Dwight D. Eisenhower photo

Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and the International Press Institute

April 17, 1958

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice President, My fellow Americans:

First, my warm and special greetings to the distinguished visitors here from other lands. I must say to them that my subject today is more national than international in scope. Yet, there are international overtones in all that I shall say. American strength, of which I shall speak, is inseparable from the waging of peace. In this, all of us are interested.

Five years have passed since as President I last met with your Society. I discussed then what is still the world's paramount need--an enduring, just peace.

In early 1953, you recall, the world was deeply troubled. Two wars were in progress. One had cost the lives of thousands of our own youth. It promised to go on indefinitely. The other menaced all southeast Asia. There was daily possibility of more trouble--in the Formosa area, the Middle East, Western Europe--even in the Western Hemisphere.

Many of the goals I then presented to your Society are now achieved:

In Korea and Vietnam, the wars are ended.

In Formosa--Guatemala--Iran--the Communist threats are blocked.

In Trieste, the age-old struggle is resolved.

Austria is liberated, the Red Army withdrawn.

Germany--at least West Germany--is once again sovereign and today reinforces European unity.

"Atoms for Peace," so meaningful to mankind, is at last under way.

The stature of the United Nations is appreciably raised; free world nations are more united in collective defense.

And slowly but significantly the Iron Curtain has started to lift. Behind it the personal security and intellectual freedom of oppressed peoples gradually increase--another development not without promise.

Such gains are with us. Yet the problems remaining are many and grave.

Communist imperialism persists in striving to master the world. Germany remains divided. Eastern European nations remain enslaved.

Turmoil and bitterness plague North Indonesia, the Middle East, and parts of North Africa.

France, our historic ally, has major difficulties.

New weapons of fantastic power appall the world. Humanity now threatens its own existence.

Dependable disarmament remains but a hope--a hope we still ardently cherish and will continue striving to realize.

So today we find, despite our progress, that peace, national safety-survival itself--demand of America strength in its every aspect--spiritual, intellectual and scientific, as well as economic and military.

Now this brings me to my main topic--our military strength--more specifically, how to stay strong against threat from outside, without undermining the economic health that supports our security.

It is hard to grasp the enormity of our own military expenditures. In only five years, they are almost 200 billion dollars. This colossal expenditure has cost us far more than dollars alone. In a less threatening world, how much it could have meant to us. In private or public spending, this 200 billion dollars could have bought:

--of highways, the entire, nation-wide interstate system;

--of hydro-electric power, every worth-while project in America;

--of hospitals, our needs for ten years to come;

--of schools, our next decade's requirements, including catching up on present shortages.

And even had we additionally allocated 10 billion dollars a year for security, some 50 billion dollars would still have been left over to reduce the national debt.

So, clear it is that this armaments race--so terrible, so utterly wasteful--has imposed tragic penalties upon America and on all mankind.

Now all of us deplore this vast military spending. Yet, in the face of the Soviet attitude, we realize its necessity. Whatever the cost, America will keep itself secure.

But in the process we must not, by our own hand, destroy or distort the American system. This we could do by useless overspending. I know one sure way to overspend. That is by overindulging sentimental attachments to outmoded military machines and concepts.

Paraphrasing an American patriot, our motto must be.' "Billions for defense; not one cent for heedless waste."

Such considerations I have placed before Congress in a message on defense reorganization. The purpose is clear. It is safety with solvency. The country is entitled to both.

Now let's examine our defenses. There is a simple starting point. It is this:

The waging of war by separate ground, sea and air forces is gone forever.

This lesson we learned in World War II. I lived that lesson in Europe. Others lived it in the Pacific. Millions of American veterans learned it well.

If in organizing our defenses we ignore that lesson, we shall do so at our own deadly peril.

To prevent war--or, in the tragedy of war, to win it--is the whole purpose of this huge defense establishment. Its success requires one single basic scheme, under single direction. That scheme is called our strategic plan. The single direction is provided by our highest military chiefs, acting in unity under civilian control.

Unity, then--unity in strategic planning, unity in military command, unity in our fighting forces in combat commands--these we must achieve.

Now, applying this yardstick of unity, we at once identify needed defense changes.

Their essence can be stated in a nutshell. Unified strategic plans, carried out in peace or war under unified direction, presuppose that the directing head, the Secretary of Defense-Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanism, has sufficient authority over supporting activities to assure execution of the basic plans. This, I submit, is the sum total of unification. In critical respects, it is lacking in our defenses today. Certain revisions of the present system are urgently needed.

First, we must unify and strengthen the professional staff assistance available to the top strategic planners. The top strategic planners are the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In some respects this can be done administratively. Such improvements I have already directed. Other improvements require changes in law. These I have asked of the Congress.

Second, we must clear the lines of military command. Today they meander through subordinate elements of the Defense Department before they reach the fighting forces. Within the limits of law, I have already directed the administrative changes this improvement requires. Additionally, I have asked the Congress to remove various statutory barriers. The Congress willing, we will free the flow of military commands from unified authority down to the man with the gun.

A third change is most important. It is to integrate the power of the fighting units in the several strategic areas. The forces in each of these areas can operate effectively only under fully unified command. We must place each such command under the full control of one commanding officer, no matter what his service. This is exactly, my friends, the power that was given to me as European Commander during World War II. And again, to make this a statutory matter, I have asked Congressional cooperation. So the Congress willing, we will, in the pattern of the Navy's mighty task forces of World War II, forge singly-led fighting units of unified, concentrated power. Thus we shall face up to the requirements of modern war. It is--I repeat--power that is concentrated, not diffused. The truth is that the services acting together, rather than singly, generate power that is not the sum but a multiplication of their separate capabilities.

Our fourth need is no less urgent. We must do a more efficient job of integrating new weapons into our fighting forces. Again, we need the unity of direction.

The onrush of science has changed this problem at its very roots. Take, for example, a reconnaissance satellite, orbiting in space. If successful in carrying out that reconnaissance, it would transmit military information of value to all the armed forces. The utility and purpose of such an instrument could hardly be prerogatives of any single military service. Nor is it rational for the services to wage bitter struggles and multiply expensive research facilities in a race to control such a development.

The ballistic missile is another example. This weapon can be fired at targets hundreds of miles away. Its principal function rises above one-service considerations. It matters not at all to the American people whether such a missile is fired from a land base or from a submarine. Nor is the public overly concerned whether a piloted bomber takes off from land or from an aircraft carrier to hit the very same target. The point is to be able to get the job done, at the least cost.

In short, it is high time for all of us to pay more attention to America's strategic requirements and less to individual service claims.

The fact is, modern weapons and methods of war have scrambled traditional service functions. Interservice controversy and confusion are the result. This simply means that our military weapons and techniques and certain provisions of law just do not mesh.

I am quite sure that the American people feel it is far more important to be able to hit the target than it is to haggle over who makes a weapon or who pulls a trigger.

I have simply asked the Congress to accept and apply these facts of military life. The Congress willing, we shall bring to bear, in each unified command, all the power each military service can usefully provide to support the mission of the command with the most modern of weapons. The next change affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense. That authority must be clearly defined. Today, the law envelops it in a legal fog. Mainly this is the result of clinging to traditions and concepts of a military era that is no more.

As I have said, modern war demands the vesting of strategic planning and control of military operations clearly in the Secretary of Defense-Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanism, under the over-all direction of the Commander-in-Chief. It is impossible longer to diffuse this function among three competing services.

For this central directing mechanism to perform its function properly, it must assure the fighting forces of adequate supply and support. This requires central coordination of a multitude of military activities. Examples are transportation, maintenance, procurement, and material design. The authority of the Secretary of Defense must be sufficient to direct this support by all.

For this purpose there is no need to consolidate the traditional services. Nor do we need to create entirely new administrative units in the Defense Department. But there must be no doubt that central authority can direct the needed coordination and take steps to eliminate any wasteful duplication.

The appropriation process must facilitate, not hinder, this essential coordination. Today the Secretary of Defense is too severely restrained by this appropriation process to permit maximum efficiency. Moreover, strategic requirements change constantly--oft-times, swiftly and critically. This constant change, as well as continually discovered new opportunities to improve efficiency, are compelling reasons for giving the Secretary a reasonable flexibility in the use of funds.

Thirty-seven billion 250 million dollars have been appropriated for the military establishment this fiscal year. Less than 2 per cent of it was appropriated to the Secretary of Defense--this to run his office and to meet the costs of a certain number of activities that apply to all arms and services. Of the remaining 98 per cent, only 150 million dollars was specifically subject to transfer between appropriations by the Secretary. And that authority was limited to research and development.

I have simply proposed that the Secretary be granted additional flexibility beyond that now available by reprogramming within appropriation totals. The Congress should adopt one of the several applicable methods of doing this. Of course there should be appropriate reports to the affected Committees of Congress on the use made of this authority.

Flexibility does not mean license. It does not mean handing 40 billion dollars to the Secretary of Defense to use according to his personal decision. It does not mean depriving Congress of the power of the purse. What flexibility does mean is Congressional action that will make annual appropriations readily adaptable to rapidly changing strategic conditions in the world. Likewise, appropriations must be responsive to the demands of departmental efficiency.

In another area--defense research and development programs--the need for central direction is especially acute.

This area, more than any other, invites costly rivalries. The programs are critically important. They involve the weapons of tomorrow. In these programs we cannot afford the slightest waste motion. Nor can we afford to devote three sets of scientists and laboratories and costly facilities to overlapping weapons systems and research projects.

Recently we have been spending something more than $5 billion a year for research and development programs dispersed among the several services. This great sum is used to maintain our weapon potential but it does not procure one single weapon or piece of equipment for the operating forces. Not a one. Eminent scientists report to me that centralization of direction over this program will surely cut costs markedly and improve efficiency.

I have recommended that the supervision of this entire activity--and, to the extent deemed necessary, its direction--be centralized in the Defense Department under a top civilian who will be a national leader in science and technology--the actual work will of course be done largely by the military departments as is the case today. The Congress willing, we will substantially increase the efficiency of this multibillion dollar research and development effort. We will reduce its cost, and strike at one of the roots of service rivalries.

Finally, I have called attention to the need for review by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of our top service promotions and assignments. Top admirals and generals for unified commands must be fitted temperamentally and by conviction for responsibilities that far transcend their individual services. To reward parochialism with promotion is to invite disunity. In the same vein, I have directed the Secretary of Defense to take a firmer grasp over service publicity campaigns and Congressional activities. This should certainly reduce invitation to disunity.

Incidentally, I would personally hope that the total numbers of individuals assigned to rival publicity campaigns in the Defense Department would be drastically reduced.

In the bill just sent to Congress, I requested correction of all of those weaknesses of a statutory nature which relate to the authority of the Secretary of Defense.

Now, looking back over all the years since 1911 when I entered military service, I find it hardly surprising that a defense revision agitates partisans and traditionalists. Never has it been otherwise, whether we have gone from battleships to carriers in the Navy, from piston engines to jets in the Air force, or from cavalry to armor in the Army--and, in all services, from TNT to nuclear weapons. We can expect the same kind of resistance to the new modernization proposals. But in the present situation it is more than gratifying to me to have the assurance that the convictions of senior civil and military leaders in all parts of the Defense Department closely parallel my own. They have cooperated loyally in designing the details of the proposed reorganization. Much of the criticism we will likely hear, therefore, will probably be loudest and most bitter not from responsible service leaders but rather from outside sources. These sources often resist military change far more vigorously than the services themselves.

But from some quarters it will be said, for example, that the changes I have discussed will merge our traditional forces into a single armed service.

This is not so.

The identity of each service will remain intact. Moreover, its training, its pride, its traditions and its morale, all important to itself and to the country, will still be the responsibility of its own service and civil leaders.

It will also be said that a monstrous general staff--usually called "Prussian"--I am always amused when I hear that word, because I nearly always ask the individual to explain it to me by telling me what he thinks a Prussian general staff was. few can do it. In any event, they fear that this monstrous staff will be set up to dominate our armed forces and in due course will threaten our liberty. This is nonsense.

The group of planners and advisers and analysts that will serve under the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot logically be compared to the great general staff of Germany of 1914. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will remain the top military advisers under the clear-cut civilian control of the Secretary of Defense, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Congress, all functioning within the bounds set by the Constitution.

But it will likely be said, in the same breath, despite the obvious contradiction, that not a professional military staff but the Secretary of Defense will be made a "czar" who will overwhelm our liberty.

This, too, is not so.

We shall have neither military nor civilian czars. The Secretary will stay directly under the President and the Congress. He will remain subject to a tremendous body of detailed law. In military affairs he will be advised and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So surrounded, by no stretch of the imagination can he become an arbitrary administrator working his will independently of the President, the Congress, and our fundamental charter of government.

You know, folks, it's true, it's a habit of ours to set up straw men which we take great pleasure in beating down. But in this case it seems to me that the men are not made of good, honest straw even. They scarcely deserve the name of "chaff."

It will likely be said, in addition, that these proposals will violate the responsibilities of Congress, especially its power over the purse. As I have said, this is equally farfetched.

The Congress will keep, in every respect, its full constitutional authority over the appropriation of funds. But greater flexibility in defense spending will result in greater efficiency, more responsiveness to changing military requirements, and more economical management of major defense programs.

Apprehensions such as these are at the least misconceptions. At the most they are misrepresentations. I repeat--there will be:

--no single chief of staff;

--no Prussian staff;

--no czar;

--no 40 billion dollar blank check;

--no swallowing up of the traditional services;

--no undermining of the constitutional powers of Congress.

But this there will be, if the program which I so earnestly support and believe in is adopted by the Congress:

There will be a stop to unworthy and sometimes costly bickering.

There will be clear-cut civilian responsibility, unified strategic planning and direction, and completely unified combat commands.

There will be a stop to inefficiencies and needless duplications encouraged by present law.

Thus we will meet our dual needs--safety and solvency. The Congress willing, we shall have maximum strength, with minimum cost, in our national defense.

And now, one final thought:

Today I have been speaking mainly about military problems. Overseas we can count on the Soviet propaganda to twist these statements into accusations that we are making threats and are obsessed with war making techniques. But all the world knows, as we do, that neither war nor the technique of war has ever been America's primary concern.

The powerful armed forces of the United States are no more than supports for a much larger purpose. That purpose is peace--a just peace--and the advancement of human well-being at home and throughout the world. Freer trade and cooperative assistance among the free nations are indispensable aids in bringing this about.

This I believe deeply: if we will but hold fast in our struggle for lasting peace, we shall, in coming years, find full justification for confidence that war will not occur and that this wearisome and dangerous armaments burden will be lifted from the shoulders of a grateful humanity.

I believe further that in this struggle the strength that endures rests with those who live in freedom. Tyranny is too brittle--too insecurely based--too dependent upon force and brutality--too contrary to the hopes and ideals of humanity--to last over the long pull. The day will surely come when this undeniable truth will dawn upon even the rulers of the Soviet Union, as already it is dawning upon their peoples. Then, we shall see at last the true worth of all our effort, all our sacrifice, all our prayers.

Thank you very much.

Note: The President spoke at a luncheon meeting held at the Statler Hotel, Washington, D.C. His opening words "Mr. Chairman" referred to Virginius Dabhey, President, American Society of Newspaper Editors.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and the International Press Institute Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/234693

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