4.9	11.7	10.0
Debt instruments.....	67.9	63.3	67.0	82.6	91.6	79.8	109.5	138.8
Debt capital instruments.....	38.8	38.9	45.7	50.6	50.6	57.7	83.2	92.4
State and local government securities.....	7.3	5.6	7.8	9.5	9.9	11.3	16.6	11.9
Corporate and foreign bonds.....	5.9	11.0	15.9	14.0	13.0	20.6	19.7	13.2
Mortgages.....	25.6	22.3	22.0	27.1	27.7	25.7	46.8	67.3
Home.....	15.4	11.7	11.5	15.1	15.7	12.8	26.0	39.7
Other residential.....	3.6	3.1	3.6	3.4	4.7	5.8	8.8	10.3
Commercial.....	4.4	5.7	4.7	6.4	5.3	5.3	10.0	14.8
Farm.....	2.2	1.8	2.3	2.2	1.9	1.8	2.0	2.6
Other private credit.....	29.0	24.4	21.3	32.0	41.0	22.1	26.3	46.4
Bank loans n.e.c.....	14.1	10.7	9.5	13.1	15.3	6.4	9.3	21.8
Consumer credit.....	9.6	6.4	4.5	10.0	10.4	6.0	11.2	19.2
Open-market paper.....	-.3	1.0	2.1	1.6	3.3	3.8	-.9	-1.6
Other.....	5.6	6.2	5.1	7.2	12.0	5.9	6.6	7.0
By borrowing sector:								
Total funds raised.....	68.1	64.1	69.2	81.2	95.0	84.7	121.2	148.8
Foreign.....	2.5	1.3	4.0	3.1	3.3	3.0	5.7	3.4
State and local governments.....	7.7	6.3	7.9	9.8	10.7	11.4	17.0	12.3
Households.....	28.4	22.6	19.0	29.6	32.2	22.9	38.3	63.2
Nonfinancial business.....	29.5	33.9	38.2	38.7	48.8	47.3	60.2	69.9
Farm.....	3.3	3.1	3.6	2.8	3.2	3.2	4.1	4.9
Nonfarm noncorporate.....	5.7	5.4	5.0	5.6	7.4	5.3	8.7	10.4
Corporate.....	20.4	25.4	29.6	30.3	38.3	38.8	47.4	54.6
Total funds advanced to nonfinancial sectors.....	69.9	67.7	82.2	94.6	91.4	97.5	146.7	166.1
Financed directly or indirectly by:								
Private domestic nonfinancial sectors.....	46.3	41.2	50.3	60.0	47.8	62.6	82.5	107.3
Deposits.....	40.5	24.4	52.1	48.3	5.4	66.6	94.2	102.2
Demand deposits and currency.....	7.8	4.1	12.8	14.5	7.7	10.5	13.0	16.5
Time and savings accounts.....	32.7	20.3	39.3	33.9	-2.3	56.1	81.2	85.7
At commercial banks.....	19.6	13.0	22.6	21.0	-10.3	39.2	40.6	39.7
At savings institutions.....	13.2	7.3	16.7	12.9	8.0	16.9	40.6	46.0
Credit market instruments, net.....	5.8	16.8	-1.7	11.7	42.4	-4.1	-11.7	5.0
U.S. Government securities.....	2.9	8.2	-1.4	8.0	16.8	-8.3	-13.0	4.1
Private credit market instruments.....	5.0	9.3	5.6	12.4	28.2	5.9	8.8	11.4
Corporate equities.....	-2.2	-1.1	-4.5	-7.9	-4.3	-2.6	-5.4	-5.9
Less security debt.....	-.1	-.3	1.5	.8	-1.6	-.9	2.1	4.6
Other sources:								
Foreign funds.....	.5	1.8	4.9	5.1	10.6	2.4	23.9	15.7
At banks.....	.8	3.7	2.3	2.6	9.3	-8.5	-3.2	5.1
Direct.....	-.3	-1.9	2.7	2.5	1.3	10.9	27.2	10.6
Change in U.S. Government cash balance.....	-1.0	-.4	1.2	-1.1	.4	2.8	3.2	.5
U.S. Government loans.....	2.8	4.9	4.6	4.9	2.9	2.8	3.2	2.3
Private insurance and pension reserves.....	15.6	18.1	18.2	18.8	19.2	21.8	25.4	24.8
Other.....	5.8	2.2	3.0	6.9	10.4	5.1	8.4	15.5

See footnote at end of table.

TABLE C-54.—*Total funds raised in credit markets by nonfinancial sectors, 1965-73—Continued*

(Billions of dollars)

Item	1973 unadjusted quarterly flows			1973 seasonally adjusted annual rates		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
Total funds raised.....	46.5	47.1	37.4	221.7	180.2	156.4
U.S. Government.....	8.8	-5.9	- .4	32.6	1.5	-9.6
Public debt securities.....	8.2	-5.9	-1.1	30.1	1.4	-12.4
Budget agency issues.....	.6	.0	.7	2.6	.1	2.9
All other nonfinancial sectors.....	37.7	53.1	37.8	189.1	178.7	166.0
Corporate equities.....	2.2	2.2	.7	8.9	8.7	2.9
Debt instruments.....	35.5	50.9	37.1	180.1	170.0	163.1
Debt capital instruments.....	18.4	27.4	23.8	81.7	102.8	93.0
State and local government securities.....	1.5	2.8	1.0	5.1	9.7	5.1
Corporate and foreign bonds.....	1.7	3.6	2.0	8.3	11.7	8.5
Mortgages.....	15.1	21.0	20.8	68.3	81.4	79.4
Home.....	8.2	11.6	11.6	37.9	44.9	42.5
Other residential.....	2.8	4.1	3.4	12.6	15.6	14.1
Commercial.....	3.1	4.0	4.8	13.8	16.4	18.9
Farm.....	1.0	1.3	1.0	4.0	4.6	3.9
Other private credit.....	17.0	23.5	13.2	98.4	67.2	70.1
Bank loans n.e.c.....	13.9	13.1	5.8	74.4	33.5	37.0
Consumer credit.....	1.8	7.8	6.0	25.3	24.1	21.9
Open-market paper.....	-1.7	.5	.8	-10.8	4.0	3.1
Other.....	3.1	2.1	.7	9.6	5.6	8.1
By borrowing sector:						
Total funds raised.....	37.7	53.1	37.8	189.1	178.7	166.0
Foreign.....	3.3	1.8	-.7	14.3	7.3	-2.1
State and local governments.....	1.6	2.8	.9	5.4	9.5	4.9
Households.....	11.2	21.3	18.2	71.3	72.5	77.3
Nonfinancial business.....	21.6	27.2	19.4	98.0	89.5	85.8
Farm.....	2.0	2.8	1.6	7.0	7.7	7.6
Nonfarm noncorporate.....	2.7	3.7	3.6	13.8	13.0	14.1
Corporate.....	16.9	20.6	14.2	77.2	68.8	64.1
Total funds advanced to nonfinancial sectors.....	46.5	47.1	37.4	221.7	180.2	156.4
Financed directly or indirectly by:						
Private domestic nonfinancial sectors.....	20.3	35.6	22.1	111.4	134.9	117.0
Deposits.....	17.9	29.7	11.0	120.0	98.1	69.9
Demand deposits and currency.....	-12.7	10.1	-4.1	-.8	20.7	8.1
Time and savings accounts.....	30.6	19.6	15.1	120.7	77.4	61.9
At commercial banks.....	18.7	11.0	14.0	76.3	46.1	54.0
At savings institutions.....	12.0	8.6	1.1	44.4	31.3	7.8
Credit market instruments, net.....	2.4	5.9	11.1	-8.5	36.8	47.0
U.S. Government securities.....	2.8	2.2	8.8	-.7	23.3	32.5
Private credit market instruments.....	-.8	3.8	3.8	-4.1	13.5	20.4
Corporate equities.....	-.3	-1.2	-2.4	-6.8	-4.5	-9.2
Less security debt.....	-.8	-1.1	-.8	-3.0	-4.5	-3.3
Other sources:						
Foreign funds.....	9.7	.2	1.6	38.6	.6	-1.8
At banks.....	.2	2.1	1.0	1.9	8.1	4.6
Direct.....	9.5	-1.9	.6	36.7	-7.5	-6.4
Change in U.S. Government cash balance.....	2.3	-.4	-5.1	16.4	-9.3	-21.3
U.S. Government loans.....	.5	-.2	1.1	1.9	-1.0	4.2
Private insurance and pension reserves.....	7.3	7.1	6.9	28.8	29.1	27.4
Other.....	6.5	4.8	10.9	24.5	25.8	30.8

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE C-55.—Private liquid asset holdings, nonfinancial investors, 1965-73

(Averages of daily figures; billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted)

Year and month	Total liquid assets	Currency and deposits					U.S. Government securities		Negotiable certificates of deposit <sup>5</sup>	Commercial paper <sup>6</sup>
		Total	Cur- rency <sup>1</sup>	De- mand deposits <sup>1</sup>	Time deposits		Sav- ings bonds <sup>3</sup>	Short- term market- able secur- ities <sup>4</sup>		
					Com- mer- cial banks <sup>1</sup>	Non- bank thrift institu- tions <sup>2</sup>				
1965: Dec	561.0	451.0	36.3	119.1	125.2	170.4	49.5	38.7	14.9	6.8
1966: Dec	590.6	473.7	38.3	121.1	136.9	177.3	50.1	43.6	14.5	8.8
1967: Dec	640.4	520.3	40.4	129.4	156.3	194.2	51.0	39.6	19.1	10.4
1968: Dec	699.8	564.2	43.4	139.4	174.5	206.9	51.4	46.9	22.4	14.9
1969: Dec	730.3	582.1	46.1	143.4	177.2	215.4	51.1	64.9	9.0	23.3
1970: Dec	780.8	630.7	49.1	151.5	198.7	231.4	51.3	53.3	23.0	22.4
1971: Dec	863.9	718.6	52.6	160.6	233.4	272.0	53.7	40.7	29.7	21.2
1972: Dec	975.1	814.7	56.9	174.7	265.0	318.1	57.0	42.8	39.3	21.2
1973: Dec <sup>p</sup>	1,080.9	887.5	61.6	184.3	294.6	347.0	60.9	52.4	57.2	22.8
1971: Jan	789.0	638.3	49.4	151.3	202.7	234.9	51.5	52.6	24.3	22.3
Feb	798.7	649.4	49.8	153.1	207.5	239.0	51.6	50.5	25.5	21.7
Mar	807.1	659.6	50.0	154.4	212.4	242.8	51.8	48.0	26.5	21.3
Apr	814.0	668.2	50.5	155.4	215.4	246.9	52.0	47.0	26.1	20.6
May	821.6	677.2	50.8	157.9	217.9	250.6	52.2	46.2	26.4	19.6
June	828.8	684.4	51.0	159.7	220.0	253.7	52.4	46.2	26.9	18.8
July	835.7	690.4	51.5	160.5	221.4	257.1	52.6	46.4	27.4	18.8
Aug	840.4	695.0	51.6	160.4	222.9	260.1	52.9	45.7	27.2	19.5
Sept	845.4	699.7	51.9	160.3	224.3	263.1	53.1	44.3	27.8	20.4
Oct	852.4	706.4	52.2	160.8	227.1	266.3	53.3	43.0	28.7	21.0
Nov	857.6	712.2	52.3	160.3	230.2	269.3	53.5	41.8	28.7	21.4
Dec	863.9	718.6	52.6	160.6	233.4	272.0	53.7	40.7	29.7	21.2
1972: Jan	872.6	727.4	52.9	160.8	237.4	276.3	54.0	39.7	30.1	21.4
Feb	881.6	737.2	53.2	163.0	240.2	280.9	54.2	38.2	30.6	21.4
Mar	892.3	746.2	53.6	165.2	242.4	285.0	54.5	39.4	30.5	21.6
Apr	901.3	752.6	53.8	166.3	243.8	288.7	54.8	40.1	32.0	21.9
May	909.2	758.8	54.1	166.2	246.5	291.9	55.0	40.0	33.4	22.0
June	917.4	766.1	54.3	166.9	249.4	295.5	55.3	39.6	34.3	22.1
July	926.6	774.9	54.6	168.4	252.2	299.6	55.6	39.3	34.8	22.0
Aug	935.2	782.9	54.9	169.6	255.0	303.5	55.9	39.1	35.6	21.7
Sept	944.4	790.8	55.3	170.7	257.4	307.5	56.1	39.5	36.6	21.4
Oct	954.0	799.6	55.8	171.9	260.4	311.5	56.4	40.2	36.8	21.0
Nov	964.4	806.5	56.3	172.5	262.7	315.0	56.7	42.0	38.2	21.1
Dec	975.1	814.7	56.9	174.7	265.0	318.1	57.0	42.8	39.3	21.2
1973: Jan	983.2	822.9	57.1	175.1	268.0	322.7	57.3	41.5	40.2	21.3
Feb	992.6	829.2	57.5	175.7	269.4	326.6	57.6	41.1	44.3	20.5
Mar	1,004.1	834.7	58.0	175.5	271.6	329.5	57.9	42.5	49.6	19.5
Apr	1,014.2	841.0	58.6	176.5	273.7	332.3	58.2	42.6	53.3	19.1
May	1,026.4	848.4	58.9	178.9	276.0	334.6	58.5	44.4	56.0	19.1
June	1,037.2	857.3	59.4	181.4	278.7	337.8	58.8	45.2	56.4	19.6
July	1,045.2	861.6	59.5	182.0	280.4	339.7	59.0	45.8	58.4	20.4
Aug	1,053.1	864.2	59.8	181.2	283.5	339.7	59.3	47.4	60.8	21.5
Sept	1,058.5	866.5	60.2	179.8	286.0	340.5	59.4	49.0	61.0	22.6
Oct	1,064.3	873.3	60.4	180.9	289.7	342.3	60.0	50.0	58.0	23.0
Nov	1,071.2	880.3	60.9	183.0	292.1	344.3	60.8	50.9	56.3	23.0
Dec <sup>p</sup>	1,080.9	887.5	61.6	184.3	294.6	347.0	60.9	52.4	57.2	22.8

<sup>1</sup> Money stock components (see Table C-52) after deducting foreign holdings and holdings by domestic financial institutions. The three columns add to M<sub>2</sub> held by domestic nonfinancial sectors.

<sup>2</sup> Deposits at nonbank thrift institutions, as published in money stock statistics, plus monthly-average deposits at credit unions.

<sup>3</sup> Series E and H savings bonds held by individuals.

<sup>4</sup> Short-term marketable U.S. Government securities excluding official, foreign, and financial institution holdings.

<sup>5</sup> Certificates over \$100,000 at weekly reporting banks, except foreign holdings.

<sup>6</sup> Commercial paper held outside banks and other financial institutions.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.



TABLE C-56.—Federal Reserve Bank credit and member bank reserves, 1929-73

(Averages of daily figures; millions of dollars)

Year and month	Reserve Bank credit outstanding				Member bank reserves			
	Total	U.S. Government securities	Member bank borrowings		All other, mainly float	Total	Re-quired	Excess
			Total	Seasonal				
1929: Dec.....	1,643	446	801	-----	396	2,395	2,347	48
1933: Dec.....	2,669	2,432	95	-----	142	2,588	1,822	1,766
1939: Dec.....	2,612	2,510	3	-----	99	11,473	6,462	5,011
1940: Dec.....	2,305	2,188	3	-----	114	14,049	7,403	6,646
1941: Dec.....	2,404	2,219	5	-----	180	12,812	9,422	3,390
1942: Dec.....	6,035	5,549	4	-----	482	13,152	10,776	2,376
1943: Dec.....	11,914	11,166	90	-----	658	12,749	11,701	1,048
1944: Dec.....	19,612	18,693	265	-----	654	14,168	12,884	1,284
1945: Dec.....	24,744	23,708	334	-----	702	16,027	14,536	1,491
1946: Dec.....	24,746	23,767	157	-----	822	16,517	15,617	900
1947: Dec.....	22,858	21,905	224	-----	729	17,261	16,275	986
1948: Dec.....	23,978	23,002	134	-----	842	19,990	19,193	797
1949: Dec.....	19,012	18,287	118	-----	607	16,291	15,488	803
1950: Dec.....	21,606	20,345	142	-----	1,119	17,391	16,364	1,027
1951: Dec.....	25,446	23,409	657	-----	1,380	20,310	19,484	826
1952: Dec.....	27,299	24,400	1,593	-----	1,306	21,180	20,457	723
1953: Dec.....	27,107	25,639	441	-----	1,027	19,920	19,227	693
1954: Dec.....	26,317	24,917	246	-----	1,154	19,279	18,576	703
1955: Dec.....	26,853	24,602	839	-----	1,412	19,240	18,646	594
1956: Dec.....	27,156	24,765	688	-----	1,703	19,535	18,883	652
1957: Dec.....	26,186	23,982	710	-----	1,494	19,420	18,843	577
1958: Dec.....	28,412	26,312	557	-----	1,543	18,899	18,383	516
1959: Dec.....	29,435	27,036	906	-----	1,493	18,932	18,450	482
1960: Dec.....	29,060	27,248	87	-----	1,725	19,283	18,527	756
1961: Dec.....	31,217	29,098	149	-----	1,970	20,118	19,550	568
1962: Dec.....	33,218	30,546	304	-----	2,368	20,040	19,468	572
1963: Dec.....	36,610	33,729	327	-----	2,554	20,746	20,210	536
1964: Dec.....	39,873	37,126	243	-----	2,504	21,609	21,198	411
1965: Dec.....	43,853	40,885	454	-----	2,514	22,719	22,267	452
1966: Dec.....	46,864	43,760	557	-----	2,547	23,830	23,438	392
1967: Dec.....	51,268	48,891	238	-----	2,139	25,260	24,915	345
1968: Dec.....	56,610	52,529	765	-----	3,316	27,221	26,766	455
1969: Dec.....	64,100	57,500	1,086	-----	5,514	28,031	27,774	257
1970: Dec.....	66,708	61,688	321	-----	4,699	29,265	28,993	272
1971: Dec.....	74,255	69,158	107	-----	4,990	31,329	31,164	165
1972: Dec.....	76,851	71,094	1,049	-----	4,708	31,353	31,134	219
1973: Dec.....	85,554	79,701	1,298	41	4,555	34,984	34,791	193
1972: Jan.....	75,415	70,687	20	-----	4,708	32,865	32,692	173
Feb.....	73,994	69,966	33	-----	3,995	31,922	31,798	124
Mar.....	73,181	69,273	99	-----	3,809	31,921	31,688	233
Apr.....	75,171	70,939	109	-----	4,123	32,565	32,429	136
May.....	75,705	71,428	119	-----	4,158	32,812	32,708	104
June.....	76,108	71,632	94	-----	4,382	32,539	32,335	204
July.....	77,035	72,089	202	-----	4,744	33,021	32,874	147
Aug.....	76,676	71,858	438	-----	4,380	33,148	32,893	255
Sept.....	75,451	70,252	514	-----	4,685	33,003	32,841	162
Oct.....	77,331	71,359	574	-----	5,398	33,803	33,556	247
Nov.....	75,959	71,112	606	-----	4,241	31,774	31,460	314
Dec.....	76,851	71,094	1,049	-----	4,708	31,353	31,134	219
1973: Jan.....	78,063	72,194	1,165	-----	4,704	32,962	32,620	342
Feb.....	77,600	72,307	1,593	-----	3,700	31,742	31,537	205
Mar.....	79,219	74,019	1,858	-----	3,342	31,973	31,678	295
Apr.....	80,542	75,353	1,721	5	3,468	32,277	32,125	152
May.....	81,889	76,758	1,786	30	3,345	32,393	32,275	118
June.....	80,546	75,355	1,789	77	3,402	32,028	31,969	59
July.....	83,880	77,448	2,051	124	4,381	33,542	33,199	343
Aug.....	82,445	76,653	2,143	163	3,649	33,785	33,539	246
Sept.....	81,809	76,073	1,861	147	3,875	34,019	33,782	237
Oct.....	83,643	78,042	1,467	126	4,134	34,912	34,712	200
Nov.....	83,755	78,457	1,399	84	3,899	34,727	34,523	204
Dec.....	85,554	79,701	1,298	41	4,555	34,984	34,791	193

<sup>1</sup> Data are for licensed banks only.<sup>2</sup> Beginning December 1959, total reserves held include vault cash allowed.<sup>3</sup> Beginning November 1972, includes \$450 million of reserve deficiencies on which Federal Reserve Banks are allowed to waive penalties for a transition period in connection with bank adaptation to Regulation J as amended effective November 9, 1972. Beginning 1973, allowable deficiencies included are (beginning with first statement week of quarter): first quarter, \$279 million; second quarter, \$172 million; third quarter, \$112 million; fourth quarter, \$84 million.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE C-57.—*Aggregate reserves and member bank deposits, 1959-73*[Averages of daily figures; <sup>1</sup> billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted]

Year and month	Member bank reserves <sup>2</sup>				Deposits subject to reserve requirements <sup>4</sup>				Total member bank deposits plus non-deposit items <sup>5</sup>
	Total	Nonborrowed	Required	Available <sup>3</sup>	Total	Time and savings	Demand		
							Private	U.S. Government	
1959: Dec.....	18.57	17.63	18.07	16.62	158.2	54.3	99.0	4.8	158.2
1960: Dec.....	18.88	18.81	18.14	17.01	162.5	58.8	99.1	4.5	162.5
1961: Dec.....	19.71	19.57	19.12	17.71	175.5	67.7	102.9	4.9	175.5
1962: Dec.....	19.64	19.38	19.07	17.58	189.0	79.9	103.3	5.7	189.0
1963: Dec.....	20.26	19.93	19.77	18.26	203.2	92.1	105.9	5.2	203.4
1964: Dec.....	21.18	20.91	20.77	19.08	218.7	103.8	109.1	5.9	220.1
1965: Dec.....	22.24	21.80	21.82	20.21	238.5	120.6	112.8	5.1	240.0
1966: Dec.....	23.34	22.81	23.00	21.40	246.7	128.6	113.9	4.2	250.9
1967: Dec.....	24.81	24.58	24.44	22.50	275.5	148.8	121.2	5.5	279.9
1968: Dec.....	27.28	26.54	26.86	24.86	299.6	164.4	130.3	4.9	306.6
1969: Dec.....	28.01	26.90	27.73	25.40	287.7	150.4	131.9	5.3	307.7
1970: Dec.....	29.19	28.86	28.95	27.10	321.3	178.8	136.1	6.5	332.9
1971: Dec.....	31.30	31.17	31.12	28.96	360.3	210.4	143.8	6.1	364.3
1972: Dec.....	31.41	30.36	31.13	29.05	402.0	241.4	154.5	6.1	406.4
1973: Dec.....	35.11	33.81	34.80	32.91	442.2	279.0	158.3	4.9	449.6
1972: Jan.....	31.76	31.74	31.55	29.18	363.5	213.6	143.5	6.4	367.5
Feb.....	31.68	31.64	31.52	29.36	365.7	216.2	145.2	4.2	369.3
Mar.....	31.98	31.88	31.79	29.66	370.2	217.3	147.2	5.7	373.9
Apr.....	32.57	32.45	32.42	29.83	374.5	219.4	147.6	7.5	378.1
May.....	32.82	32.71	32.68	29.94	378.9	222.8	148.4	7.8	382.7
June.....	32.99	32.88	32.78	30.17	380.9	225.6	149.3	6.0	384.7
July.....	33.17	32.93	32.97	30.38	384.4	228.0	150.9	5.5	388.3
Aug.....	33.39	33.00	33.20	30.65	387.3	230.4	151.8	5.0	391.4
Sept.....	33.35	32.81	33.14	30.96	390.4	233.1	152.4	4.9	394.5
Oct.....	33.81	33.25	33.59	31.06	394.1	235.6	152.8	5.8	398.4
Nov.....	31.92	31.32	31.57	29.62	398.4	238.7	152.9	6.8	402.7
Dec.....	31.41	30.36	31.13	29.05	402.0	241.4	154.5	6.1	406.4
1973: Jan.....	32.20	31.04	31.94	29.44	404.7	244.0	154.0	6.7	409.7
Feb.....	31.63	30.04	31.43	29.37	409.0	248.9	154.0	6.1	413.5
Mar.....	31.91	30.08	31.70	29.62	416.3	255.4	153.3	7.6	421.2
Apr.....	32.30	30.59	32.08	29.87	421.4	260.9	153.4	7.1	426.6
May.....	32.44	30.60	32.29	30.11	425.1	265.1	154.8	5.2	430.5
June.....	32.46	30.61	32.22	30.55	428.9	267.3	156.3	5.3	434.5
July.....	33.58	31.62	33.29	31.36	431.1	270.1	157.1	3.9	437.6
Aug.....	33.91	31.74	33.73	32.04	436.7	275.0	157.0	4.8	443.8
Sept.....	34.17	32.32	33.95	32.39	438.6	277.5	156.2	5.0	445.9
Oct.....	34.94	33.47	34.72	32.84	439.7	277.3	156.4	6.0	446.5
Nov.....	34.86	33.46	34.62	32.71	440.4	277.1	157.5	5.8	447.5
Dec.....	35.11	33.81	34.80	32.91	442.2	279.0	158.3	4.9	449.6

<sup>1</sup> Except as noted in footnote 5.<sup>2</sup> Member bank reserves series reflects actual reserve requirement percentages with no adjustment to eliminate the effect of changes in Regulations D and M.<sup>3</sup> Reserves available to support private nonbank deposits are defined as (1) required reserves for (a) private demand deposits, (b) total time and savings deposits, and (c) nondeposit sources subject to reserve requirements and (2) excess reserves. This series excludes required reserves for net interbank and U.S. Government demand deposits.<sup>4</sup> Deposits subject to reserve requirements include total time and savings deposits and net demand deposits as defined by Regulation D. Private demand deposits include all demand deposits except those due to the U.S. Government, less cash items in process of collection and demand balances due from domestic commercial banks.<sup>5</sup> Total member bank deposits subject to reserve requirements, plus Eurodollar borrowings, bank-related commercial paper (data relate to Wednesday figures), and certain other nondeposit items. This series for deposits is referred to as "the adjusted bank credit proxy."

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE C-58.—Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-73

(Percent per annum)

Year or month	U.S. Government securities				Corporate bonds (Moody's)		High-grade municipal bonds (Standard & Poor's)	Average rate on short-term bank loans to business—selected cities	Prime commercial paper, 4-6 months	Federal Reserve Bank discount rate	FHA new home mortgage yields <sup>5</sup>
	3-month Treasury bills <sup>1</sup>	9-12 month issues <sup>2</sup>	3-5 year issues <sup>3</sup>	Taxable bonds <sup>4</sup>	Aaa	Baa					
1929					4.73	5.90	4.27		5.85	5.16	
1933	0.515		2.66		4.49	7.76	4.71		1.73	2.56	
1939	.023		.59		3.01	4.96	2.76	2.1	.59	1.00	
1940	.014		.50		2.84	4.75	2.50	2.1	.56	1.00	
1941	.103		.73		2.77	4.33	2.10	2.0	.53	1.00	
1942	.326		1.46	2.46	2.83	4.28	2.36	2.2	.66	1.00	
1943	.373	0.75	1.34	2.47	2.73	3.91	2.06	2.6	.69	1.00	
1944	.375	.79	1.33	2.48	2.72	3.61	1.86	2.4	.73	1.00	
1945	.375	.81	1.18	2.37	2.62	3.29	1.67	2.2	.75	1.00	
1946	.375	.82	1.16	2.19	2.53	3.05	1.64	2.1	.81	1.00	
1947	.594	.88	1.32	2.25	2.61	3.24	2.01	2.1	1.03	1.00	
1948	1.040	1.14	1.62	2.44	2.82	3.47	2.40	2.5	1.44	1.34	
1949	1.102	1.14	1.43	2.31	2.66	3.42	2.21	2.68	1.49	1.50	4.34
1950	1.218	1.26	1.50	2.32	2.62	3.24	1.98	2.69	1.45	1.59	4.17
1951	1.552	1.73	1.93	2.57	2.86	3.41	2.00	3.11	2.16	1.75	4.21
1952	1.766	1.81	2.13	2.68	2.96	3.52	2.19	3.49	2.33	1.75	4.29
1953	1.931	2.07	2.56	2.94	3.20	3.74	2.72	3.69	2.52	1.99	4.61
1954	.953	.92	1.82	2.55	2.90	3.51	2.37	3.61	1.58	1.60	4.62
1955	1.753	1.89	2.50	2.84	3.06	3.53	2.53	3.70	2.18	1.89	4.64
1956	2.658	2.83	3.12	3.08	3.36	3.88	2.93	4.20	3.31	2.77	4.79
1957	3.267	3.53	3.62	3.47	3.89	4.71	3.60	4.62	3.81	3.12	5.42
1958	1.839	2.09	2.90	3.43	3.79	4.73	3.56	4.34	2.46	2.15	5.49
1959	3.405	4.11	4.33	4.07	4.38	5.05	3.95	5.00	3.97	3.36	5.71
1960	2.928	3.55	3.99	4.01	4.41	5.19	3.73	5.16	3.85	3.53	6.18
1961	2.378	2.91	3.60	3.90	4.35	5.08	3.46	4.97	2.97	3.00	5.80
1962	2.778	3.02	3.57	3.95	4.33	5.02	3.18	5.00	3.26	3.00	5.61
1963	3.157	3.28	3.72	4.00	4.26	4.86	3.23	5.01	3.55	3.23	5.47
1964	3.549	3.76	4.06	4.15	4.40	4.83	3.22	4.99	3.97	3.55	5.45
1965	3.954	4.09	4.22	4.21	4.49	4.87	3.27	5.06	4.38	4.04	5.46
1966	4.881	5.17	5.16	4.66	5.13	5.67	3.82	6.00	5.55	4.50	6.29
1967	4.321	4.84	5.07	4.85	5.51	6.23	3.98	6.00	5.10	4.19	6.55
1968	5.339	5.62	5.59	5.25	6.18	6.94	4.51	6.68	5.90	5.17	7.13
1969	6.677	7.06	6.85	6.10	7.03	7.81	5.81	8.21	7.83	5.87	8.19
1970	6.458	6.90	7.37	6.59	8.04	9.11	6.51	8.48	7.72	5.95	9.05
1971	4.348	4.75	5.77	5.74	7.39	8.56	5.70	6.32	5.11	4.88	7.78
1972	4.071	4.86	5.85	5.63	7.21	8.16	5.27	5.82	4.69	4.50	7.53
1973	7.041	7.30	6.92	6.30	7.44	8.24	5.18	8.30	8.15	6.44	8.08

See next page for continuation of table and for footnotes.

TABLE C-58.—Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-73—Continued

[Percent per annum]

Year or month	U.S. Government securities				Corporate bonds (Moody's)		High-grade municipal bonds (Standard & Poor's)	Average rate on short-term bank loans to business—selected cities	Prime commercial paper, 4-6 months	Federal Reserve Bank discount rate	FHA new home mortgage yields <sup>3</sup>
	3-month Treasury bills <sup>1</sup>	9-12 month issues <sup>2</sup>	3-5 year issues <sup>2</sup>	Taxable bonds <sup>4</sup>	Aaa	Baa					
1971: Jan.....	4.494	4.29	5.72	5.91	7.36	8.74	5.70	7.6.59	5.11	5.23	8.40
Feb.....	3.773	3.80	5.31	5.84	7.08	8.39	5.55	-----	4.47	4.91	-----
Mar.....	3.323	3.66	4.74	5.71	7.21	8.46	5.44	-----	4.19	4.75	-----
Apr.....	3.780	4.21	5.42	5.75	7.25	8.45	5.65	-----	4.57	4.75	7.32
May.....	4.139	4.93	6.02	5.96	7.53	8.62	6.14	6.01	5.10	4.75	7.37
June.....	4.699	5.57	6.36	5.94	7.64	8.75	6.22	-----	5.45	4.75	7.75
July.....	5.405	5.89	6.77	5.91	7.64	8.76	6.31	-----	5.75	4.88	7.89
Aug.....	5.078	5.67	6.39	5.78	7.59	8.76	5.95	6.51	5.73	5.00	7.97
Sept.....	4.668	5.31	5.96	5.56	7.44	8.59	5.52	-----	5.75	5.00	7.92
Oct.....	4.489	4.74	5.68	5.46	7.39	8.48	5.24	-----	5.54	5.00	7.84
Nov.....	4.191	4.50	5.50	5.44	7.26	8.38	5.30	6.18	4.92	4.90	7.75
Dec.....	4.023	4.38	5.42	5.62	7.25	8.38	5.36	-----	4.74	4.63	7.62
1972: Jan.....	3.403	3.99	5.33	5.62	7.19	8.23	5.25	-----	4.08	4.50	7.59
Feb.....	3.180	4.07	5.51	5.67	7.27	8.23	5.33	5.52	3.93	4.50	7.49
Mar.....	3.723	4.54	5.74	5.66	7.24	8.24	5.30	-----	4.17	4.50	7.46
Apr.....	3.723	4.84	6.01	5.74	7.30	8.24	5.45	-----	4.58	4.50	7.45
May.....	3.648	4.58	5.69	5.64	7.30	8.23	5.26	5.59	4.51	4.50	7.50
June.....	3.874	4.87	5.77	5.59	7.23	8.20	5.37	-----	4.64	4.50	7.53
July.....	4.059	4.89	5.86	5.57	7.21	8.23	5.39	-----	4.85	4.50	7.54
Aug.....	4.014	4.91	5.92	5.54	7.19	8.19	5.29	5.84	4.82	4.50	7.54
Sept.....	4.651	5.49	6.16	5.70	7.22	8.09	5.36	-----	5.14	4.50	7.55
Oct.....	4.719	5.41	6.11	5.69	7.21	8.06	5.20	-----	5.30	4.50	7.56
Nov.....	4.774	5.22	6.03	5.50	7.12	7.99	5.03	6.33	5.25	4.50	7.57
Dec.....	5.061	5.46	6.07	5.63	7.08	7.93	5.03	-----	5.45	4.50	7.57
1973: Jan.....	5.307	5.78	6.29	5.94	7.15	7.90	5.05	-----	5.78	4.77	7.56
Feb.....	5.558	6.07	6.61	6.14	7.22	7.97	5.12	6.52	6.22	5.05	7.55
Mar.....	6.054	6.81	6.85	6.20	7.29	8.03	5.30	-----	6.85	5.50	7.56
Apr.....	6.289	6.79	6.74	6.11	7.26	8.09	5.16	-----	7.14	5.50	7.63
May.....	6.348	6.83	6.78	6.22	7.29	8.06	5.12	7.35	7.27	5.90	7.73
June.....	7.188	7.27	6.76	6.32	7.37	8.13	5.15	-----	7.99	6.33	7.79
July.....	8.015	8.37	7.49	6.53	7.45	8.24	5.39	-----	9.18	6.98	7.89
Aug.....	8.672	8.82	7.75	6.81	7.68	8.53	5.47	9.24	10.21	7.29	8.19
Sept.....	8.478	8.44	7.16	6.42	7.63	8.63	5.11	-----	10.23	7.50	-----
Oct.....	7.155	7.42	6.81	6.26	7.60	8.41	5.05	-----	8.92	7.50	9.18
Nov.....	7.866	7.66	6.96	6.31	7.67	8.42	5.17	10.08	8.94	7.50	8.97
Dec.....	7.364	7.38	6.80	6.35	7.68	8.48	5.12	-----	9.08	7.50	8.86

<sup>1</sup> Rate on new issues within period. First issued in December 1929.<sup>2</sup> Certificates of indebtedness and selected note and bond issues.<sup>3</sup> Selected note and bond issues.<sup>4</sup> First issued in 1941. Series includes bonds which are neither due nor callable before a given number of years as follows: April 1953 to date, 10 years; April 1952–March 1953, 12 years; October 1941–March 1952, 15 years.<sup>5</sup> Data for first of the month, based on the maximum permissible interest rate (8½ percent beginning August 25, 1973). Through July 1961, computed on 25-year mortgages paid in 12 years and thereafter, 30-year mortgages paid in 15 years.<sup>6</sup> From October 30, 1942, to April 24, 1946, a preferential rate of 0.50 percent was in effect for advances secured by Government securities maturing in 1 year or less.<sup>7</sup> Series revised. Not strictly comparable with earlier data.

Note.—Yields and rates computed for New York City except for short-term bank loans.

Sources: Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of the Treasury, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Moody's Investors Service, and Standard &amp; Poor's Corporation.

TABLE C-59.—Short- and intermediate-term consumer credit outstanding, 1929-73

[Millions of dollars]

End of year or month	Total	Instalment credit					Noninstalment credit			Addendum: Policy loans by life insurance companies <sup>3</sup>
		Total	Auto-mobile paper	Other consumer goods paper	Home improvement loans <sup>1</sup>	Personal loans	Total	Charge accounts	Other <sup>2</sup>	
1929.....	7, 116	3, 524	1, 384	1, 544	27	569	3, 592	1, 996	1, 596	2, 379
1933.....	3, 885	1, 723	493	799	15	416	2, 162	1, 286	876	3, 769
1939.....	7, 222	4, 503	1, 497	1, 620	298	1, 088	2, 719	1, 414	1, 305	3, 248
1940.....	8, 338	5, 514	2, 071	1, 827	371	1, 245	2, 824	1, 471	1, 353	3, 091
1941.....	9, 172	6, 085	2, 458	1, 929	376	1, 322	3, 087	1, 645	1, 442	2, 919
1942.....	5, 983	3, 166	742	1, 195	255	974	2, 817	1, 444	1, 373	2, 683
1943.....	4, 901	2, 136	355	819	130	832	2, 765	1, 440	1, 325	2, 373
1944.....	5, 111	2, 176	397	791	119	869	2, 935	1, 517	1, 418	2, 134
1945.....	5, 665	2, 462	455	816	182	1, 009	3, 203	1, 612	1, 591	1, 962
1946.....	8, 384	4, 172	981	1, 290	405	1, 496	4, 212	2, 076	2, 136	1, 894
1947.....	11, 598	6, 695	1, 924	2, 143	718	1, 910	4, 903	2, 381	2, 522	1, 937
1948.....	14, 447	8, 996	3, 018	2, 901	853	2, 224	5, 451	2, 722	2, 729	2, 057
1949.....	17, 364	11, 590	4, 555	3, 706	898	2, 431	5, 774	2, 854	2, 920	2, 240
1950.....	21, 471	14, 703	6, 074	4, 799	1, 016	2, 814	6, 768	3, 367	3, 401	2, 413
1951.....	22, 712	15, 294	5, 972	4, 880	1, 085	3, 357	7, 418	3, 700	3, 718	2, 590
1952.....	27, 520	19, 403	7, 733	6, 174	1, 385	4, 111	8, 117	4, 130	3, 987	2, 713
1953.....	31, 393	23, 005	9, 835	6, 779	1, 610	4, 781	8, 388	4, 274	4, 114	2, 914
1954.....	32, 464	23, 568	9, 809	6, 751	1, 616	5, 392	8, 896	4, 485	4, 411	3, 127
1955.....	38, 830	28, 906	13, 460	7, 641	1, 693	6, 112	9, 924	4, 795	5, 129	3, 290
1956.....	42, 334	31, 720	14, 420	8, 606	1, 905	6, 789	10, 614	4, 995	5, 619	3, 519
1957.....	44, 971	33, 868	15, 340	8, 844	2, 101	7, 582	11, 103	5, 146	5, 957	3, 869
1958.....	45, 129	33, 642	14, 152	9, 028	2, 346	8, 116	11, 487	5, 060	6, 427	4, 188
1959.....	51, 544	39, 247	16, 420	10, 631	2, 809	9, 386	12, 297	5, 104	7, 193	4, 618
1960.....	56, 141	42, 968	17, 658	11, 545	3, 148	10, 617	13, 173	5, 329	7, 844	5, 231
1961.....	57, 982	43, 891	17, 135	11, 862	3, 221	11, 673	14, 091	5, 324	8, 767	5, 733
1962.....	63, 821	48, 720	19, 381	12, 627	3, 298	13, 414	15, 101	5, 684	9, 417	6, 234
1963.....	71, 739	55, 486	22, 254	14, 177	3, 437	15, 618	16, 253	5, 903	10, 350	6, 655
1964.....	80, 268	62, 692	24, 934	16, 333	3, 577	17, 848	17, 576	6, 195	11, 381	7, 140
1965.....	89, 883	70, 893	28, 437	18, 483	3, 736	20, 237	18, 990	6, 430	12, 560	7, 678
1966.....	96, 239	76, 245	30, 010	20, 732	3, 841	21, 662	19, 994	6, 686	13, 308	9, 117
1967.....	100, 783	79, 428	29, 796	22, 389	4, 003	23, 235	21, 355	7, 070	14, 285	10, 059
1968.....	110, 770	87, 745	32, 948	24, 626	4, 239	25, 932	23, 025	7, 193	15, 832	11, 306
1969.....	121, 146	97, 105	35, 527	28, 313	4, 613	28, 652	24, 041	7, 373	16, 668	13, 825
1970.....	127, 163	102, 064	35, 184	31, 465	5, 070	30, 345	25, 099	7, 968	17, 131	16, 064
1971.....	138, 394	111, 295	38, 664	34, 353	5, 413	32, 865	27, 099	8, 350	18, 749	17, 065
1972.....	157, 564	127, 332	44, 129	40, 080	6, 201	36, 922	30, 232	9, 002	21, 230	18, 003
1973 <sup>4</sup> .....	180, 800	148, 100	51, 400	47, 750	7, 350	41, 600	32, 700	9, 600	23, 100	-----
1972: Jan.....	137, 426	110, 757	38, 450	34, 046	5, 399	32, 862	26, 669	7, 630	19, 039	17, 130
Feb.....	136, 941	110, 510	38, 516	33, 579	5, 403	33, 012	26, 431	6, 987	19, 444	17, 186
Mar.....	137, 879	111, 257	38, 853	33, 695	5, 437	33, 272	26, 622	6, 963	19, 659	17, 267
Apr.....	139, 410	112, 439	39, 348	33, 981	5, 504	33, 606	26, 971	7, 179	19, 792	17, 352
May.....	141, 450	114, 183	40, 063	34, 439	5, 604	34, 077	27, 267	7, 464	19, 803	17, 434
June.....	143, 812	116, 365	41, 019	35, 041	5, 717	34, 588	27, 447	7, 610	19, 837	17, 522
July.....	145, 214	117, 702	41, 603	35, 470	5, 797	34, 832	27, 512	7, 644	19, 868	17, 601
Aug.....	147, 631	119, 911	42, 323	36, 188	5, 950	35, 450	27, 720	7, 717	20, 003	17, 691
Sept.....	148, 976	121, 193	42, 644	36, 745	6, 049	35, 755	27, 783	7, 693	20, 090	17, 771
Oct.....	150, 576	122, 505	43, 162	37, 216	6, 124	36, 003	28, 071	7, 780	20, 291	17, 855
Nov.....	152, 968	124, 325	43, 674	38, 064	6, 174	36, 413	28, 643	8, 010	20, 633	17, 927
Dec.....	157, 564	127, 332	44, 129	40, 080	6, 201	36, 922	30, 232	9, 002	21, 230	18, 003
1973: Jan.....	157, 227	127, 368	44, 353	39, 952	6, 193	36, 870	29, 859	8, 357	21, 502	18, 080
Feb.....	157, 582	127, 959	44, 817	39, 795	6, 239	37, 108	29, 623	7, 646	21, 977	18, 166
Mar.....	159, 320	129, 375	45, 610	39, 951	6, 328	37, 486	29, 945	7, 702	22, 243	18, 288
Apr.....	161, 491	131, 022	46, 478	40, 441	6, 408	37, 695	30, 469	8, 036	22, 433	18, 420
May.....	164, 277	133, 531	47, 518	41, 096	6, 541	38, 376	30, 746	8, 319	22, 427	18, 533
June.....	167, 083	136, 018	48, 549	41, 853	6, 688	38, 928	31, 065	8, 555	22, 510	18, 673
July.....	169, 148	138, 212	49, 352	42, 575	6, 845	39, 440	30, 936	8, 479	22, 457	18, 841
Aug.....	171, 978	140, 810	50, 232	43, 505	7, 009	40, 064	31, 168	8, 605	22, 563	19, 181
Sept.....	173, 035	142, 093	50, 557	44, 019	7, 120	40, 397	30, 942	8, 335	22, 607	19, 511
Oct.....	174, 840	143, 610	51, 092	44, 632	7, 235	40, 651	31, 230	8, 590	22, 640	19, 768
Nov.....	176, 969	145, 400	51, 371	45, 592	7, 321	41, 116	31, 569	8, 785	22, 784	19, 926
Dec <sup>4</sup> .....	180, 800	148, 100	51, 400	47, 750	7, 350	41, 600	32, 700	9, 600	23, 100	-----

<sup>1</sup> Holdings of financial institutions only; holdings of retail outlets are included in other consumer goods paper.<sup>2</sup> Single-payment loans and service credit.<sup>3</sup> Data are annual statement asset values. These loans are not included in consumer credit series.<sup>4</sup> Preliminary; by Council of Economic Advisers.

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Institute of Life Insurance (except as noted).

TABLE C-60.—*Installment credit extended and repaid, 1946-73*

(Millions of dollars)

Year or month	Total		Automobile paper		Other consumer goods paper		Home improvement loans		Personal loans	
	Ex- tended	Re- paid	Ex- tended	Re- paid	Ex- tended	Re- paid	Ex- tended	Re- paid	Ex- tended	Re- paid
1946.....	8,495	6,785	1,969	1,443	3,077	2,603	423	200	3,026	2,539
1947.....	12,713	10,190	3,692	2,749	4,498	3,645	704	391	3,819	3,405
1948.....	15,585	13,284	5,217	4,123	5,383	4,625	714	579	4,271	3,957
1949.....	18,108	15,514	6,967	5,430	5,865	5,060	734	689	4,542	4,335
1950.....	21,558	18,445	8,530	7,011	7,150	6,057	835	717	5,043	4,660
1951.....	23,576	22,985	8,956	9,058	7,485	7,404	841	772	6,294	5,751
1952.....	29,514	25,405	11,764	10,003	9,186	7,892	1,217	917	7,347	6,593
1953.....	31,558	27,956	12,981	10,879	9,227	8,622	1,344	1,119	8,006	7,336
1954.....	31,051	30,488	11,807	11,833	9,117	9,145	1,261	1,255	8,866	8,255
1955.....	38,972	33,634	16,734	13,082	10,642	9,752	1,393	1,316	10,203	9,484
1956.....	39,866	37,056	15,515	14,555	11,721	10,758	1,582	1,370	11,051	10,373
1957.....	42,019	39,870	16,463	15,545	11,810	11,574	1,674	1,477	12,069	11,276
1958.....	40,110	40,339	14,226	15,415	11,738	11,557	1,871	1,626	12,275	11,741
1959.....	48,048	42,603	17,779	15,579	13,981	12,402	2,222	1,765	14,070	12,857
1960.....	49,793	46,073	17,657	16,419	14,525	13,613	2,215	1,876	15,396	14,165
1961.....	49,048	48,124	16,029	16,552	14,551	14,235	2,092	2,015	16,377	15,319
1962.....	56,191	51,360	19,694	17,447	15,701	14,935	2,084	2,010	18,710	16,969
1963.....	63,591	56,825	22,126	19,254	17,920	16,369	2,186	2,046	21,359	19,156
1964.....	70,670	63,470	24,046	21,369	20,821	18,666	2,225	2,086	23,578	21,349
1965.....	78,661	70,463	27,208	23,706	22,857	20,707	2,270	2,112	26,326	23,938
1966.....	82,832	77,480	27,192	25,619	26,329	24,080	2,223	2,118	27,088	25,663
1967.....	87,171	83,988	26,320	26,534	29,504	27,847	2,369	2,202	28,978	27,405
1968.....	99,984	91,667	31,083	27,931	33,507	31,270	2,534	2,303	32,860	30,163
1969.....	109,146	99,786	32,553	29,974	38,332	34,645	2,831	2,457	35,430	32,710
1970.....	112,158	107,199	29,794	30,137	43,873	40,721	2,963	2,506	35,528	33,835
1971.....	124,281	115,050	34,873	31,393	47,821	44,933	3,244	2,901	38,343	35,823
1972.....	142,951	126,914	40,194	34,729	55,599	49,872	4,006	3,218	43,152	39,095
1973 <sup>1</sup> .....	165,800	145,000	46,800	39,500	67,100	59,400	4,700	3,600	47,200	42,500

Seasonally adjusted										
1972: Jan.....	11,116	10,015	3,089	2,795	4,258	3,905	309	256	3,460	3,059
Feb.....	10,952	10,069	3,100	2,776	4,052	3,878	296	253	3,504	3,162
Mar.....	11,741	10,427	3,176	2,831	4,453	3,944	323	262	3,789	3,390
Apr.....	11,374	10,384	3,162	2,867	4,370	3,986	331	268	3,511	3,263
May.....	11,687	10,355	3,274	2,819	4,393	3,981	334	287	3,686	3,268
June.....	12,057	10,671	3,412	2,922	4,577	4,164	351	283	3,717	3,302
July.....	11,687	10,593	3,298	2,917	4,684	4,249	328	279	3,377	3,148
Aug.....	12,484	10,841	3,491	2,896	4,990	4,395	371	270	3,632	3,280
Sept.....	11,953	10,667	3,368	2,873	4,772	4,303	340	263	3,473	3,228
Oct.....	12,404	10,908	3,504	3,041	4,971	4,354	335	263	3,594	3,250
Nov.....	12,846	11,128	3,620	3,023	5,118	4,444	327	271	3,781	3,390
Dec.....	12,627	10,964	3,763	2,977	4,876	4,341	351	263	3,637	3,383
1973: Jan.....	13,304	11,355	4,006	3,097	5,282	4,649	329	267	3,687	3,342
Feb.....	13,434	11,437	3,972	3,145	5,245	4,627	364	275	3,853	3,390
Mar.....	13,852	11,808	4,001	3,225	5,349	4,755	406	286	4,096	3,542
Apr.....	13,465	12,061	3,822	3,218	5,563	4,963	365	294	3,715	3,586
May.....	13,932	11,941	3,989	3,261	5,504	4,917	374	290	4,065	3,473
June.....	13,646	12,034	3,762	3,253	5,505	4,955	400	300	3,979	3,526
July.....	14,542	12,544	3,930	3,334	5,943	5,141	433	308	4,236	3,761
Aug.....	14,294	12,399	3,968	3,293	5,961	5,168	408	298	3,957	3,640
Sept.....	13,691	12,332	3,939	3,406	5,537	5,072	410	322	3,805	3,532
Oct.....	14,149	12,449	3,912	3,427	5,911	5,149	415	308	3,911	3,565
Nov.....	14,275	12,549	3,819	3,471	5,978	5,154	402	301	4,076	3,623
Dec <sup>1</sup> .....	13,600	12,400	3,600	3,450	5,700	5,050	450	300	3,850	3,600

<sup>1</sup> Preliminary; December by Council of Economic Advisers.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (except as noted).

TABLE C-61.—*Mortgage debt outstanding by type of property and of financing, 1939-73*

[Billions of dollars]

End of year or quarter	All properties	Farm properties	Nonfarm properties				Nonfarm properties by type of mortgage					
			Total	1- to 4-family houses	Multi-family properties	Commercial properties <sup>1</sup>	Government underwritten				Conventional <sup>2</sup>	
							Total	1- to 4-family houses			Total	1- to 4-family houses
								Total	FHA insured	VA guaranteed		
1939 .....	35.5	6.6	28.9	16.3	5.6	7.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	-----	27.1	14.5
1940 .....	36.5	6.5	30.0	17.4	5.7	6.9	2.3	2.3	2.3	-----	27.7	15.1
1941 .....	37.6	6.4	31.2	18.4	5.9	7.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	-----	28.2	15.4
1942 .....	36.7	6.0	30.8	18.2	5.8	6.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	-----	27.1	14.5
1943 .....	35.3	5.4	29.9	17.8	5.8	6.3	4.1	4.1	4.1	-----	25.8	13.7
1944 .....	34.7	4.9	29.7	17.9	5.6	6.2	4.2	4.2	4.2	-----	25.5	13.7
1945 .....	35.5	4.8	30.8	18.6	5.7	6.4	4.3	4.3	4.1	0.2	26.5	14.3
1946 .....	41.8	4.9	36.9	23.0	6.1	7.7	6.3	6.1	3.7	2.4	30.6	16.9
1947 .....	48.9	5.1	43.9	28.2	6.6	9.1	9.8	9.3	3.8	5.5	34.1	18.9
1948 .....	56.2	5.3	50.9	33.3	7.5	10.2	13.6	12.5	5.3	7.2	37.3	20.8
1949 .....	62.7	5.6	57.1	37.6	8.6	10.8	18.1	15.0	6.9	8.1	39.0	22.6
1950 .....	72.8	6.1	66.7	45.2	10.1	11.5	22.1	18.9	8.6	10.3	44.6	26.3
1951 .....	82.3	6.7	75.6	51.7	11.5	12.5	26.6	22.9	9.7	13.2	49.0	28.8
1952 .....	91.4	7.2	84.2	58.5	12.3	13.4	29.3	25.4	10.8	14.6	54.9	33.1
1953 .....	101.3	7.7	93.6	66.1	12.9	14.5	32.1	28.1	12.0	16.1	61.5	38.0
1954 .....	113.7	8.2	105.4	75.7	13.5	16.3	36.2	32.1	12.8	19.3	69.2	43.6
1955 .....	129.9	9.0	120.9	88.2	14.3	18.3	42.9	38.9	14.3	24.6	78.0	49.3
1956 .....	144.5	9.8	134.6	99.0	14.9	20.7	47.8	43.9	15.5	28.4	86.8	55.1
1957 .....	156.5	10.4	146.1	107.6	15.3	23.2	51.6	47.2	16.5	30.7	94.6	60.4
1958 .....	171.8	11.1	160.7	117.7	16.8	26.1	55.1	50.1	19.7	30.4	105.5	67.6
1959 .....	190.8	12.1	178.7	130.9	18.7	29.2	59.3	53.8	23.8	30.0	119.4	77.0
1960 .....	206.8	12.8	194.0	141.3	20.3	32.4	62.3	56.4	26.7	29.7	131.7	84.8
1961 .....	226.3	13.9	212.4	153.1	23.0	36.4	65.6	59.1	29.5	29.6	146.8	93.9
1962 .....	248.6	15.2	233.4	166.5	25.8	41.1	69.4	62.2	32.3	29.9	164.1	104.3
1963 .....	274.3	16.8	257.4	182.2	29.0	46.2	73.4	65.9	35.0	30.9	184.0	116.3
1964 .....	300.1	18.9	281.2	197.6	33.6	50.0	77.2	69.2	38.3	30.9	204.0	128.3
1965 .....	325.8	21.2	304.6	212.9	37.2	54.5	81.2	73.1	42.0	31.1	223.4	139.8
1966 .....	347.4	23.3	324.1	223.6	40.3	60.1	84.1	76.1	44.8	31.3	240.0	147.6
1967 .....	370.2	25.5	344.8	236.1	43.9	64.8	88.2	79.9	47.4	32.5	256.6	156.1
1968 .....	397.5	27.5	370.0	251.2	47.3	71.4	93.4	84.4	50.6	33.8	276.6	166.8
1969 .....	425.3	29.5	395.9	266.8	52.2	76.9	100.2	90.2	54.5	35.7	295.7	176.6
1970 .....	451.7	31.2	420.5	280.2	58.0	82.3	109.2	97.2	59.9	37.3	311.3	182.9
1971 .....	499.9	32.9	467.0	307.8	66.8	92.4	120.7	105.2	65.7	39.5	346.3	202.6
1972 p .....	565.4	35.4	530.0	346.1	76.4	107.5	131.1	113.0	68.2	44.7	398.8	233.1
1973 p .....	633.7	39.4	594.3	383.8	86.9	123.6	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
1971: I .....	459.0	31.8	427.2	283.6	59.7	83.9	111.0	98.2	61.0	37.3	316.2	185.3
II .....	471.1	31.9	439.3	290.9	62.1	86.3	114.4	100.4	62.8	37.6	324.9	190.5
III .....	485.6	32.4	453.2	299.7	64.3	89.2	117.5	102.9	64.4	38.5	335.7	196.8
IV .....	499.9	32.9	467.0	307.8	66.8	92.4	120.7	105.2	65.7	39.5	346.3	202.6
1972: I p .....	511.7	33.5	478.2	314.1	68.8	95.3	123.7	107.5	66.8	40.7	354.5	206.6
II p .....	529.1	34.4	494.8	324.6	71.3	98.9	126.6	109.6	67.6	42.0	368.2	215.0
III p .....	547.3	35.0	512.3	335.8	73.5	103.0	129.0	111.5	68.4	43.1	383.3	224.3
IV p .....	565.4	35.4	530.0	346.1	76.4	107.5	131.1	113.0	68.2	44.7	398.8	233.1
1973: I p .....	580.1	36.5	543.6	353.9	79.0	110.7	132.5	113.7	67.9	45.8	410.9	240.2
II p .....	600.4	37.7	562.7	365.7	82.2	114.8	133.6	114.7	67.5	47.2	429.1	251.0
III p .....	619.9	38.7	581.2	376.6	85.0	119.5	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
IV p .....	633.7	39.4	594.3	383.8	86.9	123.6	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

<sup>1</sup> Includes negligible amount of farm loans held by savings and loan associations.<sup>2</sup> Derived figures.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, estimated and compiled from data supplied by various Government and private organizations.

TABLE C-62.—*Mortgage debt outstanding by lender, 1939-73*

[Billions of dollars]

End of year or quarter	Total	Selected financial institutions					Other lenders	
		Total	Savings and loan associa- tions	Mutual savings banks	Com- mercial banks <sup>1</sup>	Life insurance com- panies	U.S. agencies <sup>2</sup>	Indi- viduals and others
1939 .....	35.5	18.6	3.8	4.8	4.3	5.7	5.0	11.9
1940 .....	36.5	19.5	4.1	4.9	4.6	6.0	4.9	12.0
1941 .....	37.6	20.7	4.6	4.8	4.9	6.4	4.7	12.2
1942 .....	36.7	20.7	4.6	4.6	4.7	6.7	4.3	11.7
1943 .....	35.3	20.2	4.6	4.4	4.5	6.7	3.6	11.5
1944 .....	34.7	20.2	4.8	4.3	4.4	6.7	3.0	11.5
1945 .....	35.5	21.0	5.4	4.2	4.8	6.6	2.4	12.1
1946 .....	41.8	26.0	7.1	4.4	7.2	7.2	2.0	13.8
1947 .....	48.9	31.8	8.9	4.9	9.4	8.7	1.8	15.3
1948 .....	56.2	37.8	10.3	5.8	10.9	10.8	1.9	16.5
1949 .....	62.7	42.9	11.6	6.7	11.6	12.9	2.4	17.4
1950 .....	72.8	51.7	13.7	8.3	13.7	16.1	2.7	18.4
1951 .....	82.3	59.5	15.6	9.9	14.7	19.3	3.4	19.4
1952 .....	91.4	66.9	18.4	11.4	15.9	21.3	4.0	20.5
1953 .....	101.3	75.1	22.0	12.9	16.8	23.3	4.4	21.8
1954 .....	113.7	85.7	26.1	15.0	18.6	26.0	4.6	23.4
1955 .....	129.9	99.3	31.4	17.5	21.0	29.4	5.2	25.4
1956 .....	144.5	111.2	35.7	19.7	22.7	33.0	6.0	27.3
1957 .....	156.5	119.7	40.0	21.2	23.3	35.2	7.5	29.3
1958 .....	171.8	131.5	45.6	23.3	25.5	37.1	7.8	32.5
1959 .....	190.8	145.5	53.1	25.0	28.1	39.2	10.0	35.4
1960 .....	206.8	157.6	60.1	26.9	28.8	41.8	11.2	38.0
1961 .....	226.3	172.6	68.8	29.1	30.4	44.2	11.8	41.9
1962 .....	248.6	192.5	78.8	32.3	34.5	46.9	12.2	44.0
1963 .....	274.3	217.1	90.9	36.2	39.4	50.5	11.2	45.9
1964 .....	300.1	241.0	101.3	40.6	44.0	55.2	11.4	47.7
1965 .....	325.8	264.6	110.3	44.6	49.7	60.0	12.4	48.7
1966 .....	347.4	280.8	114.4	47.3	54.4	64.6	15.8	50.9
1967 .....	370.2	298.8	121.8	50.5	59.0	67.5	18.4	53.0
1968 .....	397.5	319.9	130.8	53.5	65.7	70.0	21.7	55.8
1969 .....	425.3	339.1	140.2	56.1	70.7	72.0	26.8	59.4
1970 .....	451.7	355.9	150.3	57.9	73.3	74.4	33.0	62.8
1971 .....	499.9	394.4	174.4	62.0	82.5	75.5	39.4	66.2
1972 p .....	565.4	450.6	206.4	67.6	99.3	77.3	45.8	69.0
1973 p .....	633.7	504.5	232.6	73.2	118.1	80.6	55.3	73.9
1971: I .....	459.0	361.8	154.2	58.7	74.4	74.5	33.6	63.5
II .....	471.1	372.0	161.2	59.6	76.6	74.5	35.2	63.9
III .....	485.6	383.5	168.2	60.6	79.9	74.8	37.4	64.6
IV .....	499.9	394.4	174.4	62.0	82.5	75.5	39.4	66.2
1972: I p .....	511.7	404.2	180.1	63.0	85.6	75.4	41.2	66.4
II p .....	529.1	418.9	188.9	64.4	90.1	75.5	42.7	67.5
III p .....	547.3	434.6	197.9	65.9	95.0	75.8	44.3	68.3
IV p .....	565.4	450.6	206.4	67.6	99.3	77.3	45.8	69.0
1973: I p .....	580.1	463.3	213.3	68.9	103.5	77.6	47.3	69.5
II p .....	600.4	480.5	222.8	70.6	109.1	77.9	49.0	71.0
III p .....	619.9	494.9	229.4	72.0	114.4	79.0	53.0	71.9
IV p .....	633.7	504.5	232.6	73.2	118.1	80.6	55.3	73.9

<sup>1</sup> Includes loans held by nondeposit trust companies, but not by bank trust departments.<sup>2</sup> Includes former Federal National Mortgage Association and new Government National Mortgage Association, as well as Federal Housing Administration, Veterans Administration, Public Housing Administration, Farmers Home Administration, and in earlier years Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Homeowners Loan Corporation, and Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation. Also includes U.S.-sponsored agencies such as new FNMA, Federal Land Banks, GNMA (Pools), and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. Other U.S. agencies (amounts small or current separate data not readily available) included with "individuals and others."

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, based on data from various Government and private organizations.



TABLE C-63.—*Net public and private debt, 1929-72*<sup>1</sup>

[Billions of dollars]

End of year	Total	Public			Private							
		Federal Government <sup>2</sup>	Federal financial agencies <sup>3</sup>	State and local governments	Total	Corporate	Individual and noncorporate					
							Total	Farm <sup>4</sup>	Nonfarm			
									Total	Mortgage	Commercial and financial <sup>5</sup>	Consumer
1929-----	191.9	16.5	-----	13.6	161.8	88.9	72.9	12.2	60.7	31.2	22.4	7.1
1933-----	168.5	24.3	-----	16.3	127.9	76.9	51.0	9.1	41.9	26.3	11.7	3.9
1939-----	183.3	42.6	-----	16.4	124.3	73.5	50.8	8.8	42.0	25.0	9.8	7.2
1940-----	189.8	44.8	-----	16.4	128.6	75.6	53.0	9.1	43.9	26.1	9.5	8.3
1941-----	211.4	56.3	-----	16.1	139.0	83.4	55.6	9.3	46.3	27.1	10.0	9.2
1942-----	258.6	101.7	-----	15.4	141.5	91.6	49.9	9.0	40.9	26.8	8.1	6.0
1943-----	313.2	154.4	-----	14.5	144.3	95.5	48.8	8.2	40.5	26.1	9.5	4.9
1944-----	370.6	211.9	-----	13.9	144.8	94.1	50.7	7.7	42.9	26.0	11.8	5.1
1945-----	405.9	252.5	-----	13.4	140.0	85.3	54.7	7.3	47.4	27.0	14.7	5.7
1946-----	396.6	229.5	-----	13.7	153.4	93.5	59.9	7.6	52.3	31.8	12.1	8.4
1947-----	415.7	221.7	0.7	15.0	178.3	108.9	69.4	8.6	60.7	37.2	11.9	11.6
1948-----	431.3	215.3	.6	17.0	198.4	117.8	80.6	10.8	69.7	42.4	12.9	14.4
1949-----	445.8	217.6	.7	19.1	208.4	118.0	90.4	12.0	78.4	47.1	13.9	17.4
1950-----	486.2	217.4	.7	21.7	246.4	142.1	104.3	12.3	92.0	54.8	15.8	21.5
1951-----	519.2	216.9	1.3	24.2	276.8	162.5	114.3	13.7	100.6	61.7	16.2	22.7
1952-----	550.2	221.5	1.3	27.0	300.4	171.0	129.4	15.2	114.2	68.9	17.8	27.5
1953-----	581.6	226.8	1.4	30.7	322.7	179.5	143.2	16.8	126.4	76.7	18.4	31.4
1954-----	605.9	229.1	1.3	35.5	340.0	182.8	157.2	17.5	139.7	86.4	20.8	32.5
1955-----	665.8	229.6	2.9	41.1	392.2	212.1	180.1	18.7	161.4	98.7	24.0	38.8
1956-----	698.4	224.3	2.4	44.5	427.2	231.7	195.5	19.4	176.1	109.4	24.4	42.3
1957-----	728.3	223.0	2.4	48.6	454.3	246.7	207.6	20.2	187.4	118.1	24.3	45.0
1958-----	769.6	231.0	2.5	53.7	482.4	259.5	222.9	23.2	199.7	128.1	26.5	45.1
1959-----	833.0	241.4	3.7	59.6	528.3	283.3	245.0	23.8	221.2	141.0	28.7	51.5
1960-----	874.2	239.8	3.5	64.9	566.1	302.8	263.3	25.1	238.2	151.3	30.8	56.1
1961-----	930.3	246.7	4.0	70.5	609.1	324.3	284.8	27.5	257.3	164.5	34.8	58.0
1962-----	996.0	253.6	5.3	77.0	660.1	348.2	311.9	30.2	281.7	180.3	37.6	63.8
1963-----	1,070.9	257.5	7.2	83.9	722.3	376.4	345.8	33.2	312.6	198.6	42.3	71.7
1964-----	1,151.6	264.0	7.5	90.4	789.7	409.6	380.1	36.0	344.1	218.9	45.0	80.3
1965-----	1,243.6	266.4	8.9	98.3	870.0	454.3	415.7	39.3	376.4	236.8	49.7	89.9
1966-----	1,338.7	271.8	11.2	104.8	950.8	506.6	444.2	42.4	401.8	251.6	53.9	96.2
1967-----	1,438.7	286.5	9.0	113.4	1,029.9	553.7	476.2	48.3	427.9	266.9	60.2	100.8
1968-----	1,582.5	291.9	21.4	123.9	1,145.4	631.5	513.9	51.8	462.1	284.9	66.4	110.8
1969-----	1,735.0	289.3	30.6	132.6	1,282.6	734.2	548.4	55.5	492.9	303.9	67.9	121.1
1970-----	1,854.1	301.1	38.8	144.8	1,369.4	793.5	575.9	58.7	517.2	320.9	69.1	127.2
1971-----	2,018.3	325.9	39.8	163.0	1,489.6	858.6	631.0	63.2	567.8	352.6	76.9	138.4
1972-----	2,227.3	341.2	42.6	176.5	1,667.0	952.3	714.7	67.8	646.9	397.8	91.5	157.6

<sup>1</sup> Net public and private debt is a comprehensive aggregate of the indebtedness of borrowers after eliminating certain types of duplicating governmental and corporate debt.<sup>2</sup> Net Federal Government and agency debt is the outstanding debt held by the public, as defined in the "Budget of the United States Government, for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1975."<sup>3</sup> This comprises the debt of federally sponsored agencies, in which there is no longer any Federal proprietary interest. The obligations of the Federal Land Banks are included beginning with 1947, the debt of the Federal Home Loan Banks is included beginning with 1951, and the debts of the Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, and Banks for Cooperatives are included beginning with 1968.<sup>4</sup> Farm mortgages and farm production loans. Farmers' financial and consumer debt is included in the nonfarm categories.<sup>5</sup> Financial debt is debt owed to banks for purchasing or carrying securities, customers' debt to brokers, and debt owed to life insurance companies by policyholders.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Department of the Treasury, Department of Agriculture, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Federal Land Banks, and Federal National Mortgage Association.

# GOVERNMENT FINANCE

TABLE C-64.—Federal budget receipts and outlays, fiscal years 1929–75

(Millions of dollars)

Fiscal year	Receipts	Outlays	Surplus or deficit (—)
1929.....	3,862	3,127	734
1933.....	1,997	4,598	—2,602
1939.....	4,979	8,841	—3,862
1940.....	6,879	9,589	—2,710
1941.....	9,202	13,980	—4,778
1942.....	15,104	34,500	—19,396
1943.....	25,097	78,909	—53,812
1944.....	47,818	93,956	—46,138
1945.....	50,162	95,184	—45,022
1946.....	43,537	61,738	—18,201
1947.....	43,531	36,931	6,600
1948.....	45,357	36,493	8,864
1949.....	41,576	40,570	1,006
1950.....	40,940	43,147	—2,207
1951.....	53,390	45,797	7,593
1952.....	68,011	67,962	49
1953.....	71,495	76,769	—5,274
1954.....	69,719	70,890	—1,170
1955.....	65,469	68,509	—3,041
1956.....	74,547	70,460	4,087
1957.....	79,990	76,741	3,249
1958.....	79,636	82,575	—2,939
1959.....	79,249	92,104	—12,855
1960.....	92,492	92,223	269
1961.....	94,389	97,795	—3,406
1962.....	99,676	106,813	—7,137
1963.....	106,560	111,311	—4,751
1964.....	112,662	118,584	—5,922
1965.....	116,833	118,430	—1,596
1966.....	130,856	134,652	—3,796
1967.....	149,552	158,254	—8,702
1968.....	153,671	178,833	—25,161
1969.....	187,784	184,548	3,236
1970.....	193,743	196,588	—2,845
1971.....	188,392	211,425	—23,033
1972.....	208,649	231,876	—23,227
1973.....	232,225	246,526	—14,301
1974 <sup>1</sup> .....	270,000	274,660	—4,660
1975 <sup>1</sup> .....	295,000	304,445	—9,445

<sup>1</sup> Estimate.

Note.—Data for 1929–39 are according to the administrative budget, those for 1940–53 according to the consolidated cash statement, and those for 1954–75 according to the unified budget.

Certain interfund transactions are excluded from receipts and outlays beginning 1932. For years prior to 1932 the amounts of such transactions are not significant.

Refunds of receipts are excluded from receipts and outlays.

Sources: Department of the Treasury and Office of Management and Budget.

TABLE C-65.—Federal budget receipts, outlays, financing, and debt, fiscal years 1964-75

[Millions of dollars; fiscal years]

Description	Actual					
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
<b>BUDGET RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS:</b>						
Total receipts.....	112,662	116,833	130,856	149,552	153,671	187,784
Federal funds.....	87,205	90,943	101,427	111,835	114,726	143,321
Trust funds.....	28,518	29,230	32,997	42,935	44,716	52,009
Interfund transactions.....	-3,061	-3,339	-3,568	-5,218	-5,771	-7,547
Total outlays.....	118,584	118,430	134,652	158,254	178,833	184,548
Federal funds.....	95,761	94,807	106,512	126,779	143,105	148,811
Trust funds.....	25,884	26,962	31,708	36,693	41,499	43,284
Interfund transactions.....	-3,061	-3,339	-3,568	-5,218	-5,771	-7,547
Total surplus or deficit (-).....	-5,922	-1,596	-3,796	-8,702	-25,161	3,236
Federal funds.....	-8,556	-3,864	-5,085	-14,944	-28,379	-5,490
Trust funds.....	2,634	2,268	1,289	6,242	3,217	8,725
<b>BUDGET FINANCING:</b>						
Total means of financing.....	5,922	1,596	3,796	8,702	25,161	1-3,236
Net borrowing from the public or repayment of borrowing (-).....	3,092	4,061	3,076	2,838	23,100	-1,044
Other means of financing.....	2,830	-2,465	720	5,863	2,061	-2,192
<b>OUTSTANDING DEBT, END OF YEAR:</b>						
Gross Federal debt.....	316,763	323,154	329,474	341,348	369,769	367,144
Held by Government agencies.....	59,210	61,540	64,784	73,819	79,140	87,661
Held by the public.....	257,553	261,614	264,690	267,529	290,629	279,483
Federal Reserve System.....	34,794	39,100	42,169	46,719	52,230	54,095
Others.....	222,759	222,514	222,521	220,810	238,399	225,388
<b>BUDGET RECEIPTS.....</b>	<b>112,662</b>	<b>116,833</b>	<b>130,856</b>	<b>149,552</b>	<b>153,671</b>	<b>187,784</b>
Individual income taxes.....	48,697	48,792	55,446	61,526	68,726	87,249
Corporation income taxes.....	23,493	25,461	30,073	33,971	28,665	36,678
Social insurance taxes and contributions.....	22,012	22,258	25,567	33,349	34,622	39,918
Excise taxes.....	13,731	14,570	13,062	13,719	14,079	15,222
Estate and gift taxes.....	2,394	2,716	3,066	2,978	3,051	3,491
Customs duties.....	1,252	1,442	1,767	1,901	2,038	2,319
Miscellaneous receipts:						
Deposit of earnings by Federal Re-						
serve System.....	947	1,372	1,713	1,805	2,091	2,662
All other.....	138	222	162	303	400	247
<b>BUDGET OUTLAYS.....</b>	<b>118,584</b>	<b>118,430</b>	<b>134,652</b>	<b>158,254</b>	<b>178,833</b>	<b>184,548</b>
National defense.....	53,591	49,578	56,785	70,081	80,517	81,232
International affairs and finance.....	4,117	4,340	4,490	4,547	4,619	3,785
Space research and technology.....	4,170	5,091	5,933	5,423	4,721	4,247
Agriculture and rural development.....	5,184	4,805	3,676	4,373	5,940	6,218
Natural resources and environment.....	1,966	2,056	2,036	1,878	1,722	2,169
Commerce and transportation.....	6,531	7,440	7,302	7,647	8,126	7,942
Community development and housing.....	-185	288	2,644	2,616	4,076	1,961
Education and manpower.....	1,762	2,290	4,265	5,880	6,743	6,529
Health.....	1,713	1,700	2,505	6,661	9,603	11,604
Income security.....	25,141	25,711	28,932	31,168	34,139	37,748
Veterans benefits and services.....	5,681	5,722	5,921	6,899	6,882	7,640
Interest.....	9,810	10,358	11,285	12,588	13,746	15,791
General government.....	1,979	2,160	2,240	2,429	2,500	2,800
General revenue sharing.....						
Allowances.....						
Undistributed intragovernmental transac-						
tions:						
Employer share, employee retirement.....	-1,256	-1,329	-1,447	-1,661	-1,825	-2,018
Interest received by trust funds.....	-1,621	-1,780	-1,917	-2,275	-2,674	-3,099

See next page for continuation of table and for footnotes.

TABLE C-65.—Federal budget receipts, outlays, financing, and debt, fiscal years 1964-75—Con.

[Millions of dollars; fiscal years]

Description	Actual				Estimate	
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
<b>BUDGET RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS:</b>						
Total receipts.....	193,743	188,392	208,649	232,225	270,000	295,000
Federal funds.....	143,158	133,785	148,846	161,357	185,581	202,757
Trust funds.....	59,362	66,193	72,959	92,193	105,548	115,818
Interfund transactions.....	-8,778	-11,586	-13,156	-21,325	-21,129	-23,575
Total outlays.....	196,588	211,425	231,876	246,526	274,660	304,445
Federal funds.....	156,301	163,651	177,959	186,406	203,715	220,636
Trust funds.....	49,065	59,361	67,073	81,447	92,075	107,385
Interfund transactions.....	-8,778	-11,586	-13,156	-21,325	-21,129	-23,575
Total surplus or deficit (-).....	-2,845	-23,033	-23,227	-14,301	-4,660	-9,445
Federal funds.....	-13,143	-29,866	-29,114	-25,046	-18,133	-17,878
Trust funds.....	10,297	6,832	5,886	10,746	14,473	8,433
<b>BUDGET FINANCING:</b>						
Total means of financing.....	12,845	23,033	23,227	14,301	4,660	9,445
Net borrowing from the public or re-payment of borrowing (-).....	3,814	19,448	19,442	19,275	3,500	12,500
Other means of financing.....	-969	3,585	3,785	-4,974	1,160	-3,055
<b>OUTSTANDING DEBT, END OF YEAR:</b>						
Gross Federal debt.....	382,603	409,457	437,329	468,426	486,350	507,973
Held by Government agencies.....	97,723	105,140	113,559	125,381	139,806	148,929
Held by the public.....	284,880	304,328	323,770	343,045	346,545	359,045
Federal Reserve System.....	57,714	65,518	71,426	75,182	-----	-----
Others.....	227,166	238,810	252,344	267,863	-----	-----
<b>BUDGET RECEIPTS.....</b>						
Individual income taxes.....	90,412	86,230	94,737	103,246	118,000	129,000
Corporation income taxes.....	32,829	26,785	32,166	36,153	43,000	48,000
Social insurance taxes and contributions.....	45,298	48,578	53,914	64,542	77,907	85,603
Excise taxes.....	15,705	16,614	15,477	16,260	17,144	17,444
Estate and gift taxes.....	3,644	3,735	5,436	4,917	5,400	6,000
Customs duties.....	2,430	2,591	3,287	3,188	3,500	3,800
Miscellaneous receipts:						
Deposit of earnings by Federal Reserve System.....	3,266	3,533	3,252	3,495	4,400	4,700
All other.....	158	325	381	426	649	453
<b>BUDGET OUTLAYS.....</b>						
National defense.....	80,295	77,661	78,336	76,021	80,573	87,729
International affairs and finance.....	3,570	3,095	3,726	2,957	3,886	4,103
Space research and technology.....	3,749	3,381	3,422	3,311	3,177	3,272
Agriculture and rural development.....	6,201	5,096	7,063	6,191	4,039	2,729
Natural resources and environment.....	2,568	2,716	3,761	589	609	3,128
Commerce and transportation.....	9,455	11,428	11,284	13,070	13,521	13,400
Community development and housing.....	2,965	3,357	4,282	4,132	5,450	5,667
Education and manpower.....	7,289	8,226	9,752	10,185	10,819	11,537
Health.....	12,898	14,452	17,099	18,417	23,268	26,282
Income security.....	43,734	56,128	64,909	73,073	84,995	100,071
Veterans benefits and services.....	8,677	9,776	10,731	12,013	13,285	13,612
Interest.....	18,312	19,609	20,582	22,813	27,754	29,122
General government.....	3,255	3,875	4,787	5,480	6,800	6,774
General revenue sharing.....	-----	-----	-----	6,636	6,147	6,174
Allowances.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	300	1,561
Undistributed intragovernmental trans-actions:						
Employer share, employee retirement.....	-2,444	-2,611	-2,768	-2,927	-3,543	-3,577
Interest received by trust funds.....	-3,936	-4,765	-5,089	-5,436	-6,420	-7,140

<sup>1</sup> Excludes changes due to reclassification and to conversion of mixed-ownership enterprises to private ownership. (See footnotes to Table 9, "Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1971," and footnotes to Table 10, "Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1972.")

Sources: Department of the Treasury and Office of Management and Budget.

TABLE C-66.—*Relation of the Federal budget to the Federal sector of the national income and product accounts, fiscal years 1972-75*

[Billions of dollars; fiscal years]

Receipts and expenditures	Actual		Estimate	
	1972	1973	1974	1975
<b>RECEIPTS</b>				
Total receipts, budget.....	208.6	232.2	270.0	295.0
Government contribution for employee retirement (grossing).....	3.3	3.7	4.4	4.5
Other netting and grossing.....	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.6
Adjustment to accruals.....	.5	6.1	5.4	4.3
Other.....	-.4	-.4	-.8	-.6
Federal sector, national income and product accounts, receipts.....	213.7	243.3	280.5	304.8
<b>EXPENDITURES</b>				
Total outlays, budget.....	231.9	246.5	274.7	304.4
Lending and financial transactions.....	-2.4	-1.6	-2.4	-2.0
Government contribution for employee retirement (grossing).....	3.3	3.7	4.4	4.5
Other netting and grossing.....	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.6
Defense timing adjustment.....	-.3	2.3	-.4	-.2
Other.....	-1.0	2.5	7.4	5.1
Federal sector, national income and product accounts, expenditures.....	233.2	255.1	285.2	313.4

Note.—See Special Analysis A, "Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1975," for description of these categories.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Department of the Treasury, and Office of Management and Budget.

**TABLE C-67.—Receipts and expenditures of the government sector of the national income and product accounts, 1929-73**

[Billions of dollars]

Calendar year or quarter	Total government			Federal Government			State and local government		
	Re- ceipts	Ex- pendi- tures	Sur- plus or deficit (-), national income and prod- uct accounts	Re- ceipts	Ex- pendi- tures	Sur- plus or deficit (-), national income and prod- uct accounts	Re- ceipts	Ex- pendi- tures	Sur- plus or deficit (-), national income and prod- uct accounts
1929.....	11.3	10.3	1.0	3.8	2.6	1.2	7.6	7.8	-0.2
1933.....	9.3	10.7	-1.4	2.7	4.0	-1.3	7.2	7.2	-.1
1939.....	15.4	17.6	-2.2	6.7	8.9	-2.2	9.6	9.6	(1)
1940.....	17.7	18.4	-.7	8.6	10.0	-1.3	10.0	9.3	.6
1941.....	25.0	28.8	-3.8	15.4	20.5	-5.1	10.4	9.1	1.3
1942.....	32.6	64.0	-31.4	22.9	56.1	-33.1	10.6	8.8	1.8
1943.....	49.2	93.3	-44.1	39.3	85.8	-46.6	10.9	8.4	2.5
1944.....	51.2	103.0	-51.8	41.0	95.5	-54.5	11.1	8.5	2.7
1945.....	53.2	92.7	-39.5	42.5	84.6	-42.1	11.6	9.0	2.6
1946.....	50.9	45.5	5.4	39.1	35.6	3.5	12.9	11.0	1.9
1947.....	56.8	42.4	14.4	43.2	29.8	13.4	15.3	14.3	1.0
1948.....	58.9	50.3	8.5	43.3	34.9	8.4	17.6	17.4	.1
1949.....	56.0	59.1	-3.2	38.9	41.3	-2.4	19.3	20.0	-.7
1950.....	68.7	60.8	7.9	49.9	40.8	9.1	21.1	22.3	-1.2
1951.....	84.8	79.0	5.8	64.0	57.8	6.2	23.3	23.7	-.4
1952.....	89.8	93.7	-3.8	67.2	71.0	-3.8	25.2	25.3	(2)
1953.....	94.3	101.2	-6.9	70.0	77.0	-7.0	27.2	27.0	.1
1954.....	89.7	96.7	-7.0	63.8	69.7	-5.9	28.8	29.9	-1.1
1955.....	100.4	97.6	2.7	72.1	68.1	4.0	31.4	32.7	-1.3
1956.....	109.0	104.1	4.9	77.6	71.9	5.7	34.7	35.6	-.9
1957.....	115.6	114.9	.7	81.6	79.6	2.1	38.2	39.5	-1.4
1958.....	114.7	127.2	-12.5	78.7	88.9	-10.2	41.6	44.0	-2.3
1959.....	128.9	131.0	-2.1	89.7	91.0	-1.2	46.0	46.8	-.8
1960.....	139.8	136.1	3.7	96.5	93.0	3.5	49.9	49.6	.2
1961.....	144.6	149.0	-4.3	98.3	102.1	-3.8	53.6	54.1	-.5
1962.....	157.0	159.9	-2.9	106.4	110.3	-3.8	58.6	57.6	.9
1963.....	168.8	166.9	1.8	114.5	113.9	.7	63.4	62.2	1.2
1964.....	174.1	175.4	-1.4	115.0	118.1	-3.0	69.5	67.8	1.7
1965.....	189.1	186.9	2.2	124.7	123.5	1.2	75.5	74.5	1.0
1966.....	213.3	212.3	1.1	142.5	142.8	-.2	85.2	83.9	1.3
1967.....	228.9	242.9	-13.9	151.2	163.6	-12.4	93.5	95.1	-1.6
1968.....	263.5	270.3	-6.8	175.0	181.5	-6.5	107.1	107.5	-.3
1969.....	296.7	287.9	8.8	197.3	189.2	8.1	119.7	119.0	.7
1970.....	302.5	312.7	-10.1	192.0	203.9	-11.9	135.0	133.2	1.8
1971.....	322.0	340.2	-18.1	198.9	221.0	-22.2	152.3	148.3	4.0
1972.....	368.2	370.9	-2.8	228.7	244.6	-15.9	177.2	164.0	13.1
1973 p.....	419.0	407.4	11.6	265.4	264.7	.6	194.8	183.8	11.0
Seasonally adjusted annual rates									
1971: I.....	312.5	328.4	-15.9	194.8	212.4	-17.6	145.1	143.4	1.7
II.....	319.0	338.8	-19.7	197.7	221.2	-23.5	150.6	146.9	3.7
III.....	324.4	342.8	-18.4	199.4	222.6	-23.2	154.3	149.5	4.8
IV.....	332.2	350.7	-18.6	203.5	228.0	-24.5	159.3	153.4	5.9
1972: I.....	356.8	362.2	-5.4	222.9	236.6	-13.8	166.2	157.8	8.4
II.....	363.4	367.2	-3.9	225.4	244.4	-19.0	175.9	160.8	15.2
III.....	370.6	368.5	2.0	229.6	237.0	-7.4	175.3	165.9	9.5
IV.....	381.9	385.7	-3.8	236.9	260.3	-23.4	191.2	171.6	19.6
1973: I.....	402.7	393.8	8.9	253.6	258.6	-5.0	190.2	176.4	13.9
II.....	414.7	403.2	11.6	262.4	262.4	.0	192.8	181.2	11.5
III.....	425.0	410.7	14.3	269.5	265.6	4.0	196.0	185.7	10.4
IV p.....		421.9			272.4			191.9	

<sup>1</sup> Surplus of \$32 million.

<sup>2</sup> Deficit of \$41 million.

Note.—Federal grants-in-aid to State and local governments are reflected in Federal expenditures and State and local receipts and expenditures. Total government receipts and expenditures have been adjusted to eliminate this duplication.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-68.—Receipts and expenditures of the Federal Government sector of the national income and product accounts, 1949-75

(Billions of dollars)

Year or quarter	Receipts					Expenditures							Surplus or deficit (-), national income and product accounts
	Total	Personal tax and non-tax receipts	Corporate profits tax accruals	Indirect business tax and non-tax accruals	Contributions for social insurance	Total 1	Purchases of goods and services	Transfer payments		Grants-in-aid to State and local governments	Net interest paid	Subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises	
								To persons	To foreigners (net)				
Fiscal year:													
1949	40.0	16.3	11.0	8.0	4.8	39.6	19.3	8.1	5.0	2.1	4.3	0.8	0.4
1950	42.0	16.5	11.9	8.2	5.5	42.4	19.0	11.3	4.3	2.4	4.4	1.0	-0.5
1951	60.8	23.2	21.5	9.5	6.6	44.6	25.1	8.1	3.1	2.4	4.6	1.3	16.2
1952	65.1	28.8	19.3	9.7	7.3	66.0	46.6	8.5	2.6	2.5	4.8	1.1	-1.0
1953	69.3	31.4	19.7	10.7	7.5	75.8	56.1	9.3	2.1	2.8	4.8	.9	-6.5
1954	65.8	30.3	17.3	10.4	7.8	74.2	53.2	10.5	1.7	2.9	5.0	1.0	-8.5
1955	67.2	29.7	18.7	10.0	8.7	67.3	43.9	12.1	2.1	3.0	4.9	1.3	-1.1
1956	75.8	33.6	21.1	10.8	10.2	69.8	45.2	12.8	1.8	3.2	5.1	1.7	6.0
1957	80.7	36.7	20.6	11.7	11.7	76.0	47.7	14.4	1.9	3.7	5.5	2.8	4.7
1958	77.9	36.3	17.8	11.6	12.2	83.1	50.7	17.8	1.7	4.7	5.7	2.5	-5.1
1959	85.4	38.2	21.5	11.9	13.8	90.9	54.7	19.8	1.8	6.2	5.9	2.4	-5.5
1960	94.8	42.5	22.3	13.2	16.7	91.3	52.7	20.6	1.8	6.8	7.0	2.3	3.5
1961	95.3	43.6	20.3	13.3	18.1	98.0	55.5	23.6	2.1	6.9	6.8	3.2	-2.7
1962	104.2	47.3	22.9	14.2	19.9	106.4	60.9	25.1	2.1	7.6	6.8	3.8	-2.1
1963	110.2	49.6	23.5	15.0	22.1	111.4	63.4	26.4	2.1	8.4	7.5	3.6	-1.2
1964	115.5	50.7	25.7	15.6	23.5	116.9	65.7	27.3	2.2	9.8	8.1	3.8	-1.4
1965	120.5	51.3	27.7	16.9	24.6	118.5	64.4	28.3	2.2	10.9	8.5	4.1	2.0
1966	132.8	57.6	31.0	15.7	28.5	131.9	71.7	31.8	2.3	12.7	9.0	4.5	.9
1967	147.2	64.5	31.2	15.8	35.7	154.5	85.3	37.2	2.2	14.8	9.9	5.1	-7.3
1968	160.6	71.4	33.7	17.1	38.3	172.5	94.9	42.7	2.1	17.8	10.9	4.1	-11.9
1969	190.4	90.0	37.4	18.6	44.4	185.7	99.4	48.5	2.2	19.2	12.3	4.1	4.7
1970	195.2	93.6	33.3	19.2	49.1	195.9	98.0	54.8	2.0	22.6	14.0	4.7	-7
1971	192.6	87.4	32.2	20.1	52.9	212.6	95.9	67.4	2.3	26.8	14.3	5.8	-19.9
1972	213.7	100.1	34.7	19.9	59.0	233.2	103.2	75.8	2.8	32.9	13.4	5.2	-19.5
1973 <sup>1</sup>	243.3	107.2	43.8	20.9	71.4	255.1	104.5	86.8	2.6	40.4	14.4	6.4	-11.8
1974 <sup>2</sup>	280.5	123.7	50.3	23.3	83.2	285.2	111.5	102.5	4.7	44.1	18.2	4.2	-4.7
1975 <sup>2</sup>	304.8	135.3	50.2	27.5	91.8	313.4	121.6	120.7	2.8	46.6	19.6	2.1	-8.6
Calendar year:													
1949	38.9	16.1	9.8	8.0	4.9	41.3	20.1	8.7	5.1	2.2	4.4	.8	-2.4
1950	49.9	18.1	17.0	8.9	5.9	40.8	18.4	10.8	3.6	2.3	4.5	1.2	9.1
1951	64.0	26.1	21.5	9.4	7.1	57.8	37.7	8.5	3.1	2.5	4.7	1.3	6.2
1952	67.2	31.0	18.5	10.3	7.4	71.0	51.8	8.8	2.1	2.6	4.7	1.0	-3.8
1953	70.0	32.2	19.5	10.9	7.4	77.0	57.0	9.5	2.0	2.8	4.9	.8	-7.0
1954	63.8	29.0	17.0	9.7	8.1	69.7	47.4	11.5	1.8	2.9	5.0	1.1	-5.9
1955	72.1	31.4	20.6	10.7	9.3	68.1	44.1	12.4	2.0	3.1	4.9	1.5	4.0
1956	77.6	35.2	20.6	11.2	10.6	71.9	45.6	13.4	1.9	3.3	5.3	2.4	5.7
1957	81.6	37.4	20.2	11.8	12.2	79.6	49.5	15.7	1.8	4.2	5.7	2.6	2.1
1958	78.7	36.8	18.0	11.5	12.4	88.9	53.6	19.5	1.8	5.6	5.6	2.7	-10.2
1959	89.7	39.9	22.5	12.5	14.8	91.0	53.7	20.1	1.8	6.8	6.4	2.1	-1.2
1960	96.5	43.6	21.7	13.5	17.7	93.0	53.5	21.5	1.9	6.5	7.1	2.5	3.5
1961	98.3	44.7	21.8	13.6	18.2	102.1	57.4	24.9	2.1	7.2	6.6	3.8	-3.8
1962	106.4	48.6	22.7	14.6	20.5	110.3	63.4	25.5	2.2	8.0	7.2	4.0	-3.8
1963	114.5	51.5	24.6	15.3	23.1	113.9	64.2	27.0	2.2	9.1	7.7	3.6	.7
1964	115.0	48.6	26.4	16.1	23.8	118.1	65.2	27.8	2.2	10.4	8.3	4.2	-3.0
1965	124.7	53.8	29.3	16.5	25.1	123.5	66.9	30.3	2.2	11.1	8.7	4.3	1.2
1966	142.5	61.7	32.1	15.7	33.0	142.8	77.8	33.4	2.3	14.4	9.5	5.4	-2
1967	151.2	67.5	30.7	16.3	36.7	163.6	90.7	40.0	2.2	15.8	10.2	4.6	-12.4
1968	175.0	79.7	36.7	18.0	40.7	181.5	98.8	46.1	2.1	18.7	11.7	4.1	-6.5
1969	197.3	94.8	36.6	19.0	46.9	189.2	98.8	50.3	2.1	20.3	13.1	4.6	8.1
1970	192.0	92.2	31.0	19.3	49.5	203.9	96.2	61.0	2.2	24.4	14.6	5.5	-11.9
1971	198.9	89.9	33.3	20.4	55.2	221.0	98.1	72.3	2.6	29.1	13.6	5.3	-22.2
1972	228.7	107.9	37.8	19.9	63.0	244.6	104.4	80.1	2.7	37.7	13.5	6.1	-15.9
1973 <sup>1</sup>	265.4	114.5	49.8	21.0	80.1	264.7	106.9	93.1	2.4	41.2	15.9	5.4	.6
Seasonally adjusted annual rates													
1972: I	222.9	105.6	36.0	19.7	61.5	236.6	106.0	76.8	2.9	32.2	13.1	5.5	-13.8
II	225.4	106.6	36.7	19.7	62.4	244.4	106.7	77.3	2.8	38.0	13.6	5.9	-19.0
III	229.6	108.1	38.0	19.9	63.6	237.0	102.3	78.0	2.8	34.4	13.4	6.2	-7.4
IV	236.9	111.3	40.7	20.3	64.6	260.3	102.7	88.5	2.5	46.1	13.7	6.7	-23.4
1973: I	253.6	108.5	46.6	20.7	77.8	258.6	105.5	89.7	2.1	41.1	14.7	5.5	-5.0
II	262.4	111.4	50.8	21.2	79.1	262.4	107.3	91.5	2.3	40.5	15.6	5.1	.0
III	269.5	116.9	51.0	20.8	80.8	265.6	106.8	94.2	2.5	40.5	16.2	5.3	4.0
IV <sup>2</sup>	121.1	-----	-----	21.5	82.6	272.4	107.8	96.9	2.6	42.5	16.9	5.7	-----

<sup>1</sup> Wage accruals less disbursements have been subtracted from total. These were (in billions of dollars at seasonally adjusted annual rates) 0, -1, 0, and 0 in the 4 quarters of 1972 and 0, -1, 0, and 0 in the 4 quarters of 1973, respectively.

<sup>2</sup> Estimates.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Office of Management and Budget.

TABLE C-69.—Receipts and expenditures of the State and local government sector of the national income and product accounts, 1946-73

[Billions of dollars]

Calendar year or quarter	Receipts						Expenditures					Surplus or deficit (-), national income and product accounts
	Total	Personal tax and nontax receipts	Corporate profits tax accruals	Indirect business tax and nontax accruals	Contributions for social insurance	Federal grants-in-aid	Total <sup>1</sup>	Purchases of goods and services	Transfer payments to persons	Net interest paid	Subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises	
1946	12.9	1.5	0.5	9.3	0.5	1.1	11.0	9.8	1.7	0.3	-0.7	1.9
1947	15.3	1.8	.6	10.6	.6	1.7	14.3	12.6	2.3	.3	-.8	1.0
1948	17.6	2.1	.7	12.1	.7	2.0	17.4	15.0	2.9	.3	-.8	.1
1949	19.3	2.4	.6	13.3	.8	2.2	20.0	17.7	2.9	.3	-.9	-.7
1950	21.1	2.6	.8	14.5	1.0	2.3	22.3	19.5	3.5	.3	-.9	-1.2
1951	23.3	2.9	.9	15.8	1.2	2.5	23.7	21.5	3.0	.3	-1.1	-.4
1952	25.2	3.1	.8	17.3	1.3	2.6	25.3	22.9	3.2	.3	-1.1	(?)
1953	27.2	3.4	.8	18.7	1.5	2.8	27.0	24.6	3.3	.3	-1.2	.1
1954	28.8	3.7	.8	19.7	1.7	2.9	29.9	27.4	3.4	.4	-1.4	-1.1
1955	31.4	4.1	1.0	21.4	1.8	3.1	32.7	30.1	3.7	.5	-1.6	-1.3
1956	34.7	4.7	1.0	23.6	2.0	3.3	35.6	33.0	3.8	.5	-1.7	-.9
1957	38.2	5.2	1.0	25.5	2.3	4.2	39.5	36.6	4.2	.5	-1.8	-1.4
1958	41.6	5.6	1.0	27.0	2.5	5.6	44.0	40.6	4.6	.6	-1.8	-2.3
1959	46.0	6.3	1.2	28.9	2.7	6.8	46.8	43.3	4.8	.7	-2.0	-.8
1960	49.9	7.3	1.3	31.7	3.0	6.5	49.6	46.1	5.1	.7	-2.2	.2
1961	53.6	7.7	1.4	34.1	3.2	7.2	54.1	50.2	5.5	.8	-2.3	-.5
1962	58.6	8.7	1.4	36.9	3.5	8.0	57.6	53.7	5.7	.8	-2.6	.9
1963	63.4	9.4	1.7	39.4	3.8	9.1	62.2	58.2	6.0	.8	-2.8	1.2
1964	69.5	10.8	1.9	42.3	4.1	10.4	67.8	63.5	6.5	.7	-2.9	1.7
1965	75.5	11.8	2.1	45.9	4.5	11.1	74.5	70.1	6.9	.5	-3.0	1.0
1966	85.2	13.7	2.2	49.9	5.0	14.4	83.9	79.0	7.7	.3	-3.1	1.3
1967	93.5	15.5	2.4	54.1	5.7	15.8	95.1	89.4	8.7	.2	-3.2	-1.6
1968	107.1	18.3	3.2	60.6	6.4	18.7	107.5	100.8	10.0	.0	-3.4	-.3
1969	119.7	21.7	3.4	67.0	7.3	20.3	119.0	111.2	11.6	-.2	-3.5	.7
1970	135.0	24.4	3.8	74.1	8.3	24.4	133.2	123.3	14.1	-.4	-3.8	1.8
1971	152.3	27.7	4.1	82.0	9.4	29.1	148.3	136.2	16.6	-.2	-4.1	4.0
1972	177.2	34.3	4.9	89.6	10.7	37.7	164.0	150.5	18.2	-.4	-4.4	13.1
1973 <sup>p</sup>	194.8	38.4	6.4	96.8	12.0	41.2	183.8	170.3	19.5	-1.3	-4.7	11.0
Seasonally adjusted annual rates												
1971: I	145.1	26.0	3.9	78.9	8.9	27.4	143.4	131.8	15.9	-0.3	-4.0	1.7
II	150.6	27.1	4.1	80.9	9.2	29.3	146.9	134.8	16.4	-.2	-4.1	3.7
III	154.3	28.0	4.3	83.2	9.5	29.3	149.5	137.3	16.8	-.2	-4.1	4.8
IV	159.3	29.5	4.2	85.1	9.8	30.7	153.4	141.0	17.2	-.2	-4.2	5.9
1972: I	166.2	32.4	4.6	86.8	10.2	32.2	157.8	144.3	17.5	-.3	-4.3	8.4
II	175.9	34.1	4.7	88.7	10.5	38.0	160.8	147.5	18.0	-.4	-4.4	15.2
III	175.3	34.6	4.9	90.6	10.9	34.4	165.9	152.4	18.5	-.5	-4.5	9.5
IV	191.2	36.1	5.2	92.5	11.3	46.1	171.6	158.0	18.8	-.6	-4.6	19.6
1973: I	190.2	36.6	6.1	94.9	11.6	41.1	176.4	163.0	19.1	-1.2	-4.6	13.9
II	192.8	37.9	6.6	96.0	11.8	40.5	181.2	168.0	19.4	-1.6	-4.7	11.5
III	196.0	39.1	6.6	97.7	12.1	40.5	185.7	172.2	19.5	-1.3	-4.7	10.4
IV <sup>p</sup>	-----	40.1	-----	98.6	12.5	42.5	191.9	178.0	19.9	-1.1	-4.8	-----

<sup>1</sup> Wage accruals less disbursements have been subtracted from total. These were (in billions of dollars, at seasonally adjusted annual rates) .0, .0, .3, and .4 in the 4 quarters of 1971; -.6, -.1, .0, and .0 in the 4 quarters of 1972; and .0, -.1, .0, and .0 in the 4 quarters of 1973, respectively.

<sup>2</sup> Deficit of \$41 million.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.



TABLE C-70.—State and local government revenues and expenditures, selected fiscal years, 1927-72

[Millions of dollars]

Fiscal year <sup>1</sup>	General revenues by source <sup>2</sup>							General expenditures by function <sup>3</sup>				
	Total	Property taxes	Sales and gross receipts taxes	Individual income taxes	Corporation net income taxes	Revenue from Federal Government	All other revenues <sup>4</sup>	Total	Edu- cation	High- ways	Public wel- fare	All other <sup>4</sup>
1927.....	7,271	4,730	470	70	92	116	1,793	7,210	2,235	1,809	151	3,015
1932.....	7,267	4,487	752	74	79	232	1,643	7,765	2,311	1,741	444	3,269
1934.....	7,678	4,076	1,008	80	49	1,016	1,449	7,181	1,831	1,509	889	2,952
1936.....	8,395	4,093	1,484	153	113	948	1,604	7,644	2,177	1,425	827	3,215
1938.....	9,228	4,440	1,794	218	165	800	1,811	8,757	2,491	1,650	1,069	3,547
1940.....	9,609	4,430	1,982	224	156	945	1,872	9,229	2,638	1,573	1,156	3,862
1942.....	10,418	4,537	2,351	276	272	858	2,123	9,190	2,586	1,490	1,225	3,889
1944.....	10,908	4,604	2,289	342	451	954	2,269	8,863	2,793	1,200	1,133	3,737
1946.....	12,356	4,986	2,986	422	447	855	2,661	11,028	3,356	1,672	1,409	4,591
1948.....	17,250	6,126	4,442	543	592	1,861	3,685	17,684	5,379	3,036	2,099	7,170
1950.....	20,911	7,349	5,154	788	593	2,486	4,541	22,787	7,177	3,803	2,940	8,867
1952.....	25,181	8,652	6,357	998	846	2,566	5,763	26,098	8,318	4,650	2,788	10,342
1953.....	27,307	9,375	6,927	1,065	817	2,870	6,252	27,910	9,390	4,987	2,914	10,619
1954.....	29,012	9,967	7,276	1,127	778	2,966	6,897	30,701	10,557	5,527	3,060	11,557
1955.....	31,073	10,735	7,643	1,237	744	3,131	7,584	33,724	11,907	6,452	3,168	12,197
1956.....	34,667	11,749	8,691	1,538	890	3,335	8,465	36,711	13,220	6,953	3,139	13,399
1957.....	38,164	12,864	9,467	1,754	984	3,843	9,250	40,575	14,134	7,816	3,485	14,940
1958.....	41,219	14,047	9,829	1,759	1,018	4,865	9,699	44,851	15,919	8,567	3,818	16,547
1959.....	45,306	14,983	10,437	1,994	1,001	6,377	10,516	48,887	17,283	9,592	4,136	17,876
1960.....	50,505	16,405	11,849	2,463	1,180	6,974	11,634	51,876	18,719	9,428	4,404	19,325
1961.....	54,037	18,002	12,463	2,613	1,266	7,131	12,563	56,201	20,574	9,844	4,720	21,063
1962.....	58,252	19,054	13,494	3,037	1,308	7,871	13,489	60,206	22,216	10,357	5,084	22,549
1963.....	62,890	20,089	14,456	3,269	1,505	8,722	14,850	64,816	23,776	11,136	5,481	24,423
1962-63 <sup>5</sup>	62,269	19,833	14,446	3,267	1,505	8,663	14,556	63,977	23,729	11,150	5,420	23,678
1963-64 <sup>5</sup>	68,443	21,241	15,762	3,791	1,695	10,002	15,951	69,302	26,286	11,664	5,766	25,586
1964-65 <sup>5</sup>	74,000	22,583	17,118	4,090	1,929	11,029	17,250	74,546	28,563	12,221	6,315	27,447
1965-66 <sup>5</sup>	83,036	24,670	19,085	4,760	2,038	13,214	19,269	82,843	33,287	12,770	6,757	30,029
1966-67 <sup>5</sup>	91,197	26,047	20,530	5,826	2,227	15,370	21,197	93,350	37,919	13,932	8,218	33,281
1967-68 <sup>5</sup>	101,264	27,747	22,911	7,308	2,518	17,181	23,598	102,411	41,158	14,481	9,857	36,915
1968-69 <sup>5</sup>	114,550	30,673	26,519	8,908	3,180	19,153	26,118	116,728	47,238	15,417	12,110	41,963
1969-70 <sup>5</sup>	130,756	34,054	30,322	10,812	3,738	21,857	29,971	131,332	52,718	16,427	14,679	47,507
1970-71 <sup>5</sup>	144,927	37,852	33,233	11,900	3,424	26,146	32,374	150,674	59,413	18,095	18,226	54,940
1971-72 <sup>5</sup>	166,352	42,133	37,488	15,237	4,416	31,253	35,825	166,873	64,886	19,010	21,070	61,907

<sup>1</sup> Fiscal years not the same for all governments. See footnote 5.<sup>2</sup> Excludes revenues or expenditures of publicly owned utilities and liquor stores, and of insurance-trust activities. Intergovernmental receipts and payments between State and local governments are also excluded.<sup>3</sup> Includes licenses and other taxes and charges and miscellaneous revenues.<sup>4</sup> Includes expenditures for health, hospitals, police, local fire protection, natural resources, sanitation, housing and urban renewal, local parks and recreation, general control, financial administration, interest on general debt, and unallocable expenditures.<sup>5</sup> Data for fiscal year ending in the 12-month period through June 30. Data for 1963 and earlier years include local government amounts grouped in terms of fiscal years ended during the particular calendar year.

Note.—Data are not available for intervening years.

See Table C-63 for net debt of State and local governments.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

TABLE C-71.—Public debt securities by kind of obligation, 1946-73

[Billions of dollars]

End of year or month	Total public debt securities	Interest-bearing public debt							Matured public debt and debt bearing no interest
		Marketable public issues by maturity class			Nonmarketable public issues			Special issues	
		Within 1 year	1 to 10 years	10 years and over	U.S. savings bonds and notes	Foreign and international	Other		
1946	259.1	54.8	61.7	60.1	49.8		6.7	24.6	1.5
1947	256.9	49.6	56.1	60.0	52.1		7.4	29.0	2.7
1948	252.8	44.6	55.1	57.7	55.1		6.3	31.7	2.2
1949	257.1	49.4	51.8	53.9	56.7		9.3	33.9	2.1
1950	256.7	49.4	50.5	52.5	58.0		10.1	33.7	2.4
1951	259.4	47.1	56.7	38.8	57.6		20.9	35.9	2.3
1952	267.4	57.7	62.2	28.7	57.9		19.6	39.1	2.1
1953	275.2	73.9	50.4	30.3	57.7		19.3	41.2	2.3
1954	278.7	62.8	64.7	30.2	57.7		17.7	42.6	3.0
1955	280.8	61.7	68.6	32.9	57.9		12.7	43.9	3.0
1956	276.6	68.6	58.9	32.9	56.3		11.9	45.6	2.4
1957	274.9	75.3	56.9	32.0	52.5		10.4	45.8	2.0
1958	282.9	72.6	71.0	32.0	51.2		9.2	44.8	2.1
1959	290.8	79.9	83.7	24.6	48.2		7.8	43.5	3.1
1960	290.2	75.3	89.5	24.2	47.2		6.3	44.3	3.4
1961	296.2	85.9	84.7	25.4	47.5	0.5	5.3	43.5	3.5
1962	303.5	87.3	95.6	20.1	47.5	7	4.6	43.4	4.3
1963	309.3	89.4	94.2	24.0	48.8	1.3	3.8	43.7	4.1
1964	317.9	88.5	100.4	23.6	49.7	1.8	3.5	46.1	4.4
1965	320.9	93.4	95.6	25.6	50.3	2.4	2.9	46.3	4.4
1966	329.3	105.2	87.5	25.4	50.8	1.5	2.7	52.0	4.3
1967	344.7	104.4	97.0	25.1	51.7	3.2	2.6	57.2	3.5
1968	358.0	108.6	103.4	24.8	52.3	4.4	2.6	59.1	2.9
1969	368.2	118.1	93.3	24.4	52.2	4.7	2.5	71.0	2.0
1970	389.2	123.4	104.9	19.4	52.5	6.5	2.4	78.1	1.9
1971	424.1	119.1	123.0	19.9	54.9	17.4	2.4	85.7	1.8
1972	449.3	130.4	117.7	21.4	58.1	21.3	2.4	95.9	2.0
1973	469.9	141.6	106.8	21.8	60.8	26.9	2.8	107.1	2.1
1972: Jan.	422.9	119.2	123.0	19.8	55.1	17.6	2.4	84.2	1.8
Feb.	424.0	122.1	119.4	19.7	55.3	17.5	2.4	85.6	1.9
Mar.	427.3	126.3	119.5	19.6	55.6	17.2	2.4	84.9	1.8
Apr.	425.3	122.3	121.2	19.5	55.9	19.1	2.4	83.1	1.8
May	427.9	126.6	115.9	19.4	56.2	18.9	2.4	86.6	1.8
June	427.3	121.9	115.9	19.4	56.5	19.7	2.4	89.6	1.9
July	432.4	122.5	115.9	19.3	56.7	22.7	2.4	91.0	1.8
Aug.	435.4	121.6	114.9	21.6	57.0	22.4	2.4	93.6	1.9
Sept.	433.9	121.3	114.9	21.6	57.2	22.5	2.4	92.3	1.8
Oct.	439.9	122.4	116.9	21.5	57.5	21.8	2.4	95.5	1.8
Nov.	444.2	128.6	115.6	21.4	57.8	21.7	2.4	94.9	1.8
Dec.	449.3	130.4	117.7	21.4	58.1	21.3	2.4	95.9	2.0
1973: Jan.	450.1	131.5	117.7	22.0	58.4	21.2	2.5	95.0	1.9
Feb.	454.8	130.2	117.8	21.9	58.7	26.1	2.5	95.8	1.9
Mar.	458.6	130.2	117.8	21.8	59.0	29.1	2.5	96.4	1.8
Apr.	457.1	128.4	117.7	21.7	59.3	29.2	2.5	96.4	1.8
May	457.3	125.7	117.8	22.4	59.7	29.0	2.5	98.3	1.9
June	458.1	122.8	119.3	20.8	59.9	29.2	2.5	101.7	1.8
July	459.0	122.6	119.3	20.8	60.2	28.8	2.5	103.0	1.8
Aug.	461.8	129.1	111.7	21.6	60.3	28.6	2.5	106.1	1.9
Sept.	461.4	129.1	111.7	21.6	60.3	28.9	2.5	105.4	2.0
Oct.	462.5	130.9	111.6	21.5	60.5	28.4	2.6	105.1	1.9
Nov.	464.0	139.4	109.0	21.8	60.8	26.7	2.8	101.6	2.0
Dec.	469.9	141.6	106.8	21.8	60.8	26.9	2.8	107.1	2.1

Source: Department of the Treasury.

TABLE C-72.—*Estimated ownership of public debt securities, 1946-73*[Par values,<sup>1</sup> billions of dollars]

End of year or month	Total public debt securities <sup>2</sup>								
	Total	Held by Government accounts	Held by Federal Reserve Banks	Held by private investors					
				Total	Commercial banks <sup>3</sup>	Mutual savings banks and insurance companies	Other corporations <sup>4</sup>	State and local governments <sup>5</sup>	Miscellaneous investors <sup>7</sup>
1946.....	259.1	27.4	23.3	208.3	74.5	36.7	15.3	6.3	11.4
1947.....	256.9	30.8	22.6	203.6	68.7	35.9	14.1	7.3	11.9
1948.....	252.8	33.7	23.3	195.8	62.4	32.7	14.8	7.9	12.5
1949.....	257.1	35.9	18.9	202.4	66.8	31.5	16.8	8.1	12.9
1950.....	256.7	36.0	20.8	199.9	61.8	29.6	19.7	8.8	13.6
1951.....	259.4	39.3	23.8	196.3	61.5	26.2	20.7	9.6	13.7
1952.....	267.4	42.9	24.7	199.8	63.4	25.5	19.9	11.1	14.7
1953.....	275.2	45.4	25.9	203.8	63.7	25.1	21.5	12.7	16.1
1954.....	278.7	46.7	24.9	207.1	69.1	24.1	19.1	14.4	16.9
1955.....	280.8	49.0	24.8	207.0	62.0	23.1	23.2	15.4	18.3
1956.....	276.6	51.2	24.9	200.5	59.5	21.2	18.7	16.3	18.9
1957.....	274.9	52.8	24.2	197.9	59.5	20.1	17.7	16.6	19.1
1958.....	282.9	52.1	26.3	204.5	67.5	19.8	18.1	16.5	18.9
1959.....	290.8	51.4	26.6	212.7	60.3	19.4	21.4	18.0	24.3
1960.....	290.2	52.8	27.4	210.0	62.1	18.1	18.7	18.7	26.5
1961.....	296.2	52.5	28.9	214.8	67.2	17.4	18.5	19.0	26.9
1962.....	303.5	53.2	30.8	219.5	67.1	17.4	18.6	20.1	30.2
1963.....	309.3	55.3	33.6	220.5	64.2	16.8	18.7	21.1	31.6
1964.....	317.9	58.4	37.0	222.5	63.9	16.5	18.2	21.2	33.0
1965.....	320.9	59.7	40.8	220.5	60.7	15.6	15.8	22.9	33.4
1966.....	329.3	65.8	44.3	219.2	57.4	14.1	14.9	24.3	33.9
1967.....	344.7	73.1	49.1	222.4	63.8	12.7	12.2	24.1	35.7
1968.....	358.0	76.6	52.9	228.5	66.0	11.6	14.2	24.9	36.1
1969.....	368.2	89.0	57.2	222.0	56.8	10.1	10.4	27.2	36.1
1970.....	389.2	97.1	62.1	229.9	62.7	9.8	7.3	27.8	40.4
1971.....	424.1	106.0	70.2	247.9	65.3	9.3	11.4	25.4	62.5
1972.....	449.3	116.9	69.9	262.5	67.7	8.7	9.8	28.9	72.8
1973.....	469.9	129.6	78.5	261.7	60.2	7.6	11.4	29.3	76.0
1972: Jan.....	422.9	104.4	69.6	248.9	63.1	9.2	10.8	26.0	66.2
Feb.....	424.0	106.2	67.7	250.2	62.4	9.2	11.1	26.7	67.2
Mar.....	427.3	105.5	69.9	251.9	63.6	9.2	10.6	26.2	67.5
Apr.....	425.3	105.5	70.3	249.5	62.2	9.1	9.5	26.1	67.9
May.....	427.9	109.1	71.6	247.2	61.3	9.1	10.3	26.0	66.1
June.....	427.3	111.5	71.4	244.4	60.9	8.9	9.3	26.9	64.5
July.....	432.4	112.8	70.8	248.8	60.5	8.8	9.4	26.9	68.9
Aug.....	435.4	115.4	70.7	249.3	60.3	8.6	8.0	27.0	71.2
Sept.....	433.9	113.5	69.7	250.1	61.1	8.9	7.8	27.6	71.4
Oct.....	439.9	116.7	70.1	253.1	61.6	8.6	9.1	28.5	71.3
Nov.....	444.2	116.1	69.5	253.6	64.2	8.8	10.6	28.6	72.0
Dec.....	449.3	116.9	69.9	262.5	67.7	8.6	9.8	28.9	72.8
1973: Jan.....	450.1	116.2	72.0	261.8	66.4	8.7	10.3	30.0	71.5
Feb.....	454.8	117.1	72.6	265.1	62.8	8.4	10.9	29.5	78.5
Mar.....	458.6	117.9	74.3	266.4	62.0	8.4	11.2	29.4	80.1
Apr.....	457.1	117.9	75.5	263.7	60.5	8.2	10.0	29.2	80.4
May.....	457.3	120.1	74.1	263.1	58.9	8.1	10.8	28.6	81.0
June.....	458.1	123.4	75.0	259.7	58.8	8.1	9.8	28.8	78.4
July.....	459.0	125.0	77.1	256.9	56.5	8.0	10.3	28.4	77.0
Aug.....	461.8	128.7	76.1	257.1	55.1	7.8	11.5	27.7	78.0
Sept.....	461.4	127.8	76.2	257.4	55.4	7.7	9.2	29.0	78.9
Oct.....	462.5	127.4	78.5	256.5	56.3	7.6	10.2	28.5	76.9
Nov.....	464.0	127.1	77.2	259.7	58.5	7.5	11.1	28.9	77.2
Dec.....	469.9	129.6	78.5	261.7	60.2	7.6	11.4	29.3	76.0

<sup>1</sup> U.S. savings bonds, series A-F and J, and U.S. savings notes are included at current redemption value.<sup>2</sup> Not all of total shown is subject to statutory debt limitation.<sup>3</sup> Includes commercial banks, trust companies, and stock savings banks in the United States and Territories and island possessions; figures exclude securities held in trust departments. Since the estimates in this table are on the basis of par values and include holdings of banks in United States Territories and possessions, they do not agree with the estimates in Table C-53, which are based on book values and relate only to banks within the United States.<sup>4</sup> Exclusive of banks and insurance companies.<sup>5</sup> Includes trust, sinking, and investment funds of State and local governments and their agencies, and of Territories and possessions.<sup>6</sup> Includes partnerships and personal trust accounts.<sup>7</sup> Includes savings and loan associations, nonprofit institutions, corporate pension trust funds, dealers and brokers, Federal oriented agencies not included in Government accounts, and investments of foreign balances and international accounts in this country. Beginning with December 1946, the international accounts include investments by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Development Association, the Inter-American Development Bank, and various United Nations' funds, in special non-interest-bearing notes and bonds issued by the U.S. Government.

Source: Department of the Treasury.

TABLE C-73.—Average length and maturity distribution of marketable interest-bearing public debt, 1946-73

End of year or month	Amount out- standing	Maturity class					Average length	
		Within 1 year	1 to 5 years	5 to 10 years	10 to 20 years	20 years and over	Years	Months
Millions of dollars								
Fiscal year:								
1946.....	189,606	61,974	24,763	41,807	17,461	43,599	9	1
1947.....	168,702	51,211	21,851	35,562	18,597	41,481	9	5
1948.....	160,346	48,742	21,630	32,264	16,229	41,481	9	2
1949.....	155,147	48,130	32,562	16,746	22,821	34,888	8	9
1950.....	155,310	42,338	51,292	7,792	28,035	25,853	8	2
1951.....	137,917	43,908	46,526	8,707	29,979	8,797	6	7
1952.....	140,407	46,367	47,814	13,933	25,700	6,594	5	8
1953.....	147,335	65,270	36,161	15,651	28,662	1,592	5	4
1954.....	150,354	62,734	29,866	27,515	28,634	1,606	5	6
1955.....	155,206	49,703	39,107	34,253	28,613	3,530	5	10
1956.....	154,953	58,714	34,401	28,908	28,578	4,351	5	4
1957.....	155,705	71,952	40,669	12,328	26,407	4,349	4	9
1958.....	166,675	67,782	42,557	21,476	27,652	7,208	5	3
1959.....	178,027	72,958	58,304	17,052	21,625	8,088	4	7
1960.....	183,845	70,467	72,844	20,246	12,630	7,658	4	4
1961.....	187,148	81,120	58,400	26,435	10,233	10,960	4	6
1962.....	196,072	88,442	57,041	26,049	9,319	15,221	4	11
1963.....	203,508	85,294	58,026	37,385	8,360	14,444	5	1
1964.....	206,489	81,424	65,453	34,929	8,355	16,328	5	0
1965.....	208,695	87,637	56,198	39,169	8,449	17,241	5	4
1966.....	209,127	89,136	60,933	33,596	8,439	17,023	4	11
1967.....	210,672	89,648	71,424	24,378	8,425	16,797	4	7
1968.....	226,592	106,407	64,470	30,754	8,407	16,553	4	2
1969.....	226,107	103,910	62,770	34,837	8,374	16,217	4	0
1970.....	232,599	105,530	89,615	15,882	10,524	11,048	3	8
1971.....	245,473	112,772	89,074	24,503	8,455	10,670	3	6
1972.....	257,202	121,944	89,004	26,852	9,343	10,059	3	3
1973.....	262,971	122,803	88,223	31,111	14,477	6,357	3	2
1972: Jan.....	261,918	119,152	93,646	29,318	9,484	10,317	3	4
Feb.....	261,215	122,067	93,089	26,347	9,459	10,253	3	4
Mar.....	265,380	126,315	93,106	26,349	9,419	10,191	3	3
Apr.....	262,989	122,263	94,849	26,348	9,392	10,137	3	3
May.....	261,924	126,617	89,005	26,853	9,363	10,086	3	3
June.....	257,202	121,944	89,004	26,852	9,343	10,059	3	3
July.....	257,717	122,528	89,004	26,852	9,318	10,015	3	2
Aug.....	258,095	121,589	85,730	29,149	15,419	6,208	3	4
Sept.....	257,720	121,260	85,730	29,148	15,394	6,188	3	4
Oct.....	260,863	122,442	87,762	29,147	15,363	6,151	3	3
Nov.....	265,621	128,569	86,464	29,146	15,330	6,112	3	2
Dec.....	269,509	130,422	88,564	29,143	15,301	6,079	3	1
1973: Jan.....	271,121	131,454	88,572	29,142	15,271	6,682	3	1
Feb.....	269,881	130,205	95,422	22,357	16,114	5,783	3	1
Mar.....	269,775	130,187	95,425	22,356	16,058	5,748	3	0
Apr.....	267,847	128,359	95,392	22,356	16,022	5,718	3	0
May.....	265,919	125,697	88,222	29,620	15,996	6,385	3	3
June.....	262,971	122,803	88,223	31,111	14,477	6,357	3	2
July.....	262,708	122,602	88,223	31,108	14,457	6,318	3	2
Aug.....	262,405	129,072	80,594	31,106	15,345	6,288	3	3
Sept.....	262,356	129,114	80,576	31,103	15,317	6,245	3	2
Oct.....	264,047	130,940	80,535	31,102	15,269	6,201	3	1
Nov.....	270,234	139,433	83,817	25,136	15,679	6,169	3	1
Dec.....	270,224	141,571	81,715	25,134	15,659	6,145	3	0

Note.—All issues classified to final maturity except partially tax-exempt bonds, which were classified to earliest call date (the last of these bonds were called on August 14, 1962 for redemption on December 15, 1962).

Source: Department of the Treasury.

# CORPORATE PROFITS AND FINANCE

TABLE C-74.—Profits before and after taxes, all private corporations, 1929-73

(Billions of dollars)

Year or quarter	Corporate profits (before taxes) and inventory valuation adjustment						Corporate profits after taxes					Corporate capital consumption allowances <sup>2</sup>	Profits plus capital consumption allowances <sup>3</sup>
	All industries	Manufacturing			Transportation, communication, and public utilities	All other industries	Corporate profits before taxes	Corporate tax liability <sup>1</sup>	Total	Dividends	Undistributed profits		
		Total	Durable goods industries	Non-durable goods industries									
1929.....	10.5	5.2	2.6	2.6	1.8	3.4	10.0	1.4	8.6	5.8	2.8	4.2	12.8
1933.....	-1.2	-.4	-.4	.0	.0	-.8	1.0	.5	.4	2.0	-1.6	3.8	4.2
1939.....	6.3	3.3	1.7	1.7	1.0	2.0	7.0	1.4	5.6	3.8	1.8	3.7	9.3
1940.....	9.8	5.5	3.1	2.4	1.3	3.0	10.0	2.8	7.2	4.0	3.2	3.8	11.0
1941.....	15.2	9.5	6.4	3.1	2.0	3.7	17.7	7.6	10.1	4.4	5.7	4.2	14.4
1942.....	20.3	11.8	7.2	4.6	3.4	5.1	21.5	11.4	10.1	4.3	5.9	5.0	15.2
1943.....	24.4	13.8	8.1	5.7	4.4	6.2	25.1	14.1	11.1	4.4	6.6	5.4	16.4
1944.....	23.8	13.2	7.4	5.9	3.9	6.7	24.1	12.9	11.2	4.6	6.5	6.1	17.2
1945.....	19.2	9.7	4.5	5.2	2.7	6.7	19.7	10.7	9.0	4.6	4.4	6.4	15.4
1946.....	19.3	9.0	2.4	6.6	1.8	8.5	24.6	9.1	15.5	5.6	9.9	4.7	20.2
1947.....	25.6	13.6	5.8	7.8	2.2	9.9	31.5	11.3	20.2	6.3	13.9	5.8	26.0
1948.....	33.0	17.6	7.5	10.0	3.0	12.5	35.2	12.5	22.7	7.0	15.6	7.0	29.7
1949.....	30.8	16.2	8.1	8.1	3.0	11.6	28.9	10.4	18.5	7.2	11.3	7.9	26.5
1950.....	37.7	20.9	12.0	8.9	4.0	12.7	42.6	17.8	24.9	8.8	16.0	8.8	33.7
1951.....	42.7	24.6	13.2	11.4	4.6	13.5	43.9	22.3	21.6	8.6	13.0	10.3	31.8
1952.....	39.9	21.6	11.7	9.9	4.9	13.3	38.9	19.4	19.6	8.6	11.0	11.5	31.0
1953.....	39.6	22.0	11.9	10.1	5.0	12.6	40.6	20.3	20.4	8.9	11.5	13.2	33.5
1954.....	38.0	19.9	10.5	9.4	4.7	13.4	38.3	17.7	20.6	9.3	11.3	15.0	35.5
1955.....	46.9	26.0	14.3	11.8	5.6	15.2	48.6	21.6	27.0	10.5	16.5	17.4	44.4
1956.....	46.1	24.7	12.8	11.9	5.9	15.6	48.8	21.7	27.2	11.3	15.9	18.9	46.1
1957.....	45.6	24.0	13.3	10.7	5.8	15.8	47.2	21.2	26.0	11.7	14.2	20.8	46.8
1958.....	41.1	19.3	9.3	10.0	5.9	15.9	41.4	19.0	22.3	11.6	10.8	22.0	44.3
1959.....	51.7	26.3	13.6	12.7	7.0	18.4	52.1	23.7	28.5	12.6	15.9	23.5	52.0
1960.....	49.9	24.4	12.0	12.4	7.5	17.9	49.7	23.0	26.7	13.4	13.2	24.9	51.6
1961.....	50.3	23.3	11.4	11.9	7.9	19.1	50.3	23.1	27.2	13.8	13.5	26.2	53.5
1962.....	55.7	26.6	14.1	12.5	8.5	20.5	55.4	24.2	31.2	15.2	16.0	30.1	61.3
1963.....	58.9	28.8	15.8	13.0	9.5	20.6	59.4	26.3	33.1	16.5	16.6	31.8	64.8
1964.....	66.3	32.7	17.8	14.9	10.1	23.5	66.8	28.3	38.4	17.8	20.6	33.9	72.3
1965.....	76.1	39.3	22.8	16.6	11.1	25.6	77.8	31.3	46.5	19.8	26.7	36.4	82.9
1966.....	82.4	42.6	24.0	18.6	11.9	27.9	84.2	34.3	49.9	20.8	29.1	39.5	89.5
1967.....	78.7	38.7	20.7	18.0	10.8	29.1	79.8	33.2	46.6	21.4	25.3	43.0	89.6
1968.....	84.3	41.7	22.4	19.3	10.6	32.0	87.6	39.9	47.8	23.6	24.2	46.8	94.6
1969.....	79.8	36.6	18.8	17.7	10.1	33.1	84.9	40.1	44.8	24.3	20.5	51.9	96.8
1970.....	69.2	27.8	10.5	17.3	7.8	33.7	74.0	34.8	39.3	24.7	14.6	56.0	95.2
1971.....	80.1	32.5	14.7	17.8	8.6	39.1	85.1	37.4	47.6	25.1	22.5	60.4	108.0
1972.....	91.1	40.1	20.2	20.0	9.3	41.7	98.0	42.7	55.4	26.0	29.3	65.9	121.3
1973 p.....	109.2	51.7	26.9	24.8	9.3	48.2	126.5	56.2	70.2	27.8	42.4	71.0	141.3
Seasonally adjusted annual rates													
1971: I.....	75.8	31.8	14.2	17.6	8.2	35.8	80.8	37.0	43.8	25.3	18.5	58.8	102.6
II.....	80.5	32.7	14.9	17.8	9.1	38.6	85.5	38.4	47.1	25.1	22.0	59.8	106.9
III.....	80.9	31.8	13.8	18.0	9.1	40.0	87.0	38.0	49.0	25.2	23.7	61.0	109.9
IV.....	83.4	33.6	15.7	17.9	7.9	41.9	86.9	36.4	50.6	24.9	25.7	62.1	112.6
1972: I.....	86.2	37.3	18.7	18.6	8.5	40.4	92.8	40.6	52.2	25.7	26.5	63.4	115.6
II.....	88.0	38.7	20.2	18.5	8.9	40.4	94.8	41.4	53.4	25.9	27.5	66.2	119.5
III.....	91.5	39.9	19.5	20.4	9.8	41.7	98.4	42.9	55.6	26.2	29.4	66.0	121.6
IV.....	98.8	44.7	22.3	22.4	9.9	44.2	106.1	45.9	60.3	26.4	33.9	68.0	128.3
1973: I.....	104.3	49.7	26.9	22.8	9.2	45.4	119.6	52.7	66.9	26.9	40.0	69.3	136.2
II.....	107.9	52.4	28.5	23.9	8.5	47.0	128.9	57.4	71.6	27.3	44.2	70.5	142.0
III.....	112.0	51.9	26.6	25.3	10.3	49.8	129.0	57.6	71.5	28.1	43.4	71.7	143.2
IV p.....										29.0		72.7	

<sup>1</sup> Federal and State corporate income and excess profits taxes.

<sup>2</sup> Includes depreciation and accidental damages.

<sup>3</sup> Corporate profits after taxes plus corporate capital consumption allowances.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-75.—Sales, profits, and stockholders' equity, all manufacturing corporations, 1947-73

[Billions of dollars]

Year or quarter	All manufacturing corporations <sup>1</sup>				Durable goods industries				Nondurable goods industries <sup>1</sup>			
	Sales (net)	Profits		Stockholders' equity <sup>2</sup>	Sales (net)	Profits		Stockholders' equity <sup>2</sup>	Sales (net)	Profits		Stockholders' equity <sup>2</sup>
		Before Federal income taxes	After Federal income taxes			Before Federal income taxes	After Federal income taxes			Before Federal income taxes	After Federal income taxes	
1947	150.7	16.6	10.1	65.1	66.6	7.6	4.5	31.1	84.1	9.0	5.6	34.0
1948	165.6	18.4	11.5	72.2	75.3	8.9	5.4	34.1	90.4	9.5	6.2	38.1
1949	154.9	14.4	9.0	77.6	70.3	7.5	4.5	37.0	84.6	7.0	4.6	40.6
1950	181.9	23.2	12.9	83.3	86.8	12.9	6.7	39.9	95.1	10.3	6.1	43.5
1951	245.0	27.4	11.9	98.3	116.8	15.4	6.1	47.2	128.1	12.1	5.7	51.1
1952	250.2	22.9	10.7	103.7	122.0	12.9	5.5	49.8	128.0	10.0	5.2	53.9
1953	265.9	24.4	11.3	108.2	137.9	14.0	5.8	52.4	128.0	10.4	5.5	55.7
1954	248.5	20.9	11.2	113.1	122.8	11.4	5.6	54.9	125.7	9.6	5.6	58.2
1955	278.4	28.6	15.1	120.1	142.1	16.5	8.1	58.8	136.3	12.1	7.0	61.3
1956	307.3	29.8	16.2	131.6	159.5	16.5	8.3	65.2	147.8	13.2	7.8	66.4
1957	320.0	28.2	15.4	141.1	166.0	15.8	7.9	70.5	154.1	12.4	7.5	70.6
1958	305.3	22.7	12.7	147.4	148.6	11.4	5.8	72.8	156.7	11.3	6.9	74.6
1959	338.0	29.7	16.3	157.1	169.4	15.8	8.1	77.9	168.5	13.9	8.3	79.2
1960	345.7	27.5	15.2	165.4	173.9	14.0	7.0	82.3	171.8	13.5	8.2	83.1
1961	356.4	27.5	15.3	172.6	175.2	13.6	6.9	84.9	181.2	13.9	8.5	87.7
1962	389.9	31.9	17.7	181.4	195.5	16.7	8.6	89.1	194.4	15.1	9.2	92.3
1963	412.7	34.9	19.5	189.7	209.0	18.5	9.5	93.3	203.6	16.4	10.0	96.3
1964	443.1	39.6	23.2	199.8	226.3	21.2	11.6	98.5	216.8	18.3	11.6	101.3
1965	492.2	46.5	27.5	211.7	257.0	26.2	14.5	105.4	235.2	20.3	13.0	106.3
1966	554.2	51.8	30.9	230.3	291.7	29.2	16.4	115.2	262.4	22.6	14.6	115.1
1967	575.4	47.8	29.0	247.6	300.6	25.7	14.6	125.0	274.8	22.0	14.4	122.6
1968	631.9	55.4	32.1	265.9	335.5	30.6	16.5	135.6	296.4	24.8	15.5	130.3
1969	694.6	58.1	33.2	289.9	366.5	31.5	16.9	147.6	328.1	26.6	16.4	142.3
1970	708.8	48.1	28.6	306.8	363.1	23.0	12.9	155.1	345.7	25.2	15.7	151.7
1971	751.4	53.2	31.3	320.9	382.5	26.5	14.5	160.6	368.9	26.7	16.7	160.3
1972	849.5	63.2	36.5	343.4	435.8	33.6	18.4	171.4	413.7	29.6	18.0	172.0
1971: I	177.5	12.1	7.0	314.0	90.7	6.0	3.2	158.0	86.9	6.1	3.8	156.0
II	191.4	14.5	8.5	319.0	99.8	7.8	4.3	160.3	91.6	6.8	4.2	158.7
III	185.6	12.8	7.5	323.2	92.6	5.8	3.2	161.2	93.1	7.0	4.3	162.0
IV	196.9	13.7	8.2	327.3	99.4	6.9	3.8	162.8	97.4	6.8	4.4	164.6
1972: I	197.2	13.9	7.9	332.6	100.0	7.3	3.9	165.5	97.2	6.6	4.1	167.1
II	213.2	16.7	9.6	340.4	111.5	9.6	5.3	170.3	101.7	7.2	4.3	170.1
III	210.6	15.1	8.8	347.4	106.2	7.5	4.2	173.6	104.4	7.6	4.6	173.9
IV	228.6	17.5	10.1	353.1	118.1	9.2	5.1	176.3	110.4	8.3	5.0	176.8
1973: I	232.5	18.3	10.5	361.1	121.2	10.3	5.7	181.9	111.3	8.0	4.8	179.2
II	256.3	22.2	13.0	370.8	136.5	12.7	7.1	187.1	119.9	9.5	5.8	183.7
III	254.0	19.6	11.6	378.9	130.3	9.9	5.7	191.9	123.7	9.7	5.9	186.9

<sup>1</sup> Includes newspapers beginning 1969.<sup>2</sup> Annual data are average equity for the year (using four end-of-quarter figures).

Note.—For explanatory notes concerning compilation of the series, see "Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations," Federal Trade Commission.

Data are not necessarily comparable from one period to another due to changes in accounting procedures, industry classifications, sampling procedures, etc. Specific information about the effects of the more significant changes and revisions is contained in the following issues of the "Quarterly Financial Report": third quarter 1953, third quarter 1956, first quarter 1959, and first quarter 1965.

Source: Federal Trade Commission.

TABLE C-76.—*Relation of profits after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, all manufacturing corporations, by industry group, 1950-73*

Year or quarter	Durable goods industries													
	All manufacturing corporations <sup>1</sup>	Total durable <sup>2</sup>	Motor vehicles and equipment	Aircraft and parts	Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies	Machinery (except electrical)	Fabricated metal products	Primary iron and steel industries	Primary non-ferrous metal industries	Stone, clay, and glass products	Furniture and fixtures	Lumber and wood products (except furniture)	Instruments and related products	Miscellaneous manufacturing (including ordinance)
Ratio of profits after Federal income taxes (annual rate) to stockholders' equity—percent <sup>3</sup>														
1950.....	15.4	16.9	25.3	-----	20.9	14.1	16.0	14.3	15.1	17.7	15.2	17.5	16.7	12.3
1951.....	12.1	13.0	14.3	-----	14.0	13.0	13.4	12.3	13.8	14.2	11.3	11.9	13.2	9.7
1952.....	10.3	11.1	13.9	-----	13.7	11.3	10.1	8.5	11.6	11.7	8.6	8.5	11.6	7.0
1953.....	10.5	11.1	13.9	-----	13.1	9.8	9.8	10.7	11.1	11.8	8.2	7.1	11.4	8.2
1954.....	9.9	10.3	14.1	-----	12.4	8.6	7.6	8.1	10.4	12.5	6.0	6.3	12.3	7.5
1955.....	12.6	13.8	21.7	-----	12.3	10.3	10.0	13.5	15.5	15.6	9.2	11.1	12.5	8.5
1956.....	12.3	12.8	13.1	-----	11.4	12.6	10.7	12.7	16.4	14.9	11.6	8.7	12.4	11.6
1957.....	10.9	11.3	14.2	17.7	12.5	10.7	9.3	11.4	9.3	12.4	8.5	4.7	12.0	7.7
1958.....	8.6	8.0	8.2	13.2	10.2	6.9	7.3	7.2	6.0	10.2	6.3	5.7	10.6	8.2
1959.....	10.4	10.4	14.5	8.1	12.5	9.7	8.0	8.0	7.9	12.7	8.9	9.4	13.1	9.3
1960.....	9.2	8.5	13.5	7.3	9.5	7.5	5.6	7.2	7.1	9.9	6.5	3.6	11.6	9.2
1961.....	8.9	8.1	11.4	9.8	8.9	7.8	5.9	6.1	7.1	8.9	4.9	4.1	10.6	9.9
1962.....	9.8	9.6	16.3	12.7	10.0	9.1	7.9	5.4	7.5	8.9	7.9	5.6	12.0	9.4
1963.....	10.3	10.1	16.7	11.3	10.1	9.6	8.3	7.0	7.6	8.7	8.3	8.2	12.1	8.8
1964.....	11.6	11.7	16.9	12.2	11.2	12.5	10.1	8.8	9.8	9.6	10.1	9.9	14.4	9.5
1965.....	13.0	13.8	19.5	15.2	13.5	14.1	13.2	9.8	11.9	10.3	13.4	10.1	17.5	10.7
1966.....	13.4	14.2	15.9	14.4	14.8	15.0	14.7	10.2	14.8	9.9	14.2	10.0	20.9	15.4
1967.....	11.7	11.7	11.7	12.9	12.8	12.9	12.7	7.7	10.9	8.2	12.1	8.6	18.0	13.1
1968.....	12.1	12.2	15.1	14.2	12.2	12.3	11.7	7.6	10.8	9.2	12.2	14.6	16.6	12.4
1969.....	11.5	11.4	12.6	10.6	11.1	12.2	11.3	7.6	12.2	9.2	12.6	13.0	15.6	11.6
1970.....	9.3	8.3	6.1	6.8	9.1	9.8	8.5	4.3	10.6	6.9	7.9	5.6	14.3	10.0
1971.....	9.7	9.0	13.1	5.8	9.5	8.7	8.3	4.5	5.1	9.2	9.5	11.4	13.6	9.0
1972.....	10.6	10.8	14.7	7.9	10.8	10.6	10.9	6.0	5.9	10.1	13.4	16.3	14.9	10.8
1972: I.....	9.5	9.3	16.4	7.2	8.5	9.3	9.2	4.0	5.7	5.0	10.1	12.5	13.5	7.6
II.....	11.3	12.4	19.1	9.7	11.1	11.7	12.1	7.5	7.5	12.7	14.6	19.2	14.9	10.9
III.....	10.1	9.7	5.5	7.3	10.2	11.0	11.7	4.9	4.9	13.4	13.7	19.2	15.8	9.8
IV.....	11.5	11.6	17.6	7.4	13.5	10.2	10.2	7.6	5.6	9.3	14.7	14.1	15.2	14.6
1973: I.....	11.6	12.5	21.1	9.8	11.6	12.4	11.9	7.8	8.4	6.2	14.2	21.0	14.1	6.9
II.....	14.0	15.3	21.4	12.2	13.3	14.7	15.4	10.4	11.5	13.5	14.4	30.4	16.6	12.1
III.....	12.3	11.9	6.8	9.8	12.7	12.9	13.7	9.3	9.1	14.2	12.7	22.3	17.6	12.5
Profits after Federal income taxes per dollar of sales—cents														
1950.....	7.1	7.7	8.3	-----	7.2	7.3	6.8	7.9	10.2	10.1	5.1	9.4	8.6	5.6
1951.....	4.8	5.3	4.7	-----	5.0	5.5	5.0	5.8	7.8	7.1	3.4	5.5	6.1	3.7
1952.....	4.3	4.5	4.7	-----	4.5	4.8	4.0	4.7	6.7	6.6	2.7	4.1	4.8	2.7
1953.....	4.3	4.2	3.9	-----	4.1	4.2	3.6	5.3	6.3	6.5	2.6	3.5	4.6	2.8
1954.....	4.5	4.6	5.1	-----	4.5	4.4	3.1	5.3	6.6	7.4	2.1	3.4	5.5	2.8
1955.....	5.4	5.7	6.9	-----	4.4	5.1	3.8	7.2	8.3	8.6	2.9	5.4	6.0	3.1
1956.....	5.3	5.2	5.2	-----	3.8	5.4	4.0	6.7	9.3	8.2	3.4	3.9	5.8	3.6
1957.....	4.8	4.8	5.4	2.9	4.2	4.8	3.6	6.6	6.6	7.5	2.6	2.3	5.7	2.5
1958.....	4.2	3.9	4.0	2.4	3.8	3.7	3.1	5.4	4.7	6.8	2.0	2.8	5.4	3.0
1959.....	4.8	4.8	6.3	1.6	4.4	4.8	3.2	5.4	5.8	7.9	2.7	4.2	6.5	3.5
1960.....	4.4	4.0	5.9	1.4	3.5	3.9	2.4	5.1	5.4	6.6	2.1	1.7	5.9	3.5
1961.....	4.3	3.9	5.5	1.8	3.5	4.1	2.5	4.6	5.3	5.8	1.6	1.9	5.4	3.6
1962.....	4.5	4.4	6.9	2.4	3.7	4.5	3.1	3.9	5.5	5.6	2.3	2.5	5.9	3.4
1963.....	4.7	4.5	6.9	2.3	3.8	4.7	3.2	4.8	5.3	5.3	2.4	3.3	6.0	3.3
1964.....	5.2	5.1	7.0	2.6	4.2	5.8	3.7	5.6	6.5	5.6	2.9	3.9	7.2	3.6
1965.....	5.6	5.7	7.2	3.3	4.8	6.2	4.5	5.7	7.3	5.9	3.7	4.0	8.6	3.8
1966.....	5.6	5.6	6.2	3.0	4.8	6.4	4.9	5.8	8.2	5.6	3.9	3.8	9.5	4.9
1967.....	5.0	4.8	4.9	2.7	4.4	5.7	4.5	4.8	6.8	4.8	3.5	3.4	8.5	4.2
1968.....	5.1	4.9	5.7	3.2	4.3	5.5	4.1	4.6	6.2	5.2	3.4	5.3	8.1	4.0
1969.....	4.8	4.6	4.7	3.0	3.9	5.4	3.8	4.4	6.6	4.7	3.5	4.8	7.8	3.8
1970.....	4.0	3.5	2.6	2.0	3.3	4.6	3.0	2.5	6.2	3.6	2.5	2.5	7.3	3.4
1971.....	4.1	3.8	4.6	1.8	3.5	4.2	2.9	2.6	3.3	4.5	3.0	4.4	7.2	3.2
1972.....	4.3	4.2	4.8	2.5	3.9	4.9	3.5	3.1	3.7	4.7	3.7	5.0	8.2	3.3
1972: I.....	4.0	3.9	5.4	2.3	3.2	4.5	3.1	2.3	3.7	2.7	3.1	4.4	7.8	2.5
II.....	4.5	4.7	5.9	2.9	4.0	5.2	3.8	3.7	4.5	5.8	3.9	5.8	8.1	3.3
III.....	4.2	4.0	2.2	2.4	3.8	5.1	3.8	2.5	3.2	5.9	3.8	5.7	8.5	3.1
IV.....	4.4	4.3	5.3	2.2	4.5	4.6	3.1	3.7	3.3	4.1	4.0	4.3	8.2	3.9
1973: I.....	4.5	4.7	6.1	2.9	4.1	5.5	3.7	3.5	4.5	3.1	4.1	6.3	7.9	2.1
II.....	5.1	5.2	6.1	3.2	4.3	5.9	4.3	4.4	5.4	5.6	3.8	7.8	8.7	3.5
III.....	4.6	4.4	2.4	2.9	4.3	5.4	4.0	4.0	4.7	5.8	3.6	6.3	9.2	3.5

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-76.—*Relation of profits after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, all manufacturing corporations, by industry group, 1950-73—Continued*

Year or quarter	Nondurable goods industries										
	Total non-durable <sup>1,2</sup>	Food and kindred products	Tobacco manufactures	Textile mill products	Apparel and related products	Paper and allied products	Printing and publishing <sup>1</sup>	Chemicals and allied products	Petroleum refining	Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products	Leather and leather products
Ratio of profits after Federal income taxes (annual rate) to stockholders' equity—percent <sup>3</sup>											
1950.....	14.1	12.3	11.5	12.7	10.1	16.2	11.5	17.8	-----	16.9	10.9
1951.....	11.2	8.1	9.5	8.2	2.9	13.9	10.3	12.2	15.2	14.8	2.1
1952.....	9.7	7.6	8.4	4.2	4.4	10.5	9.1	10.9	13.3	11.1	5.8
1953.....	9.9	8.1	9.4	4.6	5.1	10.1	9.4	10.7	13.4	11.3	6.0
1954.....	9.6	8.1	10.2	1.8	4.5	9.9	9.2	11.6	12.7	10.6	5.9
1955.....	11.4	8.9	11.4	5.7	6.1	11.5	10.2	14.7	13.4	13.2	8.5
1956.....	11.8	9.3	11.7	5.8	8.1	11.6	13.0	14.2	13.9	12.2	7.2
1957.....	10.6	8.7	12.5	4.2	6.3	8.9	11.7	13.3	12.5	11.1	7.0
1958.....	9.2	8.7	13.5	3.5	4.9	8.1	9.0	11.4	10.0	9.1	5.7
1959.....	10.4	9.3	13.4	7.5	8.6	9.5	11.4	13.7	9.8	11.0	8.5
1960.....	9.8	8.7	13.4	5.8	7.7	8.5	10.6	12.2	10.1	9.1	6.3
1961.....	9.6	8.9	13.6	5.0	7.2	7.9	8.5	11.8	10.3	9.3	4.4
1962.....	9.9	8.8	13.1	6.2	9.3	8.1	10.3	12.4	10.1	9.6	6.9
1963.....	10.4	9.0	13.4	6.1	7.7	8.1	9.2	12.9	11.3	9.2	6.9
1964.....	11.5	10.0	13.4	8.5	11.7	9.3	12.6	14.4	11.4	10.6	10.5
1965.....	12.2	10.7	13.5	10.9	12.7	9.4	14.2	15.2	11.8	11.7	11.6
1966.....	12.7	11.2	14.1	10.1	13.3	10.6	15.6	15.1	12.4	12.2	12.9
1967.....	11.8	10.8	14.4	7.6	12.0	9.1	13.0	13.1	12.5	10.3	11.9
1968.....	11.9	10.8	14.4	8.8	13.0	9.7	12.5	13.3	12.3	12.3	13.0
1969.....	11.5	10.9	14.5	7.9	11.9	10.1	12.6	12.8	11.7	10.3	9.3
1970.....	10.3	10.8	15.7	5.1	9.3	7.0	11.2	11.4	11.0	7.1	9.4
1971.....	10.3	11.0	15.8	6.7	11.2	4.8	10.7	11.8	10.3	9.6	8.2
1972.....	10.5	11.1	15.4	7.5	12.0	9.0	12.1	12.9	8.7	10.8	9.1
1972: I.....	9.8	10.0	15.1	6.4	10.9	6.5	7.6	12.7	8.8	10.2	10.2
II.....	10.2	11.6	15.9	7.3	9.3	10.5	12.6	12.9	7.4	12.1	6.3
III.....	10.5	11.2	15.3	7.3	12.4	8.6	12.6	12.9	8.7	10.0	10.6
IV.....	11.4	11.4	15.4	9.0	15.1	10.5	15.3	12.8	9.8	10.9	9.2
1973: I.....	10.8	10.8	13.6	8.4	8.0	10.8	10.4	14.4	9.2	10.0	9.1
II.....	12.7	12.3	15.4	11.1	14.6	14.6	12.2	15.5	10.7	14.1	7.4
III.....	12.7	13.3	15.6	8.6	6.3	13.1	13.7	14.8	12.3	9.6	10.6
Profits after Federal income taxes per dollar of sales—cents											
1950.....	6.5	3.4	4.9	5.8	2.8	8.8	4.5	10.3	-----	5.8	3.7
1951.....	4.5	2.0	3.8	3.4	.6	6.6	3.7	6.5	11.1	4.5	.6
1952.....	4.1	1.9	3.2	1.9	1.0	5.7	3.3	6.1	10.1	3.6	1.8
1953.....	4.3	2.0	3.7	2.2	1.2	5.4	3.4	6.1	10.4	3.8	1.8
1954.....	4.4	2.1	4.2	1.0	1.1	5.6	3.4	6.8	10.6	4.0	1.9
1955.....	5.1	2.3	4.8	2.6	1.3	6.1	3.6	8.3	11.1	4.4	2.5
1956.....	5.3	2.4	5.0	2.6	1.6	6.1	4.2	8.0	11.6	4.4	2.1
1957.....	4.9	2.2	5.2	1.9	1.3	5.0	3.7	7.6	10.6	4.2	2.0
1958.....	4.4	2.2	5.4	1.6	1.0	4.7	3.1	7.0	9.5	3.5	1.7
1959.....	4.9	2.4	5.4	3.0	1.5	5.2	4.0	7.9	9.5	4.0	2.2
1960.....	4.8	2.3	5.5	2.5	1.4	5.0	3.6	7.5	9.9	3.6	1.6
1961.....	4.7	2.3	5.7	2.1	1.3	4.7	2.8	7.3	10.3	3.8	1.1
1962.....	4.7	2.3	5.7	2.4	1.6	4.6	3.4	7.4	9.7	3.7	1.8
1963.....	4.9	2.4	5.9	2.3	1.4	4.5	3.2	7.5	10.8	3.6	1.8
1964.....	5.4	2.7	5.9	3.1	2.1	5.1	4.3	7.9	10.9	4.1	2.6
1965.....	5.5	2.7	5.9	3.8	2.3	4.9	4.8	7.9	11.1	4.3	2.8
1966.....	5.6	2.7	5.9	3.6	2.4	5.4	5.1	7.8	11.2	4.4	3.0
1967.....	5.3	2.6	5.9	2.9	2.3	4.7	4.4	6.9	11.0	3.9	3.0
1968.....	5.2	2.6	5.5	3.1	2.4	4.7	4.1	6.8	10.7	4.5	3.3
1969.....	5.0	2.6	5.2	2.9	2.3	4.8	4.7	6.5	10.1	3.8	2.6
1970.....	4.5	2.5	5.8	1.9	1.9	3.4	4.2	5.9	9.3	2.7	2.5
1971.....	4.5	2.6	6.1	2.4	2.4	2.3	4.1	6.1	8.3	3.6	2.2
1972.....	4.4	2.5	6.0	2.6	2.4	4.0	4.7	6.4	6.7	4.0	2.4
1972: I.....	4.2	2.4	5.9	2.3	2.3	3.0	3.0	6.4	6.8	4.0	2.8
II.....	4.3	2.7	6.2	2.5	2.0	4.6	4.8	6.3	5.8	4.3	1.7
III.....	4.4	2.5	6.0	2.6	2.3	3.8	4.9	6.5	6.8	3.7	2.8
IV.....	4.6	2.5	5.8	2.8	2.7	4.6	5.7	6.3	7.2	3.9	2.2
1973: I.....	4.3	2.4	5.6	2.8	1.6	4.7	4.1	6.9	6.7	3.6	2.4
II.....	4.9	2.6	6.0	3.4	2.8	5.9	4.5	7.0	7.5	4.6	2.0
III.....	4.8	2.7	6.0	2.8	1.2	5.6	5.2	6.9	8.0	3.2	2.8

<sup>1</sup> Includes newspapers beginning 1969.

<sup>2</sup> Includes certain industries not shown separately.

<sup>3</sup> Annual ratios based on average equity for the year (using four end-of-quarter figures). Quarterly ratios based on equity at end of quarter only.

Note.—For explanatory notes concerning compilation of the series, see "Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations," Federal Trade Commission. See also Note, Table C-75.

Source: Federal Trade Commission.



TABLE C-77.—*Sources and uses of funds, nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business, 1946-73*

[Billions of dollars]

Period	Sources							Uses			Discrepancy (sources less uses)
	Total	Internal <sup>1</sup>	External					Total	Purchase of physical assets <sup>4</sup>	Increase in financial assets	
			Total	Credit market funds			Other				
				Total	Long-term <sup>2</sup>	Short-term <sup>3</sup>					
1946	18.3	7.8	10.5	6.8	3.4	3.3	3.7	16.5	17.9	-1.4	1.8
1947	27.0	12.6	14.4	8.6	5.5	3.1	5.8	25.5	17.2	8.4	1.4
1948	28.2	18.7	9.6	6.3	6.4	-1	3.3	25.2	20.2	5.0	3.0
1949	19.6	19.1	.6	3.2	5.1	-1.8	-2.7	18.7	15.2	3.5	.9
1950	41.1	17.9	23.2	7.2	3.8	3.4	15.9	40.4	24.0	16.4	.7
1951	35.5	19.9	15.6	10.0	5.9	4.1	5.6	37.2	29.8	7.4	-1.7
1952	29.1	21.2	7.9	9.2	7.8	1.4	-1.3	28.9	24.3	4.6	.2
1953	27.2	21.1	6.1	5.6	5.9	-1.3	.5	26.8	24.5	2.3	.4
1954	28.8	23.3	5.5	6.3	6.6	-1.3	-1.8	26.4	21.5	4.9	2.5
1955	52.5	29.2	23.3	10.3	6.5	3.8	13.0	47.8	31.3	16.5	4.6
1956	44.3	28.9	15.4	12.9	7.5	5.4	2.5	39.7	35.7	4.0	4.6
1957	42.2	30.6	11.6	12.0	10.3	1.7	-1.4	38.7	34.5	4.2	3.5
1958	41.2	29.5	11.7	10.6	10.5	.0	1.2	37.8	27.0	10.8	3.4
1959	55.1	35.0	20.1	12.6	8.1	4.5	7.5	50.8	36.7	14.2	4.3
1960	47.4	34.4	12.9	11.9	7.5	4.5	1.0	41.4	38.7	2.7	6.0
1961	54.5	35.6	19.0	12.3	10.8	1.5	6.7	49.5	36.3	13.2	5.0
1962	59.2	41.8	17.4	12.5	9.5	2.9	4.9	54.7	43.6	11.1	4.5
1963	65.0	43.9	21.1	12.1	8.2	3.9	9.0	59.3	45.2	14.2	5.6
1964	72.4	50.5	21.9	14.5	8.8	5.6	7.4	65.0	51.6	13.4	7.4
1965	91.4	56.6	34.8	20.4	9.2	11.3	14.4	82.5	62.3	20.2	8.9
1966	97.4	61.2	36.2	25.4	15.6	9.8	10.9	89.1	76.5	12.6	8.3
1967	94.1	61.5	32.6	29.6	21.3	8.3	3.0	88.2	71.4	16.8	5.9
1968	112.4	61.7	50.7	30.3	17.0	13.3	20.4	104.0	75.0	29.0	8.4
1969	115.5	60.7	54.8	38.3	19.5	18.8	16.5	112.1	83.7	28.4	3.4
1970	100.7	59.4	41.3	38.8	29.8	9.0	2.5	95.0	84.0	11.0	5.7
1971	122.7	69.9	52.8	47.4	42.0	5.4	5.5	109.7	86.7	23.0	13.0
1972	146.3	77.5	68.9	54.6	38.2	16.4	14.2	131.4	100.7	30.7	15.0
Seasonally adjusted annual rates											
1971: 1st half	118.1	67.3	50.8	45.1	42.0	3.0	5.8	106.2	86.5	19.7	12.0
2d half	127.2	72.4	54.8	49.7	41.9	7.8	5.2	113.3	87.0	26.3	13.9
1972: I	129.7	73.1	56.6	42.8	33.9	8.9	13.8	127.3	93.9	33.4	2.3
II	135.2	76.2	59.0	52.5	40.7	11.8	6.4	120.7	98.0	22.7	14.6
III	144.3	77.6	66.7	52.8	39.4	13.4	13.9	131.8	103.3	28.5	12.5
IV	176.2	82.9	93.3	69.9	38.8	31.1	23.4	146.0	107.4	38.6	30.2
1973: I	173.7	81.4	92.3	77.2	32.4	44.7	15.0	163.9	107.4	56.5	9.7
II	183.9	80.3	103.6	68.8	39.3	29.3	34.9	167.7	109.8	57.9	16.2
III	191.6	85.9	105.7	64.1	32.7	31.4	41.6	183.3	117.7	65.6	8.2

<sup>1</sup> Undistributed profits (after inventory valuation adjustment) and capital consumption allowances.<sup>2</sup> Stocks, bonds, and mortgages.<sup>3</sup> Bank loans, commercial paper, finance company loans, bankers' acceptances, and Government loans.<sup>4</sup> Plant and equipment, residential structures, and inventory investment.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE C-78.—Current assets and liabilities of U.S. corporations, 1939–73  
[Billions of dollars]

End of year or quarter	Current assets							Current liabilities						Net working capital
	Total	Cash on hand and in banks <sup>1</sup>	U.S. Government securities <sup>2</sup>	Re- ceiv- ables from U.S. Gov- ernment <sup>3</sup>	Notes and accounts receiv- able	In- ven- tories	Other current assets <sup>4</sup>	Total	Ad- vances and pre- pay- ments, U.S. Gov- ernment <sup>5</sup>	Notes and ac- counts pay- able	Federal in- come tax liab- ilities	Other current liab- ilities		
All corporations <sup>6</sup>														
1939-----	54.5	10.8	2.2	-----	22.1	18.0	1.4	30.0	-----	21.9	1.2	6.9	24.5	
1940-----	60.3	13.1	2.0	0.1	23.9	19.8	1.5	32.8	0.6	22.6	2.5	7.1	27.5	
1941-----	72.9	13.9	4.0	.6	27.4	25.6	1.4	40.7	.8	25.6	7.1	7.2	32.3	
1942-----	83.6	17.6	10.1	4.0	23.3	27.3	1.3	47.3	2.0	24.0	12.6	8.7	36.3	
1943-----	93.8	21.6	16.4	5.0	21.9	27.6	1.3	51.6	2.2	24.1	16.6	8.7	42.1	
1944-----	97.2	21.6	20.9	4.7	21.8	26.8	1.4	51.7	1.8	25.0	15.5	9.4	45.6	
1945-----	97.4	21.7	21.1	2.7	23.2	26.3	2.4	45.8	.9	24.8	10.4	9.7	51.6	
1946-----	108.1	22.8	15.3	.7	30.0	37.6	1.7	51.9	.1	31.5	8.5	11.8	56.2	
1947-----	123.6	25.0	14.1	38.3	44.6	44.6	1.6	61.5	37.6	39.3	10.7	13.2	62.1	
1948-----	133.0	25.3	14.8	42.4	48.9	48.9	1.6	64.4	39.3	39.3	11.5	13.5	68.6	
1949-----	133.1	26.5	16.8	43.0	45.3	45.3	1.4	60.7	37.5	37.5	9.3	14.0	72.4	
1950-----	161.5	28.1	19.7	1.1	55.7	55.1	1.7	79.8	.4	47.9	16.7	14.9	81.6	
1951-----	179.1	30.0	20.7	2.7	58.8	64.9	2.1	92.6	1.3	53.6	21.3	16.5	86.5	
1952-----	186.2	30.8	19.9	2.8	64.6	65.8	2.4	96.1	2.3	57.0	18.1	18.7	90.1	
1953-----	190.6	31.1	21.5	2.6	65.9	67.2	2.4	98.9	2.2	57.3	18.7	20.7	91.8	
1954-----	194.6	33.4	19.2	2.4	71.2	65.3	3.1	99.7	2.4	59.3	15.5	22.5	94.9	
1955-----	224.0	34.6	23.5	2.3	86.6	72.8	4.2	121.0	2.3	73.8	19.3	25.7	103.0	
1956-----	237.9	34.8	19.1	2.6	95.1	80.4	5.9	130.5	2.4	81.5	17.6	29.0	107.4	
1957-----	244.7	34.9	18.6	2.8	99.4	82.2	6.7	133.1	2.3	84.3	15.4	31.1	111.6	
1958-----	255.3	37.4	18.8	2.8	106.9	81.9	7.5	136.6	1.7	88.7	12.9	33.3	118.7	
1959-----	277.3	36.3	22.8	2.9	117.7	88.4	9.1	153.1	1.7	99.3	15.0	37.0	124.2	
1960-----	289.0	37.2	20.1	3.1	126.1	91.8	10.6	160.4	1.8	105.0	13.5	40.1	128.6	
1961-----	306.8	41.1	20.0	3.4	135.8	95.2	11.4	171.2	1.8	112.8	14.1	42.5	135.6	
Nonfinancial corporations <sup>6</sup>														
1961-----	254.7	34.8	16.5	3.4	94.5	95.0	10.5	123.7	1.8	82.6	13.3	26.0	131.0	
1962-----	269.7	37.1	16.8	3.7	99.5	100.5	12.1	132.4	2.0	86.7	14.3	29.4	137.3	
1963-----	288.2	39.8	16.7	3.6	106.9	106.8	14.4	145.5	2.5	94.5	15.7	32.8	142.7	
1964-----	305.6	40.5	15.8	3.4	116.5	113.1	16.3	156.6	2.7	102.2	16.2	35.5	149.0	
1965-----	336.0	42.8	14.4	3.9	130.2	126.6	18.1	178.8	3.1	118.4	18.3	39.0	157.2	
1966-----	364.0	41.9	13.0	4.5	142.1	142.8	19.7	199.4	4.4	133.1	17.4	44.5	164.6	
1967-----	386.2	45.5	10.3	5.1	150.2	153.1	22.0	211.3	5.8	141.3	13.2	51.0	174.9	
1968-----	426.5	48.2	11.5	5.1	168.8	166.0	26.9	244.1	6.4	162.4	14.3	61.0	182.4	
1969-----	473.5	47.9	10.6	4.8	192.2	186.4	31.6	287.8	7.3	191.9	12.6	76.0	185.7	
1970-----	490.5	49.7	7.6	4.2	200.6	196.0	32.4	302.6	6.6	200.5	11.8	83.7	187.9	
1971-----	516.6	55.3	10.4	3.5	207.5	203.1	36.8	311.9	4.9	202.8	14.5	89.7	204.7	
1972-----	561.2	60.3	9.7	3.4	228.9	218.2	40.7	336.8	4.0	216.9	16.7	99.2	224.4	
1972: I-----	526.1	55.3	9.9	3.4	211.4	207.2	38.9	316.4	4.9	202.5	15.7	93.3	209.7	
II-----	534.3	55.7	8.7	2.8	216.3	210.7	40.1	319.1	4.9	204.0	13.4	96.8	215.2	
III-----	545.3	57.3	7.6	2.9	222.5	215.2	39.8	326.2	4.7	207.6	15.0	98.9	219.1	
IV-----	561.2	60.3	9.7	3.4	228.9	218.2	40.7	336.8	4.0	216.9	16.7	99.2	224.4	
1973: I-----	577.0	61.0	10.4	3.2	234.0	225.9	42.5	345.7	4.1	218.1	18.6	104.9	231.3	
II-----	594.7	62.2	9.4	2.9	243.7	233.5	43.0	356.9	4.5	227.6	16.5	108.3	237.8	
III-----	611.6	62.1	9.2	3.1	252.2	241.5	43.5	369.7	4.4	235.6	18.2	111.5	241.9	

<sup>1</sup> Includes time certificates of deposit.

<sup>2</sup> Includes Federal agency issues.

<sup>3</sup> Receivables from and payables to the U.S. Government do not include amounts offset against each other on corporations' books or amounts arising from subcontracting which are not directly due from or to the U.S. Government. Wherever possible, adjustments have been made to include U.S. Government advances offset against inventories on corporations' books.

<sup>4</sup> Includes marketable investments (other than Government securities and time certificates of deposit) as well as sundry current assets.

<sup>5</sup> Excludes banks, savings and loan associations, and insurance companies.

<sup>6</sup> Excludes banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, investment companies, finance companies (personal and commercial), real estate companies, and security and commodity brokers, dealers, and exchanges.

Note.—Year-end data through 1969 are based on "Statistics of Income" (Treasury Department), covering virtually all corporations in the United States. "Statistics of Income" data may not be strictly comparable from year to year because of changes in the tax laws, basis for filing returns, and processing of data for compilation purposes. All other figures shown are estimates based on data compiled from many different sources, including data on corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Source: Securities and Exchange Commission.

TABLE C-79.—State and municipal and corporate securities offered, 1934-73

[Millions of dollars]

Year or quarter	State and municipal securities offered for cash (principal amounts)	Corporate securities offered for cash								
		Total corporate offerings	Type of corporate security			Industry of corporate issuer				
			Common stock	Preferred stock	Bonds and notes	Manufacturing <sup>1</sup>	Electric, gas, and water <sup>2</sup>	Transportation <sup>3</sup>	Communication	Other
1934.....	939	397	19	6	371	67	133	176	-----	21
1939.....	1, 128	2, 164	87	98	1, 980	604	1, 271	186	-----	103
1940.....	1, 238	2, 677	108	183	2, 386	992	1, 203	324	-----	159
1941.....	956	2, 667	110	167	2, 390	848	1, 357	366	-----	96
1942.....	524	1, 062	34	112	917	539	472	48	-----	4
1943.....	435	1, 170	56	124	990	510	477	161	-----	21
1944.....	661	3, 202	163	369	2, 669	1, 061	1, 422	609	-----	109
1945.....	795	6, 011	397	758	4, 855	2, 026	2, 319	1, 454	-----	211
1946.....	1, 157	6, 900	891	1, 127	4, 882	3, 701	2, 158	711	-----	329
1947.....	2, 324	6, 577	779	762	5, 036	2, 742	3, 257	286	-----	293
1948.....	2, 690	7, 078	614	492	5, 973	2, 226	2, 187	755	902	1, 008
1949.....	2, 907	6, 052	736	425	4, 890	1, 414	2, 320	800	571	946
1950.....	3, 532	6, 361	811	631	4, 920	1, 200	2, 649	813	399	1, 300
1951.....	3, 189	7, 741	1, 212	838	5, 691	3, 122	2, 455	494	612	1, 058
1952.....	4, 401	9, 534	1, 369	564	7, 601	4, 039	2, 675	992	760	1, 068
1953.....	5, 558	8, 898	1, 326	489	7, 083	2, 254	3, 029	595	882	2, 138
1954.....	6, 969	9, 516	1, 213	816	7, 488	2, 268	3, 713	778	720	2, 037
1955.....	5, 977	10, 240	2, 185	635	7, 420	2, 994	2, 464	893	1, 132	2, 757
1956.....	5, 446	10, 939	2, 301	636	8, 002	3, 647	2, 529	724	1, 419	2, 619
1957.....	6, 958	12, 884	2, 516	411	9, 957	4, 234	3, 938	824	1, 462	2, 426
1958.....	7, 449	11, 558	1, 334	571	9, 653	3, 515	3, 804	824	1, 424	1, 991
1959.....	7, 681	9, 748	2, 027	531	7, 190	2, 073	3, 258	967	717	2, 733
1960.....	7, 230	10, 154	1, 664	409	8, 081	2, 152	2, 851	718	1, 050	3, 383
1961.....	8, 360	13, 165	3, 294	450	9, 420	4, 077	3, 032	694	1, 834	3, 527
1962.....	8, 558	10, 705	1, 314	422	8, 969	3, 249	2, 825	567	1, 303	2, 761
1963.....	10, 107	12, 211	1, 011	343	10, 856	3, 514	2, 677	957	1, 105	3, 957
1964.....	10, 544	13, 957	2, 679	412	10, 865	3, 046	2, 760	982	2, 189	4, 980
1965.....	11, 148	15, 992	1, 547	725	13, 720	5, 417	2, 936	1, 013	947	5, 680
1966.....	11, 089	18, 074	1, 939	574	15, 561	7, 070	3, 665	1, 972	2, 003	3, 364
1967.....	14, 288	24, 798	1, 959	885	21, 954	11, 058	4, 935	2, 067	1, 979	4, 759
1968.....	16, 374	21, 966	3, 946	637	17, 383	6, 979	5, 281	1, 875	1, 766	6, 064
1969.....	11, 460	26, 744	7, 714	682	18, 348	6, 356	6, 736	2, 146	2, 188	9, 319
1970.....	17, 762	38, 506	6, 948	1, 383	30, 176	10, 609	11, 007	2, 207	5, 146	9, 537
1971.....	24, 370	44, 907	9, 315	3, 677	31, 915	11, 682	11, 778	2, 442	5, 819	13, 190
1972.....	22, 944	40, 835	9, 693	3, 372	27, 771	6, 622	11, 318	2, 027	4, 825	16, 045
1973.....	22, 760	33, 110	7, 905	3, 390	21, 816	4, 845	10, 246	1, 711	4, 898	11, 411
1972: I.....	5, 865	9, 813	2, 065	803	6, 945	1, 466	2, 252	634	1, 506	3, 955
II.....	6, 109	11, 158	2, 798	1, 002	7, 359	2, 088	3, 479	529	1, 369	3, 693
III.....	5, 383	9, 240	2, 418	720	6, 103	1, 627	2, 644	386	868	3, 716
IV.....	5, 587	10, 624	2, 412	847	7, 364	1, 441	2, 943	478	1, 082	4, 681
1973: I.....	5, 638	8, 222	2, 729	1, 142	4, 350	879	2, 427	329	1, 215	3, 373
II.....	5, 604	8, 598	1, 799	603	6, 197	1, 411	2, 886	519	964	2, 821
III.....	5, 096	6, 366	1, 296	440	4, 631	1, 156	2, 018	478	871	1, 841
IV.....	6, 422	9, 924	2, 081	1, 205	6, 638	1, 399	2, 915	385	1, 848	3, 376

<sup>1</sup> Prior to 1948, also includes extractive, radio broadcasting, airline companies, commercial, and miscellaneous company issues.<sup>2</sup> Prior to 1948, also includes telephone, street railway, and bus company issues.<sup>3</sup> Prior to 1948, includes railroad issues only.

Note.—Covers substantially all new issues of State, municipal, and corporate securities offered for cash sale in the United States in amounts over \$100,000 and with terms to maturity of more than 1 year; excludes notes issued exclusively to commercial banks, intercorporate transactions, investment company issues, and issues to be sold over an extended period, such as employee-purchase plans.

Sources: Securities and Exchange Commission, "The Commercial and Financial Chronicle," and "The Bond Buyer."

TABLE C-80.—Common stock prices, earnings, and yields, and stock market credit, 1949-73

Year or month	Standard & Poor's common stock data						Margin credit at brokers and banks <sup>4</sup>					Other security credit at banks <sup>7</sup>
	Price indexes <sup>1</sup>				Dividend yield (per-cent) <sup>2</sup>	Price/earnings ratio <sup>3</sup>	Regulated <sup>5</sup>			Unregulated; non-margin stock credit at banks <sup>6</sup>		
	Total (500 stocks)	Industrials (425 stocks)	Public utilities (55 stocks)	Railroads (20 stocks)			Total	Brokers	Banks			
	1941-43=10						Millions of dollars					
1949.....	15.23	15.00	17.87	12.83	6.59	6.49						
1950.....	18.40	18.33	19.96	15.53	6.57	7.15						
1951.....	22.34	22.68	20.59	19.91	6.13	8.57						
1952.....	24.50	24.78	22.86	22.49	5.80	10.57						
1953.....	24.73	24.84	24.03	22.60	5.80	9.77						
1954.....	29.69	30.25	27.57	23.96	4.95	11.75						
1955.....	40.49	42.40	31.37	32.94	4.08	12.59						
1956.....	46.62	49.80	32.25	33.65	4.09	13.25						
1957.....	44.38	47.63	32.19	28.11	4.35	12.73						
1958.....	46.24	49.36	37.22	27.05	3.97	16.33						
1959.....	57.38	61.45	44.15	35.09	3.23	17.32						
1960.....	55.85	59.43	46.86	30.31	3.47	16.98						
1961.....	66.27	69.99	60.20	32.83	2.98	21.68						
1962.....	62.38	65.54	59.16	30.56	3.37	17.39						
1963.....	69.87	73.39	64.99	37.58	3.17	18.20						
1964.....	81.37	86.19	69.91	45.46	3.01	18.81						
1965.....	88.17	93.48	76.08	46.78	3.00	17.92						
1966.....	85.26	91.08	68.21	46.34	3.40	15.15						
1967.....	91.93	99.18	68.10	46.72	3.20	17.48						
1968.....	98.70	107.49	66.42	48.84	3.07	17.66						
1969.....	97.84	107.13	62.64	45.95	3.24	16.48						
1970.....	83.22	91.29	54.48	32.13	3.83	15.69						
1971.....	98.29	108.35	59.33	41.94	3.14	18.50						
1972.....	109.20	121.79	56.90	44.11	2.84	18.20						
1973.....	107.43	120.44	53.47	38.05	3.06	-----						
1972: Jan.....	103.30	114.12	60.19	45.16	2.96	-----	6,850	5,989	861	1,182	1,313	
Feb.....	105.24	116.86	57.41	45.66	2.92	-----	7,427	6,477	950	1,170	1,327	
Mar.....	107.69	119.73	57.73	46.48	2.86	18.45	7,847	6,896	951	1,158	1,294	
Apr.....	108.81	121.34	55.70	47.38	2.83	-----	8,250	7,283	967	1,150	1,278	
May.....	107.65	120.16	54.94	45.06	2.88	-----	8,472	7,478	994	1,141	1,296	
June.....	108.01	120.84	53.73	43.66	2.87	17.95	8,747	7,792	955	1,644	1,274	
July.....	107.21	119.98	53.47	42.00	2.90	-----	8,924	7,945	979	1,772	1,285	
Aug.....	111.01	124.35	54.66	43.28	2.80	-----	9,092	8,060	1,032	1,800	1,298	
Sept.....	109.39	122.33	55.36	42.37	2.83	18.00	9,091	8,083	1,008	1,871	1,255	
Oct.....	109.56	122.39	56.66	41.20	2.82	-----	9,024	8,081	943	1,875	1,351	
Nov.....	115.05	128.29	61.16	42.41	2.73	-----	9,068	8,166	902	1,871	1,396	
Dec.....	117.50	131.08	61.73	44.62	2.70	18.39	9,045	8,180	865	1,896	1,528	
1973: Jan.....	118.42	132.55	60.01	42.87	2.69	-----	8,840	7,975	865	1,932	1,484	
Feb.....	114.16	127.87	57.52	40.61	2.80	-----	8,640	7,773	867	1,951	1,508	
Mar.....	112.42	126.05	55.94	39.29	2.83	16.40	8,347	7,468	879	1,862	1,586	
Apr.....	110.27	123.56	55.34	38.88	2.90	-----	8,165	7,293	872	1,952	1,492	
May.....	107.22	119.95	55.43	36.14	3.01	-----	7,650	6,784	866	1,992	1,513	
June.....	104.75	117.20	54.37	34.35	3.06	14.42	7,369	6,416	953	1,973	-----	
July.....	105.83	118.65	53.31	35.22	3.04	-----	7,299	6,243	1,056	1,957	-----	
Aug.....	103.80	116.75	50.14	33.76	3.16	-----	7,081	6,056	1,025	1,952	-----	
Sept.....	105.61	118.52	52.31	35.49	3.13	14.17	6,954	5,949	1,005	1,909	-----	
Oct.....	109.84	123.42	53.22	38.24	3.05	-----	7,093	5,912	1,181	1,878	-----	
Nov.....	102.03	114.64	48.30	39.74	3.36	-----	-----	5,671	-----	-----	-----	
Dec.....	94.78	106.16	45.74	41.48	3.70	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	

<sup>1</sup> Monthly data are averages of daily figures and annual data are averages of monthly figures.

<sup>2</sup> Aggregate cash dividends (based on latest known annual rate) divided by aggregate market value based on Wednesday closing prices. Monthly data are averages of weekly figures; annual data are averages of monthly figures.

<sup>3</sup> Ratio of price index for last day of quarter to earnings for 12 months ending with that quarter. Annual ratios are averages of quarterly data.

<sup>4</sup> Margin credit includes all credit extended to purchase or carry stocks or related equity instruments and secured at least in part by stock. Credit extended by brokers is end-of-month data for member firms of the New York Stock Exchange. June data for banks are universe totals; all other data for banks represent estimates for all commercial banks, which accounted for 60 percent of security credit outstanding at banks on June 30, 1971.

<sup>5</sup> In addition to assigning a current loan value to margin stock generally, Regulations T and U permit special loan values for convertible bonds and stock acquired through exercise of subscription rights.

<sup>6</sup> Nonmargin stocks are those not listed on a national securities exchange and not included in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System's list of over-the-counter margin stocks. At banks, loans to purchase or carry nonmargin stocks are unregulated; at brokers, such stocks have no loan value.

<sup>7</sup> Includes loans to purchase or carry margin stock if these are unsecured or secured entirely by unrestricted collateral.

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, New York Stock Exchange, and Standard & Poor's Corporation.

TABLE C-81.—Business formation and business failures, 1929-73

Year or month	Index of net business formation (1967=100)	New business incorporations (number)	Business failures <sup>1</sup>						
			Business failure rate <sup>2</sup>	Number of failures			Amount of current liabilities (millions of dollars)		
				Total	Liability size class		Total	Liability size class	
					Under \$100,000	\$100,000 and over		Under \$100,000	\$100,000 and over
1929.....			103.9	22,909	22,165	744	483.3	261.5	221.8
1933 <sup>3</sup> .....			100.3	19,859	18,880	979	457.5	215.5	242.0
1939 <sup>4</sup> .....			69.6	14,768	14,541	227	182.5	132.9	49.7
1940.....			63.0	13,619	13,400	219	166.7	119.9	46.8
1941.....			54.4	11,848	11,685	163	136.1	100.7	35.4
1942.....			44.6	9,405	9,282	123	100.8	80.3	20.5
1943.....			16.4	3,221	3,155	66	45.3	30.2	15.1
1944.....			6.5	1,222	1,176	46	31.7	14.5	17.1
1945.....			4.2	809	759	50	30.2	11.4	18.8
1946.....		132,916	5.2	1,129	1,003	126	67.3	15.7	51.6
1947.....		112,897	14.3	3,474	3,103	371	204.6	63.7	140.9
1948.....	112.6	96,346	20.4	5,250	4,853	397	234.6	93.9	140.7
1949.....	87.8	85,640	34.4	9,246	8,708	538	308.1	161.4	146.7
1950.....	93.1	93,092	34.3	9,162	8,746	416	248.3	151.2	97.1
1951.....	93.3	83,778	30.7	8,058	7,626	432	259.5	131.6	128.0
1952.....	98.2	92,946	28.7	7,611	7,081	530	283.3	131.9	151.4
1953.....	94.4	102,706	33.2	8,862	8,075	787	394.2	167.5	226.6
1954.....	91.3	117,411	42.0	11,086	10,226	860	462.6	211.4	251.2
1955.....	99.1	139,915	41.6	10,969	10,113	856	449.4	206.4	243.0
1956.....	95.2	141,163	48.0	12,686	11,615	1,071	562.7	239.8	322.9
1957.....	90.4	137,112	51.7	13,739	12,547	1,192	615.3	267.1	348.2
1958.....	89.5	150,781	55.9	14,964	13,499	1,465	728.3	297.6	430.7
1959.....	96.8	193,067	51.8	14,053	12,707	1,346	692.8	278.9	413.9
1960.....	82.4	182,713	57.0	15,445	13,650	1,795	938.6	327.2	611.4
1961.....	88.3	181,535	64.4	17,075	15,006	2,069	1,090.1	370.1	720.0
1962.....	90.7	182,057	60.8	15,782	13,772	2,010	1,213.6	346.5	867.1
1963.....	93.3	186,404	56.3	14,374	12,192	2,182	1,352.6	321.0	1,031.6
1964.....	97.2	197,724	53.2	13,501	11,346	2,155	1,329.2	313.6	1,015.6
1965.....	98.6	203,897	53.3	13,514	11,340	2,174	1,321.7	321.7	1,000.0
1966.....	98.2	200,010	51.6	13,061	10,833	2,228	1,385.7	321.5	1,064.1
1967.....	100.0	206,569	49.0	12,364	10,144	2,220	1,265.2	297.9	967.3
1968.....	109.8	233,635	38.6	9,636	7,829	1,807	941.0	241.1	699.9
1969.....	116.2	274,267	37.3	9,154	7,192	1,962	1,142.1	231.3	910.8
1970.....	108.0	264,209	43.8	10,748	8,019	2,729	1,887.8	269.3	1,618.4
1971.....	111.0	287,577	41.7	10,326	7,611	2,715	1,916.9	271.3	1,645.6
1972.....	117.9	316,601	38.3	9,566	7,040	2,526	2,000.2	258.8	1,741.5
1973.....	118.4	306,404	36.4	9,345	6,627	2,718	2,298.6	235.6	2,063.0
Seasonally adjusted									
1972: Jan.....	114.7	24,871	35.7	750	553	197	101.6	20.1	81.5
Feb.....	114.6	25,055	40.8	880	647	233	191.3	23.0	168.3
Mar.....	116.9	26,862	41.2	986	672	314	220.7	24.4	196.3
Apr.....	118.0	26,681	36.5	808	592	216	148.5	28.5	120.0
May.....	118.5	26,243	38.2	856	670	186	190.1	23.3	166.8
June.....	117.7	26,303	34.2	730	528	202	127.9	18.1	109.8
July.....	118.0	26,815	38.5	740	538	202	204.6	19.2	185.4
Aug.....	117.5	26,420	40.5	824	578	246	253.6	21.0	232.6
Sept.....	118.7	26,798	39.1	730	551	179	113.5	19.6	93.9
Oct.....	120.4	27,417	38.8	755	593	162	153.0	21.4	131.6
Nov.....	120.2	26,387	38.5	799	574	225	208.6	21.0	187.6
Dec.....	120.1	27,614	37.4	708	544	164	86.8	19.1	67.7
1973: Jan.....	119.1	27,173	34.9	772	534	238	205.8	19.1	186.7
Feb.....	119.8	28,640	36.0	753	557	196	137.2	19.3	117.9
Mar.....	121.9	29,914	35.9	874	647	227	252.3	23.1	229.2
Apr.....	119.6	28,693	35.2	796	598	198	119.3	20.7	98.7
May.....	119.0	28,422	36.3	838	559	279	167.9	19.0	149.0
June.....	118.2	27,859	38.2	840	608	232	180.2	20.4	159.8
July.....	118.1	27,832	35.7	714	520	194	206.2	19.6	186.6
Aug.....	117.7	27,696	39.1	837	580	257	190.1	20.4	169.8
Sept.....	115.6	26,277	38.6	717	502	215	189.5	18.5	171.0
Oct.....	115.8	26,215	37.0	772	519	253	185.7	18.7	167.0
Nov.....	117.8	27,683	34.7	739	513	226	218.7	19.6	199.1
Dec.....			35.7	693	490	203	245.6	17.2	228.4

<sup>1</sup> Commercial and industrial failures only. Excludes failures of banks and railroads and, beginning 1933, of real estate, insurance, holding, and financial companies, steamship lines, travel agencies, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Failure rate per 10,000 listed enterprises.

<sup>3</sup> Series revised; not strictly comparable with earlier data.

<sup>4</sup> Preliminary; based on seasonally adjusted data through November.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.

# AGRICULTURE

**TABLE C-82.—Income of farm people and farmers, 1929-73**

Year or quarter	Personal income received by total farm population			Income received from farming						Net income per farm, including net inventory change	
				Realized gross		Production expenses	Net to farm operators				
	From all sources	From farm sources <sup>1</sup>	From non-farm sources <sup>2</sup>	Total <sup>3</sup>	Cash receipts from marketings		Excluding net inventory change	Including net inventory change <sup>4</sup>	Current dollars	1967 dollars <sup>5</sup>	
	Billions of dollars									Dollars	
1929				13.9	11.3	7.7	6.3	6.2		945	1,969
1933				7.1	5.3	4.4	2.7	2.6		379	1,115
1939	7.4	4.8	2.6	10.6	7.9	6.3	4.3	4.4		685	1,851
1940	7.6	4.8	2.8	11.1	8.4	6.9	4.2	4.5		706	1,858
1941	10.1	6.8	3.3	13.9	11.1	7.8	6.1	6.5		1,031	2,578
1942	14.1	10.1	3.9	18.8	15.6	10.0	8.8	9.9		1,588	3,452
1943	16.5	12.1	4.4	23.4	19.6	11.6	11.8	11.7		1,927	3,706
1944	16.6	12.2	4.4	24.4	20.5	12.3	12.1	11.7		1,950	3,611
1945	17.2	12.8	4.4	25.8	21.7	13.1	12.8	12.3		2,063	3,619
1946	20.0	15.5	4.6	29.5	24.8	14.5	15.0	15.1		2,543	4,037
1947	21.1	15.8	5.3	34.1	29.6	17.0	17.1	15.4		2,615	3,534
1948	23.8	18.0	5.8	34.7	30.2	18.8	15.9	17.7		3,044	3,903
1949	19.5	13.3	6.2	31.6	27.8	18.0	13.6	12.8		2,233	2,977
1950	20.4	14.1	6.3	32.3	28.5	19.4	12.9	13.7		2,421	3,186
1951	22.7	16.2	6.5	37.1	32.9	22.3	14.8	16.0		2,946	3,549
1952	22.1	15.4	6.7	36.8	32.5	22.6	14.1	15.1		2,896	3,448
1953	19.8	13.4	6.4	35.0	31.0	21.3	13.7	13.1		2,626	3,126
1954	18.4	12.5	5.9	33.6	29.8	21.6	12.0	12.5		2,606	3,102
1955	17.6	11.4	6.2	33.1	29.5	21.9	11.2	11.5		2,463	2,932
1956	17.8	11.2	6.6	34.3	30.4	22.4	11.9	11.4		2,535	2,982
1957	17.7	11.0	6.6	34.0	29.7	23.3	10.7	11.3		2,590	2,943
1958	19.5	12.8	6.7	37.9	33.5	25.2	12.7	13.5		3,189	3,583
1959	18.1	11.0	7.0	37.5	33.5	26.1	11.4	11.5		2,795	3,140
1960	18.7	11.5	7.2	38.1	34.2	26.4	11.7	12.1		3,048	3,387
1961	19.7	12.2	7.5	39.8	35.1	27.1	12.6	13.0		3,395	3,772
1962	20.4	12.3	8.2	41.3	36.4	28.6	12.6	13.2		3,579	3,933
1963	20.6	12.1	8.5	42.3	37.4	29.7	12.6	13.2		3,697	4,018
1964	20.6	11.3	9.3	42.6	37.2	29.5	13.1	12.3		3,548	3,815
1965	23.6	13.5	10.0	44.9	39.3	30.9	14.0	15.0		4,465	4,700
1966	24.9	14.4	10.5	49.7	43.3	33.4	16.3	16.3		4,990	5,092
1967	24.0	13.1	10.9	49.0	42.7	34.8	14.2	14.9		4,707	4,707
1968	25.1	13.2	11.9	50.9	44.1	36.2	14.7	14.8		4,828	4,842
1969	27.6	14.9	12.7	55.6	48.1	38.8	16.8	16.9		5,620	5,156
1970	28.3	15.1	13.2	57.8	50.5	41.0	16.8	16.9		5,725	5,022
1971	29.2	15.2	14.0	59.7	52.8	44.5	15.2	16.9		5,817	4,888
1972	34.0	18.1	15.9	68.9	60.7	49.2	19.7	20.3		7,089	5,717
1973 <sup>p</sup>	41.3	23.8	17.5	90.5	83.4	64.4	26.1	26.9		9,469	6,862
Seasonally adjusted annual rates											
1971: I				58.9	51.8	43.1	15.8	17.0		5,840	4,990
II				59.7	52.8	44.4	15.3	16.7		5,740	4,860
III				59.1	52.2	44.7	14.4	16.4		5,640	4,700
IV				61.3	54.4	45.9	15.4	17.6		6,050	5,040
1972: I				65.8	57.8	47.0	18.8	19.6		6,830	5,600
II				68.1	59.8	48.8	19.3	20.0		6,970	5,620
III				68.7	60.5	49.4	19.3	19.9		6,930	5,540
IV				72.8	64.6	51.5	21.3	21.9		7,630	6,060
1973: I				79.8	72.4	55.8	24.0	24.4		8,620	6,580
II				82.5	75.5	58.0	24.5	24.7		8,720	6,410
III				91.4	84.5	65.9	25.5	27.2		9,610	6,860
IV <sup>p</sup>				108.3	101.2	77.9	30.4	31.4		11,090	7,650

<sup>1</sup> Net income to farm operators including net inventory change, less net income of nonresident operators, plus wages and salaries and other labor income of farm resident workers, less contributions of farm resident operators and workers to social insurance.

<sup>2</sup> Consists of income received by farm residents from nonfarm sources, such as wages and salaries from nonfarm employment, nonfarm business and professional income, rents from nonfarm real estate, dividends, interest, royalties, unemployment compensation, and social security payments.

<sup>3</sup> Cash receipts from marketings, Government payments, and nonmoney income furnished by farms (excluding net inventory change).

<sup>4</sup> Includes net value of physical change in inventory of crops and livestock valued at average prices for the year.

<sup>5</sup> Income in current dollars divided by the index of prices paid by farmers for family living items on a 1967 base.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

TABLE C-83.—*Farm production indexes, 1929-73*

[1967=100]

Year	Farm output <sup>1</sup>	Crops									Livestock and products			
		Total <sup>2</sup>	Feed grains	Hay and forage	Food grains	Vegetables	Fruits and nuts	Cotton	Tobacco	Oil crops	Total <sup>3</sup>	Meat animals	Dairy products	Poultry and eggs
1929...	53	62	50	69	50	65	67	200	77	8	54	52	76	32
1933...	50	56	45	60	35	65	68	175	70	6	57	58	80	32
1939...	58	64	52	65	47	72	85	160	97	17	59	59	83	35
1940...	60	66	53	75	52	74	83	170	74	20	60	60	85	36
1941...	62	68	70	74	59	75	88	145	64	22	64	63	89	39
1942...	69	76	66	81	62	80	87	173	71	33	71	73	92	45
1943...	68	71	60	79	53	86	75	155	71	35	77	81	91	52
1944...	70	75	63	78	66	82	87	166	99	29	73	73	93	51
1945...	69	73	61	81	68	84	79	122	100	31	73	70	95	54
1946...	71	76	66	76	71	93	94	117	117	30	71	68	94	50
1947...	69	73	50	73	83	82	90	160	107	32	70	67	93	49
1948...	75	83	73	73	80	87	82	202	100	39	68	66	90	48
1949...	74	79	64	72	69	84	87	217	100	36	72	69	93	54
1950...	73	76	65	77	64	85	87	135	103	41	75	74	93	56
1951...	75	77	60	80	63	80	89	205	118	38	78	79	92	59
1952...	78	81	64	78	81	81	86	205	114	37	78	79	92	59
1953...	79	81	62	80	74	84	87	222	105	37	79	78	97	61
1954...	79	79	66	80	66	83	88	188	114	41	82	81	98	63
1955...	82	82	69	85	62	86	88	199	111	46	84	86	99	62
1956...	82	82	69	81	65	91	92	180	110	54	84	83	101	68
1957...	80	80	75	88	61	88	84	148	84	53	83	80	102	69
1958...	86	89	82	88	90	90	91	154	88	65	85	82	101	73
1959...	88	89	85	84	72	89	93	196	91	58	88	88	100	76
1960...	90	92	88	89	86	91	87	192	99	61	87	85	101	75
1961...	90	91	79	89	78	96	91	193	104	71	91	89	104	81
1962...	91	92	80	92	73	94	92	200	117	72	92	90	105	81
1963...	95	95	87	92	76	94	89	207	119	75	95	95	104	83
1964...	94	93	76	93	84	90	90	206	113	75	97	98	105	87
1965...	97	98	89	97	87	96	95	202	94	90	95	92	104	90
1966...	96	95	89	96	87	97	97	129	95	96	97	96	101	96
1967...	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1968...	102	103	95	100	105	103	93	148	87	112	100	102	99	98
1969...	103	104	99	100	97	103	113	135	91	115	101	102	99	101
1970...	102	100	90	99	91	101	107	137	97	117	105	108	100	106
1971...	110	112	117	105	106	99	115	142	86	121	107	110	101	106
1972...	112	113	114	104	101	100	104	182	89	129	108	111	102	109
1973 <sup>a</sup> ...	116	119	117	109	111	101	127	173	90	156	107	111	99	106

<sup>1</sup> Farm output measures the annual volume of farm production available for eventual human use through sales from farms or consumption in farm households. Total excludes production of seeds and of feed for horses and mules. The Department of Agriculture also estimates net farm output, which excludes all quantities used for feed.

<sup>2</sup> Includes production of seeds and of feed for horses and mules and certain items not shown separately.

<sup>3</sup> Includes certain items not shown separately.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

TABLE C-84.—*Farm population, employment, and productivity, 1929-73*

Year	Farm population (April 1) <sup>1</sup>		Farm employment (thousands) <sup>2</sup>			Farm output				Crop production per acre <sup>4</sup>
	Number (thou- sands)	As per cent of total popu- lation <sup>3</sup>	Total	Family workers	Hired workers	Per unit of total input	Per man-hour			
							Total	Crops	Live- stock and products	
							Index, 1967 = 100			
1929 .....	30,580	25.1	12,763	9,360	3,403	54	17	17	26	57
1933 .....	32,393	25.8	12,739	9,874	2,865	54	16	17	25	50
1939 .....	30,840	23.5	11,338	8,611	2,727	60	20	21	27	61
1940 .....	30,547	23.1	10,979	8,300	2,679	62	21	22	27	62
1941 .....	30,118	22.6	10,669	8,017	2,652	64	22	24	28	64
1942 .....	28,914	21.4	10,504	7,949	2,555	69	24	26	30	70
1943 .....	26,186	19.2	10,446	8,010	2,436	68	24	26	32	64
1944 .....	24,815	17.9	10,219	7,988	2,231	69	25	27	31	68
1945 .....	24,420	17.5	10,000	7,881	2,119	70	27	29	31	68
1946 .....	25,403	18.0	10,295	8,106	2,189	72	29	31	32	70
1947 .....	25,829	17.9	10,382	8,115	2,267	70	29	31	33	67
1948 .....	24,383	16.6	10,363	8,026	2,337	76	32	35	34	75
1949 .....	24,194	16.2	9,964	7,712	2,252	73	33	36	36	70
1950 .....	23,048	15.2	9,926	7,597	2,329	73	35	39	37	69
1951 .....	21,890	14.2	9,546	7,310	2,236	73	36	38	39	69
1952 .....	21,748	13.9	9,149	7,005	2,144	76	39	42	40	73
1953 .....	19,874	12.5	8,864	6,775	2,089	77	41	43	41	73
1954 .....	19,019	11.7	8,651	6,570	2,081	78	43	45	43	71
1955 .....	19,078	11.5	8,381	6,345	2,036	81	47	48	46	74
1956 .....	18,712	11.1	7,852	5,900	1,952	82	50	52	48	77
1957 .....	17,656	10.3	7,600	5,660	1,940	83	53	56	51	77
1958 .....	17,128	9.8	7,503	5,521	1,982	89	59	65	55	86
1959 .....	16,592	9.4	7,342	5,390	1,952	90	62	66	59	86
1960 .....	15,635	8.7	7,057	5,172	1,885	93	67	71	62	88
1961 .....	14,803	8.1	6,919	5,029	1,890	94	70	73	67	92
1962 .....	14,313	7.7	6,700	4,873	1,827	95	73	77	71	95
1963 .....	13,367	7.1	6,518	4,738	1,780	98	80	82	77	97
1964 .....	12,954	6.8	6,110	4,506	1,604	97	83	85	83	95
1965 .....	12,363	6.4	5,610	4,128	1,482	100	91	92	87	100
1966 .....	11,595	5.9	5,214	3,854	1,360	97	94	95	93	99
1967 .....	10,875	5.5	4,903	3,650	1,253	100	100	100	100	100
1968 .....	10,454	5.2	4,749	3,536	1,213	101	106	106	105	104
1969 .....	10,307	5.1	4,596	3,420	1,176	101	112	112	112	107
1970 .....	9,712	4.7	4,523	3,348	1,175	101	113	110	119	102
1971 .....	9,425	4.6	4,436	3,275	1,161	108	125	122	130	111
1972 .....	9,610	4.6	4,373	3,227	1,146	110	131	126	138	115
1973 <sup>p</sup> .....	9,500	4.5	4,395	3,232	1,163	112	129	127	127	114

<sup>1</sup> Farm population as defined by Department of Agriculture and Department of Commerce, i.e., civilian population living on farms, regardless of occupation.

<sup>2</sup> Total population of United States as of July 1 including Armed Forces overseas.

<sup>3</sup> Includes persons doing farmwork on all farms. These data, published by the Department of Agriculture, Statistical Reporting Service, differ from those on agricultural employment by the Department of Labor (see Table C-24) because of differences in the method of approach, in concepts of employment, and in time of month for which the data are collected. See monthly report on "Farm Labor."

<sup>4</sup> Computed from variable weights for individual crops produced each year.

Sources: Department of Agriculture and Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census).



TABLE C-85.—*Indexes of prices received and prices paid by farmers, and parity ratio, 1929–73*  
[Index, 1967=100, except as noted]

Year or month	Prices received by farmers			Prices paid by farmers			Parity ratio <sup>1</sup>	
	All farm products	Crops	Livestock and products	All items, interest, taxes, and wage rates	Family living items	Production items	Actual	Adjusted <sup>2</sup>
1929.....	58	65	57	47	48	51	92	-----
1933.....	28	31	25	32	34	34	64	66
1939.....	37	42	39	36	37	42	77	85
1940.....	39	44	39	36	38	43	81	88
1941.....	49	55	50	39	40	45	93	98
1942.....	63	70	62	44	46	52	105	109
1943.....	76	85	71	50	52	57	113	116
1944.....	78	87	71	53	54	60	108	110
1945.....	81	92	76	56	57	61	109	111
1946.....	93	104	87	61	63	67	113	115
1947.....	109	122	104	70	74	78	115	116
1948.....	113	127	114	76	78	87	110	111
1949.....	98	111	98	73	75	83	100	100
1950.....	102	103	101	75	76	86	101	102
1951.....	119	117	121	82	83	95	107	108
1952.....	113	118	110	84	84	95	100	101
1953.....	100	106	97	81	84	89	92	93
1954.....	97	107	90	81	84	89	89	89
1955.....	91	102	84	81	84	87	84	85
1956.....	91	104	82	81	85	87	83	84
1957.....	92	99	88	84	88	90	82	85
1958.....	98	99	99	86	89	92	85	88
1959.....	95	98	93	87	89	93	81	82
1960.....	94	99	91	88	90	92	80	82
1961.....	94	100	91	88	90	93	79	83
1962.....	96	103	92	90	91	94	80	83
1963.....	96	106	89	91	92	95	78	81
1964.....	93	106	85	92	93	94	76	80
1965.....	98	103	94	94	95	96	77	82
1966.....	105	105	105	98	98	99	80	86
1967.....	100	100	100	100	100	100	74	79
1968.....	103	101	104	104	104	102	73	79
1969.....	108	97	117	109	109	106	74	80
1970.....	110	100	118	114	114	110	72	77
1971.....	112	107	116	120	119	115	69	74
1972.....	126	115	134	127	124	122	74	79
1973.....	172	164	178	145	138	146	88	92
1972: Jan 15.....	120	111	127	123	121	118	73	78
Feb 15.....	122	110	131	124	123	118	74	79
Mar 15.....	120	108	129	124	123	119	72	77
Apr 15.....	119	112	126	125	123	119	71	76
May 15.....	123	114	130	125	124	120	73	78
June 15.....	125	116	132	126	124	121	74	79
July 15.....	127	115	136	127	125	122	75	80
Aug 15.....	128	117	135	127	125	122	75	80
Sept 15.....	128	117	138	128	126	124	75	80
Oct 15.....	129	117	139	129	125	125	75	80
Nov 15.....	130	120	138	130	127	126	75	80
Dec 15.....	137	127	145	131	127	129	78	83
1973: Jan 15.....	144	131	153	134	129	132	80	83
Feb 15.....	149	133	161	136	131	134	82	85
Mar 15.....	159	140	174	138	132	138	86	89
Apr 15.....	157	143	168	140	134	139	83	87
May 15.....	163	154	169	143	136	143	85	89
June 15.....	172	170	173	146	138	149	87	91
July 15.....	172	164	179	146	138	148	88	92
Aug 15.....	207	195	217	151	141	157	102	107
Sept 15.....	191	183	198	150	142	154	95	99
Oct 15.....	184	182	187	150	142	153	91	95
Nov 15.....	181	181	182	151	146	153	89	93
Dec 15.....	184	193	178	153	146	156	89	93

<sup>1</sup> Percentage ratio of index of prices received by farmers to index of prices paid, interest, taxes, and wages rates on 1910–14=100 base.

<sup>2</sup> The adjusted parity ratio reflects Government payments made directly to farmers.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

TABLE C-86.—*Selected measures of farm resources and inputs, 1929-73*

Year	Crops harvested (millions of acres) <sup>1</sup>	Man-hours of farm work (billions)	Index numbers of inputs (1967=100)							
			Total	Farm labor	Farm real estate	Mechanical power and machinery	Fertilizer and liming materials	Feed, seed, and livestock purchases <sup>2</sup>	Taxes and interest	Miscellaneous
1929.....	365	23.2	99	302	104	40	11	31	69	53
1933.....	340	22.6	93	294	98	33	6	28	71	52
1939.....	331	20.7	96	270	103	41	12	41	67	50
1940.....	341	20.5	97	269	105	43	14	43	68	51
1941.....	344	20.0	97	265	103	45	15	46	68	52
1942.....	348	20.6	100	271	101	51	17	49	69	49
1943.....	357	20.3	101	267	100	54	19	53	72	52
1944.....	362	20.2	102	265	100	56	23	53	74	54
1945.....	354	18.8	99	249	100	57	23	55	75	53
1946.....	352	18.1	98	239	104	56	24	54	76	54
1947.....	355	17.2	98	226	105	62	28	56	76	54
1948.....	356	16.8	99	220	105	69	29	57	74	59
1949.....	360	16.2	101	212	106	76	31	63	77	62
1950.....	345	15.1	100	199	107	80	32	64	77	63
1951.....	344	15.2	103	200	108	86	36	68	77	67
1952.....	349	14.5	103	191	106	90	39	70	79	67
1953.....	348	14.0	102	184	107	91	42	70	80	65
1954.....	346	13.3	101	176	107	92	43	72	80	64
1955.....	340	12.8	101	170	107	93	45	73	82	68
1956.....	324	12.0	100	160	104	94	44	76	82	70
1957.....	324	11.1	97	149	104	92	46	75	81	69
1958.....	324	10.5	97	143	102	93	48	81	82	74
1959.....	324	10.3	98	139	102	94	54	84	86	79
1960.....	324	9.8	96	134	101	92	54	84	87	80
1961.....	302	9.4	96	129	100	90	58	87	89	84
1962.....	295	9.0	96	123	100	92	62	89	90	89
1963.....	298	8.7	97	120	100	91	70	89	92	94
1964.....	298	8.2	97	115	101	92	76	91	94	99
1965.....	298	7.8	97	109	101	95	80	92	95	101
1966.....	294	7.4	98	101	100	99	90	97	98	98
1967.....	306	7.3	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1968.....	300	7.0	101	96	99	102	107	101	103	108
1969.....	290	6.7	102	94	99	102	110	104	105	110
1970.....	293	6.5	101	89	98	101	113	109	106	107
1971.....	305	6.4	102	88	97	103	121	109	104	109
1972.....	294	6.2	102	85	101	102	120	110	108	117
1973 <sup>p</sup> .....	322	6.5	104	89	97	105	124	109	109	115

<sup>1</sup> Acreage harvested (excluding duplication) plus acreages in fruits, tree nuts, and farm gardens.<sup>2</sup> Nonfarm portion of feed, seed, and livestock purchases.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

TABLE C-87.—Comparative balance sheet of the farming sector, 1929-74

(Billions of dollars)

Beginning of year	Assets									Claims			
	Total	Real estate	Live- stock <sup>1</sup>	Other physical assets			Financial assets			Total	Real estate debt	Other debt	Pro- pri- etors' equi- ties
				Ma- chinery and motor veh- cles	Crops <sup>2</sup>	House- hold equip- ment and furnish- ings	De- posits and cur- rency	U.S. savings bonds	Invest- ment in co- opera- tives				
1929		48.0	6.6	3.2							9.8		
1933		30.8	3.0	2.5							8.5		
1939		34.1	5.1	3.2							6.8		
1940	52.9	33.6	5.1	3.1	2.7	4.2	3.2	0.2	0.8	52.9	6.6	3.4	42.9
1941	55.0	34.4	5.3	3.3	3.0	4.2	3.5	.4	.9	55.0	6.5	3.9	44.6
1942	62.9	37.5	7.1	4.0	3.8	4.9	4.2	.5	.9	62.9	6.4	4.1	52.4
1943	73.7	41.6	9.6	4.9	5.1	5.0	5.4	1.1	1.0	73.7	6.0	4.0	63.7
1944	84.6	48.2	9.7	5.4	6.1	5.3	6.6	2.2	1.1	84.6	5.4	3.5	75.7
1945	94.2	53.9	9.0	6.5	6.7	5.6	7.9	3.4	1.2	94.2	4.9	3.4	85.9
1946	103.5	61.0	9.7	5.4	6.3	6.1	9.4	4.2	1.4	103.5	4.8	3.2	95.5
1947	116.4	68.5	11.9	5.3	7.1	7.7	10.2	4.2	1.5	116.4	4.9	3.6	107.9
1948	127.9	73.7	13.3	7.4	9.0	8.5	9.9	4.4	1.7	127.9	5.1	4.2	118.6
1949	134.9	76.6	14.4	10.1	8.6	9.1	9.6	4.6	1.9	134.9	5.3	6.1	123.5
1950	132.5	75.3	12.9	12.2	7.6	8.6	9.1	4.7	2.1	132.5	5.6	6.8	120.1
1951	151.5	86.6	17.1	14.1	7.9	9.7	9.1	4.7	2.3	151.5	6.1	7.0	138.4
1952	167.0	95.1	19.5	16.7	8.8	10.3	9.4	4.7	2.5	167.0	6.7	8.0	152.3
1953	164.3	96.5	14.8	17.4	9.0	9.9	9.4	4.6	2.7	164.3	7.2	8.9	148.2
1954	161.2	95.0	11.7	18.4	9.2	9.9	9.4	4.7	2.9	161.2	7.7	9.2	144.3
1955	165.1	98.2	11.2	18.6	9.6	10.0	9.4	5.0	3.1	165.1	8.2	9.4	147.5
1956	169.6	102.9	10.6	19.3	8.4	10.5	9.5	5.2	3.2	169.6	9.0	9.8	150.8
1957	177.9	110.4	11.0	20.2	8.3	10.0	9.4	5.1	3.5	177.9	9.8	9.5	158.6
1958	185.8	115.9	13.9	20.2	7.6	9.9	9.5	5.1	3.7	185.8	10.4	10.0	165.4
1959	202.1	124.4	17.7	21.8	9.3	9.8	10.0	5.2	3.9	202.1	11.1	12.5	178.5
1960	203.5	130.2	15.2	22.7	7.7	9.6	9.2	4.7	4.2	203.5	12.1	12.7	178.7
1961	204.2	131.8	15.5	22.2	8.0	8.9	8.7	4.6	4.5	204.2	12.8	13.4	178.0
1962	212.8	138.0	16.4	22.5	8.8	9.1	8.8	4.4	4.8	212.8	13.9	14.8	184.1
1963	221.4	143.8	17.3	23.4	9.3	9.0	9.2	4.4	5.0	221.4	15.2	16.5	189.7
1964	229.2	152.1	15.8	23.9	9.8	8.8	9.2	4.2	5.4	229.2	16.8	18.1	194.3
1965	237.2	160.9	14.4	24.7	9.2	8.6	9.6	4.2	5.6	237.2	18.9	18.7	199.6
1966	253.7	172.2	17.5	25.8	9.7	8.6	10.0	4.0	5.9	253.7	21.2	20.4	212.1
1967	266.6	181.7	18.9	27.2	10.0	8.4	10.3	3.9	6.2	266.6	23.3	22.4	220.9
1968	279.9	191.9	18.7	29.5	9.6	9.0	10.9	3.8	6.5	279.9	25.5	24.9	229.5
1969	294.0	200.8	20.1	30.9	10.6	9.6	11.5	3.7	6.8	294.0	27.1	27.5	239.4
1970	305.1	206.1	23.3	31.9	10.9	10.1	11.9	3.7	7.2	305.1	28.4	29.7	247.0
1971	316.2	214.1	23.6	33.9	10.7	10.3	12.4	3.6	7.6	316.2	29.5	31.6	255.1
1972	341.4	230.5	27.2	36.0	11.8	11.0	13.1	3.7	8.1	341.4	31.3	35.6	274.5
1973	384.5	258.7	34.2	39.0	14.1	11.9	14.1	3.9	8.6	384.5	34.5	39.1	310.9
1974 <sup>2</sup>	454.6	310.4	115.6				28.6			454.6	38.0	41.9	374.7

<sup>1</sup> Beginning with 1961, horses and mules are excluded.<sup>2</sup> Includes all crops held on farms and crops held off farms by farmers as security for Commodity Credit Corporation loans. The latter on January 1, 1974 totaled approximately \$0.3 billion.

Source: Department of Agriculture.

# INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS

TABLE C-88.—U.S. balance of payments, 1946-73

[Millions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Merchandise <sup>1,2</sup>			Military transactions			Net investment income		Net travel and transportation expenditures	Other services, net	Balance on goods and services <sup>1,4</sup>	Remittances, pensions, and other unilateral transfers <sup>1</sup>	Balance on current account
	Exports	Imports	Net balance	Direct expenditures	Sales	Net balance	Private <sup>3</sup>	U.S. Government					
1946.....	11,764	-5,067	6,697	-493	(9)	-493	750	6	733	114	7,807	-2,922	4,885
1947.....	16,097	-5,973	10,124	-455	(9)	-455	997	80	946	-45	11,617	-2,625	8,992
1948.....	13,265	-7,557	5,708	-799	(9)	-799	1,177	55	374	-27	6,518	-4,525	1,993
1949.....	12,213	-6,874	5,339	-621	(9)	-621	1,200	73	230	-3	6,218	-5,638	580
1950.....	10,203	-9,081	1,122	-576	(9)	-576	1,382	78	-120	6	1,892	-4,017	-2,125
1951.....	14,243	-11,176	3,067	-1,270	(9)	-1,270	1,569	151	298	2	3,817	-3,515	302
1952.....	13,449	-10,838	2,611	-2,054	(9)	-2,054	1,535	140	83	41	2,356	-2,531	-175
1953.....	12,412	-10,975	1,437	-2,615	(9)	-2,615	1,566	166	-238	24	532	-2,481	-1,949
1954.....	12,929	-10,353	2,576	-2,642	182	-2,460	1,899	213	-269	0	1,959	-2,280	-321
1955.....	14,424	-11,527	2,897	-2,901	200	-2,701	2,117	180	-297	-43	2,153	-2,498	-345
1956.....	17,556	-12,803	4,753	-2,949	161	-2,788	2,454	40	-361	47	4,145	-2,423	1,722
1957.....	19,562	-13,291	6,271	-3,216	375	-2,841	2,584	4	-189	72	5,901	-2,345	3,556
1958.....	16,414	-12,952	3,462	-3,435	300	-3,135	2,416	168	-633	78	2,356	-2,361	-5
1959.....	16,458	-15,310	1,148	-3,107	302	-2,805	2,658	68	-821	62	310	-2,448	-2,138
1960.....	19,650	-14,758	4,892	-3,087	335	-2,753	2,825	16	-964	78	4,093	-2,292	1,801
1961.....	20,108	-14,537	5,571	-2,998	402	-2,596	3,451	103	-978	30	5,582	-2,513	3,069
1962.....	20,781	-16,260	4,521	-3,105	656	-2,448	3,920	132	-1,155	116	5,086	-2,631	2,456
1963.....	22,272	-17,048	5,224	-2,961	657	-2,304	4,056	97	-1,312	179	5,940	-2,742	3,199
1964.....	25,501	-18,700	6,801	-2,880	747	-2,133	4,872	3	-1,149	142	8,537	-2,754	5,783
1965.....	26,461	-21,510	4,951	-2,952	830	-2,122	5,274	20	-1,284	301	7,141	-2,835	4,306
1966.....	29,310	-25,493	3,817	-3,764	829	-2,935	5,331	44	-1,332	285	5,210	-2,890	2,320
1967.....	30,666	-26,866	3,800	-4,378	1,240	-3,138	5,848	40	-1,751	335	5,132	-3,081	2,051
1968.....	33,626	-32,991	635	-4,535	1,392	-3,143	6,157	63	-1,548	302	2,465	-2,909	-443
1969.....	36,400	-35,807	593	-4,856	1,512	-3,344	5,820	155	-1,782	449	1,891	-2,941	-1,050
1970.....	41,964	-39,788	2,176	-4,852	1,478	-3,374	6,374	-115	-2,013	581	3,630	-3,214	416
1971.....	42,768	-45,466	-2,698	-4,829	1,912	-2,918	8,929	-957	-2,288	739	807	-3,598	-2,790
1972.....	48,769	-55,681	-6,912	-4,724	1,166	-3,558	9,751	-1,889	-2,853	851	-4,610	-3,744	-8,353
1973 <sup>1a</sup> .....	67,001	-67,655	-653	-4,617	1,776	-2,841	11,927	-2,952	-2,449	932	3,963	-3,619	344
Seasonally adjusted													
1971: I.....	10,872	-10,743	129	-1,175	498	-677	1,942	-113	-513	186	954	-803	151
II.....	10,791	-11,708	-917	-1,214	507	-707	2,358	-178	-599	174	131	-859	-728
III.....	11,522	-11,907	-385	-1,204	489	-715	2,051	-306	-550	185	280	-958	-678
IV.....	9,583	-11,108	-1,525	-1,237	419	-818	2,577	-360	-626	192	-560	-978	-1,538
1972: I.....	11,655	-13,475	-1,820	-1,222	328	-894	2,290	-399	-755	204	-1,374	-969	-2,343
II.....	11,539	-13,313	-1,774	-1,242	288	-954	2,252	-461	-691	202	-1,426	-938	-2,364
III.....	12,362	-13,935	-1,573	-1,108	262	-846	2,447	-497	-679	209	-939	-954	-1,893
IV.....	13,213	-14,958	-1,745	-1,151	287	-864	2,763	-531	-730	237	-870	-881	-1,751
1973: I.....	15,320	-16,280	-960	-1,168	343	-825	2,954	-645	-608	234	150	-742	-592
II.....	16,778	-17,022	-244	-1,185	455	-730	2,888	-777	-703	240	674	-1,041	-367
III.....	18,153	-17,439	714	-1,110	534	-576	3,103	-792	-526	225	2,148	-931	1,217
IV.....	20,048	18,748	1,300	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE C-88.—U.S. balance of payments, 1946-73—Continued

[Millions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Long-term capital flows, net		Balance on current account and long-term capital	Non-liquid short-term private capital flows, net <sup>6</sup>	Allocations of special capital drawing rights	Errors and omissions, net	Net liquidity balance	Liquid private capital flows, net <sup>6</sup>	Official reserve transactions balance	Changes in liabilities to foreign official agencies, net <sup>7</sup>	Changes in U.S. official reserve assets, net <sup>8</sup>	U.S. official reserve assets, net (end of period)
	U.S. Government <sup>5</sup>	Private <sup>6</sup>										
1946				-253		155						20,706
1947				-236		861					-623	24,021
1948				-131		1,115					-1,736	25,758
1949				158		717					-266	26,024
1950				75		-124					1,758	24,265
1951				-227		354					-33	24,299
1952				-41		497					-415	24,714
1953				183		220					1,256	23,458
1954				-556		60					480	22,978
1955				-328		371					182	22,797
1956				-479		390					-869	23,666
1957				-174		1,012					-1,165	24,832
1958				-145		361					2,292	22,540
1959				-89		260					1,035	21,504
1960	-889	-2,100	-1,188	<sup>10</sup> -1,405		-1,084	<sup>10</sup> -3,677	<sup>10</sup> 273	-3,403	1,258	2,145	19,359
1961	-901	-2,182	-15	<sup>10</sup> -1,200		-1,037	<sup>10</sup> -2,252	<sup>10</sup> 904	-1,348	742	606	18,753
1962	-892	-2,606	-1,042	<sup>10</sup> -657		-1,166	<sup>10</sup> -2,864	<sup>10</sup> 214	-2,650	1,117	1,533	17,220
1963	-1,150	-3,376	-1,328	<sup>10</sup> -968		-418	<sup>10</sup> -2,713	<sup>10</sup> 779	-1,934	1,557	377	16,843
1964	-1,348	-4,511	-76	-1,643		-978	-2,696	1,162	-1,534	1,363	171	16,672
1965	-1,532	-4,577	-1,804	-154		-520	-2,478	1,188	-1,290	67	1,222	15,450
1966	-1,469	-2,575	-1,724	-104		-322	-2,151	2,370	219	-787	568	14,882
1967	-2,423	-2,932	-3,304	-522		-857	-4,683	1,265	-3,418	3,366	52	14,830
1968	-2,158	1,191	-1,411	231		-431	-1,611	3,252	1,641	-761	-880	15,710
1969	-1,926	-70	-3,046	-640		-2,395	-6,081	8,820	2,739	-1,552	-1,187	<sup>11</sup> 16,964
1970	-2,018	-1,429	-3,031	-482	867	-1,205	-3,851	-5,988	-9,839	7,362	2,477	14,487
1971	-2,359	-4,401	-9,550	-2,347	717	-10,784	-21,965	-7,788	-29,753	27,405	2,348	<sup>12</sup> 12,167
1972	-1,339	-152	-9,843	-1,637	710	-3,112	-13,882	3,542	-10,340	10,308	32	13,151
1973 <sup>13</sup>	-832	1,805	1,315	-3,989		-6,428	-9,103	-1,639	-10,741	10,443	299	<sup>14</sup> 14,378
Seasonally adjusted												Unadjusted
1971: I	-642	-895	-1,386	-517	180	-949	-2,672	-2,958	-5,630	4,948	682	14,342
II	-575	-1,691	-2,994	-492	179	-2,391	-5,698	-6,447	-6,345	5,686	659	13,504
III	-598	-2,018	-3,294	-822	179	-5,511	-9,448	-2,434	-11,882	10,688	1,194	12,131
IV	-544	201	-1,881	-516	179	-1,933	-4,151	-1,749	-5,900	6,087	-187	<sup>12</sup> 12,167
1972: I	-289	-1,143	-3,775	-535	178	944	-3,188	-288	-3,476	3,047	429	12,270
II	-95	604	-1,855	310	178	-940	-2,307	1,456	-851	1,082	-231	<sup>13</sup> 13,339
III	-366	-393	-2,652	-430	177	-1,626	-4,531	7	-4,524	4,579	-55	13,217
IV	-586	781	-1,556	-982	177	-1,490	-3,851	2,367	-1,484	1,595	-111	13,151
1973: I	-336	-16	-944	-1,822		-3,891	-6,657	-3,842	-10,499	10,279	220	12,931
II	75	-317	-609	-1,404		425	-1,588	1,923	335	-352	17	12,914
III	-363	1,685	2,539	234		-1,355	1,418	690	2,108	-2,095	-13	12,927
IV <sup>14</sup>												<sup>14</sup> 14,378

<sup>1</sup> Excludes military grants.<sup>2</sup> Adjusted from Census data for differences in timing and coverage.<sup>3</sup> Includes fees and royalties from U.S. direct investments abroad and from foreign direct investments in the United States.<sup>4</sup> Equal to net exports of goods and services in the national income and product accounts when converted to an annual rates basis.<sup>5</sup> Excludes liabilities to foreign official reserve agencies.<sup>6</sup> Private foreigners exclude the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but include other international and regional organizations.<sup>7</sup> Includes liabilities to foreign official agencies reported by U.S. Government and U.S. banks and U.S. liabilities to the IMF arising from reversible gold sales to, and gold deposits with, the United States.<sup>8</sup> Official reserve assets include gold, special drawing rights, convertible currencies, and the U.S. gold tranche position in the IMF.<sup>9</sup> Not available separately.<sup>10</sup> Coverage of liquid banking claims for 1960-63 and of nonliquid nonbanking claims for 1960-62 is limited to foreign currency deposits only; other liquid items are not available separately and are included with nonliquid claims.<sup>11</sup> Includes gain of \$67 million resulting from revaluation of the German mark in October 1969.<sup>12</sup> Includes \$28 million increase in dollar value of foreign currencies revalued to reflect market exchange rates as of December 31, 1971.<sup>13</sup> First 3 quarters on a seasonally adjusted annual rates basis (except reserve assets are for end of December).<sup>14</sup> Includes increase of \$1,436 million resulting from change in par value of the U.S. dollar on October 18, 1973.<sup>15</sup> Includes increase of \$1,016 million resulting from change in par value of the U.S. dollar on May 8, 1972.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Department of the Treasury.

TABLE C-89.—U.S. merchandise exports and imports by commodity groups, 1958-73

[Millions of dollars]

Year or quarter	Merchandise exports <sup>1</sup>						Merchandise imports					Gross merchandise trade balance, seasonally adjusted <sup>7</sup>
	Total, including reexports <sup>2</sup>		Domestic exports				General imports <sup>6</sup>					
	Seasonally adjusted	Unadjusted	Total <sup>3</sup>	Food, beverages, and tobacco	Crude materials and fuels <sup>4</sup>	Manufactured goods <sup>5</sup>	Total <sup>3</sup>		Food, beverages, and tobacco	Crude materials and fuels <sup>4</sup>	Manufactured goods <sup>5</sup>	
							Seasonally adjusted	Unadjusted				
1958 .....		16, 375	16, 211	2, 688	3, 052	11, 547		13, 392	3, 550	4, 164	5, 311	
1959 .....		16, 426	16, 243	2, 852	2, 996	11, 179		15, 690	3, 580	4, 615	7, 117	2, 983 736
1960 .....		19, 659	19, 459	3, 167	3, 942	12, 583		15, 073	3, 392	4, 418	6, 863	4, 586
1961 .....		20, 226	19, 982	3, 466	3, 864	12, 784		14, 761	3, 455	4, 334	6, 537	5, 465
1962 .....		20, 986	20, 717	3, 743	3, 356	13, 668		16, 464	3, 674	4, 691	7, 649	4, 522
1963 .....		22, 467	22, 182	4, 188	3, 775	14, 297		17, 207	3, 863	4, 755	8, 070	5, 260
1964 .....		25, 832	25, 479	4, 637	4, 337	16, 529		18, 749	4, 022	5, 029	9, 106	7, 083
1965 .....		26, 742	26, 399	4, 519	4, 273	17, 433		21, 427	4, 013	5, 440	11, 244	5, 315
1966 .....		29, 490	29, 054	5, 186	4, 404	19, 218		25, 618	4, 590	5, 718	14, 446	3, 872
1967 .....		31, 030	30, 646	4, 710	4, 726	20, 844		26, 889	4, 701	5, 367	15, 756	4, 141
1968 .....		34, 063	33, 626	4, 592	4, 865	23, 818		33, 226	5, 355	6, 031	20, 624	837
1969 .....		37, 332	36, 788	4, 446	5, 006	26, 785		36, 043	5, 308	6, 391	23, 011	1, 289
1970 .....		42, 659	42, 025	5, 058	6, 692	29, 343		39, 952	6, 230	6, 542	25, 906	2, 708
1971 .....		43, 549	42, 911	5, 076	6, 441	30, 443		45, 563	6, 404	7, 268	30, 414	-2, 014
1972 .....		49, 219	48, 419	6, 569	7, 091	33, 759		55, 583	7, 379	8, 838	37, 767	-6, 364
1973 .....		70, 798	69, 707	12, 939	10, 738	44, 703		69, 121	9, 199	13, 343	44, 788	1, 677
1971: I .....	11, 239	11, 116	10, 962	1, 295	1, 689	7, 738	10, 799	10, 518	1, 492	1, 626	7, 051	440
II .....	10, 966	11, 406	11, 222	1, 219	1, 674	8, 046	11, 747	12, 003	1, 706	1, 836	8, 084	-782
III .....	11, 675	10, 924	10, 777	1, 336	1, 569	7, 649	11, 958	11, 778	1, 895	1, 928	7, 589	-283
IV .....	9, 726	10, 103	9, 950	1, 225	1, 509	7, 010	11, 030	11, 264	1, 311	1, 879	7, 690	-1, 304
1972: I .....	11, 767	11, 890	11, 724	1, 416	1, 704	8, 340	13, 424	13, 302	1, 810	2, 130	8, 985	-1, 657
II .....	11, 673	12, 040	11, 826	1, 432	1, 688	8, 430	13, 370	13, 743	1, 769	2, 105	9, 478	-1, 697
III .....	12, 447	11, 574	11, 376	1, 625	1, 536	8, 014	13, 903	13, 532	1, 807	2, 195	9, 135	-1, 456
IV .....	13, 347	13, 714	13, 493	2, 095	2, 163	8, 975	14, 888	15, 006	1, 993	2, 408	10, 169	-1, 540
1973: I .....	15, 407	15, 520	15, 286	2, 384	2, 571	10, 065	16, 258	15, 965	2, 084	2, 777	10, 662	-851
II .....	16, 866	17, 440	17, 136	2, 770	2, 744	11, 250	16, 848	17, 283	2, 317	3, 063	11, 469	18
III .....	18, 335	17, 072	16, 808	3, 557	2, 222	10, 716	17, 358	16, 936	2, 188	3, 317	10, 977	977
IV .....	20, 178	20, 766	20, 477	4, 228	3, 201	12, 671	18, 623	18, 938	2, 610	4, 186	11, 682	1, 555

<sup>1</sup> Beginning 1960, data have been adjusted for comparability with the revised commodity classifications effective in 1965.<sup>2</sup> Totals exclude Department of Defense shipments of grant-aid military supplies and equipment under the Military Assistance Program.<sup>3</sup> Total includes commodities and transactions not classified according to kind.<sup>4</sup> Includes fats and oils.<sup>5</sup> Includes machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals, metals, and other manufactures. Export data for these items include military grant-aid shipments.<sup>6</sup> Total arrivals of imported goods other than intransit shipments.<sup>7</sup> Exports, excluding military grant-aid, less general imports; quarterly data seasonally adjusted.

Note.—Data are as reported by the Bureau of the Census adjusted to include silver ore and bullion reported separately prior to 1969. Export statistics cover all merchandise shipped from the U.S. customs area, except supplies for U.S. Armed Forces. Export values are f.a.s. port of export and include shipments under Agency for International Development and Food for Peace programs as well as other private relief shipments. Import values are defined generally as the market value in the foreign country, excluding the U.S. import duty and transportation costs such as ocean freight and marine insurance.

Source: Department of Commerce, International Economic Policy and Research.

TABLE C-90.—*U.S. merchandise exports and imports by area, 1967-73*

[Millions of dollars]

Area	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
<b>Exports (including reexports and special category shipments): Total</b>	<b>31,622</b>	<b>34,636</b>	<b>38,006</b>	<b>43,224</b>	<b>44,130</b>	<b>49,778</b>	<b>71,314</b>
Developed countries	21,467	23,600	26,479	30,877	30,335	34,319	47,177
Developing countries	9,960	10,821	11,277	12,993	13,410	14,576	20,973
Canada <sup>1</sup>	7,172	8,072	9,137	9,079	10,365	12,415	15,073
Other Western Hemisphere	4,718	5,339	5,576	6,532	6,484	7,275	9,931
Western Europe <sup>2</sup>	10,187	11,132	12,392	14,463	14,178	15,361	21,361
Eastern Europe	195	215	249	354	384	819	1,797
Asia	7,150	7,582	8,261	10,028	9,855	11,297	18,426
Australia and Oceania	1,018	1,026	998	1,189	1,168	1,034	1,744
Africa	1,182	1,269	1,392	1,579	1,694	1,576	2,307
Unidentified countries <sup>3</sup>							<sup>4</sup> 677
<b>General imports: Total</b>	<b>26,889</b>	<b>33,226</b>	<b>36,043</b>	<b>39,952</b>	<b>45,563</b>	<b>55,583</b>	<b><sup>5</sup>69,121</b>
Developed countries	18,993	24,130	26,460	29,259	33,744	40,822	48,094
Developing countries	7,709	8,886	9,373	10,442	11,549	14,356	19,461
Canada	7,140	9,005	10,384	11,092	12,691	14,927	17,443
Other Western Hemisphere	4,662	5,143	5,163	5,836	6,038	7,003	9,338
Western Europe <sup>2</sup>	8,052	10,139	10,138	11,169	12,658	15,423	19,162
Eastern Europe	177	198	195	226	223	321	519
Asia	5,349	6,911	8,275	9,621	11,779	15,117	17,775
Australia and Oceania	583	697	828	871	895	1,145	1,554
Africa	920	1,122	1,046	1,113	1,236	1,595	2,350
Unidentified countries <sup>4</sup>	6	11	12	24	41	51	<sup>5</sup> 981

<sup>1</sup> Beginning January 1973, transshipments of certain grains and oilseeds through Canada are shown as exports to unidentified countries.

<sup>2</sup> Includes Finland, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey.

<sup>3</sup> Beginning November 1973, crude petroleum imports are not available by country of origin, but are included in the total and in unidentified countries.

<sup>4</sup> Consists of certain low-valued shipments not identified by country.

Note.—Developed countries include Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of South Africa. Developing countries include rest of the world except Communist areas in Eastern Europe and Asia and unidentified countries.

Source: Department of Commerce, International Economic Policy and Research.

**TABLE C-91.—U.S. overseas loans and grants, by type and area, fiscal years, 1962–73**

(Millions of dollars)

Type of program and fiscal period	Total	Near East and South Asia	Latin America	East Asia and Vietnam	Africa	Europe	Other and inter-regional
<b>TOTAL ECONOMIC LOANS AND GRANTS (OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS)<sup>1</sup></b>							
1962–72 average.....	4,927	1,360	1,117	1,133	390	360	568
Loans.....	2,682	996	710	413	184	330	50
Grants.....	2,245	364	407	719	206	30	518
1973.....	7,424	992	1,388	1,839	546	1,608	1,052
Loans.....	4,704	543	775	1,253	414	1,595	124
Grants.....	2,720	449	613	586	132	13	928
<b>OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES<sup>2</sup></b>							
Obligations and loan authorizations:							
1962–72 average.....	3,983	1,239	891	923	347	55	528
1973.....	4,105	754	881	1,253	255	18	944
Loan repayments and interest receipts:							
1962–72 average.....	432	234	69	49	29	46	5
1973.....	1,034	468	102	290	60	109	6
<b>Agency for International Development</b>							
Obligations and loan authorizations:							
1962–72 average.....	2,207	626	497	580	196	3	305
1973.....	2,001	387	314	696	163	17	423
Loan repayments and interest receipts:							
1962–72 average.....	244	134	36	33	21	17	2
1973.....	490	272	75	53	36	52	2
<b>Food for Peace</b>							
Obligations:							
1962–72 average.....	1,283	602	138	314	129	52	48
1973.....	1,116	362	89	549	69	0	47
Loan repayments and interest receipts:							
1962–72 average.....	161	95	16	14	7	29	-----
1973.....	529	187	27	235	24	56	-----
<b>Contributions and subscriptions to international financial institutions<sup>3</sup></b>							
Obligations:							
1962–72 average.....	286	-----	179	-----	-----	-----	107
1973.....	801	-----	432	-----	-----	-----	369
<b>Other official development assistance, including Peace Corps<sup>4</sup></b>							
Obligations:							
1962–72 average.....	207	11	77	30	22	-----	68
1973.....	187	5	45	8	23	-----	105
<b>Other economic loans and grants to less developed countries</b>							
Obligations:							
1962–72 average.....	590	121	226	90	43	107	3
1973.....	1,780	238	508	471	290	269	4
Loan repayments and interest receipts							
1962–72 average.....	466	91	278	31	17	47	0
1973.....	650	171	284	72	40	80	2
<b>ECONOMIC LOANS AND GRANTS TO DEVELOPED COUNTRIES</b>							
Obligations:							
1962–72 average.....	355	-----	-----	119	-----	198	38
1973.....	1,539	-----	-----	115	-----	1,321	103

<sup>1</sup> Some data are preliminary.

<sup>2</sup> Official development assistance is defined as concessional aid for development purposes. Countries have been classified "less developed" on the basis of the standard list of less developed countries used by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. On this basis, "less developed" countries include all countries receiving U.S. loans or grants except the following which are considered "developed": Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Republic of South Africa, Canada, and all of Europe except Malta, Spain, and Yugoslavia.

<sup>3</sup> Includes paid-in capital subscriptions and contributions to the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and the Asian Development Bank.

<sup>4</sup> Data for certain programs from Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Source: Agency for International Development (except as noted).



TABLE C-92.—*International reserves, 1949, 1953, and 1968-73*

[Millions of dollars; end of period]

Area and country	1949	1953	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973 No- vember
<b>All countries</b> .....	46, 116	51, 826	77, 425	78, 255	92, 600	130, 560	158, 700	180, 835
<b>Developed areas</b> .....	37, 353	41, 478	63, 246	62, 636	74, 311	107, 210	126, 592	140, 110
United States.....	26, 024	23, 458	15, 710	16, 964	14, 487	13, 190	13, 150	14, 373
United Kingdom.....	1, 751	2, 670	2, 422	2, 527	2, 827	6, 582	5, 647	6, 646
Other Western Europe.....	6, 583	10, 597	36, 174	33, 610	44, 646	62, 036	75, 372	91, 693
Austria.....	92	277	1, 504	1, 530	1, 751	2, 343	2, 719	2, 878
Belgium.....	978	1, 144	2, 187	2, 388	2, 847	3, 473	3, 870	4, 977
France.....	580	829	4, 201	3, 833	4, 960	8, 253	10, 015	8, 550
Germany.....	196	1, 773	9, 948	7, 129	13, 610	18, 657	23, 785	34, 132
Italy.....	723	848	5, 341	5, 045	5, 352	6, 787	6, 079	6, 084
Netherlands.....	386	1, 230	2, 463	2, 529	3, 234	3, 796	4, 785	6, 208
Scandinavian countries (Den- mark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden).....	537	1, 026	2, 320	2, 214	2, 538	3, 701	4, 513	5, 808
Spain.....	122	150	1, 149	1, 281	1, 817	3, 268	5, 014	6, 695
Switzerland.....	1, 692	1, 768	4, 293	4, 425	5, 132	6, 966	7, 488	7, 220
Other.....	1, 277	1, 552	2, 768	3, 236	3, 405	4, 792	7, 104	9, 141
Canada.....	1, 197	1, 909	3, 046	3, 106	4, 679	5, 701	6, 050	5, 736
Japan.....	226	892	2, 906	3, 654	4, 840	15, 360	18, 365	13, 196
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.....	1, 572	1, 952	2, 989	2, 772	2, 831	4, 342	8, 009	8, 466
<b>Less developed areas</b> <sup>1</sup> .....	8, 763	10, 347	14, 180	15, 620	18, 285	23, 350	32, 110	40, 725
Latin America.....	2, 417	2, 869	3, 915	4, 470	5, 640	6, 585	10, 550	14, 220
Middle East.....	1, 534	1, 256	3, 320	3, 035	3, 120	5, 240	7, 625	10, 060
Other Asia.....	3, 642	3, 742	4, 285	4, 870	5, 225	5, 890	7, 810	10, 110
Other Africa <sup>2</sup> .....	639	1, 787	2, 495	3, 095	4, 175	5, 500	5, 985	6, 185

<sup>1</sup> Includes areas in addition to those listed.<sup>2</sup> All Africa except South Africa.

Note.—International reserves is comprised of monetary authorities' holdings of gold, Special Drawing Rights and Reserve Positions in the International Monetary Fund, and convertible foreign exchange. Beginning December 1971 gold is valued at 38 U.S. dollars per ounce and foreign exchange balances are expressed in dollars at the cross rates reflecting parities and central rates agreed on December 17, 1971 and subsequently. Data cover all countries except U.S.S.R., other Eastern European countries, Mainland China, and Cuba (after 1960).

Beginning 1959, when most of the major currencies of the world became convertible, data exclude known holdings of inconvertible currencies, balances under payments agreements, and the bilateral claims arising from liquidation of the European Payments Union.

Source: International Monetary Fund, "International Financial Statistics."

TABLE C-93.—U.S. reserve assets, 1946-73

[Millions of dollars]

End of year or month	Total reserve assets	Gold stock <sup>1</sup>		Special drawing rights <sup>3</sup>	Convertible foreign currencies <sup>4</sup>	Reserve position in International Monetary Fund <sup>5</sup>
		Total <sup>2</sup>	Treasury			
1946.....	20,706	20,706	20,529	—	—	—
1947.....	24,021	22,868	22,754	—	—	1,153
1948.....	25,758	24,399	24,244	—	—	1,359
1949.....	26,024	24,563	24,427	—	—	1,461
1950.....	24,265	22,820	22,706	—	—	1,445
1951.....	24,299	22,873	22,695	—	—	1,426
1952.....	24,714	23,252	23,187	—	—	1,462
1953.....	23,458	22,091	22,030	—	—	1,367
1954.....	22,978	21,793	21,713	—	—	1,185
1955.....	22,797	21,753	21,690	—	—	1,044
1956.....	23,666	22,058	21,949	—	—	1,608
1957.....	24,832	22,857	22,781	—	—	1,975
1958.....	22,540	20,582	20,534	—	—	1,958
1959.....	21,504	19,507	19,456	—	—	1,997
1960.....	19,359	17,804	17,767	—	—	1,555
1961.....	18,753	16,947	16,889	—	116	1,690
1962.....	17,220	16,057	15,978	—	99	1,064
1963.....	16,843	15,596	15,513	—	212	1,035
1964.....	16,672	15,471	15,388	—	432	769
1965.....	15,450	<sup>6</sup> 13,806	<sup>6</sup> 13,733	—	781	<sup>6</sup> 863
1966.....	14,882	13,235	13,159	—	1,321	326
1967.....	14,830	12,065	11,982	—	2,345	420
1968.....	15,710	10,892	10,367	—	3,528	1,290
1969.....	<sup>7</sup> 16,964	11,859	10,367	—	<sup>7</sup> 2,781	2,324
1970.....	14,487	11,072	10,732	851	629	1,935
1971.....	<sup>8</sup> 12,167	10,206	10,132	1,100	<sup>8</sup> 276	585
1972.....	<sup>9</sup> 13,151	<sup>9</sup> 10,487	<sup>9</sup> 10,410	<sup>9</sup> 1,958	241	<sup>9</sup> 465
1973.....	<sup>10</sup> 14,378	<sup>10</sup> 11,652	<sup>10</sup> 11,567	<sup>10</sup> 2,166	8	<sup>10</sup> 552
1972: Jan.....	12,879	10,132	10,132	1,810	276	587
Feb.....	12,330	9,662	9,588	1,810	276	582
Mar.....	12,270	9,662	9,588	1,810	212	586
Apr.....	12,285	9,662	9,588	1,803	429	391
May.....	<sup>9</sup> 13,345	<sup>9</sup> 10,490	<sup>9</sup> 10,410	<sup>9</sup> 1,958	469	<sup>9</sup> 428
June.....	13,339	10,490	10,410	1,958	457	434
July.....	13,090	10,490	10,410	1,958	203	439
Aug.....	13,124	10,488	10,410	1,958	234	444
Sept.....	13,217	10,487	10,410	1,958	323	449
Oct.....	13,313	10,487	10,410	1,958	414	454
Nov.....	13,307	10,487	10,410	1,958	403	459
Dec.....	13,151	10,487	10,410	1,958	241	465
1973: Jan.....	13,054	10,487	10,410	1,958	140	469
Feb.....	12,926	10,487	10,410	1,958	8	473
Mar.....	12,931	10,487	10,410	1,958	8	478
Apr.....	12,904	10,487	10,410	1,949	8	460
May.....	12,916	10,487	10,410	1,949	16	464
June.....	12,914	10,487	10,410	1,949	8	470
July.....	12,918	10,487	10,410	1,949	8	474
Aug.....	12,923	10,487	10,410	1,949	8	479
Sept.....	12,927	10,487	10,410	1,949	8	483
Oct.....	<sup>10</sup> 14,367	<sup>10</sup> 11,652	<sup>10</sup> 11,567	<sup>10</sup> 2,166	8	<sup>10</sup> 541
Nov.....	14,373	11,652	11,567	2,166	8	547
Dec.....	14,378	11,652	11,567	2,166	8	552

<sup>1</sup> Includes gold sold to the United States by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the right of repurchase and gold deposited by the IMF to mitigate the impact on the U.S. gold stock of purchases by foreign countries for gold subscriptions on increased IMF quotas.

<sup>2</sup> Includes gold in Exchange Stabilization Fund.

<sup>3</sup> Includes initial allocation on January 1, 1970 of \$867 million, second allocation on January 1, 1971 of \$717 million, and third allocation on January 1, 1972 of \$710 million of special drawing rights (SDR) in the Special Drawing Account in the IMF, plus or minus transactions in SDR.

<sup>4</sup> Includes holdings of Treasury and Federal Reserve System.

<sup>5</sup> The United States has the right to purchase foreign currencies equivalent to its reserve position in the Fund automatically if needed. Under appropriate conditions the United States could purchase additional amounts equal to the United States quota.

<sup>6</sup> Reserve position includes, and gold stock excludes, \$259 million gold subscription to the Fund in June 1965 for a U.S. quota increase which became effective on February 23, 1966. In figures published by the Fund from June 1965 through January 1966, this gold subscription was included in the U.S. gold stock and excluded from the reserve position.

<sup>7</sup> Includes gain of \$67 million resulting from revaluation of German mark in October 1969, of which \$13 million represents gain on mark holdings at time of revaluation.

<sup>8</sup> Includes \$28 million increase in dollar value of foreign currencies revalued to reflect market exchange rates as of December 31, 1971.

<sup>9</sup> Includes \$1,016 million increase in total reserve assets resulting from the change in par value of the U.S. dollar on May 8, 1972, consisting of \$828 million total gold stock, \$822 million Treasury gold stock, \$155 million SDR, and \$33 million reserve position in the IMF.

<sup>10</sup> Includes \$1,436 million increase in total reserve assets resulting from the change in par value of the dollar on October 18, 1973, consisting of \$1,165 million total gold stock, \$1,157 million Treasury gold stock, \$217 million SDR, and \$54 million reserve position in IMF.

Note.—Gold held under earmark at Federal Reserve Banks for foreign and international accounts is not included in the gold stock of the United States.

Sources: Department of the Treasury and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE C-94.—*International investment position of the United States at year-end, 1960 and 1968-72*

[Billions of dollars]

Type of investment	1960	1968 <sup>1</sup>	1969 <sup>1</sup>	1970	1971	1972 <sup>2</sup>
Net international investment position of the United States <sup>3</sup> .....	44.7	65.6	67.3	69.1	57.6	50.6
U.S. assets abroad .....	85.6	146.9	158.3	166.8	180.7	199.3
Nonliquid assets .....	66.2	128.6	138.6	149.9	164.6	180.9
U.S. Government .....	16.9	28.5	30.7	32.1	34.1	36.1
Long-term credits .....	14.0	25.9	28.2	29.6	31.7	34.2
Foreign currencies and other short-term assets .....	2.9	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.0
Private long-term .....	44.5	89.7	96.5	105.0	115.9	128.4
Direct investments abroad .....	31.9	65.0	71.0	78.2	86.2	94.0
Foreign securities .....	9.6	18.2	18.7	19.6	21.7	24.9
Other claims <sup>4</sup> .....	3.1	6.5	6.8	7.2	8.0	9.4
Private short-term nonliquid claims <sup>4</sup> .....	<sup>5</sup> 4.8	10.4	11.4	12.8	14.6	16.4
Liquid assets .....	19.4	18.3	19.6	16.9	16.1	18.4
Private claims <sup>4</sup> .....	( <sup>6</sup> )	2.6	2.7	2.4	4.0	5.2
U.S. monetary reserve assets .....	19.4	15.7	17.0	14.5	12.2	<sup>6</sup> 13.2
Gold .....	17.8	10.9	11.9	11.1	10.2	<sup>6</sup> 10.5
SDR .....				.9	1.1	<sup>6</sup> 2.0
Convertible currencies .....		3.5	2.8	.6	.3	.2
Gold tranche position in IMF .....	1.6	1.3	2.3	1.9	.6	<sup>6</sup> .5
U.S. liabilities to foreigners .....	40.9	81.3	90.9	97.7	123.1	148.7
Nonliquid liabilities to other than foreign official agencies .....	19.8	42.7	45.0	50.7	55.3	65.7
U.S. Government .....	.8	2.2	2.4	2.0	1.6	1.8
Private long-term .....	18.4	38.0	39.6	44.8	49.8	59.8
Direct investments in the United States .....	6.9	10.8	11.8	13.3	13.7	14.4
U.S. securities .....	10.0	23.8	22.9	25.6	30.1	38.6
Other liabilities <sup>4</sup> .....	1.6	3.4	4.8	5.9	6.1	6.9
Private short-term nonliquid <sup>7</sup> .....	.6	2.5	3.0	3.9	3.9	4.1
Liquid liabilities to private foreigners and liquid, other readily marketable, and nonliquid liabilities to foreign official agencies .....	21.0	38.6	45.9	47.0	67.8	82.9
To private foreigners .....	9.1	20.1	28.9	22.6	16.6	21.4
To foreign official agencies .....	11.9	18.5	17.0	24.4	51.2	61.5
Liquid .....	11.9	13.5	13.0	20.6	47.6	57.3
Other readily marketable .....		2.3	1.5	.7	.1	.5
Nonliquid, reported by U.S. Government .....		2.6	2.5	3.1	3.5	3.7

<sup>1</sup> Data do not reflect revisions made in balance-of-payments statistics in June 1973.

<sup>2</sup> Preliminary.

<sup>3</sup> Includes U.S. gold stock.

<sup>4</sup> Reported by U.S. banks and nonbanking concerns.

<sup>5</sup> Liquid claims are not available separately and are included with nonliquid claims.

<sup>6</sup> Total reserve assets include an increase of \$1.016 million resulting from a change in the par value of the U.S. dollar on May 8, 1972, consisting of \$828 million total gold stock, \$155 million SDR, and \$33 million gold tranche position in IMF.

<sup>7</sup> Reported by U.S. nonbanking concerns.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE C-95.—*Price changes in international trade, 1965-73*

[1963=100]

Area or commodity class	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
									Third quarter
	Unit value indexes by area								
Developed areas									
Total:									
Exports.....	103	105	105	104	108	114	119	130	164
Terms of trade <sup>1</sup> .....	100	100	101	101	101	102	101	102	102
United States:									
Exports.....	104	107	110	111	115	121	125	129	154
Terms of trade <sup>1</sup> .....	101	101	102	103	103	101	99	95	94
Developing areas									
Total:									
Exports.....	102	104	103	103	106	109	116	121	<sup>a</sup> 134
Terms of trade <sup>1</sup> .....	99	101	100	101	101	100	102	100	<sup>a</sup> 101
Latin America:									
Exports.....	106	108	105	106	109	115	122	129	<sup>a</sup> 138
Terms of trade <sup>1</sup> .....	103	103	100	99	100	101	101	102	<sup>a</sup> 105
Southern and Eastern Asia: <sup>3</sup>									
Exports.....	101	101	99	97	102	106	108	111	<sup>a</sup> 133
Terms of trade <sup>1</sup> .....	99	100	99	100	102	104	104	100	<sup>a</sup> 109
	World export price indexes								
Primary commodities: Total.....	103	104	101	100	104	108	115	130	192
Foodstuffs.....	103	105	104	100	104	111	117	132	203
Coffee, tea, and cocoa.....	111	112	118	110	119	136	119	132	187
Cereals.....	99	103	105	100	98	96	100	111	219
Other agricultural commodities <sup>4</sup> .....	103	104	96	96	101	101	105	120	193
Fats, oils, and oilseeds.....	114	111	102	99	101	118	118	116	234
Textile fibers.....	92	92	88	88	85	83	85	109	181
Wool.....	86	90	77	74	73	63	57	88	189
Rubber.....	97	91	75	74	98	78	64	65	<sup>b</sup> 121
Minerals.....	104	104	103	102	104	111	127	141	171
Metal ores.....	114	105	109	108	114	122	126	134	170
Manufactured goods: Total <sup>5</sup> .....	103	106	107	107	110	117	124	135	158
Nonferrous base metals <sup>6</sup> .....	135	156	142	150	168	180	154	154	226

<sup>1</sup> Terms of trade indexes are unit value indexes of exports divided by unit value indexes of imports.<sup>2</sup> Data are for second quarter 1973.<sup>3</sup> Excludes Japan.<sup>4</sup> Includes nonfood fish and forest products.<sup>5</sup> Data are for first 3 quarters of 1973.<sup>6</sup> Data for manufactured goods are unit value indexes.

Note.—Data exclude trade of Communist areas in Eastern Europe (except Yugoslavia) and Asia.

Sources: United Nations and Department of Commerce (International Economic Policy and Research and Bureau of Resources and Trade Assistance).

TABLE C-96.—*Consumer price indexes in the United States and other major industrial countries, 1955-73*

[1970=100]

Period	United States	Canada	Japan	France	Germany	Italy	Netherlands	United Kingdom
1955-----	69.0	69.9	52.6	50.4	70.1	62.2	57.8	59.0
1956-----	70.0	70.9	52.8	51.4	71.9	64.3	58.9	61.9
1957-----	72.5	73.2	54.4	53.2	73.3	65.2	62.7	64.2
1958-----	74.5	75.0	54.2	61.2	75.0	67.0	63.8	66.2
1959-----	75.1	75.9	54.7	65.0	75.7	66.7	64.3	66.5
1960-----	76.3	76.7	56.7	67.3	76.7	68.2	66.4	67.2
1961-----	77.0	77.1	59.7	69.5	78.5	69.7	67.0	69.5
1962-----	77.9	78.0	63.8	72.9	80.9	72.9	68.3	72.5
1963-----	78.8	79.4	69.2	76.4	83.3	78.3	70.9	73.9
1964-----	79.9	80.8	71.9	79.0	85.2	83.0	74.8	76.3
1965-----	81.3	82.8	76.7	81.0	88.1	86.7	78.7	80.0
1966-----	83.6	85.9	80.6	83.2	91.2	88.8	83.3	83.1
1967-----	86.0	88.9	83.8	85.4	92.5	91.6	86.0	85.2
1968-----	89.6	92.6	88.3	89.3	93.9	92.8	89.1	89.2
1969-----	94.4	96.8	92.9	95.0	96.4	95.2	95.8	94.0
1970-----	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1971-----	104.3	102.9	106.1	105.5	105.2	104.8	107.6	109.4
1972-----	107.7	107.8	110.9	111.7	111.2	110.8	116.0	117.2
1973 <sup>1</sup> -----	114.4	115.1	122.1	118.9	118.5	121.6	124.9	126.8
1971: I-----	102.8	100.9	103.9	103.0	103.3	103.1	104.4	105.5
II-----	103.9	102.3	105.7	104.6	104.8	104.2	107.1	109.3
III-----	104.9	103.8	106.7	106.0	105.7	105.2	108.3	110.8
IV-----	105.5	104.5	108.1	107.5	106.9	106.7	110.4	112.2
1972: I-----	106.4	105.7	108.4	108.9	109.0	108.0	112.7	113.9
II-----	107.2	106.7	110.6	110.4	110.2	109.5	115.5	116.1
III-----	108.2	108.8	111.5	112.5	111.8	111.4	116.3	118.0
IV-----	109.1	109.9	113.0	114.9	113.8	114.4	119.3	120.8
1973: I-----	110.7	111.9	116.1	115.9	116.3	117.5	121.3	122.9
II-----	113.1	114.5	122.2	118.2	118.7	121.6	124.9	126.9
III-----	115.6	117.7	125.8	121.1	119.6	124.4	125.9	128.8
IV <sup>2</sup> -----	118.3	119.0	129.1	123.4	120.7	126.1	128.5	132.2

<sup>1</sup> For United States, 12-month average; for Netherlands January-November average; and for all other countries, January-October average.

<sup>2</sup> October-December average for United States; October-November average for Netherlands; and October data for all other countries.

Sources: Department of Labor and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.





