Saigon, December 25, 1964--9p.m.
1Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Ivory. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 9:27 a.m.
1941. CINCPAC for POLAD. The bombing of the Brink BOQ offers us opportunity to initiate reprisal bombing if we so desire. It was major terrorist attack directed squarely at US personnel and fact that there were only two fatalities among some 66 casualties was providential.
If we retaliate by bombing attack on an appropriate target in DRV, probably barracks, there are clear gains to be anticipated. Hanoi will get word that, despite our present tribulations, there is still bite in tiger they call paper, and US stock in this part of world will take sharp rise. Some of our local squabbles will probably disappear in enthusiasm which our action would generate.
Other side of argument is, first, present absence of clear proof that bombing is work of VC. A common sense view would seem to be that it is regarded as VC act unless contrary evidence is forthcoming. An investigation is in progress and we should know outcome in another 24 hours. We are closely watching Liberation Radio and Radio Hanoi to see whether they give us any help by claiming credit for VC.
Another question arises as to the timeliness of initiating reprisals in view of our sorry relations with RVNAF. I would get around this point by excluding Vietnamese from participation and by using SEA based US aircraft for strike. We can tell our military opposite numbers that it is kind of operation we would have liked to conduct jointly but could not in present state of our relations.
I am withholding recommendation to execute reprisal attack pending outcome of investigation of source of Brink bombing. This cable is sent in hope of conditioning addressees for favorable action on such recommendation if made.2
2On December 26, Admiral Sharp sent a similar telegram to the JCS, but concluded with the specific recommendation that the Vit Thu Lu barracks in North Vietnam be attacked as soon as possible. The attack, he said, should also be accompanied by a statement relating it to the Brink Hotel bombing. (Telegram 262150Z; Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXV, Cables)
Taylor
