Special Message

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 15th of December last, requesting the President of the United States "to communicate a plan for a peace establishment of the Navy of the United States," I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of the Navy, which contains the plan required.

In presenting this plan to the consideration of Congress, I avail myself of the occasion to make some remarks on it which the importance of the subject requires and experience justifies.

If a system of universal and permanent peace could be established, or if in war the belligerent parties would respect the rights of neutral powers, we should have no occasion for a navy or an army. The expense and dangers of such establishments might be avoided. The history of all ages proves that this can not be presumed; on the contrary, that at least one-half of every century, in ancient as well as modern times, has been consumed in wars, and often of the most general and desolating character. Nor is there any cause to infer, if we examine the condition of the nations with which we have the most intercourse and strongest political relations, that we shall in future be exempt from that calamity within any period to which a rational calculation may be extended. And as to the rights of neutral powers, it is sufficient to appeal to our own experience to demonstrate how little regard will be paid to them whenever they come in conflict with the interests of the powers at war while we rely on the justice of our cause and on argument alone. The amount of the property of our fellow-citizens which was seized and confiscated or destroyed by the belligerent parties in the wars of the French Revolution, and of those which followed before we became a party to the war, is almost incalculable.

The whole movement of our Government from the establishment of our independence has been guided by a sacred regard for peace. Situated as we are in the new hemisphere, distant from Europe and unconnected with its affairs, blessed with the happiest Government on earth, and having no objects of ambition to gratify, the United States have steadily cultivated the relations of amity with every power; and if in any European wars a respect for our rights might be relied on, it was undoubtedly in those to which I have adverted. The conflict being vital, the force being nearly equally balanced, and the result uncertain, each party had the strongest motives of interest to cultivate our good will, lest we might be thrown into the opposite scale. Powerful as this consideration usually is, it was nevertheless utterly disregarded in almost every stage of and by every party to those wars. To these encroachments and injuries our regard for peace was finally forced to yield.

In the war to which at length we became a party our whole coast from St. Croix to the Mississippi was either invaded or menaced with invasion, and in many parts with a strong imposing force both land and naval. In those parts where the population was most dense the pressure was comparatively light, but there was scarcely an harbor or city on any of our great inlets which could be considered secure. New York and Philadelphia were eminently exposed, the then existing works not being sufficient for their protection. The same remark is applicable in a certain extent to the cities eastward of the former, and as to the condition of the whole country southward of the latter the events which mark the war are too recent to require detail. Our armies and Navy signalized themselves in every quarter where they had occasion to meet their gallant foe, and the militia voluntarily flew to their aid with a patriotism and fought with a bravery which exalted the reputation of their Government and country and which did them the highest honor. In whatever direction the enemy chose to move with their squadrons and to land their troops our fortifications, where any existed, presented but little obstacle to them. They passed those works without difficulty. Their squadrons, in fact, annoyed our whole coast, not of the sea only, but every bay and great river throughout its whole extent. In entering those inlets and sailing up them with a small force the effect was disastrous, since it never failed to draw out the whole population on each side and to keep it in the field while the squadron remained there. The expense attending this species of defense, with the exposure of the inhabitants and the waste of property, may readily be conceived.

The occurrences which preceded the war and those which attended it were alike replete with useful instruction as to our future policy. Those which marked the first epoch demonstrate clearly that in the wars of other powers we can rely only on force for the protection of our neutral rights. Those of the second demonstrate with equal certainty that in any war in which we may be engaged hereafter with a strong naval power the expense, waste, and other calamities attending it, considering the vast extent of our maritime frontier, can not fail, unless it be defended by adequate fortifications and a suitable naval force, to correspond with those which were experienced in the late war. Two great objects are therefore to be regarded in the establishment of an adequate naval force: The first, to prevent war so far as it may be practicable; the second, to diminish its calamities when it may be inevitable. Hence the subject of defense becomes intimately connected in all its parts in war and in peace, for the land and at sea. No government will be disposed in its wars with other powers to violate our rights if it knows we have the means, are prepared and resolved to defend them. The motive will also be diminished if it knows that our defenses by land are so well planned and executed that an invasion of our coast can not be productive of the evils to which we have heretofore been exposed.

It was under a thorough conviction of these truths, derived from the admonitions of the late war, that Congress, as early as the year 1816, during the term of my enlightened and virtuous predecessor, under whom the war had been declared, prosecuted, and terminated, digested and made provision for the defense of our country and support of its rights, in peace as well as in war, by acts which authorized and enjoined the augmentation of our Navy to a prescribed limit, and the construction of suitable fortifications throughout the whole extent of our maritime frontier and wherever else they might be deemed necessary. It is to the execution of these works, both land and naval, and under a thorough conviction that by hastening their completion I should render the best service to my country and give the most effectual support to our free republican system of government that my humble faculties would admit of, that I have devoted so much of my time and labor to this great system of national policy since I came into this office, and shall continue to do it until my retirement from it at the end of your next session.

The Navy is the arm from which our Government will always derive most aid in support of our neutral rights. Every power engaged in war will know the strength of our naval force, the number of our ships of each class, their condition, and the promptitude with which we may bring them into service, and will pay due consideration to that argument. Justice will always have great weight in the cabinets of Europe; but in long and destructive wars exigencies often occur which press so vitally on them that unless the argument of force is brought to its aid it will be disregarded. Our land forces will always perform their duty in the event of war, but they must perform it on the land. Our Navy is the arm which must be principally relied on for the annoyance of the commerce of the enemy and for the protection of our own, and also, by cooperation with the land forces, for the defense of the country. Capable of moving in any and every direction, it possesses the faculty, even when remote from our coast, of extending its aid to every interest on which the security and welfare of our Union depend. Annoying the commerce of the enemy and menacing in turn its coast, provided the force on each side is nearly equally balanced, it will draw its squadrons from our own; and in case of invasion by a powerful adversary by a land and naval force, which is always to be anticipated and ought to be provided against, our Navy may, by like cooperation with our land forces, render essential aid in protecting our interior from incursion and depredation.

The great object in the event of war is to stop the enemy at the coast. If this is done our cities and whole interior will be secure. For the accomplishment of this object our fortifications must be principally relied on. By placing strong works near the mouths of our great inlets in such positions as to command the entrances into them, as may be done in many instances, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for ships to pass them, especially if other precautions, and particularly that of steam batteries, are resorted to in their aid. In the wars between other powers into which we may be drawn in support of our neutral rights it can not be doubted that this defense would be adequate to the purpose intended by it, nor can it be doubted that the knowledge that such works existed would form a strong motive with any power not to invade our rights, and thereby contribute essentially to prevent war. There are, it is admitted, some entrances into our interior which are of such vast extent that it would be utterly impossible for any works, however extensive or well posted, to command them. Of this class the Chesapeake Bay, which is an arm of the sea, may be given as an example. But, in my judgment, even this bay may be defended against any power with whom we may be involved in war as a third party in the defense of our neutral rights. By erecting strong works at the mouth of James River, on both sides, near the capes, as we are now doing, and at Old Point Comfort and the Rip Raps, and connecting those works together by chains whenever the enemy's force appeared, placing in the rear some large ships and steam batteries, the passage up the river would be rendered impracticable. This guard would also tend to protect the whole country bordering on the bay and rivers emptying into it, as the hazard would be too great for the enemy, however strong his naval force, to ascend the bay and leave such a naval force behind; since, in the event of a storm, whereby his vessels might be separated, or of a calm, the ships and steam batteries behind the works might rush forth and destroy them. It could only be in the event of an invasion by a great power or a combination of several powers, and by land as well as by naval forces, that those works could be carried; and even then they could not fail to retard the movement of the enemy into the country and to give time for the collection of our regular troops, militia, and volunteers to that point, and thereby contribute essentially to his ultimate defeat and expulsion from our territory.

Under a strong impression that a peace establishment of our Navy is connected with the possible event of war, and that the naval force intended for either state, however small it may be, is connected with the general system of public defense, I have thought it proper in communicating this report to submit these remarks on the whole subject.

JAMES MONROE.