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North Atlantic Alliance Summit Text of Remarks on NATO Defense Policy.

May 31, 1978

Thank you, Mr. Secretary General.

These briefings illustrate the magnitude of the challenges we face. They do not justify alarm, but they should strengthen our resolve.

When I took office 16 months ago, I reviewed the condition of U.S. defenses. I found them strong, although needing improvement. In particular, I concluded that the United States should give top priority to Europe, especially the conventional defenses needed in the initial stages of a conflict.

I reached this conclusion for two reasons. First, the Warsaw Pact countries, especially the Soviet Union, have steadily expanded and modernized their conventional forces beyond any legitimate requirement for defense. They are now able to attack with large armored forces more rapidly than we previously believed. Second, although U.S. nuclear forces remain strong and are fundamental to deterrence, the long-recognized role of conventional forces in deterrence of war is increasingly important.

As a result, I directed the Secretary of Defense to strengthen initial conventional defense capacity in Europe. Of course, such efforts would amount to little unless accompanied by improvements in the conventional capacity of our NATO Allies. European NATO countries, not the United States, provide the bulk of our military forces in Europe. Also, the competing demands of our free societies limit the portion of our resources we can use for defense. Therefore, we must coordinate our defense planning to make the best use of these limited resources.

From our discussions in London last year, I know that you share my view of the challenges we face. The answers we have developed together are impressive. We are all making significant, real increases in our defense budgets. We are strengthening our national forces—and we will do more. Finally, we have designed a bold Long-Term Defense Program to pull together a more effective collective defense during the years ahead.

As we improve our conventional defenses, we must remember that the strength of our strategic and theater nuclear forces is also necessary for deterrence and defense. These forces are—and will be—fully adequate. Arms control can make deterrence more stable and perhaps less burdensome—but it will not, in the foreseeable future, eliminate the need for nuclear forces.

For years, the Alliance has relied principally on American strategic forces for deterring nuclear attack on Europe. This coupling of American strategic forces to Europe is critical, for it means that an attack on Europe would have the full consequences of an attack on the United States. Let there be no misunderstanding. The United States is prepared to use all the forces necessary for the defense of the NATO area.

As an alliance, we must continue to review our nuclear deterrence needs in light of developments in Soviet nuclear and conventional forces. As one result of the Long-Term Defense Program, the Nuclear Planning Group is examining in detail the modernizing of our theater nuclear forces, including the question of long-range nuclear systems. We need also to consider jointly the relation of longrange theater nuclear systems to arms control.

This will require considering the full scope of political and military issues, and being sure that we maintain the coupling of American strategic forces to the defense of Europe. As we examine this together, I assure you that the United States will protect the options before us as the SALT II negotiations move toward completion.

Let me now turn to conventional forces—the bulk of the Long-Term Defense Program. After all, our largest expenditures are for conventional, not nuclear, forces.

We must prepare to fight more effectively together as an alliance. We must markedly improve our ability to work together on the battlefield. We should overcome unnecessary duplication in our national programs, thus buying more security for the same money.

That is what the Long-Term Defense Program is all about. It is an unprecedented attempt by NATO to look across a longer span of years than ever before. It seeks a more cooperative course, as the only sensible way to improve our defenses without unnecessary increases in defense spending. It lays out specific measures of Alliance cooperation. It is the blueprint we need, and we must carry it out vigorously.

Of course, each of us depends on legislative approval for particular programs and projects within the Long-Term Defense Program. Because we lead democracies, we cannot bind our people by fiat. We can, however, pledge to do what is necessary to secure this approval and make this program work.

The United States is already responding to many Long-Term Defense Program recommendations, particularly in the field of reinforcement. And the recommendations will receive the highest priority in our own national defense programing. In short, we will do our part in adapting or modifying U.S. programs to support the NATO Long-Term Defense Program. I am confident that you will take similar action.

Finally, I want to mention the one remaining unresolved aspect of the Long-Term Defense Program. Although the program calls for new and unprecedented Alliance cooperation, no procedures have yet been devised for ensuring that it is carried out. We must avoid bold programs heartily endorsed—then largely ignored. The report before us directs the Secretary General to present for national review what changes are essential for vigorous follow-through.

Both the NATO Task Forces and we Americans have made several specific proposals to this end. For example, we favor explicitly recognizing NATO's new focus on logistics. One way is to create a new Assistant Secretary General for Logistics. We also favor clear assignment of responsibility for each program to one NATO body. Where appropriate, we would prefer a major NATO command. But I do not ask that you discuss our proposals today. Instead, I ask that all Alliance leaders here today to join me in calling for vigorous follow-through of the program.

In conclusion, let me state that we confront a unique opportunity to bring our national defense programs closer together. The result will be a more effective defense. The consequences will be greater security for our people. It is our responsibility not to let this opportunity pass.

Note: The President spoke at the morning session, which began at approximately 9:30 a.m. in the Loy Henderson Conference Room at the State Department.

Later in the day, the President attended a luncheon with the heads of delegation and the final session of the summit meeting, both held at the State Department.

Jimmy Carter, North Atlantic Alliance Summit Text of Remarks on NATO Defense Policy. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/245177

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