Panel Interview at the Annual Convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

THE PRESIDENT. [I.] President Noyes, President-elect McKnight,¹ all of the distinguished guests at the head table, and all of the distinguished delegates and members of the ASNE:

¹Newbold Noyes, Jr., editor of the Washington Star, was president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, and C. A. (Pete) McKnight, editor of the Charlotte, N.C., Observer, was vice president and president-elect of the Society.

It is a very great privilege for me to appear again before this organization, as the president indicated a few moments ago, for the first time in my new capacity. I also wish to congratulate President Newby Noyes on his service as president of this organization.

I understand you have a one-term tradition. I am not sure that is a good idea-- [laughter]--but, nevertheless, I congratulate Mr. McKnight on his election as your new president. I understand that after we finish with this distinguished panel you will have the opportunity to have him sworn in, and then he will make his inaugural speech, to which we will all listen.

Tonight, the panel has already been introduced, and we will go directly to the questions because I know there will be many. I understand that Mr. Dickinson, on my right--I always turn right first-[laughter]--Mr. Dickinson will have the first question.

QUESTIONS

THE PRESIDENT'S WORRIES

[2.] Mr. Dickinson.

WILLIAM B. DICKINSON (executive editor, Philadelphia Bulletin). Mr. President, I suppose that like most of us, you must have times when you wake up at 3 a.m. or 4 a.m. and you lie there in the predawn darkness and you think or even worry a little bit. I wonder, sir, if you would tell us what thoughts or worries at this stage of your Presidency come to mind at a time like that?

[Inaudible]

THE PRESIDENT. We have six members of the panel, too.

Well, Mr. Dickinson, it is quite true that just like every other person who has problems, the President of the United States does wake up in the middle of the night, and he worries about sometimes personal problems but usually about problems of the Nation, with which he has tried to wrestle during the day.

I think more often than not the problems I worry about at night are those involving foreign policy. That seems to be necessary at this time in the Presidency-not that the great domestic problems, the problems of the economy, the problems of race relations, the problems of the younger generation, et cetera, do not often also cause great concern in the middle of the night as well as in the daytime.

But at night, if there is any one subject that more often than not comes across my mind, it is what can I do the next day that will contribute toward the goal of a lasting peace for America and for the world.

That is almost a trite statement. Every President wants that. Every President has worked for it. But we have seen so much in this century--wars ended and then another war coming, wars ended with great hopes of lasting peace and then the foundations laid for another war.

I believe now we are ending American involvement in a war we are in, a very difficult war. But we are going to end it in a way that will contribute to a lasting peace. And then beyond that I believe that we are entering a new era of relations with other super powers in the world, a new era, for example, in our relations with the Soviet Union and a new era in potential relationships with the People's Republic of China. I don't mean that at 3 a.m. in the morning I make decisions as to what we are going to do about China policy or Soviet policy or the Mideast or Berlin or the rest, but I do know that sometimes the mind is clearer then; the thoughts come through much sharper than they do in the morning.

I have a little habit--I will let you all in on my secrets. You can use it for the p.m.'s, if you don't mind. But I write it down. And sometimes in the morning it doesn't look so good, but sometimes the ideas are pretty good. I haven't answered your question as well as I might, except to indicate that I am sure that President Johnson when he was there, President Kennedy when he was in that room, President Eisenhower when he was there, whenever they woke up in the middle of the night, their primary concern must have been peace for America and for the world. It is something we haven't had for a full generation in this century. It is something I think we can have now, and that is what we are working for and that is what we are going to get.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

[3.] EMMETT DEDMON (vice president and editorial director, Chicago Sun-Times and Chicago Daily News). Mr. President, you mentioned ending our involvement in the war in Vietnam, and vet the Secretary of Defense said the other day that our Air Force and naval power would remain in South Vietnam.

How do you reconcile those two statements or is there a conflict there in your opinion?

THE PRESIDENT. No, Mr. Dedmon, there really isn't a conflict between the two statements. I said that we would end our involvement in Vietnam. You will recall my speech last Wednesday. I said that our goal is a total American withdrawal from Vietnam.

On October 7 of last year, you may recall, I said that we not only propose a total American withdrawal but a cease-fire all over Southeast Asia, which would, of course, mean no air power, no American forces there, no use of power in any way.

As far as Mr. Laird's statement was concerned, what he was referring to was that pending the time that we can have a total withdrawal consistent with the principles that I laid down in my speech last week, it will be necessary for the United States to retain air power and to retain some residual forces.

Our goal, however, is a total withdrawal. We do not have as a goal a permanent residual force such as we have in Korea at the present time.

But it will be necessary for us to maintain forces in South Vietnam until two important objectives are achieved: one, the release of the prisoners of war held by North Vietnam in North Vietnam and other parts of Southeast Asia; and two, the ability of the South Vietnamese to develop the capacity to defend themselves against a Communist takeover--not the sure capacity, but at least the chance.

Once those two objectives are achieved, then the total American withdrawal can be undertaken and will be undertaken.

We can achieve them earlier, provided the enemy will negotiate. As you noticed, on October 7 I indicated we will have a total withdrawal in 12 months if they would be willing to mutually withdraw their forces.

And so, in sum, the goal of American policy in Vietnam is a total withdrawal with no residual force. But, as long as the prisoner issue remains unsettled, and as long as they hold prisoners, and as long as the South Vietnamese have not yet developed the capacity to defend themselves to take over from us the defense of their own country--a capacity that they rapidly are developing--we will have forces there.

TROOP WITHDRAWAL GOALS

[4.] MR. DEDMON. Mr. President, may I follow up with one more question?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I understand-all follow up if you want to.

MR. DEDMON. I realize that you do not wish to state a date at this time at which we will withdraw, and that there was some confusion in the press about what Senator Scott said following a meeting at the White House. Could I ask this question: Is Senator Scott's use of the date January 1, 1973, in your opinion, a practicable goal?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Dedmon, that is a very clever way to get me to answer a question that I won't answer. [Laughter] I would expect that from an editor as well as from a reporter.

The date, let me say, cannot and must not be related to an election in the United States. Let's begin with that. I don't want one American to be in Vietnam one day longer than is necessary to achieve the two goals that I have mentioned: the release of our prisoners and the capacity of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves against a Communist takeover.

Now, as far as that date is concerned, it will depend upon the circumstances. I have announced a troop withdrawal which takes us through November [December] 1. In the middle of October [November], I will make another troop withdrawal announcement.

I will then analyze the training of the South Vietnamese forces and particularly their air force at that time. I will then analyze enemy activity and, also, any progress in negotiation, particularly in negotiation with regard to prisoners.

At that time, I will be able to make a further announcement with regard to what our withdrawal will be. But for me to speculate about a date would not help us; it would only serve the enemy, and I am not going to do that even though it might be politically popular to set a date.

I have to do what is right for the United States, right for our prisoners, and right for our goal of a South Vietnam with a chance to avoid a Communist takeover, which will contribute to a lasting peace in the Pacific and the world.

THE GALLEY CASE

[5.] EUGENE V. RISHER (White House correspondent, United Press International). Mr. President, I would like to ask you about the Galley case.² Captain [Aubrey M.] Daniel, the prosecutor in the case, has said that by publicly interjecting yourself in it, you have undermined the military system of justice and done a disservice to some of the people that are fighting in Vietnam honorably. Can you respond to this?

²On March 19, 1971, a court-martial jury convicted 1st Lt. William L. Calley, Jr., of premeditated murder of not less than 22 Vietnamese noncombatant civilians and of assault with intent to murder of one Vietnamese noncombatant civilian in the village of Sonmy at Mylai on March 16, 1968.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Captain Daniel is a fine officer. And, incidentally, the six members of that court had very distinguished military records. Five of the six, as you know, Mr. Risher, had served with distinction in Vietnam. I respect the prosecutor. I respect also the judicial process under which they acted, and I respect those that served on the court.

I acted as I did because one of my capacities is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. There was enormous interest in this case. There was concern expressed throughout the Nation with regard to that decision, going far beyond the innocence or guilt of Captain [Lieutenant] Calley with regard to the specific charges.

I felt that under the circumstances, I should take two steps that I think are completely consistent with upholding the judicial process of the Armed Forces.

One, it seemed to me that if in civilian cases where an individual is charged with a crime, he can get out on bail, it seemed to me that the least that could be done would be to say that Captain [Lieutenant] Calley, pending the time that an appeal made his sentence final, should not be sent to Leavenworth Prison, but should be confined to his quarters.

I think that was the right decision to make about that man at that time.

The second point had to do with my decision that I announced, as you recall, you and Mr. Cormier, in California on Saturday morning, when I said that I, as President and as Commander in Chief, would exercise the authority which I had in such cases to review the case, that I would not pass the buck to a commission, I would not pass it to the Secretary of the Army, but in this case, because of the great public interest in the case and because it went beyond simply the innocence or guilt of this one man, that I would review the case personally before final sentence was passed.

Now, as far as Captain Daniel's charge is concerned, I can only say that the action of the President, I think, was proper in terms of releasing him from going to Leavenworth and confining him to quarters on the base, and, second, I think it was proper to indicate that at some point in the judicial process, without impinging upon or impugning that process, that I would review the case.

That is what I intend to do. I think it is consistent with the judicial process.

Yes, do you want to follow up? Go ahead.

[6.] FRANK CORMIER (White House correspondent, Associated Press). A follow-up on that.

When John Ehrlichman told us of your decision to make the final review, he said, "Certainly, the widespread public interest in the case is a factor. It is not a determining factor." And he was rather vague as to what the determining factor was, apart from the flood of telegrams and so forth.³

³The transcript of a news briefing by John D. Ehrichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, on the President's decision to review the Calley case was released by the White House on April 3, 1971.

Could you enlighten us on that?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Cormier, the widespread public interest was a factor in the sense that when people all over the Nation, their Congressmen and their Senators, are stirred up about a particular issue, a President, the President, has a responsibility to do what he can within the law to try to quiet those fears, to try to bring some perspective into the whole matter.

I think a pretty good indication that the action that I took was effective in that respect is that since that action we have seen the fears with regard to the Calley case subside because they know that he is going to get a fair review and a final review by the President of the United States.

Now, as far as the other factors, however, are concerned, it goes to this: As I have already implied in my answer to Mr. Risher, in addition to the innocence or guilt of Captain [Lieutenant] Calley with regard to the specific charges involved, there is the problem of trials for war crimes generally, and there is, of course, debate with regard to what should happen in those trials.

There are many other cases--not many--several other cases like his. Some have already been decided, some are still to be decided. It seemed to me under the circumstances that a Presidential statement at the highest level should be made once this case is completed, should be made setting the whole thing into perspective and without infringing upon his rights, a decision that would let the American people know, and the world know, why such a prosecution did take place and why it was upheld, or why it is not upheld.

I, of course, will not prejudge it at this time before it goes through the judicial process. I think it should be done and that is why I am doing it.

MR. CORMIER. On the other hand, Mr. President, the whole military system of justice was overhauled a very few years ago to try to eliminate, or at least minimize, command influence.

This, I think, is Captain Daniel's main argument, that just by the fact that you, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief, interjected yourself into it months before otherwise necessary, it is going to have a filter-down effect all the way.

THE PRESIDENT. The military system of justice, Mr. Cormier--and I checked this, before I acted, with the Secretary of Defense-provides implicitly that the President of the United States at any time has the right to review, at any time has the right to intercede, if he believes that the national interest or the interests of the accused require it.

I felt that under these circumstances, the national interest required it, and that is why I acted.

U.S. GOALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

[7.] Mr. Meyer of the Miami News. SYLVAN MEYER (editor, Miami News). I would like to return, sir, to the matter of Southeast Asia.

The withdrawal of our troops from Vietnam it now appears a relatively short-run matter at whatever date it Occurs.

Does this mean that we will be abandoning or materially changing our long-range strategic goals, the concepts in that part of the world, and do we regard our interests in that part of the world as having changed substantially because of this war?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Meyer, it does not mean that our interests have changed. It does mean that our method of contributing to the achievement of those interests has changed.

That is where what has been called the Nixon Doctrine comes in.

Again, Mr. Cormier and Mr. Risher will remember that when I was at Guam, I explained the Nixon Doctrine in brief.

It provides that where we have a situation, as we have in South Vietnam, of a country that is threatened by an aggressive force from the outside, that the United States will try to help that country develop the capacity to defend itself, but that we will not do, if we can possibly avoid it, what we did in Korea and then what we again did in Vietnam--go in, in effect, and do the fighting for them---if we can avoid it.

Under our Vietnamization policy, we are getting out. That is one-half of it. But the other very important half of it is that the South Vietnamese are developing and, by the time we get out, will have developed the capacity to defend themselves.

And, so, how that fits into our policy to Southeast Asia, it seems to me, is quite clear. Once we leave South Vietnam, South Vietnam will be strong enough, at least for the foreseeable future, to defend itself.

That will mean that in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, with which country, of course, we have a treaty, the Philippines, with which we have a treaty, will also have a greater assurance of stability.

And I think the repercussions will go clear up to Japan, because as we look at the rimland of Asia, we must remember that in all of the debate at the present time and the great interest, understandably, in what has happened with regard to Mainland China this last week, that on the rimland of Asia live 300 million people. They produce three times as much as Mainland China and whether those people are going to remain free nations, independent nations, depends upon whether they think they have the capability and whether they can develop the capability of self-defense.

The policy of the United States--and this is a very significant change--is to help other nations, to help the Thais, to help the Indonesians, to help the Vietnamese, to help the Japanese, the others, develop the capability of defending themselves, except, of course, where a nuclear attack would be involved and then the United States assumes the responsibility.

U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR

[8.] Mr. Chandler.

OTIS CHANDLER (publisher, Los Angeles Times). Mr. President, what reason do you have to believe that--I realize that you hope to negotiate for the release of the prisoners of war but, assuming that might not be successful what reason do you have to believe that the North Vietnamese might not keep our prisoners of war there for some time to come as hostages and to try to force the United States into withdrawing or ceasing all aid after our troops have left Vietnam, ceasing all military and economic aid to South Vietnam?

In other words, using them as hostages way into the future.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Chandler, as you know, we have had some pretty bitter experiences with some Communist nations with regard to American prisoners. We have had a very difficult experience with the North Vietnamese who have, without question, been the most barbaric in their handling of prisoners of any nation in modern history. Under the circumstances, however, let's put ourselves in the position of North Vietnam. What is in it for them? What is in it for them is to get the United States residual force, including our air power, out of that part of the world.

Now, that is a lot for them. That, it seems to me, will be a great incentive when the time comes that they have to make the decision as to whether they are going to retain prisoners or whether they are going to have to continue as they will have to continue to be exposed to an American presence in South Vietnam and to American airstrikes which, of course, we will continue in the event that they play that kind of a game with the prisoners.

We have some cards to play, too, and we are going to play them right to the hilt where the prisoners are concerned.

MR. CHANDLER. Does this mean that if you are unsuccessful in negotiating at Paris on the POW question, that we will have to leave troops in there until you are successful?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Chandler, it means that, first, we haven't given up on the Paris talks. I would suggest that the moment of truth is arriving with regard to the Paris talks because time will soon run out. As the number of our forces goes down, our stroke at the negotiating table recedes and the South Vietnamese's greatly increases.

So, if they want to negotiate with the United States, the time for negotiation, except for the prisoner issue, of course, is rapidly drawing to a close. But I would say that as far as our presence in South Vietnam is concerned--I am speaking of an American force, of a residual force, and of an air presence--that as long as they do retain prisoners, no American President could simply remove our forces and remove the threat to them.

We have the responsibility, as long as there is one American being held prisoner by North Vietnam, to have some incentive on our side to get that man released, and that is why we are going to retain that force until we get it, and I think it will work in the end.

U.S. AIR BASES IN THAILAND

[9.] Mr. Risher.

MR. RISHER. Mr. President, I would like to follow up on this. Does this mean that if Hanoi agreed to release the American prisoners, that we would close down the five air bases that we have in Thailand? Would this be part of the withdrawal?

THE PRESIDENT. No. Mr. Risher, the air bases that we have in the area around Vietnam, of course, are there for reasons other than Vietnam. Vietnam is part of the reason. As you know, we have a treaty with Thailand, and those air forces are maintained there, in part, in order to sustain that treaty.

What it does mean, though, is that in terms of the use of air power, the use of air power against North Vietnam and its forces, that if at an appropriate time two things have been accomplished---one, the return of our prisoners, and the capability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves--once those two things are achieved, then the use of that air power as against North Vietnam would no longer be contemplated and, therefore, our air power in that respect could be reduced.

I should also point out, incidentally, that we have had a great deal of attention, naturally, paid to the fact that we have withdrawn now almost half of the Americans that were there when we came into office, and that we will be down to 184,000 by November [December] 1 of this year.

Our airstrikes, as you know from having covered this closely from the White House, have also been reduced; our attack air sorties since we came into office have been reduced by 45 percent. They will continue to go down.

But, on the other hand, we must retain that air power, as well as residual forces, as long as we have the prisoner problem and as long as there is still a time needed for the South Vietnamese to develop the capability of self-defense.

IMPACT OF INDOCHINA POLICY ON

ASIAN LIVES

[10.] MR. DICKINSON. Just one more question on Indochina. Most of your comments on our Indochina policy have emphasized that it is saving American lives.

What I want to ask is, what about the lives of Asians and the many, many refugees created by the incursions into Laos and Cambodia?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Dickinson, let's look at the Asian lives. I think of the 50,000 South Vietnamese civilians who have been murdered by North Vietnamese and VC since this war began. I think of a half million, by conservative estimates, in North Vietnam who were murdered or otherwise exterminated by the North Vietnamese after they took over from the South.

I visited South Vietnam just after the North Vietnamese took over in North Vietnam. As a matter of fact, I am one of the few people, at least in public life, who has been to Hanoi. I was there in 1953 and then came back in 1956. I visited a refugee camp. A million refugees came from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. And they came there because of the terrible atrocities that were visited upon them by the Government of North Vietnam.

Now, let's talk for a moment to put that in balance. We say, what about the people in Laos? As far as the activities in Laos are concerned, the bombing activities in Laos are concerned, if you will look at that particular area that is totally occupied by the North Vietnamese at this time, the number of civilians could be very, very small. As far as civilian casualties in South Vietnam are concerned from airstrikes, they are very, very small, because the war has moved out of South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese now have taken it over. And as far as our activities are concerned, on balance I would say that the United States, by its actions in South Vietnam-and I say I understand the controversy, the difficulty, the moral concern that many Americans have about all wars, and particularly this kind of a war, so difficult to understand--but on balance, I will say this: that if the United States were to fail in Vietnam, if the Communists were to take over, the bloodbath that would follow would be a blot on this Nation's history from which we would find it very difficult to return.

Now, it is not necessary--we are now in a position where we can and, I can confidently say, we are ending American involvement; we are going to end it in a way that will, we believe, give South Vietnam a chance--not guarantee it--to defend itself against a Communist takeover. And I believe that this will save many more thousands of Asian lives than it is contended were lost because of American activities.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

[11.] MR. DEDMON. Mr. President, when you last appeared before this convention prior to becoming President, you mentioned that laying the groundwork for future relations with the People's Republic of China would be one of the primary goals of your Administration.

In light of recent events, as well as the trade review which you have ordered, it looks like this is one area where you are considerably ahead of schedule.

Do you think that we can anticipate an establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in your first Administration rather than your second?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Dedmon, since you have been so kind to me, I will be kind to you.

Let the record show--and some of you will remember that time I was here in 1968--that Mr. Dedmon was the one that asked me the question about the People's Republic of China, or Mainland China if you want to call it that, and also let the record show, as you may recall, that at an editorial conference at the Chicago Sun-Times last year you asked me the question again.

The first two times I struck out. The third time we got a hit. That is all we can say.

Let me put it all in perspective, however.

What we have here is the result of a long process that began in my own thoughts even before 1968, the spring of 1968, when I answered that question at this convention. I wrote an article for Foreign Affairs--as a matter of fact, I think your question played off of that article at that time--in which I pointed out that we could not have what will be by the end of the century a billion of the most creative and able people in the world isolated from the world and that whoever was President of the United States had to develop a policy which would bring the isolation of a billion Chinese from the rest of the world to an end.

I also pointed out that that was a long-range goal. The long-range goal of this Administration and of the next one, whatever it may be, must be two things: one, a normalization of the relations between the Government of the United States and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and two, the ending of the isolation of Mainland China from the world community.

Those are long-range goals.

Let's begin with what we have done then. We can't go that far that fast in one jump. We cannot do it now. I will not speculate on it now, because it is premature to talk about either of those subjects, either recognition or admission to the U.N.

But I can point to the goal and what we have done to get toward that goal and what it can mean to the future.

Over a year ago we relaxed, as you know, our travel conditions with regard to going to China, and also we made some relaxation with regard to trade.

Finally, we had a response from the Chinese, as you know, last week. Then, on Wednesday of this week, I announced an additional relaxation with regard to trade restrictions and a relaxation with regard to Chinese who wanted to come to the United States.

Now it is up to them. If they want to have trade in these many areas that we have opened up, we are ready. If they want to have Chinese come to the United States, we are ready. We are also ready for Americans to go there, Americans in all walks of life.

But it takes two, of course. We have taken several steps. They have taken one. We are prepared to take other steps in the trade field and also with regard to the exchange field, but each step must be taken one at a time.

I know that as editors and as reporters, looking for that, you know, that hot lead or headline for the morning, this is not a satisfying answer. But from the standpoint of policy, it is the right answer. Because to try to make a headline by saying that tomorrow we are going to do this or that or the other thing would be misunderstood among many countries of the world where this matter has to be discussed and also might have exactly the reverse reaction with the Chinese.

I think the steady, ordered process that we have engaged on now begins to bear fruit. I will just conclude with this one thought:

The other day was Easter Sunday. Both of my daughters, Tricia and Julie, were there--and Tricia with Eddie Cox--I understand they are getting married this June--and Julie and David Eisenhower.

And the conversation got around to travel and also, of course, with regard to honeymoon travel and the rest. They were asking me where would you like to go? Where do you think we ought to go?

So, I sat back and thought a bit and said, "Well, the place to go is to Asia." I said, "I hope that sometime in your life, sooner rather than later, you will be able to go to China to see the great cities, and the people, and all of that, there."

I hope they do. As a matter of fact, I hope sometime I do. I am not sure that it is going to happen while I am in office. I will not speculate with regard to either of the diplomatic points. It is premature to talk about recognition. It is premature also to talk about a change of our policy with regard to the United Nations.

However, we are going to proceed in these very substantive fields of exchange of persons and also in the field of trade. That will open the way to other moves which will be made at an appropriate time.

[12.] Mr. Risher.

MR. RISHER. I just want to follow up on that if I could. Do you think that this might lead 'to a resumption of the meetings in Warsaw that were broken up about a year ago, I think?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Risher, as you recall, those meetings were resumed after we came into office. That, again, was a result of an initiative that we took. And then they were broken off again. We are ready to meet any time they are ready to meet.

I cannot--I don't have any information indicating that they want to resume them at this time, but we certainly have the door open. We are not pressing them, although we would welcome them opening them.

CUBA AND CHILE

[13.] Mr. Meyer.

MR. MEYER. Mr. President, in view of the long-range attempt to normalize relations with China, and in view of the fact that we seem to be trying to maintain normal relations with Chile in view of the changes in that government, are we thinking also about long-range or short-range normalizing our relations with Cuba?

THE PRESIDENT. Certainly not short-range. As far as long-range, until Cuba changes its policy toward us, we are not going to change our policy toward Cuba. Let me distinguish, Mr. Meyer, because coming from Miami I know you have a big Cuban readership, and they are torn-I mean they would like to be able to have some communication with their friends back in Cuba and yet they are concerned about the government, as you well know how strong they feel.

Chile has what is termed a Communist leaning government, at least. We will call it a Marxist government. Allende is a Marxist, with strong Communist support. As far as Chile is concerned, we don't particularly approve of that type of government. We wouldn't want it here. On the other hand, the Chilean people voted for it. So, as far as our attitude toward Chile is concerned, it will be affected by what Chile's attitude is toward us.

If the Chilean Government does some things internally, that is their business and and the business of the Chilean people. They voted the government in, and they will have to live with it. If, however, they do things in Chile or outside of Chile in their foreign policy that is detrimental to us, then that is our business, and we will react accordingly. We are waiting to see what they will do. As long as they treat us properly we will treat them properly.

Now, let's look at Cuba. As far as Castro is concerned, he has already drawn the line. He is exporting revolution all over the hemisphere, still exporting it. His line is against the United States, not only within Cuba but outside of Cuba.

As long as Castro is adopting an antagonistic, anti-American line, we are certainly not going to normalize our relations with Castro. As soon as he changes his line toward us, we might consider it. But it is his move.

FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER

[14.] MR. CORMIER. Mr. President, J. Edgar Hoover very recently seems to have become one of the favorite "whipping boys" of a number of prominent Americans.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I am glad to have somebody else there for a change.

MR. Cormier. Is there the slightest chance that the criticisms would hasten his retirement?

THE PRESIDENT. No. I think the criticisms, particularly when they are unfair, as many of them have been, and malicious, as many of them have been--and I haven't discussed Mr. Hoover's retirement with him; he has not brought it up with me---but if I know Mr. Hoover, such unfair and malicious criticisms would tend to have exactly the opposite effect: not to hasten his retirement, but to have him dig in.

I can only say this: that with regard to Mr. Hoover, I would ask the editors of the Nation's papers to be fair about the situation. He, like any man who is a strong man and an able man, who has led this Bureau for so many years, has made many enemies. But we can also be thankful that in the FBI he has developed an organization which is recognized throughout the world as the best law enforcement agency in the world.

He has been nonpolitical. He has been nonpartisan. And despite all of the talk about surveillance and bugging and the rest, let me say I have been in police states and the idea that this is a police state is just pure nonsense. And every editorial paper in the country ought to say that.

MR. CORMIER. Well, Mr. President, earlier this week, I think speaking in Detroit, the Vice President said that he felt the Director should remain on the job as long as he is physically and mentally sound,

Is that more or less your attitude?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Cormier, I am not going to discuss the situation with regard to Mr. Hoover's tenure in office when the matter has not been raised with me, either by me or by him.

I will only say at this time that I believe it would be most unfortunate to allow a man who have given over 50 years of dedicated service to this country to go out under a cloud, maligned unfairly by many critics.

Now, I don't mean that some criticism of him, of me, of anybody, is not justified. But he is taking a "bad rap" on a lot of things, and he doesn't deserve it.

AMERICAN YOUTH

[15.] MR. CHANDLER. Mr. President, I would like to change the subject, if we could for a moment, to the youth of America and ask you to give us your reading on the attitude and temperature of America's youth on our campuses.

They apparently have turned away, at least in recent months, from violence and seem to be going about their education, and yet I wonder if there is even deeper despair on their minds than there was when they were practicing violence. Do you have any views on that, sir?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Chandler, it always does my heart good when I look down on that beach that you and I share [laughter]---

MR. CHANDLER. We do? I can't surf there any more, sir.

THE PRESIDENT. ---and see young Americans surfing and enjoying it.

Seriously, the problem of American youth concerns us all, and I suppose that we concerned our parents. But youth today is a more difficult problem. There is more alienation.

Let's spend a moment on it, if I could, analyzing it.

One, all the old values aren't there any more--the faith and religion, family ties. What they hear in the colleges and universities generally is against the system: the system is bad, it pollutes the air, it is wrong to minorities, it is repressive, and, of course, it wages war.

All of this concerns youth because youth basically, young people basically, by nature, by definition--we all remember how we were--we tend to be idealistic, hopeful, and we want the world to be better. So, I think that young people, particularly in the sixties, the late sixties, fell into a period of great disillusionment. That disillusionment, of course, was certainly increased by what they heard in school, what they heard sometimes in their churches, maybe sometimes what they heard at home.

Now, let's look to the future. We are removing some of the problems. As we end the involvement in the war, as the draft calls come to an end, which they will, as we have programs to deal with the problems of pollution of air and water-we are not going to solve them immediately, we have programs to deal with it-as we make progress in the problems of minorities--and we are making progress, not enough, not as much as we would like, but we are making a lot of progress-and as we see in perspective, and, if I may say so, what I really believe, what a really great and good country this is, I think we are going to find great numbers of American youth reestablishing their faith in America.

You asked a moment ago, Mr. Dickinson, the question: "What do you think of when you wake up at 3 o'clock in the morning and what do you really want for this country?"

What I want first and above all, of course, is to end the war that we are in, and to build a lasting peace, through what we are doing in China, the Soviet Union, the SALT talks, the Mideast--there are problems all over the world.

But second, we want to build a new economy and a new prosperity which is not based on war. And third, we want to have a revolution in this country, of government, to make it more responsive, to make government work, to make it cost less. That is why we have revenue sharing and government reorganization.

We want to reform our welfare system and all the rest. Now, I believe that if we can just make some progress on all these fronts, that the millions of young, idealistic Americans will take another look at America, and they will say, "Well, maybe this system isn't hopeless. Maybe it is possible that it will work. Maybe the United States is"--which I firmly believe--"the world's best hope for peace and for freedom."

That is what we are. And once American youth sees that and once they see that their idealism can be fulfilled within the system, I think that this enormous frustration that has torn down can turn into creative activity that will build up.

That is what I would like to leave when I leave office, that kind of feeling in American youth.

THE ECONOMY

[16.] MR. DICKINSON. Mr. President, the economic activity in the first quarter, despite the rise in the GNP, apparently did not measure up to the expectations of your Administration.

Do you have new measures in mind in the battle against unemployment and inflation, or are you going to stick to the present game plan?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Dickinson, I have analyzed those figures pretty closely.

While, as you do point out, it did not reach the projections of our own economic target, it was far above the projections of people like Otto Eckstein,⁴ who said $22 billion. We went to $28 1/2 billion. But let me be quite objective about it.

⁴ Professor of economics at Harvard University.

We all know that when we look at that, what was the gross largest increase in the GNP in any one quarter in history, that part of that is due to inflation, part of it is due to the comeback, the snapback, from the auto strike.

But why I am optimistic about the economy has to do with what went into that figure. Let's look at the real numbers.

Automobile sales: Automobile sales in the first I o days of this year, GM, the highest on record, the highest in history, in the first quarter, the highest in about 20 years.

Housing starts: Housing starts in the first quarter, the highest in 20 years and the figure just announced today, 1,900,000 in the month of March.

Retail sales: This may not yet be reflected in advertising, but it will come. Retail sales: We find that retail sales went up a big 9 1/2 percent. But look at what that retail sale was. It wasn't just the Easter bulge, because Easter was late and it was a cold spring--but it was in those things that really build an economy for the future--appliances, home furnishings, and the rest.

Then to take another number, the stock market: The stock market, we all think, is just something for the rich. But there are 27 million people in the market apart from those that are in institutions [laughter]--I understand about 11 months ago a few went into institutions too!---but when we look at those that are affected by the market, approximately 60 million Americans are investors in the stock market, either through insurance companies or funds or directly.

What do we find?

We find that the stock market had the biggest growth in the last 11 months, 50 percent gain. People do not buy stocks because they are pessimistic about the future. What I am saying is this: The consumers in America now have confidence. I believe we are going to see that confidence grow in April, May, June. If that confidence grows, the economy will grow with it.

And I would say that at this time, with the movement not being as fast as we had hoped, but with the movement sharply up in the last week in March and the first two weeks of April, that my predictions of a good year in 1971 and a very good year in 1972 still stand, and I don't think we should change the plan now.

We will continue to wage the battle against inflation by holding spending within the full employment surplus, within the full employment revenue, and we will continue, of course, to do everything that we can with pockets of unemployment, like in southern California and the Northwest where we have airframe and other unemployment, but I believe that at this time we are going to see a strong second half, particularly, and a very, very strong 1972.

I am speaking, of course, economically.

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S CRITICISM OF

THE PRESS

[17.] MR. DEDMON. Mr. President, this is a new question. Inasmuch as this is an editors convention, I think it would be inappropriate not to discuss the criticism which has been made of the press, particularly by the Vice President, who is now not only criticizing our viewpoint but analyzing some of our stories in detail.

I was wondering, quite apart from his prowess as a golfer, if you would care to compare his abilities as Vice President and as editor for the Nation's press.

Do you think that the Vice President is better as a Vice President or as an editor?

THE PRESIDENT. You mean you are looking for an editor? [Laughter]

Mr. Dedmon, I am going to make an offer to these distinguished publishers, editors, and so forth that are here. I have had the privilege of being in your offices and to have been in editorial conferences with every paper represented here.

I would like for all of you to have the Vice President in. See what kind of a man he really is.

The trouble is he only makes news when he hits the press or a golf ball.

Here is a man, yes, he is controversial. He says what he thinks, and he says it very hard.

As a matter of fact, I believe that some of his criticisms, if you look at them very objectively, some of the criticisms that he has made in terms of some network coverage and press coverage, you really cannot quarrel with if you examine the whole record.

I believe that the Vice President's national image of simply being a man who is against a free press, who is against all the press, is just not accurate.

The difficulty is that he is not known-the things that he does, his capability in the foreign field, his capability in the domestic field. He is one of the best salesmen we have for revenue sharing because he knows what local government is. He was a Governor and he also was a county official, and all over 'this country he goes out and makes effective speeches. They get two sticks back with the corset ads. They never get up there in the front page.

So, I guess you don't advertise corsets anymore, though.

MR. DEDMON. No.

THE PRESIDENT. That is different. Nevertheless, I am simply saying this: I am simply saying that this old game--and Frank Cormier and Gene Risher have heard me say this often to the White House press corps--of having the President disagree with his Vice President goes on and on, but I am an expert at it and I am not going to get into it. I defend my Vice President.

[18.] Mr. Chandler.

MR. CHANDLER. Mr. President, could I ask a follow-up question on the Vice President? Do you think seriously, sir, in his attacks on the press, that they have been successful in causing any change, in your opinion, for the better in the press? In other words, have his attacks been successful? Has the press reacted in a positive way, in your opinion and, if so, how?

THE PRESIDENT. I suppose that is the dilemma, isn't it, of anyone who dares to criticize the press or the television, that if he does he is probably going to get worse treatment than he thought he was getting before? Of course, I am being very guarded, as you noticed.

I will simply say this, Mr. Chandler: You may recall that back in 1962, immediately after running for Governor of California, after I was out of office and had no visible prospects of success, I had some things to say about the press. I have had nothing to say about it since. That's my answer.

SURVEILLANCE BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

[19.] MR. RASHER. Mr. President, I would like to get back to Mr. Hoover and the FBI. Is there any credence to the complaints by some Congressmen, as far as you know, that they are under surveillance by the FBI?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Risher, let me answer that question in terms of what I know, because I checked this personally. I was in the House, I was in the Senate, and I am very jealous of the right of Senators and Congressmen, and every citizen actually, not to have surveillance when he is engaged in public activities. Particularly, I can assure you that there is no question in my mind that Mr. Hoover's statement that no telephone in the Capitol has ever been tapped by the FBI is correct. That is correct.

The case you referred to, the Dowdy⁵ case, did not involve the tapping of a Congressman's telephone.

⁵ Representative John Dowdy of Texas.

The second point that I should make is this: Let's get this whole business of surveillance and the rest into some perspective. First, when we talk about police states, there are 205 million people in this country.

Did you know, even the Nation's editors, sophisticated as you are, that over the past 2 years there were only 300 taps by the FBI through court orders?

Do you know what was accomplished from those taps? There were 900 arrests and 100 convictions, and particularly convictions in the important area of narcotics, where millions and millions of dollars worth of narcotics that otherwise would have gone to the young people of America were picked up. That was why those taps were carried on.

Now let's talk about the other area which I think Mr. Risher and the people are more concerned about. They say what about the taps that are not made by court order but that are made for the national security? I checked that, too. The high, insofar as those taps are concerned, were in the years 1961, 1962, and 1963. In those years, the number of taps was between 90 and 100. Now, in the a years that we have been in office--now get this number--the total number of taps for national security purposes by the FBI, and I know because I look not at the information but at the decisions that are made--the total number of taps is less, has been less, than 50 a year, a cut of 50 percent from what it was in 1961, '62, and '63. As far as Army surveillance is concerned, once we saw what had happened to the Democratic National Convention, that had even been carried to the surveillance of Adlai Stevenson,⁶ who later became a Senator, we stopped them.

⁶ Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III of Illinois.

I simply want to put this all in perspective by saying this: I believe the Nation's press has a responsibility to watch Government, to see that "Big Brother" isn't watching.

I don't want to see a police state. I argued the right of privacy case in the Supreme Court, and I feel strongly about the right of privacy. But let's also remember that the President of the United States has a responsibility for the security of this country and a responsibility to protect the innocent from those who might engage in crime or who would be dangerous to the people of this country.

In carrying out that responsibility, I defend the FBI in this very limited exercise of tapping.

One final point: You talk about police state. Let me tell you what happens when you go to what is really a police state:

You can't talk in your bedroom. You can't talk in your sitting room. You don't talk on the telephone. You don't talk in the bathroom. As a matter of fact, you hear about going out and talking in the garden. Yes, I have walked many times through gardens in various places where I had to talk about something confidential, and you can't even talk in front of a shrub. That is the way it works.

What I am simply saying is this, my friends: There are police states. We don't want that to happen to America. But America is not a police state, and as long as I am in this office, we are going to be sure that not the FBI or any other organization engages in any activity except where the national interests or the protection of innocent people requires it, and then it will be as limited as it possibly can be. That is what we are going to do.

MR. DICKINSON. Thank you very much, Mr. President.