Special Message to the Congress on National Security Requirements

To the Congress of the United States:

The military security of the United States requires armed forces, disposed and alerted for instant action, quickly reinforceable by units ready for mobilization, assured an adequate pool of trained manpower for necessary expansion. Three elements are necessary to this military posture--(1) active forces in the strength and effectiveness necessary to meet, to repel and to punish a first massive assault or to conduct a lesser operation that does not require mobilization; (2) reserves so organized and trained as units that they can be speedily mobilized to reinforce the active forces in combat or to man defense operations at home; (3) an unorganized reserve pool, adequate in training and numbers, to permit a quick general mobilization of all our military strength.

Never, in peacetime, have we achieved this proper military posture. The penalties of our unreadiness have been manifold-in treasure, in blood, in the heartbreak of a mighty nation buying time with the lives of men. Now, in an uneasy peace, we can and must move toward this proper posture--at tolerable cost, with due regard for tradition, without disruption of human plans or the material economy.

Korea and Indo-China are bitter reminders of the ever-present threat of aggression. The masses of armed men and the vast array of war-making machines, maintained by the Soviets and their satellites along the frontiers of the free world, sharpen the reminders.

The first purpose of our defense planning remains the maintenance of a just, secure peace. If, however, unwanted war should come, it should find us ready with every resource at our command to repel and defeat the enemy. And, at home, we must have forces trained for every emergency, should an aggressor be so criminally unwise as to attempt an atomic attack.

In seeking to attain these goals, we must remember that the active military forces are only the cutting edge of our nation's full strength. A vigorous economy, a strong mobilization base and trained citizens are the invincible elements in our military striking power.

But we cannot possibly keep armed and in uniform the total forces that might ultimately be required in all-out war. The inescapable burdens would endanger the liberties and the economic system we are determined to defend.

On the other hand, in case of a global war, the nation could not count on having time to marshal its strength while the enemy was engaged elsewhere. Unquestionably, the United States would be involved from the outset of such a conflict. We must be prepared.

The Defense Establishment, through the past two years, has concentrated on effectiveness, economy and efficiency within the active military forces. The result is a formidable assurance to any aggressor that we would react to attack, instantly and powerfully.

In the same period, exhaustive studies have been made on manpower--the key to a proper military posture. The recommendations herewith submitted, dealing with both the active and the reserve forces, are based on them.

In summary, I recommend (1) that the present statutory provisions authorizing the induction of young men by the Selective Service System for 24 months of training and service, scheduled to expire July 1, 1955, be extended until July 1, 1959; (2) that the existing special statutory provisions authorizing the registration and induction of doctors and dentists, also scheduled to expire on July 1, 1955, be extended until July 1, 1957; and (3) that legislation be enacted by the Congress to permit the strengthening of the reserve forces to meet essential mobilization requirements.

The extension of Selective Service is necessary because experience demonstrates that active Armed Forces of the size we must maintain cannot be raised by voluntary enlistments alone. The maximum number of volunteers will continue to be the recruiting goal of the services. But realistic estimates set the probable ceiling on voluntary forces, in the present economic situation, at a million and a half--more than 1,300,000 men short of the planned strength goal for the end of the Fiscal Year 1956.

Active force strengths are continually under review in the light of changing missions and technological improvement of weapons. A major purpose is economy in the use of men. But I see no reasonable prospect that the world situation or technological advances, in the next four years, will render the draft unnecessary. I earnestly recommend, consequently, that the extension be for four years. In the case of doctors and dentists I recommend that the extension be for another period of two years only. By that time it is expected that the medical personnel requirements of the Armed Forces can be met adequately by other means.

The term of service should be retained at the 24 month level established by the 82nd Congress after weighing the military efficiency and dollar-cost arguments involved. Those arguments, whose soundness was proved in the experience of the three past years, are now compellingly persuasive that shortening the term of service would seriously damage the combat readiness of our active forces.

The present operation of selective service is recognized by the American people as an equitable and necessary solution to a national problem. The calm planning for a call, the unquestioning acceptance of it, the smooth adjustment to a new way of life, manifested by millions of our young men and their families, evidences the maturity of their attitude toward the problem of national security.

Under the new National Reserve Plan, selective service and the reserve forces, in conjunction with our regular establishment, will fulfill our security needs with the least possible disruptive impact on the life of the individual citizen and the civilian economy. Flexibility is a primary characteristic of the Plan. Constant scrutiny and review of its operation by the Services will assure its increasing efficiency.

The reserve program has been the subject of extensive study in the Congress, in various government agencies and in the military services themselves over long periods of time. As in our active forces, we will rely as heavily as possible on voluntary service. To further this purpose, recent surveys indicate that certain improvements can be accomplished within the Services, without legislation, and steps have been taken to remedy existing deficiencies. I shall follow this action personally with particular attention to training for combat missions.

In addition, however, there is need for certain changes in present laws relating to the reserves. There are five principal areas where affirmative legislation is needed to provide the basis for a strengthened reserve plan.

First, present law divides reserve personnel into categories that do not lend themselves fully to strategic requirements. I recommend that this be altered so as to provide one group of reservists who can be organized into a force maintained in a high degree of readiness to meet immediate mobilization requirements, and a second non-organized group with prior service who would be called into military service by a selective process, if the need for their services should develop in a general mobilization.

The first group should be kept ready through training, through the constant flow of new men into the group, and through the screening from the group of combat veterans and persons of essential civilian skills in excess of military requirements whenever possible. This makes provision for meeting the essential manpower needs of defense supporting activities as well as those of the Armed Forces. Both these needs must be met if we are to realize our maximum national strength in time of emergency.

Second, present legislation does not make adequate provision for bringing young men directly into the reserve forces without either adversely affecting the readiness of the active forces or reducing the capability of the active forces to recruit long-term volunteers.

At present, the reserves are composed of older men who have completed their terms of active service. For example, less than 17 percent of the men now in the Army Reserves are under 24 years of age. I recommend that legislation be adopted by which physically fit young men between the ages of 17 and 19 may volunteer for six months' basic training, to be followed by active reserve participation for a period of nine and one-half years.

During the six-month period of training, these young men would receive pay at the reduced rate of $30 a month. The total numbers accepted in the basic-type training should be subject to quotas, fixed by the President, to avoid bringing the manpower pool down to an undesirably low level; on the other hand, if an adequate number do not volunteer for this program, authority should be given to induct the needed young men through the Selective Service System. Men so selected would be between the ages of 18½ and 19.

The six-months training program should be authorized for a term of four years, covering the same period as the requested extension of the draft. In connection with this program, the National Security Training Commission should serve in an advisory capacity to the Secretary of Defense and to the President as Commander-in-Chief.

Third, under present legislation, there is no assurance that the National Guard, which by law is in the first line of defense and dependent on voluntary enlistments, receives an adequate supply of young men with appropriate basic training. Young men who enlist in the National Guard receive no concentrated initial training of the type provided by the active services. I recommend that legislation be enacted by which the men enlisting in the National Guard receive basic training in the active services. There must be further assurance that the National Guard contain a hard core of men who have been schooled in leadership and technical military skills through longer periods of active training and service.

Primary emphasis on voluntary recruitment of personnel for the National Guard should continue. However, subject to constitutional limitations, the legislation should provide that in the event of failure to recruit the necessary numbers and quality of volunteer personnel, and at the request or approval of the Governor of a State, personnel completing training or service in the Active Forces may be assigned to the National Guard for their obligated period of reserve participation.

Fourth, I recommend that legislation be adopted to induce participation in reserve training by providing that men who have served less than two years may be recalled to active duty in order to maintain or restore proficiencies.

It is also contemplated that reservists who fail or refuse to participate in the reserve training that may be required of them and choose not to restore lost proficiencies, will be given other than an honorable discharge at the end of their period of military obligation. Such action, which will be taken in accordance with existing statutory authority and procedures, is based upon the concept that honorable military service includes complete fulfillment of all service obligations, reserve as well as active. I ask that the Congress reaffirm this concept which is already contained in the law.

Fifth, existing law does not permit states to maintain troops in addition to the National Guard. In view of the fact that the potential enemy possesses weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery, it is a matter of urgent importance that there be no break between the time that National Guard units might be called into Federal service and the time that the states could raise additional forces to replace them. I therefore recommend that the Congress enact legislation which would permit the states to raise and maintain in time of peace organized militia forces which would take over the National Guard's domestic missions and support civil defense activities upon its withdrawal.

These five remedies are suggested as amendments to our existing legislative pattern, which is an essentially sound one. Through these amendments, certain broad objectives can be attained. To begin with, we will give each young man the maximum possible right of self-determination by offering him a choice of methods of meeting his military obligation. At the threshold of his career, he will understand his obligations, so that he can make definite plans for his future.

In addition, a more equitable sharing of the military obligations will be accomplished. The program will go far toward assuring combat veterans that they will not be called in an emergency until younger men who have not had combat duty are called, thus alleviating an inequity made apparent during the Korean conflict.

In sum, the program will constitute a substantial improvement in our present defense arrangements. It will make our determination evident to every would-be aggressor.

I believe that, under today's conditions, steps generally as outlined above represent the best available approach to the problem of military security. I earnestly urge that Congress promptly initiate its studies of the detailed measures necessary and that legislation incorporating the principles of the program be enacted.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER