White House Statement on Appointments to the Committee of Inquiry Into Misstatements by the President of the Navy League.

Note: Mr. Hammond, Mr. Wadsworth, and Mr. Jahncke were members of the Navy League. The committee's letter and report, dated November 6, 1931, were released by the White House on November 7. A copy of the report is available for examination at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library. A text of the committee's letter follows:

Dear Mr. President:

Your committee appointed on November 2, 1931 to examine and report on the statement of the Navy League of the United States dated October 28, 1931, submits herewith its unanimous report. The committee, pursuant to your statement of November 2, has directed its inquiry to the accuracy of statements and assertions of fact made by the President of the Navy League. It has not inquired into the budgetary or general policies of the Navy.

In order that the facts found by the committee may readily be compared with the statements contained in the Navy League's publication of October 28, 1931 the committee's findings in detail and the pertinent text of Mr. Gardiner's statement are set forth in parallel columns. These findings are submitted herewith in the attached report.

Certain of the erroneous statements and assertions appearing in the Navy League's publication are summarized below, together with the committee's findings in regard thereto.
First: That the Washington Naval Treaty established a ratio of 10-6 as between the American and Japanese fleets as a whole. As is well known, the Washington Naval Treaty established ratios for capital ships and aircraft carriers only. All other types of combatant vessels were left entirely unrestricted, and no ratio for them was established until the London Naval Treaty went into force on January 1, 1931, to become effective December 31, 1936.

Second: That the ratios established by the London Naval Treaty are effective prior to December 31, 1936. Under the terms of Part 3 of the London Naval Treaty the tonnage limits mentioned therein do not become effective until December 31, 1936, and there is manifestly no obligation to attain these limits or the ratios resulting there from prior to that time. The committee finds that the United States has at present more treaty tonnage under construction than any other nation.

Third: That the President and the British Prime Minister admittedly reached agreements during their conversations which have never officially been divulged in their entirety.

The assertion that secret agreements were "admittedly" reached during the President's conversations with the British Prime Minister is erroneous. There were no secret agreements.

The incorrectness of the assertion that there were such agreements between the United States and Great Britain which "have never officially been divulged in their entirety" has been shown by the President's message to Congress of July 11, 1930. This message reads in part as follows:

"I take this opportunity to repeat with the utmost emphasis that in these negotiations there were no secret or concealed understandings, promises or interpretations, nor any commitments whatever except as appear in the Treaty itself and in the interpretive exchange of notes recently suggested by your Committee on Foreign Relations, all of which are now in the hands of the Senate."

In the joint statement issued at the close of the Rapidan conversations, it was announced that an agreement on naval armaments could not be completed without the cooperation of other naval powers. This statement referred to the termination of competitive building between the two countries by "agreeing to parity of fleets category by category". Over two months before the conversations took place, the British Government's acceptance of this principle had been made public on July 23, 1929, by the British Prime Minister.

Furthermore, the Secretary of State on October 30, 1931, said that the assertion of the existence of such secret agreements was "entirely false and had been publicly refuted many times".

Fourth: That the administration refused to allow even an executive session of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to see the full record of its negotiations and possible commitments preparatory to the London Naval Conference of 1930.

This statement is without foundation. In answer to Senate Resolution 320, the President's message to Congress of July 11, 1930, contains the following: "No Senator has been refused an opportunity to see the confidential material referred to, provided only he will agree to receive and hold the same in the confidence in which it has been received and held by the Executive. A number of Senators have availed themselves of this opportunity."

Furthermore, two members of the Committee, Senator Robinson and Senator Reed, were delegates to the London Naval Conference and were familiar with every phase of the negotiations from beginning to end, and their knowledge was available to all members of the committee.

Fifth: That President Hoover, in 1929, held up the building of the first five of the fifteen cruisers just ordered by Congress as a gesture preparatory to the Naval Conference, which was not commensurately copied by other prospective participants.

This assumption is manifestly incorrect. The President on July 24, 1929, announced in a public statement that he would delay the laying down of the keels of three cruisers, not five as alleged. The construction of these three American cruisers was not postponed beyond the period stipulated by Congress for laying down. The so-called Fifteen Cruiser Bill, which authorized this building included a clause stating that if the construction of any vessel authorized was not undertaken either in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1929, or in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1930, it might be undertaken in the next succeeding year. These three cruisers were laid down within the prescribed period. Two cruisers in addition to the five are now in the course of construction, making a total of seven now building, as two of the 1929 program were earlier laid down.

The President's statement postponing the building of these cruisers appeared on the same day that a declaration was made in the House of Commons by the British Prime Minister, several months before he came to the United States. The Prime Minister said that his Government had decided (1) to suspend all work on the cruisers Surrey and Northumberland; (2) to cancel the submarine tender Maidstone; (3) to cancel two contract submarines; and (4) to slow down dockyard work and other naval construction. This proves that there was commensurate action by Great Britain.

Sixth: That the President intended under the one year "holiday" to forego our treaty rights to carry on the construction of 87,600 tons of naval vessels, including the seven cruisers now building.

This refers to the proposed one year holiday in the starting of new construction and is based on the erroneous assumption repeatedly made in the Navy League statements and in its tables that construction now under way would be held up during this period. This projected armaments truce does not contemplate stopping work on vessels already under construction or for which contracts have been let. There is in the truce nothing to prevent the United States from attaining treaty ratios after its expiration. The proposed truce, designed to create an atmosphere of confidence which will prepare the ground for the successful conclusion of the General Disarmament Conference to be held next February and to prevent competition in armaments, does not in any way affect authorizations already made.

In concluding this summary, it is desirable in order that the situation may be clearly understood, to list the naval vessels now under construction or contracted for, with approximate figures of their estimated cost:

7 Cruisers at $17,000,000 each $119, 000, 000
1 Aircraft Carrier at $19,000,000 19, 000, 000
3 Submarines at $4,400,000 each 13, 200, 000
5 Destroyers at $4,700,000 each 23, 500, 000

Approximate total $174, 700, 000

In addition the Navy Department is also proceeding with the modernization of three battleships--Idaho, Mississippi and New Mexico--at an authorized cost of $30,000,000.

This program covers all combatant vessels authorized and appropriated for by Congress, with the exception of six destroyers which have been temporarily postponed.

The committee finds that the economy of $61,000,000 proposed in the naval budget of 1932-33 out of the $401,000,000 estimate does not affect the continuance of the above construction program nor result in the decommissioning of a single combatant unit.

Notwithstanding the implication contained throughout Mr. Gardiner's report, there is no basis for an assumption that the President intends to abandon the Washington and London Treaty ratios, nor do the armaments truce or the emergency economies contemplated at the present time interfere with the ultimate achievement in fact of these ratios in all categories.

For a fuller discussion of the statements and assertions which appear erroneous we invite your attention to the parallel columns of the report in which each paragraph of the statement of the President of the Navy League is dealt with in detail. It is there brought out for example that the inclusion of a series of tables, known by him to be obsolete at the time the statement was issued, should have been so labelled to avoid misleading the public.

The report unanimously adopted by this committee compares Mr. Gardiner's statements with publicly known and officially recorded facts. The report clearly shows that Mr. Gardiner's statement contains many inaccuracies, false assertions and erroneous conclusions, and that his assumption as to the President's attitude toward the Navy is wholly unwarranted.
Respectfully yours,
JOHN HAYS HAMMOND,
Chairman
HUGH RODMAN
ELIOT WADSWORTH
WILLIAM R. CASTLE, JR.
ERNEST LEE JAHNCKE