Washington, February 1, 1965, 6:58 p.m.
1Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. Drafted in the White House, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by William Bundy.
1581. Exclusive for Ambassador Taylor from McGeorge Bundy. Your 23652 reviewed by President with visiting team. We recognize the hazards in striving for too much precision in the agenda and in over-organizing the visit. Thus, the following comments are suggestive and illustrative of our interests rather than hard and fast requirements.
2Telegram 2365, February 1, provided an agenda for 3 days of discussions during Bundy's visit to Saigon. (Ibid.)
In general, I am primarily interested in coming away with a sense of what kind of pressures you and your senior subordinates feel can be effectively applied to the VC and Hanoi. In this connection, I want to get your views without any constraints you may feel are imposed by existing policy or moods anywhere. For this reason, I am anxious that our discussions will be informal, uninhibited and as leisurely as we can realistically make them.
Specifically, with respect to Topic I, I wonder whether we can postpone "E" and "F" until we talk about Topic III.3 It may well be, in fact, that we will want to save a definitive discussion of our future military and political policy and posture until we have disposed of most, if not all, of the other topics.
3Topic I was "Progress of Struggle Against Viet Cong." Topic III was "Extension of War Beyond SVN." Subtopics III E and F were "Ways and Means for Initiating Phase II" and "Necessary Preliminaries for Initiating Phase II--Political, Military."
Re Topic II,4 while the subject and the sub-topics all seem worthwhile, I hope that the discussion will be focused on what to me seems a basic question: Do we in fact need a stable government in order to proceed aggressively and effectively with pacification? Or to put it another way, how can we step up our pacification effort on the assumption that there will not be a stable government?
4"Stability of Government."
Re Topic III, I would like to pose for inclusion here the pre-emptive positioning of US and SEATO-member forces along the DMZ or elsewhere as appropriate as part of a Phase II action. (The Australians have expressed keen interest in this and we would like to get your views.) I am especially interested in your views re "III-F Political" and hope that we will leave ample time to discuss this.
As far as Topic IV5 is concerned, I wonder whether it is necessary to discuss this as a separate item. If a Khanh-controlled government has some staying power and is reasonably effective, I think we're probably stuck with it. If it does not, we run into some of the nasties in your Topic VIII6 and can face up to the problems at that point.
5"Other Possible Courses of Action."
6"Contingency Planning Against Unpleasant Political or Military Developments."
The President has expressed particular interest in Topic V (Evacuation) and in your 23697 on this subject. The President will come to a definite decision on this question upon our return.
7Document 54.
Re Topic VI,8 I think that one or two of my colleagues can deal with many of the aspects and problems of third country aid prior to our discussion and consequently we probably will be able to dispose of the subject in very short order. In essence, I want to acquire a feel as to whether, all things considered, the overall benefits are worth the local costs, and whether and how much we should continue to solicit more help.
8"Third Country Programs."
Re Topic VIII, two nitpicks: I wonder if we should put much effort in "D";9 rather, I think we should give a bit of thought to the contingency of a fast deterioration involving a US withdrawal and/or a GVN-DRV negotiated settlement.
9"Shape of U.S. Negotiating Position." Subtopic VIII-D was "A Major Communist Initiative for a New Geneva Conference and 'Negotiated Solution'."
Aside from the specific points for discussion, a few other matters are worth noting:
(1) Included in our party will be General Goodpaster who is coming at the express wish of the President to ensure full military liaison on forward planning for any wider action.
(2) I am a bit worried about the three "receptions." Can we eliminate the one for the Diplomatic Corps? I do want to meet the GVN politicos and generals, however.
(3) I plan to take your advice and stay one extra day for the purpose of getting out into the country. I assume that Sunday10 will be the best day for this.
10February 7.
(4) I will make a bland arrival statement and have a press backgrounder on departure. (We will prepare and forward arrival statement here based on your suggestions.)11 Beyond this, we plan to keep our press contacts at minimum Zorthian permits. Announcement of the visit will be made by WH this afternoon.12
11The text of the arrival statement has not been found.
12A transcript of the White House News Conference at 4:30 p.m. on February 1, during which Press Secretary George Reedy announced the composition of the Bundy mission and stated that it planned to depart the following day, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. II.
(5) Please discourage GVN from arranging "spontaneous" arrival and departure demonstrations.
(6) We have postponed De Soto operation until after Tet. It is now scheduled for 7 February.
(7) I have not worked out a definite order of march for my colleagues. We will have a better idea upon our arrival, but in any case will play it fairly loose. We may find it worthwhile for some of my group to have separate discussions with other members of the Mission.13
13In telegram 2376 from Saigon, February 2, Taylor informed McGeorge Bundy that the agenda was being revised in light of his comments and that the diplomatic reception was being eliminated from the schedule. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
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